Action, Knowledge Norms, and Moral Reasons

Abstract

What is the relationship between knowledge and action? Many philosophers in recent years have proposed a very intimate connection between these two concepts. John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley­—among others—have proposed that knowledge is both a necessary and sufficient condition for rational deliberate action, citing only that an agent must use reasons that are both known and relevant in their decision making. They also argue that an agent is blameworthy and deserving of criticism for failing to adhere to this knowledge norm of action. This thesis examines Hawthorne and Stanley’s norm, pulling apart concepts such as ‘relevance’ and ‘reasons’ to try and better understand what this knowledge norm of action entails. Ultimately this thesis proposes that Hawthorne and Stanley’s principles (and those like it) fail to adequately capture the scope of what a general norm of action should, and proposes tentative suggestions for what features a knowledge norm of action should have.