



IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009

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**ADVANCING THE NATIONAL
INTEREST: MARCEL
CADIEUX, JULES LEGER, AND
CANADIAN PARTICIPATION
IN THE FRANCOPHONE
COMMUNITY, 1964-1972**

Robin S. Gendron

When, in late 1965, Presidents Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Léopold Senghor of Senegal proposed the creation of an international organization for French-speaking states, they unwittingly created a problem for the Canadian government and the Department of External Affairs. In their initial conception of this organization, neither Bourguiba nor Senghor anticipated, nor wanted, Canada's participation. What they envisaged instead was a modest organization that would enhance the ability of French-speaking countries in Africa to preserve their shared linguistic and cultural heritage.¹ Over succeeding months, however, their proposal attracted supporters who not only embraced the idea but also broadened it. In Canada, this development compelled the government and the Department of External Affairs to consider what role Canada should play in the emerging community of French-speaking states; a question complicated by Canada's difficult relations with France in this period, as well as the challenges faced from the government of Quebec, which asserted the right to its own international personality and to conduct its own international relations.

From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, the Department of External Affairs and its officials devoted a great deal of their time and energy to advancing Canada's interests in the international community of French-speaking states. For two of the department's officials in particular, however, this issue took on an added importance. Both Marcel Cadieux and Jules Léger played key roles in the debate over Canada's involvement in the community of French-speaking states by virtue of their official positions as under-secretary of state for external affairs and Canada's ambassador in France, respectively. Beyond that, they were also the senior francophone officials in a department struggling, like the government as a whole, to become more inclusive of, and responsive to, the francophone dimension of Canada's biculturalism. For them, Canada's involvement with the international community of French-speaking states served Canadian national interests by reinforcing traditional conceptions of French Canadian identity at a time when this identity was being threatened by the emergence of a much narrower form of Québécois nationalism. By the 1960s, French Canadian nationalists in Quebec — those who had formerly identified with a pan-Canadian community of francophones with a vibrant role to play in a bicultural Canada — were increasingly focusing their sense of identity on the territory of Quebec alone and the government of Quebec as defender of French culture in North America. For Cadieux and Léger, this development posed a significant threat to their conception of Canada and the place of French Canadians in it, though they differed widely on how best to respond to it.

From the moment that it was first proposed in 1965, there were mixed feelings in the Department of External Affairs about what the establishment of an international community of French-speaking states meant for Canada. Some officials, like Thomas Carter, the head of the department's European Division, were decidedly sceptical about the benefits for Canada of becoming involved in a community which, because of the resentment that many of its potential members still bore towards France, they felt would never be as widely embraced as the British Commonwealth. Indeed, countries like Algeria, Guinea, and Morocco were more concerned about eradicating the remnants of French colonialism in their societies than with preserving their French heritage and links with France. An international organization of French-speaking states would not, consequently,

help Canada build ties with such countries. Moreover, involvement could impose extensive financial and political commitments on Canada. Because economically advanced French-speaking countries like Belgium and Switzerland had no intention of joining, Canada would be the only political and economic counterweight to France in the francophone organization. As such, French African countries would expect much greater financial assistance from Canada than it could hope to meet, in contrast to the Commonwealth where wealthy countries like Australia and New Zealand shared the burden with Britain and Canada.²

Based on the initial conception of the proposed community, Carter added an additional note of concern. Since no one in French Africa or France seemed to want to replicate the British Commonwealth's political focus and formal structure, the French-speaking community was likely to confine itself exclusively to issues of culture and language, precisely the sort of emphasis that would engage the ambitions of the government of Quebec. The Canadian government, therefore, could expect a long and bitter fight with Quebec over the latter's desire to participate in the community on its own behalf, especially since "the advocates of a more independent attitude for Quebec would consider it as a natural forum in which to promote their cause."³ Given the damage to Canada's domestic harmony and national unity that would inevitably result from such a fight, would it not be better, Carter wondered, for the Canadian government to focus on bilateral rather than multilateral efforts to improve its relations with French-speaking countries?

