The Locus of Responsibility in International Relations: A Theory of State Responsibility

Abstract

The practice of assigning responsibilities to states is central to international affairs but underexplored. States are blamed for wars, called on to apologize, held liable for debts and reparations, tasked with protecting human rights, and bound by treaties. What, if anything, justifies assigning certain responsibilities to states rather than to human beings? This thesis argues that, although there is a rational justification for assigning responsibilities to states, the practice of state responsibility outstrips this justification. The justification for state responsibility follows from the concept or internal logic of responsibility. States have the three faculties that make entities candidates for assignments of responsibility: (1) the ability to take ownership of actions, (2) persistence over time, and (3) the ability to fulfill responsibilities. However, the practice of state responsibility in international relations and international law depends on three ‘fictions’ or assumptions that are not susceptible to rational justification.