

2021-06-04

Policing the Protectorate: The Role and Development of the Police in Colonial Botswana, 1885-1975

Bayani, Simon Isaac

Bayani, S. I. (2021). Policing the Protectorate: The Role and Development of the Police in Colonial Botswana, 1885-1975 (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada).

Retrieved from <https://prism.ucalgary.ca>.

<http://hdl.handle.net/1880/113492>

Downloaded from PRISM Repository, University of Calgary

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Policing the Protectorate: The Role and Development of the Police in Colonial Botswana,

1885-1975

by

Simon Isaac Bayani

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JUNE, 2021

© Simon Isaac Bayani 2021

Abstract

This thesis traces the development of policing in Bechuanaland (Colonial Botswana) starting from 1885 when the British declared a protectorate over the territory. In order to show the impact of colonialism on policing in post-independence Botswana, the thesis goes as far as 1975, exactly 9 years after the country gained its independence from Britain. In a mostly chronological style, the thesis shows the transition of the colonial police force through various names and designations influenced by the wider politics of the Southern African region. Using the frontier and metropolitan theories found in the historiography of the North American West, the study shows that the Bechuanaland Protectorate was a frontier of Southern Africa and was also influenced by the metropolitan forces of Mafikeng, Cape Town and ultimately Britain. Policing in the formative years of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was, therefore, influenced by both frontier and metropolitan forces.

This study also reveals the changes in the nature of policing throughout Bechuanaland's 81-year period of colonization. While many African colonies began to transform their police forces from para-military to professional law enforcement organizations during the inter-war period, the Bechuanaland administration held back given the financial constraints and the influence of the neighbouring Union of South Africa. After the end of World War II, however, policing in Bechuanaland began to change within the context of the post-war reforms in British colonial Africa. While the earlier occupational force in Bechuanaland represented a para-military organization capable of crushing any possible rebellions in the territory, the post-World War II period saw the police force begin to move away from coercive and militaristic policing to a more civil and consensual style. Interestingly, however, as the thesis shows, the decolonization period brought with it political challenges to colonial authority, and as a result, the Bechuanaland administration, just like other colonies, was forced to re-militarize its police force to combat political unrest while preparing the territory for independence.

Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
List of Abbreviations	v
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: British Occupation and the Beginning of Colonial Policing in Bechuanaland, 1885-1912.....	21
Chapter 2: Racial Hierarchy and Conditions of Service in the Bechuanaland Police	63
Chapter 3: Reorganizing the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, 1930-1946.....	94
Chapter 4: The Bangwato Disturbances and the Militarization of the Police Force, 1948-1959	128
Chapter 5: The Police Force in Bechuanaland's Road to Independence, 1960-1966.....	157
Chapter 6: The Botswana Police and Post-Independence Challenges, 1966-1975	192
Conclusion	231
Bibliography	236

Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude goes out to my supervisor Timothy Stapleton for his support and encouragement throughout the writing of this thesis. He tirelessly read every chapter presented in this study, providing me with constructive feedback in a very timely manner. As my M.A and doctoral supervisor for 6 consecutive years and across 2 universities, his positive influence on my growth as an upcoming scholar is undeniable.

I would also like to thank the members of my supervisory committee, Warren Elofson and Rowland Apentiik for their assistance in this journey from the time of my candidacy exams right through to the defence of this thesis. I am also thankful to the Department of History at the University of Calgary for affording me the privilege of being one of them for the past 4 years. The Graduate Program Administrator, Lori Somner deserves a special mention for patiently assisting me during the countless times I came to her for help as well as for her friendship. For access to the written sources that this thesis relied upon, I am grateful to the staff at the Botswana National Archives and Records Services in Gaborone and the National Archives of the U.K at Kew in London. My thanks also go to the staff at the University of Calgary's Taylor Family Digital Library for helping me with the necessary secondary material for this study and especially for providing digital copies of many books following the lockdown brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic.

The members of the History Department at the University of Botswana deserve a mention for their advice on possible sources as well as their encouragement and support throughout the years. These are Professors Makgala, Morton, Mgadla, Mafela, Morapedi and Bolaane, as well as Dr Manatsha, Dr Bennett, Dr Gumbo and Mr Barei. My personal friends and fellow graduate student colleagues, Dr Bafumiki Mocheregwa, Gorata Sello and Mathew Ruguwa also deserve a mention here for their continued support, guidance and overall comradery during our studies together.

List of Abbreviations

AAC – African Advisory Council

ANC – African National Congress

APC – African Pioneer Corps

BBP – Bechuanaland Border Police

BMATT – British Military Advisory Training Team

BMP – Bechuanaland Mounted Police

BNARS – Botswana National Archives and Records Services

BPP – Bechuanaland Protectorate Police

BSAC – British South Africa Company

BSAP – British South Africa Police

CARS – Central African Relay Station

CID – Criminal Investigations Department

CMR – Cape Mounted Rifles

CPM – Communist Party of Malaya

GSU – General Service Unit

HCTs – High Commission Territories

KAR – King's African Rifles

LMS – London Missionary Society

MNLA – Malayan National Liberation Army

MK – Umkhonto We Sizwe

NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer

NDP – National Democratic Party

NRC – Native Recruiting Corporation

NRP – Northern Rhodesia Police

NWMP – North-West Mounted Police

OAU – Organization of African Unity

PAC – Pan African Congress

PMU – Police Mobile Unit

PNP – Protectorate Native Police

RAF – Royal Air Force

SAP – South African Police

SAAF – South African Air Force

SLR – Self-Loading Rifle

SWANU – South-West Africa National Union

SWAPO – South-West Africa People’s Organization

TNA – The National Archives

UDI – Unilateral Declaration of Independence

WIR – West India Regiment

WNLA – Witwatersrand Native Labour Recruitment Association

WWI – World War I

WWII – World War II

ZANU – Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union

ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army

Map of Southern Africa Showing the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Neighbouring Territories.¹



¹ United States Central Intelligence Agency, *South Africa*, (Washington DC.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1963) <https://www.loc.gov/item/96680413/> Accessed 12 April 2021.

Introduction

The history of policing in Botswana just like many other African countries can be traced back to the colonial period. The conquest and rule of African territories by European powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were consolidated through the creation of para-military police forces to operate as agents of colonial control and to maintain foreign rule. The responsibility for state security was, therefore, borne by the colonial police forces, and in some cases, by the military which operated as a reserve. In most cases, colonial police and military forces were considerably small and highly dependent on the participation of the colonized people to make up their numbers.²

The history of policing in Africa is important because it offers an avenue through which to understand the nature of colonial administration more generally, by studying the roles of security forces in the various colonies. Some colonies had more economic value to their colonizers than others, and this was sometimes reflected in the nature of policing in such territories. In territories with much larger populations and economies, including the white settler colonies, the colonial police forces were instrumental in securing low-paid wage labour, collecting tax and pushing Africans into impoverished reserves.³ While this may have been common in many British territories in Africa and other parts of the empire, the development of policing in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (colonial Botswana) was unique due to the circumstances surrounding the colonization of the territory. Because the territory was colonized

² D. Anderson and D. Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 1-15; D. Killingray, "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa," *African Affairs*, 85: 340 (1986) pp. 411-437.

³ M. Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940*. (Cambridge University Press, 2012); P. Ahire, *Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria, 1860-1960*. (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991); A. Grundlingh, "'Protectors and Friends of the People'? The South African Constabulary in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 1900-08," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 168-182.

for strategic rather than economic reasons, which will be explained in Chapter 1, the role of the police force in Bechuanaland was different from that of other colonial forces which protected mining, agricultural, and other economic interests of the state. Without a very large population to police in Bechuanaland, the force was kept fairly small, which was also informed by the territory's poor financial state. Another factor affecting the nature of policing in Bechuanaland was the fact that in the early period of colonization, the British government contemplated transferring the administration of the territory to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which conquered and ruled Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe today) in the 1890s. As a result, the name of Bechuanaland's police force changed constantly while its control remained precarious for as long as the British Colonial Office considered the question of transfer.⁴ As the possibility of placing the Bechuanaland Protectorate under company rule disappeared, so did the role and development of the territory's police force begin to take form. However, the possibility of the Bechuanaland Protectorate being transferred to the BSAC was replaced by that of joining the Union of South Africa after 1910, and this too, affected the way in which policing developed in Bechuanaland.⁵

Historical Background of African Colonial Police Forces

In understanding the development of policing in colonial Botswana, it is worthwhile discussing the formation of some of the larger police forces in British colonial Africa during and following the colonization of the continent. The police forces created in the British colonies in the 19th century were not founded along the lines of the regular police forces of Great Britain, but were rather patterned after the Royal Irish Constabulary, which was a para-military police force

⁴ P. Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Conflict in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1899*. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980); A Sillery, *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, 1835-1899: A Study in Humanitarian Imperialism*. (Cape Town: A. A Balkema, 1971); J. Halpern. *South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland*. (London: Penguin African Library, 1965).

⁵ R. Hyam, *The Failure of Southern African Expansion, 1908-1948*. (London: The Macmillan Press, 1972), 24.

created in 1822 to police Ireland during a period of unrest and resistance to British rule. The ‘Irish model’, as it came to be known, presented 3 main characteristics that were vital for colonial policing but not present in the English and Scottish police forces of the 19th and 20th centuries. One of these characteristics was the organization of a police force along military lines, and this was transplanted to the colonies. Second was the centralized control of the police as the official territorial security force and lastly, the housing of security personnel in barracks separate from the communities they policed. However, as historian Richard Hawkins explains, the degree of the application of the Irish model varied from colony to colony due to local circumstances, and at least 1 of the 3 characteristics mentioned above was visible in the police forces of the empire throughout the 19th and 20th century.⁶ In following the Irish model, therefore, colonial police forces began as para-military formations during the conquest era and then developed into law enforcement organizations with the growth of the colonial economy and state. This process usually involved the separation of police from military forces. As the thesis shall show, colonial police forces tended to comprise a racial hierarchy in which the Europeans held leadership roles while Africans operated as the rank-and-file.⁷

In Nigeria, the first colonial police force was established in 1861 following the annexation of Lagos as a British Colony. The force of 25 constables was created by a British merchant named William McCoskry after he was appointed acting governor of Lagos in 1861. Shortly after, his successor, Henry Freeman increased the establishment of the police force by 75. By October 1863, the police force had grown to 600 men and it was named the Armed Hausa Police Force, a title that reflected the force’s ethnic composition. These were mostly former slaves originally from the northern part of Nigeria. Although it is unlikely that all

⁶ R. Hawkins, “The ‘Irish Model’ and the Empire: A Case for Reassessment,” in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 18-32.

⁷ Anderson and Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control...”, 7-8.

members of the Armed Hausa Police were from that ethnic group, the name stuck to the force. The term 'Hausa' was in fact also common among British West African colonial military units in the 19th century.⁸ As British colonial authority was extended throughout Nigeria, and more protectorates created, so were other police forces formed along similar patterns as that of Lagos. With time, these constabularies were amalgamated so that by 1906, there were 2 police forces in Nigeria namely, the Southern Police Force and the Northern Police Force, reflecting the two territories of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. In 1930, the Southern and Northern police forces too, were amalgamated to form the Nigeria Police Force, which was late considering that the 2 Nigerian Protectorates mentioned above were amalgamated in 1914.⁹

In the neighbouring Gold Coast, a small armed police force was created in 1865 to respond to emergencies in the territory without necessitating the deployment of the West India Regiment that had been in the territory since 1845. The small constabulary soon proved inadequate and was replaced in 1872, by the Gold Coast Armed Police which was modelled after the Lagos Armed Police and became the paramilitary force of the territory. The original members of this force had been brought in from Nigeria and were members of the Armed Hausa Police. For similar reasons to its Lagos counterpart, the force was unofficially referred to as the Hausa police.¹⁰ Following the proclamation of the Gold Coast Colony in 1874, the paramilitary force was enlarged and renamed the Gold Coast Constabulary in 1875. In 1894, there was a formal separation of strictly police functions from military ones, and this led to the

⁸ Ahire, *Imperial Policing...*, 33-59; K. Mann, *Slavery and the Birth of an African City: Lagos, 1760-1900*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 110-111; T. Stapleton, "Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria (c.1900-1960)," *Journal of African Military History*, 3:1 (2019): 4-5.

⁹ A. Clayton and D. Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1989); O.A. Obaro, "The Nigeria Police Force and the Crisis of Legitimacy: Re-Defining the Structure and Function of the Nigeria Police," *European Scientific Journal*, 10: 8 (2014): 425-426.

¹⁰ D. Killingray, "Guarding the Extending Frontier: Policing the Gold Coast, 1865-1913," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 107-110.

formation of a civil police force named the Gold Coast Police Force.¹¹ Colonial policing in the Gold Coast was mainly centred around patrolling European mining infrastructure and agricultural areas and providing security for the transportation of goods. By the 1920s and 1930s, specialist branches for escort, mining and policing railways had been created in the Gold Coast Police while the larger part of the force mainly focused on general policing duties.¹²

From around 1887, the Imperial British East Africa Company, with a royal charter for the administration of parts of East Africa, employed a small body of armed men called askari, which means “soldier” in Kiswahili, to perform police duties in Mombasa. In 1896, after the British Foreign Office assumed responsibility for the administration of British East Africa from the company, the first ‘real’ police force in Kenya was established at Mombasa with Assistant Superintendent Ewart as its commander. In 1897 the Uganda Railway Police was also created to guard and oversee the construction of the railway line that would link the interiors of Uganda and Kenya with the port city of Mombasa. The railway was meant to facilitate the extraction of wealth from the interior to the coast, where it could then be shipped to Europe. By 1902, the early Kenyan constabulary had police posts in Mombasa, Nairobi, and Kisumu, and it was merged with the Uganda Railway Police to form the British East Africa Police. In 1920, British East Africa became the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, and therefore, the name of the police force was changed from British East Africa Police to the Kenya Police.¹³ The main police force of Uganda was established in 1899 and styled the Uganda Armed Constabulary. The 1,400 strong para-military force was responsible for protecting British political and economic interests and crushing anti-colonial uprisings in the territory. In 1906, the armed constabulary

¹¹ F. Boateng and I. N. Darko, “Our Past: The Effect of Colonialism on Policing in Ghana,” *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 18: 1 (2016): 14-15; M. Deflem, “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast and Kenya,” *Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development*, 17:1, (1994): 51-52.

¹² Killingray, “Guarding the Extending Frontier...”, 120.

¹³ W. R. Foran, *The Kenya Police, 1887-1960*. (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1962), 6-10. See also Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 109-111; Deflem, “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa...”, 54.

was replaced by the Uganda Protectorate Police which numbered around 967 men. By 1912, the force had 15 police stations, a Fingerprint Bureau, and a small Criminal Investigations Department. Although the Uganda Protectorate Police had become a civil police force after 1906, it did not lose its para-military character, and it often performed military duties. This was the case on several occasions in 1907 and again in 1912, when members of the force took to the field as soldiers to quell African uprisings in Uganda.¹⁴ It should be noted, however, that despite the existence of these police forces, Britain's East African colonies still maintained a purely military force called the King's African Rifles (KAR).¹⁵

In the 3 British territories that formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also known as the Central African Federation) from 1953 to 1963, colonial policing began between 1891 and 1896. The earliest of these was in Northern Rhodesia (today's Zambia) where in 1891, the small North-Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary was created for the protection of European life and property in that part of the territory. A second force, the Barotse Native Police, was formed in 1900, when the security forces of Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) ceased policing North-Western Rhodesia. After North-East and North-West Rhodesia were amalgamated in 1911 to form the colony of Northern Rhodesia, the 2 police forces were brought together in 1912 to form the Northern Rhodesia Police Force (NRP).¹⁶ In 1894, following the defeat of the Ndebele Kingdom, and the combination of Mashonaland and Matabeleland into Southern Rhodesia, the BSAC, which had a royal charter for the administration of the colony, formed the Mashonaland Mounted Police and Matabeleland

¹⁴ Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 79-80; Commonwealth Human Right Initiative, *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*. (New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Right Initiative, 2006), 2.

¹⁵ For the history of the KAR see M. Page, *A History of the King's African Rifles and East African Forces*. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2011); T. Parsons, *The African Rank-And-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964*. (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

¹⁶ Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 49; C. Mwalimu, "Police, State Security Forces and Human in Nigeria and Zambia: Dynamic Perspectives in Comparative Constitutionalism," *Third World Legal Studies*, 9: 1 (1990): 88-89.

Mounted Police as the two main police forces in these areas. A white-led but predominantly Ndebele force was also raised in 1895 and named the Matabeleland Native Police. Although the title British South Africa Police (BSAP) had been used as early 1897 as an umbrella term for the various divisions of police in the territory, it was officially adopted in 1903 when they were amalgamated, and it would remain the official name of the police force in Southern Rhodesia until independence in 1980.¹⁷ In Nyasaland (today's Malawi), the formation of a single centralized police force took longer than in other territories. Small law enforcement units were formed by district tax collectors in 1896 at the direction of the British colonial government. By 1914, the units had grown to about 400 men across the districts, but there was still no centralized police force. After the John Chilembwe uprising of 1915, the colonial state in Nyasaland began to recognize the need for a more efficient territorial force and duly created the Nyasaland Police Force in 1920.¹⁸ In Northern and Southern Rhodesia respectively, the NRP and BSAP continued to represent the main defence forces while Nyasaland had a KAR force from early in the colonial period. This is possibly why the police force was slow to develop in Nyasaland compared to the 2 Rhodesias.

In what would later become South Africa, the British Cape and Natal colonies established mounted para-military forces in the 1820s and 1870s respectively, while policing in the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State remained in the hands of the Boers until the British annexation of the republics amidst the South African War of 1899-1902. To consolidate British authority in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the South African

¹⁷ T. Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80*, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011), 3-4; P. Gibbs, *The History of the British South Africa Police: The First Line of Defence, 1889-1903*. (Saulsbury, Rhodesia: British South Africa Police, 1972), 181; M. P. Chingozha and M. Mawere, *Negotiating Law, Policing and Morality in Africa: A Handbook for Policing in Zimbabwe*. (Bamenda: Langaa Research and Publishing CIG, 2015), 66.

¹⁸ Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 67; Deflem, "Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa...", 49. For context on the Chilembwe uprising see G. Shepperson and T. Price, *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915*. (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1958).

Constabulary was created in September 1900, as a counter-insurgency force during the guerrilla phase of the war. Following the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the various police forces in the territory were amalgamated, resulting in the formation of the South African Police in 1913.¹⁹ The formation of the South African Police came just a year after the Union Defence Force (UDF) was created. The UDF was an exclusively white establishment in which Africans could not be enlisted unless parliament deemed it important. This was because the white South African politicians feared that including Africans in the army would be contradictory to the racial segregation that existed in the civilian society and that it would encourage them to demand civil rights.²⁰

Historiography of Colonial and Post-Colonial Policing

The history of policing in Africa and other parts of the world has over the years attracted much scholarship. Considering the vast amount of literature on the subject, these works can be classified generally according to the period which they have focused on, namely colonial and post-colonial.

Literature on Colonial Policing

In 1952, Sir Charles Jeffries, a British official in the Colonial Office in London, published a book titled *The Colonial Police*, which traced the origins of some police forces in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.²¹ Written on the eve of decolonization, the book represented the colonial school of thought, celebrating Britain's acquisition and administration of colonies. Despite Jeffries' early contribution, the study of colonial policing never really took off, and it remained

¹⁹ S. Hereward, *Constabulary: The Rise of Police Institutions in Britain, the Commonwealth and the United States*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 129-139; Grundlingh, "Protectors and Friends of the People...", 168-169. For the South African War, see B. Nasson, *The South African War, 1899-1902*. (London: Hodder Arnold, 1999).

²⁰ T. Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa: From Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid*. (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010), 115. See also W. A. Dorning, "A Concise History of the South African Defence Force, (1912-1987)," *South African Journal of Military Studies*, 17: 2 (1987): 2.

²¹ C. Jeffries, *The Colonial Police*. (London: Parrish, 1952).

a neglected field for some time. This, however, began to change in recent years with the rise of social history and the desire by historians to examine the role of policing in the social, political and economic processes involved in colonialism.

Published in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the works of pioneers such as David Killingray, David Anderson and Anthony Clayton focused on the development and roles of colonial police forces in Africa, Asia, and other parts of the colonized world, by reconstructing the social and political history of specific colonies through the study of their police forces. In their book on African colonial police and militaries, Clayton and Killingray focused on 6 colonial police forces (the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Uganda, and Kenya), as well as the British colonial militaries of West and East Africa. While providing insightful information about the formation and functions of these colonial forces, the book primarily discusses the experiences of European security personnel, with limited to no emphasis on the day-to-day experiences of Africans. The reason for this is because the book was meant to serve as a guide to an Oxford University collection of memoirs of British personnel who served in these forces.²² In the edited collection *Policing the Empire*, Anderson and Killingray focus on the functions of the colonial police forces in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The book demonstrates that British colonial police forces were not mere replicas of either the English Metropolitan Police or the Royal Irish Constabulary, but that policing the British Empire developed as a modification of British police models to suit the local circumstances in the individual territories.²³ Timothy Stapleton's *African Police and Soldiers* is perhaps the only published work that focuses on the lives and experiences of African policemen serving in a colonial police force. The book explores the ambiguities and complexities faced by African members of Southern Rhodesia's BSAP in

²² Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue*.

²³ D. Anderson & D. Killingray, eds. *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

upholding the rule of a white racist minority regime. The book also discusses many topics such as the motivations of Africans to join the police force, their attainment of education and upward mobility, their relationship with the African civilian population, as well as life after service.²⁴

Influenced by the materialist conception of African history that began in the 1980s, Philip Ahire used a neo-Marxist approach in his interpretation of the colonial police in Nigeria, arguing that the Nigeria Police Force emerged as an agent of the state's capitalist order, necessary for the exploitation of the colony and its inhabitants. He explained that the militaristic policing phase of the force was aimed at creating and maintaining an export-based economy in which the Africans provided all the labour. The police force was, therefore, responsible for protecting British economic enterprise, conscripting African labour and coercing the payment of taxes while suppressing African demands for better wages and working conditions.²⁵ Using the same materialist approach but written much later than Ahire's book, Martin Thomas's *Violence and Colonial Order* used a comparative approach in discussing the functions of British, French and Belgian colonial police forces in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean during the interwar period. In examining the role of colonial police forces in these places, Thomas revealed the existence of a triangular relationship between colonial administrations, economic enterprise, and security forces. He argued, therefore, that the colonial police forces of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean were used more for economic purposes such as controlling labour than for the detection and prevention of crime.²⁶

The literature on colonial policing also includes some institutional histories that represent a celebratory and nostalgic look at colonial police forces in Africa. William Foran's *The Kenya Police* traces the history of colonial Kenya's police force from 1896 to 1960,

²⁴ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe*.

²⁵ P. Ahire, *Imperial Policing*.

²⁶ M. Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order*.

celebrating its work during the world wars and especially during the Mau Mau Uprising.²⁷ *Blue and Old Gold* represents a celebratory history of Southern Rhodesia's BSAP. Written by 3 generations of authors and expanded into a single piece, the book follows the evolution of the BSAP with detailed accounts of the force's participation in the 1893 Matabele War, the 1896 Mashona Rebellion, the Jameson Raid, the Anglo-Boer War, both world wars and the Rhodesian war of independence.²⁸ Tim B. Wright's *The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police* similarly provides a comprehensive account of the police force from its roots in the 1890s to 1964 at Zambia's independence. Apart from the detailed discussion of the Northern Rhodesia Police's service in the East African Campaign of the First World War, the book also provides biographies of the force's officers and colonial administrators.²⁹

Other works on colonial policing in Africa and other parts of the world have tended to look specifically at the decolonization period, particularly in British territories. One major work focusing on this period is David Anderson and David Killingray's 1992 edited collection titled *Policing and Decolonization*. Focusing on the challenges faced by the colonial police forces of Ireland, India, Palestine, Ghana, Malaya, Kenya, Malawi and Cyprus, the book shows that the growth of nationalism in these territories undermined the interests of the colonial state, forcing an orderly retreat by Britain from its colonies. The period, therefore, saw colonial police forces transitioning from serving as the primary agents of colonial control to become the national police forces of newly independent countries.³⁰ In a more recent book that builds on the work of Anderson and Killingray, Georgina Sinclair's, *At the End of the Line* explores the changing trends of colonial policing at the close of empire. Sinclair demonstrates that despite efforts to

²⁷ Foran, *The Kenya Police, 1887-1960*.

²⁸ P. Gibbs, H. Phillips, N. Russell, *Blue and Old Gold: The History of the British South Africa Police, 1889-1980*. (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2009).

²⁹ T. B. Wright, *The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police*. (Bristol: British Empire and Commonwealth Museum, 2001).

³⁰ D. Anderson & D. Killingray, eds. *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and Police, 1917-65*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

reform colonial police forces along civil lines during the inter-war period, the nature of policing during the decolonization period was far from civil. As the various colonies increasingly challenged British authority, so did the colonial police forces revert to their former traditions of coercion.³¹ Philip Murphy's article on the 1959 Nyasaland Emergency also adds to the literature of colonial policing in the period of decolonization. Within the context of African nationalist protests in the Central African Federation, Murphy examines the Devlin Commission's declaration of Nyasaland as a 'police state' during the 1959 state of emergency in the territory. The article shows that the phrase 'police state' had been misused by the Devlin Commission and that it would have applied better to the neighbouring settler state of Southern Rhodesia, which was over-policed compared to Nyasaland during that period.³²

There are a number of published personal memoirs by mostly European former members of colonial police forces that also focus on the decolonization period in Africa. Among these, Derek Franklin and Peter Hewitt have written about their experiences as members of the Kenyan security forces during the emergency dubbed the Mau Mau Uprising. Franklin, who in the 1970s served as head of the police special branch in Lesotho and Botswana, recounts his involvement in pseudo-gang operations against the Mau Mau fighters in the White Highlands and forests of Kenya in the 1950s. Similarly, Hewitt, who joined the Kenyan security forces as an inspector in 1953, narrates his experiences in the pursuit of Mau Mau fighters during the emergency, with some emphasis on training, accommodation and conditions of service.³³ Gahadzikwa A. Chaza's *Bhurakuwacha* which was published posthumously, provides one of the few accounts by an African who served in a colonial police

³¹ G. Sinclair, *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

³² P. Murphy, "A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36: 4 (2010): 765-780.

³³ D. Franklin, *A Pied Cloak: Memoirs of a Colonial Police (Special Branch) Officer*. (London: Janus Publishing, 1996); P. Hewitt, *Kenya Cowboy: A Police Officer's Account of the Mau Mau Emergency*. (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2008).

force. After serving in the BSAP from 1936 to 1957, Chaza wrote this autobiography in which he critically discussed the racial discrimination experienced by African members of the BSAP in racist Southern Rhodesia.³⁴ Other personal memoirs of white police in Southern Rhodesia have focused on the territory's independence war in the 1960s and 1970s. Among these, are Anthony Trethowan, Ivan Smith and Ed Bird's personal accounts narrating their participation in different capacities, in the BSAP's counter-insurgency operations against African nationalist movements during the independence war.³⁵ Other personal memoirs focusing on the decolonization period are John Gornall's *No Better Life* and Michael J. Macoun's *Wrong Place, Right Time*. Gornall offers a story of his experiences as an inspector in the Northern Rhodesia Police during the years leading to and after the territory's independence. Apart from discussing the differences between Western and African culture and beliefs, and how they affected the investigation of murder and witchcraft cases, Gornall also explains how political activity and campaigns on the eve of Northern Rhodesia's independence shaped police work.³⁶ Macoun, on the other hand, discusses his role as superintendent and later deputy commissioner of police in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika after the Second World War, and his experiences with independence campaigns and civil unrest in Uganda as the territory's inspector-general of police.³⁷

Literature on Post-Colonial Policing

³⁴ G. A. Chaza, *Bhurakuwacha: The Story of a Black Policeman in Colonial Southern Rhodesia*. (Harare: College Press, 1998). See also T. Stapleton, "'A Naughty Child with a Pen': Gahadzikwa Albert Chaza as an African Policeman and Author in Colonial Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1936-1963," *History in Africa*, 37: 1 (2010): 159-187.

³⁵ A. Trethowan, *Delta Scout: Ground Coverage Operator*. (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2008); I. Smith, *Bush Pig District Cop: Service with the British South Africa Police in the Rhodesian Conflict 1965-77*. (Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2014); E. Bird, *Special Branch War: Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush Southern Matabeleland, 1976-1980*. (Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2014).

³⁶ J. Gornall, *No Better Life: The Experiences of a Police Officer in Central Africa*. (Nelson, New Zealand; privately published, 2008).

³⁷ M. J. Macoun, *Wrong Place, Right Time: Policing the End of Empire*. (London: Radcliffe Press, 1996).

Apart from the literature on colonial policing, there is an even wider scholarship on post-colonial police forces in Africa and beyond. The collapsed states, civil wars and other socio-economic challenges that befell Africa at the end of the Cold War can be said to have led to the rise of scholarly interest on contemporary African policing, which has not been dominated by historians, but by sociologists, political scientists, and criminologists. While this literature is vast and includes some national studies, it is worthwhile discussing the works that provide multiple case studies and a comparative approach to contemporary policing.

Among the works that examine post-colonial policing by drawing examples from around the world there is Mercedes S. Hinton and Tim Newburn's edited collection, *Policing Developing Democracies*. Focusing on 12 countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, South America and Africa, the book shows how the so-called developing democracies failed to create police forces guided by effectiveness, accountability, and regard for human rights. One of the factors leading to poor policing in the case studies examined in the book is the police forces' tendency to be accountable to government leadership and not to the rule of law. This has resulted in the forces being more coercive than civil in their functions. The book also shows that the police in these countries not only fail in protecting the human rights of the citizens, but tend to violate them also.³⁸ Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe's *Community Policing* also provides some insight on community-oriented policing, which is a model that focuses less on crime control and more on general issues like increasing accountability to the public, community service, and other ways of creating a harmonious relationship between the police and public. Using 13 case studies from Africa, Europe, South and North America, the book shows how the community-oriented policing model is espoused by almost every country but varies greatly as

³⁸ M. S. Hinton and T. Newburn, eds. *Policing Developing Democracies*. (New York, Routledge, 2009).

it is interpreted differently by police and government leaders and influenced by local social and cultural traditions.³⁹

Moving on to works that focus specifically on Africa, Daniel Ntanda Nsereko's article reveals the tendency by police in African countries to abuse power. He, therefore, argues that even though one of the roles of the police is to protect the citizens of the country and to uphold their human rights, they have proven to be among the highest abusers of the people. This has particularly been the case in countries where constitutionalism and democracy are weak.⁴⁰ Examining state-public relations in various African countries in the 1990s, Alice Hills argued that political liberalization cannot be achieved as long as leaders use police forces as their personal instruments of power.⁴¹ In *Multi-Choice Policing in Africa*, Bruce Baker examines state and non-state policing methods in Africa and contends that the major obstacle to efficient policing is the politicization and militarization of police forces, which was inherited from the colonial period. In another related book titled *Security in Post-Conflict Africa*, Baker argues that since many African states lack the capacity for effective nationwide policing, there should be collaboration between government and non-state or informal bodies such as customary, community-based, or commercial security providers. This form of multi-layered policing could, as Baker states, lead to effective safety and security for citizens.⁴² James S. E. Opolot's *Police Administration in Africa* examines police administration during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period in former British colonies and suggests the adoption of

³⁹ D. Wisler and I. Onwudiwe, eds. *Community Policing: International Patterns and Comparative Perspectives*. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009).

⁴⁰ D. D. Ntanda Nsereko, "The Police, Human Rights and the Constitution: An African Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15: 3 (1993), 465-484.

⁴¹ A. Hills, *Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization*. (Oxford: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

⁴² B. Baker, *Multi-Choice Policing in Africa*. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008.); B. Baker, *Security in Post-Conflict Africa: The Role of Non-State Policing*. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010).

generally accepted historical and contemporary methods of police management in African police forces.⁴³ In an article focusing on the police and the public in Nigeria, anthropologist Oliver Owen argues that while the Nigeria Police is often perceived as a corrupt institution, it is no different from other government agencies or organizations. He explains that the reason why the police are labelled as ‘the most corrupt’ in Nigeria is because of the salience of police misdeeds compared to politicians and other agencies. As politicians sometimes have immunity from prosecution during their incumbency, and institutions like the Nigeria Customs Service deal with a small percentage of the population, the police have become a scapegoat for corruption in the country because of their daily interactions with the public.⁴⁴

Literature on Policing in Botswana

The history of policing in Botswana has not received much attention from scholars. The earliest available literature on this subject is from O L. Sedimo and M. Maine’s short B.A theses on the Bechuanaland Border Police and the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police respectively. Making use of very limited archival material, both Sedimo and Maines’s theses do well in explaining the formation, structure and initial functions of these police forces of colonial Botswana.⁴⁵ Another notable contribution is historian Christian J. Makgala’s BA thesis on the role and development of the tribal police in Bechuanaland, especially regarding its relationship with the regular colonial police.⁴⁶ In a more recent article, Bafumiki Mocheregwa has examined the local and regional circumstances leading to the formation of the Police Mobile Unit within the police force of colonial Botswana in the early 1960s. The article shows that being the only

⁴³ J. S. E. Opolot, *Police Administration in Africa: Toward Theory and Practise in the English-Speaking Countries*. (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2008).

⁴⁴ O. Owen, “The Police and the Public: Risk as Preoccupation,” *Sociologus*, 63: 1 (2013): 63-64. See also O. Oliver, “The Nigeria Police Force: An Institutional Ethnography,” PhD Thesis, (St Cross College, 2012).

⁴⁵ O. L. Sedimo, “Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895,” Bachelor’s Thesis, (University of Botswana, 1986); M. Maine, “The Role and Development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1898 to 1966,” Bachelor’s Thesis, (University of Botswana, 1989).

⁴⁶ C.J. Makgala, “The Development and Role of Tribal Police in Botswana, 1926-1973,” Bachelor’s Thesis, (University of Botswana, 1997).

line of defence in the territory, the unit was militarized throughout the 1960s and later formed the nucleus on which the Botswana Defence Force was created in 1977.⁴⁷

The colonial police forces of Bechuanaland have also been mentioned in other works that are not necessarily about policing in the territory. In *Founding a Protectorate*, former Bechuanaland Resident Commissioner Anthony Sillery discussed the formation of the Bechuanaland Border Police and its role in the administration of the territory in the formative years of colonization. Similarly, in his article on race in colonial Botswana, historian Christian J. Makgala also mentioned the formation of the Bechuanaland Border Police, the Protectorate Native Police and race relations in the 2 forces.⁴⁸ This research builds upon these limited works by explaining the evolution of policing in Botswana and placing this within the broader context of trends in colonial administration and policing in Africa and beyond.

Methodology and Limitations of the Study

In terms of primary sources, this study has relied mainly on materials from the Botswana National Archives and Records Services in Gaborone and The National Archives at Kew in London, UK. This vast array of sources includes the annual reports of the Bechuanaland Police, as well correspondence among Bechuanaland government officials and with various departments and ministries of the British government. These primary sources proved valuable in reconstructing the history of policing in Botswana. To a lesser extent, the study also uses some newspaper articles from the *Botswana Daily News*, *Mmegi* and *The Monitor*. This is because the development of newspapers in Botswana was fairly slow, with the *Daily News* only appearing on the eve of independence. Many of the topics discussed in this thesis, therefore,

⁴⁷ B. Mocheregwa, "The Police Mobile Unit: The Nucleus of the Botswana Defence Force, 1960s-1977," *Journal of African Military History*, 3: 1 (2019): 93-122.

⁴⁸ A. Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate: History of Bechuanaland. 1885-1895*. (London: Mouton & CO., 1965), 58-59; C. J. Makgala, "A Survey of Race Relations in Botswana, 1800-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 36: 1 (2004): 13.

occurred before the development of the printing press in Botswana. In addition to these primary sources, the study employs a multitude of secondary material in the form of books, articles, unpublished seminar papers and theses.

