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Organizational identity, power, and peacekeeping: An analysis of informal communication in Canada's military

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Organizational identity, power, and peacekeeping: An analysis of informal communication in

Canada's military

by

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Abstract

I assume a critical-interpretivist stance to analyze the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as an organization, which enables me to go behind the scenes of its allegedly hierarchical and rigid power structures. While conducting a qualitative thematic analysis of one discussion on the Army.ca website, I uncover how soldiers resist organizational control in their informal communication. I argue that soldiers who post on the forum exert power by challenging and redefining the notions of peacekeeping and military identity in their comments. In their interactions, soldiers resist the publicly accepted image of the CAF as a peacekeeping force and reclaim their identity as warfighters. Grounding this research in organizational communication theory, I apply a communication lens to the CAF and show how the concepts of organizational culture, identity, image, power, and resistance are produced, contested, and reproduced through the process of communication, constantly interconnecting and mutually influencing each other.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Definition
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CF	Canadian Forces
DND	Department of National Defence
PK	Peacekeeping

INTRODUCTION

Participation of Canadian troops in the “war on terror” led by the United States (2001-2014) has profoundly changed the ways the general public perceives the military institution and its role in Canada (Anker, 2005; Granatstein, 2007). The war overall, and the start of the Canadian mission in Kandahar in 2005-2006 in particular, has put the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)¹ at the center of public attention. Debates around the roles and responsibilities of Canadian troops first started when several newspapers presented Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan as a sign of the transformation of Canada’s image from a world’s peacekeeper into a warrior involved in combat (Cohen, 2005; Curry, 2006; Dawson, 2005; Moore, 2005). This provoked heated discussions among both the Canadian public and the military about peacekeeping and the role of the troops. These debates underlie the contextual premises of the present research endeavour.

The topic of peacekeeping, and specifically peacekeeping in Canada, proved a fruitful area for research. Anker’s (2005) analysis of public opinion on peacekeeping in Canada reveals a lack of public understanding of what modern peacekeeping stands for even though it shows that the public generally believes that Canada’s soldiers are exclusively peacekeepers (Anker, 2005). Similarly, Granatstein (2007) points out Canadians’ distorted understanding of the military’s function exacerbated by what he calls “a peacekeeping myth” (p. 25). In general, the literature on the subject contains multiple attempts to define and redefine the concept of peacekeeping, as

¹ The official name of this organization was changed to the Canadian Armed Forces in 2014. For this reason, a lot of earlier sources still refer to it as the Canadian Forces (CF). For the purposes of consistency, I use the updated name, the CAF, throughout my thesis.

well as to demonstrate its evolution and transformation over time (Findlay, 2002; Gerchikoff, 2013; Legare & Tanguay, 2009; Rudderham, 2008; Windsor, 2009).

Although Canada's public perceptions on both peacekeeping and the military are an important factor in my research, in my thesis I focus exclusively on the military organization in Canada. More specifically, I explore how soldiers working for the CAF define their role and identity in the context of peacekeeping debates. An overarching research question for my study is as follows: How do Canadian soldiers talk about the role of the military, organizational identity, and peacekeeping in their informal communication? The research is based on one particular example of informal communication among CAF members, namely an online forum posted on the Army.ca website (www.army.ca). This website was created in the 1990s and represented an information page about Canada's military. With its development, it has also become a venue where military members and those interested in the CAF could discuss any issues connected with the military ("About this site", 2010). The general public has full access to this website and to forum threads posted there.

The forum includes a discussion topic entitled *The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)*, which I analyze using a qualitative thematic analysis method. This forum discussion started in 2005 and still remains open for comments. It is on this forum that soldiers provide their unique vision of military's professional role and identity, as well as express their interpretation of peacekeeping and its place within their profession. Other topics under discussion concern civil-military relations, as well as soldiers' commentary on how the military profession is presented by the CAF, media, and politicians in Canada. It is precisely for these reasons I have selected this discussion thread for my analysis. Taking this angle provides a unique opportunity for analyzing soldiers' perspectives on civil-military relations in Canada. In

my qualitative thematic analysis, I establish themes that are recurrent in the conversations of the forum's users.

In order to answer my research question, I analyze the CAF as an organization. The organizational reality of the CAF provides frames of reference for the members of this organization. Additionally, understanding how this organization functions facilitates understanding of the themes soldiers might bring up in their interactions. For these reasons, I ground my research in organizational communication theory and explore various perspectives on organizations and key concepts that underlie them, which I subsequently apply to study the CAF. The organizational concepts relevant to my study include organizational culture, identity, public image, power, and communication. Organizational communication theory offers several ways to conceptualize organizations and explains how these concepts interact with each other and the role they play within an organizational setting.

The CAF, as any military institution, is considered a powerful actor, which exercises control over its members' behaviours and interactions (Foucault, 1984a; Goffman, 1962; Guimond, 1995). In this context, the military culture, comprised of values and identity specific to the CAF, can be seen as defined by military leaders and transmitted down to subordinates who accept and internalize it during the process of professional education and training (Evetts, 2003; Guimond, 1995). This perspective is largely applied to the study of military institutions, in which the power relations are understood as top-down and culture, identity, and values are perceived as tools to ensure uniform understanding and practice of the profession (Downes, 1985; English, 2004; Evetts, 2003). In this manner, these concepts do not interact with each other but exist as separate phenomena within an institution.

The goal of my research is to put the key elements of the military organization in dialogue with each other with a view to demonstrate their interconnectedness and interdependence. In doing so, I seek to challenge a taken-for-granted assumption that the military organization itself and the power it exerts are rigid constructions. The interpretation of military organizational culture, identity, and power as interconnected phenomena becomes possible when looking at an organization through a communication lens and perceiving it as culture, a living organism, prone to changes, and constituted through the process of communication (Keyton, 2014; Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Putnam & Mumby, 2014).

The process whereby organizational identity is formed is inextricably linked with the establishment and distribution of power in organizations (Deetz, 2001; Mumby, 2001, 2011). By bringing the aspect of power in my research, I am able to explore alternative understandings of power relations within the military. Although I acknowledge organizational regulations and military leaders' control over their subordinates, my position is that one can view military organizational power as something that is acquired and exercised in the process of interaction. This interpretation stems from the Foucauldian understanding of power in organizations, and is supported by many organizational communication scholars (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Mumby, 2001; Schneider, 2007; Zoller, 2014).

According to Schneider (2007), power is an "interactional accomplishment" (p. 181) dependent on the "access to interactional resources" (p. 196). In my view, informal communication becomes such an interactional resource for military personnel. In informal settings, soldiers are not restricted by regulations and rules imposed on their communication by the organization, which implies that they may express their opinions in a more open and honest way. My objective is to determine and analyze how soldiers on Army.ca talk about their identity

and peacekeeping. For this reason, focusing on informal communication provides an opportunity to uncover soldiers' actual understanding of their role, as opposed to reiterating an organizationally approved official definition. Consistent with the Foucauldian understanding of power, I interpret any differences between the official position of the CAF and informal positions of its individual employees on the subject of peacekeeping and the military's role as a form of covert resistance to organizational power. In doing so, I follow Hardy and Clegg's (2006), Murphy's (1998), and Zoller's (2014) approaches to analyzing subtle or hidden resistance in organizations.

The purpose of this study is to establish whether informal communication among soldiers reproduces official definitions dictated by the CAF, or deviates from the narrative imposed by the organization. To the best of my knowledge, the proposed research angle, which is grounded in communication theory and methodology and is fully dedicated to informal communication among soldiers, is unique. The CAF's official position on the military's role and peacekeeping is expressed in *Duty with Honour*, a formal document containing definitions of the military profession in Canada, as well as other cornerstone documents, such as the *Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Forces (CF) Code of Ethics and Values*, *Leadership in Canadian Forces*, and, most importantly *Canadian Military Doctrine*. This position is further discussed in scholarly articles on the subject (Anker, 2005; Granatstein, 2007; Maloney, 1996; Legare & Tanguay, 2009). Therefore, rather than examining the CAF's statements, I offer a glance behind the scenes of the CAF to discover soldiers' opinions on the matters of the military profession, identity, and peacekeeping.

To be more precise, I explore the relations between organizational culture, identity, public image, and power as displayed in informal communication of the CAF members. I argue

that soldiers, who participate in the online military forum on the Army.ca website, consistently challenge the official discourse, which positions soldiers as peacekeepers, and (re)claim their identity as warfighters. In their comments on the forum, soldiers gain power and demonstrate resistance to far-reaching organizational control. Even though the image of a warfighter might hold less appeal to the public than that of a peacekeeper, the CAF members, encouraged by the anonymity of this online forum, demonstrate a strong preference for an honest, albeit potentially less palatable, image that contravenes official perceptions. In this manner, military employees create an alternative discourse on their rigidly defined and organizationally vetted identity.

It is important to note that the term *identity* as used in this research stands for the identity of an organization, meaning the way an organization defines itself. This concept is different from an understanding of identity proposed within an organizational research context, which focuses on individual members' identities and the ways they clash with or adjust to the organizational vision (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, & Ganesh, 2004; Zoller, 2014). In my understanding, organizational identity should also be separated from an organization's public image, which concerns the way the public perceives an organization (Hatch & Schultz, 1997). Therefore, organizational identity is how an organization perceives itself, whereas a public image denotes the way others perceive this organization.

The structure of my research is as follows. In Chapter 1, I provide theoretical premises for my research. I analyze organizational communication literature in order to identify and define possible approaches to conceptualizing organizations and their elements. I distinguish between the functionalist, interpretivist, and critical paradigms for studying organizations. The understanding of organizations as cultures, which guides my research, comes from the interpretivist perspective on organizations. More specifically, I treat an organization as culture,

comprised of values and identity shared by its members. An organization appears as a site, where the meaning is constructed, contested, and disseminated among members (Deetz, 2001).

However, in order to explore power relations and the process of contestation of organizational meaning, I infuse my analysis with a critical element. Similar to Murphy's (1998) analysis of flight attendant resistance to the rules imposed by airlines, I recognize that "organizations are not neutral sites of meaning formation, but rather contested fields" (p. 500). By focusing on organizational power and its exercise and contestation, I add a critical perspective to my research, which aligns it with Deetz's (2001) and Mumby's (2012) explanations of the premises of critical research on organizations. Defining the broader framework within which I position my research allows me to engage in further discussion of organizational elements.

Having established a critical-interpretivist stance of my research, I then define and analyze each key concept relevant to my inquiry. More specifically, I analyze several perspectives on power and resistance that feature prominently in organizational communication studies. Furthermore, I define the concepts of organizational identity and public image and explore the way in which they fit into the discussion of power relations within an organization. The role of communication in an organization is a concept that transcends the entire chapter and lends support to my proposition that cultures are communicatively constituted (Putnam, Nicotera, & McPhee, 2009; Putnam & Murphy, 2014).

Chapter 2 discusses several perspectives on organizational identity in the CAF. Although from the functionalist perspective, the CAF appears as a powerful organization with a rigidly defined identity, recent peacekeeping debates have revealed the existence of several perspectives on identity within the CAF. In this chapter, I define and analyze an official definition of organizational identity as stated in the core document of the CAF, *Duty with Honour* (National

Defence, 2009). I proceed with a discussion of two competing perspectives on organizational function and identity within the military institution in Canada, namely traditionalist and modernist. These positions provide potential frames of reference, which may influence the ways soldiers define identity of their organization. The chapter concludes with an analysis of a competing public image of the CAF as a peacekeeping force, in which I define peacekeeping and discuss the role that the Canadian public attributes to this concept.

In Chapter 3, I provide a detailed discussion of my methodology, a qualitative thematic analysis, in which I define and explain this specific method of data analysis and justify my choice of methodology. In my assessment of strengths and weaknesses of this method, I situate it within a broader discussion of advantages and limitations of the qualitative methodology. The chapter also includes a detailed description of the stages of my analysis, starting with the introduction of my dataset, followed by the development and application of selection criteria, and the stages of open coding, categories formation, and theme development. To conclude this chapter, I discuss challenges encountered during my analysis, as well as limitations of applying this specific method to analyze a selected dataset.

Finally, Chapter 4 contains the discussion of findings retrieved from my data, whereby I present overarching themes and recurring patterns discovered in the process of thematic analysis. Throughout this chapter, I pay specific attention to the way that soldiers who post on Army.ca exert power and practice resistance in their comments. To do so, I analyze multiple deviations in soldiers' interaction from the CAF's organizational position on the concepts of identity, public image, and peacekeeping, as well as analyze the language in their comments. I conclude my thesis by identifying connections between various concepts underlying organizations to demonstrate how they manifest themselves in the case of the CAF. I also demonstrate how the

findings of my research support the argument that I put forward. Lastly, I discuss the contributions of my research to the theory of organizational communication and military studies, as well as identify opportunities for future research.

Chapter One: **THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONS IN COMMUNICATION STUDIES**

In order to understand how organizational identity, power, and communication interplay with each other in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), it is essential to understand the CAF as an organization. This chapter contains theoretical perspectives on studying organizations through a communication lens, including perspectives on key concepts in organizational studies, such as organizational culture, identity, image, power, and resistance. Different perspectives on organizations influence the ways scholars view these key concepts and the role they attribute to communication. The objective of this chapter is twofold: to provide definitions of relevant terms and concepts and to discuss and justify a perspective I assume in my further research. Therefore, the discussion below includes sources and concepts relevant to my research interest.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, I provide a discussion of researchers' approaches to conceptualizing organizations and organizational communication. In the second part, I present several approaches to conceptualize power and resistance in organizations. Next, I define and explain the concepts of organizational identity and image construction from a communication perspective. This discussion includes the processes of socialization of new members and members' identification with a certain organizational culture, since those are mechanisms organizations employ to ensure a certain identity is shared by organizational members (Cheney et al., 2004). Furthermore, according to Lukes, the processes of socialization and identification are sites where power is exercised and/or resisted (as cited in Mumby, 2001). Finally, throughout this chapter I examine the role of communication and interactional processes within each perspective and where communication stands in relation to discussed concepts and notions.

1.1 Perspectives on Organization, Organizational Culture, and Communication

Different perspectives on organizations and their cultures allow us to distinguish between three dominant paradigms in organizational communication studies: functionalist, interpretivist, and critical (Cheney et al., 2004; Putnam et al., 2009; Papa, Daniels, & Spiker, 2008). The main dissimilarity between the functionalist, interpretivist, and critical approaches lies in the way they view culture within an organization, which influences goals and purposes of research projects. In what follows, I present the functionalist perspective in comparison with and in opposition to its interpretivist and critical counterparts. The points of comparison between various perspectives are their stances on organization, culture, and communication.

Functionalist perspective. The functionalist perspective was predominant in organizational communication in the early stages of development of the field. Some scholars refer to this perspective as the *traditional* (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Papa et al., 2008) or *instrumental* approach (Cheney et al., 2004). The main assumption underlying this perspective is that organizations *have* culture (Cheney et al., 2004; Putnam & Mumby, 2014). This approach treats culture as an object, an instrument, a “variable” (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001, p. 296), which can be measured and controlled with the purpose of influencing certain developments within an organization, such as increasing its performance or effectiveness (Cheney et al., 2004). Similarly, Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujillo (1982) emphasize the pragmatic orientation of this approach: “The traditional approach derives from the pragmatic motive to understand how organizations work so managers can make them work better” (p. 119). This position signifies proximity of organizational communication and managerial studies in the

initial stages of development of the discipline when “definitions and characteristics of organizations [were] based on administrative management” (Putnam et al., 2009, p. 6).

From a functionalist point of view, an organization is reified as a container, as a “physical entity with height, depth, breadth, and fixed boundaries” (Putnam et al., 2009, p. 7; see also Putnam & Mumby, 2014). Alternatively, organizations were construed as machines or living systems (Papa et al., 2008). Organizational communication, from this perspective, is a “transfer of information” and not “a complex, multi-dimensional process through which organizing takes place” as it became viewed later (Papa et al., 2008, p. 2). Putnam et al. (2009) describe that in the functionalist paradigm organizational communication stands for “messages [sent] up and down channels through superior-subordinate interactions and through internal communication networks” (p. 5). Similarly, Putnam and Mumby (2014) say that in the container model, communication was viewed as “transmission, information flow, message exchange, message functions, distortion, and overload” (p. 2). Thus, in functionalist research, organizational culture and communication become elements in an organization that exist and occur within the limits of such a container. The relationship between organization and communication in this case is the one of “containment” (Smith as cited in Putnam et al., 2009, p. 7).

The functionalist approach to organizations has been critiqued for multiple reasons. First, organizational scholars disagree that organizational boundaries necessarily make organizations into containers (Cheney et al., 2004). Although this perspective “provided an easy way to examine communication within the container or to focus on an organization’s messages and audiences external to the corporation” (Putnam et al., 2009, p. 7), Cheney et al. (2004) maintain that organizational boundaries are not fixed but fluid and flexible. This makes organizations responsive to different changes and processes in the social world. When disputing the nature of

the boundaries, Cheney et al. (2004) nevertheless hold organizational boundaries as “the most critical feature of [organizational] culture [because] it defines a space within which certain behaviours are expected” (Cheney et al., 2004, p. 77). Therefore, this critique neither denies the existence of the organizational boundaries nor underestimates their meaning for organizations. Rather, it brings into question the flexibility and role of organizational boundaries.

Furthermore, in their critique of the functionalist perspective, Cheney et al. (2004) disagree with its presumption that organizational culture is a static and consistent set of values and practices shared by all members and used as a control tool by the management. In fact, any culture, including its organizational counterpart, is diverse and often consists of multiple and sometimes opposing subcultures (Cheney et al., 2004; Morgan, 1996). As Morgan (1996) points out, some members of a culture often challenge and even reject its values. This way, organizational culture is not a stable formation but an entity prone to change.

In the 1980s, some scholars began questioning the very existence of organizations. The functionalist position that maintained organizations as “social facts” (Putnam et al., 2009, p. 6) was deemed insufficient to address and explain processes within organizations. Looking for answers to how organizations have come to exist in the first place, an increasing number of scholars began to approach organizations as social constructions giving rise to the interpretivist and critical perspectives on organizations.

Interpretivist and critical perspectives: commonalities. When explaining organizational culture, scholars place the interpretivist and critical views in opposition to the functionalist one (Keyton, 2014; Putnam et al., 2009; Putnam & Mumby, 2014). In their work, Cheney et al. (2004) unite these two paradigms under a single term the “symbolist perspective on organizational culture” (p. 88). While this position highlights the common ground shared by the

interpretivist and critical views, for the purposes of clarity and consistency I separate these two paradigms in my discussion.

Central to the interpretivist and critical paradigms is the view of organizations as cultures (Keyton, 2014; Mumby, 2012; Papa et al., 2008; Putnam et al., 2009; Putnam & Mumby, 2014). More specifically, culture becomes “a metaphor for describing the whole organization, its structures and processes, its imaginary and material dimensions” (Cheney et al., 2004, p. 89). In their turn, Keyton (2014) and Morgan (1996) refer to culture as a root metaphor for organizations. Therefore, according to these perspectives, organizations *are* cultures, which implies that organizations consist of elements and levels attributed to culture (Keyton, 2014; Morgan, 1996; Putnam & Mumby, 2014).

In order to understand in more detail what it means to perceive organizations as cultures, it is necessary to include definitions of culture accepted by organizational communication scholars. Putnam and Mumby (2014), Cheney et al. (2004), and Keyton (2014) suggest that many organizational communication scholars employ Schein’s model of culture. As these authors discuss, Schein maintains that cultures exist at three levels: the level of beliefs and assumptions, the level of values, and the level of artifacts. In Schein’s perspective, members of culture accept fundamental assumptions as truth, whereas values can be challenged and rejected. Artifacts are “the most visible, tangible levels of culture” displayed in rituals, processions, logos, or dress uniforms (Cheney et al., 2004, p. 78). Keyton (2014) considers that these levels of culture are not discussed directly but rather revealed in workplace interactions among organizational employees. Such a position confirms the definition of organizational culture as “the set of artifacts, values, and assumptions that emerges from the interactions of organizational members” accepted in a communication approach to culture (Keyton, 2014, p. 550).

Additionally, it links together organizational culture and the process of interaction, as communication becomes a means of formation and distribution of culture.

When discussing organizations as cultures, Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujillo (1982) rely on Geertz's conceptualization of culture as a sense-making process. Geertz presents culture as "a reality constructed and displayed by those whose existence is embedded in it" (as cited in Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 123). Similarly, Morgan (1996) defines culture as a "shared sense-making" (p. 138) conceiving sharedness or commonality of meaning as one of the ways that culture reproduces and maintains itself. This way, organizational culture becomes a site where a certain meaning is produced, contested, and then reproduced.

In his analysis of control and commitment in a high-tech corporation, Kunda (1992) focuses on an interpretation of culture as a construction. He sees culture as "something to be engineered, researched, designed, developed, and maintained in order to facilitate the accomplishment of company goals" (Kunda, 1992, p. 7). On one hand, this position reflects functionalist residue when culture was perceived as an instrument to increase organizational effectiveness. On the other hand, it is consistent with the position accepted in communication studies that cultures are socially constructed realities. Keyton (2014) acknowledges that although such a position aligns with the functionalist approach to culture, it is still present and relevant in modern organizational research.

Evidently, there are different definitions of culture within organizational communication studies. Nevertheless, these conceptualizations of culture include several common elements, which are relevant when researching organizations from a communication perspective. First, they interpret culture as a multifaceted or multilayered construction reproduced and shared by its members. Approaching organizations from the social constructionist stance allows

communication scholars to preserve a multiplicity of directions and theories in this field of study. This position underscores the nexus between organization, culture, and communication. As Mumby (2012) explains, in social constructionism, “language and communication do not simply reflect the reality, but actually create the realities in which we live” (p. 45). This leads to the second common element underlying the definitions of organizations as cultures: the active role of communication in constituting organizations (Mumby, 2012; Putnam et al., 2009). Linking culture to communicative activities implies that culture, and by extension organization, is not a fixed, static phenomenon but a fluid process. In this light, the process of communication can be interpreted as such action, which enables emergence, formation, and maintenance of organizations. This leads organizational communication scholars to believe that organizations are communicatively constituted (Deetz & Eger, 2014; McPhee & Zaug, 2009; Putnam et al., 2009).