Carter's reasoning struck Marcel Cadieux as fundamentally unsound. Cadieux believed that for Canada to eschew involvement in a multilateral association of French-speaking states would send precisely the wrong message to French Canadians, many of whom, especially in Quebec, already believed that the federal government was not interested in the French-speaking world. It was this belief, in fact, that underlay some of the arguments that individuals like André Patry, the former professor of international relations turned senior advisor to Quebec Premier Jean Lesage, and Claude Morin, Quebec's deputy minister of intergovernmental affairs, used in the early to mid-1960s to demand greater international responsibilities for the government of Quebec. If the Canadian government could not, or would not, satisfy French Canadian interests in establishing

stronger relations with the French-speaking world, then according to Patry and Morin the responsibility fell to the government of Quebec to do so for itself. For Canada to ignore an association of francophone countries, even if it worked tirelessly to strengthen bilateral relations with these nations, risked letting “the feeling develop that federal policies do not take sufficient account of the aspirations of French Canada in the international sphere.”⁴ From Cadieux’s perspective, there could be no question of the need for Canada to participate actively and enthusiastically in the community of French-speaking states, however it developed.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin and the Liberal government as a whole shared Cadieux’s view about the need for Canada to be more responsive to French Canadian interests in the realm of foreign policy. Since their election in 1963, Martin and Prime Minister Lester Pearson had devoted significant energy and resources to improving Canada’s relations with French-speaking countries. New embassies were opened in Senegal and Tunisia in 1966; Canadian developmental assistance for French-speaking countries in Africa expanded rapidly from \$300,000 in 1963 to \$7 million just a few years later; and contacts, exchanges, and discussions with French African governments increased significantly over the same period. All of this was part of a deliberate strategy to incorporate French Canadian interests more explicitly into Canada’s foreign policies and thereby help minimize the adverse effects of the growth of Québécois nationalism on Canadian unity. Long overdue, from the point of view of Cadieux and Léger, this strategy nonetheless represented an important step towards the fulfillment of long-standing French Canadian aspirations for a full and vibrant role in Canadian national and international affairs.⁵

Jules Léger and Marcel Cadieux joined the Department of External Affairs in 1940 and 1941, respectively. At that time, and for a long time thereafter, the department, its officials, and its culture were overwhelmingly anglophone, a situation against which both Cadieux and Léger struggled. Even Léger’s appointment to the department’s top post, under-secretary of state for external affairs, in 1954 did not fundamentally alter the relative marginalization of French Canadians in the Department of External Affairs and, more generally, in the formulation of Canada’s foreign relations.⁶ Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Cadieux in particular fought extremely hard to change that state of affairs: he pushed to make the

department bilingual in the 1950s by advocating French language training for Canada's anglophone diplomats;⁷ his book, *Le Diplomate canadien*, was intended, at least in part, to attract more young French Canadians into Canada's foreign service⁸ and he pleaded with his political superiors to allocate more aid to the French-speaking countries in Africa as a demonstration of the Canadian government's responsiveness to French Canadian international interests. Unfortunately, these pleas fell on deaf ears in the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker.⁹

The election of the Liberal government in 1963, however, changed the dynamic in Ottawa and the new government's broad pursuit of bilingualism and biculturalism promised to bring French Canadians and their interests more fully and equitably into the fold of the Canadian government and Canadian national affairs. For Marcel Cadieux and Jules Léger, this was a very welcome development. Both of them were French Canadian nationalists in the tradition of Henri Bourassa, the early twentieth century advocate of a bilingual and bicultural Canada.¹⁰ Like Bourassa, Cadieux and Léger sought the widest possible participation of French Canadians in the development of Canada on the basis of equality and mutual respect between Canada's French and English-speaking peoples. After 1963, the realization of this vision of a truly bicultural Canada seemed closer than ever.