Reconstructing a history on which little to no scholarship exists can be a daunting task to undertake. Considering that this is the first comprehensive history of colonial policing in Botswana, this study relies heavily on primary sources which are not without their own limitations. One such limitation is that the available archival sources reflect the opinions and policies of the colonists and, therefore, provide little to no insight into the lives and experiences of African police. This reliance on primary sources, therefore, has resulted in an institutional history of the Bechuanaland police. Another limitation to this study stemmed from the unavailability of archival material covering the period between 1912 and 1930, and this posed a challenge in accounting for the development of policing in colonial Botswana during that period. As it is unlikely that no documentation and correspondence occurred between police authorities and government officials in Bechuanaland and Britain during the period in question, the absence of this material at the archives might be due to errors in record keeping and management.

Structure and Organization of the Thesis

As mentioned above, this research represents the first comprehensive study of policing in Botswana from the colonial period through to independence and shortly after. It does not necessarily focus on police operational procedures, but rather uses aspects of the development of policing in Bechuanaland to shed some light on the nature of colonial administration in the territory. The 6 chapters included in the study are mostly chronological, with the exception of chapter 2, and they present different phases of policing in the territory, while considering local, regional, and worldwide political developments.

The first chapter lays the foundation for the subsequent ones by explaining the circumstances surrounding the British colonization of Bechuanaland and the emergence of colonial policing in the territory. Apart from the ever-changing names and functions of the police force, which reflected the regional politics of the time, the chapter applies the concepts of the frontier and metropolitan theories found in western Canadian historiography, to explain the nature of policing in a marginal territory during the formative years of colonization. Chapter 2 considers the critical issue of race and its place in the colonial police force of Bechuanaland. The philosophy of race that prevailed in 19th century Europe is explored and connected to the racial hierarchy that existed in the colonial societies and their police forces including Bechuanaland.

Chapter 3 focuses on the 1930s and 1940s reorganizations of the colonial police force in Bechuanaland. It reveals a continuous struggle between the Protectorate and British governments over the reorganization of the Bechuanaland Police, with the relationship between the Union of South Africa and Bechuanaland playing an important role in the latter's decision-making. The chapter also considers the 1940s reorganization of the Bechuanaland Police, which saw its transformation from a para-military organization to a professional and civil police force. The Bangwato disturbances of the early 1950s, which presented great challenges for the colonial police, are the focus of Chapter 4. The chapter also considers the regional and continental events of the same period and how they informed the developments in policing in Bechuanaland.

Chapter 5 looks at the political developments leading to the independence of Botswana and how they related to policing in the territory. The chapter reveals the Bechuanaland colonial administration's anxieties about the constant politically motivated protests and riots in the territory, and the role of the colonial police in bringing the situation under control. A discussion about the promotion of Africans into the gazetted ranks of the police force is also included in

the chapter, and it reveals negligence and a lack of foresight on the part of the British Colonial Office. Chapter 6 explains Botswana's post-independence vulnerabilities and the role of the country's weak police force in protecting its borders from infiltration by freedom fighters and security forces from neighbouring white minority ruled states. Another focus of this last chapter is the government of Botswana's attempts at replacing European expatriate officers of the Botswana Police with Africans, and how this achieved limited success. Although Botswana gained independence from Britain in 1966, the study extends to 1975 in an attempt to reveal the post-independence challenges faced by the country as a result of the legacy of colonial rule.

Chapter 1: British Occupation and the Beginning of Colonial Policing in Bechuanaland, 1885-1912

Introduction

The Bechuanaland Protectorate holds an interesting place in 'imperial history' because of the way in which it was colonized. In 1885, the Batswana, strategically located in the middle of Southern Africa, found themselves under the reluctant protection of the British Government. To the British, declaring a Protectorate over the territory was a way of securing their road from South Africa to the region's interior and preventing the Boers and Germans from occupying the area. After declaring the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the British Government entertained the possibility of transferring it to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) that was imposing colonial rule on what became Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), to relieve itself of the administrative burden. As a result, the future of the Protectorate remained uncertain for as long as there was a chance of it coming under company rule.

Once the Protectorate was declared, there was a need to establish a police force that would maintain colonial authority in the territory. However, colonial policing in the Protectorate was of an ambiguous and ever-changing nature due to the uncertainty surrounding the administration of the territory. The colonial police force in the Protectorate changed names, command, organization and responsibilities depending on what was happening at the administrative level of the Protectorate in relation to the British Government and the Company. On two occasions and under different names, the colonial police force of the Protectorate engaged in war outside of the territory, in what would later become Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. This was an indication that the force in the Protectorate was affected by higher politics involving the Company and the British Government.

The development of colonial policing in Bechuanaland can be understood by using the concepts of the frontier thesis and metropolitanism as developed in North American, and particularly western Canadian historiography. Scholars have debated these concepts, notably for their descriptions of the role played by metropolitan and frontier regions in the development of new settlements. The same concepts have been used to describe the development of law enforcement in the Canadian prairie west. The frontier and metropolitan theses, therefore, provide a suitable framework with which to study and explain the development and role of the colonial police in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It shall be demonstrated that colonial policing in Bechuanaland developed in accordance with the arguments of the metropolitan thesis, but also experienced challenges akin to the arguments of the frontier thesis.

The Declaration of a Protectorate and a Crown Colony

Between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, different European imperial powers occupied and established colonies and protectorates in Africa. This phenomenon, which came to be known as the “Scramble for Africa”, resulted in the division of the continent between the Germans, Italians, French, Portuguese, British, Belgians and the Spanish.⁴⁹ Scholarly debates on the Scramble have described the motivations for this phenomenon as mainly economic and strategic. Within a Marxist economic framework, imperialism, represented the monopoly stage of capitalism. The world’s largest capitalist powers were driven by the desire for investment opportunities in the colonies, and therefore divided these territories amongst themselves.⁵⁰ As British historian Antony G Hopkins has shown, however, it was the long-term economic downturn in many of the European powers that led to the Scramble, and not necessarily the desire for investment opportunities. The 19th century economic depression in Europe increased the demand for African raw materials, which led to concerted efforts to monopolize what had

⁴⁹ T. Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*. (New York: Random House, 1991), xxi.

⁵⁰ V. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. (Chippendale: Resistance Books, 1999), 92.

hitherto been free trade between Europe and Africa since the 15th century. In West Africa, for example, the “Scramble for Africa” transformed the region’s export production and entangled the region in the trade cycle of the industrial economy.⁵¹ The other interpretation for the “Scramble for Africa” is that of strategic reasons. Imperial powers like Britain engaged in the Scramble in order to secure access and control of territories that were strategically important. The Suez Canal, for example, was of paramount importance to the British as it significantly reduced voyage time from Britain to India and securing it led the British to occupy Egypt in 1882.⁵² The colonization of Bechuanaland, as it will be shown, was similarly strategically motivated.

British interests in the interior of Southern Africa, however, reflected both economic and strategic motives especially following the beginning of the mineral revolution in the region. Before the discovery of diamonds at Kimberly in the late 1860s, the British had been content with their coastal possessions at the Cape and Natal, letting the Boers (the descendants of earlier Dutch settlers) establish independent republics in the interior. Controlling the coast of Southern Africa comprised a strategically important position for the British as it dominated the sea route between Europe and Asia and remained so even after the opening of the Suez Canal. The rise of the diamond industry, however, encouraged British imperialism in the interior of Southern Africa.⁵³ British imperialism in the region intensified after the gold discoveries in the late 1880s. By the 1890s, the Transvaal had developed into the world’s biggest gold producer, and this led to British involvement in order to secure the newly discovered wealth for the Crown.⁵⁴ The mineral revolution in the interior of Southern Africa also brought with it new demands for

⁵¹ A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*. (London: Longman, 1973), 164.

⁵² R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*. (London: Macmillan, 1961), 76.

⁵³ W. H. Worger, *South Africa’s City of Diamonds: Mine Workers and Monopoly Capitalism in Kimberly, 1867-1895*. (London: Yale University Press, 1987), xi.

⁵⁴ J. Laband, *The Transvaal Rebellion: The First Boer War 1800-1881*. (London: Routledge, 2014), 15. For more on British interests in Southern Africa, see also, M. Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold and War*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 23. B. Nasson, *The South African War, 1899-1902*. (London: Hodder Arnold, 1999), 5.

labour and agricultural produce, which had an impact on the societies around the mines and even for those further away. The region rapidly assumed a capitalist and industrial economy, as small-scale claimholders gave way for amalgamated and much wealthier mining enterprises.⁵⁵

When the German colony of South West Africa (Namibia) was established in 1884, the British perceived a threat to their claim on the ‘road to the north’, which ran through an area called Bechuanaland. The ‘road to the north’ was a common waggon trade route that developed in the 1840s.⁵⁶ If the Germans in South West Africa were to join with the Transvaal Boers, the Portuguese or even the Germans on the eastern side of the subcontinent, this would have blocked British access to the road in the interior. For some years before 1884, some Tswana groups south of the Molopo River had been involved in wars of resistance against Transvaal-backed filibuster Boers from the mini-republics of Goshen and Stellaland, who were after their lands and cattle. In late 1884, the British government sent a military expedition led by Major-General Charles Warren to put an end to these wars and restore order to the area.⁵⁷ Although the Warren Expedition was aimed at reinstating the Southern Tswana chiefs to their lands, a much larger driving force for this, was the aforementioned possibility of a German-Transvaal alliance in the territory, which would block British access to the ‘road to the north’. On 30 September 1885, therefore, the British declared a Crown Colony on the area south of the river Molopo to be named British Bechuanaland.⁵⁸ On the same day, following an agreement Between Major-General Charles Warren and the three northern Tswana chiefs Khama, Sechele and Gaseitsiwe, the British Government declared a Protectorate over the area north of the

⁵⁵ N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy*. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 42.

⁵⁶ B. N. Ngwenya, “The Development of Transport Infrastructure in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1966,” *Botswana Notes and Records*, 16, (1984): 73.

⁵⁷ K. Shillington, *The Colonization of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900*. (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1985), 161.

⁵⁸ Shillington, *The Colonization of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900...*, 173.

Molopo and called it the Bechuanaland Protectorate. As High Commissioner of Southern Africa, Sir Hercules Robinson would later state, this was a strictly strategic move because Britain held no other interest in these territories.⁵⁹

Between 1885 and 1888, the northern trade route became of interest to the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and mining magnate, Cecil John Rhodes, who would soon form the BSAC. This was a London-based company that received a royal charter from the British Government in 1889 for commercial and administrative rights in south and central Africa. Having failed to secure the riches of the Transvaal Rand because of faulty investments with the Gold Fields South Africa Ltd in 1888, Rhodes would look to Southern Rhodesia in hopes of finding the 'Second Rand'.⁶⁰ In October 1888, Rhodes' agents had signed a concession with the Ndebele King Lobengula in Bulawayo for his company to have exclusive mining rights in Matabeleland and Mashonaland.⁶¹ Considering the Cape Colony's interest in the northern trade route and the prospects of more minerals in Lobengula's territory, the idea of an eventual transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Cape Colony was entertained although without any commitment from the British Government. The transfer, if completed, however, would also facilitate the achievement of Rhodes' greater desire for British rule from the Cape to Cairo.⁶²

From 1885 to 1894, the administration of British Bechuanaland as a 'protected' territory became increasingly difficult as the southern Tswana chiefs tried to reassert their political independence. This meant that without their full cooperation, it became difficult for colonial officials to collect tax and integrate them into the colonial economy.⁶³ Although the imperial government had promised British Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony, the transfer was

⁵⁹ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 43.

⁶⁰ I.R. Phimister, "Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1:1, (1974): 76.

⁶¹ S. Glass, *The Matabele War*. (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1968), 8.

⁶² Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912...*, 355.

⁶³ Shillington, *The Colonization of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900 ...*, 183.

delayed as the British government feared that it would not be able to continue protecting the rights and interests of the southern Tswana from the dominant settlers of the Cape.⁶⁴ By the end of July 1895, however, an annexation bill which officially transferred British Bechuanaland to the Cape was passed by the Colonial Office. Its only condition, as vaguely stated by the newly appointed Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, was that ‘native’ interests were to be safeguarded. The annexation of British Bechuanaland to the Cape was a great victory for Rhodes because it was a necessary step in his plans to have the more northerly Bechuanaland Protectorate handed over to his Chartered Company which had in 1889, been granted the royal charter to colonize Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).⁶⁵

When British Bechuanaland became part of the Cape Colony in 1895, the British government retained responsibility for the administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. However, Rhodes and the BSAC took even more interest in the Protectorate than before. Since its establishment in 1885, the upkeep of the Protectorate had been cumbersome for the British administration, and the chartered company was aware of that. Policing and indeed most of the administration of the Protectorate, had been the responsibility of the quasi-military Bechuanaland Border Police which was formed in 1885 to protect the borders of both the Crown Colony and the Protectorate from possible invasions by the Boers.⁶⁶ Each year, large sums of money were required for the operation of the Border Police and for the setting up of telegram communications. For a ‘wasteland’ with no known resources, except being important for controlling the road to the north, the Protectorate represented an ever-increasing burden for the British Government. Transferring it to a chartered company like the BSAC could bring

⁶⁴ K. O. Hall, “British Bechuanaland: The Price of Protection,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 6:2 (1973): 185.

⁶⁵ K. Shillington, *Luka Jantjie: Resistance Hero of the South African Frontier*. (London: Aldridge Press, 2011), 187.

⁶⁶ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 58.

much needed relief to the Crown.⁶⁷ However, Rhodes pursued the matter with much caution. He feared that the immediate BSAC takeover of the Protectorate would upset influential humanitarians like John Mackenzie of the London Missionary Society who had protested the Cape annexation of British Bechuanaland and had advised the British Government to keep both the Protectorate and the Crown Colony under imperial control.⁶⁸ Mackenzie believed in metropolitan but not colonial rule, and harboured contempt for settler politicians. While he was not opposed to European settlement, Mackenzie believed that the settlement of Europeans in predominantly African areas, should be controlled by the imperial government and not a company. Part of this government control, he believed, involved ensuring that Africans had enough land before ceding any of it to Europeans.⁶⁹

By 1895, with his company having defeated the Ndebele and the Cape Colony having annexed British Bechuanaland, Rhodes could now shift his focus to the Bechuanaland Protectorate. He thought the Protectorate to be the “Suez Canal into the interior”; a gateway to Mashonaland and Matabeleland which were the territories under his company’s royal charter.⁷⁰ Apart from the desire to link the Cape Colony and the BSAC’s territories, another reason for Rhodes’s interest in the Protectorate was to coerce the Boer Republics into a federation under the British flag. This could be achieved through cutting their access to the sea, and then surrounding them with territories ruled according to British liberal traditions.⁷¹ While the fate of the Protectorate remained unclear, rumours spread among the Tswana chiefs that the imperial government planned to transfer the Protectorate to the BSAC. In July 1895, Chiefs Khama, Sebele, Bathoen and Lentswe each wrote petitions to Colonial Secretary Joseph

⁶⁷ J. S. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company*. (London: University of California Press, 1974), 111.

⁶⁸ Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*..., 111.

⁶⁹ Sillery, *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, 1835-1899*..., 54.

⁷⁰ Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*..., 63.

⁷¹ Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*..., 65.

Chamberlain, pleading with him not to hand over their countries to the Chartered Company.⁷² Having heard about the land and cattle confiscations by the BSAC in Southern Rhodesia, the chiefs detested the idea of company rule. They wished to remain under the protection of the Queen, which to them meant protection from the Boers and the Germans, with very little British interference in the running of their territories.⁷³

In 1895, Khama, Sebele and Bathoen, sailed to England with Reverend William C Willoughby of the London Missionary Society (LMS) to present their case to Chamberlain. The missionaries were often more sympathetic to Africans than the colonial administrators. From the early 19th century, there had been a history of humanitarian missionaries siding with Africans against aggressive colonizers. Although most British missionaries were patriotic, they were not necessarily enthusiastic about the expansion of the empire and criticized its impact on indigenous people. It should be noted, however, that this humanitarianism did not apply to all missionaries. Nevertheless, in Southern Africa, the LMS often confronted white settler policies and their harsh treatment of the Africans.⁷⁴ In 1822 for example, LMS missionary John Philip began speaking against the Cape Colony's pass controls and compulsory apprenticeship that was imposed on the Khoisan to provide the colonial masters with a labour force. By 1828, the Cape Parliament had abolished these policies and acknowledged the Khoisan people's right to own land.⁷⁵

In most cases, the African chiefs together with many of their subjects, were Christian converts of these missionaries and this explains why Rev. Willoughby was involved in the case of the three Tswana Chiefs. At their meeting with Chamberlain in September 1895, the chiefs

⁷² Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate...*, 58.

⁷³ Shillington, *Luka Jantjie: Resistance Hero of the South African Frontier...*, 187.

⁷⁴ W.G. Mills, "Millennial Christianity, British Imperialism, and African Nationalism", in *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social and Cultural History*, eds. R. Elphick and R. Davenport (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 338.

⁷⁵ A. Lester, "Humanitarians and White Settlers in the Nineteenth Century", in *Missions and Empire*, ed. N. Etherington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 67.

were told that they should come to an agreement with the BSAC about the conditions of company rule. Thereafter, they wrote yet another letter to the Colonial Office repeating their fear of company rule, and asking to stay under imperial administration for another ten years.⁷⁶ While Chamberlain, who had been impervious to both their verbal and written pleas was on holiday, the chiefs, closely chaperoned by Willoughby as their guide and interpreter, went on a tour of the United Kingdom, meeting and presenting their case to the press, temperance movements and religious organizations.⁷⁷ The tour of the U.K proved very effective for the chiefs' case:

Although the Colonial Office watched these junketings with sour disapproval, the press was enthusiastic, and a significant body of public opinion distinctly sympathetic, especially to Khama, that 'pious and obedient sovereign', whose name was well known in England.⁷⁸

In November 1895, Chamberlain met again with the chiefs and on this occasion, an agreement was reached with the Colonial Office that was favourable to them. It was agreed that their territories would remain under Her Majesty's protection if they surrendered a portion of their territories on the eastern border of the Protectorate for the construction of a north-south railway line by the BSAC.⁷⁹ Although the visit to England yielded the desired results for the three chiefs and their respective reserves, the remainder of the Protectorate would remain contested between the BSAC and the Colonial Office for some time, as the latter became reluctant to transfer the rest of the Protectorate to the Company.⁸⁰ As a result, this had a direct impact on issues of policing in the Protectorate, as the jurisdiction of the colonial police forces was determined by whether the Protectorate was administered by the company or by the British government.

⁷⁶ Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 165.

⁷⁷ A. Sillery, *The Bechuanaland Protectorate*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 71.

⁷⁸ A. Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*. (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974), 109. For a fuller account of the chiefs' visit, see Neil Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen*. London: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

⁷⁹ Sillery, *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland...*, 170.

⁸⁰ Sillery, *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland...*, 170.

Frontierism, Metropolitanism and Law Enforcement

In 1893, American historian Frederick Jackson Turner presented a paper entitled “The Significance of the Frontier in American History”, at a conference of the American Historical Association in Chicago. In his paper, Turner argued that the development of American democracy, character and institutions was the result of pioneer settlers’ experiences in the frontier.⁸¹ The western expansion of European settlement in America was a socio-cultural and socio-economic experience for both the settlers and First Nations inhabiting the land. The frontier was, according to Turner, a zone where ‘savagery’ met ‘civilization’.⁸² The conditions of frontier society had shaped the character of western institutions like churches, schools, and police, which became antithetical to those of the east. It was within this context that American individualism, coarseness, idealism and inventiveness were also formed.⁸³ The frontier thesis became a widely accepted theory of settlement and it attracted many historians who applied it to the histories of America, Canada, Australia, Southern Africa and other places.⁸⁴

By the middle of the 20th century, however, Turner’s theory came under attack from other historians, some of whom were advancing a different theory called metropolitanism. As a theory of human settlement, the frontier thesis was seen to be inefficient by some scholars.⁸⁵ Metropolitanism, on the other hand, allowed for the study of the role of metropolitan forces in shaping the development of the frontier and nation at large. The metropolitan relationship

⁸¹ J. F. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” A Paper read at the Meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago, 12 July 1893.

⁸² J.M.S. Careless, *Frontier and Metropolis: Regions, Cities, and Identities in Canada before 1914*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 39.

⁸³ J.M.S. Careless, “Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History,” *Canadian Historical Review*, 35:1, (1954): 7.

⁸⁴ For the application of frontier concepts to Canada and Australia, see, W. Elofson. *So Far and Yet so Close: Frontier Cattle Ranching in Western Prairie Canada and the Northern Territory of Australia*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2015. For South Africa, see, L. Thompson, and H. Lamar eds. *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*. London: Yale University Press, 1981.

⁸⁵ M. S. Cross, *The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas: The debate on the Impact of the Canadian Environment*. (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970), 24.

involved larger centres controlling the communications, trade, finance, religion and law enforcement of the hinterlands.⁸⁶ This, therefore, dispelled some of Turner's ideas, such as democracy being built on pioneer individualism. The metropolitan thesis essentially took away agency from the frontier and showed that whatever institutions existed in the frontier, they were transplanted from the metropolis.

The concepts of frontier and metropolitanism are useful as a framework in understanding the way in which the colonial police in the Bechuanaland Protectorate developed. It must, however, be acknowledged here that the application of concepts of the North American west to the history of policing in colonial Botswana is no easy task. In the early 1980s, there were some attempts by scholars to apply the frontier concept to Southern African history. Turner's frontier hypothesis was used to explain the expansion of European settlement from the Western Cape to the northern and eastern interior. In the 19th century, when the British officially assumed the administration of the Cape Colony, the Boers became frontiersmen and fled into the interior of the region. This movement, which became known as the Great Trek, was marked by an expansion of white settlement into the interior, where the settlers became authoritarian and despotic in their dealings with the Africans.⁸⁷ These settler-'indigenous' relations were like the ones described by Turner in his frontier hypothesis. The North American and Southern African frontiers, therefore, developed in the same way as both embodied an expansion of European settlement and capitalism. In both frontiers, the European settlers carried with them deep-seated ethnocentric attitudes with little to no regard for local societies, that had been there before. The settlers in both frontiers believed that whenever they deprived local societies of resources, they were justified in doing so because the First Nations

⁸⁶ Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," 17.

⁸⁷ M. Legassick, "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography", in *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, eds. S. Marks and A. Atmore (London: Longman, 1980), 52.

and Africans did not use them effectively.⁸⁸ The use of the frontier concept in Southern Africa, has also shown that the expansion of European settlement in the frontier was accelerated by the discovery of minerals in the region. From the late 1860s, the diamond and later gold mining industries of Southern Africa grew to a level that led to the development of railroad systems going deeper into the interior, and in the process, extending the frontier line.⁸⁹

The application of the North American frontier concept to the history of Botswana helps to draw parallels in the development of policing in these two far apart yet similar parts of the world that represented frontiers. As a British High Commission Territory, the Bechuanaland Protectorate symbolized a frontier of Southern Africa. The Protectorate was administered by a Resident Commissioner in Mafikeng, who was in turn answerable to the High Commissioner in Cape Town. By metropolitanism standards, the Protectorate was a frontier/hinterland, while Mafikeng was its metropolis. Mafikeng too, however, was subsidiary to another metropolis, Cape Town. This meant, therefore, that the police force and any other institution existing in the Protectorate, were developed in the metropolis.

A much closer comparison of the Canadian frontier to that of Bechuanaland can be drawn from the experiences of the North West Mounted Police (NWMP), which often contended with challenges unique to the frontier environment. Established in 1873 by Conservative Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, the NWMP was a metropolitan construct. It was essentially the embodiment of the Canadian federal government in the frontier. The force had been formed within the context of Macdonald's 'National Policy', part of which involved the westward expansion of Canada through settlement and development. The NWMP,

⁸⁸ L. Thompson and H. Lamar, "The North American and Southern African Frontiers", in *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*, eds. L. Thompson and H. Lamar (London: Yale University Press, 1981), 17.

⁸⁹ Thompson and Lamar, "The North American and Southern African Frontiers," ..., 23.

therefore, became agents of this national policy and were responsible for ensuring its success.⁹⁰ In its formative years, the force patrolled the Canadian border with the United States and oversaw the settling of First Nations into the reserves. The force then policed the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the completion of which in 1885, marked the success of European settlement in western Canada. The role of the NWMP then changed again to be that of protecting the new settler communities, providing natural disaster relief and other civil duties.⁹¹ In the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as it shall be seen, the police force acted as an agent of the state, guarding the borders of the territory, policing the construction of the railway in the Protectorate, and maintaining colonial rule in the territory. These duties were like those of the NWMP and, therefore, reflected the nature of frontier policing and metropolitan presence in a frontier.

While the development of the NWMP was an extension of metropolitan authority to the frontier, the force experienced challenges that showed that the conditions of frontier society also had a role to play in the development of settlements. The often-celebratory view of the NWMP by some scholars created a myth wherein the Mounties were seen to have brought peace and order to the Canadian frontier. Historian Warren Elofson has dispelled this view, arguing that the myth of an orderly Canadian frontier owing to the presence of the NWMP is false and that it underestimates the frontier conditions and their ability to mould society.⁹² The frontier was too vast for a few hundred strong force to effectively police, especially considering the poor roads and communications. Moreover, the NWMP comprised single young men who policed a society that was dominated by single young men as well. As a result, activities like prostitution and illegal whiskey trade were irregularly dealt with by police and judges who

⁹⁰ W. Beahen and S. Horrall, *Red Coats on the Prairies: The North-West Mounted Police, 1886-1900*. (Regina: Print West Publishing Services, 1998), 14.

⁹¹ Beahen and Horrall, *Red Coats on the Prairie...*, 14.

⁹² W. Elofson, *Cowboys, Gentlemen and Cattle Thieves: Ranching on the Western Frontier*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000), 102.

either indulged in the activities themselves or felt like there was need for such activities in that early stage of western prairie society.⁹³ Similarly, the colonial police in the Protectorate experienced various challenges like sparsity of police posts, insufficient numbers of officers and lack of funds. The colonial police also comprised young single men who were not closely supervised and thus became prone to indiscipline just like the men of the NWMP. This made it harder for the colonial police in the Protectorate to efficiently perform its duties in the Southern African frontier that was Bechuanaland.

The Border Police as a Forerunner of the Protectorate Police

The nucleus of the colonial police in the Bechuanaland Protectorate emerged from the Warren Expedition. The 1884-85 expedition to southern Bechuanaland consisted of 4000 men including some metropolitan British troops as well as some colonial volunteers.⁹⁴ The expeditionary force reached Mafikeng in March 1885 where they faced no resistance as the Boer filibusters either withdrew into the Transvaal or surrendered and offered their services as porters and transport riders to the expedition.⁹⁵ Having achieved its objectives, Warren's force withdrew from British Bechuanaland in August 1885. The defence of the Tswana territories on both sides of the Molopo River was then entrusted to the Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP), which was raised in the same month and placed under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner at the Cape.⁹⁶ The High Commissioner's office in Southern Africa was responsible for governing the British possessions that would later be called the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. British officer Colonel Fredrick Carrington of the South Wales Borderers became the first commander of the BBP, and four officers were seconded from the British Army to assist him. These were, Major R. Martin, Lieutenant H.

⁹³ Elofson, *Cowboys, Gentlemen and Cattle Thieves...*, 118.

⁹⁴ A. Manson, "Christopher Bethell and the Securing of the Bechuanaland Frontier, 1878-1884," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24:1, (1998): 505.

⁹⁵ A. Manson, "Christopher Bethell and the Securing of the Bechuanaland Frontier, 1878-1884...", 505.

⁹⁶ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 3.

Goold-Adams, Lieutenant P. McKie and Lieutenant A. Bethell.⁹⁷ The BBP was established by absorbing some men from Warren's force, recruiting some from the Natal Mounted Police and re-engaging some former Cape Mounted Riflemen. These were the local police forces of the colonies of Natal and the Cape. The BBP had a total of 485 men divided between 5 troops of 97 men each.⁹⁸

The force was raised to protect the Bechuanaland Protectorate and British Bechuanaland from possible invasions which at the time were most likely to be from the Boers. From the onset, however, the BBP was mainly concentrated in British Bechuanaland in the towns of Mafikeng, Vryburg and Taung and not so much in the more northerly Bechuanaland Protectorate. This was possibly because before the Warren Expedition, the southern Tswana had suffered more from Boer attacks than the northern Tswana.⁹⁹ Moreover, the frontier line in Southern Africa advanced from south to north. Therefore, the northern part, which was the Bechuanaland Protectorate, was more remote and had less police presence. Even so, Chief Khama's capital at Shoshong in the Bechuanaland Protectorate was assigned a detachment of 9 BBP men in 1886. In 1887, more police were stationed at Kanye and Molepolole, while in 1889, they were placed at Mochudi and Ramotswa. In all these places, the police presence was usually not more than three men.¹⁰⁰ The appointment of the police in these areas was meant to represent metropolitan presence in the frontier. While in the Protectorate, these BBP men conducted virtually all the internal administration on behalf of the Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng. They were responsible for maintaining communication with the chiefs and in some instances, they settled 'tribal' disputes, prevented illegal liquor trading, and recovered stolen

⁹⁷ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate...*, 56.

⁹⁸ G. Tylden, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895." *Society for Army Historical Research*, 19: 76 (1940): 236.

⁹⁹ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 3.

¹⁰⁰ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 4.

cattle.¹⁰¹ These duties were like those performed by the NWMP in the Canadian frontier. One of their primary objectives when they were sent to the frontier, was to eliminate liquor traffic among the First Nations people. Horse and cattle theft embodied another problem faced by the NWMP in the Canadian frontier.¹⁰²

Although established for the sole purpose of protecting the Crown Colony and the Protectorate from possible invasions, the BBP was engaged in war outside of the borders of the territories it was meant to protect. According to Sillery, “The only time that the Bechuanaland Border Police ever fired shots in anger was in 1893, when they were engaged, not in defending the Bechuanaland Protectorate, but in carrying war into Matabeleland.”¹⁰³ The Anglo-Ndebele War broke out in November 1893 between the BSAC’s forces and the Ndebele following a raid by the latter on the Shona at Fort Victoria. Although the raid did not threaten European lives, Mashonaland Administrator, Dr Leander Starr Jameson chose to go to war with the Ndebele nevertheless. Historian Terrence Ranger has argued that Jameson went to war because the Ndebele raiding and killing of the Shona threatened the labour supply of the settler mines and farms.¹⁰⁴ Another reason for this war had been Rhodes’s desire to find his ‘second rand’. His intentions for British rule in the region were rooted in a much bigger hope that he would discover minerals of the same magnitude as those in Kimberly and Witwatersrand. Since Mashonaland did not have the gold Rhodes had hoped to find, he turned to Matabeleland.¹⁰⁵ Before the Anglo-Ndebele war broke out, the BSAC had coordinated with the High Commissioner’s office to have the BBP stationed at Motloutse, ready to advance into

¹⁰¹ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate...*, 58.

¹⁰² R.C. Macleod, *The North-West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 122.

¹⁰³ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate...*, 58.

¹⁰⁴ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: A Study in African Resistance*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 93.

¹⁰⁵ A. Keppel-Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-1902*. (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), 296.

Matabeleland to aid the Company's forces once the war had started.¹⁰⁶ On 19 October 1893, Colonel Goold-Adams who had been given command of the southern invading column, led his men into Matabeleland. The column comprised 220 mounted Europeans including the BBP, and 2000 Bangwato men under their Chief Khama. By the time of the war, Khama and his people had lived in constant threat of Ndebele raids. High Commissioner Henry Loch, therefore, promised Khama small arms and ammunition on the condition that he provide men for service in Goold-Adams' column. Khama agreed to supply the required men and rode with them, together with Goold-Adams' southern invading column into Matabeleland.¹⁰⁷ On 2 November, the BBP encountered a force of about 600 Ndebele at Empaneni, but defeated it, losing half a dozen men in the process. At this point, Khama refused to go any further because there was an outbreak of smallpox among his men, and therefore, he led them back to the Protectorate. Goold-Adams' force reached Bulawayo on 15 November 1893, where they found the Company's forces having quelled all Ndebele resistance. The BBP saw no further action and returned to the Protectorate in February 1894 at the end of the war.¹⁰⁸ The participation of the BBP in the Anglo-Ndebele War was sanctioned by the High Commissioner's office in Cape Town at the request of the BSAC.¹⁰⁹ This was a further indication of the power wielded by the metropolitan authorities in Cape Town, over the frontier that was the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In August 1895, when British Bechuanaland was annexed by the Cape Colony, the BBP was disbanded and about 100 of its men transferred to the Cape Mounted Police.¹¹⁰ In November 1895, Rhodes bought the defunct BBP's surplus stores and equipment and recruited 122 of its former men to join the BSAC's forces. The High Commissioner had been authorized

¹⁰⁶ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate...*, 170.

¹⁰⁷ S. Glass, *The Matabele War*. (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1968), 140.

¹⁰⁸ Tylden, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895" 238.

¹⁰⁹ Glass, *The Matabele War...*, 140.

¹¹⁰ Tylden, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895" 242.

by the Colonial Office to terminate the contracts of service of any men that the Company wished to recruit for its forces.¹¹¹ By this time, Rhodes and Jameson had for some time harboured plans to invade the Transvaal Boer republic, and therefore, the acquisition of the BBP and its equipment, was meant to strengthen the invasion force, while the Protectorate on the border of the Transvaal would serve as the base of operation.¹¹²

The invasion took place on 29 December 1895 when Jameson led a force of 500 armed men into the Transvaal. The Johannesburg mine owners had invited Jameson to lead a force to overthrow the Transvaal government under the guise of support for an anticipated revolt by foreign workers called Uitlanders, who President Paul Kruger detested. Under Kruger's government, the mine owners and Uitlanders were similarly impacted by the heavy taxation imposed on the mining industry.¹¹³ Another aim of the raid, however, was that Rhodes wished to overthrow Kruger and bring the Transvaal into a British federation in South Africa. Furthermore, Rhodes had been director and a shareholder in one of the biggest mining groups in the Transvaal, where Kruger's government had imposed heavy taxes on the mining industry.¹¹⁴ Although the Jameson Raid failed, it had far-reaching consequences for the BSAC and the imperial government. Senior members of the imperial government like Chamberlain and his under-secretary Edward Fairfield were implicated in the raid, accused of knowing about it beforehand. Anglo-Afrikaner relations in South Africa further deteriorated, and Rhodes was forced to resign from his position as Premier of the Cape Colony in early 1896.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, as a result of the failed raid, the railway line passing through the Protectorate was to no longer be administered by the Company but by the Protectorate officials.¹¹⁶ The Colonial Office also

¹¹¹ BNARS, RC. 2/8/5, Colonial Office, London to BSAC, 7 November 1895.

¹¹² Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 172.

¹¹³ Sillery, *The Bechuanaland Protectorate*, 77.

¹¹⁴ H. M. Hole, *The Jameson Raid*. (Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia, 1973), 26. See also, J. van der Poel, *The Jameson Raid*. London: Oxford University Press, 1951.

¹¹⁵ Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 173.

¹¹⁶ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 233.

decided to delay the transfer of the remainder of the Protectorate to the Company. This followed High Commissioner Sir Hercules Robinson's warning that a proclamation handing over the administration of that portion of the Protectorate not belonging to Chiefs Khama, Sebele and Bathoen to the Company would be injudicious, especially in light of Rhodes' implication in the Jameson Raid.¹¹⁷ The raid led to widespread doubts about the future of the BSAC and the British government considered revoking the Company's charter. Chamberlain, however, allowed the Company to retain its mining rights as well as the development and administration of Mashonaland and Matabeleland.¹¹⁸

Another ramification of the Jameson Raid was that the Colonial Office placed all police forces in the Protectorate and the BSAC's territories under imperial control. From Cape Town, High Commissioner Robinson took control of the forces in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland.¹¹⁹ Joseph Chamberlain also appointed Colonel Sir Richard Martin as Commandant-General of all police forces in Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and the Protectorate, with effect from 4 April 1896.¹²⁰ Martin, based at Bulawayo, was also appointed Deputy Commissioner to the High Commissioner, and would report to him, all police related activities taking place in Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and the Protectorate. Martin oversaw all white mounted police, African police, and the municipal police in the towns.¹²¹ The appointment of a Commandant-General and Deputy Commissioner was a significant development in matters of policing and administration both in the Protectorate and in the Company's territories. It was meant to keep the Company's forces in check, to avoid embarrassing events like the Jameson Raid from occurring again. As for the Protectorate, this development was the first step towards

¹¹⁷ BNARS, RC. 2/8/6, Colonial Office, London to Secretary of the BSACO, 14 March 1896.