Thus, in the interpretivist and critical paradigms, communication is no longer an exchange of information, or a means to transfer information; rather it is a process through which organizations are socially constructed (Mumby, 2011, 2012; Papa et al., 2008; Putnam et al., 2009; Putnam & Mumby, 2014). This position implies that communication offers an explanation for the existence of organizations (Putnam & Mumby, 2014). More specifically, a communication approach to study organizations explains “the production of social structures, psychological states, member categories, knowledge, [and] power” in organizations (Deetz & Eger, 2014, p. 30). This way, communication is not just another element that exists in organizations but rather a process that relates to and penetrates all other concepts that comprise organizations. These common views on culture and communication as interrelated phenomena in organizations constitute similarities between the interpretivist and critical perspectives.

Nevertheless, there are several differences between the two paradigms as discussed below.

Interpretivist and critical perspectives: differences. Despite these common foundations, Deetz (2001) places interpretivist and critical studies of organizations on the opposite sides of a consensus-dissensus spectrum. According to his classification, interpretivist studies assume a consensus orientation, in which they “seek to discover the organizational culture or cultures” (Deetz, 2001, p. 15). This implies that researchers conducting interpretivist studies take on a position of an observer who discovers certain aspects of an organization. According to Deetz (2001), the main goal of interpretivist studies is to “show how particular realities are socially produced and maintained through ordinary talk, stories, rites, rituals, and other daily activities” (p. 23). This objective grants interpretivist studies a certain degree of neutrality. For example, Deetz (2001) maintains that language in the interpretivist perspective serves as a mirror, “as a system of representations, to be neutralized and made transparent, used only to display the presumed shared world” (p. 15). The interpretivist position, then, connects culture and communication while aiming at the neutral representation of organizational culture displayed through workplace interaction.

In contrast, critical studies fall under the dissensus category, which accepts “struggle, conflict, and tensions to be the natural state” (Deetz, 2001, p. 15). Organizations are envisioned as a “historical creations accomplished in conditions of struggle and power relations” (Deetz, 2001, p. 25). Comparing the role assigned to language in the two perspectives, Deetz (2001) explains that in critical studies “the ‘mirror’ gives way to the ‘lens’ as the dominant metaphor for language and theory” (p. 15). This way, a researcher in critical studies assumes an active position and employs the critical lens to reveal and critique the power relations in organizations and how they are reflected, enabled, or resolved through communication (Deetz, 2001).

Although the interpretivist and critical paradigms both maintain that organizations are cultures constituted through the process of communication, their conceptualizations of culture also differ. In the interpretivist view, culture serves as a point of reference, a guiding mark for organizational members:

Culture draws attention to what organizational members must know, believe, or be able to do in order to operate in a manner that is understandable and acceptable to other members and the means by which this knowledge, belief, and action routines are produced and reproduced. [...] Communication is considered to be a central means by which the meaning of organizational events is produced and sustained.

(Deetz, 2001, p. 24)

Contrastingly, according to the critical approach, culture can be used for the purposes of oppression and manipulation, in which a dominant culture can suppress subcultures or require strong identification with it in order to integrate members (Deetz, 2001; Mumby, 2012; Papa et al., 2008). According to Murphy (1998), critical research reveals the exercise of power.

The concept of power, therefore, is intertwined with the concepts of culture and communication in organizations. Although this concept appears more prominently in the critical perspective, it is also an important part of research that assumes the functionalist or the interpretivist stances. Therefore, for further analysis it is important to discuss how power is conceptualized in organizations, as well as how the functionalist, interpretivist, and critical paradigms construe power.

1.2 Perspectives on Power and Resistance within Organizations

Power and resistance are key concepts in studying organizations (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Mumby, 2001, 2014; Zoller, 2014). According to Mumby (2001), power can be considered “a

defining, ubiquitous feature of organizational life” (p. 585). The perception of power in organizational communication has changed over time (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Zoller, 2014; Mumby, 2001). Earlier conceptualizations of power proposed in the models of Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962) regarded power as inherently connected to decision-making and conflict (as cited in Mumby, 2001; Zoller, 2014). This view of power was challenged by Lukes’s (1974) interpretation that maintains that power and power relations are permanently present in organizations even when there is no conflict (as cited in Mumby, 2001; Zoller, 2014). This position of power is largely accepted in modern organizational communication studies.

In what follows, I analyze the functionalist and critical perspectives on power in organizations based on Hardy and Clegg’s (2006) discussion of two “founding voices” (p. 754). Furthermore, similar to Schneider’s (2007) approach, I add the ‘third voice’ to the discussion, namely a perception based on Foucauldian ideas on power and resistance. These positions on power in organizations mirror the functionalist, interpretivist, and critical perspectives on organizational culture discussed in the previous section. The way each of these perspectives construes culture in organizations is decisive to the way they view and examine power. Whereas the functionalist perspective interprets culture as an instrument of power and dominance, studying organizations as cultures reveals the nexus between power, culture, and communication in organizations and allows exploration of the intricacies of this connection.

With regards to power, the difference between the interpretivist and critical perspectives lies in the expected outcome of research. Whereas the interpretivist approach “focuses on the achievement of consensus [and] takes a descriptive stance,” its critical counterpart aims at “understanding, critique, emancipation, and social change” (Zoller, 2014, p. 596). Mumby, (2012) in his analysis of the critical perspective to organizations, argues that in critical studies

“organizational meaning construction cannot be understood without examining organizations as political structures where power plays a central role” (p. 21). According to this perspective, culture is engineered and language is used in order to enhance power in an organization (Mumby, 2012). Nevertheless, power is exercised “unobtrusively”:

Organizations do not exercise power coercively but rather through developing consensus about various work issues. [...] Organizations engage in “unobtrusive control” in which members come to accept the value premises on which their organization operates and actively adopt those premises in organizational behaviour.

(Mumby, 2012, p. 46)

Despite their differences, the critical and interpretivist positions on organizational culture share a similar stance to power as dominance. This position is commonly referred to as a *critical* approach to conceptualize power in organizations (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Mumby, 2001; Schneider, 2007).

The critical approach to power stems from the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber, focusing on an explanation of power relations in the conditions of the division of labour (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Mumby, 2001; Schneider, 2007). This position presupposes the existence of several interest groups within an organization and unequal distribution of power among them (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Schneider, 2007). Accordingly, organizational power relations are hierarchical, wherein power becomes a tool of domination, regulation, and control practiced by a powerful interest group over other powerless groups. In this case, power gains material features and becomes something a group can possess, apply, or lose (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Zoller, 2014).

In a similar way, the functionalist perspective on power shares “the sovereign notion of power,” meaning it views power as “imposed from above” (Schneider, 2007, p. 183). In the

functionalist research on organizations, culture is construed as an instrument to exert managerial control over subordinates (Cheney et al., 2004). For this reason, the functionalist approach to power is also called “managerialist,” because it attributes all power to a managerial group within an organization (Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p. 754). This position reiterates Dahl’s definition of power as it implies that managers in organizations exercise power over subordinates with the purpose of control (Morgan, 1996). Interestingly, from this position, authority of organizational elites is accepted as legitimate and undisputable, whereas any challenge to it is considered illegitimate (Hardy & Clegg, 2006). This way, in the functionalist perspective, power within an organization is dichotomized as legitimate versus illegitimate, i.e. “hierarchically structured and distributed [versus] exercised outside formal structures” (Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p. 756).

Both the functionalist and critical views of power were critiqued for their unquestioning acceptance of hierarchical distribution of power in organizations as well as for treating power as a material possession of a certain group (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Schneider, 2007). Furthermore, both views posit power as a negative phenomenon presenting it as a tool of oppression and discrimination (Hardy & Clegg, 2006). Nevertheless, with the growing popularity of a Foucauldian conceptualization of power as “disciplinary” (Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p. 762), the idea of sovereignty of power in organizations has been substantially challenged and transformed (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Schneider, 2007; Zoller, 2014).

In his discussion of power, Foucault (1984b) introduces a concept of a “disciplinary power” – power, which relies on discipline as one of its techniques (p. 188). In contrast to the functionalist and critical perspectives, Foucault discovers a positive effect of disciplinary power. Although still aimed at domination, power in Foucault’s view (1984b) is not aimed at suppression of forces or their destruction. Rather, it “train[s] the sources [and] links them

together in such a way as to multiply and use them” (Foucault, 1984b, p. 188). This way, the ultimate purpose of applying power is not to reduce but to produce more forces that would potentially bear more utility for those with power:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” it “masks,” it “conceals.”

In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of object and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge [...] belong to this production.

(Foucault, 1984b, p. 204)

Similarly, Schneider (2007) in her commentary on Foucault highlights that power becomes a positive feature in organizations, enabling more opportunities for behaviour, as well as production of multiple knowledges and identities.

In his works, Foucault (1984a, 1984b) provides a historical perspective on the emergence of disciplinary institutions. In these institutions, power is not confined to one specific group, but rather it is dispersed and disseminated: “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault as cited in Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p. 765). Although Foucault goes on to state that power is “not an institution, [but] a name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault as cited in Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p. 765), his position on multiplicity of origins of power can be applied to analyze power relations in organizations.

When looking at organizations through a Foucauldian lens, scholars in the field see not only the end of the functionalist and critical assumptions about sovereignty of power (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Schneider, 2007), but also the end of a conception of power as a possession of one group. Foucault (1980) dismisses the assumption that power can be a static material possession

of one group. According to him, “power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised and that it only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980, p. 89). Some organizational scholars, who assume a communication lens in their research, extend this position to construe communicative acts as an action of power (Fay, 2011; Mumby, 2001; Murphy, 1998; Schneider, 2007). Any communicative practice, in Mumby’s view, is “fundamentally mediated by power” (as cited in Schneider, 2007, p. 184). Similarly, Schneider (2007) sees “every communicative interaction [as] an occasion to reproduce, undermine, or change apparently fixed power relations” (p. 196). This view echoes the view of communication as an active force of production, contestation, and reproduction of organizational culture, inherent to the interpretivist and critical perspectives on organizations.

Applying Foucault’s ideas to organizational research signals a shift toward a communication-based approach to power in organizations (Mumby, 2001; Schneider, 2007; Zoller, 2014). According to Mumby (2001), power in organizations “must be made sense of through a communicational lens. [...] [C]ommunication, power, and organization are interdependent and co-constructed phenomena” (p. 585). Similarly, Schneider (2007) proposes a perspective on power “as an interactional accomplishment produced by participants in the course of social interaction” (p. 181). Interestingly, if communication is the means to exercise power, it is also the means to resist it (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Schneider, 2007; Zoller, 2014).

According to Mumby and Clair, one manifestation of power is “[w]hen those with power are able to get those without power to interpret the world from the former’s point of view” (as cited in Zoller, 2014, p. 599). From the interpretivist and critical perspectives, organizations are sites that promote an organizational interpretation of the world among their members (Deetz, 2001; Mumby, 2011). Nevertheless, according to Schneider (2007), employees never fully

accept or decline these organizational frames or interpretations but rather reproduce certain “*versions* of them in their interaction” (p. 181; added emphasis). Similarly, Mumby and Clair see that power can be exercised by employees “through a set of interpretive frames that each worker incorporates as part of his/her identity” (Mumby & Clair, as cited in Zoller, 2014, p. 599). This position of organizational members practicing power by the means of their communication transforms the notion of employees’ resistance and breaks the functionalist dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate power in organizations.

Hardy and Clegg (2006) provide a detailed analysis of how the introduction of Foucauldian ideas to organizational research has transformed the understanding of employees’ resistance:

... [I]dentifying practices of resistance [is] no longer simply collective, organized action. Today, resistance has been so transformed that it is now inconspicuous, subtle, and unorganized, as well as indirect, mundane, and unplanned. [...]

Resistance used to stand in implacable opposition to power exercised by elite [...]. Now resistance is [practiced through] subtle forms of subversion invisible to superiors [...], but which nonetheless undermine organizational power relationship. (p. 768)

From this point of view, any communicative act can be construed as an act of resistance to power. Zoller (2014) and Hardy and Clegg (2006) point out that such acts as humour, cynicism, skepticism, sarcasm, ranting, and bitching, regardless of whether they are noticed or unnoticed by organizational higher-ups, are new forms of employees’ resistance. Zoller (2014) indicates that modern resistance in organizations can be overt (“public and visible”) and covert (“hidden and indirect”) (p. 607). Therefore, the forms of resistance in modern organizations are present on

an everyday basis, are relatively covert, and are “context-based” (Zoller, 2014, p. 608).

Generally, contexts for employees’ resistance are inextricably connected with contexts where organizations exercise power, such as internal policies regarding conduct and dress code (Cheney et al., 2004; Mumby, 2001; Murphy, 1998) or the processes of socialization and identification (Lukes as cited in Mumby, 2001). On a broader scale, these processes relate to the concept of organizational identity and image, which are defined and discussed in the next section.

1.3 Organizational Identity and Public Image

The concept of organizational identity, its construction, as well as the challenges it faces and changes it undergoes, is one of the hot topics within communication research on organizations (Cheney & Cristensen, 2001; Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013). This topic is also popular in research in other disciplines, such as organizational studies and management studies (Aust, 2004; Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Cheney et al., 2004; Gioia et al., 2013; Hatch & Schultz, 1997). In the conditions of globalization and change, organizations are preoccupied with defining who they are and what they stand for (Aust, 2004; Cheney et al., 2004; Gioia et al., 2013).

When providing a definition of organizational identity, many scholars rely on the one proposed by Albert and Whetten (1985) who name three qualities of any organization’s identity: it is central to an organization, distinctive from other organizations, and enduring over time (see Carlsen, 2009, p. 426; Cheney, Christensen & Dailey, 2014, p. 697; Cheney et al., 2004, p. 108; Hatch & Schultz, 1997, p. 357). Organizational identity is also interpreted as a sense of self based on shared values and missions of the organization (Gioia et al., 2013). As a rule, organizational identity is conceptualized as a complex, multi-level concept constructed

historically but also prone to change (Aust, 2004; Cheney et al., 2004). While scholarly inquiries on the issue of formation and change of organizational identity generally maintain it as a social construction, a communication lens applied to this concept goes further and “distinguishes communication as a central variable for determining an organization’s identity” (Aust, 2004, p. 516). In my thesis, I assume a communication-based approach to study organizational identity maintaining communication and identity as inextricably connected and mutually influential.

From a communication standpoint, organizational identity provides for various research angles including identity construction, transformation, articulation, promotion, and interconnection between identities on individual and organizational levels (Cheney et al., 2014). These processes can be broadly summarized under the categories of formation, socialization, and identification. Communication scholars see identity as “aris[ing] from and [being] shaped by interaction” both on individual and collective levels (Cheney et al., 2014, p. 699). Furthermore, Cheney et al. (2014) consider that organizational identity serves as a premise for these processes and simultaneously as a construct shaped during these processes.

Understanding identity as continuously being in the process of shaping and being shaped makes it into a fluid construction, always in motion, always in the process of becoming. This view that identities are fluid and being continuously produced, contested, and reproduced through communication aligns with the Foucauldian perspective on power. The process of formation and dissemination of an organizational identity among employees is a context where the power is practiced (Mumby, 2001). Similar to power, identities are dispersed within organizations rather than streamed top-down from managers to subordinates. Such a perspective contradicts an assumption that identity is a stable formation and a solid foundation for an organization, inherent to the functionalist approach to organizational culture.

In contrast, the functionalist approach assumes that higher-ups use their power to impose a certain organizational identity over other members. In the functionalist approach, managers expect a certain version of identity to be accepted and shared by all organizational members (Mumby, 2001). In this manner, identity is perceived as rigid, constructed by managers, and immune to change; therefore, it becomes a means to practice power. Either way, an organization's identity remains a core concept for existence of an organization and a reference point for members of an organization.

The processes of identification and socialization signify organizational members “com[ing] to define themselves in terms of the organization [...], internalize its mission, and values, and [...] adopt its customary way of doing things” (Cheney et al., 2004, p. 114). Foote defines identification as “appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity” (as cited in Cheney et al., 2004, p.112). While the interpretivist approach to organizations views this process as natural for organizations, from a critical perspective, identification reinforces the dominant identity (Deetz, 2001; Mumby, 2012). During the processes of identification and socialization, an organization imposes its identity on its members as a condition for their belonging to this organization (Mumby, 2012). The stronger the identification, the more powerful the organization is. However, an organization does not have a single identity, but rather represents a collection of multiple sub-identities (Cheney et al., 2004). Consequently, the process of identification is not smooth, since multiple identities within one organization often clash and conflict (Cheney et al., 2004; Mumby, 2012; Murphy, 1998).

The conflict between multiple identities within one organization is not the only conflict organizational identity faces. Cheney et al. (2004) describe organizational identity as “fluid and unstable because it is related to the organization's image, which is constantly shaped by external

pressures and interpretations” (p. 109). Organizational image, therefore, becomes an external force prompting change and transformation within an organization. Consequently, it is important to define this concept and position it in relation to organizational identity.

Hatch and Schultz (1997) treat organizational image as “the way organizational members believe others see their organization” (p. 358). Another perspective discussed in Hatch and Schultz (1997) is Whetten and Mischel’s conception of public image as “the way organizational elites would like outsiders to see their organization” (p. 358). Building on marketing and organization theory approaches, Hatch and Schultz (1997) include communication in the definition of organizational image:

A holistic and vivid impression held by an individual or a particular group toward an organization and is a result of sense-making by the group and communication by the organization of a fabricated and projected picture of itself. (p. 359)

These definitions are problematic because they only include organizational members’ perceptions about how they want the external public to see them. By doing so, they ignore the actual way the public sees this particular organization.

Contrastingly, for the purposes of my research I propose that an organization’s idea of how others see it and the way the public actually sees it should be differentiated. I am interested in how the public sees the organization (image) and how the organization sees itself (identity) and the way these two concepts interact with each other. I define organizational image as ideas and perceptions the general public has about a particular organization. Communication, in this case, serves as both a means of conveying a certain perception and a force shaping and reproducing it. Although communication has been discussed throughout this chapter, given the crucial importance of this phenomenon to organizational life, it is important to discuss it in more

detail. The last section of this chapter, therefore, represents a summary of perspectives on communication in organizations relevant to this research.

1.4 Organizational Communication

From a social constructionist perspective, organizational communication becomes a means for representation of a certain organizational culture as it “enables the creation and maintenance of organizations and institutions as groups working for common goals” (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 3). It cannot be seen as a tool or an element occurring within an organization since it is intertwined and engrained in the structure of the organization (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Mumby, 2012). According to Cheney and Christensen (2001), going beyond an interpretation of communication as a tool enables researchers “to grasp the significance of interpretation in a wide range of organizational processes” (p. 239).

The literature on the subject of organizational communication distinguishes between external and internal, formal and informal types of communication (Salem, 1999). This distinction presupposes a binary dichotomy between types of communication, which makes it easier to define each kind. For example, Salem (1999) defines internal communication as involving “only members within an organization,” whereas its external counterpart “involves at least one communicator who is not a member of the organization” (p.11). In its turn, formal communication presupposes that “an individual communicates as part of an organizational role” (Salem, 1999, p. 12), while informal communication stands for any communication outside of this role. Despite the convenience of such a distinction, organization represents a complex and multifaceted concept where different types of communication occur simultaneously and in relation with each other (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; McPhee & Zaug, 2009). For this reason, definitions based on the binary opposition do not reflect the complex nature of organization.

Furthermore, the distinction between different types of communication is not always possible and sometimes even counterproductive. Cheney and Christensen (2001) see the division between internal and external communication of organizations as “neither fruitful, nor justifiable” (p. 232). With new communicative practices, such as influencing “multiple audiences with a single organizational message” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 240), these types of communication become inherently intertwined. In order to maintain organizational unity and coherence, messages communicated within the organization (internally-oriented) must be consistent with the messages directed at the external audience (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; McPhee & Zaug, 2009; Putnam et al., 2009). A division between internal and external communication presupposes major differences between them, including differences in content. In organizations, however, the content of internal and external messages should be consistent in order to avoid “difficulties sustaining and confirming a coherent sense of [organizational] self necessary to maintain credibility and legitimacy in and outside of the organization” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 232).

Through communication, organizations establish themselves, project what they stand for, and maintain a sense of self both externally and internally. The issue of organizational identity is therefore inextricably tied to communication processes. According to Cheney and Christensen (2001) “identity has become a standing and often pressing issue for individuals and institutions in many different context” (p. 241). The process of constructing organizational identity is directly related to the process of meaning construction, when organizations establish what they stand for (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Cheney et al., 2004). Therefore, as demonstrated in this chapter, in organizational communication theory, the concepts of culture, communication,

power, and identity are connected and intertwined. Acknowledging this enables researchers to approach an organization as a living organism, as a culture, a fluid and complex construction.

Chapter Conclusion

This discussion of researchers' perspectives on organizations, organizational culture, power, and identity enables me to position my research within organizational communication studies. My research is guided by the critical-interpretivist approach to organizations as cultures, which are constituted through communication. Assuming this stance allows me to adopt a Foucauldian understanding of power in organizations as dispersed and stemming from different agents and groups. This view of power presumes that resistance in organizations may be covert and occurring in everyday employees' interactions. Furthermore, I define organizational identity and image as socially constructed, in which identity is an organization's definition or vision of self. Meanwhile, organizational image is an external force, which affects an organization and may cause changes and transformations within it. The findings discussed in this chapter guide the discussion of the military institution in Canada presented in the next chapter.