French Canadian conceptions of nationalism had not remained static since the days of Henri Bourassa, however. By the 1920s, some French Canadian nationalists had begun to reject the non-territorial, pan-Canadian definition of French-Canadian nationalism that was intrinsic to Bourassa. Instead, nationalist leaders like Abbé Lionel Groulx focused their attention much more narrowly on Quebec as the spiritual home of the French presence in Canada and the only political jurisdiction where French Canadians — being the majority of the population — could protect their culture from the threat of assimilation. Over several decades, culminating in the 1960s, this process transformed many, if not most, French Canadian nationalists in Quebec into Québécois nationalists.¹¹ Insofar as this development encouraged the concomitant emergence of a separatist movement in Quebec, it posed a significant challenge to Canada's national unity.¹² Even moderate expressions of Québécois nationalism, however,

raised fundamental questions about the ongoing place of French Canadians in Canada and Canadian national life.

As French Canadian nationalists focused more attention on the province of Quebec, they magnified the importance of the government of Quebec as defender of the French culture in Canada. Indeed, by the early 1960s, Premier Jean Lesage was calling the government of Quebec “the political expression of French Canada.” Building on the arguments contained in the Tremblay Report, the report of the Quebec Royal Commission that criticized the centralization of power in the federal government’s hands at the expense of provincial jurisdictions after 1945, Lesage’s government sought special powers to go along with its special responsibilities as the voice of French Canadians in Canada.¹³

Daniel Johnson, who succeeded Lesage as premier in 1966, stated Quebec’s claim even more explicitly: to protect and promote French Canadian interests and culture the government of Quebec needed full constitutional equality with the rest of Canada and complete responsibility for French Canada’s political, economic, social, and cultural affairs.¹⁴ In practice, this argument inspired such initiatives as the Quebec government’s attempt to gain control over the federal program of educational assistance for French-speaking countries in Africa between 1964 and 1966.¹⁵ The move was ultimately unsuccessful but the logic of even moderate forms of Québécois nationalism nonetheless reinforced the idea that Quebec City, rather than Ottawa, was the only appropriate locus for any and all initiatives connected to the *épanouissement* of French Canada in the mid- to late 1960s.

Like the Canadian government as a whole, Cadieux and Léger rejected the premise that the government of Quebec was the sole political voice of French Canada. They understood the frustrations that had helped feed such claims, and they even sympathized with them.¹⁶ Yet they shared the belief that French Canadian interests were best served, not by focusing solely on Quebec, but rather by maximizing the broader opportunities available through the Canadian government as a whole. Cadieux and Léger’s own careers demonstrated that it was possible for French Canadians to succeed in Ottawa and, at the very moment when the Canadian government was becoming more receptive to French Canadian interests, the demands of Québécois nationalists threatened to derail what they and others had struggled so hard to achieve.¹⁷ In essence, despite the emergence

of Québécois nationalism, Cadieux and Léger remained French Canadian nationalists who felt that no good would come from abandoning Canada. Instead, they believed that the Canadian government needed to remain an outlet for the energy, skills, and aspirations of all of Canada's French-speaking peoples.¹⁸ It was for this reason that Cadieux and Léger considered Canada's involvement in the community of French-speaking countries after 1965 not only desirable but necessary. Fundamentally, this community offered the Canadian government the opportunity to demonstrate that it was still capable of addressing French Canadian, and even Québécois, needs. Failing to demonstrate that capability, however, would only reinforce Québécois nationalists' criticisms of the Canadian government and buttress the already growing ambitions of the government of Quebec.

Cadieux and Léger had very little trouble persuading Paul Martin and Lester Pearson that the Canadian government needed to pursue involvement in the emerging community of French-speaking states aggressively after 1965. They even prevailed upon the government to try to take a leadership role in establishing the community, part of a strategy to ensure that it developed in a way amenable to Canadian interests. In particular, they hoped to nudge the community towards a more formal, politically oriented organization similar to the Commonwealth or, alternatively, a very loose, informal organization of private agencies and associations, either of which would have maximized the role for Canada while minimizing the scope for Quebec's involvement.¹⁹ Unfortunately for the Canadian government, the initiative in determining the nature of the francophone community lay largely in French African capitals like Dakar and Tunis or in Paris rather than in Ottawa. And in Paris, at least, the French government very much wanted Quebec to play an important role in the francophone community.