¹¹⁸ Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 187.

¹¹⁹ BNARS, RC. 2/13/1, Imperial Secretary, Cape Town to Secretary of the BSAC, 2 March 1896.

¹²⁰ BNARS, RC. 2/8/6, Colonial office, London to Secretary of the BSAC, 14 March 1896.

¹²¹ BNARS, RC. 2/8/6, Colonial office, London to Secretary of the BSAC, 14 March 1896.

merging the territory's police with that of the Company. More importantly, the appointment of Martin reflected the metropolitan thesis at work. With frontier settlement achieved, what the Jameson Raid had shown, was an attempt by the British settlers to assert their independence from the metropolis. This brought about a need for metropolitan forces to restore order and assert control over the frontier.¹²² Martin's presence in the frontier was, therefore, a metropolitan effort to maintain control of the frontier.

The Bechuanaland Mounted Police and the Protectorate Native Police

When the Colonial Office decided that all police forces in the Protectorate and the Company's territories should come under imperial control, the Protectorate raised one troop of white mounted police, comprising 4 officers, 60 rank-and-file and 12 orderlies (76 men in total) and a second troop comprising 4 white officers and 60 African rank-and-file (64 men). The white troop was named Bechuanaland Mounted Police (BMP), while the African troop became the Protectorate Native Police (PNP).¹²³ Commanded by Captain Walford, the BMP consisted of white personnel recruited from the disbanded BBP. In recruiting for the PNP, the High Commissioner turned to the neighbouring Basutoland Protectorate. As requested, the Basutoland Resident Commissioner enrolled four officers (1 Captain and 3 Lieutenants) as well as 60 Basotho Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) for a two-year service in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.¹²⁴

Although it would have been more convenient to recruit local Batswana men for the PNP, sources do not point to any such attempts being made when the force was created. Instead, the African members of the force were recruited from Basutoland. This decision was akin to British notions of 'martial races', which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

¹²² Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," 19.

¹²³ BNARS, RC. 2/8/5, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Secretary of State, London, 24 February 1896.

¹²⁴ BNARS, HC. 195, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Resident Commissioner, Maseru, 12 March 1896.

Regarding the recruitment of Basotho for the PNP, Resident Commissioner for Bechuanaland, Francis Newton described them to be “of an excellent stamp; active and willing, and for the most part discreet and intelligent.”¹²⁵ However, it is possible that this British recruitment of Basotho was informed by the latter’s recent history of resistance to colonialism. Following a series of wars against their aggressive Boer neighbours beginning in 1858, the Basotho had lost most of their arable land. In 1868, to retain what was left of his kingdom, Lesotho’s King Moshoeshoe had agreed to come under British ‘Protection’, transforming his state into colonial Basutoland. In 1871, however, Basutoland (Lesotho) was placed under the administration of the white-ruled Cape Colony, which was about to receive responsible government from the British.¹²⁶ This was the opposite of what Moshoeshoe had hoped for when he agreed to British ‘protection.’

In 1880, Basutoland was engulfed in a rebellion that came to be known as the Basuto Gun War. This came about when the Cape Government, attempting to monopolize state coercive power, passed an act calling for the disarmament of the Africans throughout the Colony. Armed African allies who had participated in the colonial conquest of the region were now seen as a threat by the colonial administration. The Cape Premier, Sir Gordon Sprigg and Henry Frere, who served as the High Commissioner for Southern Africa as well as the Governor of Basutoland, feared that the possession of guns would change the attitude of Africans toward the state, and subsequently give them the courage to rebel.¹²⁷ The disarmament of the Africans was, therefore, important for the consolidation of racial discrimination in South Africa. This was, however, not well received by the Basotho, of whom half of the adult male population owned a gun.¹²⁸ In 1879, Basotho cavalry had helped the British defeat the Zulu

¹²⁵ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 58.

¹²⁶ E. A. Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa: Conflict and Discourse in Lesotho, 1870-1960*. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 71.

¹²⁷ W. K. Storey, *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 291.

¹²⁸ E. A. Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa...*, 71.

Kingdom, and in the same year, most Basotho chiefs had helped the Cape Government subdue a rebellion by another Sotho chief named Moorosi, and they expected more gratitude from the Cape than to be asked to give up their arms. Fearing oppression after disarmament, the Basotho chiefs insisted on the retention of their arms and openly rebelled. A contingent of the Cape Mounted Rifles, an entirely white force under Cape authority, rode into Basutoland in September 1880 and the war began.¹²⁹ Owing to their mountainous and easily defended homeland, the Basotho successfully resisted Cape forces until the British imperial government intervened.¹³⁰ The Gun War resulted in the removal of Basutoland from Cape rule, and saw it placed under the Colonial Office as a Crown Colony in 1881. This was a victory for the Basotho as they retained the right to own guns and avoided settler rule and dispossession.¹³¹ Shortly after the removal of Basutoland from Cape rule, a colonial police force was formed for the territory, which consisted of Basotho men commanded by British officers. This is what later informed the High Commissioner's decision to recruit Basotho for service in Bechuanaland's newly formed PNP in 1896.¹³²

Another possible reason for the recruitment of Basotho for the PNP could have been what scholars Robert T Sigler and David J King have called 'policing strangers by strangers'. As mentioned in the introduction, the British style of colonial policing was modelled on the Royal Irish Constabulary. This model of policing used a concept of selective recruiting that was based on geography or social class. Based on geography, selective recruiting involved enlistment of the police from outside the territory they were meant to garrison, as in the case with the recruitment of Basotho for service in the Protectorate.¹³³ Similarly, in 1873 when the

¹²⁹ Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa...*, 72.

¹³⁰ W.K. Storey, "Guns, Race, and Skill in Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa," *Technology and Culture*, 45:4, (2004): 708.

¹³¹ Storey, *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa...*, 318.

¹³² Makgala, "A Survey of Race Relations in Botswana, 1800-1966...", 13.

¹³³ R. T. Sigler, D. J. King, "Colonial Policing and Control of Movements for Independence," *Policing and Society*, 3, (1992): 15.

NWMP was raised in Ottawa, it consisted entirely of white Anglophones who were sent to the frontier to pacify the First Nations people, and settle them in the reserves, while an influx of Europeans concurrently settled the frontier.¹³⁴ This system extended to colonial Africa and was used in establishing the police in Mombasa, which is where the colonial police in Kenya started. In order to protect its property in Mombasa, the Imperial British East Africa Company had employed Indians as police in 1887.¹³⁵ By 1901, the police in Mombasa had expanded to include three European officers, and 150 rank and file who were Swahili, Comoran, Somali and Asian. The railway construction in Nairobi was also policed by the Uganda Railway Police.¹³⁶ In Southern Rhodesia, the British South Africa Police (BSAP) which was the police force in the territory, employed Africans from neighbouring colonies, who sought to join the colonial capitalist economy through wage labour. When local Ndebele and Shona police defected and joined the 1896-97 rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, the BSAP recruited Africans from Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Zululand and Zanzibar. Many of these people had originally travelled to Southern Rhodesia to find employment in the mines and farms but found jobs in the police.¹³⁷

Whatever the motivation behind the recruitment of outsiders for the PNP, what is certain is that it was a move that the three Chiefs Khama, Sebele and Bathoen were less likely to protest. In November 1895 they made some requests to Chamberlain regarding the recruitment of 'native' police for their territories;

Concerning the native police, there are two tribes that would not be grateful to us. They are the Matabele and the Amacosa [Xhosa]. These people make trouble wherever they go by stealing horses and cattle and other property from us. They are also people who like drink. We hope you

¹³⁴ B.J. Mayfield, "The Interlude: The North-West Mounted Police and the Blackfoot Peoples, 1874-1877", in *The Mounted Police and Prairies Society, 1873-1919*, ed. W.M. Baker (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998), 17.

¹³⁵ J. B. Wolf, "Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 6: 3, (1973): 404.

¹³⁶ Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 109.

¹³⁷ T. Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80*. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011), 22.

will not appoint such people to be police in our country. There are other tribes in which you will find no difficulty in enrolling your police.¹³⁸

The request for the British government not to recruit the Ndebele as police in the Protectorate was not surprising considering the recent history of conflicts between the Bangwato and the Ndebele. The Ndebele attacked the Bangwato in 1844 and 1863, and this informed Khama's alliance with the British and his participation in the 1893 invasion of the Ndebele Kingdom.¹³⁹

The BMP, which was the European troop in the Protectorate, was intended to operate as a police force and not as a military body like it did during its years as the BBP. The Resident Commissioner wished for its jurisdiction to be limited to the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It will be remembered that as the BBP, the force had been involved in the Anglo-Ndebele War in 1893 and that its remnants were involved in the Jameson Raid of 1895.¹⁴⁰ While the sentiment of the colonial administration in the region was to limit the BMP's jurisdiction to the Protectorate, the Colonial Office saw things differently. Chamberlain thought it unwise to limit the BMP's service to the Protectorate alone, arguing that there would be a great advantage in making the force interchangeable with the police in the BSAC's territories. He wished for the BMP to be available for service anywhere within the limits of the Order-in-Council of 9 May 1891, which placed Mashonaland, and later Matabeleland under Her Majesty's control, albeit through Company rule.¹⁴¹ By metropolitan standards, the BMP's expanded jurisdiction was to enable it to function as an agent of the state, advancing and protecting British interests in the frontier. In 1873, when the NWMP was sent out into the Canadian frontier, it too, acted as an

¹³⁸ BNARS, RC. 2/8/1, Khama, Sebele and Bathoen to Secretary of State, London, 11 November 1895.

¹³⁹ N. Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country in Botswana, 1844-1930", in *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, eds. N. Parsons and R. Palmer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 116.

¹⁴⁰ BNARS, HC. 195, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 2 July 1896.

¹⁴¹ BNARS, HC. 163/1, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 13 August 1896.

agent of Prime Minister Macdonald's National Policy of westward settlement, and its jurisdiction covered the whole of the North West Territories.¹⁴²

When the colonial administration decided to raise two police forces for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, suitable sites for the headquarters of each had not been considered. The Commandant-General, Sir R. Martin favoured Gaborone for the BMP's headquarters since the site already had several buildings, stables, water, grazing land, a hospital, and a gaol. More importantly, all major roads in the Protectorate met at Gaborone.¹⁴³ Unbeknown to Martin, however, the PNP had already set up its headquarters in Gaborone at the direction of Resident Commissioner Newton. The Commander of the BMP, Captain Walford, argued that it would be undesirable for his force to be based at the same place as the PNP. He advised that if it was decided that the PNP stay in Gaborone, then his force should be allowed to establish headquarters at Shoshong in the centre of the Protectorate.¹⁴⁴ The BMP, however, was headquartered at Motloutse in the east of the Protectorate so that regular European police presence could also be maintained in nearby Palapye, Monarch and Tati, which were areas with Europeans.¹⁴⁵ Due to European racial superiority in the Protectorate just like in other colonies, keeping European police in areas with significant numbers of European civilians would help avoid situations where African police were undermined and perhaps even attacked by these civilians. Historian Timothy Stapleton has shown that in Southern Rhodesia, "some whites resented the limited authority that a police uniform conferred on a black man."¹⁴⁶ As a result, white civilians in Southern Rhodesia sometimes attacked black policemen, although such cases ended up in minor fines and sentences.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Beahen and Horrall, *Red Coats on the Prairie...*, 14.

¹⁴³ BNARS, HC. 195, Sir R. Martin to Captain Walford, 16 June 1896.

¹⁴⁴ BNARS, HC. 195, Captain Walford to Sir R. Martin, 17 June 1896.

¹⁴⁵ BNARS, HC. 195, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 1 August 1896.

¹⁴⁶ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80...*, 59.

¹⁴⁷ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80...*, 59.

By September 1896, the presence of two police forces in the Protectorate, which were led by officers of the same rank, had begun to cause some confusion over the hierarchy of command. Although the Resident Commissioner of the Protectorate had wished for the troops to be kept under separate command, the High Commissioner in Cape Town chose to place both forces in the Protectorate under the authority of Captain Walford of the white BMP. The latter argued that it would be redundant to have two commandants in the Protectorate, and that instead, Captain Moony should be made to understand that although he oversaw the African troop, he was still under orders from Walford, who in turn, was subordinate to Commandant-General Martin.¹⁴⁸ Captain Moony, however, cried foul at this decision because when he was offered the position by Resident Commissioner Lagden in Maseru, Basutoland, he had been promised separate and independent command of the PNP. Having also served in Basutoland as Assistant Commissioner in 1893, he objected to serving in the Protectorate as a junior Captain, drawing a salary less than he did in the three years prior. Since the Colonial Office in London also opined that the commanding officer of the white police force should be the senior officer of the whole Protectorate police, Captain Moony officially resigned from the PNP. He was succeeded by Captain John Thorne Griffith, who was responsible to Captain Walford.¹⁴⁹

The insistence by the Colonial Office to have the officer in charge of the white troop as the overall commander in the Protectorate reflected the racial hierarchy in the colonial police. The all-white BMP for example, was much favoured by the resident commissioners and colonial magistrates. Its men often worked closely with the commissioners and magistrates as messengers. The primacy of white police in the Protectorate revealed that the BMP were agents of the colonial state in the frontier. This was the metropolitan characteristic of the white troop in the Protectorate. The PNP, on the other hand, maintained law and order in the reserves and

¹⁴⁸ BNARS, HC. 195, High Commissioner, Cape Town, to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 31 August 1896.

¹⁴⁹ Sillery, *The Bechuanaland Protectorate*, 90.

enforced the unpopular liquor laws.¹⁵⁰ The enforcement of liquor laws was not a desirable duty for the Protectorate police or the NWMP in the Canadian frontier. Enforcing liquor laws in the Canadian West had damaging effects on the reputation of the NWMP in the society and the force tried unsuccessfully to remove this duty from its work.¹⁵¹

It is important to point out that the presence of the BMP and PNP in the Protectorate was necessary for the consolidation of colonial jurisdiction in the frontier. The frontier and metropolitan theses demonstrate a relationship whereby the metropolis strives to domesticate the frontier. Therefore, the developments that took place in the Protectorate with the disbandment of the BBP and the establishment of the BMP and PNP were an indication of that frontier/metropolitan relationship. Just like the federal government did in the Canadian frontier, the colonial authorities developed new mechanisms with which to domesticate and establish order in the frontier that was the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In Unison with the Company's Police

The appointment of Sir R. Martin as Deputy Commissioner and Commandant-General of all police forces in the Protectorate represented part of an elaborate plan by the Colonial Office to tie the territory to the BSAC. This became more conspicuous in August 1896 when Chamberlain refused to limit the BMP's jurisdiction to the Protectorate and chose to make the force interchangeable with the BSAC's police.¹⁵² In December 1896, Chamberlain suggested to the High Commissioner that all forces in the Protectorate and the Company's territories be given the more comprehensive name of 'British South Africa Police' (BSAP). Different subtitles could thereafter be added to this name to indicate the component elements of the force.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 21.

¹⁵¹ Z. Lin, *Policing the Wild North-West: A Sociological Study of the Provincial Police in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1905-32*. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007), 31.

¹⁵² BNARS, HC. 163/1, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 13 August 1896.

¹⁵³ BNARS, HC. 195, Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 December 1896.

By March 1897, therefore, High Commissioner Robinson and Deputy Commissioner Martin began reconsidering questions of leave and periods of engagement with a view of creating identical conditions of service for police in the Protectorate and the Company's territories. In the Protectorate, there were officers engaged for two years and others for four, while in Mashonaland and Matabeleland, officers were under one-year contracts. A general period of two years of service became the norm for the permanent officers serving in the amalgamated BSAP.¹⁵⁴ The amalgamation of the Protectorate and Company's forces was concluded in July 1897 through the High Commissioner's notice that read;

all white police forces serving within the limits of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the British South Africa Company's territories, will in future, be designated 'The British South Africa Police' and will be comprised of four divisions as follows: 1. Bechuanaland Protectorate Division, 2. Matabeleland Division, 3. Mashonaland Division, 4. North Zambezi Division.¹⁵⁵

To ensure smooth administration of the unified police force, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain revised the regulations surrounding the appointment of officers in the forces of the Protectorate and the Company's territories. Before the move to amalgamate the BMP and the Company's police, the appointment of officers rested with the Commandant-General, subject to the High Commissioner's approval. Upon the appointment of the new High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, however, Chamberlain drew up new procedures. The Commandant-General became responsible for making recommendations to the High Commissioner for appointment of officers, but ultimately, the decision to appoint such officers would rest with the Secretary of State. A similar process was to be followed with respect to promotions and transfers of officers in the force.¹⁵⁶ These developments further reflected the consolidation of colonial and metropolitan control over the frontier.

¹⁵⁴ BNARS, HC. 163/2, Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 26 March 1897.

¹⁵⁵ Gibbs, *The History of the British South Africa Police...*, 181.

¹⁵⁶ BNARS, HC. 163/2, Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 5 June 1897.

Despite changing the Bechuanaland Mounted Police's name to No.1 Bechuanaland Protectorate Division of the BSAP, the force's primary jurisdiction was still in the Protectorate. Changing the force's name reflected an administrative expediency as it ensured that Sir R. Martin could call the force for service in the Company's territories. Despite the force's new name, officials in the Protectorate continued to refer to it as the BMP. The 'native' police force in the Protectorate continued to be styled the Protectorate Native Police (PNP) working in cooperation with the white force. The PNP was not part of the BSAP but was instead under the responsibility of the Resident Commissioner in Mafikeng while the BSAP was under Martin at Bulawayo.¹⁵⁷ This was because in November 1895, the Colonial Office had agreed to retain the Tswana reserves under Her Majesty's protection and to recruit African police for those territories to avoid bringing them under Company rule. This, therefore, meant that the PNP had to remain under the control of the Resident Commissioner who represented the Queen in the Protectorate.

As a combined force of the Protectorate and BSAC's police units, the BSAP participated in the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 during the Relief of Mafikeng. As the war approached, the defences of Mafikeng, which was the administrative capital of the Protectorate, had been neglected as the Cape government had been reluctant to provoke the Boers by mobilising forces right at the border with the Transvaal. Besieged by the Boers for about 217 days, the town's defence became the responsibility of the Bechuanaland Regiment/Rifles under the command of Colonel Robert Baden-Powell of the British Army.¹⁵⁸ Shortly before the war started, British Army officer Colonel Herbert Plumer had raised a unit of volunteers in Southern Rhodesia which was named the Rhodesia Regiment to guard the territory in the event of war. Plumer and his men moved down to the Tuli Crownlands in the

¹⁵⁷ BNARS, HC. 163/2, High Commissioner's Notice NO. 18 of 13 July 1897.

¹⁵⁸ Nasson, *The South African War, 1899-1902...*, 95.

Protectorate where they joined about 100 BSAP men and together, advanced southwards to the aid of Mafikeng. Although forming part of the imperial forces during the war, the BSAP operated in separate detachments commanded by their own officers.¹⁵⁹ As a colonial police force in the Southern African frontier, the BSAP's participation in the Second Anglo-Boer War also revealed its para-military nature. It was not limited to civil policing duties but was meant to be able to participate in military operations as well. In the Canadian frontier, the NWMP similarly conducted law enforcement duties on a regular basis but also occasionally performed military duties. In early 1885 when a First Nations Rebellion broke out in the North West Territories, the NWMP deployed three columns of troops to suppress the rebellion, but immediately returned to their peacetime routine when the rebellion was over.¹⁶⁰

At the end of 1902, in the wake of the Second Anglo-Boer War, the BSAP went through a reorganization to improve efficiency in the force. The Bechuanaland Division was withdrawn from the BSAP and placed under the authority of the Protectorate's Resident Commissioner. It was then amalgamated with the PNP to create a single police force to be styled the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police (BPP).¹⁶¹ The reorganization, therefore, left the BSAP with just two Divisions, namely Mashonaland and Matabeleland. Although the motivation behind the reorganization was said to reflect a move toward civil police efficiency, the real reason behind it was economy. Having separate divisions of the BSAP was proving too expensive and therefore, by 1903, the Matabeleland and Mashonaland Divisions were placed under one command.¹⁶² Most notably, this development reflected a consolidation of colonial organization in the frontier. It marked a separation of Rhodesia from the Protectorate. For many years,

¹⁵⁹ Gibbs, *The History of the British South Africa Police*, 230.

¹⁶⁰ Macleod, *The North-West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905*, 105.

¹⁶¹ BNARS, BNB. 896, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1957.

¹⁶² Gibbs, *The History of the British South Africa Police*, 254.

Rhodes had wished for the Protectorate to be brought under Company rule, but the separation of the Protectorate forces from those of the BSAC represented an end of that idea.

At its establishment in 1903, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police (BPP) comprised 53 Europeans and 150 Basotho. The appointment of officers in the force was done through the recommendation of the Resident Commissioner but subject to the High Commissioner's approval and the Secretary of State's confirmation. The force was armed with Lee-Enfield rifles, sword bayonets and a couple of .303 Maxim guns on field carriages.¹⁶³ This was relatively heavy and militaristic hardware for a supposed civil police force. It showed that the BPP was meant to remain a force that would be ready and capable of crushing any possible rebellion in the Protectorate.

Within the framework of frontierism and metropolitanism, the establishment of the BPP signified the achievement of a colonial order and metropolitan power in the Protectorate, which represented a frontier. The frontier period had not yet closed, but the initial 'conquest' and imposition of colonial (metropolitan) authority had been achieved. The presence of a police force at that stage of a frontier was important because it was a prerequisite for the development of any possible industry or economic activity.¹⁶⁴ The police force's existence was no longer about pacifying Africans, but for aiding the colonial government in its efforts to build a frontier society. This was the metropolitan influence in a frontier. In 1791, the establishment of the province of Upper Canada (most of modern-day Ontario) had followed a similar process. The British government as the metropolitan force, had ensured successful settlement of the territory, and subsequently, began building cities and rural communities with thriving commercial

¹⁶³ BNARS, S. 35/8, Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Constitution, nd.

¹⁶⁴ D.H. Breen, *The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier, 1874-1924*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 8.

villages. This, according to the metropolitan thesis, was the advancing of capitalism and development of the wage-earning economy in the frontier.¹⁶⁵

The BPP, Game Laws, and Colonial Borders

In 1904, just a year after the formation of the BPP, the Herero and Nama people of German South-West Africa rebelled against their colonizers. This led to a 3-year conflict between these groups and the German security forces in the territory and resulted in what some have labelled the first genocide of the 20th century. Although the casualty numbers have been debated by scholars, about 60, 000 Herero and 10, 000 Nama are believed to have died between 1904 and 1907. During this uprising, many Herero people were driven through the Omaheke part of the Kalahari Desert, where most perished, but some made into the Bechuanaland Protectorate.¹⁶⁶ Between 1904 and 1905, therefore, the BPP conducted regular border patrols along the boundary between Bechuanaland and South-West Africa. Resident Commissioner for Bechuanaland, Ralph Williams had picked up reports from European newspapers that the western part of his territory was being used by the Herero as a base for collecting supplies and launching attacks against the Germans in South-West Africa. Although the reports were false, the regular BPP patrols along the border represented a precautionary measure.¹⁶⁷

By 1912, the Protectorate administration faced difficulties in policing the Africans of Chief Linchwe in the Bakgatla Reserve along the Transvaal Border. This problem was unique to the Bakgatla Reserve mainly because the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela people lived both on the Protectorate side, and in the Transvaal province of the Union of South Africa. In 1870, Chief

¹⁶⁵ Cross, *The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas...*, 78.

¹⁶⁶ S. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 40-45. See also D. J. Schaller, "The Genocide of the Herero and Nama in German South-West Africa, 1904-1907," in *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, eds. S. Totten & W. S. Parsons, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 90-92; T. Stapleton, *A Military History of Africa. Vol 2: The Colonial Period: From the Scramble for Africa to the Algerian Independence War (ca. 1870-1963)*. (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2013), 112.

¹⁶⁷ UK, House of Commons Command Papers (Cd.2648-25), Colonial Reports- Annual. No. 479. Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1906.

Linchwe II had moved with over half of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela from the Transvaal into what would later become the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and built his new capital at Mochudi. Although many of Linchwe II's subjects remained in the Transvaal, they still recognized him as their Paramount Chief.¹⁶⁸ By the time the Bechuanaland Protectorate was established in 1885, this meant that the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela were separated by the colonial border and under a cross-border chieftainship.

From its formation, one of the BPP's duties was the enforcement of a hunting ban on big game. The Bakgatla in the Protectorate, however, soon circumvented that ban by hunting in the Union of South Africa instead.¹⁶⁹ Hunting regulations in colonial Africa were not a new thing by this time. Shortly following the colonization of African territories, there was a proliferation of wildlife conservation policies imposed by colonial administrators that were aimed at transplanting 19th century European, upper class hunting practices and sports in the colonies.¹⁷⁰ In 1870, when the Hudson's Bay Company transferred its lands to the federal government of Canada, similar wildlife policies were almost immediately developed and imposed on the frontier. In his metropolitan interpretation of the Canadian conservation policies, historian George Colpitts argues that in the frontier, they were meant to slow down the extinction of buffalo herds and other big game populations. However, another objective behind the development of these policies, was to undermine the First Nations people's dependence on the hunt, so that they may be absorbed into the frontier settler economy based on farming and ranching. Ottawa, as the metropolitan centre, replaced the frontier dependence on wild meat with dependence on individualism and successful farming.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ L. Cantwell, "Chiefly Power in a Frontline State: Kgosi Linchwe II, the Bakgatla and Botswana in the South African Liberation Struggle, 1948-1994," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41:2, (2015): 258.

¹⁶⁹ BNARS, RC. 44/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 21 May 1912.

¹⁷⁰ E. I. Steinhart, *Black Poachers, White Hunters: A Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya*. (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 2.

¹⁷¹ G. Colpitts, *Game in the Garden: A Human History of Wildlife in Western Canada to 1940*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 9.

In colonial Africa, these state conservation policies prohibited Africans from hunting, and this represented a radical shift from their traditional way of life. Hunting had been important in the pre-colonial African economy and diet and would continue to be so in the colonial era. However, the traditional practice of hunting gradually declined due to the imposition of game legislation and conservation policies by the colonial administrators aimed at forcing Africans into the colonial economy and separating human settlement from animal habitat.¹⁷² In the late 19th century, much of the game laws in Africa were informed by the idea of game reserves, which was intended more at preservation rather than conservation of game. Game reserves were specified areas that were closed off from Africans to prevent them from hunting, which was then criminalized as ‘poaching’, while European colonists continued to hunt for sport in the reserves.¹⁷³ In colonial Kenya, for example, a rudimentary game department was formed in 1899 to discourage hunting by Africans and to underscore the colonial government’s efforts at wildlife preservation. However, Blayney Percival, the game ranger appointed as head of this department, was a renowned hunting sportsman, whose single contribution to sport hunting in East Africa was the pioneering of hunting lions from horseback.¹⁷⁴

While game reserves were spreading in colonial Africa in the late 19th century, in North America there developed the concept of pure conservation based on the establishment of national parks. The idea of national parks for game conservation developed in the United States in the 1870s and quickly spread to Canada in the 1880s. What is interesting about the concepts of conservation and national parks, however, is that they mostly manifested in the American and Canadian West, which were the North American frontiers. The development of these

¹⁷² J. M. MacKenzie, *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British Imperialism*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 55.

¹⁷³ J. Carruthers, *The Kruger National Park: A Social and Political History*. (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995), 32.

¹⁷⁴ Steinhart, *Black Poachers, White Hunters...*, 150.

concepts, therefore, represented a clash between frontier and metropolitan forces. To create a European settlement in the frontier, the metropolitan forces enacted laws that were antithetical to the way of life in a frontier. Customary practices that were an acceptable way of life in a frontier became criminalized by policy makers who represented the metropolis. Hunting was poaching, foraging became trespassing, the use of fires tuned into arson, while the cutting of trees was timber theft.¹⁷⁵ In 1872, Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming was established as the first in the United States. It was a great step in showing the federal government's commitment to the conservation of game. With its establishment, however, the park also led to the forced settling of 'Indian' populations into a reserve in Idaho, and the settling of European farmers in much of the countryside.¹⁷⁶ In the Canadian frontier, the first wildlife sanctuary to be established was the Rocky Mountain National Park (now Banff), in Alberta. The Park was established as an attempt by the federal government to resolve struggles between the conservationists and the settlers, but also as a form of resource development.¹⁷⁷

By the late 1920's, the idea of national parks had reached colonial Africa. In 1926, the government of the Union of South Africa passed the National Parks Act, which combined the Sabie Game Reserve and the Shingwedzi Game Reserve to create the Kruger National Park. This development wrested control of wildlife conservation from the hunting sportsmen and game wardens and placed it in the hands of mainstream politics in the Union. The Kruger National Park symbolized a form of unity between the English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites of South Africa. Both parties recognized the significance of wildlife recreational viewing as a profitable form of resource exploitation.¹⁷⁸ As for Kenya, in 1928 the Colonial Office in London began considering the idea of changing the Southern Game Reserve

¹⁷⁵ K. Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 20.

¹⁷⁶ Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature...*, 114.

¹⁷⁷ D. G. Wetherell, *Wildlife, Land and People: A Century of Change in Prairie Canada*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016), 356.

¹⁷⁸ Carruthers, *The Kruger National Park...*, 65-68.

into a national park. However, it would not be until 1946 that the Nairobi National Park would be established, followed by the Tsavo National Park in 1948.¹⁷⁹ The idea of national parks, however, was not restricted to the English-speaking world. Africa's oldest park, the Virunga National Park, was established in 1925 by the Belgian colonial authorities in eastern Congo.¹⁸⁰ Although the concept of national parks arrived in Africa in the 1920s, it was not until the late colonial era of the 1940s and 1950s and even later that most of them were created.

The issue of conservation and game legislation, however, transpired differently in the Bechuanaland Protectorate owing to the nature of colonization in the territory. Within the context of an indirect rule system, the colonial administration in Mafikeng left the African chiefs of the Protectorate to their devices in terms of running the affairs of their reserves. The administration of Bechuanaland as a 'protected' territory, implied less interference from the British government in the affairs of the Protectorate. As a result, when the hunting ban was initially enforced by the Protectorate police, there were more restrictions on Europeans than on the Africans, who were permitted by their chiefs to continue hunting within their 'native' reserves.¹⁸¹ In November 1921, at a meeting of the European Advisory Council, Ghanzi farmers remarked that they were not as favoured as the Africans, who could hunt whenever and whatever they liked, including big game if they were doing so in their reserves.¹⁸² In 1925, a new game policy was introduced to reduce restrictions on European hunting. Under this proclamation, however, the chiefs were still given control of hunting within their reserves and charged with the responsibility of prohibiting their people from hunting outside the reserves.¹⁸³ Despite these regulations and policies, the game department or any formal agency for game

¹⁷⁹ Steinhart, *Black Poachers, White Hunters...*, 192.

¹⁸⁰ S. Hochleithner, "Beyond Contesting Limits: Land, Access, and Resistance at the Virunga National Park," *Conservation and Society*, 15:1, (2017): 100.

¹⁸¹ C. A. Spinage, "Gleanings of Game Affairs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 24:1, (1992): 21.

¹⁸² C. A. Spinage, "Gleanings of Game Affairs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," 21.

¹⁸³ A. Campbell, "Establishment of Botswana's National Park and Game Reserve System," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 36: 1 (2004): 55.

and environmental conservation in the Protectorate did not exist until 1961. Hitherto, wildlife had been under the general care of the Protectorate administration.¹⁸⁴ Compared to the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, the Protectorate had a very small population of European settlers. In territories with large settler communities, albeit still minorities, the Europeans sought to monopolise land use, and wildlife and conservation issues and thus established game departments early. In the Protectorate, the colonial government was in no rush to monopolise land use or to restrict the movements of Africans.

From as early as 1912, however, the BPP became aware of the tendency by the Protectorate Bakgatla to hunt in a South African Game Reserve across the border in the Transvaal. On the 100-mile Bakgatla Reserve-Transvaal boundary, both the BPP and the Union Police had two poorly manned posts opposite each other at Sikwane and Olifant's Drift respectively. While visiting their relatives or cattle posts on the other side of the border, the Bakgatla were sometimes reported by South African officials to be hunting game there. The Protectorate officials feared that this would upset relations with the Union Government. The Union had responded by imposing regulations regarding border passes and control of arms, but the weak police presence in such outlying areas diminished these efforts.¹⁸⁵ Although the formal policy of indirect rule was not adopted in the Protectorate until 1944, the Tswana chiefs had been largely responsible for the administration of their reserves from 1885, with very minimal contact with the colonial administration. Contact between the chiefs and the administration was facilitated through the already inadequate colonial police.¹⁸⁶ Hunting by the Protectorate Bakgatla across the border was, therefore, an indication of Chief Linchwe's

¹⁸⁴ G. Child, "The Growth of Park Conservation in Botswana," in *Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation*, eds. H. Suich and B. Child (London: Earthscan, 2009), 51.

¹⁸⁵ BNARS, RC. 44/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 21 May 1912.

¹⁸⁶ Makgala, "Limitations of British Territorial Control in Bechuanaland Protectorate...", 60.

inability to control his people, but also an indication of the limitations of British territorial control in the Protectorate.

The BPP's challenge in policing the activities of the Bakgatla in the Protectorate was like that faced by the NWMP in the Canadian frontier. When the Buffalo herds significantly declined in the frontier in the late 1870s, the First Nations people began hunting the cattle that the new ranching settlers left unattended through the free-range grazing system. Preventing the hunting of cattle, therefore became another one of the NWMP's responsibilities in the Canadian prairie west.¹⁸⁷ The policing of reserves and illegal hunting in the Canadian frontier and that of Bechuanaland revealed the similarities of frontier societies and their challenges. In an attempt by the Protectorate police and their neighbours to control the situation, the Bakgatla were required to obtain passes at the nearest Union Police post before proceeding into the Transvaal. Under no circumstances would they be allowed to carry arms into the Transvaal. Those with firearms would have to deposit them at the BPP police post before crossing the border because Africans were not allowed to carry guns in the Union.¹⁸⁸

The 'illegal' hunting by the Bakgatla of the Protectorate across the South African border reflected badly on the efficiency of both BPP and the Union Police in the area. However, an incident in August 1912 showed how activities on this border could easily destabilize relations between the two territories. On 11 August, Constable Van Zyl of the Union Police shot and killed an African man named Rankoane Sioketse of the Protectorate's Bakgatla Reserve while he and another African man were hunting 8 miles into the Transvaal.¹⁸⁹ This incident caused a lot of outrage in the Bakgatla Reserve. Bechuanaland Resident Commissioner Francis Panzera,

¹⁸⁷ J. Jennings, "Policemen and Poachers: Indian Relations on the Ranching Frontier", in *The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, 1873-1919* ed. W.M. Baker (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998), 45.

¹⁸⁸ BNARS, RC. 44/3, Memorandum of Matters Agreed upon between Col. Panzera and Mr Truter regarding Matters Concerning the Border of the Transvaal and that of Protectorate, n.d.

¹⁸⁹ BNARS, RC. 44/3, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Governor-General of the Union, Pretoria, 14 August 1912.

therefore, requested the Union Police not to enter the Protectorate in pursuit of the man who was with the deceased.¹⁹⁰ This was out of fear that while in the Protectorate, the Union Policemen could be attacked or killed by the Bakgatla who would easily outnumber and overpower them.