Chapter Two: **IDENTITY AND POWER IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES**

The concept of organizational identity, its production and distribution, is key to the study of organizations from the communication perspective. As discussed in Chapter 1, identity is crucial to the functioning of an entire organization since it serves as a means through which an organization defines itself both to its members and non-members (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Cheney et al., 2014). Furthermore, from both the functionalist and critical-interpretivist approaches to organizations, identity appears inextricably linked to power (Mumby, 2001; Zoller, 2014). In this study of informal communication of soldiers, I focus specifically on how soldiers define their organizational identity in light of peacekeeping debates. In this chapter, I explore perspectives on organizational identity of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which soldiers potentially rely on when defining this concept.

The military, including the military in Canada, is often perceived as a powerful institution (Brandebo, Sjoberg, Larsson, Eid, & Olsen, 2013; Guimond, 1995; Foucault, 1984a, 1984b; Kasher, 2003; Smith, 2008; Wolfendale, 2009). Applied to the military setting, the functionalist perspective maintains that organizational identity is defined by military leaders and communicated down to subordinate members, who accept and reproduce this definition in their daily work (Evetts, 2003; Guimond, 1995). Through the functionalist lens, military identity appears as a uniform and rigid construction, shared by all members of the military institution (English, 2004; Gabriel, 2007; Guimond, 1995). Despite this assumption, recent peacekeeping debates revealed the existence of several competing perspectives on CAF's organizational identity: While the CAF defines its identity as a "fighting identity" (National Defence, 2009, p. 13), the general public appears to believe that Canadian soldiers are primarily or even

exclusively peacekeepers (Anker, 2005; Granatstein, 2007). This discrepancy between military's and public definitions of military identity has resulted in multiple debates about peacekeeping and the military's role in Canada.

These debates originate from the opposition between the traditionalist and modernist conceptualizations of military professionalism within the CAF (Kasurak, 2011). The main difference between the two perspectives lies in a definition of the military's function: While the traditionalist position is based on Huntington's (1959) definition of a soldier as a warrior, the modernist definition accepts an expanded role of a soldier as a warrior, a diplomat, and a scholar, as proposed by Janowitz (1964). Soldiers' subscription to the traditionalist or modernist view of the military's function, therefore, influences their perspective on peacekeeping and the CAF's identity. Therefore, as evident, the existence of competing perspectives on identity within the CAF poses a challenge to the functionalist assumption that military identity is uniform.

In this chapter, I argue that organizational identity of the CAF is not a concept set in stone in an official organizational definition and obligatorily shared by all members, but a fluid construction with multiple definitions that exist simultaneously in various discourses. To this end, I explore three perspectives on military identity in the CAF: uniform military identity as per the functionalist position, the traditionalist-modernist dichotomy of a narrow and expanded definitions of military identity, and finally, a publicly preferred image of the CAF as a peacekeeping force.

In my analysis of CAF's official definition of military's function and identity, I rely mainly on one of the cornerstone documents of CAF Professional Development, namely *Duty with Honour* first published in 2003. It is important to note that this document was published as a result of the development of a concept of military professionalism and its key elements prompted

by reforms in the CAF in light of the Somalia Affair in 1993.² While this document is by no means the only official document underlying the premises of the military profession in Canada, it is a document containing definitions of the main professional attributes relevant to my research. Furthermore, according to Kasurak (2011), *Duty with Honour* represents “the most complete and sophisticated statement of the military profession” (p. 113).

My purpose is not to simply reiterate the official definition of identity noted in *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009), but to explore potential ways soldiers interpret their identity. In this manner, different approaches to view military identity serve as potential points of reference for soldiers when they discuss peacekeeping and identity in their informal interaction. Positions discussed in this chapter constitute deductive categories for qualitative thematic analysis discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. A distinction between these competing views of organizational identity in Canada’s military is made only for analytical purposes, since, as discussed below, these identities exist simultaneously in the organization.

2.1 Functionalist Perspective: Uniform Military Identity

The CAF defines itself as a professional organization with its unique military culture, a strong vocation to serve the common good, and a well-developed organizational identity (National Defence, 2009; English, 2004; Gabriel, 2007). *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009), a core document of the CAF, which includes definitions of the profession of arms and its principles in Canada, defines the main role of the military as the defence of Canada and its

² The Somalia Affair refers to the events during a peace enforcement mission in Somalia in 1993, when two members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment beat to death a prisoner in custody (Kasurak, 2011; Off, 2004).

interests via “the ordered, lawful application of military force pursuant to governmental direction” (p. 4). Furthermore, according to this document, organizational identity of Canadian soldiers is defined as a “fighting identity” shaped by the primary function of the military “to conduct military operations” (National Defence, 2009, p. 13). As explained in *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009), identity of a soldier-warrior is expanded to include two more functions: “a soldier-diplomat [and] a soldier-scholar” (p. 18). This expanded definition signals that the CAF currently subscribes to the modernist conceptualization of the military profession.

From the functionalist perspective on the military organization, this threefold definition of military identity constitutes organizational identity shared by all members of the CAF. More specifically, this perspective maintains that leaders produce organizational identity, while subordinates passively accept and reproduce it (Evetts, 2003; Guimond, 1995). This puts organizational leaders in a powerful position over their employees, whereby the former use identity to ensure that the latter conform to organization’s definition of itself. Therefore, the functionalist approach to a military institution accepts a binary distribution of power among powerful professional elites who set up norms and rules and powerless lower ranks, who are expected to obey these rules. This binary opposition stems from two perspectives on military institutions prominent in organizational communication studies: Goffman’s (1962) idea of total institutions and Foucault’s (1984) perception of soldiers as docile bodies.

Goffman (1962) defines total institutions as “place[s] of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (p. xiii). Some characteristics of total institutions discussed in Goffman’s (1962) analysis include living in the immediate presence of others, visibility of all members, and a strict regimen. To this end, a

professional army fulfills some characteristics of a total institution. As discussed in Moskos (1977), joining a professional army used to be associated with a certain lifestyle, including “the extended tours abroad, the fixed terms of enlistment [and] liability for 24-hour service availability” (p. 42). With the evolution of the military profession, however, it has become “a job done within specified hours with a limited liability to perform role obligations” (Cotton, 1981, p. 100). Nevertheless, there are still trades and aspects within the military that comply with the initial idea of a military lifestyle, for example some military training courses, or combat tours overseas (Cotton, 1981; Kasurak, 2011).

With regards to power and identity in a total institution, Goffman (1962) points out a “basic split” between a managed group and a supervisory staff (p. 7). He positions managers as powerful and a managed group as accepting of, or submissive to, managerial power. The members of the managerial staff, according to Goffman (1962), define the norms and values and distribute them among the rest. Although Goffman (1962) designed this model to address particularly mental institutions and prisons, he includes examples from the military, such as organizational control over a dress code, training, and kit or weapon maintenance. These aspects are an essential part of the process of military socialization, through which soldiers acquire organizational identity (Guimond, 1995). Therefore, the CAF can be classified as a total institution due to its hierarchical power structure, strict regimen, and multiple regulations pertaining to members’ expected professional conduct. Military identity, in this case, is established by the managerial staff, and becomes a means to control lower ranks.

A similar view of power in the military institution, where subordinates appear powerless in front of their leaders, is somewhat reiterated in Foucault’s (1984a) description of docile bodies. In his examples, Foucault (1984a) focuses on historical overview of the process of

production and construction of a modern soldier. He observes that “[b]y the end of the eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made, an inapt body, the machine” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 179). Using an example of an army, Foucault (1984a) attributes machine-like, robotic features to soldiers perceiving their bodies as “object[s] and target[s] of power” (p. 180). The body, and more precisely the soldier’s body in Foucault (1984a), is “docile [and] may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (p. 180). Extending this view to the concept of organizational identity, soldiers appear as passive recipients, whose identity is “made” by more powerful leaders. This idea further reinforces the functionalist conceptualization of power in the military as a top-down stream of managerial will imposed over lower ranking soldiers.

Therefore, from the functionalist approach to the CAF, its organizational identity appears as a mechanism of control, defined and performed in a uniform manner. In Evetts’s (2003) analysis of transformations in the sphere of military professionalism, she states that military leaders define identity, values, and norms and then communicate them to practitioners through the processes of formal education and professional training. Comparably, Guimond (1995) explains how definitions of identity, beliefs, and values underlying the military profession impact and change members’ individual perspectives through the process of socialization. Since the CAF, in Guimond’s (1995) view, is a “particularly powerful organization” (p. 252), the process of integration within this organization inescapably changes personal values and attitudes of its members and replaces them with organizational definitions. According to Gabriel (2007), the uniform definition of organizational identity is crucial to the existence of the military profession and for this reason must be recorded in organization’s core documents and ethical codes.

Through the functionalist lens, military institutions in general, and the CAF in particular, are perceived as powerful and controlling. Nevertheless, in his analysis of a Foucauldian

conception of power applied to the military context, Smith (2008) argues that approaching the military institution as overly powerful and its members as fully submissive suggests military's "passive dependence upon authority" (p. 275). This position implies passive and submissive nature of soldiers and does not account for an assumption that those who join an army make a conscious choice to serve and obey (Brandebø et al., 2013). For this reason, Smith (2008) argues that functionalist perspective on the military needs to be revised and challenged.

Following Smith (2008), I acknowledge that the functionalist approach to study the CAF is useful insofar it reveals hierarchical power structure of this organization and helps establish how the organization defines itself. Despite this, recent debates around the military's role in Canada substantially challenged the assumption that organizational identity in the CAF is practiced and understood according to the definition in the core documents. Therefore, in my further examination of perspectives on organizational identity, I approach the CAF from the critical-interpretivist perspective, maintaining that identity is a fluid construction acquired and practiced in the process of interaction (Cheney et al., 2014). This way multiple versions of organizational identity can exist simultaneously, as demonstrated below in the discussion of the traditionalist and modernist perspectives on identity in the CAF.

2.2 Traditionalist and Modernist Military Identities

Over the past fifty years, the process of defining CAF's organizational identity has been complicated by the existence of two competing conceptions of military professionalism within the Canadian Army, namely traditionalist and modernist (Kasurak, 2011). The development of the concept of military's organizational identity in Canada lasted several decades, starting with unification of the three branches of military service (the army, navy, and air force) under one umbrella of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, and leading to the first publication of *Duty with*

Honour in 2003. Current definitions listed in *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009) strongly comply with the modernist approach; nevertheless, the influence of the traditionalist view within the military is still present (Kasurak, 2011).

In both the traditionalist and modernist perspectives, the definition of military identity is centered on the military's function. The purpose of the military as an organization dictates and influences other professional elements, such as the way soldiers define their identity, theoretical and practical knowledge they obtain, and values that guide their professional conduct. The main differences between the two perspectives lie precisely in the way they envision the military's function. Therefore, understanding the role attributed to the military in each perspective is crucial to understanding how the CAF defines its identity.

In the Canadian military, the traditionalist position relies on the definition proposed by Huntington (1959), who maintained that the military force is responsible for "the management of violence [and] successful armed combat" (p. 11). Traditionalists relied heavily on the British model of armed forces and advocated "regimentalism, [...], leadership, individual battalions, and internal army matters" (Kasurak, 2011, p. 96). They insisted that due to the unique function of the army this profession should be based on traditional army values of duty, self-sacrifice, loyalty, and patriotism (Cotton, 1981; Kasurak, 2011). The definition of organizational identity, according to the traditionalist view, maintained a soldier as a warrior (Huntington, 1959).

Instead of confining the military function to conducting successful armed combat, modernists accepted Janowitz's (1964) concept of a constabulary force "when [the military] is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force[,] and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory" (p. 418). Janowitz argued for the need to "break[] down barriers between civil and military professions" (as cited in Kasurak, 2011, p. 97). This

need became prominent in the 1970s in light of multiple transformations in the administrative sector after unification. Already at that time, the supporters of the modernist position rejected Huntington's definition of the military function and identity, considering it too narrow and outdated (Kasurak, 2011).

The need to redefine military identity was justified by a profound change in the military's functions in the second half of the 20th century. Over time, these functions have come to include what Downes (1985) labels as "non-traditional" tasks (p. 155), such as peacekeeping, monitoring, and providing humanitarian relief. These tasks are concerned with the prevention of war or with aftermath of armed combat. Based on this, Downes (1985) proposes to expand the definition of the military's function to include these additions to professional agenda, which can, conversely, blur "demarcation between professional and non-professional" elements (Downes, 1985, p. 157). To avoid any confusion, Downes (1985) suggests a revised definition of the military's role as "deterring [...] potential enemies from contemplating embarking upon war *instead of* providing the traditional service of protecting society by fighting wars" (p. 156; added emphasis). This statement implies that with the modernist trends gaining more influence within Canada's military, the traditionalist definition of the military's function as warfighting was replaced with the modernist understanding of the military's function as preventing wars. Performing other duties instead of fighting wars negated the identity of a soldier as a warrior and transformed it into a preventer of wars. This transition is reflected in Janowitz's (1964) expansion of soldier's identity to include a warrior, a diplomat, and a scholar, which, as indicated above, is included in *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009).

The process of redefinition of military's identity in Canada caused what Kasurak (2011) describes as organizational identity crisis in the CAF in the 1960s-1980s. As he describes, "by

the 1980s the army (and the rest of the Canadian Forces) had no clear view of its own profession” (Kasurak, 2011, p. 108). Expanding the role of a soldier beyond that of a warrior or cancelling the combat function altogether primarily affected the soldiers in the combat arms (i.e. infantry, artillery, armour and combat engineers), causing a division between these soldiers and the professionals working in the military administrative-technical sectors. Interestingly, Cotton (1981) cites the position of one infantry soldier on the changes within the CAF with regards to the military function:

I feel that most service members have forgotten that our primary role is to prepare for war. I find it increasingly difficult to relate to administratively heavy support personnel in the Canadian Forces. These civil servants in uniform need to get out of their offices, see what we are doing, and support us. (Anonymous, as cited in Cotton, 1981, p. 110)

This statement reflects a lack of understanding among the members of the same organization. Cotton (1981) labels this phenomenon as “the beleaguered warrior syndrome” caused by “a sense of alienation from a military that is perceived as having become too civilianized to perform its essential function of combat” (p. 108). In the process of integration and unification, the combat arms shrank in size and developed “a negative self-image, referring to themselves as “Kill Techs” or “Death Techs” and [as] a necessary evil in a military bureaucracy” (Kasurak, 2011, p. 104). During the administrative change, the representatives of combat troops felt misunderstood by their own kind.

Additionally, the changes in the military’s administrative sphere and the crisis of organizational identity experienced by some soldiers in the CAF took toll on an external image of the organization. According to Cowen (2008), by the mid-1970s, the military had become “a

last-resort employment option [...] earning a reputation of a social daycare for misfits and reprobates” (p. 136). The fact that both organizational identity and public image of the CAF were facing crisis simultaneously signals an inherent connection between the two concepts. The way the military as an organization defines itself has a direct impact on the way it projects its identity to the general public. Therefore, at the time of transition and redefinition, confusion about what the CAF stands for also negatively affected its public image.

The current definition of military identity as a warrior, diplomat, and a scholar, signals that this concept has come a full circle and returned to include the fighting function of a soldier as his primary role. As discussed above, *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009) embodies Janowitz’s understanding of the expanded identity of a military professional. Although this document is “strongly modernist in its orientation” (Kasurak, 2011, p. 113), nevertheless, the primary position of a soldier as a warrior signals a compromise between the traditionalist and modernist approaches.

Therefore, in contrast to the functionalist assumption that military identity is rigid, identity of Canada’s military appears as a concept prone to changes and modifications. Understanding the development of an organizational identity as a process is crucial to my analysis of the way soldiers perceive their role and identity during peacekeeping debates. The traditionalist-modernist dichotomy reveals the existence of different positions among soldiers on organization’s identity and function. Although the core CAF’s document defines identity according to the modernist canons, the traditionalist perception is still present in the CAF and offers an alternative definition of identity.

Multiple changes in the definition of a primary function might impair soldiers’ sense of organizational identity and impede their vision of the organization’s purpose. The existence of

two competing frames of reference may lead to discrepancies within the organization.

Furthermore, these discrepancies might surface in external communication of CAF members with the general public, and impact the way the public perceives the military. As evident from debates surrounding the concept of peacekeeping and the military's role, the public views soldiers as predominantly peacekeepers (Anker, 2005). This view, although rooted in the modernist expanded definition of the military's function, deviates from the organizational definition because it prioritizes peacekeeping over warfighting. In this manner, the peacekeeping image constitutes an alternative perception of the CAF's identity in the eyes of the public. The next section examines this perception in more detail, as well as explores the circumstances that contributed to its formation among the Canadian public.

2.3 Civilian Perception of the CAF: The Peacekeepers

Civil-military relations are a factor that influences the military's understanding of its organizational identity and responsibilities in many ways. The relations between the military and the general public in Canada are unique and inherently complicated, because the entire nation becomes a 'client' of the military (Downes, 1985; Gabriel, 2007). Therefore, when performing their duties, the military serves the entire nation. *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009) lists several responsibilities of Canada's military in front of the nation, which include "communicat[ing] with the Canadian people on the requirements of military professionalism and establish[ing] transparency in what the profession is doing and how" (National Defence, 2009, p. 47). Based on this, CAF members are responsible to create and maintain a truthful image of their profession in the eyes of the public, which is a crucial prerequisite for public trust in the military.

This obligation in front of the public implies that soldiers need to perform not only their own definition of military professionalism, but also the public definition assigned to them. For

this reason, the military must ensure that the public has an accurate understanding of its values, roles, responsibilities, and the means employed by soldiers in order to accomplish their tasks. The lack of transparency on behalf of the military can result in the public having a different understanding of what the military stands for and what it does.

Given that the public trust is crucial to the existence of this profession, any discrepancy between the public and military members' definitions of the military's role and identity may become an impediment to an effective practice of the profession. To this end, peacekeeping and the role assigned to it in the military and among the public is an example of competing organizational identity and public image. In this section, I define peacekeeping and examine the meaning the Canadian civilian public assigns to this concept. Finally, I examine where soldiers place peacekeeping in relation to their identity when relying either on the traditionalist or modernist conceptualizations of military professionalism.

Understanding peacekeeping in Canada. According to Anker (2005), Canadians have a very special relationship with peacekeeping, seeing it not only as a function performed by their troops, but rather as “a defining aspect of Canadian identity, reflecting fundamental values, beliefs, and interests” (p. 23). By participating in peacekeeping operations, Canada has built a peacekeeping legacy for itself, and is often regarded by Canadians as a “world's leader[] in peacekeeping ” (Morrison, 2001, p. 3), “the world's peacekeeper,” a “moral superpower,” or “a good citizen in the world, dedicated to peace and justice”(Granatstein, 2007, p. 24-25). Based on the Canadian Prime Minister's, Lester B. Pearson's, contribution to the development of peacekeeping doctrine, Canadians take pride in having invented peacekeeping (Granatstein, 2007; Morrison, 2001; Off, 2004). This image, however, is largely idealized and does not

account for the evolution of peacekeeping doctrine and the changed nature of peace support operations.

Granatstein (2007) regards peacekeeping in Canada to be “comforting mythology” (p. 26) based on “wishful thinking” (p. 31). Despite the beliefs of the Canadian public, it is more accurate to state that Canadians did not invent peacekeeping: Although Canada was actively involved in developing peacekeeping principles peacekeeping had been practiced long before it was given a specific name (Anker, 2005; Findlay, 2002; Legare & Tanguay, 2009). Furthermore, as Rudderham (2008) points out in his analysis of Canada’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, “the perception of Canada as a leader in UN-led peace operations suffers when juxtaposed against Canada’s current troop contributions” (p. 360). The numbers of Canadian troops deployed on peace support operations have gradually decreased to reach their lowest point in 2007. The numbers look even less impressive when compared to Canada’s contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan (58 peacekeepers compared to 2774 soldiers in 2007 as discussed in Rudderham, 2008, p. 360). Most important, however, is the lack of public awareness of what the military does overseas when performing their peacekeeping tasks (Anker, 2005; Granatstein, 2007).

As Granatstein (2007) puts it, “Canadians had come to believe that traditional, blue-beret, United Nations peacekeeping was their *métier*” (p. 23). The public understanding of peacekeeping in its traditional form is considered outdated, since this concept has substantially evolved and changed over time (Anker, 2005; Findlay, 2002). Traditional peacekeeping is defined according to Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which describes pacific settlement of disputes (UN, 1945). This method of conflict resolution is based on three principles: consent of parties, impartiality, and non-use of force (www.un.org). Consent of parties is one of the main

prerequisites enabling peacekeepers to fulfill their fundamental role, that of keeping peace (UN, “Consent of parties”, para. 2). In its turn, impartiality assigns to peacekeeping forces the role of “a good referee” (UN, “Impartiality”, para. 2), impartial but not neutral or passive about their mission. This is an important condition for building and enhancing credibility of peacekeepers and setting them apart from the conflicting sides.

While consent of parties and impartiality are rather straightforward principles, non-use of force is conditional. During peacekeeping operations, force can be used “at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate” (UN, “Non-use of force”, para 1). When using force, a peacekeeping operation becomes robust, and its mandate extends to “deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat [...], and assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order” (UN, “Non-use of force”, para 2). Arguably, permission to use force even under certain conditions still contradicts the ideal of non-violence embodied in peacekeeping (Legare & Tanguay, 2009).

The public seems to define the role of Canadian soldiers as peacekeeping in its traditional sense as a non-invasive and non-violent resolution of conflicts (Anker, 2005). Nevertheless, the term *peacekeeping* is used to describe several types of operations, which are quite different from each other, such as traditional peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, peace support operations, peacemaking, peace building, peace enforcement, and even humanitarian relief operations (Findlay, 2002; Maloney, 1996). While robust peacekeeping is considered a type of traditional peacekeeping and aligns with its principles and norms (Findlay, 2002), peace building and peacemaking contradict the ideal of non-violence promoted in peacekeeping and are in fact synonymous to war (Anker, 2005). Further contributing to confusion around this term and its

definition is the fact that since its invention, the term *peacekeeping* “has never been guided by established theory and doctrine” (Findlay, 2002, p. 4). A lack of a clear definition implies that when using this term, the public and the military might actually refer to different operations.

