The Criminal Brain: Neurointerventions and Mental Freedom

Abstract

This dissertation addresses the ethics of non-consensual neurointerventions for criminal offenders by considering ‘punishment equivalence arguments.’ They suggest if proven safe and effective, neurointerventions could serve as ethically viable alternatives to traditional punitive measures like imprisonment. I examine the four premises of these arguments: (1) the state’s legitimate authority to punish, (2) the assumed safety and efficacy of neurointerventions, (3) the similar effects of direct and indirect interventions into the brain, and (4) that based on specific ethical paradigms, neurointerventions are equivalent to standard punitive measures. Practically, I highlight challenges posed by the current crisis in our penal systems and the nascent state of our understanding of neuroscience. Theoretically, I argue unique properties of neurointerventions pose distinct threats to mental freedom. The project supports a negative claim: punishment equivalence arguments fail to offer meaningful guidance in a broad range of foreseeable cases or mitigate deep-seated ethical reservations. However, it also suggests a positive claim: there are compelling moral and prudential reasons for extreme caution before rushing to implement a comprehensive project for neurointerventions in criminal justice practices. There is a pressing need for further ethical theorizing, including the possibility of recognizing rights over the brain and mind.