An inquest into the incident later revealed that Constable Van Zyl had killed Mr Sioketse in self-defence after the latter had fired a gun at him. The District Surgeon at Rustenburg produced a post-mortem report on 17 August 1912, on the basis of which the Attorney-General in Pretoria closed the case.¹⁹¹ Despite what happened to Mr Sioketse, a major concern among the Protectorate and Union officials was that this had had no real effect on the Bakgatla as they continued to hunt game in the Transvaal. On 22 September, Union Constables A. Yzel and D.J. Beukes came across two Bakgatla hunting on Farm Worcester in the Transvaal. They gave chase and apprehended one of them, who was then sentenced to two months in prison for poaching plus seven more days for entering the Transvaal without a pass. This was the third hunting party encountered by the two Union officers in September alone.¹⁹² The Bechuanaland Protectorate was an indirect rule African territory adjacent to a white settler territory and this was what concerned the Protectorate administration about the Bakgatla's 'illegal' hunting in the Transvaal in 1912. From a frontier/metropolitan point of view, this reflected the closing of a frontier. In 1910, the Cape, Orange Free State, Natal and Transvaal colonies were unified into the Union of South Africa. The Union's neighbours Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland remained as High Commission Territories under British administration.¹⁹³ This meant that the frontier line in Southern Africa had reached its limits,

¹⁹⁰ BNARS, RC. 44/3, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Governor-General of the Union, Pretoria, 14 August 1912.

¹⁹¹ BNARS, RC. 44/3, Attorney-General, Pretoria to the Rustenburg Magistrate, 14 October 1912.

¹⁹² BNARS, RC. 44/3, District Commandant, Rustenburg to Transvaal Police, Pretoria, 16 October 1912.

¹⁹³ B. Freund, "South Africa: The Union Years, 1910-1948-Political and Economic Foundations," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, eds. R. Ross, A.K. Mager and B. Nasson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 212.

and that the Bechuanaland Protectorate stood as a British territory, on the frontier limits of what was now the Union of South Africa.

Conclusion

At the centre of Southern Africa, the Bechuanaland Protectorate was established in 1885 in a strategic move by the British to prevent the Boers and Germans from occupying that portion of the region. British administration in the Protectorate remained minimal because the territory was of no economic significance to the Crown. Moreover, the British government had expressed intentions of transferring the Protectorate to the BSAC, but this was precluded by the three chiefs' protests in England with the help of the LMS missionaries. This led the Colonial Office to place the territories of the three chiefs under British imperial protection. The Company continued to call for the transfer of the rest of the Protectorate, but the British government kept on stalling because of reasons like the Jameson Raid, and because of the reported atrocities of Company rule in Southern Rhodesia.

The colonization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the development of colonial policing thereafter presents an opportunity to apply to the Protectorate's history, the concepts of frontierism and metropolitanism as developed in the historiography of the Canadian West. The Protectorate was a frontier of what would later become the Union of South Africa, and it was administered from there. This meant that Mafikeng was the metropolis to the Protectorate, while Cape Town was the metropolis to Mafikeng. The colonial police in the Protectorate, therefore, existed as a metropolitan construct, and an embodiment of the colonial administration in the territory. However, it was exposed to challenges like shortages of men, sparsity of police posts, poor infrastructure and the enforcement of unpopular laws. These were challenges that were unique to a frontier environment, much in the same way as was the case of the NWMP in the Canadian West.

For as long as the imperial government entertained the idea to transfer administration of the Protectorate to the Company, the colonial police force's mandate remained uncertain. The force's designations and jurisdictions also remained unsure. The force's continuous change in name and responsibilities were closely linked to the broader politics of the region. At the formation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and British Bechuanaland in 1885, the first police force to be established was the entirely white BBP, which was meant to protect the two territories from possible invasion by the Boers. The BBP, however, performed some administrative roles in the Protectorate, and was in 1893, sent to participate in the Anglo-Ndebele War, alongside the Company's police. This was in no way related to the BBP's mandate of protecting the borders of Bechuanaland Protectorate and British Bechuanaland. When British Bechuanaland became part of the Cape Colony in 1895, the BBP was disbanded, but some of its personnel constituted the new BMP. Another force comprising African police called the PNP was established and recruited from Basutoland. At this time, the Colonial Office decided to turn the BMP into a division of the BSAP, which was an indication that Joseph Chamberlain still considered the possibility of the Protectorate becoming part of the Company's territories. At the turn of the 20th century, the BMP, as part of the BSAP, participated in the South African War, most notably during the Siege of Mafikeng.

Following the combination of the BMP and PNP into the BPP, the administration, jurisdiction and responsibilities of the police force became less ambiguous. The police force served within the confines of the Protectorate under the control of the Resident Commissioner and High Commissioner. Owing to the scattered and isolated police posts and the occasional shortage of men, the BPP faced some challenges like those faced by the NWMP in western Canada, which was typical of the frontier setting. The BPP was responsible for enforcing the hunting laws and conservation policies of the Protectorate. The same laws and policies prevailed in other parts of British colonial Africa and they were aimed at monopolizing hunting

by Europeans while limiting Africans to farming and wage labour. While these laws were not as strict in the Protectorate as they were in other colonies, enforcing them proved difficult for the BPP especially in the case of the Bakgatla who occasionally hunted across the border in the Transvaal, causing problems with the authorities in the Union of South Africa. The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 had marked the closing of the frontier period. Therefore, the 'illegal' hunting by the Bakgatla from an indirect rule African territory in a white ruled settler territory presented a challenge for the Protectorate police and administration.

Chapter 2: Racial Hierarchy and Conditions of Service in the Bechuanaland Police

Introduction

In the colonial police and militaries of Africa, Asia and other British dependencies, there often existed stark racial inequalities between the personnel of the forces. Whereas class was the main distinguishing factor between British officers and other ranks in metropolitan forces, race and ethnicity played a more significant role in stratifying the colonial forces in British colonial territories. There developed in these police and militaries, a racial hierarchy between the European and the local members. Among the local personnel of British colonial forces, there were often further hierarchies, based on the ethnicity of the recruits and guided by the theories of martial races. In some instances, British beliefs in the inherent military superiority of some communities led the colonial forces to recruit men from other colonies or specific regions of colonies. The established racial and ethnic hierarchies in colonial police and militaries were a direct representation of the racial divisions prevailing in the colonial societies that they operated within.

In the colonial police of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, race and ethnicity played a major role in determining the conditions of service for the men serving in the force. From 1887 to the late 1940s, the colonial police in the Protectorate mainly recruited its African members from the neighbouring Basutoland Protectorate (now Lesotho). This represented the colonial administration's perceived ethnic hierarchy between the Batswana and the Basotho, the latter being considered more desirable for a colonial police force. Between the Basotho and the European members of the Protectorate's police, however, the racial hierarchy manifested in unequal conditions of service. African police earned a significantly lower salary than their European counterparts even if they held the same rank in the force. Other concessions like leave of absence and the right to get married while serving in the force were usually reserved for European police but denied to the African personnel. The prohibition of African police from

marrying was unusual compared to other British colonial forces although that may have been because they were from another territory. The provision of adequate housing for the members of the Protectorate's police also revealed the racial inequality that existed between the African and European members of the force. Adequate housing was provided for European police whereas the African police for the most part lived under deplorable conditions due to a shortage of accommodation.

The racial hierarchy that existed in the Protectorate's colonial society, and by extension, the police force, was born out of a racial ideology that developed in mid-19th century Europe. The Europeans believed that as a 'civilized' people, their race was superior to any other. Out of this belief, the Europeans embarked on a civilizing mission to other parts of the world. Because of their belief in 'white superiority', the Europeans placed themselves in charge their newly acquired colonies. In the colonial societies, therefore, there was a racial hierarchy, whereby the Europeans were at the top, imposing European ideals on the colonized. In the colonial forces, similarly, the Europeans inherently assumed a supervisory position over the local personnel. It was this racial ideology that dictated the experiences of Africans in the colonial police of Bechuanaland and those of other colonies.

Locating Race in Imperialism

To understand race and hierarchy in the Bechuanaland police, it is important to know first, the relationship between race and domination, and their place in imperialism. Beginning in the 15th century, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade had revealed early Western forms of racism, which were simplistic and based on prejudice. European traders had presumably concluded that African people were of slave status. This, however, would change over the course of the slave trade as European slave traders began to treat West African kings with a degree of respect and

dealing with African merchants as equals. It is important to explain here, however, that there is a debate over the Atlantic Slave Trade and the origins of European racisms.¹⁹⁴

By the 19th century, there had developed a new idea of “racial superiority” in British thought and rhetoric. In early Victorian Britain, the word “race” was only used broadly to denote any group without attention to their descent.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, prior to the middle of the 19th century, Europeans did not attribute their domination over other parts of the world to their biological superiority. They saw it as the result of their gradual cultural and technological advances.¹⁹⁶ In the middle to the late 19th century, however, Europeans and white Americans reinvented the concept of race. The word began to carry connotations of difference and power, and it was used to differentiate “them” from “us”. The British even referred to other European nationalities as different “races”. Europeans, particularly the British and the Germans clung to this philosophy of race and used it to distinguish themselves from “others”. The Caucasian race was believed to be superior to all others and it was this belief that would eventually form the foundation of Hitler’s anti-Semitic policies and ultimately result in the Jewish Holocaust.¹⁹⁷ Closely related to this racial philosophy, was the idea of civilization. By virtue of their cultural and technological advancements, Europeans considered themselves civilized, and began attaching imperialism to the fantasy of race. They believed that no darker skinned group could achieve cultural and technological developments on its own, and that only the lighter groups (Caucasian) could bring such civilization to the lesser races.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ P. Curtin, “The Black Experience of Colonialism and Imperialism,” *Daedalus*, 103:2 (1974): 19. See also J. E. Inikori and L.S Engerman eds. *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the America, and Europe*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); A. O. Thompson, “Race and Colour Prejudices and the Origin of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade,” *Caribbean Studies*, 16: 3 (1973) pp. 29-59; S. Drescher, “The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism,” *Social Science History*, 14: 3 (1990) pp. 415-450.

¹⁹⁵ E. Beasley, *The Victorian Reinvention of Race: New Racisms and the Problem of Grouping in the Human Sciences*. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 2.

¹⁹⁶ G. M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 61.

¹⁹⁷ A. J. Njoh, “Colonial Philosophies: Urban Space, and Racial Segregation in British and French Colonial Arica,” *Journal of Black Studies*, 38:4 (2008): 580.

¹⁹⁸ Beasley, *The Victorian Reinvention of Race...*, 21.

Out of this 19th century racial philosophy of power and difference, there also developed a scholarly practice known as Orientalism. This, according to Edward Said, was the European way of coming to terms with the Orient and its special place in European experience. The Orient was an area that extended from China to the Mediterranean.¹⁹⁹ This western scholarship was inherently political and intellectually dubious. Through stereotypical depictions of the East, the West justified its colonization of the Orient. This was done by underscoring the differences between the familiar (Europe, the West or “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East or “them”).²⁰⁰ The East was, therefore, presented as a place in need of civilization. Said’s work has, however, been critiqued by imperial historian David Cannadine. While Said argued for the existence of prejudiced interpretations of the Orient by Europeans, Cannadine has argued that the metropolitan British perception of the empire was based more on class, rank and status and not so much on race. The British imperialists were more interested in seeing elements of their traditional individualistic and unequal society in the East and not necessarily the creation of the concept of ‘otherness’ as Said claimed.²⁰¹

In 1859, British naturalist Charles Darwin published his theory of biological evolution in a book titled *The Origins of Species*. Darwin’s work had primarily focused on the biological evolution of animal species and did not necessarily relate that evolution to humans. Other philosophers, however, like Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” just several years before the publication of *The Origins of Species*, took Darwin’s principles further and applied them to humans, thus, creating the concept of Social Darwinism.²⁰² Social Darwinism, therefore became an ideology that attributed social evolution to the law of natural

¹⁹⁹ E. Said, *Orientalism*. (London: Routledge, 1978), 42.

²⁰⁰ Said, *Orientalism*..., 43.

²⁰¹ D. Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), xix.

²⁰² R. M. Dennis, “Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race,” *The Journal of Negro Education*, 64:3 (1995): 244.

selection. In the process, this ideology gave scientific legitimacy to the Europeans' belief in white superiority. Europeans began to think that their ideas of racial superiority had been confirmed by science and, therefore, represented a natural law.

By the time of the "Scramble for Africa" in the late 19th century, imperial powers carried into the colonies, the racial theories prevailing back in Europe. The Scramble represented the climax of Western Imperialism. Apart from the economic and strategic motives behind the acquisition of new colonial territories, the ideology behind imperialism was openly racist. It was based on the notion of "the white man's burden", which suggested that it was the duty of the "superior race" to take responsibility for the civilization of the "half-devil and half-child" races.²⁰³ This resulted in a new global order under which the non-western societies were politically subordinated to and economically dependent on their colonizers. Furthermore, imperialism transformed colonial societies by creating institutionalized inequalities along racial lines.²⁰⁴

The racial attitudes that developed in the colonial period were necessary for upholding white privilege and prestige. The European had to have power over the local people in the colony.²⁰⁵ Despite the fact that racial inequality was a direct contradiction of the vision of the civilizing mission, which on its face, appeared to be inclusive, colonial racial subordination was maintained. It became the legitimate way with which imperial authority could be exercised over the races classified as "inferior".²⁰⁶ In Britain, there was also an assumption that all agents of the imperial government such as the colonial state, the chartered companies, the settlers and the missionary organizations would impose their ways on the colonized people. This would

²⁰³ Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History...*, 107.

²⁰⁴ D. A. Lorimer, *Science, Race Relations, and Resistance: Britain, 1870-1914*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 18.

²⁰⁵ B. Bush, *Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919-1943*. (London: Routledge, 1999), 73.

²⁰⁶ Lorimer, *Science, Race Relations, and Resistance...*, 28.

result in a racial hierarchy in which the whites ruled the non-whites.²⁰⁷ One of the cost-effective ways in which this racial hierarchy was maintained, was through the policy of indirect rule in the case of British territories. This was a system through which the Europeans controlled their colonies through pre-existing indigenous power structures. The colonial society was, therefore, entwined with racism from the onset.²⁰⁸

Racial Prejudice in the Bechuanaland Border Police

As agents of the colonial state, the police and militaries of the colonies were organized and structured to reflect the social and racial hierarchy of the territories. In the colonies of white settlement, especially in Southern Africa, there was almost always an inclination by the colonizers to keep the police or militaries exclusively white even though this was usually difficult to achieve given the small numbers of Europeans compared to Africans. This was also a period when some white settler minorities in Southern Africa began to gain forms of self-government. In 1872, for example, the British government had granted the Cape Colony responsible government with a qualified voting system that massively favoured the white minority.²⁰⁹ As a result, there was a sort of “whitening” of the colonial forces of these territories in the late 19th century. For example, during their first occupation of the Cape in 1795, the British recruited the Khoikhoi and Cape Coloureds into the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) until the force was disbanded in 1870. When the force was reconstituted in 1878, just 6 years after responsible government in the Cape, it was exclusively white. It should be acknowledged, however, that the 1850 rebellion of the Khoisan and Cape Coloured members of the CMR also had something to do with its reconstitution as an exclusively white force in 1878.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Lorimer, *Science, Race Relations, and Resistance...*, 41.

²⁰⁸ M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 19.

²⁰⁹ Storey, *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa...*, 183.

²¹⁰ G. Tylden, “The Permanent Colonial Forces of the Cape Colony,” *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 19: 75 (1940): 151. For CMR rebellion, see Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa...*, 33.

During the colonization of Bechuanaland, the success of the 1884-85 Warren Expedition had also shown the British what a show of European military strength could achieve. This, therefore, led the new colonial administration to reject the recruitment of Africans into the Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP). The colonial administration and the leadership of the BBP chose reliance on force and compulsion rather than suasion through a locally recruited constabulary.²¹¹ This characterized a strong British perception of white racial superiority that would keep the BBP an exclusively European force for two years.²¹²

In 1886, John Moffat, who was a former missionary working in the colonial service, suggested to the Resident Commissioner of British Bechuanaland that the BBP should be relieved of the management of internal affairs in the territory and be replaced with 60 'native' constables.²¹³ The withdrawal of the BBP from internal administrative duties, and the appointment of a magistrate who would be assisted by African constables would be far more economical for the colonial administration. However, the BBP commander Colonel F. Carrington and Resident Commissioner Sidney Shippard only preferred European police, even though they were aware of the costly maintenance of Europeans compared to Africans.²¹⁴ While many British imperial officers commanded white British troops in Africa, Carrington was different because during his career, he commanded locally-based settler units like the Frontier Light Horse, the CMR and the Rhodesian Field Force.²¹⁵ It is possible, therefore, that this influenced his aversion to the recruitment of Africans into the BBP. Similarly, the position of the Bechuanaland administration regarding the recruitment of Africans into the BBP was influenced by the existence of racially homogenous forces like the CMR in the neighbouring

²¹¹ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate...*, 59.

²¹² Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 7.

²¹³ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 59.

²¹⁴ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 7.

²¹⁵ For Carrington's career, see P. Gon, *Send Carrington: The Story of an Imperial Frontiersman*. (Johannesburg: AD. Donker, 1984).

Cape Colony. It must be understood, however, that the racial composition of the CMR reflected the evolving nature of the colonial state. A white minority-ruled settler territory like the Cape was likely to have an entirely white police force because the settlers were afraid that armed blacks would rebel. As will be seen below, an exclusively white force in a Crown Colony like British Bechuanaland, was not practical.

In the British Caribbean too, slave owners and some colonial administrators were averse to the recruitment and arming of local black people because they feared resistance from them. In 1795, therefore, when the West India Regiment (WIR) was created to aid in the British Army's struggle against revolutionary France in the Caribbean, it comprised British slave soldiers obtained from West Africa.²¹⁶ Unlike local black men, the slave soldiers were seen by the white Caribbean slave owners as less likely to rebel although they sometimes did. When the slave trade was abolished, the British began to use conscripted "liberated" slaves rescued by the Royal Navy and landed at Sierra Leone. By 1860, however, with the demise of the Atlantic slave trade, WIR recruitment shifted to the Caribbean as there were no more "liberated Africans".²¹⁷

In other parts of the empire, it was also typical to recruit non-Europeans for the colonial police, although there was still a hierarchy in those forces that reflected the colonies' racial divisions. In colonial Kenya for example, the police force consisted of European inspectors and assistant inspectors, some middle ranking Asians, and Africans as the rank-and-file.²¹⁸ Asians

²¹⁶ ²¹⁶ D. Lambert, "[A] Mere Cloak for their Proud Contempt and Antipathy towards the African Race': Imagining Britain's West India Regiments in the Caribbean, 1795-1838," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 46: 4 (2018): 627.

²¹⁷ T. Lockley, *Military Medicine and the Making of Race: Life and Death in the West India Regiments, 1795-1874*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 85-86; See also B. Dyde, *The Empty Sleeve: The Story of the West India Regiments of the British Army*. (London: Hansib Publications, 1997); A. B. Ellis, *The History of the First West India Regiment*. (London: Chapman and Hall, LTD, 1885), 17-18.

²¹⁸ D. Anderson, "Policing, Prosecution and the Law in Colonial Kenya, c. 1905-39," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 184.

in the Kenya Police were often assigned more responsible roles and they had more status than their African counterparts. However, the European police still held the more respectable positions and had more status than both the Asians and Africans.²¹⁹ This represented a clear example of racial hierarchy in that different races were given varying degrees of responsibility based on their perceived abilities. Asians in East Africa occupied an intermediary role between the African majority and the European minority, and therefore they enjoyed a level of authority over Africans.²²⁰

Although Carrington and Shippard initially rejected the idea of recruiting Africans into the BBP, this changed in 1887 when 50 men from the Basutoland Protectorate were recruited into the force. This reflected the status of Bechuanaland, which as a Protectorate and frontier territory, could not have an exclusively white police force like its neighbouring white settler colony, the Cape. The Basotho men made for perfect candidates because they had some experience in colonial police work. When Lesotho regained separate colonial status from the Cape Colony in 1881 following the Basutoland Rebellion, some African men were recruited into its new police force.²²¹ Another reason for the employment of Basotho in the BBP was that they were considered by the Bechuanaland administration to be excellent horse-riders and they could understand Setswana as it is mutually intelligible with Sesotho.²²² Within a year, however, all 50 Basotho were discharged from the BBP because they were said to be incompetent, undisciplined, and too costly to maintain. The commander of the BBP claimed that the 50 men were useless, and that they were bad riders who gave the horses sore backs. He reckoned it would be cheaper to replace them with 27 European police.²²³

²¹⁹ Wolf, "Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950....,405.

²²⁰ D. P. Ghai and Y. P. Ghai, "Asians in East Africa: Problems and Prospects," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3:1 (1965): 35.

²²¹ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 7.

²²² Makgala, "A Survey of Race Relations in Botswana, 1800-1966...., 13

²²³ Sedimo, "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," 7.

It is more plausible that the Basotho were dismissed out of racial prejudice than on the grounds given by the commander of the force. After all, the Basotho were recruited specifically for their horse-riding skills and colonial police experience.²²⁴ If it was a case of lack of discipline on the part of the Basotho, then the white police in the BBP also had their fair share of indiscipline that went unpunished. In December 1886, just a year following the formation of the BBP, there were already disturbing allegations against the men of the force. Chief Montshiwa of the Barolong and his Wesleyan missionaries relayed reports of European BBP men having affairs with Barolong women and in many cases raping them.²²⁵ Despite the evidence of mixed-race children being born to Barolong women, the colonial administration dismissed these reports. The word of the white colonial police carried more weight than that of the African complainants who also had no witnesses to corroborate their stories. This was a further reflection of the racial hierarchy that existed in Bechuanaland. The lack of witnesses coming forward also reflected the fear that the Batswana had for the colonial police.²²⁶ Another case was later levelled against the BBP in 1892 with no success. Two European businessmen known as the Masson brothers reported that some BBP men had unlawfully confiscated large amounts of liquor and gunpowder from their wagon on its way to Francistown from Mafikeng.²²⁷ Despite the brothers being called to present their case to the police officials, the matter was never resolved. It can be concluded, therefore, that the ‘indiscipline’ cited as one of the reasons for dismissing the Basotho from the BBP was very ironic considering the level of impunity enjoyed by the European establishment of the force. The reasons behind the discharge of the Basotho were as implausible as they were racist. Furthermore, considering the ambiguous position of Bechuanaland on the borders of white minority-ruled settler states, the

²²⁴ Makgala, “A Survey of Race Relations in Botswana, 1800-1966...”, 13; Sedimo, “Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895,” 7.

²²⁵ BNARS, HC. 46/62, Chief Montshiwa to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 6 December 1886.

²²⁶ Sedimo, “Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895,” 7.

²²⁷ BNARS, HC. 110/1, Report of the Masson Brothers against the BBP, 1892.

dismissal of the Basotho from the BBP may have represented continuing tensions over the appropriate racial composition of the force.

Imagining Martial Races in the Bechuanaland Police.

Closely related to the issue of race and hierarchy in the colonial police and militaries, was the idea of ethnic superiority which was informed by the theory of martial races. The martial qualities of African ethnic groups were for the most part, constructs imagined in the minds of the British about the military capabilities of Africans. They were based on the European officers' visualizations of the ideal African soldier. As historian Heather Streets has explained, the theory of martial races evolved out of the 1857-58 Indian Rebellion. During this uprising, British Army officers depicted groups such as the Scottish Highlanders, Nepalese Gurkhas and Indian Sikhs as having shown great loyalty and courage. Based on these groups' outstanding performance, an ideology that would later be known as the martial race theory was developed in the British military.²²⁸ Recruiting for the Indian Army in the decades following the 1857-58 rebellion became entirely based on martial race theories coupled with Victorian ideologies and racial sciences. Sikhs and Gurkhas and other Indian groups from the northern parts of India began to fill up the ranks of the Indian Army while those from the south declined in the late 19th century. The British believed that the cold climate of the north and north-western regions of India produced men who were tall, physically attractive and ultra-masculine. Therefore, the British officers of the Indian Army preferred the northern 'races' who they considered superior soldiers.²²⁹ In the 1860s, the British even began using these martial groups from India in the colonial police of Burma. Indian Sikhs, Dogras, Gurkhas and Rajputs began to fill the ranks of the Burma Police while the Burmese were described by British officials as unsuited for the

²²⁸ H. Streets, *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 80.

²²⁹ Streets, *Martial Races...*, 95.

demanding nature of police work.²³⁰ Indians were also involved in the conquest of East Africa and Nyasaland in the late 1800 and recruited for the colonial police in Mauritius, Fiji, Trinidad, Malaya and Hong-Kong.²³¹

In the Kings African Rifles (KAR), which was the colonial military in British East Africa, recruitment biases rooted in the theory of martial race were common. According to Timothy Parsons, the KAR attracted men who were from remote and impoverished regions. He attributes the recruitment of these so-called martial groups to their marginal position within the colonial economy; hence their willingness to take low-paid jobs in the KAR.²³² The distinction between ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial’ groups, therefore, emerged as a rationalization as opposed to a guide for recruitment. However, historian Myles Osborne has criticized the works of Parsons and Heather Streets for their description of martial races as constructed by British military officers. Focusing on the Kamba people of Kenya, whom the British only began to consider a martial group during WW1, Osborne argues that martial identity was shaped by the Africans themselves through the projection of their traditional values.²³³ The colonial police and military, according to Osborne, provided the space for Kamba men to display their virtue and skills, which in turn, inspired the colonial authorities to label them as ‘martial’.²³⁴

Although the Basotho men who served in the BBP were dismissed in 1888, when the Protectorate Native Police (PNP) was formed in 1896, it was the Basotho who were once again recruited to make up the African establishment of the new force.²³⁵ From 1896 to the late 1940s, the Basotho dominated the African establishment of the Bechuanaland police like a martial

²³⁰ L. Hingkanonta, “The Police in Colonial Burma,” PhD Dissertation, (University of London, 2013), 47.

²³¹ T. R. Metclaf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 113-124; Anderson and Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control...”, 7.

²³² T. Parsons, *The African Rank-And-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964*. (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 54.

²³³ M. Osborne, *Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya: Loyalty and Martial Race among the Kamba, c. 1800 to the Present*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 9.

²³⁴ Osborne, *Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya...*, 60.

²³⁵ Sedimo, “Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895,” 20.

group, although there is no explicit evidence that the colonial administration considered them as such. In 1896 when the PNP was formed, Bechuanaland Resident Commissioner F. Newton described the Basotho as people “of an excellent stamp; active and willing, and for the most part discreet and intelligent.”²³⁶

The recruitment of extra-territorial personnel was an early policy for colonial forces, and as mentioned above, it revealed early European prejudices about different races, ethnicities and cultures.²³⁷ Another reason for recruiting “outsiders” to invade a territory or during the early period of occupation was that the colonizer usually did not yet have access to the manpower of the conquered territory. This often resulted in the use of men who had already been recruited in other territories and deemed martial races. Following the British occupation of Lagos in 1861, for example, formerly enslaved Hausa men from the hinterland were recruited for the creation of the Armed Hausa Police Force which was also known as “Glover’s Hausas.”²³⁸ In 1872, the Hausa troops from Lagos were added to the garrison of the Gold Coast where more Hausas were recruited to create the force that would be used during the Asante Campaign of 1873-74.²³⁹

In 1888, when the activities of the German East Africa Company sparked an Arab and Swahili rebellion in East Africa, Berlin sent a military expedition led Captain Hermann von Wissmann to suppress it. Wissmann’s expeditionary forces included Sudanese mercenaries formerly employed by the Anglo-Egyptian army as well as some Zulu from South Africa.²⁴⁰ When the German imperial government assumed responsibility for the administration of German East Africa from the company in 1891, a colonial army, the Schutztruppe (Protection

²³⁶ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 58.

²³⁷ Anderson and Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control...”, 7.

²³⁸ T. Stapleton, “Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria...”, 4.

²³⁹ D. Killingray, “Imagined Martial Communities: Recruiting for the Military and Police in Colonial Ghana, 1860-1960,” in *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention*, eds. C. Lentz & P. Nugent (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 121.

²⁴⁰ Stapleton, *A Military History of Africa. Vol 2...*, 46.

Force) was also formed. Because of their participation in the Wissmann Expedition and their former training in the units of the Anglo-Egyptian army, the Sudanese formed the nucleus of the Schutztruppe as the German military officers now perceived them as a martial group. Although the Sudanese or Nubi recruits of the Schutztruppe were mainly from southern Sudan, the German officers used the name “Sudanese” to refer to any person from north-eastern Africa. It must be explained here that, eventually, local people were recruited in the Schutztruppe as there could never be enough of the Sudanese to maintain the force.²⁴¹

While the reasons for the initial recruitment of the Basotho for the PNP have been discussed above and to a lesser extent in the previous chapter, it is important to point out that over the course of the colonial period, the Basotho increasingly became favoured and preferred by the Bechuanaland officials. In 1916, for example, the amalgamated Bechuanaland Protectorate Police (BPP) found itself understaffed as many Europeans had left the force at the end of their contracts while some went to fight in the First World War. In order to make up the strength of the police force, 30 new recruits were obtained from Basutoland, while no attempts were made to recruit locally.²⁴²

Given the continued reliance of the Bechuanaland police on Basotho recruits, it can be concluded that they were considered superior to Batswana although not exactly described as a martial group. The colonial administration of Bechuanaland held preconceived beliefs about the differences between the Basotho and the Batswana. As pointed out by a British Dominion’s Office report in the 1930s, the Basotho were “... exceptionally efficient policemen who required very little supervision from their European officers.”²⁴³ The Batswana, on the other hand, could not be trusted in any position of authority, especially that of detecting and

²⁴¹ M. R. Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014), 36-40.

²⁴² BNARS, S. 35/8, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 23 October 1916.

²⁴³ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion’s Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

investigating crime among their fellow countrymen. Furthermore, the Batswana were described as a meek people who had never been known for fighting.²⁴⁴ Based on these British perceptions, therefore, the Basotho appeared to be more convenient and appropriate for policing Bechuanaland. Another possible reason why the Basotho were favoured over Batswana was the former's history of resistance to colonial rule, which was discussed in the previous chapter; first, during the time of King Moshoeshe's resistance to Boer expansion between 1858 and 1868, and secondly in the Cape-Sotho Gun War of 1880-1881.²⁴⁵

By 1932, the BPP had an establishment of 242 Basotho including 10 sergeants, 1 drill corporal, 10 mounted corporals, 40 mounted troopers, 134 higher grade dismounted troopers, and 47 lower grade dismounted troopers.²⁴⁶ The Basotho continued to dominate the BPP even after 1936 when the colonial government began a reorganization of the force. The number of European police in the force was increased by over 50%, and to make up for the extra costs, the colonial administration replaced 71 Basotho troopers with 55 Batswana "police messengers". These 55 men represented the first Batswana to join the Bechuanaland police. From 1936, therefore, the BPP had 226 African police; 171 Basotho and 55 Batswana.²⁴⁷ Despite the title "police messengers", these Batswana carried out similar duties as some of their Basotho counterparts in the force, including patrolling the 'native' reserves and doing some fatigue work at the outposts like serving as the magistrates' orderlies or cleaning police camps and tending to the force's horses.²⁴⁸ Apart from designating the 55 Batswana "police messengers" in order to pay them less than their Basotho counterparts, the name also diminished the men's standing in the force, placing them beneath the Basotho and the European

²⁴⁴ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, High Commissioner's Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, 3 March 1935.

²⁴⁵ For Moshoeshe's resistance to Boer aggression, see E. A. Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa: Conflict and Discourse in Lesotho, 1870-1960*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007. For the Cape-Sotho Gun War, see W. K. Storey, *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

²⁴⁶ BNARS, S. 294/15, Staff Officer's Report on the Development of the BPP, nd.

²⁴⁷ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

²⁴⁸ BNARS, S. 294/15, Staff Officer's Report on the Development of the BPP, nd.

police. This enforced the idea of white racial superiority and the imagined status of the Basotho as more preferable than Batswana.

With the predominance of the Basotho in the Bechuanaland police already explained, it is worthwhile considering reasons for the absence of Batswana in the force, other than the fact that the colonial authorities considered the Basotho to be superior. In 1895 when Chiefs Khama, Bathoen and Sebele successfully convinced Secretary of State J. Chamberlain not to place their territories under company rule, their understanding of British “protection” was that there would be little to no European interference in the running of their territories, which would have included policing.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, when the PNP and BMP were formed in 1896, the chiefs advised the colonial government to recruit African police anywhere except among the Ndebele and Xhosa, but did not offer their own people.²⁵⁰ It is possible, therefore, that the reason why the chiefs advised the colonial government to recruit its African police elsewhere was because they did not wish for their own subjects to be agents of the colonial state.

The absence of Batswana in the colonial police force of Bechuanaland could have also been influenced by the existence of tribal police in some of the ‘native’ reserves. Tribal police were common in some territories of British colonial Africa. In territories where the colonial police operated largely in urban areas, tribal police were recruited in the native reserves and paid by the colonial state to enforce traditional/customary law within the context of indirect rule. Operating under, and deriving their authority from their local chiefs, tribal police served summonses and made arrests for offenses that took place within the native reserves. Because they were recruited from within their native reserves, they also had more knowledge of the local people, language, customs and traditions than the colonial police.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Shillington, *Luka Jantjie: Resistance Hero of the South African Frontier...*, 187.

²⁵⁰ BNARS, RC. 2/8/1, Khama, Sebele and Bathoen to Secretary of State, London, 11 November 1895.

²⁵¹ G. Sinclair, “‘Hard-Headed, Hard-Bitten, Hard-Hitting and Courageous Men of Innate Detective Ability...’ From Criminal Investigation to Political and Security Policing at the end of Empire, 1945-50,” in *Police Detectives*

In the 1930s, within the context of indirect rule and its relation to customary law, the Bechuanaland colonial administration encouraged the formation of tribal police forces in the larger native reserves of the Bangwato, Bakwena, Bangwaketse and Bakgatla.²⁵² As sociologist Mathieu Deflem has explained, tribal police units operated within, and were guided by British conceptions of law enforcement and, therefore, did not represent pre-existing African legal practices.²⁵³ In Bechuanaland too, tribal police forces were used to enforce different colonial laws, including cracking down on the “illegal” brewing and selling of a potent traditional beer known as Khadi.²⁵⁴ Although the tribal police were founded on indirect rule and colonial law, there was still a clear divide between the colonial and tribal police in Bechuanaland including their jurisdiction. When the BPP carried out investigations in the native reserves, they were required by law to be accompanied by some tribal police. In reserves with no tribal police forces, the chiefs appointed some of their trusted men to accompany the BPP.²⁵⁵ In the early 1940s, the BPP authorities expressed the need for close cooperation between their force and the tribal police, offering to provide training and handcuffs to the latter as a way of building good relations.²⁵⁶ Despite the colonial police authorities’ willingness to train the tribal police forces, the Bechuanaland government rejected this out of fear that it would help strengthen the powers of the chiefs. As tribal police forces comprised men loyal to their chiefs, the Bechuanaland administration wanted to prevent their empowerment because in the event of any conflict with the government, they would naturally pick their chiefs despite being paid by the colonial state.²⁵⁷ There were also occasional hostilities between members of the BPP and

in History, 1750-1950, eds. C. Emsley and H. Shpayer-Makov (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 199. See also Killingray “The Maintenance of Law and Order...”, 416; Deflem, “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa...”, 58.

²⁵² Makgala, *The Development and Role of Tribal Police...*, no page number.

²⁵³ Deflem, “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa...”, 57.

²⁵⁴ Makgala, “Limitations of British Territorial Control...”, 69.

²⁵⁵ BNARS, S.443/5, Sub-Inspector Masterman, Mafikeng to BPP Deputy Commandant, Mafikeng, 27 September 1935.

²⁵⁶ BNARS, S.443/5, District Commissioner, Serowe to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 20 May 1941.

²⁵⁷ Makgala, *The Development and Role of Tribal Police...*, 28-29.

the tribal police, especially when the question of jurisdiction was concerned. In 1955 for example, the BPP's Constable Thipe, who was off-duty, came across 2 African girls selling cakes in Mogoditshane within the Bakwena Reserve, and forbade them from doing so. A tribal policeman by the name of Motlhanka, having been called by a passer-by who had seen Thipe admonishing the 2 African girls, came to their rescue. In the midst of an argument that ensued when Motlhanka tried to defend the 2 African girls, a fight broke out between him and Thipe and the latter sustained an injury on his mouth. Although Constable Thipe laid charges against the tribal policeman, the case was dismissed because he (Thipe) was off-duty at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the District Commissioner for Molepolole feared that prosecuting Motlhanka would lead to increased hostilities between the tribal and colonial police in Bechuanaland.²⁵⁸ It is conceivable, therefore, that the absence of Batswana in the colonial police of Bechuanaland was influenced by the government's preference for Basotho and thus, limiting Batswana to the tribal forces in the native reserves.