From the opening of Quebec's *Délégation générale* in Paris in 1961 through the negotiation of a cultural accord in 1965, relations between the governments of Quebec and France became remarkably close during the 1960s. More to the point, the government of Quebec needed France to support its international ambitions. Without that support, Quebec's claim that it exercised the same competence over fields like education and culture at the international level that it did within Canada, articulated by the Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine of 1965,²⁰ would have carried much less weight. However, with French President Charles de Gaulle increasingly convinced that

a bicultural Canada was ultimately unworkable and anxious to strengthen the *rayonnement* of French culture in Quebec, the French government was more than willing to recognize Quebec's claims to international competence and deal directly with it in international affairs.²¹ Naturally, the Canadian government resented the special relationship that developed between the governments of France and Quebec in the 1960s, yet it could do little to impede it or to stem the deterioration of its own relations with France in the same period.²² Nor could the Canadian government prevent France from trying to ensure that Quebec was able to participate fully and autonomously in the emerging international community of French-speaking states.

Despite leaving the initiative on the development of this community in the hands of other governments, the French government worked hard to keep its focus strictly on language and culture. It had its own reasons for doing so — it wanted to avoid the impression that it was seeking to impose some form of neo-imperialism on its former colonies in Africa²³ — yet this focus also strengthened Quebec's claim to its own membership in the community on the grounds that it involved areas of its constitutional competence. Because of its responsibility for fields like culture and education, the French government was convinced that Quebec had an important role to play in the francophone community that Canada, which de Gaulle and many others in Paris considered essentially an anglophone country, did not.²⁴ It was this conviction, and the French government's willingness to use its influence in French Africa, that ultimately helped Quebec secure an invitation to the Libreville meeting of ministers of education from France and French Africa in early 1968 and, subsequently, to participate in the conferences in 1970 and 1971 that established the *Agence de coopération culturelle et technique*, forerunner of the organization that would become known as *la Francophonie*.²⁵ In the meantime, however, the Canadian government needed to determine its own response to efforts to gain for Quebec autonomous membership in this francophone community.

Between 1964 and 1968, Cadieux and Léger were the central figures in the debate within the Department of External Affairs about how to respond to Quebec's interest in the international community of French-speaking states and in international affairs more broadly. Friends as well as colleagues, they generally shared a common view about Canada and its

international interests, but on this particular issue they diverged noticeably. For Cadieux there could be no question of Quebec's being able to act on its own behalf internationally since, under both international law and the Canadian constitution, the Canadian government enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of international affairs. Consequently, the federal government was the only body entitled to represent Canadians, all Canadians, internationally.²⁶ Quebec therefore had no authority to act internationally and any pretensions otherwise had to be opposed vigorously as a threat to federal authority and, more importantly, Canada's national unity. Any concessions to Quebec's international ambitions, even in the fields of education or culture, would only encourage Québécois nationalists to make further demands at the expense of the federal government. Moreover, if France continued to encourage Quebec's ambitions, Cadieux felt that the Canadian government had to be prepared to respond forcefully, even if it meant rupturing Franco-Canadian relations.²⁷

While Léger agreed with Cadieux about the need to defend the Canadian government's constitutional position aggressively, including its claim of pre-eminence in international affairs, he did not share his colleague's absolute conviction that Quebec had to be prevented from exercising any international role whatsoever. Instead, Léger advocated a more conciliatory attitude towards Quebec's international ambitions. After all, he argued, any international activities undertaken by Quebec were really only a threat to Canada if they took place in defiance of the Canadian government. Ultimately, he believed that the solution to the crisis over Quebec's intention to participate in the international community of French-speaking states lay in negotiating a settlement that allowed Quebec to join the community under the overall umbrella of Canada's own involvement. Léger consistently advocated such a settlement from 1966 to 1968.²⁸ Even on the eve of Quebec's participation in the Libreville Conference, when Cadieux himself was pushing Lester Pearson and Paul Martin to punish France and Quebec, Léger counselled caution and a negotiated agreement to resolve the constitutional dispute.²⁹

