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OF BABEL

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
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
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SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
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(PLANNING)


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ABSTRACT

The Plight of Development: A Twentieth Century Tower of Babel

Andrea Czarnecki
September 9, 1996
Supervisor: S.M. Stein

Prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the MEDES
Degree in the Faculty of Environmental Design,
The University of Calgary

The purpose of this MDP will be to explore critically the underlying theoretical assumptions of conventional development planning in light of the pervasive sense of crisis in development theory and the frequent calls for 'alternatives'. In section one, an overview of development theory as it has emerged over the last five decades is provided. Specifically, accounts of modernization, dependency, and world system perspectives will be given. In section two, it is suggested that while these accounts have contributed to a re-thinking of development theory, their shared implicit appeal to scientism has severely limited their critical potential, particularly with respect to the normative nature of development. In other words, it is argued that these perspectives have all ultimately cast development against an ideological backdrop - namely, scientism - which effectively excludes the rational dialogue of values and ends from decision making processes and, in turn, distorts the goals of development. This is followed by some practical considerations regarding participatory approaches to development planning.

KEYWORDS: modernization, dependency, world system, scientism, critical theory, development theory

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I would especially like to thank my 'editor-in-chief', Mac Hickley, and my parents, Judy Wong and Hans Czarnecki, for their unwavering faith and support.

We should be on our guard not to overestimate science and scientific methods when it is a question of human problems; and we should not assume that experts are the only ones who have a right to express themselves on questions affecting the organization of society.

- Albert Einstein

For millions of years mankind [sic] lived just like the animals. Then something happened which unleashed the power of our imagination. We learned to talk.

All we need to do is make sure we keep talking.

- Stephen W. Hawking

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Appendix A

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Appendix C

THE PLIGHT OF DEVELOPMENT: A TWENTIETH CENTURY TOWER OF BABEL

SECTION ONE

1. Introduction

As an inquiry concerning the underlying theoretical assumptions of conventional development planning, this MDP explores the development problematique at an abstract level. Consequently, the practices and policies associated with conventional development planning will not be discussed in any great detail (save for a brief commentary in chapter three). Suffice it to say, however, that the links between theory and practice are closely interwoven. Consider, for example, the basic elements crucial to the practice of conventional development planning. Since its inception in the late 1940s, conventional development planning has maintained a focus on *rapid economic growth* in efforts to accelerate 'progress' in 'developing' countries. Development planning, as such, is a project deeply embedded in *economic* analyses and policy-making. It is an applied social science that has been fundamentally concerned with *quantifying goals* (e.g., setting a GNP growth target) and determining (via planning models¹) the most *efficient means* of achieving them. It concerns, first and foremost, *empirical* investigation and *control*². Such dominance of economics in conventional development planning reflects the dominance of scientism in development theory: economics is

¹ As Chowdhury and Kirkpatrick point out (1994:5), "[planning] models are simplified pictures of reality...[which] specify the relationships between the goals of a society and the instruments that are available to achieve them". Quantification of these relationships allows planners to determine the efficiency of possible policies and/or projects.

² The element of 'control' is brought out in Todaro's definition of development planning as "the conscious effort of a central organization to influence, direct, and, in some cases, even control changes in the principal economic variables (e.g., GDP, consumption, investment, saving, etc.) of a certain country and region over the course of time in accordance with a predetermined set of objectives" (1971:1) as quoted by Chowdhury and Kirkpatrick (1994:2).

concerned with the descriptive, not the normative - so too is scientism; economics is concerned with means, not ends - so too is scientism. A critique of scientism thus has implications at the practical level of economic policy and development practice.

2. Classical Modernization Theory: Circa 1945 - 1965

The birth of the 'development' project in the late 1940s reflected an era dominated both politically and economically by the West - particularly the United States. The end of World War II was, in effect, the beginning of a Western campaign to industrialize and modernize the 'economically backward' areas of the world collectively referred to as the Third World or the South (the U.N. currently uses 'less developed countries', or LDCs, in reference to these areas). As exemplified by President Truman's statement that Americans "must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement of and growth of *underdeveloped* areas³" (emphasis added), the project of development assumed not only a unilinear path of progress, but that the West (namely, America) was furthest ahead on that path. Typically cast in terms of moving from tradition to modernity, the 'path of progress' thus marked both the territory and the goal of development: respectively, the Third World and modernity⁴.

During its infancy, development (as modernism) enjoyed broad theoretical consensus in the West. The formula 'progress = modernity = good' sat well in an academic community already familiar with its fundamental premises, namely, evolutionism and functionalism⁵.

³ Truman as quoted by Esteva (1992:6)

⁴ It should be noted that such American efforts must be considered in light of the period of cold-war tension which characterized the day. Taken in this light, it is evident that 'development' served U.S. strategic political interests in securing U.S. influence over third world countries.

⁵ Some social change theorists argue for the importance of distinguishing 'evolution' from 'development' (e.g., Pieterse, 1991). However, key figures in evolutionist and functionalist traditions (e.g., Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, and Parsons) are typically associated with providing the framework for modernization theory via their accounts of social change and the roles of institutions, individuals, and technology

Borrowing from Alvin So's lucid review of evolutionist and functionalist assumptions in modernization theory, the following traits can be discerned⁶:

- (1) Modernization is a process that is presumed to be phased, homogenizing, Americanizing (or Europeanizing), irreversible, progressive, and lengthy.
- (2) Modernization is a process that is presumed to be systemic, transformative, and immanent.

Let us begin with a discussion of the evolutionist assumptions listed in (1).

The notion that modernization is a *phased* process refers to a division made between stages each society passes through. W. Rostow, a dominant economist in early modernization studies, identifies five such stages: traditional/primitive, pre-take-off, take-off, the road to maturity, and the modern/mass consumption society⁷. Rostow's stage theory assumes that each society can be compared and measured in terms of how 'developed' it is according to which of these stages it occupies in a given time. Movement from the traditional stage, through the intermediate stages, towards the modern stage, implies a movement from simple to complex - in other words, from undeveloped to developed⁸. This notion of change (i.e., that change is directional) has been applied by many social theorists, though in reference to differing 'entities' of development. For example, Comte's Law of Three Stages refers to human knowledge, which "could be seen as having passed from the religious to the metaphysical to the positive

in contributing to the stability and growth of society (see The Dictionary of Sociology, pp.92-93, 101).

⁶ So, A. (1990:33-35). Note that this list is not intended as exhaustive. In the literature there are various terms associated with 'modernism'. Critical interpretations, such as that of J. Pieterse's article "Dilemmas of Development Discourse", describe modernism as universalist, ahistorical, teleological, and ethnocentric. Such terms, however, are essentially co-terminous with A. So's list.

⁷ In "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth", 1964. Note that the evolutionary assumptions Rostow incorporated can be traced back to C. H. Saint-Simon and A. Comte. See *The Dictionary of Sociology* (1984) for brief discussions of these thinkers.

⁸ The distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies is elaborated on by Talcott Parsons' pattern variables.

(or scientific),...For Hegel the entity was freedom; for Marx, the means of economic production through the ages"⁹. Rostow's stage theory, however, is cast in primarily economic and technological terms. Thus, the first stage is characterized by lack of technology (and, accordingly, lack of economic development), the intermediate stages by a process of industrialization, and the final stages by self-sustaining growth.¹⁰

The second and third evolutionist assumptions (i.e., *homogenization* and *Americanization*) are closely linked. Homogenization - or the process of becoming similar - is applied within modernization theory to support the idea that "the more highly modernized societies become, the more they resemble one another" (Levy, as quoted by So, A., 1990:30). Accordingly, while so-called 'primitive' or first stage societies may initially differ enormously in their relative 'backwardness', they will nevertheless become increasingly similar with each passing stage. Moreover, such similarity will be of a strictly Western character. As assumed by the process of Americanization, the path of 'modernization' is paved by Western economic, political, and social influences. Replication of the Western model thus constitutes the very essence of development.¹¹

The fourth evolutionist assumption - that modernization is an *irreversible* process - asserts the "unchangeability" of modernization. That is, "although the rate of change may vary from one country to another, the direction of change will not" (So, A., 1990:34). For example, once modern technologies are introduced in developing countries it is impossible for those countries to 'go back' to their traditional means or methods. Modern, mass production farm machinery (introduced as a replacement of traditional 'ox and plow' farming methods) irreversibly changes a country's productive capacities and land use: commercial production replaces subsistence agriculture. A 'new' economic order (based on maximization of profits

⁹ R. Nisbet, (1969:167-168). See Chapter 5 for a discussion of these positions.

¹⁰The emphasis on categorizing societies according to phases is indicative of modernization theory's focus on the nation as its unit of analysis.

¹¹ See Paul Harrison (1993: 47-60) for a good discussion of the impacts of 'Westernization'.

and capital accumulation) replaces an 'old' economic order, in turn promoting new social and political orders. The roles and responsibilities of, for example, families and governments are redefined: formerly self-sufficient families must now find supplementary means of income; and, in turn, governments must focus on counteracting the effects of unstable world markets on their export-led economies.

Identifying modernization with the concept of *progress* (defined as "advance or improvement"¹²) serves to validate development as both good and desirable. Accordingly, third world 'misfortunes' such as the poverty incurred by the loss of subsistence agriculture do not discredit the process of modernization but merely indicate that the inevitable path to modernity may be rocky at times. Indeed, such 'growing pains' suggest that the automatic process of modernization is somehow being obstructed. Obstructed, according to early modernization theory, by tradition itself. (Later, 'obstacles' to development were elaborated on and, indeed, sparked a whole movement of underdevelopment theories.) Poverty, therefore, is not a result of modernization, but rather an indication of the 'backwardness' of a society in its initial stage of development. In other words, the more 'backward' a country is, the more 'rocky' its transition will be. Such rationalization, in effect, illuminates the very normative basis of development: because certain conditions (namely, traditions) obstruct a society's progress, those conditions *ought* to be changed. Modernization theory was, accordingly, fundamentally concerned with explaining development through internal factors/conditions (e.g., social values and institutions).¹³

The assumption that modernization is a *lengthy* process (based on the maxim 'evolution not revolution') ensures an undemanding time-frame for modernization processes, the benefits of which may not be noticed for "generations or even centuries" (So, A., 1990:34).

¹² Oxford (1994:638).

¹³ G. Papenek reviews some of these 'internal' conditions (e.g., the inability of the 'poor majority' in less developed countries to save) in his essay "Economic Development Theory: The Earnest Search for a Mirage" (1977), in Todaro, 1983:17-26).

Ultimately, it is only a matter of time before the entire world becomes 'developed' (few questioned during this period, however, what a 'fully developed' world would actually look like).

Let us now review the functionalist assumptions listed in (2) above, namely, that modernization is systemic, transformative, and immanent.¹⁴ The *systemic* aspect of modernization essentially relates to the issue of scope, the idea being that the constituent parts of 'modernity', such as institutions and activities, are actually "a set of connected things that form a whole or work together"¹⁵. The process of modernization is thus all-encompassing. For example, as Randall and Theobald explain:

...during a society's transition from domestic to factory production the division of labour increases and economic activities previously based on the family move to the firm. As a formal education system emerges, training functions previously performed by the family and church are now catered for by a specialised unit, the school. Turning to the political sphere, in a typical pre-modern society political roles are closely bound up with, if not inseparable from, kinship roles....However, as a society becomes increasingly more complex more specialised structures emerge: bureaucracies, eventually parties, assemblies and the like.¹⁶

This example illustrates the effects of modernization processes (in this case, 'differentiation'¹⁷) across a broad range of economic, social, political, and educational institutions and activities. Allegedly, these institutions or 'subsystems' form a consistent whole, performing specific functions yet working together to promote stability and growth.

¹⁴ In the nineteenth-century, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was instrumental in providing the early elements of functionalist theory (particularly with respect to his ideas on the division of labour). Later, functionalism - particularly as it relates to modernization theory - was influenced primarily by the work of Talcott Parsons (1902-1979).

¹⁵ Oxford, (1994:814).

¹⁶ Randall and Theobald (1985:15-16).

¹⁷ Differentiation is a process whereby a set of activities formerly performed by one institution become the prerogative of other institutions. In the example given by Randall and Theobald, education - once the prerogative of the family - is replaced by the (more specialized) school.