Another possible reason for the absence of Batswana in the colonial police force of Bechuanaland was migrant labour. In 1899, the Bechuanaland administration introduced a hut tax of 10 Shillings to be paid by every able-bodied man across the territory. In 1907, the hut tax was converted to a poll tax of 20 Shillings, while in 1919 a 'native tax' of 3 Shillings was also introduced.²⁵⁹ The introduction of these taxes meant that Batswana men, most of whom were subsistence farmers, had to make regular payments to the colonial state, and to afford this, they turned to migrant labour. The introduction of the hut tax in Bechuanaland coincided with the formation of a labour recruitment organization called the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) in South Africa and the extension of labour recruitment to external markets. With its comprehensive transport system, WNLA recruited labour from

²⁵⁸ BNARS, S.443/5, District Commissioner, Molepolole to Divisional Commissioner, Lobatse, 19 October 1955.

²⁵⁹ C. J. Makgala, "Taxation in the Tribal Areas of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1899-1957," *Journal of African History*, 45: 1 (2004): 282.

Bechuanaland, the 2 Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Angola and the Congo. By 1910, the South African gold mines had created a labour system that brought over 200,000 unskilled African workers into the Witwatersrand annually.²⁶⁰ As the colonial administration of Bechuanaland only recruited Basotho for its police force, and did very little to stimulate the domestic economy, this led to an ever-growing dependence by Batswana on migrant labour in the South African mines.²⁶¹ While a conclusion can be reached, that the Bechuanaland colonial authorities recruited Basotho for the police force to avoid the interruption of migrant labour in the territory, there is no evidence of this. In Nyasaland, however, there was an official policy that prohibited the KAR from recruiting Africans in central and northern Nyasaland, as these were areas that the WNLA and Southern Rhodesian farmers drew their migrant labourers from.²⁶²

Regardless of the reasons behind the absence of Batswana in the Bechuanaland police, it was not until the 1950s that things began to change and the Basotho numbers in the force began to dwindle. Within the context of urbanization and social change, the need for extra-territorial police was likely declining, making way for local men with a better knowledge of the territory, its people and languages. In 1950, there were 212 Africans in the BPP classified as “indigenous” and “non-indigenous”. Of the 159 men from the “indigenous” ethnic groups, the Bangwato and the Bakalanga dominated the force, with 42 and 32 members respectively. The Basotho, however, numbered 32 out of the 53 “non-indigenous” men. The rest were a mixture of the Ndebele, Lozi, Xhosa, and Nyanja.²⁶³ By 1961, the BPP had a total of 432 African police, of which the Basotho made up 9%. The most dominant groups were still the locally recruited Bangwato and the Bakalanga, making up 15% and 20% of the African

²⁶⁰ M. Leepile, “The Impact of Migrant Labour on the Economy of Kweneng, 1940-1980,” *Botswana Notes and Records*, 13: 1 (1981): 33. For migrant labour in Southern Africa, see A. H. Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour, 1890-1920*. (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985).

²⁶¹ J. Tylor, “Mine Labour Recruitment in the Bechuanaland Protectorate,” *Botswana Notes and Records*, 10: 1 (1978): 99.

²⁶² Parsons, *The African Rank-And-File...*, 60-61.

²⁶³ BNARS, BNB. 891, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police. 1950, 3.

personnel respectively.²⁶⁴ The reason for the high representation of the Bangwato and Bakalanga in the police force was because the former represented the largest Tswana-speaking ethnic group, while the latter was the largest non-Tswana-speaking indigenous group in Bechuanaland.²⁶⁵ If the predominance of Basotho in the Bechuanaland police had been influenced by the theory of martial races, then the rising number of African police recruited from within the Protectorate represented the end of this idea, which was late compared to other territories.

In India, it had been the First World War that led to the downfall of the martial race theory. In the early stages of the war, the Indian Army met the demands of manpower by including formerly non-martial groups under the scope of martial races, proving that the whole concept was invented. This was initially done in the regions like Nepal and Punjab where the martial races were recruited.²⁶⁶ By 1917, however, the traditional recruiting regions were failing to meet the growing demand for manpower, and the Indian Army began seeking combatants even in the non-martial regions.²⁶⁷ The Second World War also triggered an expansion of many colonial armies through mass recruitment which dispelled ethnically based policies. The imagined racial/ethnic characteristics of various regions became less relevant as the post-war generation of British officers also tried to distance themselves from the racial concepts of their predecessors.²⁶⁸ Interestingly, however, martial race recruiting left a lasting impact. For example, at independence, Nigeria still had a polarized army in which the rank-and-file of combatant units was primarily from the poorly educated martial recruiting regions of the north, while the southerners, because of their better education, became support personnel.

²⁶⁴ BNARS, BNB. 900, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police. 1961, 16.

²⁶⁵ J. A. Wiseman, "Multi-Partyism in Africa: The Case of Botswana," *African Affairs*, 76: 302 (1977): 73. See also I. Schapera, *The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes*. (London: London School of Economics, 1952).

²⁶⁶ R. Kaushik, "Race and Recruitment in the Indian Army: 1880-1918," *Modern Asian Studies*, 47:4 (2013): 1338.

²⁶⁷ Kaushik, "Race and Recruitment in the Indian Army...", 1340.

²⁶⁸ Marjomaa, "The Martial Spirit...", 430.

In the 1960s, many northerners, who still saw themselves as a martial group, resented their newly commissioned Igbo officers whom they saw as inferior soldiers.²⁶⁹

Race and Conditions of Service in the Protectorate Police

In 1896, a year after the disbandment of the BBP, the Bechuanaland Protectorate raised two police forces divided along racial lines. The African force was named the Protectorate Native Police (PNP) and the European one, the Bechuanaland Mounted Police (BMP).²⁷⁰ Although the PNP was the African branch of the Protectorate Police, it was supervised by European officers, while the Africans only held NCO ranks. It was an accepted axiom in British colonial police and militaries that these forces should always be under European supervision.²⁷¹ This axiom was later enunciated in a 1946 annual report of the Kenya Police with the words; “Naturally, as the supervising staff is mainly European...”²⁷² As Europeans were in charge of the colony, they considered it only ‘natural’ that white police should supervise Africans, which further underscored European ideas of racial superiority.²⁷³ Even with minimal training and experience, a young European policeman’s race and rank conferred on him, great responsibility and authority over his non-European subordinates. Through their ‘racial superiority’, Europeans in colonial forces enjoyed more status and power than their counterparts in England or Ireland.²⁷⁴

The presupposition that Europeans must ‘naturally’ supervise Africans was not just a construct developed by the colonial police or militaries themselves. It was rooted in the 19th century European philosophy of race and the belief that the superiority of the ‘civilised’ whites

²⁶⁹ N. J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966*. (London: Methuen & CO LTD, 1971), 21-25. See also Stapleton, “Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria...”, 27.

²⁷⁰ Makgala, “A Survey of Race Relations in Botswana, 1800-1966...”, 13

²⁷¹ D. Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’: The Debate Over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888-1946,” *Journal of African History*, 35: 2 (1994): 206.

²⁷² Wolf, “Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950...”, 403.

²⁷³ Wolf, “Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950...”, 403.

²⁷⁴ Anderson and Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940...”, 8.

over the ‘savage’ peoples was essential for the civilizing mission.²⁷⁵ The ‘natural’ propensity of the European to supervise the African was so entrenched that it also manifested in corporal punishment in African colonial forces. The ideas of racial superiority in the colonial setting became closely linked with discipline, which in the late Victorian mind, had to be instilled in the ‘child-like’ African by his European superior.²⁷⁶ It must be explained here that corporal punishment or flogging, was also employed in the metropolitan British Army for most of the 19th century and was only ended in 1881. However, the abolition of corporal punishment in Britain did not extend to the colonies. Although sources do not reveal any evidence of it in the Bechuanaland police, corporal punishment continued in colonial African militaries until its abolishment in 1946.²⁷⁷

The PNP, as typical of most colonial forces in British colonies, had an establishment of European officers and an entirely African rank-and-file. At its formation in 1896, the force comprised 60 African NCOs supervised by 1 captain and 3 lieutenants as its British officers. The conditions of service for Africans in the PNP and Europeans in both the PNP and the BMP contrasted greatly, and this was rooted in the existing racial hierarchy of the colonial society. Because the officers of both the PNP and BMP were European, their conditions of service and rates of pay were similar. The captains as commanding officers earned £400.00 per annum, while their lieutenants earned £300.00.²⁷⁸ The officers of the BMP and PNP were also entitled to three months of paid leave, with the option of an extra month at a half salary rate of pay.²⁷⁹

A comparison between the salaries of the NCOs in the PNP and those in the BMP reveals the racial inequality and the dissimilar conditions of service that existed in the colonial police of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In the black PNP, the rates of pay were; sergeant:

²⁷⁵ Fredrickson. *Racism: A Short History*, 108.

²⁷⁶ Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’...”, 202.

²⁷⁷ Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’...”, 207.

²⁷⁸ BNARS, HC. 195, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 13 March 1896.

²⁷⁹ BNARS, HC. 162, Leave regulations for the Protectorate Native Police. n.d.

£6.00 per month, corporal: £5.00 per month, private: £3.00 per month and a saddler who also earned £3.00 per month.²⁸⁰ In the white BMP, however, a sergeant made £9.00 per month, while a corporal made £7.50 per month, and a trooper made £6.00 per month.²⁸¹ Under these rates of pay, the lowest ranking European earned the same salary as the highest ranking African. These disparities were an indication of the racial hierarchy in the colonial police.

The unequal rates of pay between the BMP and the PNP did not go unnoticed by members of the latter. In 1898, there was a lot of disinclination among the Basotho men to re-engage in the force for a further period when their two-year contracts expired. This was because the PNP men argued that they were paid too little and explicitly stated that they would not re-engage with the force unless their salaries were increased.²⁸² Apart from being paid less, the Basotho were not allowed any leave opportunities to go to Basutoland to see their families. Furthermore, these men were not allowed to bring their wives from Basutoland, nor were the single men allowed to marry while in Bechuanaland.²⁸³ It is, therefore, conceivable that the lower rates of pay, and the lack of female companionship, curbed the African police' desire to renew their contracts with the PNP.

Learning of the PNP men's grievances, Commandant-General Martin offered to allow only 10% of the force to marry, but the Basotho remained adamant not to re-engage in the force. The 10% meant that virtually 5 men out of a force of 50 would be allowed to marry.²⁸⁴ Although the colonial administration acknowledged the value of the Basotho men and the need to retain their services, it remained unsympathetic to the causes of these men's grievances. The

²⁸⁰ BNARS, HC. 195, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 13 March 1896.

²⁸¹ BNARS, RC. 4/6, Colonial Office report on Bechuanaland Div. British South Africa Police, 29 March 1901.

²⁸² BNARS, HC. 163/2, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 9 February 1898.

²⁸³ BNARS, HC. 163/2, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 9 February 1898.

²⁸⁴ BNARS, HC. 163/2, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 9 February 1898.

lower rates of pay, lack of leave of absence and the prohibition to marry, all represented undesirable conditions of service for the African personnel of the colonial police.

To avoid having to recruit new men from Basutoland with little to no knowledge of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the colonial administration of Bechuanaland made some minor concessions regarding the PNP's conditions of service. In March 1898, the PNP slightly increased the monthly salaries of its men by 15 Shillings for sergeants, and 10 Shillings for the corporals and privates.²⁸⁵ Instead of 10% of the force being allowed to marry, the number was increased to 30%, meaning that about 15 men out of 50 could marry. Leave of absence was also granted for the Basotho police, although the government would not cover the travel expenses for the men. Similarly, those who were married were expected to pay for their wives' trips from Basutoland to Bechuanaland.²⁸⁶ Even under these supposedly improved terms, inequality persisted in that the African police traveling to Basutoland on leave were expected to pay their own travel expenses. European NCOs in the BMP, on the other hand, were provided free passage to England, whether travelling there for private or official reasons.²⁸⁷

Housing in the Protectorate Police represented another condition of service that was different between the African and European members of the force. As a marginal territory, the Bechuanaland Protectorate had a constant problem of insufficient funds. Even with inadequate funding, however, the police force always received the largest share of the territory's annual budget. In 1894, for example, the police used up £89, 000 out of a budget of £148, 000.²⁸⁸ Despite this, housing remained a challenging issue for the force. In the formative years of the BBP, the police living quarters at Mafikeng were described by a former member of the force as nothing but a handful of tin-roofed shelters.²⁸⁹ Because of insufficient funding, housing in

²⁸⁵ BNARS, HC. 163/2, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 10 March 1898.

²⁸⁶ BNARS, HC. 163/2, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 10 March 1898.

²⁸⁷ BNARS, HC. 162, Leave regulations for the Bechuanaland Border Police, n.d.

²⁸⁸ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*..., 142.

²⁸⁹ H. Lynn-Stevens, "The Bechuanaland Border Police in the Early Nineties," *Police Journal*, 4:2 (1931): 218.

the Protectorate police, particularly for the African members, remained inadequate while the colonial administration made no real efforts to improve the situation. At a BPP officer's conference held at Mafikeng in September 1944, Resident Commissioner Aubrey Forsyth-Thompson stated that because of financial reasons, his administration would not be prepared to consider the issue of African police housing for another 4 to 5 years. He suggested instead that the problem of inadequate accommodation for Africans in the force be dealt with by building temporary thatched huts to avoid unnecessary spending.²⁹⁰

While securing accommodation for African police was considered unnecessary spending, the colonial administration ensured adequate housing for the European members of the BPP. In instances where accommodation could not be secured for European police, especially the married ones, there was a suitable allowance provided in lieu of that.²⁹¹ In some cases, young European members of the BPP were lodged in local hotels, a habit that was strongly criticized by a British Army officer appointed by the High Commissioner to carry out a comprehensive report on the police forces of the 3 High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland in 1946. The practice of providing hotel accommodation for European police had been maintained for some years even though African quarters in many stations across the Protectorate were inadequate and in need of serious repairs.²⁹² This was a further indication of the racial hierarchy and unequal conditions of service that existed in the Protectorate's colonial police force.

Compared to the BSAP in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia, the BPP appears to have done the bare minimum when it came to housing and accommodation for its African members. While there is no doubt that racial discrimination existed in the Southern Rhodesian society and its police force, the BSAP still strove to provide suitable accommodation for its African

²⁹⁰ BNARS, S. 302/4, Minutes of a Police Conference held at Mafikeng from 31 August to 6 September 1944.

²⁹¹ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato on the Police Forces of the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 1946, 33.

²⁹² BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 33.

men and their families. The force began making significant improvements to African housing in the 1930s right through the duration of World War II. This was mostly influenced by the increased reliance on African police in the BSAP. By 1942 for example, the unmarried African men of the BSAP at Salisbury were lodged in 2 large buildings that were among the first in police housing to have showers and flush toilets. In the following year, the married men in nearby Avondale were also housed in 14 rooms that had separate kitchens and bathrooms with running showers. Despite these developments, however, a 1946 commission on the BSAP showed that accommodation for African police in the colony was still inadequate. This led to an extensive program of improving and expanding African living quarters that spanned into the federal period of the mid-1950s.²⁹³ The BSAP's expansion and improvement of African police accommodations, in a settler society that had stricter racial boundaries than that of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, reflected badly on the BPP. While it is obvious that the BSAP must have provided better living conditions for its European members than the African ones, it still did more for the latter compared to the BPP. It is important to acknowledge, however, that since Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory that made its own decisions about budget allocations and was economically stronger than the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the BSAP had more funding than the BPP and was in a position to provide better housing for its African police.

In the KAR in British East Africa, better efforts were also made to provide enough accommodation for soldiers and their families. During the interwar period, unmarried KAR soldiers were housed in long barrack blocks made of either corrugated iron or brick with a thatched roof. The married men were given rondavels laid out around the compound area to live in with their families.²⁹⁴ During peacetime, and especially before WWII, colonial armies

²⁹³ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80...*, 91.

²⁹⁴ Clayton & Killlingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 234.

did not have commissariat services. The wives of soldiers, therefore, represented a form of cheap labour for the provision of services like cooking, cleaning and even cultivating gardens around the barracks to feed the army.²⁹⁵ Accommodating the rank-and-file soldiers together with their families, however, became more difficult when the KAR was expanded during both World Wars. At the outbreak of World War II, many of the families in KAR housing were sent back to their homes, and only those whose husbands had obtained special permission could stay.²⁹⁶ At the end of the war, however, the KAR was once again able to provide adequate accommodation for its men and their families. In 1948, for example, the unmarried men at the Jinja barracks in Uganda were housed 4 to a room in long barrack blocks. The married soldiers lived in the same blocks but were given 2 rooms instead.²⁹⁷

It must be explained here that, the KAR's provision of military housing for African soldiers and their families was rooted in racial and gender stereotypes inherited from the British Army at home. Colonial officials and Army officers believed that African men were governed by an insatiable sexual appetite. They considered it imperative for the sake of the African soldier's mental and physical health and especially his discipline and morale, that he should be allowed access to women.²⁹⁸ Under this derogatory racial stereotype that African soldiers had to have women, the KAR pursued a family policy that tried to house the wives and children of the African soldiers, especially during peacetime. By providing accommodation for soldiers' families, the colonial military believed that it was containing the dangerously volatile sexuality of African soldiers. They would be less likely to prey on 'innocent' women living near KAR

²⁹⁵ D. Killingray, "Gender Issues and African Colonial Armies," in *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers C. 1700-1964*, eds. D. Killingray and D. Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 227.

²⁹⁶ T. Parsons, "All askaris are family men: sex, domesticity and discipline in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964," in *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers C. 1700-1964*, eds. D. Killingray and D. Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 158.

²⁹⁷ Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 234.

²⁹⁸ Parsons, "All askaris are family men...", 159.

camps or fall victim to ‘unwholesome’ women such as prostitutes. This was also believed to reduce the likelihood of sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers.²⁹⁹

It was not until July 1955 that the colonial administration in the Bechuanaland Protectorate acknowledged the deplorable state of accommodation for the African members of the BPP, which was believed to be handicapping the discipline and morale of the men. This resulted in the launching of the £130, 500 African Housing Programme with aid from the Colonial Office and the Treasury in London. The objective of the program was to bring the accommodation of the African police up to acceptable standards.³⁰⁰ Under this housing programme, satisfactory accommodation for 191 African police across the Protectorate were erected. Furthermore, extra ablution and cooking facilities as well as dining rooms were added to the existing barracks at Gaborone. Additional barracks for 30 men of the Security Platoon at the Gaborone Headquarters were also erected.³⁰¹ This was an era of reform and decolonization in Africa, and there was a change in what was considered suitable and satisfactory by both the government and the police.

Despite the African Housing Programme, by the end of 1955 there was still a significant shortage of accommodation in the BPP, especially for married African police and their dependents. The prefabricated quarters that had been recently acquired for the Security Platoon at Gaborone had provided relief for only 30 men out of an establishment of 322, leaving most of the African police living under unsatisfactory conditions.³⁰² In 1957, however, a new training depot was built at Gaborone, with dormitory accommodation for recruits, lecture

²⁹⁹ Parsons, “All askaris are family men...”, 159.

³⁰⁰ TNA, FCO. 141/1239, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Deputy High Commissioner, Pretoria, 12 July 1955.

³⁰¹ TNA, FCO. 141/1239, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Deputy High Commissioner, Pretoria, 21 August 1955.

³⁰² TNA, FCO. 141/1239, Acting Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 18 October 1955.

rooms, a recreation room as well as a dining room. In the same year, the BPP built 57 detached 5-roomed houses for married African personnel and their families across the Protectorate.³⁰³

In 1959, 59 more 5-roomed houses were built for married African police across various stations in the territory. Other buildings included new District Headquarters at Gaborone and Francistown, as well as new standard type police stations at Palapye, Mochudi and Pitsani Molopo.³⁰⁴ By February 1965, just a year before independence, the Resident Commissioner and some of the Headquarters staff formerly based in Mafikeng, had moved into their new offices and quarters in the new capital, Gaborone. By the end of the year, 12 houses had been built for the NCOs of the BPP, bringing the total number of accommodations for NCOs to 445 various types of brick houses. Even then, however, there were still some police stations, especially the more isolated ones, that had a shortage of accommodation.³⁰⁵ The colonial administration had, however, gone a long way in rectifying the issue of inadequate accommodation for African police in the BPP. These developments took place within the context of impending independence in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In 1963, the new constitution of the Protectorate had been passed, and it was announced that the territory was to be given a form of self-government meant to lead to a smooth transition into independence.³⁰⁶ These developments, therefore, influenced the colonial administration's efforts to improve the standard of housing in the Protectorate Police. The Bechuanaland Protectorate was a marginal territory throughout its colonial period, surrounded by white minority-ruled settler colonies which had more resources than it did. As the decolonization of Africa progressed, the British government recognized the need to prepare Bechuanaland for its independence. These were,

³⁰³ BNARS, BNB. 896, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1957, 9.

³⁰⁴ BNARS, BNB. 898, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1959, 5.

³⁰⁵ BNARS, BNB. 904, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1965, 7.

³⁰⁶ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 157.

therefore, the reasons behind the very late improvement of police accommodation in Bechuanaland compared to its neighbouring territories.

Conclusion

By the time European powers acquired colonial possessions in Africa and elsewhere, they carried with them into the colonies, an ideology of race that had developed in mid-19th century Europe. At the core of this ideology was the belief that the Europeans were civilized because they were culturally and technologically superior. They, therefore, took up the notion of “the white man’s burden”, which suggested that the superior white race had the responsibility of civilizing the “barbaric” races. The development of Social Darwinism had also given legitimacy to this European belief in white racial superiority. It was under this philosophy of race, that once European powers had established their colonies, they facilitated institutionalized inequalities along racial lines.

From its establishment in 1896, and throughout its existence under different names, the colonial police force of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was a racially divided organization. Typical of many colonial police and militaries, the Bechuanaland police comprised European officers who supervised an African rank-and-file. This was in line with a common assumption that as the civilizers, Europeans were ‘naturally’ in charge of the colonies, and therefore, had to hold the supervisory role in the colonial forces. Apart from the racial superiority that they conferred upon themselves, the Europeans in the colonial forces also developed their own beliefs about the various ethnic groups in the colonies. Certain ethnicities were considered more reliable for police and military work than others. Among other factors such as the existence of tribal police forces and migrant labour, the predominance of the Basotho in the police force of Bechuanaland was due to the colonial administrators’ preconceived notions about the ethnic differences of Africans. For most of the colonial period, the Bechuanaland

government considered the Basotho superior to Batswana and, therefore, better suited for police work.

The conditions of service in the Bechuanaland police revealed a racial hierarchy that existed in the force and in the Protectorate at large. Because of the racial hierarchy of the force, the African police were paid a significantly lower salary than the European police. The African police were also deprived of some of the benefits of the job that European police enjoyed such as leaves of absence and free transportation when travelling home on leave. The colonial administration went above and beyond to provide adequate accommodation for European police, sometimes lodging them in hotels or giving them housing allowances in lieu of accommodation. African police on the other hand often did not have adequate accommodation and were forced to live under deplorable conditions. It was only in the 1950s that the colonial administration of Bechuanaland began efforts to improve the state of African police housing, possibly influenced by the decolonization era and other colonial reforms across the continent.

Chapter 3: Reorganizing the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, 1930-1946

Introduction

The interwar period was characterized by the consolidation of colonial rule in Africa. Following the Versailles agreement in 1919, and the expulsion of Germany from colonial Africa, there was no longer any real competition for the control of African colonies. The stability of colonial rule in this period represented what has been called the ‘high tide’ of colonialism.³⁰⁷ As an economic measure for dealing with the financial challenges brought about by World War I (WW I), colonial powers made efforts to cut the costs of administration in their colonies. These budget cuts were enforced again during the Depression years starting from 1929. As part of these budget cuts, colonial military and police forces in the colonies were reduced. As the policy of indirect rule also expanded, colonial administrators gradually withdrew from the countryside or the rural areas, thus leaving the maintenance of law and order in the hands of African chiefs.³⁰⁸

While WWI had resulted in the consolidation of colonial rule in Africa, WWII had an opposite effect as the post-war period became an era of colonial reforms and a general change in British attitude towards empire. The end of WWII brought with it, economic and political pressure on the colonial administrations. Urbanization, rising costs of living, agriculture and colonial development all became challenging for colonial powers, who were almost bankrupt from the war.³⁰⁹ Within the context of both the interwar and post-war reforms in Africa, the

³⁰⁷ C. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 149-153. See also T. Stapleton, *A Military History of Africa. Vol 2: The Colonial Period: From the Scramble for Africa to the Algerian Independence War (ca. 1870-1963)*. (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2013), 186.

³⁰⁸ Killingray, “Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa...”, 420.

³⁰⁹ D. Killingray, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War*. (Rochester, N.Y: James Currey, 2010), 236-237. See also D. Killingray and R. Rathbone eds. *Africa and the Second World War*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 8.

colonial police in Bechuanaland also went through some reorganization. However, as this chapter shows, the reorganizations of the Bechuanaland police in the interwar and post-WWII periods transpired differently compared to other colonial police forces in Africa. This not only reflected the nature and attitude of British administration in Bechuanaland, but also the relationship between the territory and its powerful and expansionist neighbour, South Africa.

Reorganization as the Brainchild of Charles Rey

In 1929, the Colonial Office in London appointed Charles Fernand Rey as Resident Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Rey shadowed the outgoing Resident Commissioner Rowland M. Daniel as an understudy before assuming full responsibility in April 1930. Before his appointment to the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Rey had had a distinguished career in the British civil service. During WWI, Rey worked as Assistant General Secretary in the Ministry of Munitions. In 1916, British Prime Minister Lloyd George appointed Rey as the Director of Employment Exchange in the new Ministry of Labour.³¹⁰ As historians Michael Crowder and Neil Parsons explain, Colonel Charles Rey had been sent to the Protectorate as, “a new broom to sweep out the cobwebs of decades of administrative neglect.”³¹¹ So keen was Rey on bringing change to the Protectorate, that in February 1930 he wrote in his diary that, “The police force is in a shocking state, and I am going to reorganize it root and branch: I intend to recruit all officers and NCOs from England, and all natives from Basutoland -Oh Lord, what a lot there is to do to get this place cleaned up.”³¹²

Before getting into what the Dominions Office considered to be decades of administrative neglect in the Protectorate, it is important to understand and acknowledge the geopolitical circumstances that the territory found itself in following the turn of the 20th

³¹⁰ J. Landell-Mills, “An Extract from the Diaries of C.F. Rey,” *Botswana Notes and Records*, 5:1 (1973): 67.

³¹¹ M. Crowder and N. Parsons, *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey: Bechuanaland Diaries 1919-37*. (Gaborone: The Botswana Society, 1988), vii.

³¹² Crowder and Parsons, *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey...*, 14.

century. The threat of transferring the Protectorate to company rule in Southern Rhodesia was no sooner overcome when a new one arose. This was the possibility of the Bechuanaland Protectorate together with the two other High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Basutoland and Swaziland being transferred to what would become the Union of South Africa. Between October 1908 and February 1909, delegates from the four self-governing colonies of South Africa sat for the National Convention in Durban, Cape Town and Bloemfontein to draft a constitution for a united South Africa.³¹³ Before the creation of the Union of South Africa, High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Lord Selborne had cautioned the colonial secretary against the transfer of the HCTs to the Union. In his Africanist interpretation of the issue, historian Alan Booth argues that it was the pressure from Africans and their missionaries, especially in Basutoland, that impressed upon Selborne, the dangers of transferring the territories to the South Africans.³¹⁴ Selborne argued that the question of such issues as the African franchise and the rights of Africans had to be dealt with before any transfer of the HCTs could be assumed. He suggested that a clause be included in the South African Act, that would deal precisely with the transfer of the territories to South Africa. The colonial secretary agreed, therefore, that the British government was under an obligation of honour not to hand over the HCTs to South Africa unless there were conditions safeguarding the rights of the African chiefs and their people. This was because the territories of what would become South Africa were governed by white settler minorities and their African majorities had limited civil rights.³¹⁵ Contrary to Booth, however, historian Ronald Hyam argues that the local pressures on High Commissioner Selborne had only been secondary, and that the British government on its own had decided to withhold the transfer of the territories.³¹⁶ When the South Africa Act

³¹³ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 120.

³¹⁴ A. R. Booth, "Lord Selborne and the British Protectorates," *The Journal of African History*, 10: 1 (1969): 142.

³¹⁵ Booth, "Lord Selborne and the British Protectorates," 140.

³¹⁶ R. Hyam, "African Interests and the South Africa Act, 1908-1910," *The Historical Journal*, 13:1 (1970): 86.

was accepted by Britain in 1909, therefore, it contained a section that laid down how the HCTs would be administered when and if they were to ever be transferred to the Union government. The High Commission would be responsible for appointing the administrative staff for the HCTs. Furthermore, all legislation affecting the territories would remain under the jurisdiction of the British government.³¹⁷

Over the years, the South Africans became increasingly frustrated by the British government's reluctance to move forward with the transfer of the HCTs. As historian Ashley Jackson states, "the reluctance of African peoples outside the Union to become a part of it frustrated the South African government throughout the region, and the chiefs of the three High Commission Territories maintained their plea not to be incorporated."³¹⁸ Besides incorporating the HCTs, the Union Prime Ministers Botha and Smuts had envisioned South African expansion up to the Zambezi River. In a 1922 referendum, however, the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia voted against the inclusion of their territory in the Union of South Africa and paved their own path to responsible government. For the white Rhodesians, Southern Rhodesia could be built up as a pro-British self-governing buffer-state between the Union and the territories further north administered by the Colonial Office. This, therefore, hampered the South Africans' efforts of expansion up to the Zambezi, although the Union government still hoped to exercise an informal empire, and play a leadership role in Africa.³¹⁹

In 1934, when South African Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog expressed the dismay of his government over the issue of transfer, the Dominions Office responded by saying that consultation with the Africans in the HCTs had revealed a very low likelihood of success.³²⁰

³¹⁷ D. E. Torrance, "Britain, South Africa and the High Commission Territories: An Old Controversy Revisited," *The Historical Journal*, 14:3 (1998): 162.

³¹⁸ A. Jackson, "Bechuanaland, the Caprivi Strip and the First World War," *War and Society*, 19:2 (2001): 118.

³¹⁹ R. Hyam, "The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953," *The Historical Journal*, 30:1 (1987): 146. See also, R. Hyam, *The Failure of Southern African Expansion, 1908-1948*, 24.

³²⁰ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 23.

Although the HCTs would have been an economic burden on the Union government, South African interest in them was more political as politicians like Hertzog were driven by the desire for expansion.³²¹ Nevertheless, the transfer of the territories to the Union of South Africa never materialized despite mounting pressure from South Africa throughout the first half of the 20th century.

For as long as the transfer of the HCTs seemed inevitable, any form of development in the Bechuanaland Protectorate remained limited. African development was neglected by the Protectorate administrators as it was incompatible with the principles of white settlerism to which the territory's destiny seemed to be tied. The political economy of the Protectorate gradually shifted from that of relative autonomy to complete dependency on the Union of South Africa as formerly prosperous Tswana territories turned into labour reserves for their much powerful neighbour.³²² It can be argued, therefore, that what the Dominions Office saw as decades of administrative neglect in the Protectorate, was influenced by the perpetual expectation of eventual transfer to South Africa.

In 1930, when Colonel Rey assumed office as Resident Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the BPP was in what he considered an exceedingly unsatisfactory condition. The police force commanded little respect among the territory's Europeans and Africans alike. Because Rey's predecessors took little interest in the BPP, partly due to the uncertainty around the transfer of the Protectorate to the Union and because of the post-WWI financial cuts, the force was characterized by inefficiency and indiscipline.³²³ Owing to lack of education and poor discipline, a large proportion of the BPP's European police were only suitable for NCO ranks. Consequently, the force comprised men who had low morale because

³²¹ R. Hyam, *The Failure of Southern African Expansion, 1908-1948*. (London: The Macmillan Press, 1972), 74.

³²² Crowder and Parsons, *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey...*, xix.

³²³ BNARS, S. 251/9, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, nd.

of their limited opportunity for promotion. Another cause for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the BPP was the manner of recruitment for the European police, who often joined the force as sergeants and were at once placed in positions of authority. Due to its preference for men with some practical police experience, the BPP often attracted European men of an already advanced age, who had served in neighbouring colonial forces. These men, while not necessarily incompetent, were not ideal as colonial police work required, for the most part, young and active men.³²⁴

By 1932, having considered the state of affairs in the BPP, Resident Commissioner Rey worked out a draft reorganization scheme which met with the general approval of his Resident Magistrates, many of whom had been police officers. The main object of the scheme was to enable the BPP to recruit from England, young men aged between 18 and 24, who would be trained in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and promoted right through the NCO and commissioned officer ranks.³²⁵ The educated young men suitable for the BPP would be attained through the Colonial Officers Appointment Board in England, to whom a statement of the conditions of service and the desired qualifications would be sent. During the 12-month probationary period in the Protectorate, the young cadets would be trained in practical and theoretical police work before being graduated into their regular ranks after successfully passing their examinations. The Protectorate government was to be also responsible for transporting back to England, any of the cadets who would fail their police examinations.³²⁶

From its formative years, the police force in the Bechuanaland Protectorate had always accounted for well over half of the colonial administration's annual expenditure. Part of Rey's reorganization scheme was, therefore, aimed at reducing police expenditure. In 1932, the BPP

³²⁴ BNARS, S. 251/9, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, nd.

³²⁵ BNARS, S. 251/9, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, nd.

³²⁶ BNARS, S. 251/9, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, nd.

included 33 mounted Europeans, 50 mounted Africans, and 134 dismounted African constables. As a way of reducing costs, Rey's scheme suggested the discharge of 34 dismounted constables who earned £48.6 per annum each. This would mean an annual saving of £1,642.4 for the BPP and a reduction of the police vote in the annual budget of the territory.³²⁷ A further annual saving of £2,467 was envisaged through the recruitment of new African police at a pay of £2 a month. These new men would be engaged as soon as the present cadre of men, who earned £3, 10, reached the end of their contracts with the force.³²⁸

At the beginning of 1933, the Bechuanaland Protectorate experienced an outbreak of the Foot and Mouth disease which had broken out in Southern Rhodesia two years prior. As a response to this, the Protectorate administration immunised 800,000 head of cattle starting from Ramatlabama on the border with Southern Rhodesia. More importantly, a cordon was established to prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the territory.³²⁹ The BPP became responsible for the maintenance of the 600-mile cordon, and it took almost all European and African police to do this. This put an immense strain on the BPP as it did not have enough personnel to maintain the cordon and continue with its normal duties.³³⁰

The effects of the Foot and Mouth cordon became evident on 8 April 1933 when Resident Commissioner Rey attempted to arrest Chief Gobuamang Mosielele of the Bakgatla-Baga-Mmanaana for undermining the authority of his overlord and Bangwaketse paramount Chief Bathoen. Rey had only been able to send 10 police to Moshupa to arrest Gobuamang-whom he insisted on calling 'Gobbleman'. Most of the police force was occupied with the cordon or manning isolated police posts and 10 men was all Rey could raise on such short

³²⁷ BNARS, S. 251/9, Staff Officer's Suggested Scheme for Increasing the Mounted Men in the BPP Force, nd.

³²⁸ BNARS, S. 251/9, Staff Officer's Recommendations on Police (Native), nd.

³²⁹ J. Falconer, "History of the Botswana Veterinary Services-1905-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 3:1 (1971): 75.