Most importantly, the term *peacekeeping* has been redefined to include offensive operations, which rely on use of force. With the changes in the geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era, the principles of traditional peacekeeping became challenged by the altered nature of warfare. Anker (2005) describes the change in operational requirements of peacekeeping:

Intra-state conflict has become a much greater problem than conventional wars between states. From Somalia to Rwanda to Former Yugoslavia, these internal conflicts characteristically have no buffer zones, involve non-state actors, and are waged along religious, ethnic or tribal lines. [...] Consequently, symbolic and non-threatening peacekeepers with blue-berets, simply put, were mostly rendered impotent in this new operational environment. (p. 25)

After the end of the Cold War, the definition of traditional peacekeeping seemed to no longer suffice to describe situations peacekeepers faced on the ground. Because of the changed circumstances, peacekeeping forces could no longer perform peacekeeping in its traditional non-violent sense. The paradox lay in the fact that what peacekeepers were tasked to perform on the ground did not comply with the rules of traditional Chapter 6 peacekeeping. Therefore, there was a need for a new definition of peacekeeping or a new term to define what peacekeepers did on the ground.

Modern peacekeeping, in fact, has very little in common with its traditional counterpart (Anker, 2005; Edwards, Vakenzano III, & Stevenson, 2011; Gerchikoff, 2013; Granatstein, 2007). In his analysis of Capstone doctrine, which redefines peacekeeping, Gerchikoff (2013)

describes modern peacekeeping missions a “multi-dimensional [...], go[ing] beyond the traditional peacekeeping paradigm” (p. 729). Based on the changed nature of peacekeeping, Anker (2005) considers the term *Three Block War* to reflect the reality of current peacekeeping missions more appropriately:

This analogy depicts a typical operational context in which C[A]F members can be engaged in combat operations against well-armed militia forces in one city block, conducting stabilization operations in the next block, and supporting humanitarian relief in another, with the transition from one role to another occurring instantly. (p. 25)

This way, in the modern context, peacekeeping and warfighting are becoming increasingly intertwined and difficult to separate. Ironically, just as earlier the definition of the military’s function was expanded to include peacekeeping, more recently the definition of peacekeeping was expanded to include elements of offensive and enforcement operations. In this light, the distinction between peacekeepers and warfighters becomes increasingly problematic, because both types of engagement require “combat-capable, responsive military forces, and ever-expanding expertise” (Anker, 2005, p. 25). In order to avoid any confusion, Anker (2005) suggests replacing the term *peacekeeping* with *peace support operations*.

Based on this discussion, the public still sees peacekeeping in its traditional sense, whereas the military relies on the updated definition of peace support operations. When the reality of Canadian soldiers’ involvement in Afghanistan and the death toll suffered by the troops reached the general public through newspapers, the public was outraged by Canada’s deviation from its traditional peacekeeping identity (Anker, 2005; Granatstein, 2007). Anker (2005) explains that the conceptual gap in public opinion about peacekeeping exists due to confusing

terminology and public interpretation of modern peace operations as traditional peacekeeping. Granatstein (2007), in his turn, maintains that public idealization of peacekeeping has been created and supported due to the rhetoric utilized to boost a positive image of the Government and the troops.

Similarly, English (2004) considers that peacekeeping was used by the Canadian Government to “gain influence and persuade friends around the world” and also to “achiev[e] such goals as the recognition of Canada as a middle power” (p. 102). Interestingly, English (2004) also points out that peacekeeping has come to be included as the military’s function due to public support for this concept and despite the fact that “at first, neither the Canadian government, nor the military was enthusiastic about it” (p. 89). Nevertheless, later the Government of Canada has come to rely on Canada’s participation in peacekeeping missions as a tool to increase their positive image both inside and outside Canada.

Creating and supporting a peacekeeping myth among the Canadian public is taking a negative toll on civil-military relations. Attributing a high significance to peacekeeping results in public idea that non-invasive, non-violent traditional peacekeeping constitutes identity of the Canadian military: “It is the only thing the public think the military are any good for. It is a distraction from the military role, but it is unfortunately the one every one out there will put as priority one” (Morton as cited in Granatstein, 2007, p. 24). Public perceptions of Canadian soldiers’ identity as peacekeepers are reflected in the expectations civilians tend to place on their military, because, as Hackett (1983) explains, the society holds the military as a reflection of what it stands for:

What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country

looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own. (p. 158)

As demonstrated in discussion above, the meanings attributed to peacekeeping among the general public and soldiers differ substantially. While the public views traditional peacekeeping as a point of national pride, the military is cognizant of the changes that have occurred in conducting peacekeeping operations. These discrepancies in definitions contribute to the existing gap between the definition of the organizational identity in the military and its image in the eyes of the public.

Traditionalist versus modernist perspectives: Peacekeeping. Understanding the difference between traditional and modern peacekeeping is a crucial factor affecting how soldiers perceive peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping, relying on non-use or very limited use of force stands in an obvious contradiction to the role of the Canadian military to engage and prevail in combat (*Duty with Honour*, National Defence, 2009). From the traditionalist perspective on military identity, traditional peacekeeping would not be included as a role of a soldier. Meanwhile, the modernist perspective argues for expanding the role of the military and includes peacekeeping as one of the military's tasks (*Duty with Honour*, National Defence, 2009).

The definition of modern peace support operations uniting “diplomatic, humanitarian, and stabilization fields” (General Dallaire as cited in Anker, 2005, p. 26) is synonymous to the expanded definition of the military's function, which includes warfighting, stabilization, and even humanitarian efforts. This way, an updated understanding of a peacekeeper who “must be prepared to face every type of situation, from combat to building and enforcing peace to humanitarian relief” (Graham as cited in Anker, 2005, p. 26), implies that a skill set for peacekeeping is increasingly similar to the skills required to fight wars. If interpreted this way,

modern peacekeeping and the military's primary function do not stand in opposition to each other, but work together on the ground.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I discuss several perspectives on organizational identity of the CAF with the purpose to establish the possible frames of reference soldiers rely on when defining this concept. In light of discussion above, the functionalist assumption positioning the CAF as a powerful organization with a uniform and rigid identity used to control organizational members remains prominent when studying the military institution. Despite this assumption, recent peacekeeping debates revealed that there are several competing perspectives on the military's role and identity in Canada. These perspectives stem from the traditionalist and modernist conceptualizations of military professionalism.

The traditionalists argue in support of the narrow definition of military identity as a warrior, while the modernists expand soldier's identity to include a warrior, a diplomat, and a scholar. While the traditionalist view confines the military's function to exclusively application of lethal force and armed combat, according to its modernist counterpart, the military's function includes non-military tasks, such as peacekeeping, for example. The two approaches to define military identity create varying understandings of this concept among Canadian soldiers.

Another perspective on the CAF's organizational identity is public perception of soldiers as peacekeepers. As Anker (2005) points out, the general public in Canada gives preference to traditional understanding of peacekeeping and considers it to be primary or even exclusive identity of the Canadian troops. The evolution of the term *peacekeeping* over time and its redefinition often goes unnoticed and the usage of this term remains problematic. As a result, discrepancies arise at the semantic level between what the term stands for in soldiers'

understanding and what meaning the public assigns to it. Furthermore, some discrepancies arise at the functional level, since conflicting meanings create unrealistic public expectations about what the military does or should do when participating in peacekeeping missions.

Chapter Three: **METHODOLOGY. QUALITATIVE THEMATIC ANALYSIS**

The terms *thematic coding* (Ayres, 2008), *thematic content analysis* (Rivas, 2012), or *thematic analysis* (Basford, 2014; Fay, 2011; Lapadat, 2010) are used to describe a qualitative method, which involves analyzing data in order to establish recurring patterns and develop themes. This method is interdisciplinary (Lapadat, 2010) and is often utilized in organizational communication research (Basford, 2014; Fairhurst, 2014; Fay, 2012). Thematic analysis is applied to qualitative data, such as messages, interviews, field notes, and texts. Sometimes it serves as a preliminary stage of data analysis and its findings are used to develop a theory or to conduct a quantitative study (Rivas, 2012). Furthermore, the results of a thematic analysis can be combined with a different method in a mixed methods research (Rivas, 2012).

Lapadat (2010) defines thematic analysis as:

A systematic approach to the analysis of qualitative data that involves identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking commonalties, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs, or explanatory principles. (p. 925-926)

This definition reflects the main purposes of applying a thematic analysis, which is seeking out overarching patterns and themes that emerge in data. Thematic analysis is used as a method of “data reduction” (Ayres, 2008, p. 868), meaning it is ideal for managing and organizing large amounts of data (Lapadat, 2010; Rivas, 2012). Lapadat (2010) describes thematic analysis as a “sensemaking approach” (p. 926), credited for “yield[ing] insightful interpretations [of data] that are contextually grounded” (p. 927). Similarly, Rivas (2012) considers that this method enables a

more in-depth analysis by going beyond a simple summary of data.

Although the terms assigned to define this method vary, scholars identify similar stages in analyzing data thematically. First, a researcher immerses in data by reading and rereading it multiple times. At this stage, the researcher conducts open coding of data (Basford, 2014; Fay, 2011; Lapadat, 2010; Rivas, 2012). The second stage involves category formation, when similar codes are grouped together (Rivas, 2012). After this, categories are integrated, in which the researcher combines connected categories and “collaps[es] categories with overlapping conceptual domains” (Fay, 2011, p. 218). Although the main condition to form a category is reiteration or recurrence of similar codes, the refined categories should not repeat. The final stage involves the development of themes from the categories (Ayres, 2008; Lapdat, 2010; Rivas, 2012). Rivas (2012) defines themes as “abstract concepts shaped from two or several categories” (p. 376). These themes could later be used as a basis for building abstract theoretical concepts (Rivas, 2012).

Interestingly, Rivas (2012) states that this method was developed to enhance legitimacy of qualitative research. As Lapadat (2010) suggests, this method is used to “quantify qualitative data” (p. 926), which makes it more credible in the eyes of positivist research. Nevertheless, thematic analysis has been criticized from both positivist and interpretivist points of view. The criticisms of this method are part of a broader critique of qualitative research methods, originating in a qualitative-quantitative divide. Therefore, the assessment of strengths and criticisms of thematic analysis requires a broader assessment of qualitative research methods presented and discussed in the section below.

3.1 Qualitative Methods in Organizational Communication Research: Strengths and Criticisms

Qualitative methods became prominent in the organizational communication field as early as the 1930s (Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014), their popularity increasing with a shift toward understanding organizations as cultures (Putnam & Mumby, 2014; Putnam et al., 2009; Taylor & Trujillo, 2001). In organizational communication, qualitative research emerged as a challenge to a positivist perception of the worker “as a cog in a machine [rather than] an emotional human being” (Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014), and, as a result, it is often perceived in conflict with its quantitative counterpart. Although the dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative methods has been deemed unproductive and unreasonable (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001; Mays & Pope, 1995), qualitative methods are often defined, assessed, and criticized from the quantitative point of view.

The qualitative-quantitative divide is based on the assumption that the two sets of methods are mutually exclusive and stand in opposition to each other (Brannen, 2004; Creswell, 2009; Mays & Pope, 1995). Qualitative research relies on the constructionist worldview, which assumes that “individuals seek understanding of the [social] world” (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). In doing so, qualitative researchers promote “the socially constructed nature of reality [along with] the value-laden nature of inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln as cited in Bergman, 2008, p. 11). This individualized pursuit of meaning results in a plurality of interpretations, presenting the researcher with “a complexity of categories” without a need to “narrow meanings down into a few categories” (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). Meanwhile, instead of exploring the multiplicity of meanings, the positivist perspective posits that certain causes lead to certain outcomes, therefore

reducing ideas into a dataset that can be tested and examined (Creswell, 2009; Bryman, 1988; Maykut & Morehouse as cited in Bergman, 2008). In organizational communication, the main difference between quantitative and qualitative methods lies in the way the two approaches view an organization. While quantitative methods are based on the assumption that organizations *have* culture, their qualitative counterparts construe organizations *as* cultures in their own right (Putnam & Mumby, 2014; Cheney et al., 2004; Papa et al., 2008).

When assessed against quantitative standards, qualitative studies in organizational communication are often denounced as “soft, imprecise, unverifiable, unreliable, and nongeneralizable” (Aldag & Stearns; Lindlof as cited in Taylor & Trujillo, 2001). Moreover, qualitative research is criticized for the absence of a uniform algorithm to conduct a study, as well as the lack of agreed-upon evaluation criteria to assess its findings (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001). According to the positivist view, qualitative researchers have too much freedom to interpret data and fail to provide a detailed description of a research procedure (Fairhurst, 2014).

Arguably, this lack of format in a qualitative study is exacerbated by an inductive approach to data. The inductive approach implies examining data without relying on any a priori theories. As argued by the proponents of qualitative research, the inductive approach increases researchers’ attention to meanings concealed in data, while precluding predetermined hypotheses from interfering with research outcomes (Creswell, 2009; Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014). The positivist perspective generally labels such approach as “unfit” for science (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001, p.181). As an alternative, quantitative studies rely on a deductive approach to data, which relies on a predetermined research hypothesis and certain expectations about findings. For their part, qualitative researchers view the positivist deductive approach as leaning “toward totalization and reductionism” (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001, p. 183). As Taylor and Trujillo (2001)

suggest, qualitative researchers postpone introduction of theory “until they have developed a holistic understanding of the scene” (p. 183), in order to avoid research bias and not tamper with research outcomes.

With regard to thematic analysis specifically, scholars insist on the importance of approaching data inductively (Fay, 2011; Lapadat, 2010; Rivas, 2012). Arguably, the inductive approach ensures that codes and subsequent categories emerge directly from the data under scrutiny and not from the research conducted prior to this process. Alternatively, Ayres (2008) states that researchers can conduct thematic coding with deductive categories in mind. It appears, however, that the inductive-deductive tension is artificially constructed as qualitative analysis often approaches data deductively and relies on the findings of prior research (Fairhurst, 2014; Rivas, 2012; Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014). Rivas (2012) suggests that thematic coding is a good example of a qualitative method that treats inductive and deductive approaches to data as complementary and not mutually exclusive. In Rivas’s (2012) argument, a combination of deductive and inductive techniques increases “theoretical sensitivity [...] to concepts, meanings and relationships within data” (p. 368). In order to explicate these relationships, thematic analysis requires a detailed description of a research procedure for both inductive and deductive studies.

The main positivist critique of qualitative thematic analysis concerns replicability of studies conducted using this method. The flexibility of this method as a whole and of each of its stages, which becomes appealing to qualitative researchers, is seen as a flaw from the positivist perspective (Lapadat, 2010). The main positivist argument against thematic analysis is its lack of thorough explanation of each stage of research, which makes “unambiguous replication” of a

study impossible (Lapadat, 2010, p. 927). The same critique applies to the majority of qualitative methods (Fairhurst, 2014).

In an attempt to overcome the divide between the quantitative and qualitative methodologies, Taylor and Trujillo (2001) suggest that instead of trying to decide which one is better, it is more productive to treat these methodologies as different tools that can be employed to study organizations and to recognize that “different methods tap into different dimensions of organizational communication [...] [and] no one method has more privileged access to organizational ‘reality’ than any other” (p. 167). Nevertheless, qualitative researchers still encounter quantitative criticisms when it comes to publishing their work (Fairhurst, 2014; Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014).

Quantitative-qualitative tensions can be attributed to epistemological and ontological differences between the two methodologies. However, when it comes to defining the premises of a qualitative inquiry, the interpretivist and critical paradigms differ substantially (Cheney as cited in Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014; Taylor & Trujillo, 2001). According to Tracy and Geist-Martin (2014), “interpretive studies focus on emergent meanings [and] how communication constructs organizational relationships and structures” (p. 169). Critical studies, in their turn, employ qualitative methods to uncover power relations, as well as reveal and challenge oppression within an organization (Deetz, 2001; Mumby, 2012). Preoccupied with challenging organization’s control over its members, critical scholars often criticize interpretivist qualitative research in organizational communication for “serv[ing] dominant managerial rationality [and] perpetuat[ing] oppression [by] fail[ing] to conceptualize and oppose it” (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001, p. 169). In their defence, interpretivists argue that not every qualitative research should aim to accomplish a reformist goal of the critical perspective (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001). Arguably,

further developing a uniform set of evaluation criteria to assess a qualitative study could mitigate the tension between the interpretivist and critical paradigms.

As indicated in Kreps and Herndon (2001), “qualitative methods are now widely recognized as legitimate and appropriate tools for the study of communication phenomena in organizational life” (p. 1). The use of qualitative methodology in organizational communication is justified by several strengths that enable researchers to “decipher, understand, and even anticipate the significant issues [...] and communication rituals” when studying organizations (Kreps & Herndon, 2001, p. 4). Thematic coding, like any qualitative method, is focused on uncovering levels of meaning in interaction. According to Rivas (2012), it allows a researcher to “move beyond simple reporting of themes [and] consider underlying concepts” (p. 362). This method facilitates researchers’ understanding of data by breaking them into categories and themes.

Despite recognition of the benefits of thematic analysis when managing a vast body of data, an additional interpretivist criticism of this method concerns the fragmentation of the data. From the interpretivist view, such fragmentation occurs during the processes of coding, categorization, and theme development. This way, the data become “fracture[d],” which takes away from the “coherence and contextuality of narratives” (Lapadat, 2010, p. 927). Nevertheless, according to Fay (2011) and Rivas (2012) such fragmentation can be easily avoided if throughout the analysis researchers always situate their findings contextually. For these purposes, iterative coding and reading over the data are essential.

The ability of qualitative methodology in general, and thematic coding in particular, to uncover multiple levels of meaning behind the workplace communication is the primary reason for my decision to employ this method to determine how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)

members define their professional identity and responsibilities. The main focus of qualitative research in organizational communication lies in exploring the “everyday workers’ ideology [and] stories that [are] inherently intersubjective and partial” (Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014, p. 250). Qualitative thematic analysis is concerned with uncovering the meaning behind everyday workplace interactions, as well as understanding a “lived experience” of organizational members, i.e. “what a phenomenon [...] looks like to the individuals of interest” (Rivas, 2012, p. 367). Thus, according to Tracy and Geist-Martin (2014), qualitative research accounts for “a range of voices [rather than] just that of management” (p. 250). In this manner, conducting a qualitative thematic analysis of soldiers’ informal communication enables me as a researcher to explore the members’ perspectives on an organization and organizational issues. Looking at the themes that recur in the informal interaction of the CAF members permits me to go behind the scenes and discover a hidden meaning, as well as a subtle challenge to organizational control over its members.

3.2 Qualitative Analysis of Online Data: Challenges and Limitations

Taylor and Trujillo (2001) suggest that online communication represents a challenge for organizations and those who study them, because it “destabilize[s] the presumably formal structures of an organization by facilitating the bypassing of hierarchies” (p. 185). There are certain aspects of online communication that researchers must be aware of and cautious about. Longaker and Walker (2011) and Grabill and Piggs (2012) name several features of online discourse that might pose issues during research, such as the “many-to-many” format, non-linearity and inconsistency, and the indeterminacy of audience and commentators, among others. When working with data retrieved and located online, organizational communication researchers need to pay attention to how the data are used within an organization and whether they come

from official or unofficial sources. On the positive side, however, with an increased reliance of any modern organization on the Internet, research topics for analysis have expanded substantially. Qualitative researchers in communication studies treat the Internet as yet another source of data, a venue, where meaning-making process takes place (Bakardijeva, 2005). The Internet can be analyzed as “a culture in its own right” (Hine as cited in Bakardijeva, 2005, p. 5), or as a factor influencing other aspects of users’ lives, such as their lives at home or professional activities. In my research, I conduct a qualitative thematic analysis of an online forum, Army.ca, created by Mike Bobbitt for the CAF members.

3.3 Description of Data: Army.ca Forums

In my analysis, I am interested primarily in the opinions of soldiers on matters relating to their organizational identity and peacekeeping, as expressed through informal communication. As discussed earlier, the CAF as an organization imposes certain rules and limitations with regards to communication of its employees with the public. *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009) talks about “limitations on members’ rights and freedoms to make public statements” (p. 46). Furthermore, the *Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Forces (CF) Code of Values and Ethics* (National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces [NDCAF], 2013) explicitly states that military personnel must refrain “from public criticism of the Government of Canada” (Chapter III, para. 11.9). With these concerns in mind, when choosing a method to collect data for my research, I have decided against conducting interviews, focus groups, or surveys. It is plausible to assume that soldiers might be reluctant to participate in interviews or disclose any opinions deviating from the official position of the CAF. While

searching for other alternatives for data collection, I discovered Army.ca (or Milnet.ca³) online forums, which provide an unofficial anonymous venue created specifically for soldiers to express their opinions more openly.

The forum administrators repeatedly stress that Army.ca is an unofficial website, which is “in no way connected to DND or the C[A]F [and] does not represent policy of the Canadian Forces in any way” (Bobbitt, 2003, “Milnet.ca is an Unofficial Site”, para. 1, lines 1-2).