At first, these differences did not unduly affect the relationship between Cadieux and Léger. As the Canada-Quebec-France crisis over the francophone community deepened in 1967, however, Cadieux became ever more concerned about Léger's apparent willingness to concede that Quebec

did in fact have some capacity to act on its own behalf internationally. In March 1967, Léger wrote an article for the Canadian Institute for International Affairs' *International Journal* that, to Cadieux, seemed to favour allowing Quebec a role to play in Canada's relations with French-speaking countries. The article also neglected to stress to Cadieux's satisfaction that "the Canadian government [was] the instrument for the expression of Canadian foreign policy in terms of the bicultural and bilingual character of the country." Fearful of the consequences of this argument being made in such a public way by a prominent member of the department, Cadieux denied Léger permission to publish this article.³⁰ Fundamentally, Cadieux was concerned that Léger failed to understand the full political and constitutional implications of allowing Quebec to develop its own foreign relations, with France or any other French-speaking countries. For his part, Léger believed that Cadieux's instinctive response towards the dispute with Quebec and France was too confrontational and that this too carried long-term risks for Canada and its domestic and foreign interests.

Some of their differences with regard to dealing with Quebec and its international ambitions can be attributed to their respective positions in the Department of External Affairs and the view of events they gained from them. As under-secretary of state for external affairs from 1964 to 1970, Cadieux was at the centre of events in Ottawa, where he was much more familiar with, and sensitive to, developments in Quebec and Ottawa, including the extent of the threat that Quebec's ambitions posed to federal interests. From Paris, in contrast, Ambassador Léger's concern for the preservation of Canada's long-term relations with France led him to favour a pragmatic, conciliatory response to the crisis in Canada-Quebec-France relations. Léger also believed that, once de Gaulle was removed from the centre of political life in France, more sensible elements in the French government would reassert themselves.³¹ There was, however, more to their divergent perspectives on Quebec and its international ambitions. Their different personalities — Cadieux the uncompromising, highly principled lawyer and Léger the consummate diplomat (forever seeing shades of grey where Cadieux saw only black and white) — only added to the gulf that divided them.³²

Cadieux is widely acknowledged to have been a fierce Canadian nationalist, with his nationalism rooted in a firm commitment to a long-standing

French Canadian vision of Canada as a bicultural country.³³ Jules Léger, however, was no less committed than Cadieux to this vision of nationalism. As such, they were both at odds with the emergence of a Québécois nationalism in their home province that threatened to undermine Canadian biculturalism at the very moment in the mid- to late 1960s that it was closer than ever to being realized. They differed, though, in their assessment of how much of a threat Québécois nationalism actually posed to Canada. For Cadieux, the true extent of this threat was summed up by his experience with Claude Morin, the Quebec official at the heart of efforts to expand that government's international identity, who convinced Cadieux that the ultimate goal of Québécois nationalism was the breakup of Canada.³⁴ Léger, on the other hand, despite the deepening tension between Canada and Quebec in this period maintained a relatively congenial and effective working relationship with Quebec's delegate general in Paris, Jean Chapdelaine, even though this relationship caused a certain amount of unease among their respective colleagues in Ottawa and Quebec City.³⁵

For Cadieux, Québécois nationalism was incompatible with his sense of French Canadian nationalism and, since only one of them could prevail, he was committed to ensuring that the one that did preserved the greatest opportunities for French Canadians on the widest possible scale. Léger, though, did not believe that Québécois nationalism and his own sense of French Canadian nationalism were mutually exclusive; they could, in fact, co-exist, although doing so required the Canadian government to be more accommodating of the aspirations of the government of Quebec, among the most notable of which was the desire for its own place in the broader francophone world of *la Francophonie*.