³³⁰ Crowder and Parsons, *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey...*, 122.

notice.³³¹ Gobuamang, backed by almost his entire village, resisted arrest, and a mob attacked the 10-men police detachment representing the government. Rey, who was infuriated, declared Moshupa under a state of rebellion and proposed an aerial bombardment of the village. The Dominions Office vetoed Rey's proposal, stating that while the whole village had to be dealt with, an aerial bombardment would be excessive. Rey was ordered to arrange with Southern Rhodesia to bring in some BSAP men to place the village under siege if the BPP could not do the job. Gobuamang, however, surrendered by April 14 and no further action was required on the part of Rey.³³²

Considering the BPP's preoccupation with the Foot and Mouth cordon, Rey's reorganization scheme for the force could not be undertaken. The cordon was to remain in force until January 1934, which was when the Protectorate administration hoped the disease would be eradicated.³³³ Another reason for the delay of the reorganization was the fact that the BPP's Staff Officer was due to retire in November 1934, and that it was his successor who would reorganize the force. For most of 1934, therefore, the state of affairs in the force remained the same.³³⁴

The Appointment of Colonel Godley as Staff Officer

In March 1935, at the insistence of Rey, the Dominions Office appointed Colonel Richard Godley to the post of Staff Officer and Deputy Commandant of the police in the Bechuanaland Protectorate on a two-year contract. Godley was brought in as the man to plan and carry out the reorganization scheme of the BPP under the direction of Resident Commissioner Rey who was also the Commandant of the force. Colonel Godley was experienced in police work, having

³³¹ Crowder and Parsons, *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey...*, 122.

³³² Crowder and Parsons, *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey...*, 122.

³³³ BNARS, S. 311/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 6 February 1933.

³³⁴ BNARS, S. 311/3, Extract from Resident Commissioner's Memorandum on Sir Alan Pim's Report, 8 November 1933.

worked as commander of the BSAP and Transkei police forces.³³⁵ Before being offered the position in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Godley had worked as Deputy Commissioner of police in the Union of South Africa; a position he retired from in 1934 to join the Union's Chamber of Mines.³³⁶ Godley's appointment to the BPP is particularly interesting because apart from the expertise he gained from his experience of colonial police forces in the region, he also had ties with the mines, and probably mine security. This, therefore, meant that he had a considerable amount of knowledge on the migrant labour trends of the region in that period.

Following his appointment, Godley immediately embarked on a 6-month tour of the Protectorate, visiting police stations in Pitsane-Molopo, Lobatse, Otse, Ramatlabama, Gaborone, Mahalapye, Palla Road, Francistown, Kanye, Serowe, Rakops, Maun, Kachikau, Ghanzi and Kasane. During this tour, Godley also conducted interviews with magistrates, policemen and other government officials. He came to the overall conclusion that the number of European police in the BPP was inadequate, and that coupled with lack of proper training and funding, this rendered the force incapable of efficiently policing the Protectorate.³³⁷ For the most part, Godley's findings on the causes of the unsatisfactory state of the BPP corresponded with those of Resident Commissioner Rey. Among other things, police work in the Protectorate was weakened by the tendency by the colonial government to use the police for duties that fell on the civil side of administration. Godley remarked that a semi-military police force like the BPP could not efficiently perform its duties if it was administered as a civil department, as had been the case for decades.³³⁸ Because of the paucity of the colonial

³³⁵ Maine, "The Role and Development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1898 to 1966...", 8.

³³⁶ TNA, DO. 35, 396/11, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Dominion's Office, London, 27 November 1934.

³³⁷ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

³³⁸ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

state in Bechuanaland, other government departments were understaffed, and therefore relied on the small police force to perform every duty, thus putting a strain on the whole system.

While Rey's initial 1933 proposal had involved a European NCO establishment of 8 sergeants, 8 corporals and 7 troopers, Godley found that cadre inadequate considering the number of isolated police posts which he argued required European police supervision.³³⁹ Having worked in the police forces of the settler minority territories of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, Godley brought with him sentiments of white racial superiority to the Protectorate as he favoured the presence of more European police than what the Resident Commissioner considered necessary. The most notable feature of Godley's reorganization scheme was, therefore, the increase in the total number of European NCOs from 25 to 43. This involved 2 warrant officers, 8 sergeants, 14 corporals and 19 troopers.³⁴⁰ The justification for doubling the number of European corporals and troopers was that this would bring relief to the BPP, considering the extra duties placed by the administration on European police such as serving as magistrate clerks, postmasters, prison guards, immigration and customs officers, and manning the disease control cordon.³⁴¹ Although the frontier stage of Bechuanaland had passed, the nature of the colonial state was still rudimentary, with the BPP performing almost all administrative duties in the Protectorate.

Godley's recommendation to double the number of European police in the Protectorate, was antithetical to the direction that was being taken by other British colonial forces during the same period. Many military and police forces in British territories were reduced in the 1920s, and later in the 1930s for economic reasons owing to the Great Depression.³⁴² In Nyasaland for example, the force shrank from 1,000 men in 1921 to just 250 in 1930. With these reduced

³³⁹ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Dominions Office, London, 30 December 1935.

³⁴⁰ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

³⁴¹ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Dominions Office, London, 30 December 1935.

³⁴² Killingray, "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa...", 420.

numbers, the Nyasaland Police fulfilled its duties through closer cooperation with African chiefs. Through the extension of the system of indirect rule in British colonies between the 1920s and 1930s, African traditional authorities assumed the responsibility for preserving law and order in their territories.³⁴³

The reduction of colonial forces in the British Empire coincided with the development of the idea of air policing in Britain. From around 1920, British officials like Winston Churchill began to argue that the new technology of airpower could also help control the empire as a few planes could be cheaper than keeping large ground forces.³⁴⁴ Although the British Air Ministry denied it, the Royal Air Force (RAF) had been used to bomb rioters in Egypt in 1919, and again in 1920 to police and suppress the Somali rebellion, and this informed Churchill's pursuits to use airpower for colonial control. By the 1930s, the British Air Ministry had come close to replacing 6 infantry battalions of the KAR with 2 RAF Squadrons, but had to delay these plans following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.³⁴⁵ In South Africa too, following the use of the South African Air Force (SAAF) to suppress the 1922 Rand Rebellion, the government began to consider the use of airpower as a means of controlling the black majority. Throughout the 1920s, the SAAF was used in gunning and bombing demonstrations which were meant to intimidate the Africans and deter them from rebelling.³⁴⁶

Since the policy of indirect rule spread as a form of administrative expediency to deal with inadequate personnel, Colonel Godley's recommendation to increase the number of police in the BPP did not appear to be an economically sound one. The Protectorate government could have continued to rely on the African chiefs to maintain order in their own reserves instead of increasing the strength of the BPP. In 1935, when Godley formulated the reorganization

³⁴³ Deflem, "Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa...", 49.

³⁴⁴ D. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 21.

³⁴⁵ Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control...*, 52-58.

³⁴⁶ T. Dederig, "Air Power in South Africa, 1914-1939," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41: 3 (2015): 460.

scheme, indirect rule was officially introduced in the Protectorate. The African chiefs, however, openly disputed the policy, citing a lack of their consultation by the Protectorate administration. In a 1936 article in the *Journal of the Royal African Society*, the Bangwato Regent, Tshekedi Khama, argued that a chief was like a governor to his people and, therefore, was entitled to the consideration and confidence due to such an office. If the African chiefs were not accorded the respect they deserved, then the phrase “to rule through and by the chief” would mean that the African rulers were nothing but convenient administrative tools.³⁴⁷ Interestingly, the Tswana chiefs disputed the policy of indirect rule when it was introduced in 1935 although a form of the same policy had always existed in Bechuanaland from the time of the declaration of the Protectorate in 1885. It was not until 1944, however, that indirect rule was reintroduced and made official policy in Bechuanaland, following the participation of Tswana chiefs in formulating the laws that guided it.³⁴⁸ In neighbouring South Africa too, the white settler minority was developing its own form of indirect rule in the same period. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was an extension of the legal foundations of chieftainship in South Africa. The logic behind indirect rule was, therefore, implemented throughout South Africa through the appointment of African chiefs to rule in the reserves.³⁴⁹ For the South African segregationists, however, indirect rule was envisaged to be more than a temporary colonial expedient like in the British colonies. It set the tone for the more full-blown policy of apartheid that would come into place in 1948.³⁵⁰

Furthermore, during the 1920s and 1930s, colonial forces in some British territories underwent some reorganization to become more professional in the carrying out of police work. Some police forces were enlarged to include Criminal Investigation Departments (CID) and

³⁴⁷ T. Khama, “Chieftainship Under Indirect Rule,” *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 35:1 (1936): 254.

³⁴⁸ Makgala, “Limitations of British Territorial Control in Bechuanaland Protectorate...”, 60.

³⁴⁹ J. C. Myers, *Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming of Political Power*. (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 17.

³⁵⁰ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject...*, 89.

fingerprinting.³⁵¹ In the Nyasaland Police for example, a CID was formed in 1922 and detectives were appointed to it at a slightly higher salary than regular police. One reason for the establishment of the CID in Nyasaland had been the John Chilembwe Uprising of 1915 which emphasized the need to investigate political activities that could possibly pose a threat to the colonial state. As a way of ensuring control over migrant workers involved in the Southern African labour market, the Nyasaland Police also opened a central Finger-Print Bureau which maintained close links with the CIDs of Northern and Southern Rhodesia.³⁵² In Nigeria too, the police officials recognized the need for a skilled and professional force constituted by specialist units. For this reason, the Nigeria Police Force introduced forensic science to its work in 1930, established a CID in 1936, and imported a fingerprint expert from London in 1939.³⁵³ The move towards professionalizing law enforcement was also informed by social change in colonial Africa such as urbanization and the growth of an educated African middle class. Para-military occupational forces were no longer necessary because the era of armed resistance had passed in most places.

For the BPP, Godley's 1935 reorganization scheme similarly called for the establishment of a CID complete with fingerprinting and detective work. The CID was to be organized into a department that could give adequate warning of any dangerous or subversive movements forming in the Protectorate. This represented a form of fear on the part of the imperial government who felt that "... the more the education of the natives improves, the easier will it be for agitators to find suitable ground for subversive propaganda throughout Africa."³⁵⁴ Two Europeans, therefore, a sergeant and a trooper, were to be selected and undergo

³⁵¹ Killingray, "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa...", 420.

³⁵² J. McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police Force," *The Journal of African History*, 27:1 (1986): 130. For CID in the Nyasaland Police, See also Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 67.

³⁵³ Ahire, *Imperial Policing...*, 95.

³⁵⁴ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, War Office, London, to Dominions Office, London, 17 March 1936.

specialized training in Salisbury for fingerprinting and detective work. After training, the sergeant would be stationed at Gaborone where the Headquarters and Training Depot of the BPP was located. In addition to his duties as a detective, he was meant to be an instructor on the same work. The trooper would be stationed at Francistown in the north of the Protectorate, where he would carry out fingerprinting and detective work.³⁵⁵ The creation of a CID was a significant development in the BPP. As Mpho Maine says in his bachelor's thesis on the BPP, this development put the force "in a position to keep proper records of criminals in the Protectorate."³⁵⁶ Given that the population of Bechuanaland was primarily African, it is arguable, however, that the effectiveness of the European detectives was limited.

In terms of distribution of personnel, the scheme recommended the closure of 10 small police posts across the Protectorate. Patrolling in the affected areas would be carried out by the police from adjacent posts, especially considering the suggested increase of European police.³⁵⁷ An additional 3 police posts were recommended at Bokspits, Riverside and Kang in the Kgalagadi District. These previously under-policed villages had been an area of operations for poachers from neighbouring territories, as well as prospectors and illicit diamond buyers. Ncojane in the Ghanzi district was also a vast area with a lot of poaching, and therefore the reorganization scheme called for another police post to be opened there.³⁵⁸ This also reflected a continuation of the Protectorate administration's anti-poaching policy which the BPP had enforced since 1903, as pointed out in Chapter 2.

Considering the events of April 1933, when Resident Commissioner Rey declared the village of Moshupa to be in a state of rebellion, Godley's scheme recommended a small fully

³⁵⁵ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

³⁵⁶ Maine, "The Role and Development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1898 to 1966...", 9.

³⁵⁷ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

³⁵⁸ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

armed force for emergency use. This would comprise 20 European officers and NCOs as well as 30 African police, armed with rifles and 2 Lewis machine guns. Using the south-north railway line, the emergency force could be concentrated at any point between Lobatse and Plumtree within 36 hours.³⁵⁹ Godley maintained that this force would easily crush any rebellion before it could develop into such a state as to necessitate reinforcements from neighbouring territories.³⁶⁰ In his discussion of Bechuanaland's Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which was formed between 1961 and 1963, Bafumiki Mocheregwa argues that calls for the formation of this anti-riot unit began in 1948, when the Protectorate administration was concerned by the 'communist inspired' uprisings in the Gold Coast, the Basutoland Protectorate and in Malaya.³⁶¹ It can be argued, however, that the roots of the PMU extended further back to 1935, with Godley's reorganization scheme, and that this was influenced by the 1933 state of rebellion in Moshupa. Godley's suggested reaction unit was, however, not formed, likely due to budgetary constraints in the Protectorate.

While the reorganization of the BPP was intended to make the force more efficient, and better suited for policing such a vast territory as the Bechuanaland Protectorate, it was also meant to significantly reduce the police vote in the annual expenditure of the government.³⁶² In this regard, however, Godley's scheme failed. The recommended increase in the number of European NCOs in the force by over 50% meant more costs for the government. Godley attempted to meet this cost by reducing the strength and pay of African police and replacing 71 Basotho constables with 55 Batswana police messengers.³⁶³ The shift from extraterritorial African police to locally recruited ones was a significant development in the BPP. It marked

³⁵⁹ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

³⁶⁰ Maine, "The Role and Development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1898 to 1966...", 9.

³⁶¹ Mocheregwa, "The Police Mobile Unit...", 96.

³⁶² BNARS, S. 251/9, Staff Officer's Suggested Scheme for Increasing the Mounted Men in the BPP Force, nd.

³⁶³ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

the demise of the long-lasting notion among the Protectorate administration that Basotho were a martial race and better suited than Batswana to police Bechuanaland. In terms of the cost of the reorganization scheme, which was to be implemented in the financial year of 1936-1937, the total expenditure came to £32, 164. This was a higher expenditure compared to the £30, 662 for the financial year of 1934-1935 and the £31,077 for 1935-1936.³⁶⁴

Challenges and Subsequent Adoption of the Scheme

Although the Dominions Office recognized the need for the reorganization of the BPP, there were concerns over the proposed increase of European police and the reduction of Africans in the force. A comparison of the HCTs' ratios of European to African residents and of total police to population in the territories, revealed more European police in Bechuanaland and Swaziland than considered necessary by the Dominions Office.

Ratio of Europeans to Africans and Police to Population in 1936

	Ratio of European to African	Ratio of Police to Population
Basutoland	1 to 22.5	1 to 1, 870
Bechuanaland	1 to 4.6	1 to 580
Swaziland	1 to 4.5	1 to 930

These figures, from the records of the Dominions Office, suggest that in 1936, Europeans comprised 22% of Bechuanaland's population. This, however, appears doubtful because the population of Bechuanaland at that time was 160, 000.³⁶⁵ This would mean that by 1936, there were 35, 200 Europeans in Bechuanaland. The unlikelihood of this is further shown by the fact that in 1920, a European Advisory Council had been formed in Bechuanaland to advise the Resident Commissioner on matters affecting European residents, who at the time, only

³⁶⁴ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel Godley's Proposed Scheme in Resident Commissioner's dispatch to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 18 October 1935.

³⁶⁵ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

numbered 1,700.³⁶⁶ It is, therefore, implausible that between 1920 and 1936, the European population in Bechuanaland grew from 1,700 to 35,200.

Based on the figures in the above table, nevertheless, the Dominions Office raised the question of why it was necessary for Bechuanaland and Swaziland to have 5 to 6 times as many Europeans in proportion to African police, and 2 to 3 times as many police in relation to the total population compared to Basutoland.³⁶⁷ The proposed numbers in the reorganization scheme were more baffling because amongst the HCTs, the Dominions Office had always understood that there was lesser risk of serious disorder in Bechuanaland than the two other territories. This was because official records revealed to the Dominions Office that there was little serious crime and hardly any organized crime in Bechuanaland.³⁶⁸ Furthermore, unlike in other territories in the region, there had never been any serious resistance to British colonization in Bechuanaland and Swaziland as they had become protectorates through negotiation with the African leaders in 1885 and 1903 respectively.

In March 1936, the Dominions Office consulted with Colonel Oliver Leese, the officer whom the War Office had sent to conduct a study on the internal security in the HCTs in late 1935. Leese expressed complete support for Godley's reorganization scheme and advised on its immediate adoption and implementation.³⁶⁹ The Dominions Office, however, remained unconvinced, and was primarily still dubious about the increase of European police in the force at the expense of Africans. This represented a retrograde step because the intention of the Dominions Office for its African dependencies, was to make as much use of African police as possible, and to subsequently replace Europeans with the latter, especially in the lower ranks of service. This was because European police were expensive for the colonial administration

³⁶⁶ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*..., 128.

³⁶⁷ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁶⁸ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁶⁹ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, War Office, London, to Dominions Office, London, 17 March 1936.

as they were paid more than the Africans.³⁷⁰ Furthermore, African police were more effective because of their knowledge of local languages, culture and geography. Northern Rhodesia, with its total population of about 1,400, 000 had only 56 European police, which was just about the same ratio as what Godley's scheme proposed for Bechuanaland, with its smaller population of 160, 000. In Tanganyika, the ratio of European to African in the wider population was 1 to 25.5, while the ratio of police to population was 1 to 1, 800. These ratios too, were much smaller than those proposed for Bechuanaland and it was on this aspect of the reorganization of the BPP, that the Dominions Office remained dubious.³⁷¹

One reason why the reorganization scheme for the BPP made no efforts to replace European NCOs with Africans, and proposed instead the opposite, was the relationship between Bechuanaland and the Union of South Africa. In his remarks about reorganization, High Commissioner Sir William Clark expressed an anticipation of the Dominions Office's discontentment with the proposed scheme.³⁷² He argued, however, that while the increase of European police at the expense of Africans was contradictory to a policy that the British government wished to adopt for its dependencies, there was a need to bear in mind the general question of the transfer of Bechuanaland to the Union. It was, therefore, desirable in the meantime, to adopt a system which would not greatly diverge from that of the Union government, by prematurely replacing European NCOs with Africans.³⁷³ What Clark meant here was that until there was certainty that Bechuanaland will not eventually be transferred to the Union of South Africa, high numbers of European police had to be maintained in the territory. Although South Africa was a settler minority regime, the South African Police (SAP) was

³⁷⁰ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominions Office, London to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 2 April 1936.

³⁷¹ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominions Office, London to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 2 April 1936.

³⁷² TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, High Commissioner's Remarks on the BPP Reorganization Scheme, 15 February 1936.

³⁷³ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, High Commissioner's Remarks on the BPP Reorganization Scheme, 15 February 1936.

dominated by white policemen despite the significant numbers of Africans in the force. By 1939 for example, white police in the SAP numbered between 6000 and 8000, while there were 4000 Africans in the force. The SAP had been guided by policies that were meant to debilitate the advancement of African police in the force, so as to maintain the racial hierarchy existing in the broader society.³⁷⁴ High Commissioner Clark's argument was, therefore, informed by the prevailing white minority dominance and racial hierarchy in South Africa. Another factor that may have influenced Clark's argument was the possibility of the BPP cooperating with the SAP on cases of mutual interest as was the case with the cross-border 'poaching' discussed in Chapter 1. It can be concluded, therefore, that in such cases, officials like Clark would have preferred the SAP to deal with European as opposed to African members of the BPP.

For Godley and Rey, the increase of European police in Bechuanaland was necessitated by the large number of isolated police posts which had to be maintained. Godley assumed that every police post in the territory had to have a European in charge of it. Of the 48 police posts in the Protectorate, only 12 of them had a European administrative official stationed there. Under the proposed reorganization scheme, only 11 posts would be left without administrators or police presence as opposed to 36 posts, which was hitherto the case. These 11 posts would be supervised by the European police from nearby posts.³⁷⁵ This, however, still did not adequately explain the need for the BPP to have three times more police as Basutoland or Tanganyika. As mentioned above, one of the recommendations of Godley's scheme was the closure of 10 police posts and the opening of 3 new ones. It would have been more practical, therefore, to expand the jurisdiction of the police posts that would remain open to cover the area of the closed ones, instead of recruiting more police.

³⁷⁴ K. Shear, "Chiefs or Modern Bureaucrats? Managing Black Police in Early Twentieth-Century South Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 54:2 (2012): 256.

³⁷⁵ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 9 December 1935.

Another justification for the proposed increase in European police was to enable white settlers in the Protectorate to be visited regularly by these men. This system was copied from the SAP, where there was a general practice of police visiting European settlers at least once a month to hear their news or concerns and it was also practiced by the Swaziland Police.³⁷⁶ In Southern Rhodesia too, the BSAP has a similar system although in the 1920s, the European settlers living in rural areas complained that 1 European and 2 African police did not provide them with any sense of security and they demanded to see more European police frequently patrolling around their farms.³⁷⁷ As noted in 1932 by British official, Sir Alan Pim, who conducted an economic and administrative survey of the HCTs, these routine police visits to settlers had outlived their usefulness as the use of motor vehicles eliminated the isolation that some European settlers used to live in. At the time of the proposed reorganization scheme for the BPP, therefore, there was no justification for so costly a system, involving many European police.³⁷⁸ Colonel Godley argued, however, that these visits were essential and that the European settlers in the Protectorate repeatedly demanded them and frequently asked that the patrolling of European areas should not be left to African police.³⁷⁹ This represented a legacy of the frontier tradition discussed in the first chapter, whereby the BPP, just like the NWMP in western Canada, were responsible for protecting the lives and property of European settlers from Africans and First Nations people respectively.

Despite the Dominions Office's initial concerns about the reorganization scheme, it was adopted almost entirely, except for the creation of a separate armed force that Godley had recommended for the purpose of emergencies and riots. While the reason for the exclusion of this recommendation is not apparent, it is likely that it was due to insufficient funding for such

³⁷⁶ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁷⁷ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers...*, 58.

³⁷⁸ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominion's Office Report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁷⁹ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Colonel. Godley to High commissioner, Cape Town, 22 April 1936.

a development and perhaps the lack of a history of significant armed resistance in the territory. The Treasury Office in London approved the reorganization scheme although its cost brought the police vote on the budget of the 1936-1937 financial year to £32, 164, an amount that was higher than the previous years.³⁸⁰ In March 1937, Colonel Godley's contract with the BPP expired, just a couple of months following the end of Colonel Rey's term as Resident Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Rey was succeeded by Charles Arden-Clarke while Godley was succeeded by R. Hurndall as the BPP Staff Officer.³⁸¹

Post-World War II Organization of the BPP

While the archival material on the BPP reveal the post-WWII developments of the force, there is no evidence about policing in Bechuanaland during the war. The only mention of WWII and its potential effect on the BPP is found in the Deputy Commandant's note on the proposed post-war organization of the force. The note states that during the war, some members of the BPP were released for active service and had returned to the force with commissioned ranks.³⁸² Perhaps the only insightful discussion of what happened to the BPP during WWII is from historian Ashley Jackson's book on the British Empire and the war. He explains that when the war broke out, the Bechuanaland administration's response was to post 2 police columns armed with Lewis Guns at Maun in the north of the Protectorate and Gaborone in the South to guard against acts of sabotage by the Germans in the region. Measures were also taken to protect the railway line running through the Protectorate from South Africa into Southern Rhodesia as it was logistically important for shipping troops and supplies.³⁸³ The Bechuanaland Protectorate was divided into defence areas in which Europeans (police and colonial administrators) formed a small defence force. All available weapons, regardless of their condition were gathered from

³⁸⁰ TNA, DO. 35, 396/12, Dominions Office, to Treasury, London, 5 June 1936.

³⁸¹ TNA, DO. 35, 907/12, High Commissioner Cape Town to Dominions Office, London, 30 January 1937.

³⁸² BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁸³ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*. (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 257.

wherever the Bechuanaland government could find them and used for training the Europeans in the territory. The resident commissioners of the HCTs and other parts of the world had a defence scheme that included a scorched earth policy in the unlikely event of an enemy invasion.³⁸⁴

In 1944, a year before the end of WWII, the colonial administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate began to consider the reconstitution of the BPP. Much of the changes that took place in the police force after WWII were agreed upon at the Police Officers Conference held at Mafikeng in August 1944 to discuss the direction of the BPP at the end of the war. One of the issues agreed upon at the conference was the need for the gradual replacement of subordinate European personnel with Africans, especially as the latter's level of education in the Protectorate slowly improved.³⁸⁵ As pointed out by the Deputy Commandant of the BPP in 1944, however, the bulk of Africans in the force were men with little to no education. Educated Africans, on the other hand, showed little to no interest in the BPP because the police salary was low compared to what they could earn elsewhere. Efforts were made, therefore, to make the BPP into a professional organization that would provide an attractive career to educated African young men with desirable prospects of advancement in the force.³⁸⁶

Between the late 1930s and 1940s, the need for educated African police had become increasingly apparent for colonial administrators across the continent as they sought to professionalize their police forces. The formative years of occupation and colonization that required militaristic and coercive policing had long gone, and a more civil and consensual model of policing became desirable. Apart from pacification of African societies, the formative

³⁸⁴ Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*..., 258.

³⁸⁵ BNARS, S. 302/4, Minutes of a Police Conference held at Mafikeng from 31 August to 6 September 1944.

³⁸⁶ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

colonial forces had been built along military lines because their illiterate personnel were ill-placed to use conventional police methods that required reading and writing.³⁸⁷ Throughout the 1930s, the Dominions Office mounted pressure on colonial administrators to keep pace with the police reforms in the metropolitan forces of Britain. There was a gap in performance between metropolitan forces and those in the colonies, and this reflected the absence of ‘modern methods’ in the colonial police forces.³⁸⁸

Recruiting educated police was one of the necessary moves towards civil policing, as this would produce policemen who were literate enough to write statements and carry out investigations. In Southern Rhodesia for example, the police authorities emphasized the need for educated African police from the early 1930s and took measures to improve the education of the African members. One of the ways this was done was through the launching of a monthly police magazine called *Mapolisa* in 1937, in hopes that it would cultivate a culture of reading among the African police. The standard of education among African police in the BSAP continued to grow especially following WWII. By 1949, most recruits in the force had passed Standard V and 3 years later, all the new recruits could speak, read and write in English. In the early 1950s, a minimum educational qualification of Standard IV was introduced for African police and raised again in 1956 to Standard VI.³⁸⁹

Another step towards civil and consensual policing, was changing the image of the colonial forces to present them as strictly police and not military in nature. This involved the discarding of military ranks and insignia for police ones. By 1945, therefore, the BPP began to lose its semi-military character while a body of professional civil police emerged. The ranks of trooper and corporal were dropped from the force, while those of sergeant and warrant

³⁸⁷ A. Burton, “‘Brothers by day’: Colonial Policing in Dar es Salaam under British Rule, 1919-1961,” *Urban History*, 30:1 (2003): 68.

³⁸⁸ Anderson and Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940...”, 11.

³⁸⁹ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers...*, 76.

officer were replaced with assistant inspector and inspector respectively. The rank of regimental sergeant major was replaced by senior inspector.³⁹⁰ In keeping with the practice of the police forces in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the ranks of lieutenant, captain and major were retained, even though they would otherwise have been replaced by assistant superintendent, superintendent and senior superintendent respectively. This reflected the influence that South Africa still had over the Protectorate. The Deputy Commandant became the Commissioner of Police, while the Resident Commissioner of the territory remained the honorary Commandant of the force.³⁹¹

The Resident Commissioner and the Commissioner of Police in the Protectorate considered it psychologically important to eliminate military ranks in the BPP as a step towards doing away with the military ethos hitherto present in the force. Furthermore, in 1945 the BPP was anticipating having recruits who had served in the British Forces during WWII, some as commissioned officers and others as NCOs. Some of the British members of the BPP had been released for active service and had attained commissioned ranks while at war. Upon their return to the BPP, however, they reverted to their former ranks and they saw this as a relegation to a lower status.³⁹² As Police Commissioner J. Masterman regarded all European police as ‘officers’ of the force, the elimination of military ranks was a necessary development. This left the BPP with an establishment of junior officers with the ranks of assistant inspector and inspector, as well as a senior officer one holding the ranks of assistant superintendent and superintendent.³⁹³ Just like other British colonial police forces, the post-war establishment of the BPP comprised 3 main levels. The first was the gazetted officers, which included the

³⁹⁰ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant’s Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁹¹ Maine, “The Role and Development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1898 to 1966...”, 9.

³⁹² BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant’s Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

³⁹³ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant’s Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

assistant superintendents up to the rank of commissioner. The second was the non-gazetted officers or the Inspectorate, comprising the assistant inspectors up to the senior inspectors. Lastly there was the rank-and-file, who held the rank of constable.³⁹⁴

One significance of the post-war organization of the BPP was that the colonial government and the police top brass recognized the need to reconstitute the force in order to make it possible for the promotion of Africans and their gradual replacement of Europeans. Before 1945, the African members of the BPP just like those of the Swaziland Police, were confined to the rank-and-file as constables, while the non-gazetted officers or the Inspectorate, was entirely European. In the Basutoland Mounted Police, however, because of the considerably high level of education among the African police, the entire Inspectorate comprised Basotho, with the Europeans holding the gazetted ranks only.³⁹⁵ Another reason for this was that unlike in Bechuanaland and Swaziland, there was no European settler population in Basutoland. In Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the European settlers and farmers objected to being investigated by 'illiterate' Africans, and for this reason, the Inspectorate in the two territories, remained European. It was recognized, however, that as African police became more educated and better trained, it would be expedient to reduce the European Inspectorate although not necessarily abolishing it.³⁹⁶ The decision not to entirely abolish the European Inspectorate was influenced by the colonial racial hierarchy that had always existed in the BPP like other forces. Another factor influencing this decision may have been the fact that educated African police were often disliked by colonial authorities as they were thought to avoid manual labour and question everything they saw as an injustice.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁴ Clayton & Killingley, *Khaki and Blue...*, 7.

³⁹⁵ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 3.

³⁹⁶ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 4.

³⁹⁷ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80*, 72.

As historians Clayton and Killingray state, the Africanization of colonial forces transpired at varying degrees and speeds and according to the political developments in the colonies. In most territories, serious Africanization took place in the 1950s although the process began in the early post-war period. By 1947, the Nigeria Police had 10 African assistant superintendents who were promoted into positions of command in small stations and second-in-command in larger stations.³⁹⁸ In Uganda, preparations for Africanization began in the late 1940s with the introduction of sub-inspector courses at the training school in Kampala. By 1951, the Uganda Police had 139 non-gazetted officers, 69 of whom were African. In 1957, just 5 years before Uganda's independence, the first 2 Africans were promoted to assistant superintendent, and 16 more attained the same rank by 1959.³⁹⁹ It must be pointed out that these developments were taking place in British colonies and not in the settler territories. The developments were part of the post-war colonial reforms that Britain carried out in her colonies. For example, in the years immediately after the war, the Colonial Office began to call for large numbers of Africans to be introduced in the higher levels of the colonial civil service.⁴⁰⁰ In the late 1940s similar efforts were made to Africanize the officer corps of the colonial militaries even though this was achieved in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It must be pointed out here, however, that the first fully commissioned African officer in the British military was S. K. Anthony of the Gold Coast during WWII in 1942, followed by T. K Impraim in 1945.⁴⁰¹ The decision to train more Africans to command local forces in the Gold Coast came in 1947. By the end of 1956, however, only 28 of the 212 officers in the Ghanaian Army were African. This was a slower rate compared to the Ghanaian civil service, where African senior officials

³⁹⁸ Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue*..., 31.

³⁹⁹ Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue*..., 87.

⁴⁰⁰ R. Pearce, "The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa," *African Affairs*, 83:330 (1984): 83.

⁴⁰¹ D. Killingray, "Race and Rank in the British Army in the Twentieth Century," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 10: 3 (1987): 285-286.

increased from 89 to 1,581 between 1946 and 1957. This was, however, also due to the fact that the civil service paid higher than the armed forces.⁴⁰²

The post-war developments of the BPP were, therefore, taking place within this broader context. In 1945, Police Commissioner J. Masterman, promoted 2 Africans to the rank of inspector, while 6 more Africans rose to the rank of sub-inspector. Four Africans were also transferred from the uniformed branch and added on to the CID as detectives. This was a significant development because Africans made for better detectives within a primarily African population like that of the Protectorate. Furthermore, it was important to have African detectives for better policing of urbanization and the growth of towns. This was the first time that Africans held Inspectorate or non-gazetted ranks in the force, as well as joining the CID.⁴⁰³ These appointments were meant to demonstrate to the Dominions Office, that the BPP intended to reduce its costly reliance on European personnel and conform to the British government's desired policy of relying more on Africans. Furthermore, the appointments were meant to attract more Africans to the force and show them that there were opportunities for career advancement in the BPP.⁴⁰⁴

Additionally, in 1945 the BPP reached an agreement with the BSAP to send its European recruits to the latter's all-white Morris Depot for training. In order to fill European vacancies in the BPP, an agreement was also reached between the two forces that the BSAP could transfer some of its trained European police to the BPP. This plan would, however, be contingent on the BSAP being up to strength, seeing as their European membership had dwindled during the war.⁴⁰⁵ During wartime, the training of African police had not kept pace

⁴⁰² E. Hutchful, "The Development of the Army Officer Corps in Ghana, 1956-1966," *Journal of African Studies*, 12:3 (1989): 163.

⁴⁰³ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

⁴⁰⁴ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 31.

⁴⁰⁵ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

with the intake of recruits, and this resulted in the BPP having a large proportion of men serving without any prior training. The BPP, therefore arranged a two to three-month course at the Gaborone Training Depot for its untrained African police to give them thorough grounding in police work.⁴⁰⁶ For the already existing African establishment of the force, promotion and refresher courses were arranged at the Gaborone Depot to prepare the African Inspectorate for the work that they would eventually take over from Europeans.⁴⁰⁷ At the Police Officers' Conference in 1944, a recommendation had been made to build a school in Gaborone for the sons of the African members of the BPP. In 1945, the colonial administration accepted this recommendation and set it aside for the 1947-1948 financial year. Such a school was considered desirable as it would foster esprit-de-corps and a tradition of service among police families. Furthermore, the combination of education and training in discipline, would eventually produce the right type of future recruits for the BPP.⁴⁰⁸

The end of WWII also saw the BPP making great improvements in terms of its transport and communications. As Bechuanaland was a vast territory with poor roads, isolated police posts and almost an entire lack of telephones, the need for wireless communications became imperative. With the approval of the Director of Public Works, measures were taken to establish a radio network connecting most of the BPP's district headquarters.⁴⁰⁹ Although the Protectorate government was able to purchase and install 6 radio sets, there was not enough funding for the BPP to allow for the installation of 20 more required sets in the various police stations and vehicles. For this reason, a small capital grant was sought from the British

⁴⁰⁶ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

⁴⁰⁷ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 31.

⁴⁰⁸ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

⁴⁰⁹ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

government to complete the wireless network.⁴¹⁰ In neighbouring Southern Rhodesia, the BSAP operated an efficient network of American built installations. The BPP, therefore, sent a European non-gazetted officer to Salisbury to study the BSAP's wireless communications. Upon return, he assisted the Public Works Department in completing the radio network of the BPP and remained responsible for its maintenance.⁴¹¹

The post-war developments of the BPP also included greater efforts at mechanizing the force's transport system. While horses, oxen, camels, canoes and bicycles would continue to be important, especially in the outlying portions of the Protectorate, the colonial government recognized the need for augmenting this with motor vehicles. As motor transport increasingly became available to the general public, albeit the wealthy, it became important that the police force have access to similar resources in order to perform their duties effectively.⁴¹² By the beginning of 1946, the BPP had 180 transport animals, 7 wagons, 15 scotch carts, 7 water carts and 1 trailer. There were also three vehicles in the force; a Chevrolet truck purchased in 1938, which was reputed to have driven about 100,000 miles before its milometer stopped working some years before 1946; and two Willys half-ton Jeeps that had been purchased for anti-poaching patrols in 1944 but found to be unsuited for the Protectorates' roads. In order to improve the BPP's transport, the 180 animals and the animal-drawn carriages were sold, and the three vehicles already in use were also traded in to purchase new ones.⁴¹³

The force, therefore, obtained 8 vehicles, seven of which were distributed among the various district headquarters, while an extra vehicle would be used in cases of emergency or if one of the seven was undergoing repair. In relation to the terrain of the Protectorate, the BPP

⁴¹⁰ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 33.