A society must change more than its institutions and activities, however, in order to achieve modernity. Indeed, a complete change in values is required - hence the notion that modernization is a *transformative* process.¹⁸ In this process, modern values (e.g., the Protestant ethic, economic achievement, technological progress, and scientism, etc.) replace traditional or 'unmodern' values. The traits of such 'unmodern' values are characterized simply as those values that are not modern. As J. Pieterse writes, "intrinsic to the tradition-modern dichotomy is the idea that 'tradition' is a residual and diffuse concept, denoting everything 'unmodern' so that the two are not symmetrical, not of equivalent conceptual status."¹⁹ This, in effect, conveniently minimizes tradition such that it "has a small role to play and has to be replaced (or completely transformed) in the process of modernization".²⁰

This imperative relates to the assumption that modernization is an *immanent* process: i.e., the changes associated with modernism are inherent to societies and their institutions. In other words, they exist within societies or institutions "as a natural or permanent characteristic or quality"²¹. The roots of this assumption run deep within nineteenth-century perspectives of social change. As R. Nisbet points out:

...in any structure or entity there is a pattern of growth in time that springs from its inner composition. The prime task of nineteenth-century development [social change] theory was...to ascertain the course or direction of change in whatever entity or system was under consideration, but more was required here than merely describing what appeared to be the curve of development in the past. For unless such development could be shown to arise from the very nature of the society or institution under consideration, how could such development be declared a

¹⁸ Though the discussion here refers primarily to the transformation of values required in the modernization process, it should be noted that the term "transformative" is all-encompassing (i.e., it can be used to refer to both structural and value changes).

¹⁹ J. Pieterse, (1991:10)

²⁰ A, So (1990:35).

²¹ Oxford (1994:411) "inherent".

fixed law - as Comte, Marx, and Spencer, among others, so declared it?²²

Thus construed, immanent change constitutes the unfolding of a society's pre-existing potentials. In the context of modernization theory, this implies that 'modernity' is a pre-existing potential embedded in all societies. Barring certain obstacles which decelerate the realization of this potential (e.g., 'traditions'), development - or modernization - will in time manifest itself.

The question is, however, if change (modernization) is immanent why is there a 'project of development' (i.e., why are there deliberate efforts to develop Third World countries)? In reply to this, modernists may simply state that the development project is intended to give undeveloped societies a 'push' which accelerates the process of modernization. Introducing technology, for example, is intended to act as a stimulus for the advancement from primitive to industrial stages. As well, increasing a country's savings and investment rate through financial aid may promote a society's movement from industrialism to mass-consumption. The 'project of development', then, is justified as a project to stimulate or accelerate the otherwise immanent process of modernization.

3. The Modernization Experience: Rapid Economic Growth Policy

Adherents of early modernization theory, while diverse in their opinions, generally accepted its basic descriptive and normative assumptions as outlined above.²³ In practice, these assumptions supported a general espousal of Keynesian-based economic growth policies, which were believed to be the key elements in accelerating the process of modernization in so-called developing nations²⁴. Certainly Rostow's stage theory, which assumes economic growth as a stimulus for social and political growth, contributed greatly towards

²² R. Nisbet, (1969:171)

²³ See Harrison, D. (1988:41-61) for a brief summary of differing strains of modernization theory.

²⁴ See Hettne, (1990:48-50); Leeson and Minogue, (1988:4); and Todaro, (1989:253)

this emphasis. Historically speaking, however, influence was also drawn from the economic planning experiences of WWII - experiences which contributed to the institutionalization of development.²⁵ Revealing that the rate and direction of growth could in fact be influenced by state action rather than market forces alone,²⁶ these experiences contributed to the melding of economic planning and development. The era of *development planning* had begun.

In the Soviet Union, of course, economic planning in the form of five-year plans had already existed for fifteen years; though it was not until after the war that such countries as China, Cuba, and those of Eastern Europe drew from the Soviet model in their efforts to develop.²⁷ These countries, wherein state economic control was already exercised, were particularly suited towards the Soviet model, which itself heralded state responsibility in economic planning. In contrast, U.S. influence ranged over those countries with mixed economy formats (i.e., economies comprised of both public and private sectors) including, for example, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and Pakistan. Despite such differences, however, both the Soviet and Western models of development share fundamental tenets of modernism. Both, for example, utilize the concept of stages to describe the process of development - though they offer differing pictures of where that process ultimately leads.²⁸ Also, both emphasize the necessity of industrialization and, hence, economic growth in promoting development in all aspects of society. To the extent that both Soviet and U.S models are similar - particularly with respect to their shared emphasis on economic growth - the following discussion

²⁵ The first major success of 'development planning' was undoubtedly the Marshall Plan, which was set up to rebuild Europe and Japan. This initiative subsequently provided the model for a new world system, which included the Bretton Woods agreements (made in the U.S. in July 1944). The four major institutions arising from these agreements are: IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) - the "World Bank"; the IMF (International Monetary Fund); UN (United Nations); and GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). See Allen and Thomas, eds., (1992:259).

²⁶ See Conyers and Hills, (1984:44).

²⁷ Conyers and Hills, (1984:44).

²⁸ Whereas the Western model is characterized by Rostow's five stages (as described earlier), the Soviet (i.e., Marxist) model is characterized by the following five stages: primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism.

can be said to apply to both. Given the fact that modernization theory is explicitly a 'Western' theory, however, the discussion is intended to reflect a Western, capitalist perspective.

As stated above, economic growth was considered a catalyst in accelerating the process of modernization in so-called developing nations. Todaro explains:

The thinking of the 1950s and early 1960s focused mainly on the concept of stages of economic growth in which the process of development was viewed as a series of successive stages through which all countries must pass. It was primarily an economic theory of development in which the right quantity and mixture of saving, investment, and foreign aid were all that was necessary to enable Third World nations to proceed along an economic growth path that historically had been followed by the more developed countries. Development thus became synonymous with rapid, aggregate economic growth.²⁹

Certainly, promises of economic growth served as the proverbial 'carrot' insofar as colonial territories were concerned. Striving towards independence, these territories were generally receptive to prospects of accelerating this process. Indeed, Third World elites - standing to profit from 'development' - were especially receptive.³⁰ The question was: Could rapid aggregate economic growth deliver on its promises of improved human welfare and increased standards of living?

As many development practitioners and theorists now suggest,³¹ such growth has not delivered on its promises: the gap between (and within) many 'developed' and 'developing' nations has actually widened. Ironically, while many explanations of this failure have been suggested, (such as the notion of the "vicious circle of poverty"³²), it

²⁹ Todaro, (1989:63).

³⁰ Hettne, (1990:152).

³¹ See e.g., Jones, 1990; Mowlana and Wilson, 1990; Sen and Grown, 1987; Timberlake, 1987, *The Economist*, Nov. 5, 1994.

³² The "vicious circle of poverty" thesis rests on the fact that the geographic location of "developing" countries has forced unique pressures upon them. As Paul Harrison points out, "Droughts, floods, cyclones, and earthquakes are the major destroyers [in Third World countries]" (1993:29). The African droughts (and famines) of 1984-85 affected some 30 million people on the continent; the droughts of India in 1985-86 affected approximately 100 million people (Timberlake, 1987:20). In such cases, lack

seems that the pursuit of rapid, aggregate economic growth itself may have been at the root of the problem. Indeed, it led to the stronghold of GNP (gross national product) within economic growth models³³ and, hence, within development itself: increased GNP became *the* goal to be met. As well, it embodied the false assumption that economic growth would inevitably 'trickle down' to all segments of society. The combined effects of these two factors were significant in the demise of early modernist thinking. Let us turn, then, to a brief discussion of each.

The use of GNP³⁴ as the pre-eminent measure of development arose from the difficulties inherent in pursuing rapid, *aggregate* economic growth. Difficulties arose from the demand to quantify research findings of censuses, surveys, and cost-benefit analyses such that they were easy to understand and utilize in the appraisal and selection of development projects/policies. This demand, however, generally entailed the measurement of one variable over all others - namely, the national income variable GNP (Beck, 1994:6). In effect, the drive to 'measure what could be measured' (namely, GNP) defined the goal of development. Accordingly, development was cast in terms of the growth rate of national income, whereby "the more an economy is able to save - and invest - out of a given GNP, the greater will be the growth of that GNP" (Todaro, 1989:66). Foreign-aid packages and development projects thus focused entirely on capital formation.

of firewood (due to drought) often forces people to clear land of its wood and shrubs - unfortunately, the soil that remains is left without means of soaking up rainfall, causing water to run off the soil before it can be used by people and their crops. The impending food shortage serves only to exacerbate both drought conditions and poverty. Countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and India thus find themselves in a vicious cycle of poverty, misuse of land or other resources, and in turn, greater poverty and greater vulnerability to future disasters.

³³ The Harrod-Domar model (a classic growth-model) is often cited as predominant in early development economics (see, e.g., Kothari, 1989:122). There are, however, numerous names associated with economic debates (and, thus, competing models) at the time. These include: Rosenstein-Roden and Nurske, Hirschman, Leibenstein, Myrdal, Myint, Bauer and Yamey, and Lewis and Rostow. See Hunt, (1989:53-64) for a review of these contributors.

³⁴ GNP is defined as a measurement "of the total domestic and foreign output claimed by residents of a country in one year" (Todaro, 1989:628). Their 'claim' is their income. GDP (gross domestic product), a related concept, "measures the total final outputs of goods and services produced by the country's economy" (Todaro, 1989:628). GDP is thus a measurement of the size of a country's economy while GNP measures total income available.

Moreover, given the relatively low level of capital formation in developing countries (presumably due to 'backward' conditions), financial aid and technological assistance were deemed both valid and necessary in raising developing countries' investment rates (Todaro, 1989:67). In effect, subsistence agriculture was replaced by commercial production agriculture, cottage-industries by mass-production factories, and indigenous knowledge by modern technologies and science.³⁵

Building upon the functionalist assumption that modernization is systemic, the benefits of such economic growth were believed to trickle down to all segments of the society. Presumably, growth in the GNP would inevitably have positive effects on, for example, living conditions, health, education, employment, and real income levels.³⁶ As it turned out, early development policies did indeed increase growth rates of GNP. As Morawetz points out, "GNP per capita of the developing countries grew at an average rate of 3.4% per annum during 1950-1970...This was faster than either the developed or developing nations had grown in any comparable period prior to 1950, and exceeded both official goals and private expectations"³⁷. There are, however, varying interpretations of the 'successes' of modernization (i.e., economic growth) in developing countries. For example, Wilber and Jameson (1975:10) suggest that the benefits of increased growth rates of GNP did not trickle down - indeed, that unemployment, poverty, and inequality all increased. Bill Warren, however, counters that:

...in the Third World the postwar period has witnessed substantial, accelerating and historically unprecedented improvements of productive capacity and of the material welfare of the mass of the population ... the widespread belief that the rapid Third World economic progress of the postwar period has been generally associated with growing aggregate inequality is

³⁵ To be sure, it must be acknowledged (as pointed out by Leeson and Minogue, 1988:24) that "the subsistence sector had already been affected by colonialism and that it did not have the untouched primeval characteristics attributed to it by the modernization school".

³⁶ 'Real income' is simply income as it relates to purchasing power: it is "money income adjusted by some price index" (Todaro, 1989:644).

³⁷ Morawetz as quoted in Wilber and Jameson, (1975) in *Political Economy* (1984:10).

not borne out by either the (extremely scanty and unreliable) time series data or by the more plentiful cross-section data.³⁸

To be sure, changes such as marketization and urbanization make it virtually impossible to make simple 'before and after' comparisons; the effects of such processes are notoriously difficult to measure³⁹. Nevertheless, increased persistence of a widening gap between rich and poor, developed and undeveloped, has provoked increased criticism of modernist assumptions. It is to this issue that we shall now turn.

4. The Dependency Perspective

As Rajni Kothari writes (1989:123), "by the late sixties and early seventies the initial certainties and optimism of developmental theory began to fade in the light of experience. The growing evidence of marginalization and mass unemployment revealed that economic growth by itself was profoundly inadequate". Consequently, orthodox modernization theory fell out of favour and a 're-thinking' of development began.⁴⁰ At the forefront of development discussions was the dependency perspective - a perspective which cast problems such as unemployment and inequality not in terms of 'tradition' (as modernism had) but, rather, 'underdevelopment'. As such, a different set of questions and issues came into focus: What structures fostered underdevelopment, and why had some nations 'progressed' more than others? It was in light of these questions that the dependency perspective sought to expose capitalist economic structures as perpetuating relationships of dependency between centre and periphery countries. Capitalist development, it was argued, breeds

³⁸ Warren, (1979) in *Political Economy* (1984:110-113).

³⁹ The process of urbanization is itself extremely complex, requiring analysis of such elements as ripple effects, changes in demand, and backward and forward linkages (to name but a few).

⁴⁰ It is important to note that dependency theory did not arise, strictly speaking, in response to the 'crisis' of modernism. Indeed, dependency theorists (such as Baran and Frank) were writing during the same period as modernist authors (such as Parsons and Rostow).

dependency - and dependency is, quite simply, harmful to the periphery's overall development.