Although “being outside the official umbrella” is considered to be a “benefit” (Bobbitt, 2003, para. 1, lines 3-4), the users are nevertheless required to post responsibly in order to maintain and protect a positive public image of the CAF:

[W]e’re all representatives of the C[A]F. We may not want to be, but ultimately, we don’t have the luxury of choice. The truth is when you post a message even on an unofficial site like this, your comments reflect upon the C[A]F. [...] There’s no way for a casual visitor to tell that you’re not in uniform [...]. To a visitor, we are all a cross section of what the C[A]F has to offer. [...] With so many hard working professionals in the C[A]F, it would be a shame to have the name tarnished here. (Bobbitt, 2003, “Protecting the C[A]F Image”, para. 1-2)

In other words, the comments posted on military forums must demonstrate a certain level of professionalism as emphasized by the administrators of Army.ca, since opinions of the CAF

³ When working with Army.ca forums, I noticed that they are located on Milnet.ca server, and the two titles are often used interchangeably. To the extent of my knowledge, Milnet.ca is an umbrella website, containing multiple forum threads and other information related to the military profession in Canada, whereas Army.ca forums form part of this general website.

employees, albeit personal, may still give the CAF a bad reputation in the eyes of the public. An overarching piece of advice to soldiers posting on Army.ca is to “imagine [they] are in uniform” and to act accordingly (Bobbitt, 2003, “Posting to the Boards”, para. 3, line 1).

Army.ca forums are publicly accessible and do not require visitors to register in order to view the comments. As stated on the webpage outlining administrative issues, the forums are “completely public, meaning anyone can come here at any time and review comments” (Bobbitt, 2003, “Posting to the Boards”, para. 2, lines 1-2). Registration is required only to leave comments and send electronic or private messages to other registered users. Bobbitt (2003), an administrator of the forum, warns forum’s users that anything they post therein is “easily found via search engines and all over the Internet” (“Posting to the Boards”, para. 2, line 6). Due to the forum being publicly available, I did not have to register as a user and was able to access it at liberty through the general search using the Google.ca search engine. Furthermore, given that my primary interest lies in determining what work-related themes soldiers deem relevant to discuss in an off-work setting, I assumed that my participation in this forum might stir the discussion in a certain direction. In order to avoid that, I decided against becoming a member of this forum.

Out of multiple forum threads available for viewing, I chose to analyze the thread titled *The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth*, which contains merged topics and includes comments from several threads, namely *Canada and Peacekeeping*, *Peacekeeping or Fighting? Or Both?*, and *The Myth of Canada as Global Peacekeeper*, among others. While the thread remains open for new comments, the comments under scrutiny were posted during the time period from April 2005 to August 2013. The version of the thread under analysis was retrieved from Army.ca in May 2014 and saved in the PDF format for the purpose of consistency.

3.4 Selection Criteria

The Army.ca forum can be accessed by “past and present members of the military; potential recruits; military and civilian organizations; [and] anyone with an interest in Canada's military” (Bobbit, 2010, “About This Site”, para. 1). This implies that both military members and civilians can leave comments on the forum. The forum is anonymous, but users are encouraged to fill out a public profile to enhance their credibility (Bobbitt, 2003, “Public Profiles”, para. 1). These forums are rigorously moderated by administrators, whose responsibilities include facilitating forum discussions as well as issue warnings and ban forum’s users who break the rules of posting. While administrators do not censor the comments’ content allowing users to enjoy unlimited subject matter, they monitor trustworthiness and reliability of information and require users to support their comments with sources. Administrators also discourage users from falsifying their professional experience.

Although the forum is fully anonymous, there is an explicit warning against abusing the anonymity of the forum, which reads: “[W]e’ve had some cases where a visitor tries to exaggerate or invent stellar military experience. [...] Please. Don’t insult us [...]. It is *always* painfully obvious what your real experience is” (Bobbitt, 2003, “Public Profiles”, para. 2, lines 3-4, original emphasis). Users who break this rule are exposed by others, given a warning, or, in some cases, banned from the forum. Ultimately, the objective of posting rules and strict moderation of the forum is to prevent some users from stating that they belong to the military when it is not the case. The process of selecting comments for my analysis was undeniably facilitated by the enforcement of these rules by administrators.

For the purposes of this analysis, I am interested only in the perspective of soldiers; therefore, I have selected comments that provide some indication of professional belonging to

the military organization. In some cases, user names indicate a connection to a military trade or an area of expertise within the military. For example, ‘a Sig Op’ stands for ‘a signals operator’; ‘c4th’ stands for ‘Seaforth Highlanders,’ an infantry reserve unit in British Columbia; ‘Infanteer’ refers to a member of an infantry battalion, among others. Nevertheless, since users select the names at their own discretion, user names in their own right do not provide a sufficient basis for including comments in the analysis. As a result, I considered other indicators of professional belonging such as the use of personal pronouns “we/us/our” when referring to the military forces, and, in some cases, an explicit disclosure by users of their professional involvement with the military. Some examples of selected comments are included in the Table 3.1. in *Appendices*.

Some users left multiple comments in the forum thread. In cases when one or several of their comments indicated their belonging to the military, all users’ comments were included in the dataset and analyzed. In addition, some users posted links to newspaper articles. Whenever a comment contained only a newspaper article without any commentary from a user, it was omitted from the analysis. Conversely, when a user relied on the article to substantiate his/her own statements and express his/her opinions, a comment was included provided it contained some indication that its author belonged to the military. In total, 76⁴ out of 184 comments posted on the Army.ca forum were analyzed.

⁴ Out of 76 selected comments only 73 were coded. Comments by aesop081 (June 17, 2012, 16:39:45), Brihard (June 17, 2012, 17:28:23), and aesop081 (June 17, 2012, 17:47:12) were excluded from the analysis since they did not make any references to peacekeeping or the military profession and did not have a connection to the themes discussed throughout the forum thread. Instead, they deviated from the topic of peacekeeping and the military profession, but

3.5 Procedure

When conducting qualitative thematic analysis of the chosen online forum thread, I approached data from a critical-interpretivist perspective, examining the construction and reproduction of meaning in soldiers' informal communication. Murphy (1998) suggested a combination of the interpretivist and critical positions in her analysis of the flight attendants' communication. Murphy (1998) combined interpretivist and critical analytical elements to "understand how power is exercised as a discursive process through which meaning is not only reproduced but produced, negotiated, and resisted" (p. 500). When applied to my research, the interpretivist position enables me to examine the CAF organization as a culture, and define prevalent organizational perceptions of its identity, responsibility, public image, and professional purpose. Meanwhile, the critical approach allows me to uncover conflicting meanings or perceptions that may challenge or obstruct the functioning of this organization. While the military organization exercises control over its members and their communication in formal settings (*Duty with Honour*, National Defence, 2009), employees might challenge and dispute the official organizational position with regards to peacekeeping when communicating informally.

rather discussed the viability of forceful intervention. The topic was pursued by two users only, Brihard and aesop081, who engaged in discussion exclusively with each other. The topic did not reappear throughout the forum thread. Moreover, Brihard (June 17, 2012, 17:59:47) suggested separating out this discussion thread: "maybe there's room here to separate discussion on the viability of forceful intervention?" (line 2). Based on these considerations, this topic and three comments pertaining to it are considered a deviation rather than a separate category.

When conducting my thematic analysis, I followed the steps and stages as described by Rivas (2012) and Fay (2011). In her analysis of qualitative thematic analysis, Rivas (2012) provides a detailed description of the research procedure and suggests ways to enhance feasibility, reliability, and coherence of research. In addition, I relied on the article by Fay (2011), wherein she conducts a thematic analysis of informal communication among teleworkers. While both resources provided excellent guidance, Fay's (2011) description of the coding process was especially useful, since she describes in detail the open coding, category formation, and theme development stages of her research.

In my thematic analysis, I combine deductive and inductive approaches to data as suggested by Rivas (2012). Despite a concern that deductive research hinders researchers' sensitivity to categories and themes that emerge within a dataset (Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014), formulating potential categories prior to the analysis increased my awareness of two competing frameworks of meaning used by CAF soldiers to define their profession, i.e. traditionalist and modernist. Having conducted an extensive literature review on the subjects of the military profession and peacekeeping, I deductively developed four main categories, namely traditionalist and modernist views on military identity, traditional peacekeeping, and redefined peacekeeping. In the deductive phase, I defined these codes rather generally leaving plenty of room for further refinement as required. My reluctance to operationalize deductive categories prior to analysis is dictated by the concern that not all these categories may be equally relevant within the dataset. Although a detailed discussion of these categories is included in Chapter 2 of this thesis, a list of categories in question and their definitions are provided in the table below (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2. Deductive categories: definitions

<p>Traditionalist view of military identity</p>	<p>Traditionalists argue for a narrow definition of the military function as warfighting and military identity as a warrior. This view also defends traditional military values of leadership, duty, courage, and self-sacrifice, and confines military expertise to the knowledge of armed combat. Supporters of the traditionalist view resist any civilian influence on the profession. The traditionalist understanding of the military profession does not include peacekeeping as one of the military functions or responsibilities (Huntington, 1959; Kasurak, 2011).</p>
<p>Modernist view of military identity</p>	<p>This view promotes an expanded definition of the military function, which includes non-traditional military tasks, such as peacekeeping, interposition, and monitoring. Military identity is also expanded to define a soldier as a warrior, diplomat, and a scholar. The modernist view accepts civilian control over the military profession and allows for integration of civilian values and civilian general education along with military values and expertise. According to the modernist view, peacekeeping is included as a military function (English, 2004; Janowitz, 1964; Kasurak, 2011).</p>
<p>Traditional peacekeeping (also referred to as blue beret, United Nations, Pearsonian peacekeeping)</p>	<p>A doctrine established and developed by the United Nations, which promotes pacifist, non-violent, non-invasive resolution of conflicts based on the principles of impartiality, consent of parties, and non-use of force (Anker, 2005; Findlay, 2002).</p>
<p>Redefined peacekeeping (modern peace operations)</p>	<p>Arguably, modern peacekeeping is a term used to describe all kinds of operations, including peacemaking, peace building, peace enforcement, stabilization operations, and humanitarian relief. Another accepted term is Three Block War. Each of these terms, with the exception of humanitarian operations, includes combat operations, which makes using the term <i>peacekeeping</i> inappropriate when describing/defining these operations. Modern peacekeeping, therefore, has become similar in meaning to warfighting. Based on the semantic differences, this term should either be redefined, or replaced with <i>peace operations</i> (Anker, 2005; Findlay, 2002, Legare & Tanguay, 2009). For the purpose of consistency and clarity, when referring to modern peacekeeping, I use the term <i>peace operations</i>.</p>

My analysis of the data consisted of three stages: the open coding, category formation, and theme development. In the initial stages of the inductive analysis, I began with open coding of a

sample of the first seven selected comments from my data, which comprised approximately ten percent of the entire dataset. The sample analysis revealed that in their informal interaction, soldiers relied predominantly on the traditionalist framework of meaning defining their profession as warfighting and excluding peacekeeping from it. A distinction between traditional peacekeeping and modern peace operations also proved relevant. Furthermore, the users of this forum made a distinction between public perceptions of the Canadian Army as “an army of peacekeepers” (paracowboy, April22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 64-65) and soldiers’ perceptions of themselves as “good soldiers” (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20, line 6). Negative assessment of peacekeeping and the public (mis)understanding of peacekeeping also stood out as a separate category. While the deductive categories as described above were also present in the data, they required further specification and refinement. Some examples of codes and preliminary categories evident in the sample are provided in the Table 3.3. in *Appendices*.

During the open coding stage, I read and reread the data multiple times to code the clusters of data that suggested a category. Following Rivas’s (2012) guidelines, I have coded sentence by sentence paying particular attention to the context to ensure that all parts of the data were treated equally. Due to a high number of spelling mistakes, abbreviations, and professional terminology, I decided to code manually, using a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel instead of NVivo or Dedoose software to organize the data. The initial number of coded units was 251; after re-coding the data for the second time to ensure consistency, I eliminated duplicate codes, therefore reducing the number of units to 230. Throughout this analysis, I coded the data three times: twice with the purpose to establish overarching patterns and themes and the third time to trace how soldiers on Army.ca assert power and practice resistance through their language.

Upon completion of the open coding stage, I drafted an initial list of 34 categories that emerged when analyzing the data. Following multiple revisions, some categories were eliminated as irrelevant, while others were integrated together on the basis of similarity. During this process, I revised the number of categories to 26. Once at the theme development stage, five overarching themes were derived from the identified categories, namely the theme of ambiguity of terms; the theme of defining profession; the theme of misrepresentation; the theme of deconstructing peacekeeping; and the theme of transparency. Since the aspect of power and resistance was present in all themes, I discuss it separately in one of the sections in the next chapter. For further details on the research procedure and extracting evidence from the data, please consult relevant tables included in ‘Appendices’ section of this thesis (see Table 3.4. Operationalization of categories; Table 3.5. Themes and categories).

Chapter Conclusion: Challenges and Limitations

One of the biggest challenges, and consequently, the biggest limitations, in my thematic analysis relates to the anonymous nature of comments in this forum. Despite my application of detailed selection criteria, because of the forum’s anonymity policy, there is no guarantee that the comments selected for the analysis in fact were authored by the representatives of the CAF. This limitation is quite common when researching the data sourced online (Grabill & Piggs, 2012). In my analysis, I compensated for this limitation by developing robust criteria for selecting comments that demonstrate belonging to the military profession and applying them in a consistent manner, rather than analyzing the forum in its entirety. In doing so, I believe I preserved the credibility of my research and obtained meaningful data upon which to draw conclusions.

The findings of my analysis demonstrate that the majority of users posting on the forum

expressed a negative opinion about peacekeeping. It is important to note that the dominance of negative attitudes toward peacekeeping among the forum's users is in no way indicative of the CAF as an organization. As indicated in some comments, the topic of peacekeeping is the favourite subject to rant about among the forum's visitors who chose to post comments (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43; silentbutdeadly, July 31, 2005, 22:47:07; bobthebuilder, July 31, 2005, 23:19:41). It is quite possible that the absence of positive comments about peacekeeping is due to the fact that those CAF members who do not view peacekeeping as negative or damaging to their profession did not post in this specific forum.

Finally, the findings of my analysis, while insightful, cannot be generalized or extended to the CAF as a professional organization. Instead, the conclusions based on the results of thematic analysis are limited exclusively to the users of this specific forum. Moreover, certain comments discussing peacekeeping and its place within the military profession were inspired by newspaper articles published at the time of posting. Therefore, the findings are contextualized and cannot be extrapolated to remain valid over time.

Despite the aforementioned limitations, the analysis yielded some pertinent conclusions with respect to the ways in which certain CAF members define their organizational identity and responsibilities when interacting in informal online settings. While only a snapshot of a highly specific subset of military professionals (namely, the users posting on the Army.ca forum), the study highlighted consistent trends in interpretations of military identity and roles as they relate to peacekeeping, and allowed me to establish several overarching themes that appear to dominate online discourse on the subject. Therefore, the analysis proved a valuable, albeit limited in scope, exercise in applying a blend of deductive-inductive methods to examine specifics of informal internal communication by representatives of the military organization.

Chapter Four: **DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

Prior to providing a discussion of findings, I would like to remind the reader of the premises underlying this research endeavour. The qualitative thematic analysis of the comments on the Army.ca forum purports to answer an overarching research question, namely: How do soldiers talk about peacekeeping, the role of the military, and their identity in their informal communication? The claim resulting from this research is that despite military members being subject to far-reaching organizational control, the participants of the Army.ca forum consistently challenge the official discourse positioning soldiers as peacekeepers, and reclaim their identity as warfighters. In this manner, military employees exert power and reclaim their agency by creating an alternative discourse to their rigidly defined and organizationally vetted identity.

The qualitative thematic analysis of the Army.ca online forum *The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)* has revealed several overarching themes that recurred throughout the forum, namely *Ambiguity of Relevant Terms*, *Defining the Military Profession*, *Misrepresentation of the Military and Peacekeeping (by Various Actors)*, *Deconstructing Peacekeeping*, and *Transparency and Honest Communication*. Each theme was derived from several categories, which share similar but not overlapping patterns. Finally, I analyze means and methods in which the users of this forum exert power and practice resistance through their language. A detailed discussion of the themes is provided below.

4.1 Ambiguity of Relevant Terms

The analysis has revealed that, according to the soldiers who post on this forum, the interpretation of relevant terms, such as peacekeeping and peace operations, varies among the military and also between the military and the public. The abundance of various definitions

demonstrates a lack of agreement on what the terms stand for and the phenomena they describe. The absence of consensus on terminology signifies that the soldiers who post on the forum lack a clear understanding of what peacekeeping is. This challenges the assumption that the CAF provides uniform and clear definitions for operational concepts and military tasks, which are shared by all organizational members.

Based on the opinions expressed on the forum, soldiers tend to think of peacekeeping in its traditional form. They refer to it as Pearsonian, traditional, blue beret, or United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. Regardless of their preference for any specific term, soldiers generally agree on peacekeeping principles, such as consent of the parties, impartiality or neutrality, and non-use of force (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07; mainerjohnthomas, July 24, 2005, 01:00:21; beltfeedPaul (Banned), July 27, 2005, 04:43:59; 48Highlander, December 21, 2005, 17:04:12; Infanteer, December 21, 2005, 20:20:19; 3rd Horseman, December 22, 2005, 23:35:40). Interestingly, some forum members consider neutrality or impartiality of a peacekeeping force to be the most important principle of a traditional peacekeeping mission:

[P]eacekeeping by definition is a *neutral* force, acting to prevent violence from re-emerging between two or more factions. (48Highlander, December 21, 2005, 17:04:12, lines 7-8, original emphasis)

"Peacekeeping" status isn't defined by the amount of ammo [ammunition] sent down range. [...] Traditional "peacekeeping" implies neutrality. (Infanteer, December 21, 2005, 20:20:19, lines 3 and 6).

Pearson peacekeeping concept was to place a standing army built of neutral nations under UN flag and await the call to intervene as an aggressor if needed but as a stabilizing force preferred.⁵ (3rd Horseman, December 22, 2005, 23:35:40, lines 14-17)

⁵ All direct quotes and user names from the forum preserve original spelling.

In addition, the soldiers on this forum tend to agree that the main idea behind peacekeeping is to place a neutral force between two warring factions. There appears to be some consensus on what traditional peacekeeping stands for. Nevertheless, the term itself is considered outdated and inadequate for describing modern peace operations. Some users debate the suitability of this term for the military profession, while others condemn the term itself as an inadequate tool to describe the reality on the ground:

Calling a soldier a "peace keeper" [sic] is like calling a Fireman [sic] a car accident specialist. (Petamocto, December 31, 2005, 20:49:49, line 1)

Peace is not the absence of war. Peace must be *made*. The name Peacekeeper would be better suited towards to law enforcement in places where peace actually *does* exist. (Dare, July 23, 2005, 03:00:52, lines 8-10, original emphases)

Peacekeeping ... such a terrible term. As if peace in half these places existed prior to us being there and so naturally we are keeping it. (skyhigh10, June 16, 2012, 20:58:00, lines 6-7)

The C[A]F is usually sent to places where there is litte [sic] peace (how can a person keep peace where there is none). (Dare, July 23, 2005, 03:00:52, lines 7-8)

In light of the discussion above, the Army.ca users lobby for replacement of the term *peacekeeping* with a better term. There is a lot of controversy about which term might best describe modern peace operations. Some users prefer *stability operation/campaigns* or *stabilization* (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07). Others use *peacemaking* (Dare, July 23, 2005, 03:00:52; Nieghorn, November 06, 2006, 01:45:41), *peace enforcement*, or *peace support operations* (PSO) (pbi, December 21, 2005, 08:43:16). Arguably, peacemaking is a “far more apt and broadly usable” term, which describes more accurately the operational reality on the ground (Dare, July 23, 2005, 03:00:52, line 4). Among suggested terms is the *Three Block War*, which is considered a suitable “communications [sic] tool to get an idea across quickly” (pbi, December

22, 2005, 09:06:29, lines 9-10). The forum members generally agree that compared to traditional peacekeeping, modern operations use combat force in order to accomplish a mission:

They [stability campaigns] require aggressive military operations (and aggressive military personnel), whether it be [sic] to remove tyrannical regimes or to disarm lawless and powerful warlords. (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 22-23)

In many cases, killing is the only way to save lives. To keep the peace in fact is to use force on those who would break the peace, to apply the weapons and training to eliminate the ability of belligerents [sic] to make war. (mainerjohnthomas, July 25, 2005, 01:16:10, lines 1-3)

In this manner, the use of lethal force constitutes the main distinction between traditional and modern peacekeeping. Although some forum members consider peacekeeping and peacemaking similar, since both presuppose “play[ing] nice” (48Highlander, December 21, 2005, 15:25:48, lines 5), the dominant position on the forum is that peacemaking is more aggressive. Thus, the main distinction between the terms, according to mainerjohnthomas (July 24, 2005, 01:00:21), lies in the mandate of traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking operations: “[peacemakers] have the mandate from our politicians [...] take whatever steps are necessary to *make peace*. No peacekeeper will ever get that mandate” (line 14-15, original emphasis). According to Nieghorn (November 06, 2006, 01:45:41), the term *peacemaking* came to replace *peacekeeping* when the latter no longer reflected the reality on the ground. The purpose of introducing a new term was “to keep [it] in the same line of thinking, rather than labelling it 'war'” (Nieghorn, November 06, 2006, 01:45:41, lines 4-5). This suggests that the reality on the ground and the conditions of peacekeeping operations have changed profoundly since the principles of peacekeeping were first established.