⁴¹¹ BNARS, S. 218/2, Deputy Commandant's Note on the Memorandum on the Proposed Post-War Organization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

⁴¹² BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 32.

⁴¹³ BNARS, S. 218/2, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 5 February 1946.

obtained 6 1-ton trucks capable of hauling food and equipment, being used for motorized patrols. The other 2 vehicles, which were meant to be used in the desert districts of Kgalagadi and Ngamiland, were Jeeps fitted with 1-ton trailers.⁴¹⁴ The colonial administration also found it necessary that the gazetted officers of the BPP should have vehicles for official use. Since the force did not have enough money to supply them with such vehicles, a practice was started where officers were paid a mileage allowance whenever they used their personal cars for police duties.⁴¹⁵ At this point, the prospect of Bechuanaland's amalgamation with South Africa was over, and this gave the BPP the freedom to develop on its own and for more resources to be devoted to it.

In 1946, Police Commissioner Masterman suggested to the Resident Commissioner and the District Commissioners of Bechuanaland, the formation of an African police reserve in the territory. Between 1931 and 1946, there had been sporadic outbreaks of diseases like Foot and Mouth, Smallpox and Rabbits, to which the BPP was called upon to supply men for the establishment of cordons and other control measures relating to those outbreaks.⁴¹⁶ The African police reserve would, therefore, ensure a regular supply of men to maintain such disease control cordons in future. The African reservists would also be used in cases of emergency where it would otherwise be difficult for government to mobilize significant numbers of men in a short period owing to the scattered police posts the territory.⁴¹⁷ The reserve was, therefore, meant to be a cost effective measure to address personnel shortage.

⁴¹⁴ BNARS, S. 218/2, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 5 February 1946.

⁴¹⁵ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 32.

⁴¹⁶ BNARS, S. 468/11, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 2 January 1946.

⁴¹⁷ BNARS, S. 468/11, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 2 January 1946.

Membership in the African police reserve was to be compulsory for all former African police considered physically and medically fit and residing in the Protectorate. This was because it was desirable to have men with previous police training who would not need any supervision in whatever duties they could be called upon to perform.⁴¹⁸ The reservists would be sworn in as special constables for each period of duty and, therefore, become subject to all police regulations in the Protectorate. When called for duty, these men would carry the same rank and receive the same pay as they did when they retired. However, they would only be paid for the period they were called upon to serve.⁴¹⁹ The benefit to the African ex-members of the BPP for joining the reserve was that they would be exempt from tax and their sons would be eligible for admittance to the proposed Police School at Gaborone.⁴²⁰

While the Police Commissioner's proposal for the formation of the African police reserve received the support of most of the District Commissioners, it was not entirely without flaws. The BPP was a relatively small force with very few discharges per annum. It would, therefore, be difficult for various districts to meet the quota of reservists required unless the overall strength of the force was numerically increased. Furthermore, the ethnic composition of African police in the BPP was disproportionate to the whole territory as the Bangwato and the Bakalanga were beginning to dominate the force. Lastly, the Basotho and other 'non-indigenous' Africans discussed in Chapter 2 would not have made good reservists as they would have moved back home after discharge. As a result, the quota of reservists to be met by each district would have to depend largely on the number of ex-members residing there.⁴²¹ Another problem with the proposed reserve was the compulsory membership for the ex-

⁴¹⁸ BNARS, S. 468/11, Minutes of the 27th Session of the African Advisory Council, 25 April to 4 May 1946.

⁴¹⁹ BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato..., 14.

⁴²⁰ BNARS, S. 468/11, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng, 2 January 1946.

⁴²¹ BNARS, S. 468/11, District Commissioner, Lobatse to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 25 January 1946.

members of the BPP. The District Commissioner for Kanye argued that any man who had served his time should be free of such restraints and obligations as suggested by the Police Commissioner. Since the African police reserve was not needed for national defence, but primarily for disease control measures to avoid using the regular police for such duties, compulsion was not justified.⁴²²

At a session of the African Advisory Council (AAC) that was held from 25 April to 4 May 1946, Resident Commissioner Aubrey Forsyth-Thompson consulted with the African chiefs on the proposed African police reserve. Just like some of the District Commissioners, the chiefs were critical of the Police Commissioner's proposal. Chief Bathoen of the Bangwaketse for example, pointed out that it would be difficult to obtain the right men for the police reserve as most men who leave the service of the force do so on account of old age or disability.⁴²³ This, however, was not entirely true as most Africans left the BPP at the end of 10 years of service when they qualified for gratuity and then took up cattle ranching. Others, like Bangwato acting Chief Tshekedi Khama and Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Chief Molefi Pilane were critical of the obligatory membership of the force, arguing that it should instead be voluntary.⁴²⁴ Despite these criticisms, the proposal for the police reserve was accepted. At the same AAC session, it became apparent that in the various 'tribal' territories there were ex-members of the African Pioneer Corps (APC)⁴²⁵ who had served in WWII and needed employment. It was agreed, therefore, that former APC members should be allowed in the African police reserve, which had been accepted in principle and pending legislation.⁴²⁶

⁴²² BNARS, S. 468/11, District Commissioner, Kanye to Government Secretary, Mafikeng 6 February 1946.

⁴²³ BNARS, S. 468/11, Minutes of the 27th Session of the African Advisory Council, 25 April to 4 May 1946.

⁴²⁴ BNARS, S. 468/11, Minutes of the 27th Session of the African Advisory Council, 25 April to 4 May 1946.

⁴²⁵ For more on the APC, see Ashley Jackson, *Botswana 1939-1945: An African Country at War*, (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1999); D. A. Schmid, *The Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners*. (Westport: PRAEGER, 2006).

⁴²⁶ BNARS, S. 468/11, Minutes of the 27th Session of the African Advisory Council, 25 April to 4 May 1946.

Conclusion

The 1930s reorganization of the BPP brought significant changes to the overall work of policing in the Protectorate. The creation of a CID and the introduction of fingerprinting to the BPP placed the force in a position to keep proper records of offenders in the Protectorate. Similarly, the closure of some 10 police posts across the Protectorate ensured that men were stationed where they were mostly needed. On the other hand, the 1930s reorganization doubled the number of European police in the force, a development that the Dominions Office was not pleased with, considering their desire for the force to rely more on Africans who were cheaper to employ than Europeans and potentially far more effective at policing an African population. The BPP therefore, had a higher ratio of European police than other territories like Tanganyika and Basutoland, that had a larger population than Bechuanaland. This was influenced by Bechuanaland's proximity to the settler minority state of South Africa, where racism and racial hierarchy was more pronounced. As a result, the reorganization of the BPP ended up raising the annual expenditure of the force higher than the previous years. One of the main reasons for reorganizing the force had been to reduce its annual expenditure and, therefore, the reorganization failed to achieve its goal. The nature of policing in the Protectorate was, therefore, characterized by contradictions. On the one hand, there was the pressure from the Dominions Office for the BPP to cut its expenditure by limiting the number of European police, while on the other hand, the Protectorate government felt the need to keep up with the idea of a significantly white police force like in South Africa. Furthermore, it is possible that the police force was so poorly developed that the desired cuts by the Dominions Office were not easy to implement.

Following the end of WWII, the BPP lost its semi-military character, and discarded military ranks for police ones. This was meant to represent a move towards civil and consensual policing as opposed to militaristic and coercive policing. Social changes in post WWII Africa

like urbanization and the development of an educated African middle class, also influenced the professionalization of law enforcement in the Protectorate and other colonies. During the post-war period, Africans were also promoted to the inspectorate for the first time in the history of the BPP. This was meant to demonstrate to the Dominions Office that the Protectorate did recognize the need to eventually replace Europeans with Africans in the force. Furthermore, the prospect of Bechuanaland's absorption by South Africa was no longer on the table. Post WWII colonial reforms on the continent were also characterized by the British government's insistence that the upper echelons of the civil service be filled by more Africans. Other post-war developments in the BPP were the increase of mechanized transportation and the introduction of wireless networks to improve communications in the force. The use of vehicles and communications technology in colonial policing also alleviated the frontier situation of the Protectorate and increased the efficiency of the force.

Chapter 4: The Bangwato Disturbances and the Militarization of the Police Force, 1948-1959

Introduction

The late 1940s and early 1950s saw the growth of African nationalist movements that challenged colonial rule and began demanding self-governance and independence. Within the context of the post-war social and economic pressures in colonial Africa, Africans readily accepted and supported the nationalist movements that emerged. Ultimately, as the Africans grew more and more disgruntled with their working and living conditions, the nationalist movements became increasingly militant, resulting in riots and uprisings in various British colonies.⁴²⁷ The emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers at the end of WWII also represented an obstacle to colonialism as they became allies of African and Asian colonies in the quest to overthrow European imperialism.⁴²⁸

The growth of African nationalism and anti-colonial protest in other territories during this period and its impact on policing in the Bechuanaland Protectorate has not received any scholarly attention. The main reason for this is simply that policing in colonial Botswana remains an understudied field. Despite limited sources, however, it is clear that the colonial officials in Bechuanaland were aware of the political unrest in other British territories and that this ultimately influenced the nature of policing in the territory especially after 1952 in the aftermath of the Serowe riots. While the causes of the Serowe riots were different from those of the political unrest in other British territories, the incident informed much of the developments that characterized policing in Bechuanaland throughout the 1950s.

⁴²⁷ D. Birmingham, *The Decolonization of Africa*. (London: UCL Press, 1995), 5. See also J. D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*. (London: Routledge, 1996), 75-80; C. A. Babou, "Decolonization or National Liberation: Debating the End of British Rule in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 632: 1 (2010): 45-46.

⁴²⁸ E. Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960*. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001), xv. See also, R. F. Betts, *Decolonization*. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 35-36.

The ‘Communist-Inspired’ Disorders and African Nationalism

In August 1948, the Colonial Office requested all colonial police forces to submit reports on their strength, efficiency, and equipment. The Colonial Office’s call for these reports was influenced by the recent Gold Coast riots and the start of the Malayan Emergency which the Secretary of State described as having been motivated by communism.⁴²⁹ In February 1948, the colonial administration in the Gold Coast faced a security crisis when rioters in Accra and surrounding areas stormed the streets and looted foreign businesses for 3 days. Although the tensions that led to the riots had been building up for some time, it was the police’s fatal shooting of protesters at a political demonstration led by an organization of Second World War veterans that sparked them. The Gold Coast had also been faced with problems of inflation and unemployment which caused great discontentment among the Africans. The British officials failed to recognize the troubles as a result of anti-colonial frustrations, but instead labelled them as an international communist plot to undermine British political control in West Africa.⁴³⁰ The Malayan Emergency, however, was different from what had happened in Ghana. The Emergency had been declared on 18 June 1948, after the murder of 3 Europeans in the territory, and this marked the beginning of an armed insurgency that would last 12 years.⁴³¹ The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its armed wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), waged a guerrilla war against the British-led security forces with the objective of establishing a Communist People’s Democratic Republic of Malaya. Other objectives of the

⁴²⁹ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Colonial Office, London to Government Secretaries in the colonies and dependencies, 5 August 1948.

⁴³⁰ C. Arnold, “The cat’s Paw of Dictatorship”: Police Intelligence and Self-Rule in the Gold Coast, 1948-1952,” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 11:2 (2020): 167. See also; Rathbone, R. “Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21:3 (1993) pp. 107-128; D. Killingray & D. Anderson, “An Orderly Retreat? Policing the end of Empire,” in *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 1.

⁴³¹ A. J. Stockwell, “‘A Widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya’? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21: 3 (1993): 66.

CPM included expropriation of British property in Malaya, the nationalization of monopolistic capital, racial equality and the restoration of land to the people.⁴³² Although the situation in Malaya involved a communist party, which was not the case in the Gold Coast, the Colonial Office labelled both the Accra riots and the beginning of the Malayan Emergency as communist-inspired. Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones, therefore, emphasized the importance of ensuring that police forces around the empire were ready and capable to deal with internal threats of that nature.⁴³³

In the Bechuanaland Protectorate, however, the colonial government and police authorities were not alarmed by the Secretary of State's concerns about the recent disorders in Malaya and in the Gold Coast. In September 1948, the commissioner of the BPP, M. Langley, believed that such disorders were unlikely to happen in the Protectorate because the seed of communism would land on infertile ground in Bechuanaland. This was because of the absence of a large African intelligentsia in the Protectorate and stereotypes around the peaceful nature of the Tswana people and their natural respect for traditional authority. Since there were no known disruptive influences of a serious magnitude in the Protectorate, Langley argued there was no cause for the immediate adoption of any elaborate and costly precautions.⁴³⁴ Resident Commissioner Anthony Sillery also believed that the BPP, which in 1948 had 38 European and 214 African personnel, was adequate and that with the help of colonial officials and the African chiefs, the force would easily cope with the localized outbreaks of the kind that were reported in the Gold Coast. Officials acknowledged, however, that based on its numbers alone, it would be difficult for the force to deal with a territory-wide outbreak, especially if the native

⁴³² L. Comber, *Malaya's Secret Police, 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency*. (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2008), 10.

⁴³³ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Colonial Office, London to Government Secretaries in the colonies and dependencies, 5 August 1948.

⁴³⁴ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 4 September 1948.

authorities were not to actively assist the colonial government.⁴³⁵ An aspect of the BPP which was still found deficient was intelligence gathering. There was no proper system in the Protectorate by which subversive intentions on the part of the people could be brought to the notice of the government. In 1949, therefore, Police Commissioner Langley went on a tour of the Protectorate with the view of setting up a small intelligence organization that would be headed by himself with the help of the District Commissioners in gathering political intelligence. In a small colonial service like that of the Protectorate with limited staff, a small intelligence gathering system such as what Langley was contemplating was more economic and efficient.⁴³⁶

It is worthwhile pointing out that the events in the Gold Coast and Malaya took place at the beginning of the Cold War. The Anglo-American relationship with the Soviet Union in the period following the end of WWII had been characterized by a clash of ideologies and attempts by both sides to achieve maximum political influence in the post-war world.⁴³⁷ Historian Phillip Deery argues that the Malayan Emergency marked the beginning of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, bringing to reality, the fears of British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, who had described the conditions in the region as favourable for the spread of communism.⁴³⁸ Other scholars have argued that from the late 1940s, the Soviet Union began to issue directives to various communist parties in Southeast Asia, and that it was these instructions that informed the activities of the Malayan Communist Party, resulting in the state of emergency in the territory.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁵ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Acting High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 September 1948.

⁴³⁶ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 22 June 1948.

⁴³⁷ J. L. Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*. (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 18.

⁴³⁸ P. Deery, "Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 9:1 (2007): 30.

⁴³⁹ K. Hack, "The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya, 1948," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 40:3 (2009): 473.

Coinciding with the beginning of the Cold War in the post-WWII period, nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments grew in colonial Africa. WWII itself had caused resentment to colonial rule because of the increased demands for resources from African colonies during the war. As historians David Killingray and Richard Rathbone explain, Europe's relationship with Africa during the war became that of extreme economic exploitation. For example, the loss of rubber and tin from Southeast Asia in 1942 led the allied powers to depend on African sources of these commodities. WWII propaganda about the Allied ideals of freedom and democracy became influential among African nationalists, especially following the independence of Asian countries like British-ruled India in 1947 and French Indochina 1954.⁴⁴⁰ The end of WWII had brought with it economic and social hardships to Europe and African colonies alike. The failure of African colonial governments to alleviate these economic and social challenges in their territories, coupled with the growth of an educated African middle class, created a favourable atmosphere for the development of political movements in the colonies. As a result, the post-war period became characterized by rising nationalist protest, which in some territories, culminated into wars of independence. The civil colonial police forces that existed during this period, therefore, found themselves faced with the challenge of policing political disorder; a task for which many of them were not fully prepared.⁴⁴¹

As historian David Birmingham has pointed out, African nationalism was not a homogeneous ideological and political force that pushed colonial powers into decolonization. In each colony, various factors bred anti-colonial sentiments, which in turn shaped the nationalist cause as the leaders of these movements sought the popular support of their fellow

⁴⁴⁰ D. Killingray & R. Rathbone, "Introduction," in *Africa and the Second World War*, eds. D. Killingray and R. Rathbone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 9. See also, Byfield, J.A et al., eds., *Africa and World War II*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), T. Stapleton, *A Military History of Africa: The Colonial Period: From the Scramble for Africa to the Algerian Independence War (ca. 1870-1963)*, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2013).

⁴⁴¹ D. Killingray & D. Anderson, "An Orderly Retreat? ...", 11.

Africans.⁴⁴² The growth of African nationalism in the various colonies and the spread of nationalist protest led to the eventual militarization of colonial police forces. During the decolonization period, the colonial police forces found themselves performing a dual role. They were firstly responsible for general civil policing, which involved the detection and prevention of crime as well as the enforcement of law. Another role they quickly adopted, however, was that of internal security, which involved dealing with the unrest and insurrection that was caused by anti-colonial politics. To achieve this second role, as it will be shown below, the colonial police forces were re-equipped and reorganized, and new units were formed to deal specifically with the challenges arising from anti-colonial political activities.⁴⁴³

The BPP and the Bangwato Disturbances

Although nationalist sentiments had not yet developed in the Bechuanaland Protectorate in the late 1940s, the territory still experienced some disturbances that presented a challenge to the colonial administration. The royal conflict in the Bangwato Reserve, which was caused by the marriage of Seretse Khama to English woman Ruth Williams, resulted in the BPP's biggest security challenge of the late colonial era. The conflict, which would culminate in a bloody riot at Serowe in 1952, put the efficiency of the BPP to the test, and the force ultimately proved incapable of suppressing violence. Interestingly, however, following the Gold Coast riots and the beginning of the Malayan Emergency, the Bechuanaland police authorities had been confident in the capabilities of the force, considering it to be competent and adequate for maintaining order in the Protectorate.

Seretse Khama had met Ruth Williams while he was in law school in London and married her in September 1948. This marriage outraged Seretse's traditionalist uncle Tshekedi Khama, who had been Bangwato regent for 23 years. Just like Tshekedi, the vast majority of

⁴⁴² Birmingham, *The Decolonization of Africa...*, 4.

⁴⁴³ Killingray & Anderson, "An Orderly Retreat? ...", 5.

the Bangwato people were against Seretse's marriage to Ruth and they opposed his ascension and installation to the throne for as long as he remained married to her.⁴⁴⁴ Between November and December 1948, two kgotla (traditional assembly) meetings were held to publicly discuss Seretse's marriage. At both kgotla meetings, Seretse was forced to choose between his wife and the Bangwato chieftaincy and each time he refused to choose, insisting instead, that the Bangwato should accept his wife if they wanted him to be chief. At the third kgotla, in June 1949, after a moving speech by Seretse, the Bangwato people had a change of heart and accepted him as their rightful chief.⁴⁴⁵ Tshekedi, having lost the confidence of the people, announced his intentions to step down as regent although he was willing to serve the Bangwato people in some capacity. Together with some of his followers, he moved to the village of Rametsana in the Bakwena Reserve, where he vowed to continue fighting against Seretse's marriage. There was also some belief among the Bangwato people that Tshekedi wanted to assume the chieftaincy for himself. Historian Neil Parsons states that Tshekedi resigned from the regency and exiled himself in Rametsana to wait for the colonial government to officially install him as the full chief to replace Seretse.⁴⁴⁶

The marriage of Seretse and Ruth also had consequences that were related to the politics of the region. The settler minority governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa which had for a long time hoped to incorporate the Protectorate, protested the marriage, and their pressure on the High Commissioner led the British government to force Seretse into exile. To Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, an interracial marriage of a chief just outside their borders was a subversion of the notions of racial, social and political separation, which they held

⁴⁴⁴ R. Hyam, "The Political Consequences of Seretse Khama: Britain, the Bangwato and South Africa, 1948-1952," *The Historical Journal*, 29:4 (1986): 924.

⁴⁴⁵ W. Harragin, R.S. Hudson, G.E. Nettelton, "Report of the Judicial Enquiry Re Seretse Khama of the Bamangwato Tribe," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 17:1 (1985): 54.

⁴⁴⁶ N. Parsons, "Give us your Trousers!": The Role of Women in the Serowe Kgotla Riot in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, June 1952," Seminar Paper: Stanford University, African Studies Seminar, 2003: V.

strongly.⁴⁴⁷ The acceptance of Seretse as chief by the Bangwato happened just a year after the National Party came into power in South Africa, which marked the official entrenchment of apartheid in that territory. The National Party also wanted to distance South Africa from Britain. The British government, therefore, felt that their official recognition of Seretse as chief would represent a threat to the relationship of South Africa with the Commonwealth. As a result, Seretse was invited back to Britain in 1950. After being asked to renounce his chieftaincy for some money, a request that he declined, Seretse was subsequently banned from returning to the Protectorate.⁴⁴⁸

The exile of Seretse Khama caused displeasure among the Bangwato people and eventually the BPP found itself involved in the dispute. On 10 July 1951, the BPP was anonymously informed of an imminent raid by some villagers from Serowe, led by members of the Malekantwa age regiment on the village of Shashane (possibly Shoshong). The aim of the raid was to evict some of Tshekedi's suspected followers from Shashane, who were now referred to as Bo-Rametsana, in association with the Bakwena village that Tshekedi had retired to in 1949.⁴⁴⁹ Owing to the anger and volatile mood of the people of Serowe, the BPP allowed for the raiding party of about 60 Malekantwa to leave for Shashane, and after some time went in pursuit of them. At 5:00 p.m., less than an hour following the departure of the raiding party's 2 trucks, Inspector Whitsitt, who was the officer in command at Serowe, was ordered by the police commissioner to detail Sub-Inspector D.J.D. Knight and 12 African police and follow the Malekantwa regiment.⁴⁵⁰ Just outside of Serowe, the BPP trucks encountered a roadblock of about 200 men, which tried to prevent the police from pursuing the Malekantwa trucks. At

⁴⁴⁷ Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation...", 29.

⁴⁴⁸ Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation...", 30.

⁴⁴⁹ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 20 July 1951.

⁴⁵⁰ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 20 July 1951.

this roadblock, Inspector Whitsitt spoke to Keaboka Kgamane, the interim Bangwato leader who also headed the pro-Seretse group against Tshekedi's traditionalist faction. Keaboka attempted to deceive the police by saying that no trucks carrying Malekantwa men had passed, but Whitsitt informed him that the BPP was aware of the raid on Shashane, and that if any of his men tried to stop the police, they would be arrested and charged. The police, therefore, went through the roadblock and eventually caught up with the Malekantwa who, however, refused to stop.⁴⁵¹

About 7 miles out of Shashane, Whitsitt's truck was able to overtake the two other trucks and force them to stop, while Sub-Inspector Knight pulled up behind them to prevent them from going in reverse. When the men were told that they would not be allowed to proceed to Shashane, they began shouting wildly, with one of them pointing a rifle at Whitsitt. Sub-Inspector Knight took up a position to cover his commanding officer, and immediately the Malekantwa dispersed into the bushes, encouraging each other to proceed to Shashane on foot.⁴⁵² Whitsitt called back the African police who were about to give chase, and after immobilizing the two abandoned vehicles, the BPP also proceeded to Shashane where they arrived before the Malekantwa. The police positioned themselves inside a stockade surrounding a cluster of huts belonging to the Bo-Rametsana, who had already fled. When the Malekantwa finally arrived, the BPP men tried to block all three entrances of the stockade. The mob, however, took down the gate, and advanced on the police brandishing large sticks, axes and other objects. With their backs against the stockade, the BPP men surged forward and began to strike the Malekantwa with their batons until the latter started disappearing into the

⁴⁵¹ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 21 July 1951.

⁴⁵² TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Statement of No. 2977 Sub-Inspector D.J.D. Knight, Stationed at Serowe Security Camp, nd.

night. The BPP men managed to arrest 4 Malekantwa, then rushed to their trucks and headed back to Serowe.⁴⁵³

About 1 mile outside of Serowe, the two BPP trucks encountered another roadblock by the people of the village, who had lit fires across the road. The District Commissioner and Police Commissioner Langley were already at the roadblock attempting to dissuade the crowd from carrying on with their intention of retaliating against Whitsitt and his men for interfering with their raid on the Bo-Rametsana. Shortly after the arrival of police reinforcements, Police Commissioner Langley began to prepare them for dispersing the villagers.⁴⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the crowd of villagers noticed the 4 Malekantwa prisoners at the back of Whitsitt's truck and began to run towards it, with the intension of freeing them from police custody. Whitsitt started up his truck, and ordered Knight to do the same, and the 2 trucks drove straight into the oncoming crowd that was carrying blazing pieces of wood. Many of them threw the burning sticks at the cabs of the advancing BPP trucks although no one was injured. The 2 trucks made it through the roadblock and returned to the security camp where they detained the prisoners.⁴⁵⁵ The Resident Commissioner praised the BPP for their conduct during the events of 10 July 1951, describing them as having shown the greatest restraint under serious provocation by not firing a single shot at the aggressors. While this may have been true, it also spoke volumes about how little respect the BPP commanded among the people. The events of that day had only offered a glimpse of what would happen at Serowe in the next year, where the BPP, together with its reinforcements from Basutoland and Swaziland, failed at deescalating protests that turned violent.

⁴⁵³ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Statement of No. 2919 Inspector W. Whitsitt, Stationed at Serowe Security Camp, nd.

⁴⁵⁴ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 21 July 1951.

⁴⁵⁵ TNA, FCO. 141/1176, Statement of No. 1884 Constable Mogatle, Stationed at Serowe Security Camp, nd.

On 1 June 1952, the Bangwato's discontentment over the exile of Seretse Khama erupted into a bloody riot at the Serowe kgotla. On 21 May, a delegation of 6 Bangwato men had returned to Serowe from a futile trip to London, where they failed to convince the British government to restore to them, their rightful chief, Seretse Khama. Furthermore, the British government initiated an Order-in-Council, by which it would install Rasebolai Kgamane as chief of the Bangwato. This led to a series of protest meetings in the smaller kgotlas where the pro-Seretse people voiced their fears that the British government was trying to re-impose the rule of Tshekedi through Rasebolai.⁴⁵⁶ From 21 to 31 May 1952, a series of defiant actions towards the District Commissioner had led to the ban of all kgotla meetings, a ban on hunting permits and ammunition, as well as a prohibition of the sale of beer. By this time, the colonial administration had recognized that the BPP alone, would not be able to cope with the incipient troubles. Police reinforcements were, therefore, brought in from Basutoland and Swaziland, arriving in Serowe at 4:00 am on 1 June 1952.⁴⁵⁷ In the afternoon of 1 June, there were major confrontations at the kgotla between the demonstrators and police. The District Commissioner, standing behind lines of police with riot gear, tried to warn off the protesters with a loudspeaker. The crowd, instead, with women at the forefront, advanced towards the lines of police with sticks and stones intending to attack the District Commissioner. Tear-gas was fired into the angry crowd and violence broke out in the kgotla.⁴⁵⁸ As the police trucks attempted to drive off from the kgotla with the District Commissioner, 1 African policeman (sources do not state which one of the HCTs he was from) was dragged out of the vehicle and killed by the angry protesters. Two African members of the Basutoland Mounted Police were also chased and subsequently beaten to death.⁴⁵⁹ The outburst of violence in a territory understood by the

⁴⁵⁶ N. Parsons, "The Serowe Riot of 1952: Popular Opposition to Tshekedi Khama and Colonial Rule in Botswana," *Collected Seminar Papers*. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 40 (1990): 24.

⁴⁵⁷ Parsons, "Give us your Trousers...", XVII

⁴⁵⁸ Parsons, "The Serowe Riot of 1952...", 25.

⁴⁵⁹ Parsons, "Give us your Trousers...", XIX.

administration to be tranquil was a surprise for the Bangwato and the British alike. On 2 June 1952, reinforcements of the BSAP arrived from Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia to contain the situation in the Bangwato Reserve. Although no further violence occurred after 1 June, the visible presence of the BSAP detachments in the reserve, together with the BPP and other HCT reinforcements was instrumental in keeping the peace.⁴⁶⁰ During the riots, however, the BPP and its reinforcements had proved incapable of handling disturbances of that magnitude. The riots had been an embarrassment to the Protectorate government and the police authorities in Bechuanaland, who in 1948, had insisted that the BPP was adequate and capable of dealing with any sort of local uprisings that could occur. The fact that the BPP had to be bailed out by forces from neighbouring territories showed that the BPP was not as capable as officials claimed.

The Militarization of Police and Occupation of the Bangwato Reserve

Following the Serowe riots in June 1952, the Protectorate administration made efforts to strengthen the police force in Bechuanaland and increase its presence in the Bangwato Reserve as a way of guarding against further disturbances. However, being the marginal territory that it was, the Protectorate's attempts at bolstering the security forces in the Bangwato Reserve were limited by financial constraints. Lack of adequate funding in Bechuanaland, therefore, often subjected the Protectorate administration to the tedious red tape involved in the process of acquiring financial assistance from the British government. Fears of under-policing the Bangwato Reserve led the Protectorate government to constantly request further funding, while the British government reluctantly continued the financial support with the hope that it would not be long before the political situation in the reserve settled down.

⁴⁶⁰TNA, DO. 35/4150, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 18 June 1952.

The Protectorate's attempts at increasing the strength of the police force in the Bangwato Reserve came at a time when similar measures were being taken in other colonies. The period between 1946 and 1960 in Africa saw the gradual increase in the strength of colonial police forces, but also the creation of new para-military units designed to suppress uprisings and opposition to the colonial state.⁴⁶¹ With the economies of different British territories struggling to recover from the effects of WWII, the standard of African social and economic life in the colonies gradually declined. Sentiments of African nationalism became even more pronounced in this period, giving rise to some liberation movements that called for the end of colonial rule.⁴⁶² This informed the decisions by various British colonial authorities to militarize their police forces and create specific units dedicated to combatting unrest in the colonies.

In 1947 for example, the colonial government in Kenya witnessed the biggest workers' strike in the history of the territory. The Mombasa general strike represented the culmination of a series of strikes in the territory dating back to the 1930s. The end of WWII had brought with it more pressures on the colonial government as workers demanded higher wages as well as better living and working conditions.⁴⁶³ In 1948, therefore, as a response to the Mombasa strikes, and the growing disturbances in the Kikuyu Reserve that would culminate into the Mau-Mau Emergency in 1952, the Kenya government created a police reaction unit that was meant to be able to respond swiftly to any uprising in the territory.⁴⁶⁴ The Police Emergency Company, as the unit was called, was equipped with light machine guns, rifles, grenades and armoured vehicles. In 1949, it was reconstructed and renamed the Kenya Police Emergency

⁴⁶¹ Killingray, "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa...", 421.

⁴⁶² Deflem, "Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa...", 53.

⁴⁶³ T. Zeleza, "The Strike Movement in Colonial Kenya: The Era of the General Strikes," *Transafrican Journal of History*, 22:1 (1993): 10.

⁴⁶⁴ For the Mau Mau Emergency, see; H. Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 8. See also; N. van der Bijl, *Mau Mau Rebellion: The Emergency in Kenya, 1952-1956*. (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2017), C. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).

Company.⁴⁶⁵ The regular police, however, continued to struggle with policing the colony as the social and economic changes brought about by the demands of WWII had led to a drastic rise in urban crime rates, while the number of convictions declined. Offenses against property in the White Highlands rose from 3,017 in 1940 to 7,274 in 1949 while crimes against persons doubled in Mombasa and some settled areas and trebled in Nairobi.⁴⁶⁶

In the Gold Coast too, the colonial administration had recognized the inadequacy of the police force. The Gold Coast Police was stretched to its maximum in performing its regular civil duties of detecting and preventing crime, while also policing the growing political activity by the Africans. As regular law enforcement became increasingly difficult, the colonial government either looked the other way, handed over the responsibility to private organizations, or accepted the reality that new legislation was due.⁴⁶⁷ Considering the deficiency of the Gold Coast Police, the government created a Police Mobile Force in 1947 to combat any possible unrest in the territory. Between December 1947 and September 1951, this Police Mobile Force was used at least 200 times in the Gold Coast, including the Accra riots of February 1948.⁴⁶⁸

During the early 1950s, the Nyasaland Protectorate also strengthened its police force as a response to rising nationalist protest in the territory. With growing African nationalism in the territory, African chieftaincy, which was part of the colonial system, was beginning to lose its authority over the people. This manifested in the form of localized riots in districts such as Cholo, Chikwawa and Domasi, where chiefs considered to be sympathizers and supporters of

⁴⁶⁵ D. A. Percox, "Mau Mau & the Arming of the State," in *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority & Narration*, eds. E.S.A. Odhiambo & J. Lonsdale (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), 126. See also Killingray, "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa...", 421.

⁴⁶⁶ D. Throup, "Crime, Politics and the Police in Colonial Kenya, 1939-63," in *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and Police, 1917-65*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 130.

⁴⁶⁷ Killingray, "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa...", 421.

⁴⁶⁸ R. Rathbone, "Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21:3 (1993): 108.

the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were targeted.⁴⁶⁹ As a way of strengthening the coercive arm of the colonial state, a Police Mobile Force was created in 1954 to deal specifically with violent disturbances in Nyasaland and the unit quickly gained a reputation for brutality. Most of the 14 European officers in the Police Mobile Force were experienced former members of the Palestine Police Force, who had been involved in its violent suppression of the Arab revolt in Palestine between 1936 and 1939. The 200 local recruits were men with a minimum of 5 years of military experience, many having served in Burma during WWII or Malaya during the ongoing emergency.⁴⁷⁰ In the years to come, the Police Mobile Force would be used to enforce government agricultural policies in the districts and after January 1959, it was at the forefront of combatting the increasingly militant Nyasaland African Congress.⁴⁷¹

Although the political atmosphere in Bechuanaland during this period was different from the territories mentioned above, the disturbances in the Bangwato Reserve had warranted the strengthening of the police force in the territory. In July 1952, Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins made an urgent request for the return of the BSAP contingent that had been in the Bangwato Reserve for over a month. After some negotiations, High Commissioner Sir John Le Rougetel arranged for the return of 40 BSAP men, leaving behind 37. To Le Rougetel, the release of the entire BSAP contingent would have caused a serious threat to the security of the reserve.⁴⁷² Police Commissioner Langley felt, however, that if the police presence in the reserve could be strengthened through the acquisition of 2 armoured trucks, then the services of the remaining 37 BSAP men would no longer be required. In a

⁴⁶⁹ O.J.M. Kalinga, "Resistance, Politics of Protest, and Mass Nationalism in Colonial Malawi, 1950 to 1960: A Reconsideration," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 36: 143 (1996): 448.

⁴⁷⁰ J. McCracken, "Authority and Legitimacy in Malawi: Policing and Politics in a Colonial State," in *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and Police, 1917-65*, eds. D. Anderson & D. Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 175.

⁴⁷¹ McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland...", 141.

⁴⁷² TNA, DO. 35/4281, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 7 August 1952.

move to militarize the BPP, therefore, Le Rougetel negotiated with the South African government for the purchase of 2 reconditioned GMC trucks with side armour for a combined price of £1,800.⁴⁷³

Until early August 1952, there had been detachments of police from Basutoland, Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia in the Bangwato Reserve. Over this period, most of the BPP's total strength of about 250 men, had been also concentrated at that reserve, drastically reducing the number of police available elsewhere in the Protectorate. Considering it necessary to extensively police the Bangwato Reserve for no less than 12 months, Police Commissioner Langley called for the creation of a temporary security force comprising 3 European gazetted officers, 6 European non-gazetted officers and 87 African constables from all the 3 HCTs.⁴⁷⁴ Two European gazetted officers were seconded from Basutoland, while the third was recruited from South Africa. The British Treasury Office sanctioned 1 supernumerary post of assistant superintendent in the BPP, to allow for the recruitment of an experienced officer from the South African Police to take charge in the Bangwato Reserve. This was done on the understanding that the officer would be absorbed into the BPP when the temporary security force was dissolved. For the 6 European non-gazetted posts, 1 was seconded from Swaziland, another was obtained locally from the BPP, while the remaining 4 were recruited from Britain. These posts too, were on a permanent basis, with the plan that the sub-inspectors would be absorbed into any of the HCT forces when their work in the Bangwato Reserve was complete.⁴⁷⁵

To come up with the 87 African constables required for policing the Bangwato Reserve, 25 recruits were engaged in Basutoland, and after short but intensive training, they were sent to the reserve to relieve the members of the Basutoland Mounted Police who had been there

⁴⁷³ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Treasury, London to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 20 August 1952.