The intellectual heritage of the dependency perspective includes both neo-Marxism⁴¹ and Latin American structuralism.⁴² Given the complexity of these origins it is understandably difficult to provide a definitive account of the perspective. Assuming, however, that differences between dependency theorists are largely matters of degree rather than kind⁴³, the following section will focus on bringing to light commonly shared tenets of dependency theory. Moreover, it will relate the dependency critique to the modernist assumptions outlined above.

Hettne broadly defines the dependency perspective as follows:⁴⁴

1. The most important obstacles to development were not lack of capital or entrepreneurial skills, but were to be found in the international division of labour. In short, they were external to the underdeveloped economy, not internal.

⁴¹ The distinctions made between neo-Marxism and classical Marxism are a subject of on-going debate. Differences within neo-Marxism itself complicate the matter further. However, Aidan Foster-Carter (1974) - cited as coining the term "neo-Marxism" (Hettne, 1990:82) - suggests the following differences:

- Marxism (as interpreted by Lenin) sees imperialism in a centre perspective; neo-Marxism...sees imperialism from the periphery's point of view.
- Marxist analysis of classes is based on specifically European experiences and emphasizes the emancipatory mission of the industrial proletariat, while the neo-Marxists have a considerably more generous [i.e., optimistic] view of different groups' revolutionary potential, for instance the peasantry.

In addition to these, Marxism and neo-Marxism differ fundamentally in their conclusions. Specifically, Marxists view a bourgeois revolution as a necessary precursor to socialism whereas neo-Marxists suggest this can be "skipped".

⁴² Structuralism is essentially concerned with the underlying social and economic structures in relation to underdevelopment. Development, accordingly, requires that these structures must be changed. Latin American structuralists Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado were particularly influential throughout the 1930s-1960s. Their work is most well-known in reference to the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA - or "CEPAL" in Spanish) and the policy of import substitution.

⁴³ Orthodox and unorthodox dependency theorists, for example, differ in the degree to which they emphasize external constraints in explaining underdevelopment (orthodox theorists place more emphasis on external constraints). See Appendix A for a comparison of "old" and "new" dependency studies. Typically, the "old" (i.e., orthodox/classical) dependency studies are equated with the writings of Andre Gunder Frank and the "new" (i.e., unorthodox) dependency studies are equated with the writings of Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

⁴⁴ Note that while few dependency theorists would disagree with this generalized account, many might disagree with its concrete implications (for example, what counts as "disassociating from the world market?").

2. The international division of labour was analysed in terms of relations between regions of which two kinds - centre and periphery - assumed particular importance, since a transfer of surplus took place from the latter to the former regions.

3. Due to the fact that the periphery was deprived of its surplus, which the centre instead could utilise for development purposes, development in the centre somehow implied underdevelopment in the periphery. Thus development and underdevelopment could be described as two aspects of a single global process. All regions participating in this process were consequently considered as capitalist, although a distinction was made between central and peripheral capitalism.⁴⁵

4. Since the periphery was doomed to underdevelopment because of its linkage to the centre it was considered necessary for a country to disassociate itself from the world market, to break the chains of surplus extraction, and to strive for national self-reliance. In order to make this possible a more or less revolutionary political transformation was necessary. Politics would take command. As soon as the external obstacles had been removed, development as a more or less automatic and endogenous process was taken for granted.⁴⁶

Essentially, then, the dependency perspective claims that *underdevelopment* in the periphery (e.g., Africa, Asia, and Latin America) is the consequence of *development* in the core (e.g., Europe and North America).⁴⁷ Underdevelopment, accordingly, is not a result of persistent 'backwardness' in 'traditional' societies, but rather, is "a historical condition of blocked, distorted, and dependent development."⁴⁸ Indeed, it is a result of the same process by which 'modern' societies became 'developed': namely, capitalism. The idea is that while capitalism is a global process (i.e., both core and periphery countries are its participants), it has nevertheless resulted in the

⁴⁵ Due to the colonial heritage of periphery countries, dependency theorists hold that these countries cannot follow the same path and processes of capitalism as the "central" countries. A distinction is thus made between "peripheral" and "central" capitalism. The distinction is, however, problematic and has been a source of debate within the dependency school itself. Some issues, as Kothari (1989:26) points out, surround the nature and interactions of centre and periphery capitalism. Is the distinction one of classes or regions? And can the periphery in any way exploit the core?

⁴⁶ Hettne (1990:91)

⁴⁷ Wilber and Jameson, "Paradigms", (1975), in *Political Economy* (1984:17).

⁴⁸ Toye (1987), as quoted by Hewitt, "Developing Countries" in *Poverty and Development* (1992:227).

development of one group of countries and the underdevelopment of another.

Dependency theorists explain this divergence through historical/structural analysis. Such analysis reveals that core and periphery countries have differing historical backgrounds: most periphery countries are former colonies of core countries. The economic structures established through these relationships contributed to an international division of labour which saw peripheral countries' economies systematically subordinated by core countries' economies. In other words, peripheral economies became defined by 'cheap labour', exporting of raw materials, and importing of manufactured goods. Core countries, in search of capital accumulation, took advantage of the periphery's cheap labour and resources, resulting in the core's extraction of the periphery's surplus. Hence, underdevelopment plagued the periphery while development flourished in the core.

The situation of peripheral countries is exacerbated - indeed, perpetuated - by the fact that "many of the most important decisions about development strategies - decisions about prices, investment patterns, government macroeconomic policies, etc, are made by individuals, firms, and institutions external to the [peripheral] country."⁴⁹ 'Development' is taken out of the hands of peripheral nations and placed within the hands of core nations, essentially depriving the periphery of its autonomy.

The dependency perspective's analysis of underdevelopment thus represented a critical assessment of modernization theory⁵⁰. It rejected, in particular, assumptions that 'traditions' are obstacles to development, that periphery countries necessarily develop along the same lines as core countries, and that Western social, political, and economic ideals are necessarily superior to all 'others'. Modernization theory, as such, was criticized as ahistorical, universalist, and ethnocentric. Let us briefly review these criticisms.

⁴⁹ Wilber and Jameson, "Paradigms", (1975), in *Political Economy* (1984:17-18).

⁵⁰ However, as noted by Hettne (point 4 above), dependency does not challenge the (modern) evolutionist assumption that development is a more or less automatic process (once, that is, external obstacles are removed).

Rooted within a Latin American context, the dependency perspective challenges Western development theory as masking significant historical variables and relationships within the development process. Indeed, Cardoso and Faletto (key figures in later dependency studies) write that "the present [meaning late twentieth-century] situations of dependency *cannot be understood* without an analysis, however brief, of the historical situations [in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries] that explain how Latin American nations fit into the world system of power and the periphery of the international economy"⁵¹ (Packenham's brackets and emphasis). Rostow's blanket characterization of traditional, 'unmodern' societies is, by such analysis, both ahistorical and misleading.

According to the dependency perspective, historical-structural analysis reveals "that the major industrialized countries had never had the experience of facing the structural constraints of underdevelopment which were, in fact, their creation" (Kothari, 1989:126). Peripheral nations (namely, those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia) cannot, therefore, develop along the same evolutionary path as core nations. Rather, the periphery - bound by its colonial past - is caught within self-perpetuating processes of underdevelopment and dependency⁵². Modernist formulations of 'tradition' and 'backwardness', which ignore these processes in favour of the illusions of universalism (embedded in the form of 'grand theory'), are thus criticized as misrepresenting the realities of peripheral nations' concrete situations.

It is further argued that Western insistence on the ideals of modernism (which, presumably, only 'developed' nations exhibit) imposes an ethnocentric world view which denies the periphery's right to self-determination and autonomy. The transformation of traditional societies prescribed by modernization processes necessitates Westernization - or, more specifically, Americanization. In effect, Western political, economic, and cultural ideals (e.g., capitalism) marginalize and ultimately replace all 'other' ideals.

⁵¹ Cardoso and Faletto as quoted by Packenham, (1992:67).

⁵² It is interesting to note here that Canada, the U.S., New Zealand, and Australia were all colonies at one time as well: dependency does not adequately address this.

The issue of Western ethnocentrism raises a serious question within the dependency school, namely: What actions ought to be taken to counter Western dominance? This has precipitated various practical and theoretical positions within the perspective. Earlier dependency views supported measures which decreased core linkages (e.g., the ECLA policy of import substitution) in an attempt to reassert Latin American economic independence.⁵³ Later views upheld the possibility of capitalist development. The difference between these two views (often cited as a distinction between 'old', determinist dependency and 'new' voluntarist dependency) is summarized by Hettne as follows:

The great majority of the dependency theorists did see their research as politically relevant. However, a distinction can be made between those who considered the political means constrained by the objective situation, and those who stressed the possibility of overcoming these limitations by direct political action. The latter attitude is obviously linked to the idea that Latin America (and the Third World) was doomed to underdevelopment and that political activism was the only response. Typically, this activism took the form of guerilla struggle and the model was provided by the Cuban revolution. Consequently those who admitted the possibility of some development, albeit along capitalist lines, took a middle of the road position between the official communist and the extreme voluntarist points of view.⁵⁴

Implicit in both of the above perspectives are views on the nature of dependency. The determinist perspective cast dependency as a mostly economic phenomenon whereas the voluntarist perspective viewed dependency as a primarily socio-political phenomenon⁵⁵ (So, 1990:138). While neither approach successfully dismantled modernity's dominance, its foundations were nevertheless shaken, paving the way for further critiques of modernism. Indeed, by the

⁵³ For critique of this see Packenham, (1992:46)

⁵⁴ Hettne, (1990:90).

⁵⁵ Presumably, dependency as a socio-political phenomenon is voluntarist because changes can be brought about by social/political revolution. Dependency as an economic phenomenon, however, is determinist because "both development and underdevelopment are 'inevitable' products of capitalism" (Packenham, 1992:115).

mid-1970s many of those critiques found expression in world system theory, to which we shall now turn our attention.

5. The World System Perspective

As its name implies, the world system perspective offers an analysis of development and underdevelopment that goes beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Distinct from both modernist and dependency analyses, world system analysis examines development within the context of the entire world. This entails broader parameters than offered by the bi-modal conceptions of 'tradition/modernity' or 'core/periphery' found in modernization and dependency accounts. Offering instead an interdependent, tri-modal framework of 'core/semi-periphery/periphery', world system analysis "enables researchers to examine the complexity and changing nature of the capitalist world-economy" (So, 1990:198).⁵⁶

Key figures contributing to the world system perspective include S. Amin, A. G. Frank, and (most notably) I. Wallerstein.⁵⁷ As David Harrison writes, "In Frank, Wallerstein, and Amin we have the bare bones of what has come to be known as world systems theory...they differ in numerous details, and to some extent focus on different areas, but despite this they have much in common, including a more or less blanket opposition to modernization theory" (Harrison, D., 1988:97). While divergences within the perspective thus exist,⁵⁸ it is possible to delineate its major tenets, many of which overlap those of dependency theory. For example, world system perspectives agree with dependency positions that "development and underdevelopment are

⁵⁶ As outlined by A. So, the demand to explain "the complexity and changing nature of the capitalist world economy" grew largely from three factors: the rise of East Asian industrial states (namely: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore); the demise of socialist states; and the waning of U.S. "hegemony in the capitalist world-economy" (exemplified by such events as the Vietnam War, the Watergate crisis, and "the unprecedented government deficit" etc.) See A. So (1990:170) for a brief account of these factors.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Amin (1974), Frank (1971), and Wallerstein, (1974). Note that some authors (e.g., Packenham, 1992:111) classify Frank as an orthodox dependency theorist.

⁵⁸ See Harrison, D., (1988:85-94), for an account of the divergences within the world system perspective.

essentially aspects of the same economic process, and the former has been able to occur only by increasing the latter" (Harrison, D., 1988:97); and that world capitalism involves unequal exchange between nations (a transfer of surplus value), which in turn means "that the development potential of underdeveloped countries is blocked" (Harrison, D., 1988:97). Such similarities reflect a shared critical stance between world system and dependency perspectives; dependency critiques of modernism are thus often echoed by those of world system analyses. The unique contribution of world system analysis to the issues of development, however, rests in its differences from dependency theory. The remainder of this section shall thus highlight these distinguishing features (see appendix B).

In his "Sociologies of Development," Fitzgerald summarizes the world system perspective (as given in particular by I. Wallerstein):

...Wallerstein has argued that the expansion of Europe starting in the 16th century signalled the end of pre-capitalist modes of production in those areas of the Third World incorporated within the world capitalist market....[therefore] we cannot speak of stages of national development, but only of stages of the world system. The modern world system is unitary in that it is synonymous with the capitalist mode of production, yet disparate in that it is divided into tiers - core, semi-periphery, and periphery - which play functionally specific roles within the system as a whole.