For both Marcel Cadieux and Jules Léger, defending the national interest was a multilayered concern, incorporating the need to protect Canada's national interests as well as French Canadian national interests. Ultimately, these two ardent defenders of both Canada and French Canada agreed that Canada's participation in the international community of French-speaking states was vital for the pursuit of Canadian national interests and an important step towards fulfilling the promise of biculturalism that was central to the French Canadian conception of Canada. That they disagreed about whether the Canadian government could accommodate Quebec's participation in this community without undermining the

pursuit of biculturalism in Canada is indicative of the turmoil in Ottawa provoked by the emergence of Québécois nationalism and the related demands for new powers and responsibilities from the government of Quebec in the 1960s. In the end, the governments of Canada and Quebec reached a compromise in 1971–72 enabling Quebec to participate in the international organization later known as *la Francophonie* under a Canadian umbrella.³⁶ This compromise vindicated Léger's belief that Québécois and French Canadians could in fact co-exist in Canada, and that Québécois nationalism and the more aggressive provincial government that harnessed it for its own purposes were not an irremediable threat to Canada. Moreover, the ongoing commitment to an active role in *la Francophonie* of the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian government as a whole demonstrated the overlapping nature of Canadian and French Canadian interests in this period. Defending the one meant defending the other as well, the fulfillment of a long-standing French Canadian vision of a truly bilingual and bicultural Canadian nation.

NOTES

- 1 See Robin S. Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community: Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 116.
- 2 Memorandum, T. Carter to J. George, "Possible Canadian Initiative Regarding a French Commonwealth," 28 January 1966, Department of External Affairs Records (DEAR), vol. 10683, file 26-1, pt. 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC); and Report, European Division, A French Commonwealth or a Francophone Community, 14 July 1966, DEAR, vol. 10683, file 26-1, pt. 1, LAC.
- 3 Memorandum, T. Carter to J. George, 28 January 1966, DEAR, vol. 10683, file 26-1, pt. 1, LAC.
- 4 Telegram 3935, M. Cadieux to External Affairs [DEA], 11 September 1966, DEAR, vol. 10683, file 26-1, pt. 2, LAC.
- 5 When the Diefenbaker government announced that it would begin extending educational assistance to the French-speaking countries in Africa in November, 1961, Professor Jacques Morin of the Université de Montréal lamented that the government had already been providing scholarships to Commonwealth countries in Africa for over two years. According to Morin, the discrepancy between the two programs only reinforced the degree to which French Canadian interests were of secondary importance in Canada's foreign policy. Jacques Morin, "Scholarships for French-Speaking African Countries," *Le Devoir*, 12 November 1960, DEAR, vol. 5258, file 8260-15-40, pt. 1, LAC.
- 6 John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life and Times of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Toronto: Vintage, 1993), 149.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Marcel Cadieux, *Le Diplomate canadien: éléments d'une définition* (Paris: Fides, 1962).
- 9 See, for example, Memorandum, Marcel Cadieux to African and Middle Eastern Division, 3 January 1962, DEAR, vol. 5259, file 8260-15-40, pt. 4, LAC.
- 10 David Meren, "Antagonism and Engagement: Marcel Cadieux, Jules Léger, and the Department of External Affairs' Response to Canada-Quebec-France Tensions," unpublished paper presented at the Canada and France: A Diplomatic Partnership Conference, Montreal, 31 October 2008, 2.
- 11 For further information on Lionel Groulx and French Canadian nationalism in the 1920s, see Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, *Action Française: French Canadian Nationalism in the Twenties* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975). For a brief account of subsequent developments in French Canadian nationalism, see Marcel Martel, *French Canada: An Account of its Creation and Break-Up, 1850-1967* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1998).
- 12 On the emergence of the separatist movement in Quebec, see William Coleman, *The Independence Movement in Quebec, 1945-1980* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).
- 13 As quoted in Louis Balthazar, "Quebec and the Ideal of Federalism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 538 (March 1995): 43. On the influence of the Tremblay Report, see Donald J. Horton, *André Laurendeau: French Canadian Nationalist, 1912-1968* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 167.
- 14 See Daniel Johnson, *Égalité ou indépendance* (Montreal: Renaissance, 1965).
- 15 See Robin S. Gendron, "Educational aid for French Africa and the Canada-Quebec Dispute over Foreign Policy in the 1960s," *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2000-2001): 26-28.
- 16 See Meren, "Antagonism and Engagement," 2; and English, *The Worldly Years*, 84.

