Making Up Reasons: constructivism, functionalism, and reasons

Abstract

This dissertation expounds and defends a theory of what it is for some fact to be a reason. The goal of the dissertation is to combine the role of reasons in justifying behavior with the role of reasons in motivating behavior, to give a more robust, practically viable account of reasons that can be applied across a range of domains and disciplines. In advancing this view, the dissertation advances the unorthodox philosophical view that in order for some fact to be a reason, that fact must both justify and motivate the agent acting in the relevant way. The analysis of being a reason advanced in this dissertation is formulated as follows: Some fact R is a pro tanto reason for an agent S to do an act of type φ in a circumstance C iff (1) R is evidence that S ought to φ and (2) R entails S φ-ing in C promotes or protects something of value. Condition (1) and (2) correspond to the justifying and motivating roles of reasons, respectively. In defending this analysis, the dissertation takes a functionalist approach to considering the roles. On a functionalist approach, some fact is a reason if and only that fact functions as a motivation and justification for action. The methodology of this dissertation includes assessing whether the analysis I have proposed above and various competing analyses are correct in their assessment of whether some fact is a reason in a range of cases. This approach to assessing the extension of the concept of being a reason helps to refine and clarify the analyses; it establishes where the differences in case judgments lie between analyses of reasons. The dissertation then argues that the analysis expounded and defended in this dissertation is especially well-positioned to account for the way that reasons are used in personal deliberation and social interaction. As reasons are used to predict, anticipate, explain, and influence the behavior of other agents, an analysis of reasons should improve our understanding of these practical uses.