The primary advance made by world system analysis over earlier versions of the dependency perspective is in its breadth of analysis. World system analysis places a new emphasis on the multilateral relations of the system as a whole...rather than on the unilateral relations of metropole and satellite characteristic of dependency theory. Thus core-core and periphery-periphery relations become as central to the analysis as do core-periphery ones.⁵⁹

This passage highlights a number of fundamental characteristics of the world system perspective - all of which derive from the perspective's methodological emphasis on 'historical dynamics'. It is through this emphasis that the influence of Fernand Braudel and the French *Annales* school on the world-system perspective becomes

⁵⁹ Fitzgerald (1983), in *Neo-Marxist Theories* (1983:19).

apparent (So, 1990:172). Particularly influential were Braudel's assertions that history must be developed as a 'whole' and that studies in history and the social sciences must cover long periods of time. Let us consider each of these as they relate to the world system perspective.

According to world system analysis, developing history as a 'whole' entails developing a 'global' history. This, in effect, leads to the world system position that the study of development and underdevelopment must reach beyond the narrow analysis of, for example, the United States and Latin America, to include the entire global context. It thus moves beyond the boundaries of core-periphery models (which did not explain the existence of NICs - i.e., newly industrialized countries⁶⁰) offering instead core-semiperiphery-periphery models. Simply, the 'core' (synonymous with developed/centre/metropolises) is defined in terms of economic power/influence over all other regions; the 'semi-periphery' as "those regions that are exploited by the center [core] but which, in turn, exploit their own peripheries" (Harrison, D., 1988:98); and the 'periphery' (or undeveloped/satellite) as those lacking economic power and influence over the semi-periphery and core.⁶¹

According to Wallerstein, the core, semi-periphery, and periphery structuring of the world provides the "intellectual tool to help analyze the multiple forms of class conflict in the capitalist world economy" (Wallerstein, 1979:293⁶²). The structure 'helps', specifically, in relation to the question raised by Wallerstein himself: "Why do not the majority who are exploited simply overwhelm the minority who draw disproportionate benefits?" (Wallerstein, 1974⁶³). In answer to this question, the role of the semi-periphery is crucial - as Wallerstein states, the "semi-periphery is...assigned as it were a specific economic

⁶⁰ As J. Browett points out, "While there is no universally accepted definition of the criteria by which a country is classified as a NIC (and hence no agreement as to which countries should be so defined), a number of authors have adopted the OECD (1979) grouping of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, Brazil [the former] Yugoslavia, and Spain". (1985:789)

⁶¹ D. Harrison explains the use of these terms (1988:98), and he notes that these regions also differ in social structures.

⁶² As quoted by Pakenham, (1992:113).

⁶³ As quoted by Gulalp in *Neo-Marxist Theories*, Limqueco & McFarlane, eds., 1983:128.

role, but the reason is less economic than political...The existence of the third category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the unified opposition of all the others because the middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter."⁶⁴

The world system emphasis on long term historical and social scientific studies reveals that this 'capitalist world economy' emerged in the sixteenth century and prevails to this day. Indeed, according to the world system perspective, the capitalist world economy is the most recent of "three known forms of historical systems: *mini-systems*, *world-empires*, and *world-economies*."⁶⁵ These are, as Fitzgerald suggests above, stages of the world system. Long-term studies reveal that within these stages trends and cycles can be discerned. As So explains:

the capitalist world-economy develops itself through secular trends of incorporation, commercialization of agriculture, [and] industrialization...Along with these secular trends, the capitalist world-economy has developed the cyclical rhythms of expansion and stagnation as a result of the imbalance between world effective demand and world supply of goods. When world supply outstrips world demand, when there are too many goods on the market without enough consumers to buy them, factories have to be closed and workers have to be laid off. The world economy then moves into the B-phase of economic stagnation. During this downward phase, the core weakens its control over the

⁶⁴ As quoted by Gulalp, (1983:128). It is important to note that while Wallerstein refers to "class", his analysis is in fact concerned with countries themselves. As Gulalp notes, however, "the replacement of classes by countries blinds Wallerstein to the elementary fact that a country or nation is not a homogeneous unity whose members have common interests, but rather they are composed of classes with contradictory interests" .

⁶⁵ Essentially, as A. So points out (1990:177), *mini-systems* were pre-agricultural and based on *reciprocity* and *exchange*, *world-empires* (ca. 8000 B.C. to 1500 A.D. were based on "the extraction of tribute from otherwise locally self-administered direct producers that was passed upward to the center and *redistributed* by officials", and *capitalist world economies* - which characterize the present day - are based on an *unequal distribution* of accumulated surplus and absorbed all *mini-systems* and *world-empires* by the late nineteenth century. The distinction between the latter two is elaborated on by H. Gulalp in *Frank and Wallerstein Revisited* ("NeoMarxist Theories" 1983:128). Gulalp cites Wallerstein's comment that "an empire cannot be conceived of as an entrepreneur as can a state in a world-economy. For an empire pretends to be the whole. It cannot enrich its economy by draining from other economies, since it is the only economy."

periphery, giving the periphery a chance to promote autonomous development and to catch up with the core.⁶⁶

In terms of development, then, the world system offers a dynamic account whereby core nations may move downward while peripheral nations move upward (and vice versa); as well, the 'semi-periphery' may move upward (in cases of downward core movement) or downward (in cases of upward peripheral movement).

This, of course, raises the question: How do periphery or semi-periphery nations achieve upward mobility in the world system? In other words, how do such nations achieve 'development'?⁶⁷ The differing economic situations of periphery and semi-periphery countries leads world system analysts to propose differing strategies for each. Overall, however, the contention of the world system perspective is that upward mobility is dependent upon the strength of a country's state:⁶⁸ the more control a state exercises over economic policies, the more likely it will achieve upward mobility. It must be possible, therefore, for a state to intervene at the appropriate time in order to take full advantage of a given economic condition; whether this takes the form of, for example, import substitution or policies aimed at increasing the demand for domestic goods.⁶⁹

Ultimately, the world system perspective advocates a world-level socialist revolution to combat the world capitalist market. Such a revolution must occur at the 'world' level because, as So points out (1990:193), "the economic self-interest of the state bureaucrats pushed them [the nation-states] toward the economic growth and 'catching up' goals. As a result, the goal of internal equality and the

⁶⁶ So, (1990:197).

⁶⁷ While I here refer to "development", it is important to note that Wallerstein and the world system school argued that the concept of development ought to be discarded (see Sztompka, 1993:188). World-system theorists nevertheless spoke of 'upward mobility' in economic terms (thereby raising the question of whether or not world-system theorists actually escaped the grip of 'development').

⁶⁸ Gulalp, in *NeoMarxist Theories* (1983:129).

⁶⁹ So provides a list of methods for increasing a market for national goods (1990:184) including:

(1) It can expand its political boundaries by unification with its neighbours or by conquest, thus enlarging the size of its domestic market.

(2) It can increase the costs of imported goods through tariffs, prohibitions, and quotas, thus capturing a larger share of its domestic market.

interest of the popular strata were sacrificed". National movements must thus be replaced by a world-level movement. As R. Kothari points out, however, it is not clear how this world-level socialist revolution is to occur, he writes: "...Wallerstein's theory...remains silent on the issue as to what concrete structure of relations need to be altered in order to reverse capitalism. In brief, it offers no clues as to the needed instrumentalities for socialist revolution."⁷⁰

6. Modernization Revisited

While neither dependency nor world system perspectives can lay claim to dethroning modernism, both have nevertheless contributed to a fundamental rethinking of its theory and practice. Unrelenting critique, unrealized expectations, and the sobering reality of the first three decades of development had left some sectors of the modernist camp searching to re-invent and revive modernism. What emerged in the late 1970s was a 'new and improved', somewhat conciliatory, modernist vision. That is, despite retaining many of its orthodox assumptions, the 'new' modernization school shifted its stance on some of its most contentious tenets. Using A. So's table as a guideline (see appendix C), this section will provide an overview of the similarities and differences between classical and new modernization perspectives.

As stated in chapter two above, the "territory and goal" of development during the mid-1940s to mid-1960s were, respectively, the Third World and modernity. By the late 1970s, these assumptions remained central to the modernist perspective: Third World development continued to be the focal point of modernization studies, and the process of modernization itself continued to be regarded as a generally beneficial process. The concepts of tradition and modernity were thus retained in modernist explanations of development and progress - as were the emphases on the nation and its internal make-up (i.e., its values and institutions).

⁷⁰ Kothari, (1989:133).

Facing both practical and theoretical challenges, however, new modernization theorists had to seriously reconsider the "dubious assumptions of classical modernization studies" (So, 1990:61). As the table in Appendix C indicates, new modernization studies thus revised earlier views on tradition, methodology, progress, and the relevance of 'external' factors.⁷¹ Let us briefly review each of these.

Recall that, according to early modernization theory, to the extent to which nations become modern, they cease (by an equal degree) to be traditional: development is a 'zero-sum' process. New modernization studies, however, postulate the coexistence of tradition and modernity within a single society - even going so far as to say that tradition may be "an additive factor of development" (So, 1990:62). Certainly, research findings supporting this position have been available as early as 1967. For example, J. Gusfield's study of traditional Indian culture and values revealed that traditional family arrangements - namely, large extended families - actually facilitate the modernization process. He found, in particular, that these families provided the foundations for many "highly successful industrial organizations"⁷² (Randall/Theobald, 1985:36). A later study revealed similar findings within Chinese society. Wong's (1988) study on entrepreneurial familism⁷³ revealed that traditional Chinese family

⁷¹ These theoretical revisions occurred against a backdrop of two fundamental strategies: Basic Needs Approach (BNA) and the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The BNA was based on a distinction between economic growth and the satisfaction of basic needs for the impoverished. In other words, it recognized that the former does not guarantee the latter. BNA thus sought to channel/redistribute the benefits of economic growth. It also broadened the scope of development beyond economic factors to include social, cultural and political factors. Two issues, however, proved troublesome for the perspective. First, beyond such needs as food, clothing and shelter, what other needs were 'basic'? - indeed, *whom* was to determine this? Second, *how* was the satisfaction of basic needs to be accomplished? The second strategy, NIEO, strove to "redistribute" wealth and power at an international level. It was an attempt, in particular, by the countries of OPEC, Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Singapore, and Taiwan (see Arnold, 1994:150) to revolutionize international power relations. Presumably, the economic pressure exerted by OPEC and others could counteract the power of the West. This 'revolution' has yet to be realized. U.N. discussions of the NIEO occurred in 1974, (the oil crisis of 1973 presumably forced the West to reconsider international relations, especially trade), but these, and subsequent discussions, have not yet altered the balance of power.

⁷² As described by Randall and Theobald (1985).

⁷³ See A. So (1990:63-65) for a review of this study.

values (e.g., nepotism) actually contribute to the productive strength of firms. Wong writes,

There exists a much stronger measure of trust among *jia* [family] members than among unrelated business partners; consensus is easier to attain; the need for mutual accountability is reduced....As a result, they are particularly well-suited to survive and flourish in situations where a high level of risk is involved.⁷⁴

The relationship between tradition and modernity thus proved much more dynamic than early modernization theorists assumed. Indeed, it was the *interrelationship* of these aspects of society that demanded a more sophisticated analysis from the new modernization school. This demand was met halfway by the new modernization theorists. That is, while they acknowledged the active/positive role of tradition in the modernization process, the degree to which it must be valued remained an open question.

Nevertheless, the postulation that tradition may co-exist with modernity represented a breakthrough of sorts in modernization theory. It led, in particular, to a greater sensitivity towards the historical/social contexts of development in particular societies. This was, in part, a consequence of the studies of Gusfield, Wong, and others,⁷⁵ for they revealed not only the falsity of modernist conceptions of 'tradition', but also that there are historical complexities involved in a nation's 'development'. Such observations raised the following issue: given that a society's culture and tradition - or 'social structure' - is implicated in development processes, and social structures vary from society to society, it follows that an appropriate methodology must incorporate both concrete case studies and historical analysis. As R. Kiely puts it:

The basic problem with modernization theory is that it assumes that there is an unproblematic transition from traditional society to modernity. The cause of this transition is either Western individualism (entrepreneurship) or Western technology (the industrial society), or a mixture of these two factors. The

⁷⁴ As quoted by So (1990:64).

⁷⁵ See So (1990: 63-87) for reviews of other studies.

problem with this approach is that the two factors are taken in isolation from the particular social structure in which they are embedded.⁷⁶

Early modernization theorists were unable to account for the varying patterns of development in societies because their analyses were divorced from considerations of the social realities of those societies. New modernization theorists, on the other hand, expressed a willingness to concede the relevance of case studies and historical analysis in their methodology. This, in turn, went hand in hand with a revised vision of the direction of development.