- 17 J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 123-24.
- 18 In 1964, Jean Chapdelaine left the Department of External Affairs to become Quebec's delegate general in Paris, one of several francophones who left the department in this period. Bitter at being denied the senior position he felt he deserved, Chapdelaine's departure was also partly motivated by the lack of sympathy in the department for Quebec's aspirations, especially after Marcel Cadieux became under-secretary of state for external affairs. - See Marcel Cadieux to Jules Léger, 28 September 1964, Jules Léger Papers, vol. 2.3, LAC.
- 19 In the end, the Canadian government opted for the latter approach. On March 11, 1967, Paul Martin gave a speech to the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Montreal in which he proposed that the Canadian government would sponsor an international conference to foster the birth of an *Association internationale de solidarité francophone*, an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of non-governmental associations devoted to the development of the French language and culture. See Paul Martin, "Canada and la francophonie," 11 March 1967, DEAR, vol. 10684, file 26-2-CDA, pt. 1, LAC.
- 20 For numerous, and varied, discussions of the significance and influence of the Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine, see Stéphane Paquin, ed., *Les relations internationales du Québec depuis la Doctrine Gérin-Lajoie (1965-2005): Le prolongement externe des compétences internes* (Lévis: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006).
- 21 Éric Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle* (Paris: Galimard, 2002), 381-83.
- 22 Many works have discussed the difficulties in the Canada-France relationship in the 1960s. For some of the most notable, see Eldon Black, *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996); John Bosher, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999); and Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre* (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1988).
- 23 Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, Director of the American section in the French Foreign Ministry, elaborated upon this concern in a conversation with Jules Léger in August 1966. Telegram 1852, Paris to Ottawa, 31 August 1966, DEAR, vol. 10683, file 26-1, pt. 2, LAC.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community*, 130-33.
- 26 Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 124-26. Along these same lines see also the legal opinion prepared by the department's legal advisor. See Allan Gotlieb, Memorandum, 27 September 1966, DEAR, vol. 10685, file 26-2-CDA-QUE, pt. 1, LAC.
- 27 In late December 1967, Cadieux prepared a memorandum for Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson outlining possible responses the Canadian government could take if France engineered an invitation for Quebec to the Libreville Conference in early 1968. These responses included abrogating Canada-France trade agreements, ending the visa waiver for French citizens travelling to Canada, challenging French actions in the World Court, or even breaking off diplomatic relations with France entirely. His own inclination, he wrote, "would be to let the French and the world know that there is still some life left in us, and that we will react with all the vigour and strength at our command to protect ourselves against external intervention [in Canada's internal affairs]." Cadieux to the Prime Minister, 27 December 1967, DEAR, vol. 10689, file 26-4-CME-1968, pt. 1, LAC.
- 28 See, for example, Jules Léger to Marcel Cadieux, 7 February 1967, DEAR, vol. 10683, file 26-1, pt. 3, LAC. See also Léger's arguments to this effect included in, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967, DEAR, vol. 10045, file 20-1-2-FR, pt. 7, LAC.
- 29 Telegram, Paris to Ottawa, 11 January 1968, DEAR, vol. 10685, file 26-2-CDA-QUE, pt. 1, LAC.

- 30 Marcel Cadieux, Memorandum for the Minister, 30 March 1967, DEAR, vol. 10045, file 20-1-2-FR, pt. 5, LAC.
- 31 Telegram, Paris to Ottawa, 11 January 1968, DEAR, vol. 10685, file 26-2-CDA-QUE, pt. 1, LAC.
- 32 English, *The Worldly Years*, 318.
- 33 See, for example, Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 123.
- 34 Claude Morin, *Les Choses comme elles étaient* (Montreal: Boréal, 1994), 191-92.
- 35 Meren, "Antagonism and Engagement," 7.
- 36 See Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 143-45.