One Army.ca user suggests that modern peacekeeping appears to have “drifted well away from [...] peacekeeping in most traditional models” (Brihard, June 17, 2012, 17:59:12, lines 13-

14). In response, some forum members argue that modern peace operations are in many ways synonymous to fighting a war. For example, the training for peacekeeping and combat operations is essentially the same (pbi, December 21, 2005, 08:43:16; 3rd Horseman, December 21, 2005, 12:16:31; Bobbyoreo, December 21, 2005, 15:52:20). Furthermore, the amount of risk that peacekeeping troops face is comparable to that in an offensive combat operation (FormerHorseGuard, September 21, 2009, 13:11:35). More importantly, in the eyes of a soldier, the way a peacekeeping mission is implemented is arguably identical to warfighting:

A peacekeeper in Kabul today is the same thing [as] a war-fighting soldier was in Nazi-occupied France 60 years ago: an infantryman. A tired soldier on the ground, with a pair of dirty boots, a clean rifle, and the will to use it. A man who is willing to fight for peace, and who doesn't worry about the philosophical conundrum such a statement makes. A man who does what he does, so that others will not have to. (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 68-72)

The only difference between peacekeeping and warfighting, according to 3rd Horseman (December 21, 2005, 12:16:31), lies in who controls the operation:

I never got confused by the term "Peacekeeping" for it just meant that I was under a UN command it never changed the way I trained my troops or executed my tasks I just wore a different colour beret and was answering to a UN commander. (lines 1-3)

The last comment indicates that there is some confusion about the terms among military members. The lack of a clear definition for each term may be the reason for such confusion. According to paracowboy (April 22, 2005, 01:39:07), the absence of a clear definition and a lack of distinction among the terms mean "it [peacekeeping] can be applied to anything from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to policing to war zones, and whatever other dirty little task is required" (lines 44-45). Arguably, another factor contributing to ambiguity of terms is the invention of new terms to describe old phenomena (3rd Horseman, December 21, 2005,

12:16:31). This leads to an increased number of terms that are used to describe essentially the same procedure.

According to the Army.ca users, such ambiguity of terms may affect the practice of the military profession in a negative way. The inability to arrive at an agreed-upon term to describe modern peace operation leads to “huge disconnects between the C[A]F and the public and, even, within the C[A]F itself” (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, line 18). On more than one occasion, a forum member under the user name 3rd Horseman described soldiers as “confused by the term” (December 21, 2005, 12:16:31, line 4) and “believing the propaganda” of the political leaders (December 22, 2005, 23:35:40, lines 5). Arguably, confusion of terms serves as an impediment for clear and transparent communication between the military and the public.

As the discussion included under this topic reveals, soldiers who post on Army.ca refuse to accept what they consider to be an inadequate definition of peacekeeping. By attempting to provide their own definitions of peacekeeping or by offering new terms to describe modern peace operations, the soldiers on this forum resist an absence of the CAF’s official definition of peacekeeping. They also exert power by assessing different terms with regards to their suitability and adequacy to describe the changed nature of peace operations. Furthermore, these soldiers take liberty to suggest the reasons for the military’s confusion about terms, as well as its possible consequences for civil-military relations. According to the soldiers’ comments, if the military itself lacks a strong coherent understanding of what peacekeeping is, it cannot explain its position to the public. In fact, misuse of the term peacekeeping by the public can be a consequence of the absence of a uniform position on this matter among the military (silentbutdeadly, July 22, 2005, 22:55:40; MCG, July 29, 2005, 00:40:56). However, as the soldiers on the Army.ca forum suggest, the confusion about the terms among the civilian public

is exacerbated by misrepresentation of peacekeeping and the military profession by the media, political leaders, or the CAF itself. Prior to the discussion of the theme of misrepresentation, it is important to understand how these soldiers define their profession based on the forum's comments.

4.2 Defining the Military Profession

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, defining Canada's military identity was a lengthy process, which finally resulted in the prevalence of the modernist interpretation of a military identity, comprised of "a warrior, diplomat, and a scholar" (*Duty with Honour*, National Defence, 2009, p. 18). Such an interpretation presupposes inclusion of what essentially are non-military tasks, along with warfighting and application of lethal force. This way, peacekeeping, which falls under the non-military tasks, is accepted under the modernist definition of the military's function and identity.

Despite this official position of the CAF, only a few users of the Army.ca forum agree, albeit reluctantly, to include peacekeeping as a task in the military profession (Chimo, July 23, 2005, 20:58:44; dutchie, July 24, 2005, 02:53:55; reccecrewman, September 02, 2005, 21:12:08; pbi, December 21, 2005, 08:43:16; dglad, November 06, 2006, 00:02:27). As dutchie (July 24, 2005, 02:53:55) argues, "[t]he 'job' of an army (or Navy, or Air Force) is to wage war, and everything else is secondary" (lines 2-3). Peacekeeping is considered to be just another task, something the army can do precisely because it has *combat* training and skills:

[T]o me Peacekeeping is little more than a task, albeit a complex task. [...] Peacekeeping is a task just as forest fire fighting, floods, humanitarian missions, etc are tasks. It just so happens that there is no other group out there that can *do* this particular task. (dutchie, July 24, 2005, 02:53:55, lines 1-5, original emphasis)

[W]e just have to sit back and be prepared for whatever role they come up with for us on any given mission. Be trained and prepared for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance or full fledged [sic] war fighting. (reccecrewman, September 02, 2005, 21:12:08, lines 3-5).

As far as our "jobs" go, as soldiers our duties involve a huge range of activities, of which peace support operations form just one part, but still, a part. So I can't agree that just because we are on a PSO we are not "doing our jobs" (pbi, December 21, 2005, 08:43:16, lines 5-7)

Our role is to close with and destroy the enemy, but if there is no enemy at the time, we can be used elsewhere. (Petamocto, December 31, 2005, 20:49:49, lines 7-8)

I'd rather that "peacekeeping" just got accepted as another military task. So, at any given time, we may have forces involved in "peacekeeping", while other forces are "warfighting/attacking/defending/whatever," others are doing "humanitarian assistance," and so on. [Peacekeeping is] just something, among many things, the C[A]F can do. (dglad, November 06, 2006, 00:02:27, lines 4-6, 8)

As evident, even when included under military tasks, in the eyes of the users of this forum, peacekeeping stands far from replacing their warfighting or combat role. In contrast, the majority of users refuse to include peacekeeping in any capacity under the military profession. By doing so, they subscribe to the traditionalist view of military identity. The prevalence of the traditionalist paradigm constitutes a prominent deviation from the official position of the CAF discussed earlier. In light of peacekeeping debates, most soldiers on Army.ca refuse to take on a peacekeeping role, arguing that the military profession is concerned exclusively with armed combat and application of violence to defend the Canadian nation:

The mission of the Canadian Forces is to engage in war fighting. Combat, full stop. [...] Canada needs her military to maintain it's offensive abilities in order to protect Canadians from war. (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 8-9)

~~The majority~~ all of the people I have read who have posted on this topic say warfighting is our profession. (x-grunt, July 22, 2005, 21:23:55, lines 2-3)

General Hillier [...] actually remembers what we are here for, to seek out and kill the enemies of our nation. (mainerjohnthomas, July 24, 2005, 01:00:21, lines 17-19)

“We're not the public service of Canada, we're not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people.' (Gen Hillier, CDS July 2005). I agree completely with the above quote. (Breacher41, February 28, 2007, 14:53:17, lines 1-3)

Following the traditionalist paradigm, some users of this forum resist including any other tasks under the military profession that are not related to warfighting. Thus, when defining an organizational military identity, peacekeeping is also excluded: “I enlisted to be a soldier, not a peacekeeper”(bruce7711, February 28, 2007, 15:07:20, line 15-16). When defining what their profession is or what it should be called, some commentators cite their first-hand professional experience. The orders that soldiers are tasked with during peacekeeping missions lead them to doubt “what [they] do has anything to do with peacekeeping” (aesop081, July 23, 2005, 08:28:53, line 2). Furthermore, the soldiers who deploy on peacekeeping missions “regard [them]selves as warfighters” (aesop081, July 23, 2005, 08:28:53, line 3-5). This position reinforces the perception that the distinction between peacekeeping and warfighting is blurred.

Furthermore, the forum’s users take pride in Canada’s military legacy and consider Canadians to be “good soldiers” (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20, line 6) or “arguably some of the worlds [sic] best peace enforcers” (skyhigh10, June 16, 2012, 20:58:00, line 7). Alternatively, some users argue that precisely because Canadians make good soldiers they can be good at peacekeeping (Chimo, July 23, 2005, 20:58:44; pbi, December 21, 2005, 08:43:16; Brihard, June 17, 2012, 16:06:53). In any case, no military member in this forum discussion considered that Canadian soldiers are primarily or exclusively peacekeepers.

When defining their profession, soldiers on Army.ca appear defensive and assertive about the warfighting function. Their defensive position is a response to a common public misunderstanding that the military profession is, or should be, confined to peacekeeping: “the public seems to think that the only thing we do/should do is peacekeeping” (a Sig Op, April 22, 2005, 01:28:15, lines 1-2). This way, the members of the military consider that in public minds peacekeeping “got conflated [with] the actual role of the C[A]F” (dglad, November 06, 2006, 00:02:27, line 7). The Army.ca users consider the public perception of peacekeeping as the main role of the Canadian military a “misconception” (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20, line 5), a sign of “disturbingly short memory”(Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, line 5), and a proof that “a huge, overwhelming majority [...] have no useful knowledge of what a military does” (E. R. Campbell, July 22, 2005, 21:10:01, line 9-11). While trying to convince the readers of this forum that Canada is not and has never been an exclusively peacekeeping nation, military professionals invoke Canada’s warfighting legacy, citing Canada’s participation in major armed conflicts, both in the 20th and 21st centuries (TCBF, April 22, 2005, 01:37:29; paracowboy, April 22, 2005; 01:39:07; Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26; pbi, December 21, 2005, 08:43:16; E.R. Campbell, February 24, 2007, 11:58:20).

According to the comments on this forum, the process of defining the military organizational identity also serves as a means to defend the military’s definition of itself. One of the tools utilized by these soldiers, along with historical examples, is glorification of the military profession. This technique also serves as a mechanism to empower representatives of this profession. The topics of self-sacrifice and willingness of the Canadian military personnel to put their lives in danger in order to defend their nation appear multiple times throughout the forum. Dedication to these principles requires both emotional and spiritual power and physical strength

to conduct an operation. The heroism associated with fulfilling the military duty is reinforced by the fact that soldiers agree to risk their lives repeatedly despite the public's apparent misunderstanding of and lack of support for the military:

I have always empathized with those who served in the Medak Pocket crew and were not recognized in a timely nor substantive manner for their actions. It was shameful. (Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, lines 11-12)

I wish those who are headed back to Kandahar Godspeed and every success. It was with no surprise that I saw a bunch of the same faces from 2002 ponying up yet again. Now *that* is a story deserving of print. The guys and girls who have been there/done that, and are willingly putting it all on the line *again*. In keeping with the above however, we will probably never hear their stories.... My hat is off to them, and to those who are headed over for the first time. (Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, lines 29-34, original emphases)

When Canadians say they want Canada to have an "army," what they really mean is an "army of peacekeepers." (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 64-65)

The military members' definition of their main function as primarily, and in most cases exclusively, warfighting and the application of lethal force deviates not only from the official position of the CAF as stated in its core documents, but also from public opinion on this matter. In their informal communication, the Army.ca users recognize the existing disconnect between the way soldiers see the military's function and the way it is seen by the general public. Moreover, the soldiers resist the organizational and public vision of their profession. Even though it might appear as a challenge to the organization, these soldiers use this forum as a venue where they can openly discuss their understanding of what they do and should do as military professionals. As the soldiers on the forum suggest, the expansion of the definition of the military profession to include non-military tasks has contributed to the gap between the military's and public definitions. Among other factors contributing to the aforementioned gap is misrepresentation of the military and peacekeeping, which constitutes the theme below.

4.3 Misrepresentation of the Military and Peacekeeping

The analysis of the forum revealed that the soldiers who post there feel that their profession is misrepresented, or depicted in a negative way, by multiple actors, such the media, political leaders, as well as the CAF and Department of National Defence (DND). Peacekeeping, on the contrary, is given a positive representation by the same actors. These sentiments expressed in the soldiers' comments resulted in establishing a theme of misrepresentation, which includes false portrayals of the military, peacekeeping, as well as media's or other actors' references to the military as a peacekeeping force. In order for it to be considered a misrepresentation, the forum's users had to explicitly state so in their comments.

This theme, in contrast to the two themes discussed above, does not constitute a deviation from the official position of the CAF per se, but rather exemplifies one of the factors that may potentially lead to a deviation. If soldiers feel that the media and political actors, including the CAF, distort the image of the profession, they seek to correct it by projecting what they consider to be a more accurate or honest image. The latter image may differ or even stand in opposition to other politically and publicly accepted representations. In this manner, this image represents an example of the organizational members challenging the dominant organizational discourse, which underlies the premises of critical inquiry (Deetz, 2001; Mumby, 2011, 2012; Murphy, 1998).

The users of this forum largely hold the media as a strong force forming the public opinion. The media are held responsible for painting the military operations, and by extension the entire military organization, in a negative way (FormerHorseGuard, September 21, 2009, 13:11:35). Furthermore, the soldiers on Army.ca condemn the media for always pursuing their own agenda and seeking to express their own opinion instead of portraying the military in an

unbiased way (Dare, July 23, 2005, 03:00:52; mainerjohnthomas, August 01, 2005, 13:52:55).

One of the biggest faults of the media, according to these soldiers, is their promulgating the images of Canadian soldiers as peacekeepers, or, even worse, ‘happy’ peacekeepers:

Canadas [sic] reputation as a peacekeeping [sic] force, especially amongst Canadians, is the result of the capabilities of today’s [sic] media bringing Yugo [Yugoslavia] and Kosovo into the homes of people all over the country. It portrays Canadian soldiers as top class peacekeepers (our secondary or even third line role) and takes away the image of the fighting man and woman. (bruce7711, February 28, 2007, 15:07:20, lines 10-13)

PK [peacekeeping] was nice and fluffy, and lots of pics [pictures] of men and women in blue berets, holding babies in far away lands (Chimo, July 23, 2005, 20:58:44, lines 1-3)

Another flaw of the media representation of military operations lies in labeling operations as ‘peacekeeping’ regardless of what the mandate actually is. According to Mark C (July 23, 2005, 23:49:26), the media “have no institutional checks and balances when it comes to recounting history” (lines 18-19). This user regards the media as “hauling out the *exact* same clichéd phrases that they used to describe our operations 3 years ago” and disregarding completely the current situation on the ground (Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, 19-20, original emphasis). Similarly, another user points out that the media always focus on irrelevant matters and do not acknowledge any of the military’s achievements: “There is too much emphasis placed on *why* we are there and what we *should* be accomplishing. There seems to be very little understanding that [...] we *are* doing things that *are* making a difference” (bruce7711, February 28, 2007, 15:07:20, lines 1-3, original emphases). These and other flaws of media representation undermine media’s credibility as a means of communication between the military and the general public. As stated by one of the users, looking at the images of the military in the media makes soldiers “query whether or not anything we do truly ever sinks into the quasi-permanent public conscience”

(Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, line 21-22).

The national media are not the only actor that is responsible for a dishonest image of the CAF. According to the soldiers posting on this forum, political leaders and even the CAF and the DND themselves often deliberately project a false image of the military for their own benefit:

The public has the image of the happy "peacekeeper" precisely because that's the image that many in DND, the CF and the government wished to project. (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, lines 2-3)

Embracing the term "peacekeeper" has mollified the Canadian public, but has hidden what we really do for about three decades. (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, lines 24-27)

We (the big "corporate" we...) tried for too long to garner favour by selling a false but supposedly more palatable version of ourselves to an abysmally ignorant public. (pbi, July 29, 2005, 09:03:55, lines 1-3)

This way, peacekeeping rhetoric serves as a tool to enhance a positive image of the government or the military among the general public. Even more so, it can also serve as a tool to boost a sense of national pride among Canadians and “to make the nation feel good about a mission” (MCG, November 05, 2006, 22:46:04, line 3) and feel as if “we [Canadians] have the moral highground [sic]” (Infanteer, December 21, 2005, 16:48:21, line 5). *Peacekeeping* has become “a politically friendly term” (bruce7711, February 28, 2007, 15:07:20, lines 14-15) or a “politically correct” way to speak about Canada’s involvement overseas (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 7). An excessive use of the term *peacekeeping* to describe any type of a military operation has resulted in the fact that anything other than peacekeeping is considered a “deviation” from the role of Canada’s military (MCG, July 29, 2005, 00:40:56). Evidently, soldiers see such distortions of their professional image as damaging (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43; mainerjohnthomas, August 01, 2005, 13:52:55; Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26; ArmyRick, February 28, 2007, 14:26:53).

An analysis of a discussion of the CAF (mis)using the term *peacekeeping* to secure more public support for the military presented interesting insights. First, the soldiers believe that the name given to a profession and the way it is described and communicated to the general public constitutes a key part of the public image of a profession: “The name isn't for boosting moral. It's to give a public face to C[A]F operations” (Dare, July 23, 2005, 18:00:27, line 1). Concerned with its public image, the CAF’s leaders justified using peacekeeping rhetoric when referring to the military based on the assumption that “the label Killer is [not] very Public Friendly [sic]” (Dare, July 23, 2005, 18:00:27, line 2). On one hand, this step indeed increased public support for the military; on the other hand, it has inescapably sowed a false image of a ‘peacekeeping army’ in the public minds:

This fascination with 'Peacekeeping' has been a double-edged sword for Canada. On one hand it put a :) on the C[A]F, particularly in the last 10-15 years when our image was taking a beating. (dutchie, July 24, 2005, 02:53:55, lines 10-11)

[A comment in response to statements of a Member of Parliament Carolyn Parrish: “We’re sending in armed troops to kill people (in Afghanistan). This is a drastic change in direction”]:

However, because we have used dishonest vernacular to soften our image, it is our fault a[s] a military that some in the public will believe her (MCG, July 28, 2005, 22:35:54, lines 3-4)

Furthermore, soldiers on Army.ca explicitly blame the CAF for misrepresenting what the military does overseas. This way, they challenge the credibility of military leaders’ public statements and position themselves as a more credible source based on their first-hand experience conducting or participating in military operations.

According to the users of Army.ca, misrepresentation of the military as a peacekeeping force bears multiple consequences to the military as a profession. Some users are concerned that the military cannot be funded the same as a peacekeeping force; therefore, the peacekeeping

image negatively affects the funding available for military training and equipment (a Sig Op, April 22, 2005, 01:28:15; MCG, July 23, 2005, 16:41:05; Dare, July 23, 2005, 18:00:27). Others are preoccupied with the issue of the military's credibility, stating that credibility is key for both combat and peacekeeping missions (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20; Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43). Still others are concerned with the detrimental effect peacekeeping rhetoric has had on civil-military relations, causing misunderstanding between the two groups (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43; dutchie, July 24, 2005, 02:53:55). In the extreme cases, listening to peacekeeping rhetoric may result in soldiers' confusion about their role and identity:

I have met a C[A]F personal [sic] who are a little naive [sic] about our role as soldiers. I am thinking [sic] of 3 years ago meeting a supply tech cpl [corporal] (REG F [regular forces]) with close to 20 years in who believed [sic] we should never go to war because as he put it "we are peacekeepers and its what I joined to do." (ArmyRick, December 28, 2005, 10:40:41, lines 16-19)

"Peacekeeping" put operations into terms civilians liked, and we raised an entire generation of soldiers to believe that being a "peacekeeper" was the norm for C[A]F deployments. This has created huge disconnects between the C[A]F and the public and, even, within the C[A]F itself. (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, lines 15-18)

Although the majority of users in this forum express their concerns about the impact that using or abusing certain terms bears for the profession, some users consider terms largely irrelevant and unimportant for the practice of the profession itself (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07; Young KH, July 23, 2005, 16:36:34; c4th, July 23, 17:34:55, lines 7-9; dutchie, July 24, 2005, 02:53:55; 3rd Horseman on December 21, 2005, 19:36:15). According to these users, using a different label for the military profession does not change how this profession is practiced.

Neither does it change how the military personnel approach their tasks:

I defy anyone to explain the difference between a modern "peacekeeping" mission and a D-Day style liberation invasion, to the man with his belly in the dirt dodging incoming rounds. To him [a soldier], a bullet is a bullet, and whether it's

fired by the child-soldier of an African army of brigands, or the highly trained commando of a “civilized” enemy nation, makes no difference. To him, dead is dead. The only way he will survive is to aggressively close with and destroy his enemy, by any means available to him. (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 50-55)

The users, who share this position, acknowledge that the debate about the labels is “political” but see this as a proof for its irrelevance for the profession since “it is the same job and people get killed” (Young KH, July 23, 2005, 16:36:34, lines 3, 5). In both positions, the military personnel demonstrate a negative attitude toward peacekeeping, calling it a “buzz word” (3rd Horseman on December 21, 2005, 19:36:15, line 9), “a smokescreen” (Infanteer, December 21, 2005, 16:48:21, line 7), “an easy sell to the Canadian public” (Infanteer, December 21, 2005, 16:48:21, line 1), and a “myth” (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, line 30; paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 66) that must be deconstructed.

4.4 Deconstructing Peacekeeping

In light of the discussion above, it becomes evident that the soldiers on the forum resist the public’s vision of the army as a peacekeeping force. The difference between two images of the military in Canada - the one of warriors shared by the soldiers on Army.ca, and the one of peacekeepers, shared by the general public - reveals several conceptual gaps. On one hand, there is a gap between the military’s and the public definitions of the military’s function. On the other hand, there is also a gap between how the military and the public understand peacekeeping. Both the military and the public define peacekeeping according to its traditional principles established by the UN. Nevertheless, the commentators in this forum admit that traditional peacekeeping is an outdated term, removed from reality that has changed over time (E. R. Campbell, September 21, 2009, 15:35:26). Meanwhile, according to the soldiers who post on Army.ca, the public continues to define modern peacekeeping according to its traditional canons. The forum’s users

consider such understandings of peacekeeping a “lily-white myth” that needs to be replaced “with the mud slogging, grinding truth” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 66-67). By attempting to deconstruct peacekeeping, the soldiers who leave comments on this forum challenge the public idea of the peacekeeping military, which is partly promoted by the CAF itself. Therefore, an act of deconstruction serves as soldiers’ resistance to the organizationally accepted public image of a peacekeeping army.