It stands to reason that if development is a function of a society's unique historical and social conditions (even if only in part), then an equally unique path of development will likely be followed by that society. Early modernization theorists made the mistake, however, of assuming that their Western/American path represented *the* model for all other societies. After three decades of 'development', however, the realities of diverging development paths were impossible to ignore. The path of China, for example, could hardly be explained in reference to Western ideals. As a result, new modernization studies "did not assume a unidirectional path of development toward the Western model. Instead, these studies take it for granted that Third World countries can pursue their own paths of development."⁷⁷

Such new-found concern to match theory to reality added to the demise of early modernization theory in another important way. As Pieterse points out,⁷⁸ the decline of U.S. hegemony (indicated by the Vietnam war) and the end of the post-war boom were significant in modernization's decline. In addition to these, Preston (1986) cites the oil crisis of 1973 (i.e., the drastic rise in oil prices by OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and the "arrival on the intellectual/political scene of a new series of concerns: overpopulation and (new) food crises; arms production;...[and] ecological problems."⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Kiely (1995:41).

⁷⁷ So (1990:61).

⁷⁸ Pieterse (1991:13).

⁷⁹ Preston (1986:106).

The significance of these events and issues is their international/external character. The oil crisis of 1973 proved that a 'united' Third World could 'threaten' the balance of power through, for example, calls for a New International Economic Order.⁸⁰ As well, pollution proved to have no boundaries. Accordingly, new modernization theorists placed greater emphasis on "the role played by external factors in shaping the development of Third World countries."⁸¹

⁸⁰ See Arnold (1994:138-149) for a discussion on OPEC and oil power.

⁸¹ So (1990:61).

SECTION TWO

7. The 'Crisis' in Development Theory

In 1974, the U.N.'s *Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order* called for:

the establishment of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereignty, interdependency, common interest and co-operation among states, irrespective of their economic and social systems [which would] correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development in peace and justice for present and future generations.⁸²

In 1986, the U.N.'s *Declaration on the Right to Development* stated that:

Development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural, and political process which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all its individuals on the basis of their active, free, and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.⁸³

Such proclamations seemed to represent the dawn of a new era. Calls for peace, justice, equality, freedom and wholistic development lent hope to the possibility of 'righting' the 'wrongs' of the past. Yet, while no one expected the world's problems to be solved in a mere two decades (many of these problems had, after all, taken centuries to evolve), such hope has slowly diminished into a pervasive sense of crisis in the 1990s.

As Hettne explains,

Crisis implies that a certain arrangement no longer works, and therefore also the opening up of new opportunities and the need for new solutions in various fields of social life. To speak of 'crisis' rather than 'problem' normally suggests that a

⁸² As quoted by G. Arnold (1994:151).

⁸³ As quoted by N. Dower in *International Justice*, Attfield & Wilkins, eds. (1992:94).

nonconventional solution is called for, i.e., a change in the pattern and direction of development.⁸⁴

'Nonconventional' solutions have, unfortunately, been few and far between. The fact is, many of the modernist assumptions that characterized early development thought have proven remarkably resilient. Indeed, progress and development continue to be defined in terms of maximum economic growth (Connelly, et al, 1995; Goulet, 1992). The difference now, however, is that:

In most cases even the "developmental" objectives of the earlier growth model (improved standards of living, job creation, better social services, and a diversified basket of available consumer goods) are forgotten. The rhetoric of development is still invoked, but in reality debt-servicing and crisis management now occupy center stage in arenas of development policy setting.⁸⁵

Development has, in essence, remained within the grip of economics. This is perhaps not surprising if we consider the fact that over the last five decades, emergent development perspectives (namely, modernization, dependency, and world systems) have all ultimately relied upon economic conceptions of development and underdevelopment (Leys, 1983:32-33; Kothari, 1989:142). Modernization theory explains development in terms of moving towards a 'mass-consumption' society; dependency and world system perspectives explain underdevelopment in terms of surplus extraction from 'periphery' to 'core' nations. Moreover, an appeal to economic growth (e.g. increased GNP, market expansion, or the development of productive forces) has permeated all perspectives (Kiely, 1995:58).

These similarities, which become apparent if we reconsider the foregoing chapters, suggest that modernization, dependency, and world system perspectives all adhere to economic conceptions of development. While not denying the normative components of these perspectives (e.g., their underlying utopian capitalist or socialist visions), it is evident that economic forces of development (or

⁸⁴ Hettne (1990:10).

⁸⁵ Goulet (1992:469).

underdevelopment) are their focal point. Indeed, such over-emphasis of the economic/descriptive nature of development has come at the cost of providing adequate accounts of the underlying ethical/normative nature of development.

As H. W. Arndt points out, "the choice of ends of policy, the optimum mix of economic growth, stability, equality, power, and freedom, involves value judgments about which the science of economics as such has nothing to say."⁸⁶ Herein - according to critical theorists and the like⁸⁷ - lies the root of the development crisis. Under the rubric of economics, development perspectives expounded by modernization, dependency, and world system approaches have perpetuated a scientific ideology - or 'scientism'. Rationality is thereby reduced to empirical analysis of the most efficient *means* of achieving a predetermined set of goals. The goals themselves are not subject to analysis since they reflect 'values' and thus fall outside the realm of (instrumental) rationality. Modernization, dependency, and world system perspectives all espouse economic - or more generally, scientific - conceptions of development which, in turn, encompass a view of rationality (namely, instrumental rationality) which precludes rational argument over values (i.e., goals or ends).

There are two consequences of this. First, social critique of practices and institutions is precluded (this may account for the fact that there has been little, if any, movement towards a realization of the grand proclamations of the U.N. cited above). Second, the normative nature of development theory and practice is masked: development theory is both a descriptive *and* normative enterprise - yet development theory has so far been subsumed under the former. This masks the implicit normative judgments in conventional development theory, rendering it closer to the realm of ideology⁸⁸ than theory.

⁸⁶ Arndt (1978:2).

⁸⁷ For example, some feminists and environmentalists. See Braidotti, et al, (1994:107-122).

⁸⁸ "Ideology", that is, in what Geuss refers to as its 'pejorative' sense (Geuss, 1988:12). The masking of values constitutes ideology in this sense because it serves to support relations of domination (e.g., core-periphery relations). This sense of ideology is to be distinguished from two others Geuss identifies: namely, ideology in the descriptive sense and ideology in the positive sense. The descriptive sense simply refers to a group's beliefs, attitudes, desires, and values etc. Unlike the pejorative sense of

The rise of more explicitly normative development 'alternatives' (and in some cases, 'alternatives to development') has thus come to the fore in recent years. Hints of its emergence (e.g., the U.N. proclamations) suggest a re-thinking of development theory. However, unless such re-thinking involves a serious assessment of scientism, 'nonconventional' solutions will continue to be elusive and the patterns and direction of development will likely remain unchanged.

8. Scientism and Development Theory

The issues raised above have undoubtedly opened a Pandora's Box. It is thus important to understand the connection between scientism and development theory. Let us begin with a brief discussion of scientism.

In its most general sense, scientism refers to the hegemony of modern science. In somewhat stronger terms, J. Habermas writes: "scientism means...that we no longer understand science as *one* form of possible knowledge, but rather identify knowledge with science."⁸⁹ Scientism, accordingly, maintains scientific inquiry as the sole source of human knowledge - moreover, as the *only possible* source. Indeed, it rests upon the positivist⁹⁰ assumption that because there is one objective reality (consisting of facts which exist independently of the knower) there is only one valid understanding of it.⁹¹ Science, in other words, provides the authoritative framework of human understanding.⁹²

ideology, this sense excludes any judgements of whether or not these elements are good, bad, useful, or unjust. Ideology in the positive sense refers to those beliefs and attitudes (etc.) that best enable a group to achieve its *true* interests (more on what these 'true interests' are will be discussed in a later chapter nine).

⁸⁹ Habermas (1971:19).

⁹⁰ Positivism is a philosophical position which claims that only empirical knowledge is valid. This position can be traced back to the British empiricist school of the 17th and 18th centuries, though it was primarily developed in the 19th century by French thinkers Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. Recent adherents include R. Carnap, M. Schlick, and A.J. Ayer.

⁹¹ This reflects a metaphysical/ontological commitment regarding the nature/structure of 'reality'.

⁹² 'Scientific method' is, of course, central to this framework. While there is perhaps no one definition of scientific method, it is conventionally understood as:

Undoubtedly, the advances in human understanding resulting from scientific inquiry since the sixteenth century are central to claims of such authority. Of course, prior to this time, religion (particularly in Europe) subsumed all human understanding of the world. The rise of the Scientific Revolution in the sixteenth century, however, soon replaced this spiritual view with a more mechanistic view. Expressed most fervently by Francis Bacon⁹³ - who called for the redirection of knowledge towards the control of nature - the Scientific Revolution marked the beginning of tremendous changes in human life. Indeed, the quest to discover universal laws governing facts in the world has yielded an unprecedented body of knowledge encompassing everything from gravitational force to penicillin and nuclear energy. With benefits ranging from increased life expectancy to space travel, such knowledge has proven immensely useful. The authority of scientific inquiry - and thus the knowledge it produces - seems unquestionable.

By granting such authority, scientism assumes the supremacy of 'instrumental rationality'. Instrumental (or 'technical') rationality rests upon the assumption that the realm of facts (or brute matter) is distinct and separate from the realm of values (or social preferences). The significance of an objective reality is cast in terms of the extent to which it serves human purposes (e.g., medical cures). It is in this sense that the methods of science, which produce 'technically useful' knowledge, embody instrumental rationality. The positivist conception of science, which relegates the concerns of science to empirical analysis, has nothing as such to say about values and goals (e.g., valuing health). Rather, through its description and correlation of facts, science provides knowledge of how best to achieve such goals. This, of course, accords with the conventional model of science whereby

An empirical, experimental, logicomathematical conceptual system which organizes and interrelates facts within a structure of theories and inferences. In most cases, scientific method presupposes that whatever happens has a specific cause followed by a specific effect; that effects can be deduced (predicted) from an empirical knowledge of causes. (Angeles, 1981:171)

⁹³ Francis Bacon (1561-1626) argued that scientific method should produce useful knowledge (i.e., knowledge which benefits the human condition). His most notable works (in which his ideas on knowledge and science are developed) include: *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), *Novum Organum* (1620), and *The New Atlantis* (1627).

inquiry is guided by rules of consistency, verification, and predictive force, but not preferences and prejudices.

Let us turn now to the implications of scientism within the social sciences. Like the sciences of chemistry, physics, biology, and mathematics, the social sciences of sociology, political science, economics, and history are concerned with discovering empirical regularities. However, whereas the former are concerned with laws of 'nature', the latter are concerned with rules of 'society'.⁹⁴ Conventional social science, then, assumes that the social world exists independently of the knower: it consists of facts of social behaviour and the rules embodied therein. As Burrell and Morgan write, the social world:

is a real world made up of hard, tangible, and relatively immutable structures. ... [It] has an existence which is as hard and concrete as the natural world.⁹⁵

The empirical-analytical inquiry thus associated with social science research is largely that of providing descriptive accounts of societies. Assuming the positivist thesis that only observable phenomena can be 'known' (i.e., only empirical analysis produces valid knowledge), conventional social sciences thereby claim to be just as 'scientific' (or value-free) as, say, physics and chemistry.

Upholding the fact-value distinction, social science research produces knowledge of what 'is' as opposed to what 'ought' to be. It affirms that claims of the latter - not being matters of fact - lie outside the realm of valid inquiry and are thus excluded as irrational. This

⁹⁴ The distinction between laws and rules can be drawn as follows: Briefly, laws (specifically, laws of nature) are thought to be *experience indifferent* - they pertain to matters of brute fact. If it is the case that a law of nature is found to be broken by a certain event, then that law (if an explanation is lacking) is discarded. Rules are essentially social phenomena. Indeed, if a rule is a 'good' rule, it is typically widely accepted in a given society. Rules are often implicit (they may not necessarily be articulated). Furthermore, rules have normative force, that is, they pertain to questions of 'ought' - but not necessarily of the moral kind (e.g., if you are hungry, as a rule you *ought* to eat). A moral rule would constitute something like the following: if you want peace, then you ought to apply the principle of charity. When rules are broken, they are not discarded (as laws are). Rather, the person (or society) breaking the rule may just be condemned for acting inappropriately or, (in cases of breaking a moral rule), condemned for acting immorally.

