The Role of intelligence at the Battle of Imphal-Kohima, March - July 1944

Abstract

On 7 March 1944, the Japanese Fifteenth Army launched the U-GO offensive into India in order to provide a more secure defensive perimeter for the Japanese empire. By 8 July, Fifteenth Army had suffered a very serious defeat at the hands of the British Fourteenth Army at Imphal - Kohima. The role of British intelligence in this battle has never been thoroughly examined before. This study found that conventional intelligence as well as signals intelligence, particularly Ultra, provided the British Fourteenth Army with much important intelligence, before, during and after the battle, and this contributed significantly to the defeat of the Japanese Fifteenth Army. Unlike the Allied campaigns elsewhere, however, Ultra was not a major component of the intelligence picture. Instead, the efficiency of conventional intelligence sources, as well as technical and organisational problems with Ultra in the theatre, prevented the latter from assuming the same significant status as in Europe.