In their informal online communication, these soldiers deconstruct peacekeeping as an operational concept on three levels. First, relying on the examples from past peacekeeping missions, the forum’s users demonstrate that peacekeeping is an ineffective method of conflict resolution that can cause more damage than good. To the soldiers on Army.ca, peacekeeping in its traditional sense belongs to the past (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:00). Furthermore, in the opinion of the users of this forum, even when peacekeeping was practiced it was not necessarily an effective method of conflict resolution. For example, a comment by mainejohnthomas (July 24, 2005, 01:00:21) describes peacekeeping as a “sick joke”:

Peacekeeping was a sick joke. We guarded the villages until our political masters ordered us out, at which point the massacer [sic] we were there to stop happened, was duely [sic] documented, and our troops moved somewhere else. All sides in our peacekeeping missions laughed at us, for our ROE [rules of engagement] kept us from making a difference, and our greater military potential was irrelevant, as men with machetes and the will to use them will always trump men with APC, artillery, and jet fighters who have to get Ottawa [sic] and the Peace Corps rejects at the UN in New York to authourize [sic] the use of force. (lines 8-14)

Similarly, according to paracowboy (April 22, 2005, 01:39:00), peacekeeping “worked well on paper,” but was never easy to implement on the ground (line 30). As E.R. Campbell (September 21, 2009, 13:55:23) points out, traditional peacekeeping is over, and it is not coming back.

Second, similar to the first level of deconstruction, the military in the forum deems the

peacekeeping image as an impediment to the effectiveness of the military profession. On top of the repercussions peacekeeping has for the military profession, it could also be damaging to the general public (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:00; Mark C, July 28, 2005, 19:08:18). The main concern of these soldiers is summarized in the words of General Mackenzie paraphrased by one of the users: “If you take your war fighters and make them peace keep [sic] forever, one day the country *will* need them to fight a war, but they'll say "I'm sorry, we don't do that anymore” (Petamocto, December 31, 2005, 20:49:49, line 12-14, original emphasis). Similarly, Mark C (July 28, 2005, 19:08:18) in his prognosis of what might happen if a danger of a terrorist attack on the Canadian soil becomes a reality, claims that the military’s “immediate response would be entirely inadequate and meaningless” because of the limitations imposed on the military by the general public and the government (lines 9-10). This way, perpetuating a peacekeeping myth negatively affects military capabilities to defend their nation, which implies potential negative consequences for the nation.

Finally, the users reveal the reality behind peacekeeping with the purpose to challenge the ideas of altruism and non-violence associated with this term. As it appears from the comments on this forum, the general public is shocked to find out “about the violence involved in ‘peacekeeping’” (MCG, July 28, 2005, 22:35:54, lines 4-5). The revelation that peacekeepers are armed shocks not only the general public, but also the media and politicians:

I used to take great pains when providing operations briefings to the press that Bosnia was not a peacekeeping mission. Many reporters were shocked to discover that we had the authority and obligation to use force to ensure the Dayton Accord was followed and that our job there was not to come between two combatants, but to direct that fighting cease. (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, lines 19-20)

This reminds me of the (apocryphal?) tale of the Federal MP who, during the Somalia situation, allegedly rose in the House to state how shocked and indignant he was that Canadian peacekeepers were actually carrying weapons on a mission.

(pbi, July 29, 2005, 09:03:55, lines 5-7)

I remember a relative of mind [sic] was shocked when she saw that C[A]F UN troops going into Iraq/Iran in '88 or '89. She didn't realize that "Peacekeepers" were armed. (ArmyRick, December 28, 2005, 10:40:41, lines 10-13)

The soldiers who participate in this forum not only dissect the myth of peacekeeping because it “has never had a basis in fact” (mainerjohnthomas, July 24, 2005, 01:00:21, line 1), but also suggest several remedies to obliterate or at least lessen any confusion about what peacekeeping stands for and what the military actually does overseas. The main suggestion coming from these soldiers is to move away from the term *peacekeepers* and replace this term with *peacemakers* or *enforcers*:

We should have dropped that term [peacekeeping] long ago. "Enforcers" may have been better but, personally, I think we should have just stuck with "soldiers." (MCG, July 28, 2005, 22:35:54, lines 4-5)

I believe, that the slight change from Peacekeepers [sic] to Peacemakers [sic] would clarify to the public the C[A]F role in society and send a message that "No, we're not neutral. Our national security is paramount, and our operations advance that." Peace Maker [sic] implies force and could (positively) change the way the C[A]F is perceived, so the public understands it does take effort and force to accomplish our goals. (Dare, July 23, 2005, 18:00:27, lines 4-9)

The sooner we move away from the 'peacekeeper' image and reestablish our selves as a military, and a military who fights foremost, we will be set in the Canadian populace minds. [...] *We* know what we do, it's time to make *them* see that. (Breacher41, February 28, 2007, 14:53:17, lines 3-7, original emphases)

Another suggestion is “to adjust our thinking to [T]hree [B]lock [W]ar” (Chimo, July 23, 2005, 20:58:44, lines 4-6) and acknowledge that in reality there are no firm lines between modern peacekeeping and warfighting. One way or another, the soldiers on the forum suggest that the peacekeeping myth should be destroyed. While paracowboy (April 22, 2005, 01:39:00) considers it a responsibility of political leaders, the majority of commentators on the forum consider the

military, meaning both leaders and soldiers, responsible to educate the public. This latter position constitutes the last theme established within the data.

4.5 Transparency and Honest Language

One of the biggest concerns expressed by the soldiers on the Army.ca forum is the damaging effect of peacekeeping rhetoric on civil-military relations. As discussed in the theme of misrepresentation, the Army.ca users hold the CAF organization as partially responsible for obscuring a public image of the military and military operations by projecting a false image of soldiers-peacekeepers to the public. Interestingly, while some users believe the military must work hard to secure public support because “without public support, the C[A]F has little to nothing” (Dare, July 23, 2005, 18:00:27, lines 3-5), others demonstrate a strong negative attitude toward the general public. Blaming the general public for its lack of interest in and support for the military, the users of this forum describe the public as “navel-gazing, self-indulgent and falsely secure” (Mark C, July 28, 2005, 19:08:18, lines 35-36), “abysmally ignorant” (pbi, December 22, 2005, 09:06:29, lines 17), and “lazy” (TCBF, December 27, 2005, 06:00:57, line 4). Nevertheless, the military’s criticisms of the general public concern only public misconceptions about the military and peacekeeping and do not extend beyond this issue.

Despite some criticisms directed at the general public, the military is still convinced of the importance of preserving transparency in civil-military communication. Using “honest language” and projecting a true image are just a couple of ways to do so:

The government & [sic] the public must understand that we are warfighters that, because of our big stick, can enforce peace when required. If the public thinks we "peacekeeping" in some fuzzy comfy place, they will be less supportive of major projects to ensure our combat effectiveness. [...] [I]f we do not use honest language with civilians, then we should not expect them to support our real needs. (MCG, July 23, 2005, 18:47:09, lines 10-13, 18-19)

Furthermore, according to the Army.ca users, soldiers bear responsibility “to educate [their] friends and relatives on what the C[A]F really does” (ArmyRick, December 28, 2005, 10:40:41, lines 14-15). The soldiers on this forum argue that in their external communication members of the military must make an effort to correct any inconsistencies in the media’s representation of the military institution and operations (Chimo, July 24, 2005, 16:04:09). Another way to ensure that “media start to portray us [the military] in an accurate light” is to always use “honest language” (MCG, July 29, 2005, 00:40:56, line 8-9). The result of an honest representation of the military by the military institution is that the public might start seeing peacekeeping as any soldier does, “just as risky as any war” (FormerHorseGuard, September 21, 2009, 13:11:35, line 21).

Accusing the CAF of the lack of transparency in its external communication signals employees’ resistance to organizational authority and control. Furthermore, soldiers on Army.ca consider themselves responsible for educating the public about what they do in their profession. By doing so, they gain power to project an image of their organization that they consider appropriate. This way they create knowledge about and definitions of their profession, organizational identity, and public image, which are potentially distinct from the ones approved by the organization. In addition to some ways users of Army.ca practice power and resistance in their comments, I also discuss the language they use in the section below.

4.6 Asserting Power in the Army.ca Forum

After establishing several overarching themes, this section focuses specifically on how the users of the Army.ca forum assert power and practice resistance through their language. In this chapter, I have pointed out several deviations from the official position of the CAF that are prominent in the comments on this forum. I consider these deviations to represent a form of

soldiers' subtle resistance to both the CAF's control over members' internal and external interactions and more importantly, to the CAF's projection of a dishonest public image of itself. That some soldiers use the Army.ca website to express their disagreement with the organizational position implies that in this case, this method of communication serves as a means of employees' resistance. This resistance is prominent in both the themes that come to surface throughout this forum and the language that the users of this forum use to express themselves.

In my analysis, I have noticed several ways through which the users of this forum exert power. Throughout this forum thread, the users employ two kinds of methods to assert themselves: On one hand, they rely on negative methods, namely dismissive or coarse language, sarcasm, complaining, or ranting directed at the general public, media, political leadership, and the CAF. On the other hand, they also use some positive techniques, such as glorification of the military profession and acknowledgement of the fighting legacy of the Canadian Army. According to Hardy and Clegg's (2006) and Zoller's (2014) discussion of the changed nature of resistance within organizations, these methods can be considered a form of covert resistance displayed in employees' interactions. By resisting organizational power through such means, the users of this forum disrupt the established and legitimized organizational order.

Since soldiers' criticisms of the CAF, media, and the Government, as well as glorification of the military profession were discussed above, here I cite several specific examples of sarcasm, dismissive or coarse language, and ranting found in the comments of Army.ca users. For example, when discussing the public's misconception of the Canadian Army as an army of peacekeepers, a user under the name Ex-Dragoon (September 21, 2009, 13:35:53) ridicules a possibility of the CAF becoming a fully peacekeeping force:

I wonder how many people would stay in the Forces if we went to a strictly peace loving, blue beret wearing, hand holding military...peace force? We could rename our infantry battalions to the 1st HuggieBears, 2nd ILoveYou and the 3rd PlayNiceOrIWillStompMyFeet ::). (lines 1-4)

Other examples resurface when soldiers on this forum criticize political leaders' lack of awareness about peacekeeping and military operations:

[in reference to the public statement of MP Carolyn Parrish, who blames the military for deviating from their peacekeeping role]:
[Q]uestion Ms Parrish: If Canada is such a Peaceful [sic] nation, then tell why do our police officers carry guns then? The reason they do is for protection, and the fact that one day something or someone might take there [sic] life! or better yet Ms Parrish lets have them not go into the Bad [sic] areas within our cities just in case they get killed hows [sic] that. So if our Police forse [sic] loses and [sic] friend in the line of duty, that must mean we have to take all the officers [sic] off the street! So end my rant! Haha. (silentbutdeadly, July 31, 2005, 22:47:07, lines 1-5)

Furthermore, when discussing publicly accepted definitions of peacekeeping, soldiers on this forum largely use derogatory or even coarse language. Thus, some of them dismiss public interpretation of peacekeeping entirely by referring to it as “ ‘ok, guys, play nice’ bullshit” (48Highlander, December 21, 2005, 15:25:48, line 5) or “a nugget of poop” (dutchie, July 24, 2005, 02:53:55, line 6). In addition, the attributes of peacekeeping in soldiers' comments are largely aimed to undermine or dismiss it. Peacekeeping is described as “a terrible term” (skyhigh10, June 16, 2012, 20:58:00, line 6), “a catchall, touchy-feely phrase,” or “pie-in-the-sky, ivory-tower notion” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, lines 43 and 63), “nice and fluffy” (Chimo, July 23, 2005, 20:58:44, line 1), and “a warm fuzzy” (bruce7711, February 28, 2007, 15:07:20, line 14) among others. Those who subscribe to the assumption that the Canadian Army is a peacekeeping force are dismissed as “bozos” (ArmyRick, February 28, 2007, 14:26:53, line 8) or “a navel-gazing nation” (Mark C, July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, line 25), which is “abysmally ignorant” (pbi, December 22, 2005, 09:06:29, line 17) and needs to “get off their

lazy butts and form some intelligent impressions of their own” (TCBF, December 27, 2005, 06:00:57, lines 4-5). This way, soldiers on this forum seem to share a negative attitude toward the general public based on the public support for the peacekeeping image of Canadian troops.

Among other techniques of covert organizational resistance, Hardy and Clegg (2006) and Zoller (2014) name ranting or complaining. In this forum, several users explicitly state that peacekeeping is one topic they like to rant or complain about (silentbutdeadly, July 31, 2005, 22:47:07; Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43). Others complain about a lack of recognition and support from the public and the Government:

I think we have to bear in mind that the Canadian public [...] are quite content to go on with life not caring a whit for the CF. It sucks, but we are not in the periscope of most (99%) Canadians. We get minor tips of the hat for ice storm rescues, or filling sand bags on the Red River, but lip service, from the public, and the federal government is a long sad tradition. (beltfeedPaul (Banned), July 27, 2005, 04:43:59, lines 1-5)

The members of 3 PPCLI BG [Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry battle group] were well recognized at the time for their efforts. Having said that, some 3 years later it seems that an admittedly small but significant piece of Canadian Army history is all but forgotten - at least in the infamously attention-deficit minds of the Canadian media. (Mark C July 23, 2005, 23:49:26, lines 13-16)

In addition, the soldiers who post in Army.ca acquire power by identifying the need to change the way the CAF leaders and the general public think (pbi, December 22, 2005, 09:06:29) and by arguing for a more aggressive military force (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07; Dare, July 23, 2005, 03:00:52, line 11-12).

Duty with Honour (National Defence, 2009) and the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics* (National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces [NCDAF], 2013) provide definitions of expected behaviours for the CAF employees. Among others, to project the organization’s transparent and honest image to the public and to treat the Canadian nation respectfully are two

important organizational responsibilities of the CAF (National Defence, 2009). Furthermore, CAF members must obey certain rules in their communication, in which they must refrain from any criticism of the Canadian Government or the CAF and practice caution when disclosing information to civilians (NCDAF, 2013). Given that the workplace communication among military members is subject to strict rules and regulations, soldiers most likely would not express these opinions relying on such language in a formal setting. Nevertheless, the anonymity of this forum and its unofficial nature facilitate its users to express their opinions more openly even if it involves criticizing their employer, the CAF, and their 'client,' the Canadian nation.

Chapter Conclusion

The formal organizational culture of the CAF fits under the functionalist assumption that organizations have culture and use it as a tool to exercise power and control over their employees (English, 2004; Evetts, 2003; Guimond, 1995). Looking at the CAF through the functionalist lens places the focus on the hierarchical rank-based distribution of power within it. In this case, power is streamed top down from military leaders to subordinates, culture is defined by higher-ups and accepted by lower ranks, and communication is a heavily regulated means to transmit orders. Nevertheless, in my analysis I argue that employing the critical-interpretivist perspective, which maintains organizations as cultures, reveals multiple connections among the key elements of the CAF, such as power, identity, public image, and communication. This is the position I assume to conduct a qualitative thematic analysis of the online forum on Army.ca.

While rules and regulations outlined in the core documents may be observed during formal communication in the workplace, the analysis of informal communication by the CAF members reveals multiple deviations from the main organizational positions on several issues. From the Foucauldian perspective on power in organization, such deviations are examples of

subtle resistance to the dominant organizational power (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Zoller, 2014). In their informal online communication, the CAF members deviate from the official position of the CAF by subscribing to the traditionalist view of the military's function as warfighting, excluding peacekeeping from their professional tasks, and criticizing the public, the Government, the CAF, and other political bodies, such as the UN. Some members who post on this forum also expose the inconsistencies within the CAF organization, such as its dishonest representation of military operations and lack of transparency in its external communication with the media and the public. As a result, informal online communication of CAF members poses a challenge to the dominant organizational culture of the CAF and becomes a means to exert power and practice resistance for these employees.

The qualitative thematic analysis of the Army.ca online forum *The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)* has revealed several overarching themes that recurred throughout the forum. Each of the themes contains a position, which deviates from the organizational one, and challenges organizational power. More specifically, the theme *Ambiguity of Relevant Terms* challenges the assumption that representatives of the Canadian military share the same definitions of operational concepts and military tasks. The second theme, *Defining the Military Profession*, reveals that a lot of the forum members argue in favor of a traditionalist definition of a soldier and criticize the officially accepted modernist definition. This way, the first two themes include perspectives that negate the idea of obligatory uniformity of the military culture shared by all members.

The themes of *Misrepresentation of the Military and Peacekeeping (by Various Actors)* and *Deconstructing Peacekeeping* expose the consequences of misrepresentation of the military to the public and the need to redefine peacekeeping as an operational concept. In addition, these

two themes contain multiple criticisms of political leadership, the media, and the CAF for misusing the terms for their benefit. Furthermore, the theme *Transparency and Honest Communication* exposes the inconsistencies within the CAF and the need to construct a truthful image of the military among the civilian public.

As the findings of this qualitative thematic analysis reveal, the official definition of the military profession promoted by the CAF differs from the position of some individual members of the military, who participate in the Army.ca online forum. Interestingly, according to the comments on the forum, the official position of the CAF holds peacekeeping as an important or primary function of the military, which is more aligned with the public perception. In soldiers' opinion, the CAF uses this alignment to enhance public support for the military and secure a positive public image. Nevertheless, the employees of the CAF who post on the Army.ca forum deviate from the official CAF's position and condemn the organization for distorting a true image of the military profession. Most of the forum's users define their professional function as warfighting and application of lethal force. Therefore, in their informal communication, the members of the CAF challenge the idea of uniform organizational identity of the CAF by providing their own understanding of what their profession is. The themes of resistance to organizational power and empowerment of soldiers thread through this forum, as it is evident from the topics soldiers discuss and the language they use. The soldiers on Army.ca expose the flaws of their organization, such as using obscure language in civil-military communication and contributing to the public's lack of understanding of the military. Nevertheless, the forum's users also seek to rectify this misrepresentation of their profession by attempting to redefine and deconstruct peacekeeping and by taking on a responsibility to educate the general public.

CONCLUSION

In my study of informal communication of the members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), I analyzed the ways soldiers talk about the role of the military, organizational identity, and peacekeeping when interacting on the online forum on the Army.ca website. Peacekeeping debates around Canada's role in Afghanistan started with the announcement of Canada's involvement in Kandahar in 2005 and are still relevant today, as evident from the comments posted on the forum. These debates provided context for my research and served as a departing point for my analysis.

When analyzing the forum's content, my objective was to establish certain overarching themes and patterns in soldiers' informal interactions in an environment where they are not bound by workplace rules and regulations. In this manner, the analysis focused on soldiers' individual viewpoints on issues relevant to their profession, namely how they perceive their identity as representatives of the CAF and their assessment of the impact that peacekeeping has on the practice of this profession. I also explored the alleged disconnect between soldiers' definitions of their organizational identity and peacekeeping and public opinions on the same notions, and confirmed its existence through my analysis. To this end, I examined opinions as expressed in the comments by the Army.ca users or as discussed in the secondary sources (Anker, 2005; Granatstein, 2007).

Having performed a qualitative thematic analysis of one of the discussions on Army.ca, I established several overarching themes pertaining to definitions of military organizational identity and peacekeeping. In these recurring themes, the Army.ca users pointed out a lack of clarity surrounding the term *peacekeeping*, distorted public understanding of the military

profession, and ongoing misrepresentation of the military profession by various actors, such as the media, the Government, and the CAF itself. The soldiers also identified the pressing need to deconstruct peacekeeping as an operational concept and create and maintain an honest image of the military in Canada. Each theme demonstrated a perceptible deviation from the official position of the CAF, which I interpreted as a form of employees' resistance against organizational control. The analysis also established how the members of this forum exert power through their language.

The findings of my analysis corroborated my argument that in their informal communication, the participants of the online forum on the Army.ca website challenge the official and public image of soldiers as peacekeepers and reclaim their identity as warfighters. They do so despite the far-reaching organizational control that the CAF exercises over its members. Even though the soldiers on the forum acknowledge that the image of a warfighter is less appealing in the eyes of the public, they refuse to define themselves as peacekeepers in order to secure public support. In fact they insist that the public's conviction that Canada's military only does peacekeeping is distorted, removed from reality, and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of their profession. According to my analysis, CAF members on Army.ca demonstrate a strong preference for an honest albeit less desirable image that contravenes official perceptions. By deviating from the CAF's peacekeeping rhetoric and criticizing the officials for misrepresenting the military for their benefits, military employees exert power and control over the way organizational identity is projected to the public. Furthermore, they create an alternative understanding of identity of the organization, which they share with each other and, potentially, with a larger audience since the forum is open to the general public.

I situated my research in organizational communication theory choosing to undertake a critical-interpretivist perspective, which perceives organizations as cultures (Cheney et al., 2004; Eisenberg & Riley, 2001; Keyton, 2014; Putnam & Mumby, 2014). This perspective is rooted in the social constructionism, which maintains that culture of any organization, including the military, is socially constructed and reproduced through organizational members' interactions. It is through this lens I have explored the culture in Canada's military, organizational identity and public image of the CAF, and power relations within the military institution. In my research, I depart from the assumption that these concepts are concurrently shaped by and shape communication among the CAF members.

Nevertheless, I acknowledge the relevance of the functionalist view when studying any military institution. To this end, I have explored perspectives on power within an institution proposed by Goffman (1962) and Foucault (1984a), which several scholars consider applicable when studying the military (Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Smith, 2008). These perspectives implicitly support the functionalist perspective that views organizations as *having* cultures and employing them as tools of managerial domination (English, 2004; Evetts, 2003; Guimond, 1995). Furthermore, these perspectives subscribe to a functionalist view of military power as a rigid hierarchical construction based on ranks (Foucault, 1984a; Smith, 2008).