⁹⁵ Burrell and Morgan (1979), as quoted by Maguire (1987:18).

posturing of value-neutrality has implications, of course, for the social scientist. That is, while the social scientist can provide knowledge of how society works, its underlying structures, who we are, and the likelihood of where we are going, it is not her business to delineate social goals or values (e.g., determine what a society 'ought' to do). In other words, the most social science can offer is knowledge of societies (in terms of their past, present, and possible futures); it cannot provide moral direction. Thus, while the empirical-analytic techniques of social science can provide information regarding the most efficient means of achieving goals, they cannot claim to produce knowledge of what those goals should be.⁹⁶ Indeed, according to such a view, this is not even possible: values are distinct from facts and are thus not amenable to rational assessment.⁹⁷

The explanatory and predictive capacities of social scientific inquiry are inextricably linked to purposes of controlling human behaviour and social events. Bachrach writes: "It should be apparent that once we are able successfully to predict events we achieve a degree of control over them."⁹⁸ The social sciences, like the natural sciences, thus subscribe to the notion that rationality is, and can only be, an instrumental device. Whereas the sciences produce knowledge useful in controlling the physical world, the social sciences produce knowledge useful in controlling the social world.

While this is indeed a simplified account of scientism, it should suffice as a link to a discussion on scientism within development planning theory. That scientism (particularly of the social science variety) underlies this body of theory is a matter frequently raised in development literature (see, e.g., Ekins, 1992:202-204; Braidotti et al, 1994:29-58; and Kothari, 1989:23-43). While such claims most

⁹⁶ One must be careful here not to conflate moral 'oughts' with non-moral 'oughts'. That is, while the social scientist can issue normative prescriptions (e.g., in describing how best to achieve a given set of objectives) these prescriptions are non-moral (i.e., they merely tell us what would be expedient in a given situation with given goals).

⁹⁷ Importantly, even if some social scientists admitted the possibility of moral knowledge they would nevertheless likely contend that producing such knowledge falls outside the realm of social science (falling, instead, within the realms of religion or philosophy).

⁹⁸ Bachrach (1972), as quoted by Maguire (1987:23).

often refer to modernization theory, it will here be argued that scientism also underlies dependency and world system perspectives (though to a lesser degree).

As indicated above, one of the main tenets of scientism is the positivist claim that only empirical knowledge is valid. The sciences and social sciences have embodied this assumption in their quest to describe and understand how things actually take place: they are devoted to questions of what 'is' as opposed to what (morally) 'ought' to be. Development theories have emerged in a similarly descriptive vein. As D. Goulet writes, "descriptive usage prevails...in the writings on development."⁹⁹ Accordingly, such theories have provided accounts of various development patterns (e.g., Rostow's stage theory) and structures (e.g., peripheral dependency on core). In other words, they attempt to discover 'regularities' from an analysis of development as it 'really' occurs. Consider the words of the Latin American structuralist, C. Furtado, who described development theory as

[endeavouring] to explain, from a macroeconomic point of view, the causes and mechanism of the persistent growth in productivity of the labour factor and the repercussions of this growth on the organization of production and on the distribution and utilization of the social product. ...This investigation calls for building models or simplified schemes of existing economic systems, models based on stable relationships between calculable variables deemed to be relevant and important.¹⁰⁰

Modernization, dependency, and world system perspectives have all endeavoured to offer explanations of exactly this sort. Taking economic growth as *the* stimulus for development, each perspective has sought to explain such growth (or lack thereof) in terms of underlying causes and mechanisms. Rostow expressed this in terms of the West's experiences with industrialization and technological advances. 'Stages' of economic growth (or *modernization*) reflect the degree to which a society becomes increasingly technological and economically productive (i.e., increasingly *developed*). "Important" variables presumably include the rise of new entrepreneurs, market

⁹⁹ Goulet, in *World Development* (1992:467).

¹⁰⁰ Furtado (1967:1).

expansion, and savings and investment rates (all of which are reflected in a nation's GNP). While dependency and world system theorists investigate the underlying causes and mechanisms of *underdevelopment*, these too are ultimately explained in economic terms. Colonialization and surplus extraction, it will be recalled, were central to these explanations. Moreover, economic growth is inextricably linked to development (or 'upward mobility').

Within development theory, then, 'instrumental' rationality is cast in terms of 'economic' rationality. As Held explains:

Conditioned by the necessities and exigencies of capital accumulation, the spheres governed by instrumental reason, or as Marcuse called it, technological rationality, expanded, creating a common framework for all occupations....[As] standardized techniques advanced and the laws and mechanisms of technological rationality expanded over the whole of society, they developed, as Marcuse put it, 'a set of truth values which hold good for the functioning of the apparatus - and for that alone'. Propositions concerning production, effective organization, the rules of the game, business methods,...are judged true or false according to whether or not the 'means' to which they refer are suitable or applicable (for an end which remains, of course, unquestioned).¹⁰¹

This is a (perhaps convoluted) way of saying the following: In a climate where capital accumulation governs rationality, judgment of 'means' is based on the efficiency with which they achieve or promote predetermined goals. In order to make this judgment, individual achievements ("occupations") are quantified, as are all factors contributing to "the functioning of the [social] apparatus". Accordingly, 'reason' becomes synonymous with 'economic efficiency': whereby the process of establishing the most efficient means to a given end is governed by the collection of quantifiable, objective data. As Marcuse suggests, "truth values" thus refer to whether or not those means promote the *predetermined* ends.

The co-ordination of means with pre-determined ends (i.e, the assurance of the proper functioning of society) is thus cast as a rational, objective, and impersonal activity. The framework for

¹⁰¹ Held, (1980:67).

bureaucracy¹⁰² is thereby established, as is the attendant mechanistic view of society. As Marcuse writes:

The private and public bureaucracy thus emerges on an apparently objective and impersonal ground, provided by the *rational specialization of functions*....For, the more the individual functions are divided, fixated, and synchronized according to objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable it is for the individual to withdraw or withstand. The material fate of the masses becomes increasingly dependent upon the continuous and correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic order of private capitalist organizations. The objective and impersonal character of technological rationality bestows upon the bureaucratic groups the universal dignity of reason. *The rationality embodied in the giant enterprises makes it appear as if men [sic], in obeying them, obey the dictum of an objective rationality*¹⁰³ (emphasis added).

Control of the "fate of the masses" is thus deferred to a 'neutral' and 'rational' bureaucratic body. It is assumed that such agencies can best maintain the proper functioning of society, and indeed, with increased division of labour, the need for an 'overseer' capable of 'big picture' analyses becomes even greater.

Within development theory, instrumental rationality and the bureaucracy to which it gives rise are interwoven in explanations of progress. Consider, for example, the functionalist basis of modernization theory. Functionalism highlights the movement from 'traditional' to 'modern' in terms of increased specialization of labour (i.e., differentiation and marketization).¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, multi-functional families characteristic of traditional societies are replaced by simpler, modern family structures. Schools replace informal parental socialization, factories replace family farms, and welfare

¹⁰² The bureaucratic model consists of four essential features:

- 1) its *purpose* is to achieve known goals;
- 2) it employs *instrumental rationality* - i.e., it chooses the best means to achieve goals;
- 3) it assumes *impartiality* in decision-making processes; and
- 4) it functions on the basis of *routine* or standard operating procedures.

See Stzompka (1993:76) for additional traits of the bureaucratic model.

¹⁰³ Marcuse (1941), as quoted by Held (1980:68).

¹⁰⁴ See page 6.

replaces extended family care of the elderly.¹⁰⁵ The underlying assumption is that differentiation is economically efficient and therefore rational: modern (consumptive) families promote market expansion while traditional (self-sufficient) families impede such growth. Moreover, it is assumed that problems of coordinating the differentiated structures (or institutions) can be addressed by a 'knowing', impartial bureaucracy.¹⁰⁶

The development 'expert' has emerged as part of this bureaucracy. As Parpart writes,

much of development agencies' policy and planning is based on the premise that these experts, with their special knowledge of the modern, especially the technical world, are particularly well placed to solve the problems of the developing world...These experts became, and continue to be, essential to the development enterprise, as development policies and programs are largely predicated on the assumption that developmental problems can be reduced to technical, i.e., "solvable" problems which involve the transfer of Western technical expertise to the developing world.¹⁰⁷

The legitimacy of development experts is based on their ability to provide "rational counsel for charting courses of action into the future."¹⁰⁸ While this is plainly unlike the 'routine' tasks typical of bureaucrats, development experts are nevertheless cast in the same mold. Indeed, impartiality, standardized procedures¹⁰⁹, and instrumental reason provide the framework for development expertise.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ See So (1990:27).

¹⁰⁶ This problem is often referred to as the problem of integration. See Smelser (1964), as cited in So, (1990:26-28).

¹⁰⁷ Parpart, pp. 334, 339. See also, Anderson (1985) as quoted in Stamp (1990:51). Anderson writes, "The basic assumption persists that technical solutions can be found for any problem... that a technological 'fix' can be found. If we can only get the technology 'right', then the assumption is that progress and development in the Third World will be inevitable."

¹⁰⁸ Friedmann (1987:7).

¹⁰⁹ The rational planning model underlies most conventional procedures. See, e.g., Rondinelli, (1976:5); also, Moore, (1988:525). Major components of this model include: problem definition, data collection, project design, implementation, monitoring, and feedback.

¹¹⁰ The fact/value distinction inherent in instrumental reason is reflected in the separation of public means from public goals (where development experts are

9. The Normative Component of Development Theory

Such a 'framework', however, requires a 'nail' from which to hang: i.e., it requires a *normative* component. While modernization, dependency, and world-system perspectives have cast 'development' as a predominantly economic activity (and have thus focused on descriptions of how development actually occurs), the concept itself is nevertheless essentially value-laden.¹¹¹ As D. Goulet writes:

If development deals essentially with the nature of the good life and the relationship between having goods and being good; if, moreover, development is concerned essentially with the foundations of life together in society...it is clear that no definition of development which is exclusively economic, technical, organizational, or managerial can be adequate.¹¹²

Either implicitly or explicitly, then, all development theories express preferred conceptions of 'the good life'. Development, thus, is very unlike science: whereas scientific inquiry is not (in principle) in the business of ranking goals, theories of development cannot help but rank such goals. Indeed, modernization theorists assume the universal desirability of capitalism; and dependency and world system theorists assume the universal desirability of socialism (both, therefore, assume economic growth to be their top priority).

Certainly, emphasis on descriptive analyses of development has systematically overshadowed the importance of normative analyses (including political implications) within development theory. As Killick writes:

concerned with the former). This can also be considered in terms of the separation of administration from politics.

¹¹¹ While it may be suggested that the 'political-economy' (i.e., dependency and world system) perspectives have attempted to link politics and economics (and thus link value and fact), as C. Leys points out, such perspectives nevertheless "tend to be economic in the sense that social classes, the state, politics, [and] ideology figure in [them] very noticeably as derivatives of economic forces" (*Neo-Marxist Theories*, 1983:31). See also D. Goldsworthy (1988:505).

¹¹² Goulet (1992:472).

...the main characteristic of writings on development planning is the virtual absence of systematic discussion of the implications of planning for political systems, or vice versa, even though authors often insist that a plan is essentially a political document....The result is a largely unarticulated view of political processes, which appears to owe the greatest intellectual debt not to the study of government but to economists' own theories of the behaviour of individuals and firms.¹¹³

Accordingly, most development theorists simply assume 'public goals', even though, as Hettne points out, "no people ever voted for capital accumulation and industrialism" (1990:152). The desirability of the 'mass-consumptive' society or the 'socialist utopia' are implied, but seldom questioned (at least within the respective theoretical positions). Moreover, when such conceptions of 'the good life' are questioned, economic analysis typically provides the platform. (Dependency theorists, for example, critique modernist visions of development from an economic, Marxist analysis of surplus extraction.)

According to modernization, dependency, and world system perspectives, 'the good life' is implicitly cast in terms of economic growth. The moral imperative generally underlying these theories is thus: One ought to do that which brings about the greatest expected benefit or utility over expected costs. (This, of course, reflects the utilitarian principle of economic efficiency, i.e., maximal benefit for minimal cost.) Reduced, as such, to a matter of 'calculation', the good life has invariably been linked to measurements of GNP (see chapter three). Indeed, GNP has become the definitive goal of development.

Development has, in effect, become a double-edged sword, "simultaneously creating and destroying values."¹¹⁴ The assumption of a consensual (homogeneous) society whose 'public interests' can be discerned by a state whose neutrality is unquestioned¹¹⁵ has brought both gains and losses. That is, while technological advance and

¹¹³ T. Killick (1976), in Todaro (1983:351).

¹¹⁴ Goulet (1992:467).

¹¹⁵ R. Beauregard (JPER vol 10, number 3)

material gains have generally benefited societies,¹¹⁶ such benefits have come at the cost of other (less measurable) values (e.g., justice, cultural diversity, and environmental preservation).¹¹⁷ Let us briefly review these gains and losses.

As a proponent of conventional development, Bill Warren has argued that:

In terms of the standard measure of economic progress, GNP per capita, it must be stated unequivocally that the record of the Third World postwar has been reasonably, and perhaps outstandingly, successful as compared *either* with their pre-Second World War twentieth-century record *or* with whatever past period one cares to take as relevant...¹¹⁸

This is indeed supported by the World Bank's 1990 *World Development Report*, which stresses that "large numbers of people have more food, more comfortable lodgings, a greater variety of clothing, access to books, and numerous other material goods than ever before."¹¹⁹

Technological advances (e.g.: agricultural and medical equipment, communications systems) are certainly linked to such optimism. Indeed, Truman's statement (cited in chapter two) has never lost its force. Belief in the values of 'things' (i.e., tools, machinery, or other types of hardware) in the development process underlies the mass-consumptive society (and 'expert' knowledge) idealized in modernization theory. It underlies, as well, dependency and world system perspectives. As Parpart writes, these perspectives "have never challenged the belief that modernity/development requires technical assistance from the North."¹²⁰

While the benefits of material gain and technological advance cannot be denied, there are nevertheless attendant losses that must be

¹¹⁶ Mostly Western societies have benefited (the extent to which 'developing' societies have benefited is an issue of great debate).

¹¹⁷ See Goulet (1992: 467).

¹¹⁸ Warren (1979:109).

¹¹⁹ As quoted by Goulet (1992:470). It should be noted that this does not necessarily negate the claim that the gap between 'rich' and 'poor' is increasing (either between or within countries). See page 10.

¹²⁰ Parpart, p.340.

considered. Such losses include decreased cultural diversity, and increased injustice and environmental destruction, all of which reflect a de-valuation of 'meaning' in social life. As Goulet writes,

...the meaning systems of numerous cultural communities are evacuated. Meaning systems are the religious [and] philosophical...symbols and codes providing explanations as to the significance of life and death. The *Weltanschauung* ['universe'] of modernity simply treats questions about the ultimate meaning of tragedy, of suffering, of the fleetingness of human experience as insignificant. People are caught up in the pursuit of goods, in the rat race to gain upward mobility for jobs or social status. So the more profound meanings are largely evacuated.¹²¹

They are 'largely evacuated', that is, because they are 'largely incalculable'. In other words, the economic drive to quantify the whole of society inevitably involves the emphasis of some factors over others. To the extent that such 'others' are non-economic or non-quantifiable (e.g., cultural, ethical, and religious values), they are systematically "evacuated." Indeed, the pre-eminence of GNP as a measure of development clearly reflects this phenomenon.

10. The Possibility of Normative Critique

As Goldsworthy rightly points out, "...to confront the facts of gain and loss is to move directly to considerations of values, of interests, and of power."¹²² Who gains and who loses, then, is largely reflective of: the (usually implicit) values underlying decision-making processes, whose interests are being served, and who wields the power to enforce decisions one way or the other. In an important sense, then, it is difficult indeed to sustain a 'neutral' economic conception of development. This seems almost trivially true, for the very notion of 'development' was conceived as a non-economic, value-laden, emancipatory process. Yet, even while U.N. Declarations have (for many decades) endorsed this emancipatory conception with references to 'equity', 'co-operation', 'well-being', 'free and meaningful

¹²¹ Goulet, (1992:471).

¹²² D. Goldsworthy, (1988:508)

participation', and 'correction of existing injustices', there has nevertheless been little change in the actual development priorities of economic growth and capital accumulation.¹²³ While such priorities are rationalized on the basis that they are in *the public interest*, increased disparity between those who 'gain' and those who 'lose' has rendered conventional development (both theory and practice) seriously problematic.¹²⁴ We have, then, come full circle and have once again arrived at the notion of 'crisis' (recall chapter seven). With a background discussion now provided (chapters seven and eight), we shall now consider a critical response to this crisis.

The point of departure for this discussion is provided by the question: If the 'public interest' has been misconstrued as such, why has there not been massive public revolt - sufficient, that is, to effect development as described by the U.N. Declarations? In answering this question, let us first acknowledge the fact that meeting developmental goals is possible: indeed, the overall failure of past development initiatives is not due to lack of technical knowledge or resources. This is especially true with respect to meeting basic human needs. Indeed, as a UNICEF report states:

...[given] the opportunities now offered by recent social and scientific progress...the goal of adequate food and health for the

¹²³ There has, indeed, been little change in the power structures underlying these priorities. If we consider the failure of the U.N Declaration on a New International Economic Order (1976), it is apparent that the powerful nations of the world are as yet unwilling to give up their power. As G. Arnold succinctly states (1994:150):

In the broadest sense the concept of NIEO ...assumes that the better-off will - in a statesmanlike manner - surrender advantage for the sake of a wider world harmony and international - as opposed to national - interests. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that those now in power -in this context the rich North - are prepared to make any such willing surrender of their advantages, while there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. A NIEO, if it means anything, means the termination of an existing order of the world economy and its replacement by a new one that has quite different priorities.

¹²⁴ It is interesting to note that this disparity is completely consistent with utilitarian-based development. That is, utilitarianism is not concerned with the distribution of costs and benefits, but rather the grand totals of such calculations. That immense poverty can co-exist with increasing GNP figures reflects the fact that "the rate of GNP growth is largely a calculation of the rate of growth of the incomes of the upper 40% of the population who receive a disproportionately large share of the national product. Therefore, GNP growth rates can be a very misleading index of improved welfare." Todaro, (1989:170). See pp. 170-172 for Todaro's discussion of the biased nature of GNP.

vast majority of the world's children need not be a dream deferred.¹²⁵

Nielson, arguing against neo-Malthusian 'life-boat' ethics,¹²⁶ adds to this sentiment by arguing that, "Africa has half the world's unused farm land in the world. If it were only utilized, Africa could readily feed itself and be a large exporter of food."¹²⁷ The implication of the above question - i.e., that people *ought* to effect certain development - is thus cast against the backdrop that they *can* do so.

Returning, then, to the question of why a misconstrued, bureaucratically-defined, 'public interest' has not met with widespread resistance or critique, (barring, of course, the diligent efforts of some groups and individuals¹²⁸), the work of critical theorist Jurgen Habermas seems particularly germane.¹²⁹ According to Habermas, individuals in society are in fact suffering from what is termed 'ideological distortion' - a pervasive misunderstanding of what constitutes one's true interests. Bureaucratic decisions which end up frustrating these true interests thus go unrecognized and unchallenged. Indeed, because rationality has been reduced to a scientific concept (whereby knowledge is confined to matters of fact) individuals are deprived of the very ability to criticize and challenge. That is, normative critique is precluded. The scientific assumption 'one reality, one rationality' has thus "lulled people into an acceptance of their condition at the expense of their own real interests."¹³⁰

¹²⁵ As quoted by Goldsworthy (1988:513).

¹²⁶ Briefly, neo-Malthusian life-boat ethics likens the issues of poverty and population to a life-boat situation, whereby if a life-boat exceeds its carrying capacity, *everyone* drowns (the key, then, is to ensure limited numbers of people on board). This, neo-Malthusians hold, is similar to the earth's situation: if too many people are 'on board', *everyone* will perish. Thus, the goal is not to provide, say, famine relief, as such conditions serve to keep population numbers in check.

¹²⁷ Nielsen, Kai (1992), in *International Justice*, Attfield and Wilkins, eds. (1992:20).

¹²⁸ In raising this question, I do not intend to diminish the efforts of individuals and groups committed to improving the human - and environmental - condition.

¹²⁹ It must be duly noted that Habermas has modified his views since the publication of his oft-quoted *Knowledge and Human Interests* (see Held, 1980:253). However, the overall thrust of his argument (which shall be presented in this chapter) has remained constant.

¹³⁰ Nielsen (1993:28). This raises the question: What are one's true interests? Habermas employs psychoanalytic theory in his explanation of 'interests'. While this requires a discussion beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that Habermas

Habermas contends that while scientific knowledge contributes to our understanding of nature and society, it nonetheless falls short of providing an emancipatory understanding of what we *ought* to do.¹³¹ Geuss writes,

None of the members of the Frankfurt School¹³² thinks that the tasks circumscribed by the positivist are insignificant ones - it is important that people not accept beliefs which are factually erroneous and don't take normative statements to be descriptive - but the positivist's notion of 'rationality' is too narrow and restricted, and can't handle any of the more interesting cases of ideological delusion; by excluding normative and metaphysical beliefs, preferences, attitudes, etc. from the realm of rational discussion and evaluation, the positivist leaves us without guidance about important parts of our form of consciousness, and thereby abandons whole areas of our life to mere contingent taste, arbitrary decision, and sheer irrationality.¹³³

Emancipation thus requires a broader understanding of rationality. Restricting it to a purely instrumental role not only masks this necessity (denying its very possibility), but also leads to some rather un-emancipatory situations (e.g., bureaucratic maintenance of status-quo power relations¹³⁴). In addition to instrumental (or technical) rationality, then, Habermas proposes two other forms of rationality: namely, communicative/interpretative and critical/reflective rationality.¹³⁵

In order to grasp Habermas' position, it is important to be clear on his critique of scientism and its positivist assumptions. Recall that scientism means that we no longer understand science as *one* form of

ultimately subscribes to a view in which 'true interests' are reached under 'optimal conditions' (e.g., conditions free of physical deprivation and coercion).

¹³¹ See Held (1980:300).

¹³² Leading critical theorists in the 'Frankfurt School' include Habermas, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse.

¹³³ Geuss (1988:28).

¹³⁴ As Held writes, "Technocratic consciousness fulfils the ideological function of legitimating the pursuits of particular interests. It conceals behind a facade of objective necessity the interests of classes and groups that actually determine the function, direction, and pace of technological and sociological development" (1980:264-265).

¹³⁵ Habermas (1971).

possible knowledge, but rather identify knowledge with science.¹³⁶ According to Habermas (1971), this is inherently problematic. That is, it posits the validity of a certain type of knowledge (and rationality) yet at the same time undermines the *possibility* of any critical assessment of this knowledge (for this would require knowledge *independent* of science). To be sure, this has serious implications for epistemology (namely, it loses its critical dimension). It also, however, seriously overlooks the fact that the *rules* governing science are very much *social* products. The 'reality' revealed by scientific inquiry is thus partially a subjective reality (while scientists observe laws in nature, the process of observing those laws are rule-governed¹³⁷). As Nielsen writes, "we should recognize that all reality, including scientific reality, is reality apprehended from a distinctive and determinate perspective."¹³⁸ The radical separation of fact from value (or objective from subjective) implicit in positivism (and scientism) is thus rejected, in turn rejecting the supposed value-neutrality of 'technically useful knowledge' and 'economic efficiency' (these are, indeed, implicit - often unrecognized - values in science).¹³⁹

Essentially, then, scientism assumes much more than it can rationally justify. The ideological distortion that thereby arises can only be alleviated through broadening our conception of rationality. 'Emancipation', in other words, requires communicative and critical knowledge. Let us begin with a discussion of the former.

Just as scientific (and social scientific) knowledge rests upon an interest (namely, controlling human and natural environments), so too, Habermas claims, does communicative knowledge. Communicative knowledge, however, rests upon an interest not of control, but rather of maintaining social relationships through dialogue. This *practical* interest reflects the need to understand "how

¹³⁶ See p.34

¹³⁷ See Stein (1973:92-98) for a more thorough discussion on this matter.

¹³⁸ In "Some Theses in Search of ..." (1993). Another way of formulating this idea is in terms of 'paradigms' (i.e., the entire constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques, on shared by members of a given community" (Kuhn 1970:7). Science, accordingly, must be understood against a backdrop of social beliefs, values, and techniques.

¹³⁹ See Held (1980:306).

human interaction produces rules governing social life, rather than discovering universal laws of human interaction" (Maguire, 1987:14). Communicative knowledge is thus built upon the hermeneutic¹⁴⁰ thesis that human action is not comprised of meaningless events following one another (from which laws may be established), but rather that human action must be understood against a cultural backdrop. Making the connection between this backdrop and human action (in other words, giving human action *meaning*) requires more than science can provide - it requires, that is, communicative (or interpretive) knowledge.

In chapter eight, the de-valuation of meaning in social life (a consequence of scientism) was linked to certain losses - for example, loss of cultural diversity and increased environmental destruction. Goulet referred to these losses in terms of the "evacuation of cultural meaning systems." Habermas' proposal of communicative knowledge stands as a remedy to the 'vacuous' tendencies of scientism. It emphasizes "the understanding of the meanings given to social interactions by those involved," (Maguire, 1987:14), and in so doing fosters meaningful, undistorted dialogue. The ideology of scientism has impeded such dialogue, fostering instead 'hidden' meanings and cultural manipulation (e.g., bureaucratically defined 'public interests'). Alternately, communicative knowledge necessitates the involvement of, for example, households, local communities, and social movements¹⁴¹ in decision-making processes (processes typically dominated by 'experts'). Only through such involvement can *meaning* of our social relationships even be established.