While I recognize the usefulness of the functionalist perspective for exploring certain aspects of my research, I argue that applying a critical-interpretivist paradigm to analyze the CAF was rather beneficial for it enabled me to explore interconnection between institutional concepts from angles not possible in functionalist research. While using the critical-interpretivist perspective to study an organization is a relatively common approach in organizational communication (Putnam & Mumby, 2014), I expand the paradigm's application by choosing a

non-traditional study object, namely a military institution, known for power and control it exercises over its members (Evetts, 2003; Guimond, 1995). In this lies one of the contributions of my research to a broader theoretical body of organizational communication since the critical-interpretivist perspective offers a new way of looking at the military institution within organizational studies.

When considered through the critical-interpretivist lens, military identity, although officially positioned as uniform and rigid, becomes a construction, which is contested and reproduced by each member of the military in Canada. This does not imply that employees constantly challenge the military institution, but rather acknowledges that each member of Canada's military internalizes organizational identity in a certain way and reproduces a version of it in his/her work practice and communication. More importantly, organizational identity, as defined in *Duty with Honour* (National Defence, 2009), may not be an accurate depiction of identity performed by military leaders and lower-ranked soldiers in their everyday work practice. Military members' definition of their identity might be influenced by other core documents available to them, as well as by their experience on the ground.

The existence of the traditionalist and modernist approaches to conceptualizing military identity has generated varied understandings of the military's function. While the officially mandated identity is defined according to the modernist view (*Duty with Honour*, National Defence, 2009), the comments on the Army.ca forum revealed that some soldiers prefer the traditionalist definition of themselves as warfighters. This way, the soldiers on Army.ca contest the official definition and demonstrate resistance to the modernist influence on the military institutions. In doing so, they do not necessarily declare the official position as false, but rather

offer an alternative understanding of military identity that is shaped by their experience as soldiers, and not by the institutional doctrine.

Soldiers' insistence on organizational identity which is less appealing or even sometimes rejected by the public contradicts Cheney et al.'s (2004) assumption that members' attachment to an organization would prompt them "to protect and affirm positive perceptions of the organizations to which [they] belong" (p. 112). As evident from my research, the soldiers who post on the Army.ca forum advocate for a true image of their profession as warfighters instead of promoting a false, albeit publicly encouraged, image of peacekeepers. Therefore, the users of this forum are more concerned with explaining their profession to the public so that the public can support them for what they actually do, rather than perpetuating an illusion of being peacekeepers. Defying the invasive nature of organizational identity, which aims to alter the individual values and beliefs of its members (Guimond, 1995), the soldiers on Army.ca succeed in constructing an alternative organizational identity by participating in this forum. Their success shifts understanding of military identity away from the functionalist view. Contrastingly, it suggests that organizational identity is not something that is communicated from the top down and indoctrinated in soldiers, but is rather a concept constructed and interpreted based on individuals' experiences in the military. In other words, military identity is not knowledge retrieved from a code of values or other key documents, but rather a notion that is developed through soldiers' experiences on the ground, which shape their understanding of how they serve their nation.

Another contribution of this research endeavour is that it relies on a Foucauldian perspective on power in organizations to challenge an assumption of docility and submissive nature of soldiers (Foucault, 1984a). Interpreting power as originating from various sources and

acquired and manifested in members' communication demonstrates a shift away from the functionalist perception of power as a negative phenomenon, a tool of domination and oppression. According to the Foucauldian perspective, power is dispersed among organizational members and cannot be a possession of one particular group (Schneider, 2007). This makes power a fluid interactional construction that can be acquired or lost in the process of organizational interaction. When having access to what Schneider (2007) calls "interactional resources" (p. 196), such as the Army.ca forum, members of the CAF are not docile, but can exercise power by explicitly endorsing a warfighting identity and challenging the current official definition of soldiers as warriors, diplomats, and scholars, with peacekeeping as one of their functions. Soldiers use the Army.ca forum to share their experience during peacekeeping missions and operations, while deconstructing the myth surrounding the notion of peacekeeping. By doing so, they create a different image of their profession and redefine peacekeeping. Therefore, the Army.ca forum becomes a method of knowledge production and sharing, empowering the soldiers who post there. This finding reiterates a Foucauldian (1984b) view of power as a means to create knowledge and not to destroy and oppress those with less power.

Soldiers' resistance on Army.ca is subtle, covert, and exercised through non-traditional means such as sarcasm, critique, ranting, and complaining, among others. The effectiveness of such resistance is debatable since there is no knowing as to how the messages delivered on this forum are perceived by the audience or whether they prompt any change within the organization. This stands in line with Foucault's position suggesting that resistance to organizational power does not necessarily change the structure of an organization (as cited in Hardy & Clegg, 2006). Rather, by resisting the power, the employees reproduce a certain variation of an established organizational order (Schneider, 2007). Notably, the soldiers participating in the Army.ca forum

do exactly that: They do not create a completely new identity, but reclaim the earlier iteration that was produced and promoted within their organization. This way they reproduce a traditionalist identity, which they consider a more appropriate description of what their profession actually involves.

Finally, this study is fully dedicated to exploring how soldiers talk about work-related issues in an informal setting. My review of the sources on the military and specifically the military in Canada, confirms the unique nature of my research. Although the military profession has been a subject of multiple studies and analyses (Cowen, 2008; English, 2004; Kasurak, 2011), presenting the soldiers' positions based on their informal communication is a unique contribution to the field of civil-military relations. Similarly, the subject of peacekeeping provides for the multitude of angles from which to approach research of the military institution (Anker, 2005; Findlay, 2002; Granatstein, 2007; Off, 2004; Windsor, 2009). Therefore, a study, which focuses solely on the impact of peacekeeping on the practice of the profession and conveys soldiers' perspective on this issue, offers a unique, albeit very targeted, contribution to the body of knowledge on this topic.

As briefly discussed in the *Methodology: Qualitative Thematic Analysis* chapter, there are several limitations to conducting research using the data sourced online, since users' comments can be altered substantially or removed completely at any moment, making my research very difficult, if not impossible, to replicate. Furthermore, this research may be criticized from the positivist point of view, given a high level of interpretation and flexibility embedded in qualitative research methods. The anonymous nature of the forum under analysis poses another challenge. Even though I developed and applied detailed selection criteria to identify users' belonging to the military profession, there is no guarantee the CAF members in fact author the

comments I selected and analyzed. Therefore, opinions analyzed in this thesis belong to the users of the Army.ca forum and cannot be attributed more generally to the CAF as an organization.

My lack of personal experience with the Canadian military and its structure can also be considered a limitation. While I addressed this knowledge gap through in-depth research of military institutions in general and the development of the military institution in Canada in particular, my findings were confined to the literature available to me. Nevertheless, given that the main objective of my study was to reveal the soldiers' view on the issues of peacekeeping and organizational identity using an informal communication medium, I believe my lack of first-hand knowledge of the Canadian military did not prevent me from achieving my research goals. My decision to concentrate on how the soldiers talk about their organization allowed me to prioritize individual soldiers' positions and opinions over those advanced by the military institution. Thus, I was able to go behind the scenes to explore the interaction that occurs in an informal setting away from the official environment and its constraints.

In addition to contributing to the existing body of literature in organizational communication and military studies, this thesis also opens possibilities for future research. Firstly, further research efforts could focus specifically on the medium of online forums, which operate on the condition of anonymity, and the role they play in the employees' communication. While in my research I take into account the anonymity of this forum and discuss its potential implications for soldiers' communication, I do not investigate the online format in detail. Secondly, the aspect of civil-military relations could also be explored in a more profound way to determine the origins of varying understandings of the military's function and identity between the soldiers and the public.

To conclude, I consider this research a relevant and insightful contribution to the spheres of organizational communication and military studies. This work contains a detailed analysis of theoretical approaches to organizations and power and applies them to the case of the military profession in Canada to establish which work-related themes soldiers consider relevant enough to engage with when interacting in the off-work environment. Furthermore, this research reaffirms the importance of the issues of organizational identity, public image, power, and resistance interconnected by communication in organizational settings.

APPENDICES

Table 3.1. Selection criteria and examples

Indicator signaling users' belonging to the military	Relevant comments
Use of personal pronouns	<p>“which heavily detracts from our ability to train and make ready for war” (a Sig Op, April 22, 2005, 01:28:15, line 2).</p> <p>“[it] just strengthens the common idea that we are a peacekeeping army by choice” (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20, line 1).</p> <p>“so that we, the big “we” including Canadians” (E.R. Campbell, July 22, 2005, 21:10:01; line 2).</p> <p>“warfighting is our profession” (x-grunt; July 22, 2005; 21:23:55, line 3).</p> <p>“failures in the nuts and bolts of our battalions” (c4th; July 23, 2005, 17:34:55, line 3).</p> <p>“we must bear responsibility for the equipment we choose and the training we conduct” (MCG; July 23; 2005, 18:47:09, line 1).</p> <p>“If we, as a military, are content ...” (MCG, July 23, 2005, 16:41:05, line 1).</p>
User names	<p>A Sig Op = a signal operator;</p> <p>c4th = Seaforth Highlanders, an infantry unit in British Columbia;</p> <p>cdnsignaller = a Canadian signaler;</p> <p>Infanteer = a member of an infantry battalion</p>
Self-declaration of military service/experience	<p>“This was far from reality of any peace support operation I was ever involved in” (Chimo, July 23, 2005, 20:58:44, line 4).</p> <p>“I used to be one of those guys on the ground” (aesop081, July 23, 2005; 08:28:53, line 3).</p> <p>“in my time of service” (FormerHorseGuard, September 21, 2009, 13:11:35, line 20).</p> <p>“it never changed the way I trained my troops” (3rd Horseman, December 21, 2005, 12:16:31, line 2).</p> <p>“my section/platoon/company do not consider ourselves PeaceKeepers! I have banned the word in my section” (silentbutdeadly, July, 24, 2005, 15:15:23, line 1-2).</p> <p>“I remember preparing for a UNPROFOR roto [rotation] in ‘95” (ArmyRick, December 28, 2005, 10:40:41, line 6)</p> <p>“I’ve always trained for war” (Bobbyoreo, December 21, 2005, 15:52:20, line 1-2).</p> <p>“It’s what makes me proud to be a Canadian, and to wear her uniform” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 13-14).</p> <p>“I used to take great pains when providing operations briefings” (Teddy Ruxpin, July 24, 2005, 12:07:43, line 19).</p>

Table 3.3. Sample coding and suggested categories (examples)

Sample code	Quotes	Suggested category
Peacekeeping (PK) as a sales pitch PK is a joke PK is a catchall term	<p>“It’s [pk] a great sales pitch” (TCBF, April 22, 2005, 01:37:29, line 9).</p> <p>“but we all know it’s [pk] is a joke” (TCBF, April 22, 2005, 01:37:29, line 9).</p> <p>“Peacekeeping” now, though, has become a catchall, touchy-feely phrase” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 43).</p>	Negative perception of PK by the military
Public thinks the army does/should do (only) PK Public perception of PK and the military’s function is wrong	<p>“the public seems to think that the only thing we do/should do is peacekeeping” (a Sig Op, April 22, 2005, 01:28:15, line 1-2).</p> <p>“The common misconception is that Canada is moving towards a peacekeeping role because we make such good peacekeepers” (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20, lines 5-6).</p> <p>“<i>Peacekeeping</i>, as the 99% understand it, never makes the cut: it is not the primary job of any armed force, including Canada's”(E. R. Campbell, July 22, 2005, 21:10:01, line 11, 12, original emphasis).</p> <p>“Yet, Canadians still have a pie-in-the-sky, ivory-tower notion about peacekeeping. We need to replace the lily-white myth of “peacekeeping” with the mud slogging, grinding truth” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 63, 67).</p> <p>“I understand that many, many Canadians, probably a huge, overwhelming majority - which would include 99% of teachers and journalists and other 'experts' have no useful knowledge of what a military does or why nations should maintain military forces” (E. R. Campbell, July 22, 2005, 21:10:01, line 9-11).</p>	Public misunderstanding of the role of the armed forces Public misunderstanding of PK and the military’s function
Public perceptions impede the military profession	<p>“the public seems to think that the only thing we do/should do is peacekeeping... which heavily detracts from our ability to train and make ready for war, and effectively employ our assets in such a manner”(a Sig Op, April 22, 2005, 01:28:15, line 1-4).</p> <p>“It [PK] takes away from our primary function”(George Wallace, April 22, 2005, 01:31:16, line 1).</p> <p>“Fostering the myth of peacekeeping is not in the best interests of our nation as a whole, or the Canadian Forces in particular. Peacekeeping (by any name) is important, true, but Canada must be capable of waging war, in order to</p>	Public perception of PK as an impediment to effective practice of the military profession

	protect (or impose) peace” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 73-75).	
Ambiguous definition of the term <i>PK</i>	“whose definition [PK] (or lack thereof, rather) means it can be applied to anything from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to policing to war zones, and whatever other dirty little task is required” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 43-45).	Ambiguity of the term <i>PK</i>
Line between PK and warfighting is blurred	“The bottom line remains the same, however. Peacekeeping today means imposing order on people. It means troops on the ground saying: “Love thy neighbour, or I’ll kill you” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 50-55). “It is, in a broader sense, an entirely defensive operation” (E. R. Campbell, July 22, 2005, 21:10:01, line 5).	PK is synonymous to warfighting PK is synonymous to warfighting
The military’s function is warfighting	“The mission of the Canadian Forces is to engage in war fighting. Combat, full stop. Hopefully, always overseas” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 8-9). “ The majority all of the people I have read who have posted on this topic say warfighting is our profession”. (x-grunt, July 22, 2005, 21:23:55, lines 2-3). “In fact we make good soldiers no matter what our role is” (SHELLDRAKE!!, July 22, 2005, 21:22:20, line 6). “Canada needs her military to maintain it's offensive abilities in order to protect Canadians from war” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 9). “but Canada must be capable of waging war, in order to protect (or impose) peace. We could once” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 73-75).	Warfighting as the primary function of the military
PK is not the job of the military	“Despite the Politically Correct spin that has continuously been put on the subject, Canada does not maintain her armed forces for “peacekeeping operations.” (paracowboy, April 22, 2005, 01:39:07, line 7-8)	Narrow (traditionalist) definition of the military profession (excludes PK)

Table 3.4. Operationalization of categories

	Categories	Operationalization (Definition of the category)
1.	Definition of peacekeeping and its principles	Includes definitions of peacekeeping proposed by military professionals, their explanations of the term <i>peacekeeping</i> , and their understanding of this term and its principles. Excludes any criticism of this term, or assessments of suitability of this term.
2.	Definition of peacemaking/ peace support operations/ peace enforcement/ Three Block Wars/ peace building	Includes definitions of modern peacekeeping, discussion of the terms, such as peacemaking/ peace support operations/ peace enforcement/ Three Block Wars/ peace building. The discussion of the origins of these terms is also included. Excludes criticism of these terms and indication of confusion about terms.
3.	Synonymy of peacekeeping and warfighting	Includes any statements about the synonymy or sameness of these terms, implying that although the terms are different they essentially describe the same phenomenon.
4.	Lack of definition/clarity	Includes the statements that the term <i>peacekeeping</i> is applied to describe a variety of phenomena, most of them have nothing to do with peacekeeping.
5.	Distinctions between peacekeeping and warfighting or peace enforcement	Includes distinctions between these terms, statements that these terms are different and should be used appropriately to describe different phenomena.
6.	Inadequacy of the term <i>peacekeeping</i>	Includes criticism of the term (!) <i>peacekeeping</i> (not the practice of peacekeeping itself). Includes statements regarding inadequate use of this term, controversy and paradoxicality of this term, the gap between what it stands for and what it is applied to.
7.	Confusion about terms among the military and the public.	Includes statements that the military itself lacks a uniform understanding of what peacekeeping is. Includes statements about a lack of a clear definition of the term, or a lack of agreement among military members of what this term stands for. Includes references to how the military and the public understand the terms in different ways.
8.	Civilians' misunderstanding of peacekeeping	Includes public illusions about what peacekeeping is and the reality behind this term (what peacekeepers actually do). Includes references to peacekeeping as a myth, an illusion, and soldiers' description of public understanding of peacekeeping as wrong, ungrounded, and removed from reality.
9.	Media and politicians' misrepresentation of peacekeeping and the	Includes statements that reveal holding the media or politicians responsible for misrepresenting (creating the wrong image) of peacekeeping and the military profession.

	military	Includes comments about the way the media describe military operations.
10.	Misuse of the terms by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Department of National Defence (DND)	Includes any reference to misrepresentation of the peacekeeping or the military profession by the military itself (both the CAF and DND).
11.	Public lack of knowledge about or interest in the military	Includes references of public lack of awareness about the military and what it does. Includes statements that the public does not care about their military or that there is a lack of public support for the military. Also, public unawareness about Canada's military history is included here. Excludes the assessment of what role the public support or awareness plays for the military profession.
12.	Peacekeeping and other terms as political tools to enhance positive perception of the government among the public	Includes any references about the government using peacekeeping rhetoric to increase public support for itself. Includes statements that peacekeeping serves as an intensifier of a positive perception of Canada among the general public. Also includes defining peacekeeping as a part of Canadian national identity, and/or as contributing to Canadians' perception of their nation as a moral power or a middle power.
13.	Peacekeeping as a tool to enhance a positive public image of the CAF	Includes statements that the CAF (or the CAF leaders) uses peacekeeping rhetoric to increase public support and improve public image of the organization.
14.	Narrow (traditionalist) definition of the military profession as warfighting	Includes definition of the military profession as warfighting, or using violence, or killing the enemy. Includes statements that peacekeeping is not a part of the military profession. References to the military identity as warriors, fighters, soldiers, or warfighters are also included.
15.	Expanded (modernist) definition of the military profession	Includes definition of the military's function beyond warfighting or using violence to defend the nation. Includes peacekeeping as a function of the military, or a military task.
16.	Concepts of self-sacrifice and duty as a part of the military profession	Includes soldiers' statements about their willingness to risk and sacrifice their lives to defend Canada. Also includes statements that the military members realize the risks involved in their profession.
17.	Canada's military legacy and history of involvement in the conflicts	Includes any references to Canada's history of past and modern participation in the military conflicts. Includes indications that Canada's peacekeeping involvement is low compared to its participation in combat missions. The comments included in this category treat Canada's military history as a proof that Canada is not a peacekeeping nation.

		Statements that the history of Canada is often ignored or forgotten by the general public and media are NOT included here.
18.	Ineffectiveness of peacekeeping	Includes soldiers' assessment of peacekeeping as an ineffective method to deal with the modern conflict. Also, includes statements that peacekeeping belongs to the past and no longer exists, or indications that peacekeeping is changing or has changed.
19.	Peacekeeping as an impediment to effective practice of the military profession	Includes the discussion of the damage peacekeeping and misinterpretation of this term (or lack of clarity on what it stands for) can do to the military profession. Includes the discussion of repercussions of misunderstanding peacekeeping for the funding available to this profession, also its negative effect on training and equipment capabilities of the military, and undermining credibility of this profession both on the national and international levels.
20.	Irrelevance of terms	Includes statements that the terms or labels do not matter because they do not change what the military does. The military profession remains the same regardless of what others call it. This category stands in opposition to the category "peacekeeping as an impediment to the military profession" because it considers that peacekeeping debates have no influence on the military profession.
21.	Soldiers' attitude toward peacekeeping	Includes soldiers' negative statements about peacekeeping and the expressions of negative attitude toward this term or operational practice.
22.	Soldiers' negative attitude toward the general public	Includes indication of soldiers' resentment toward the general public, their references to the public as ignorant. Includes statements that the military feels misunderstood and underappreciated by the general public.
23.	Need to redefine peacekeeping or to deconstruct the peacekeeping myth	Soldiers point out the need to redefine peacekeeping, replace this term, or move away from it altogether. Includes soldiers' statements urging to destroy the myth or tell the truth about peacekeeping.
24.	The role of public support to the military	Includes the discussion of the role of public support to the military. Includes both positions that public support is a key prerequisite for existence of the profession and that public should not/does not matter to the profession.
25.	Military's obligation to project an honest image of itself	Includes statements about the importance of transparency on behalf of the military institution when describing what this profession involves and what soldiers do on the ground. Includes statements that the military should use honest language when communicating with the public,

		correct the media misrepresentation of the military and its operations, and educate the general public about the military profession.
26.	Critique of the United Nations (UN)	Statements including criticism of the UN as an institution are prominent throughout the forum and therefore constitute a separate category.

Table 3.5. Themes and categories

Themes	Categories
Ambiguity of Relevant Terms	Definition of peacekeeping and its principles
	Definition of peacemaking/ peace support operations/ peace enforcement/ three block wars/ peace building
	Synonymy of peacekeeping and warfighting
	Distinctions between peacekeeping and warfighting or peace enforcement
	Inadequacy of the term <i>peacekeeping</i>
	Confusion about the terms among the military and the public
	Lack of definition/clarity
Defining the military profession	Narrow (traditionalist) definition of the military profession as warfighting
	Expanded (modernist) definition of the military profession
	Concepts of self-sacrifice and duty as a part of the military profession
	Canada's military legacy and history of involvement in the conflicts
Misrepresentation of the military and peacekeeping	Media misrepresentation of peacekeeping and the military
	Misuse of the terms by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Department of National Defence (DND), and the Government
	Peacekeeping (or other terms) as political tools to enhance positive perception of the government among the public
	Peacekeeping as a tool to increase a positive national identity
	Peacekeeping as a tool to enhance a positive public image of the CAF
	Public lack of knowledge about or interest in the military
Deconstructing peacekeeping	Civilians' misunderstanding of peacekeeping
	Ineffectiveness of peacekeeping
	Peacekeeping as an impediment to effective practice of the military profession
	(Ir)relevance of terms
	Soldiers' negative attitude toward peacekeeping
	Soldiers' negative attitude toward the general public
	Need to redefine peacekeeping
Transparency and honest language	The role of public support to the military
	Military's obligation to project an honest image of itself

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