A major source of difficulty within the hermeneutic tradition is that of 'legitimation'. Meanings attached to human actions are necessarily imprecise (they are, after all, products of 'interpretation'). Accordingly, "there can never be a completely correct interpretation"¹⁴²; tension will always exist between what is intended (by the speaker or actor) and what is actually understood (by the

¹⁴⁰ 'Hermeneutics' is essentially "the theory and method of interpreting meaningful human action" (Abercrombie, et al., 1984:112).

¹⁴¹ See Friedmann (1987:394).

¹⁴² Abercrombie, et al (1984:112).

listener or observer). It is in response to this issue that Habermas asserts the necessity of critical knowledge. This knowledge, which is based on our emancipatory interests, is a product of historical analysis and self-reflection. As Maguire writes,

Critical inquiry is structured to uncover the systems of social relationships and the contradictions which underlie social tensions and conflicts. Through self-reflection, analysis of social systems, and action, people come to understand and try to change supposed "natural" constraints.¹⁴³

Critical inquiry, then, challenges individuals to 'ferret out' the irrationalities and inconsistencies in their understandings of themselves and their relationships with society (and, indeed, other societies). Relevant to such inquiry is not only the analysis of means but also of ends: it requires, that is, the rational analysis of both descriptive *and* normative claims. As Geuss points out, "in most of the interesting cases the ideological delusion to be rooted out...is not an empirical error even of the most sophisticated kind, but something quite different" (1988:12). Accordingly, value choices must be subjected to scrutiny: Is one value choice inconsistent with another? If so, what might the sources of this inconsistency be? Are one's beliefs and values ultimately consistent with (or supportive of) oppressive social institutions? What actions or practices have emancipatory potential?

Scientism maintains that value choices are simply a-rational: one choice is as good as another (this is, of course, in spite of its own

¹⁴³ Maguire (1987:14). Held (1980:324) provides an approximation of what this process involves (based on the model of psychoanalysis):

- 1) begin with an object the nature and meaning of which is in question;
- 2) employ 'dialogue', as in traditional hermeneutics, as an essential means of gaining data and exploring possible interpretations;
- 3) move beyond traditional interpretive techniques, because subjects' accounts of their behaviour include meanings which remain opaque due to distortion and repression;
- 4) explain the opaqueness through explanations involving causal order...with reference to a general theory...formulated within terms provided by a metatheory...; and
- 5) test the general theory by reconstruction of individual cases [or specific societies] and examine whether or not it has the capacity to reveal distortions of communication.

implicit appeal to certain values, namely, technical knowledge). Critique of institutions (e.g., bureaucratic or economic institutions) is thereby rendered a-rational. As Nielsen puts it: "Intelligentsia, under the sway of this scientific ideology, can barely conceive of the possibility that there could be any fundamental critique of social institutions. As they see it, a person who tries to do anything like that must be an ideologist."¹⁴⁴ The championing of instrumental rationality, however, has wreaked havoc - especially within development. One need only consider the fact that 'bottom line' development (i.e., development based on economic growth and efficiency) is fully consistent with war, pollution, human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and even poverty. Indeed, when these factors contribute to a nation's GNP, they are not only consistent with development, but are actually *economically viable*.¹⁴⁵

Little wonder, then, that even after decades of 'development' the grand proclamations of the U.N. are far from being realized.

11. Practical Implications

Where, in all of this, does this leave the 'development planner' - who, after years of institutional training and preparation, is supposedly positioned to effect development? By dispelling the myth of value-neutrality, we need not necessarily discount as irrelevant the development planner's 'knowledge' and skills (for example, of techniques, theories, and data). Indeed, as Habermas contends, such knowledge is necessary (though not sufficient) in emancipatory efforts. However, development planners must shed pretensions of 'knowing what is best.' The dismal record of development planning has at least shown this much to be true. What we can expect from the development planner, rather, is not unlike what we expect from each

¹⁴⁴ Nielsen "Critical Theory..." p.59.

¹⁴⁵ GNP, as an indicator of both growth and development, is simply a calculation of goods and services sold. A factory polluting a lake is thus not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, companies hired to clean up the mess actually add to the GNP. Moreover, if people happen to fall ill because of the contaminated water, this also adds to the GNP (they need to visit the doctor or maybe even hire a lawyer). See Waring (1988) for a thorough discussion of this phenomenon.

other: namely, a different viewpoint or perspective of a given situation. If a planner is worth her salt, her 'perspective' will translate into, for example, questions being raised within a project situation that might not otherwise have been raised, thereby enriching dialogue and (hopefully) raising consciousness of what does (and does not) contribute to emancipation. She may also impart knowledge and skills relating to organizational techniques (which would assist community mobilization), time management, workshop exercises (e.g., methods for determining participants' perspectives), and writing effective proposals for financial aid.

Linked to this re-defined role of the 'development expert' is the notion that planning methods must become more participatory. That is, given that the development planner may not 'know what is best', the active involvement of the community affected by a project or policy is all the more important in research and decision-making processes. Typically referred to as 'participatory action research' (PAR) or 'community participation' (CP), this approach seeks to establish planning *with* rather than *for* the people.¹⁴⁶ As Maguire writes,

Participatory research cautions against either dichotomy: "They know, I don't know." or "They don't know, I know." Instead, participatory research offers a partnership: *We both know some things; neither of us knows everything. Working together we will both know more, and we will both learn more about how to know.* Participatory research requires that both the researcher and researched be open to personal transformation and conscientization. Participatory research assumes that both parties come to the research process with knowledge and experience to contribute.¹⁴⁷

Though Maguire is here referring specifically to research methods, her comments are certainly relevant to planning methods in general. Indeed, from a planning perspective Maguire's suggestion translates into a shift from 'planning as social control' to 'planning as local self-determination'. Accordingly, the development planner "no longer designs only with scientific data and professional expertise but

¹⁴⁶ See Thomas (1985:13).

¹⁴⁷ Maguire (1987:37-38).

collaborates actively with clients [or stakeholders] in the formulation of...plans."¹⁴⁸

The major components of the rational planning model (i.e., problem definition, data collection, project design, implementation, monitoring, and feedback) may indeed retain their importance within a participatory approach (it is, for example, difficult to imagine a project proceeding without a clear definition of what problems it must address). However, if these components are adopted in a participatory project or policy-making situation, there are some guidelines that may prove useful. First, it must be recognized that the sequence of these components may not necessarily occur in a linear fashion - the planning process, in other words, is an iterative process. Indeed, problem definition may be returned to even at the implementation stage (e.g., unforeseen problems may emerge during implementation). Moreover, problem definition should not be the sole prerogative of the planner. Rather, it should involve an interactive process/dialogue between planners and relevant actors (e.g., stakeholders and bureaucrats) aimed at reaching a critical understanding of participants' (including planners') perspectives. Some questions which may be addressed include: What do the locals perceive as problem areas? How do these perceptions link to the broader context? What are the participants' values, attitudes, and experiences? And what are the community's expectations of the project or policy?

Data collection and analysis may also be undertaken by local communities. For example, household members may keep record of such activities as water collection (e.g., how many times a well is used) or travel methods (e.g., public transportation or biking).¹⁴⁹ Such participation, combined with the critical dialogue described above,

¹⁴⁸ Thomas (1985:16).

¹⁴⁹ The 'planner' must here be aware of such things as the differences in gender roles. For example, there may be a tendency for women to be designated as the 'household data collector' as they may be the dominant users of the resources in question. This may result in increasing women's workloads (which may, in turn, exacerbate community problems). Solutions to this will have to be worked out according to the specifics of the project or policy situation. (There is a related problem with organizing meeting times. Planners must be aware of women's schedules. They must also be aware of the implications of men and women meeting together - does this, for example, result in discussions dominated by one group over another?)

contributes to the development of participant solutions to problems as well as the definition of the problem. This includes participant identification of actions needed to address the problems and the feasibility of these actions (based on, for example, information gathered by the participants themselves). The chief benefit of such participation is that the solutions will likely be more appropriate to the situation at hand than they might otherwise have been. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of the success of the policy or project after the planner has left.¹⁵⁰

12. Conclusion

According to the Old Testament, efforts to build a Tower which reached to the heavens were frustrated by God's willed distortion of the languages of its builders. In the twentieth century, such willed distortion has again afflicted human efforts. This time, however, scientism (and not God) is the source of distorted languages. And the Tower left unbuilt is not one which had the heavenly purpose of reaching God, but rather the human purpose of reaching emancipation. 'Development' is indeed a twentieth century Tower of Babel.

¹⁵⁰ The ideas expressed here essentially challenge the existing power relations in society. Friedmann's notion of 'civil society' is an important link to this challenge as it embodies the notion that "...it is no longer the state that is addressed but the people, particularly those of working-class origins who...are fundamentally opposed to the bureaucratic state and, more generally, to every form of alienated power" (Friedmann, 1987:55). Friedmann's notions of social learning and radical planning are further links to this challenge. Briefly, social learning (a normative planning theory) posits an alternative to the more scientific social reform and policy analysis approaches. In particular, it focuses on mutual learning (e.g., between planners and participants) whereby goals and objectives emerge during processes of dialogue. This stands in contrast to the rational planning model, which requires the setting of goals and objectives at the beginning of the planning process by the planning 'expert'. Habermas' notion of communicative rationality is thus implicit in social learning. Friedmann's 'radical planning' can also be cast in Habermasian terms. Radical planning is based on the premise that challenging the power relations in society requires a bottom up (or grassroots) approach - it is, accordingly, an essentially critical approach. The 'radical' aspect of this approach stems from the notion that such 'planning' stands in necessary opposition to existing power relations and the structures which support them. See Friedmann (1987) for a detailed discussion of civil society, social learning, and radical planning.

Perhaps the ideals in both cases lay forever out of human reach. But perhaps, also, faith in their inherent 'goodness' or 'worthiness' is what compels humans forward - even if only to achieve momentary glimpses of, in the words of Martin Luther King, the 'promised land'.

To achieve glimpses of peace, health, equality, justice, and well-being, we need a "wisdom to match our sciences."¹⁵¹ We need, that is, critical thought and meaningful dialogue. Modernization, dependency, and world system perspectives have largely precluded this possibility through their implicit appeal to scientism. Indeed, the grip of scientism has reduced even some of the more 'forward-thinking' approaches (e.g., basic needs and a New International Economic Order) to mere payments of lip-service. That such lip-service is being paid, however, is itself cause for hope:¹⁵² the possibility of actually doing development planning in a different way is at least recognized. In effect, a fighting chance is given to, for example, non-governmental organizations, grassroots movements, and participatory action research - all of which challenge conventional notions of 'expertise' and 'top-down' planning.

¹⁵¹ Goulet (1992:472).

¹⁵² See Goulet (1992:469).

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APPENDIX A

Reproduced from A. Y. So, Social Change and Development
(1990:138)

Comparison of Old Dependency Studies and New Dependency Studies

	<i>Old Dependency Studies</i>	<i>New Dependency Studies</i>
Similarities		
focus of research	Third World development	same
level of analysis	national level	same
key concepts	core-periphery, dependency	same
policy implications	dependency harmful to development	same
Differences		
methodology	high-level abstraction, focus on general pattern of dependency	historical-structural, focus on concrete situation of dependency
key factors	emphasis on external: unequal exchange, colonialism	emphasis on internal: class conflict, the state
nature of dependency	mostly an economic phenomenon	mostly a sociopolitical phenomenon
dependency and development	mutually exclusive: lead only to underdevelopment	can coexist: associated-dependent development

APPENDIX B

Reproduced from A. Y. So, Social Change and Development
(1990:195)

Comparison of Dependency Perspective and World-System Perspective.

	<i>Dependency Perspective</i>	<i>World-System Perspective</i>
Unit of analysis	the nation-state	the world-system
Methodology	structural-historical: boom and bust of nation-states	historical dynamics of the world-system: cyclical rhythms and secular trends
Theoretical structure	bimodal: core-periphery	trimodal: core-semiperiphery- periphery
Direction of development	deterministic: dependency is generally harmful	possible upward and downward mobility in the world-economy
Research focus	on the periphery	on the periphery as well as on the core, the semiperiphery, and the world-economy

APPENDIX C

Reproduced from A. Y. So, Social Change and Development
(1990:62)

Comparison of Classical Modernization Studies and New Modernization Studies

	<i>Classical Modernization Studies</i>	<i>New Modernization Studies</i>
Similarities		
research focus	Third World development	same
level of analysis	national level	same
key variables	internal factors: cultural values and social institutions	same
key concepts	tradition and modernity	same
policy implications	modernization generally beneficial	same
Differences		
on tradition	tradition an obstacle to development	tradition an additive factor of development
on methodology	typology construction high-level abstraction	concrete case studies historical analysis
on direction of development	unidirectional path toward the U.S. model	multidirectional paths of development
on external factors and conflict	relative neglect of external factors and conflict	greater attention to external factors and conflict