⁴⁷⁴ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Commonwealth Relations Office, London to Treasury, London, 11 August 1952.

⁴⁷⁵ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Treasury, London to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 11 August 1952.

since June. The 25 recruits were engaged on a permanent basis, to be absorbed into both the BPP and Basutoland Mounted Police as vacancies became available in the normal establishment of these forces.⁴⁷⁶ The 15 men of the Swaziland Police in the Bangwato Reserve were retained there for another 6 months, while the Swaziland Protectorate was authorized to recruit 15 temporary replacements for that period. Concurrent with the arrangements made in the Swaziland and Basutoland police forces, Bechuanaland recruited 62 Africans on a temporary basis for service in the reserve. At the end of 6 months, it was intended that 15 of these recruits would replace the men from Swaziland, while the remaining 47 would be used in other parts of Bechuanaland to replace the BPP men concentrated at the reserve. The overall costs for the creation of the temporary security force in the Bangwato Reserve was £19,500, an expenditure which the Treasury Office argued was excessive for policing a single reserve.⁴⁷⁷ The Commonwealth Relations Office, however, impressed upon the Treasury Office, the importance of approving the expenditure involved. As the Bangwato troubles were far from over, it was important to have a strong security force, not only to effectively deal with any possible uprising, but to also exercise a deterrent influence on those who would otherwise be tempted to once again protest.⁴⁷⁸ What the Commonwealth Relations Office argued for, was a military occupation of the Bangwato Reserve, which was meant to deprive the people of their rightful ruler. It was on these grounds that the Treasury Office approved the expenditure involved in setting up the temporary security force in the Bangwato Reserve.

When the formation of the temporary security force was approved and financed in August 1952, the colonial administration intended for the force to remain in the Bangwato Reserve for 1 year. However, provision had only been made for the first 6 months of the

⁴⁷⁶ TNA, DO. 35/4281, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 7 August 1952.

⁴⁷⁷ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Treasury, London to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 20 August 1952.

⁴⁷⁸ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Commonwealth Relations Office, London to Treasury, London, 11 August 1952.

financial year, with the hope that an improvement of the security conditions in the reserve would make further funding unnecessary.⁴⁷⁹ After 1 year, the conditions in the Bangwato Reserve were slowly settling down. However, with the appointment of Rasebolai Kgamane as African authority, there were some areas within the reserve, particularly Serowe, where there was still resistance to his rule. For as long as Seretse Khama remained in exile, there were those who continued to undermine the colonial government and its chosen African leader Rasebolai. It was, therefore, necessary to keep the security force in the reserve for a further 6 months at a cost of £10,000.⁴⁸⁰ The Protectorate administration once again had to painstakingly go through the excessive bureaucracy involved in sourcing funding from the British government. Still dubious about the necessity for the security force in the Bangwato Reserve, the Treasury Office approved the required expenditure of £ 10,000 with conditions. The approval was given on the understanding that the situation in the reserve would be reviewed at the end of the financial year, or as soon as the conditions in the reserve no longer required the temporary security force.⁴⁸¹ Although the Protectorate government had required £10,000 for the rest of the 1952-1953 financial year, it settled for £6,029. This was a welcomed saving for the Treasury Office, which was anxious to see the withdrawal of the security force in the Bangwato Reserve and for the return of regular civil policing in the Protectorate. The reduced funding, however, did not have any impact on the policing of the reserve as no more disturbances occurred.⁴⁸²

In March 1954, the Protectorate government decided that while it would be unwise to dispense with the entire security force in the Bangwato Reserve, the unit could be reduced. For a further 6 months, ending on 30 September 1954, the security force in the reserve was downsized to 1 assistant superintendent, 2 sub-inspectors and 46 African constables. The cost

⁴⁷⁹ TNA, DO. 35/4281, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Commonwealth Relations Office, 4 August 1953.

⁴⁸⁰ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Commonwealth Relations Office, London to Treasury, London, 10 August 1953.

⁴⁸¹ TNA, DO. 35/4281, Treasury, London to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 18 August 1953.

⁴⁸² TNA, DO. 35/4281, High Commissioner, Cape Town to Secretary of State, London, 6 November 1953.

of maintaining the force at these numbers for 6 months was estimated to be £5, 950.⁴⁸³ The security force in the Bangwato Reserve was to be maintained at this strength until March 1955, just a year before the return of Seretse Khama and his wife from exile. When the security force was finally dissolved, the BPP deployed an intelligence field detachment in the Bangwato Reserve. The intelligence detachment comprised 1 detective sub-inspector and 16 detectives, mostly Batswana.⁴⁸⁴ Having Batswana detectives in the intelligence detachment was important for the BPP as these men had a superior knowledge of Setswana and could easily infiltrate the Bangwato people. Although there were no further disturbances in the Bangwato Reserve, the period from 1952 to 1955 was characterized by a tense atmosphere, especially in Serowe.

The Formation of a Rifle Club Association

In 1953, as part of the militarization of the police in the Protectorate and as an effort to ensure reliable supplementary personnel for the BPP in times of emergencies, the colonial administration and police authorities expressed the need to establish a territory-wide rifle association. The objective of the envisaged association was to form the primary support system for the BPP in the internal security of the Protectorate, and to organize target-shooting competitions for members.⁴⁸⁵ It was, however, not until late 1955 that efforts to create the rifle association were initiated, after the Bechuanaland government consulted with that of Swaziland on the running and administration of such an organization.

It is important to point out here that rifle clubs and associations in colonial Africa were not a new thing, especially in territories with settler populations. For example, in the British colony of Natal, rifle associations were first formed in 1862 to encourage shooting amongst members for the defence of British life and property. Membership in these rifle clubs was

⁴⁸³ TNA, DO. 35/4281, High Commissioner, Cape Town, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 23 March 1954.

⁴⁸⁴ TNA, DO. 35/4281, High Commissioner, Cape Town, to Secretary of State, London, 17 March 1955.

⁴⁸⁵ BNARS, S. 207/2, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 21 August 1953.

reserved for white people only and not Africans. When the colony attained responsible government in 1893, a small volunteer force was formed for the defence of the territory. In 1898, the rifle associations in the colony were officially adopted as a reserve force to assist the Natal Volunteer Force in times of emergency.⁴⁸⁶ Following the attainment of self-government by the Boers of the Transvaal Colony in 1907, Prime Minister Louis Botha resurrected the pre-Anglo-Boer War commandos as rifle clubs. Afrikaners discharged from the Transvaal Volunteer Force, which was formed in 1902, found a home in these rifle clubs, which were built on republican traditions and offered leadership positions for those disappointed in the Volunteer Force.⁴⁸⁷

In the early 1900s, the white settlers of Livingstone in Northern Rhodesia, founded a rifle association which had a dual purpose. The association was meant to create an opportunity for European men and women to come together for socialization, but also to provide security and defence for them in the event of an uprising by the African population. By 1905, the rifle association was not only a necessary measure for 'self-protection' by the Europeans, but it became an integral component of colonial culture. European men and women in Livingstone were increasingly encouraged to take part in the association and its frequent competitions to sharpen their marksmen skills.⁴⁸⁸ This reflected a militarization of a settler community, influenced by European fears of African resistance to colonial rule.

Even in colonies without settlers, like Nigeria, the first rifle clubs were established in the 1880s as a leisure activity by military officers and colonial administrators. As colonialism extended into the hinterland, rifle clubs began to increase in number, where Europeans met to

⁴⁸⁶ P. Thompson, "The Natal Militia: Defence of the Colony, 1893-1910," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, 29:1 (2011): 28.

⁴⁸⁷ I. van der Waag, "Rural Struggles and the Politics of a Colonial Command: The Southern Mounted Rifles of the Transvaal Volunteers, 1905-1912," in *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918*, ed. S. Miller (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 269.

⁴⁸⁸ A. L. Arrington-Sirois, *Victoria Falls and Colonial Immigration in Colonial Southern Africa: Turning Water into Gold*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 174.

socialize and practice their shooting, while Africans only watched with amazement since they were barred from joining these clubs.⁴⁸⁹ The exclusion of Africans from rifle clubs although they could watch or hear the shooting was meant to have a psychological effect on them. It showed the Africans that the Europeans were prepared to defend themselves in the event of an uprising by the former. Following the outbreak of WWI, the importance of rifle clubs extended further from their recreational purpose. In Lagos for example, the local rifle club was constituted into the Lagos Defence Force, which was meant to defend the colony in the event of a German invasion.⁴⁹⁰ As historian David Killingray points out, the small number of Europeans in colonies other than those of white settlement, meant that regular shooting practise had to be maintained, especially after WWI. This was done through volunteer organizations such as local defence associations and rifle clubs. Rifle clubs began to enjoy government subsidies in the interwar period as a third-line of defence in the colonies, but as time passed, some began to disappear. However, whenever there were fears of imminent unrest in the colonies, the Europeans were swift to reform the rifle clubs.⁴⁹¹

In the Bechuanaland Protectorate too, exclusively white rifle clubs had existed in Lobatse, Molepolole, Gaborone, Mahalapye, Serowe Francistown and Maun before the 1950s. The rifle clubs had faced some challenges in the past and could not be sustained because of low membership and difficulties in obtaining ammunition from the cash-strapped government.⁴⁹² Following the disturbances in the Bangwato Reserve, however, the Protectorate government found it necessary to revive these rifle clubs to form a reserve force for the BPP. At a meeting of the European Advisory Council in November 1955, members agreed on the benefit that rifle clubs could bring to the internal security of the Protectorate and approved their

⁴⁸⁹ S. Aderinto, *Guns and Society in Colonial Nigeria: Firearms, Culture and Public Order*. (Bloomington: University Press, 2018), 134.

⁴⁹⁰ Aderinto, *Guns and Society in Colonial Nigeria...*, 134.

⁴⁹¹ Killingray, *The Maintenance of Law and Order...*, 432.

⁴⁹² BNARS, S. 207/2, Minutes of the 57th Session of the European Advisory Council, 21 November 1955.

revival.⁴⁹³ It was agreed that in order to ensure government control, the various rifle clubs would have to be federated into an association under the authority of the police commissioner. In December 1955, the Protectorate government issued a draft proclamation of the formation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Rifle Association, which was meant to come into existence in March 1956.⁴⁹⁴

Placing the rifle clubs under the control of the police commissioner was meant to enable him to call upon them to assist the BPP in the suppression of possible disturbances in the Protectorate. The police commissioner held the power to approve the formation of as many rifle clubs affiliated to the BPP Rifle Association as he deemed necessary, but also to disband any rifle club in the Protectorate.⁴⁹⁵ The membership of the rifle clubs was open to every European male resident over the age of 16. The admission or rejection of applicants into the various rifle clubs laid with the police commissioner, who also prescribed the oath to be taken upon attestation.⁴⁹⁶ The exclusivity of the rifle clubs to Europeans not only reinforced notions of racial superiority and discrimination, but also showed that these clubs were being reinstated out of fear of African uprising on the part of the colonists. The language used in the oath of attestation also showed that the BPP Rifle Association was created to form a reserve force for the BPP. Part of the oath stated;

... that I will serve in any emergency or in defence of life and property in any part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate if called upon by the Resident Commissioner, and that in the event of any such emergency, I will serve under and obey the orders of the Police Commissioner if the Resident Commissioner may deem it necessary for me to become a supplementary member of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹³ BNARS, S. 207/2, Minutes of the 57th Session of the European Advisory Council, 21 November 1955.

⁴⁹⁴ BNARS, S. 207/2, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 12 December 1955.

⁴⁹⁵ BNARS, S. 207/2, Bechuanaland Protectorate Proclamation No. 32 of 1956.

⁴⁹⁶ BNARS, S. 207/2, Bechuanaland Protectorate Proclamation No. 32 of 1956.

⁴⁹⁷ BNARS, S. 207/2, Oath to be taken upon attestation in the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Rifle Association, n.d.

The formation of the BPP Rifle Association reflected a reinforcement of the colonial police force but also the militarization of the small settler population in the Protectorate influenced by not only the Bangwato disturbances, but also the numerous uprisings in other parts of the empire in the same period. Although the Bechuanaland government had formed an African police reserve in the late 1940s under the post-WWII reorganizations of the BPP, sources do not show it being relied upon as a reinforcement for the colonial police or how it related to the rifle clubs.

Decentralizing the Command of the BPP

In 1954, Mr I. Stourton, the Deputy Inspector General of Colonial Police in the British Empire paid a visit to the HCTs on a tour of inspection. Among his recommendations for Bechuanaland, Stourton called for the decentralization of command in the BPP. Because of the BPP's preoccupation with policing the Bangwato Reserve, however, the Protectorate was not able to implement the recommendations. It was not until early 1956 that 2 senior superintendent posts were created in the BPP to take charge of the Northern and Southern Division Headquarters of the force respectively.⁴⁹⁸ The decentralization of command was in a broader sense, a continuation of the militarization of the BPP, meant to devolve authority to divisional and district commanders of the force. In cases of localized uprisings, these officers would be free to respond swiftly in the suppression of such troubles, without necessarily waiting for instructions from the police commissioner, which could take time.

By July 1956, the senior officer establishment of the BPP included the police commissioner and his deputy, 2 senior superintendents, and 7 superintendents and assistant superintendents. The junior officer establishment, on the other, hand involved 4 senior inspectors and 32 inspectors and sub-inspectors. Particularly among the inspectorate ranks, the

⁴⁹⁸ BNARS, BNB. 895, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1956.

BPP was on the verge of being 7 men under strength as some men were due for leave and vacation, while others were approaching retirement.⁴⁹⁹ The new Police Commissioner J. Bailey, was also concerned that most men in the inspectorate approaching the end of their initial 2 year period of attestation, were planning on enlisting in the inspectorate cadres of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where the police forces were busy hiring white police to counter mounting black protest. One reason why the junior officers in the Protectorate desired to enlist in the police forces of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was the lack of opportunity for promotion in the inspectorate ranks of the BPP. Furthermore, because of the insufficient numbers of gazetted officers in the force, members of the inspectorate were often called upon to assume these men's duties and responsibilities, without receiving compensation by way of acting rank or pay.⁵⁰⁰ The second, and perhaps primary reason, was the disparity in the salary scales between the BPP and the other colonial forces. In the BPP, the minimum annual salary in the inspectorate was £525 for sub-inspectors while the maximum was £975 for senior inspectors, with the inspectors falling somewhere in the middle. In Northern Rhodesia, the scales were £705 for sub-inspectors and £1,200 for senior inspectors. The BSAP in Southern Rhodesia offered £1,030 for sub-inspectors and £1,400 for senior inspectors.⁵⁰¹ It must be pointed out, however, that in terms of economy, Bechuanaland was much smaller compared to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The 3 member territories had become interdependent and complementary, with the copper mining industry of Northern Rhodesia being the main economic engine of the Federation.⁵⁰² Although policing remained a territorial responsibility and not a federal one, the amalgamated territories had more money and could

⁴⁹⁹ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 12 July 1956.

⁵⁰⁰ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 12 July 1956.

⁵⁰¹ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 12 July 1956.

⁵⁰² L. J. Butler, "Business and British Decolonization: Sir Ronald Prain, the Mining Industry and the Central African Federation," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 35:3 (2007): 462.

decide what to do with it rather than to beg for it from London as the Bechuanaland Protectorate often did.

By September 1956, the Protectorate government was looking to move forward with the policy of decentralization in the BPP, which Police Commissioner Bailey believed could also represent the solution to the undesirable tendency to use the inspectorate to fill up gazetted officer duty posts without the benefits of such positions. With 7 gazetted officer posts and 36 inspectorate posts, the BPP's senior officer establishment was inadequate, and therefore, Bailey called for its increase, with a corresponding decrease in the inspectorate establishment.⁵⁰³ The Protectorate administration, however, also considered it important to have educated European gazetted officers given the growing numbers of educated Africans. Isolated police stations near the border like Machaneng, Kasane or Ghanzi also required educated gazetted officers because of the likelihood of dealing with white settlers from neighbouring territories. There was, therefore, a need for decentralization of command to enable gazetted officers to oversee these places.⁵⁰⁴

In 1956, the hierarchy of command in the BPP extended from the commissioner and his deputy in Mafikeng, to the 2 senior superintendents commanding the Northern and Southern Division Headquarters in Francistown and Gaborone respectively. At a lower level there were 5 superintendents commanding the 5 major police districts whose headquarters were at Maun, Francistown and Serowe in the north and Gaborone and Lobatse in the south.⁵⁰⁵ For these 5 major district headquarters, Police Commissioner Bailey called for an adjustment in the inspectorate to allow for 5 senior inspectors to be stationed there as part of the decentralization of command. These men would be suitable to take charge of the district headquarters if the

⁵⁰³ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Deputy High Commissioner, Pretoria, 19 September 1956.

⁵⁰⁴ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Deputy High Commissioner, Pretoria, 19 September 1956.

⁵⁰⁵ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Commissioner of Police, Mafikeng to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 12 July 1956.

commanding superintendents were absent. Furthermore, Bailey argued that the responsibilities of the officer in charge of CID in the Northern Division as well as the Force Wireless officer, justified the rank of senior inspector. He proposed, therefore, that the number of senior inspectors in the BPP be increased from 4 to 7 and that a corresponding reduction be made in the number of inspectors and sub-inspectors from 27 to 24.⁵⁰⁶

Bailey's proposal also called for decentralization at the smaller and isolated districts, the headquarters of which were also on the Protectorate's border with neighbouring territories. For this level, Bailey argued that the officers in charge, who were Europeans, should hold the rank of assistant superintendent. The first was the Chobe Police District which was on the Protectorate's border with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The assistant superintendent who would be stationed at Kasane, would also oversee the Pandamatenga and Kachikau stations. At the Ghanzi Police District, which bordered South West Africa (South African controlled Namibia), the assistant superintendent would command the Ghanzi and Mamuno police stations. Ghanzi district also had a growing population of European farmers and settlers and, therefore, guided by notions of racial superiority, Bailey believed it required the presence of a white gazetted officer.⁵⁰⁷ At the Kgalagadi Police District, bordering the Cape Province of South Africa, the assistant superintendent was to be in charge of the Tsabong, Tshane and Werda police stations. Lastly, at the Tuli Block Police District, which formed the northeast border with South Africa, and was largely populated by European farmers and settlers, the assistant superintendent was to oversee the Machaneng, Baines Drift and Martin's Drift police stations. In keeping in line with the other HCTs, Bailey called for an upgrade of the officer commanding CID at Gaborone, to the rank of assistant superintendent. The officer

⁵⁰⁶ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Deputy High Commissioner, Pretoria, 19 September 1956.

⁵⁰⁷ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Police Commissioner's Memo on Draft Estimates, 1957-1958: Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

would be in charge of the criminal records office, the fingerprinting bureau, investigating serious crimes in the Southern Division and publishing the police gazette.⁵⁰⁸ For the purpose of leave and vacation relief, Bailey called for the creation of a further 3 posts of assistant superintendent. The additional recurrent cost of Bailey’s proposal was to be £4,500 a year, and it was to be phased in over the 1957-1958 and 1958-1959 financial years.⁵⁰⁹ For purposes of comparison, the existing gazetted and non-gazetted establishment of the BPP and that suggested by Bailey was;

Existing and proposed establishment of gazetted and non-gazetted officers in 1956

Existing: 1 July 1956	Proposed
commissioner 1	commissioner 1
deputy commissioner 1	deputy commissioner 1
senior superintendent 2	senior superintendent 2
	Superintendents 5
superintendents and assistant superintendents 7	Assistant superintendents 10
senior inspectors 4	senior inspectors 7
Inspectors & sub-inspectors 32	Inspectors & sub-inspectors 24
Total: 47	50

Despite some minor criticism from the High Commissioner’s Office regarding the creation of extra inspectorate posts for the purpose of leave relief, Police Commissioner Bailey’s proposal

⁵⁰⁸ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Police Commissioner’s Memo on Draft Estimates, 1957-1958: Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, nd.

⁵⁰⁹ BNARS, S. 311/9/3, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to Deputy High Commissioner, Pretoria, 19 September 1956.

for the decentralization of command in the BPP was ultimately approved in March 1957. The £4,500 annual recurrent cost of the proposal was also approved by the Commonwealth Relations office, and changes in the establishment of the force were implemented over the financial years of 1957-1958 and 1958-1959.⁵¹⁰ The significance of the decentralization of command in the BPP was that it allowed for every police district in the Protectorate to be commanded by a gazetted officer. This was a precautionary measure on the part of the police authorities to be prepared for possible disturbances like those that took place in the Bangwato Reserve in 1951 and 1952. District commanders were now to have the prerogative of dealing with localized disturbances in their jurisdictions as opposed to waiting for instructions from the northern and southern divisional commanders or the police commissioner himself.

Conclusion

Following the 1948 Accra riots and the beginning of the Malayan Emergency, the Colonial Office warned territorial administrators across the British Empire to ensure that their police forces were prepared to deal with similar problems. The increasing social and economic pressures of the post-war period in African colonies had led to the growth of nationalist movements that began to challenge colonial rule. The rise of anti-colonial political activity in the colonies, therefore, prompted the various colonial governments to create new para-military police units to strengthen the coercive arm of the state and to suppress mounting African protests.

In 1952, the colonial government in the Bechuanaland Protectorate militarized the BPP following a bloody riot at the Serowe kgotla. The 1948 marriage of Bangwato heir apparent Seretse Khama to Ruth Williams and his subsequent exile from the territory in 1950, led to the

⁵¹⁰ BNARS, BNB. 896, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1957. & BNARS, BNB. 897, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1958.

biggest internal security crisis faced by the colonial government in the 20th century. Rising discontentment among the Bangwato people with the Protectorate administration over the exile of their rightful chief, had resulted in violent altercations between them and the colonial police in 1951 and 1952. As a result, the colonial government sanctioned a military-style occupation of the Bangwato Reserve by the BPP, Basutoland and Swaziland police for 3 years. The colonial government's fear of further disturbances in the Protectorate also resulted in the 1956 revival of rifle clubs in the territory, which were placed under the control of the BPP to be called upon in the event of more uprisings. This also reflected the militarization of the small settler population in the Protectorate as the membership of the rifle clubs was open to all European male residents of 16 years and above. Another development in the BPP which reflected the government's efforts at preparing the force for possible disturbances in the Protectorate, was the decentralization of command in 1957. The number of gazetted officer posts in the BPP was raised from 7 to 15 in order to allow for senior officers to assume command of all police district headquarters in the territory. These officers could now have the power to authorize the suppression of any localized uprisings within their jurisdiction.

Chapter 5: The Police Force in Bechuanaland's Road to Independence, 1960-1966

Introduction

The early 1960s were characterized by growing African nationalist activities in the white minority-ruled territories of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the same time, and within the context of decolonization in Africa, the British government had begun to consider the question of transferring political power to the African majority in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The political developments that took place in Bechuanaland during the early 1960s have received much attention from historians of Botswana. Furthermore, much has been written about the influence of African nationalist activities in the neighbouring settler territories on the political developments of Bechuanaland, especially as it relates to the emergence of party-based politics.⁵¹¹ However, very little is known about what these developments meant for policing in the Bechuanaland Protectorate in the years leading to the territory's independence. The Bechuanaland government was faced with a conundrum of gradually transferring power to the African majority while attempting to bolster its police force to suppress nationalist protest at the same time.

Political Change in the Protectorate

The year 1960 marked the beginning of Britain's efforts towards the eventual transfer of power to the Africans in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Political change had proceeded swiftly in much of colonial Africa and in 1960, 17 former colonies attained independence. Among these were Nigeria, Somalia, the Congo and most of the French territories in West and Central Africa.⁵¹² This change in policy was underscored by the "winds of change" speech by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at Cape Town in February 1960, where he proclaimed his

⁵¹¹ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*..., 155. See also C.J. Makgala, "The BNF and the BDP's 'Fight' for the Attention of the ANC, 1912-2004: A Historical Perspective," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 38:1 (2006): 118.

⁵¹² D. Birmingham, *The Decolonization of Africa*..., 1.

government's support for majority rule in Africa.⁵¹³ By the end of 1960, therefore, the Commonwealth Relations Office in conjunction with High Commissioner Sir John Maud and Resident Commissioner Sir Peter Fawcus had drawn up a new constitution for the Bechuanaland Protectorate.⁵¹⁴

The Protectorate's new constitution provided for the formation of the Legislative, African, and Executive Councils. The Legislative Council, which comprised 10 Europeans, 10 Africans and 1 Asian, was responsible for making recommendations on the improvement of local government. The African Council, which represented an electoral college for the African members of the Legislative, advised the Resident Commissioner on matters affecting African customs and traditions in as far as government policy and administration were concerned.⁵¹⁵ Lastly, the Executive Council, which met weekly under the chairmanship of the Resident Commissioner, functioned as an advisory cabinet comprising 5 official and 4 unofficial members. The 4 unofficial members of the Executive Council were designated trainee ministers and among them, were the 2 Batswana royals, Seretse Khama and Bathoen II. Seretse Khama, the formerly exiled Bangwato chief and future Prime Minister, was appointed government secretary, while the Bangwaketse chief Bathoen II was responsible for local administration.⁵¹⁶ It is important to point out, however, that the Legislative Council in the Protectorate remained largely symbolic. Much of the legislation was still in the hands of the Protectorate administration and there was no real opposition to government. Regarding the late formation of the Legislative Council in the history of the Protectorate, historian Brian Mokopakgosi has

⁵¹³ F. Myers, "Harold Macmillan's "Winds of Change" Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 3: 4 (2000): 556.

⁵¹⁴ J.J. Zaffiro, "Twin Births: African Nationalism and Government Information Management in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1957-66," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 22: 1 (1989): 52.

⁵¹⁵ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 155.

⁵¹⁶ R. Vengroff, *Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid*. (Cransbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1977), 36.

argued that this was because the British government had not considered the territory to be ready for independence.⁵¹⁷

As the rest of Africa prepared for independence, South Africa experienced intensified anti-apartheid protest. In 1960, the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa, namely the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC), embarked on nationwide demonstrations against pass laws that culminated in the Sharpeville Massacre where the police shot into a crowd killing 69 and injuring more than 180.⁵¹⁸ The Sharpeville Massacre was followed by the banning of both the ANC and PAC by the South African government and many of the African activists fled into the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Following their ban in South Africa, the ANC and the PAC resurfaced the next year and shifted their method from peaceful non-cooperation to an armed struggle against the apartheid government. After forming its armed wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK – Spear of the Nation) in late 1961, the ANC launched its struggle against the apartheid regime through a bombing campaign on government installations and other properties.⁵¹⁹ The PAC too, formed an armed wing initially known as Poqo, (Alone in IsiXhosa) in 1961. Its approach was to encourage violent mass uprising among black South Africans. This was reflected in the call for action written in the organization's leaflets in 1961; "... The white people shall suffer. The black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started. It needs a real man. The Youth has weapons, you need not be afraid. The PAC says this."⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁷ B. T. Mokopakgosi, "The 1965 Self-Government Elections and the Transfer of Power in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," *South African Historical Journal*, 60:1 (2008): 86.

⁵¹⁸D.M. Smith, *Apartheid in South Africa*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2.

⁵¹⁹J. Cherry, *Umkhonto weSizwe: South Africa's Liberation Army, 1960s-1990s*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2011), 8; T. Simpson, *Umkhonto We Sizwe: The ANC's Armed Struggle*. (Cape Town: Penguin Books, 2016); S. Ellis, "The Genesis of the ANC's Armed Struggle in South Africa, 1948-1961," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37: 4 (2011): 673. See also, S. R. Davis, *The ANC's War against Apartheid: Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 5.

⁵²⁰ K. Kondlo, *In the Twilight of Revolution: The Pan African Congress of Azania (South Africa), 1959-1994*. (Basel, Switzerland: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2009), 234.

Interestingly, some of the ANC activists like Fish Keitseng and Motsamai Mpho were Bechuanaland nationals, and once back home, they provided refuge for many of the party leaders and guerrillas in transit to the organization's bases in Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. Prominent people like Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were among those who found sanctuary in Keitsing's home in Lobatse.⁵²¹ The influx of South African political refugees and Batswana members of the ANC now in Bechuanaland, created an atmosphere suitable for the emergence of party-based nationalist activity in the territory.

Apart from the short-lived existence of Leetile Raditladi's Bechuanaland Federal Party from 1959 to 1960, the Bechuanaland People's Party was the first 'real' political party to be formed in the Protectorate in December 1960. Among its founders, was General Secretary Motsamai Mpho, who had first distinguished himself as secretary of the ANC branch in Roodeport, South Africa from 1953. Together with Fish Keitseng, who became secretary of the Lobatse branch of the Bechuanaland People's Party, Mpho had been among the 156 Africans accused in the 1956-60 treason trial in South Africa.⁵²² Another founding member of the Bechuanaland People's Party was President K.T Motsete who would later compose the national anthem of Botswana. Motsete was an educator who briefly worked as assistant head teacher at the Tiger Kloof Theological School in South Africa. Later on, while teaching in Nyasaland, Motsete was believed to have been involved in the formation of the Nyasaland National Congress in 1944. The vice president of the People's Party was P.G Matante- a distinguished veteran of WWII who had served in the Protectorate's contingent of the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps. Upon returning from war, Matante moved to Johannesburg where he was briefly involved in the activities of the ANC. Although he is often associated with the

⁵²¹ Makgala, "The BNF and the BDP's 'Fight' for the Attention of the ANC, 1912-2004...", 118.

⁵²² J. Ramsay, "The 1962 BPP Split," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 25:1 (1993): 79.

PAC, Matante returned to Bechuanaland in 1957 before that nationalist movement was formed.⁵²³

The central plank of the People's Party included radical demands for social and political reforms that included the expulsion of European settlers from the Protectorate. The party was critical of the Legislative Council and demanded a new Africanized constitution for the territory. More importantly, the party was vocal against racial discrimination and the policy of indirect rule.⁵²⁴ This made the People's Party unpopular with the colonial government, the European settlers and the chiefs in the tribal areas. The party did, however, find support among the Africans living in towns along the railway line especially Lobatse and Francistown, as well as from South African political refugees living in the Protectorate.⁵²⁵ The People's Party also enjoyed support from foreign sources. Through funds from Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party, the Bechuanaland People's Party was able to purchase several Land Rovers, establish a newsletter as well as facilitate numerous international trips for its leaders. The cause of the People's Party also received some support from the communist governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, as well as from the Organization of African Unity's African Liberation Committee.⁵²⁶ Despite all of this initial support, the People's Party was soon plagued by internal disputes and rivalry which ultimately led to the expulsion of Mpho in 1962. Mpho would go on to form his own political party in 1963, which he called the Bechuanaland Independence Party.⁵²⁷

Meanwhile, another factor entered into the Protectorate's political scene. The Protectorate government did not wish to appear as the only alternative to the People's Party,

⁵²³ Ramsay, "The 1962 BPP Split," ..., 80.

⁵²⁴ Makgala, "The BNF and the BDP's 'Fight' for the Attention of the ANC, 1912-2004...., 119.

⁵²⁵ Makgala, "The BNF and the BDP's 'Fight' for the Attention of the ANC, 1912-2004...., 119.

⁵²⁶ J. Kirby, "What has Ghana Got That We Haven't?: Party Politics and Anti-Colonialism in Botswana, 1960-66," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 45: 6 (2017): 1058.

⁵²⁷ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*..., 156.

which they considered to be communist and extremist because of its connections with the ANC. As a result, the government encouraged Seretse Khama to form the moderate and multi-racial Bechuanaland Democratic Party which was announced in 1962.⁵²⁸ The Democratic Party appealed to the European settlers, the African chiefs, as well as civil servants and tribal administration cadres. To the colonial government, the Democratic Party was the only party capable of assuming the responsibility of government because it did not possess the People's Party's characteristics of radicalism, anti-British sentiment, and threatening economic policies. It was a progressive and conservative party with an affinity for the colonial administration.⁵²⁹

In 1962, in the context of the emergence of political parties, the Protectorate government announced a constitutional review scheduled for July 1963. Even though the People's Party orchestrated some demonstrations to call for the immediate abolition of the existing constitution, the government followed its own timeline, consulting with various stakeholders, including political party leaders. The chiefs were also consulted specifically on the future role of traditional institutions in an independent country.⁵³⁰ The resolutions of the constitutional conference were announced in November 1963 and the Protectorate was to be granted a form of self-government that would naturally lead to independence. The British Commissioner (formerly Resident Commissioner) was to preside over a cabinet which represented the executive branch of government modelled after Britain's Westminster system.⁵³¹ The cabinet was to comprise a prime minister and his deputy, as well as 5 ministers drawn from the legislative assembly. Furthermore, there was to be a House of Chiefs, whose role would be to advise government on issues affecting African tribal authority and institutions. Despite these developments towards self-government in the Protectorate, authority over

⁵²⁸ Zaffiro, "Twin Births...", 53.

⁵²⁹ Kirby, "What has Ghana Got That We Haven't? ...", 1063.

⁵³⁰ "The 1965 Self-Government Elections...", 87.

⁵³¹ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 157.

external affairs, internal security, defence and public service, remained under British control through the British Commissioner.⁵³²

Internal Security in the Protectorate

From as early as July 1960, the Protectorate government had begun expressing concern over the state of internal security in the territory, citing its inadequacy in light of the political developments in the region. As Resident Commissioner Peter Fawcus observed, the Protectorate formed a buffer zone between African nationalism to the north and Afrikaner republicanism to the south, and that this had inevitable repercussions in the territory.⁵³³ The position of the Protectorate as this buffer zone presented the territory with a number of internal security threats.

First, there was the growth of African nationalism and the emergence of what the Resident Commissioner referred to as “a politically conscious and irresponsible element, whose object is to undermine government policy by demanding the expedition of political and economic development to suit their own needs.”⁵³⁴ By this, Peter Fawcus was referring to the Batswana ANC activists who had recently returned home from South Africa. Furthermore, the presence of South African political refugees in the Protectorate was perceived as an internal security threat as they were likely to incite violence in the territory. Another security threat was seen to be coming from the influence of migrant labourers from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, who used the Protectorate as a corridor between the South African mines and their homelands.⁵³⁵ There had always been some belief among colonial administrators that a by-product of migrant labour was contempt for tribal authorities, and that this bred a sort of

⁵³²Vengroff, *Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid...*, 38.

⁵³³ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 July 1960.

⁵³⁴ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 July 1960.

⁵³⁵ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 July 1960.

sophistication among migrant workers that was characterized by western political ideals.⁵³⁶ Fawcus feared, therefore, that the influence of transiting migrant workers from the Federation, as well as the returning Batswana, would result in the undermining of local African authorities and by extension, the Protectorate government.⁵³⁷

With all these potential threats to the internal security of the Protectorate, government officials and police authorities did not have confidence in the state of the BPP. In 1960, the BPP had an establishment of 377 African and 59 European police. These figures included a special unit which was known in the police force as the Security Platoon,⁵³⁸ and it was based at the Gaborone Police Training Depot. The Security Platoon, which appears to have been formed between 1959 and 1960, comprised 2 Europeans and 40 Africans. Apart from providing an operational squad trained to quell riots and disturbances, the Security Platoon also provided a reserve available for special duties in times of disease outbreaks or natural disasters.⁵³⁹ Among the 40 African members of the Security Platoon, however, were 16 men who made up the Police Band, which was created in 1956. The bandsmen of the BPP were men of an undesirable fitness level, trained only in regular duties although they were regularly engaged in riot drills as well. Their role, in the case of major disturbances, was purely that of auxiliaries to the striking force.⁵⁴⁰

In July 1960, the Military Advisor and the Assistant Air Advisor to the High Commissioner made a report on the internal security of the Protectorate. Guided by this report, the High Commissioner's office expressed the need for an increased establishment of the CID

⁵³⁶ E. S. Munger, *Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 39.

⁵³⁷ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 July 1960.

⁵³⁸ The Security Platoon was a precursor of the Police Mobile Unit in Bechuanaland, very much similar to the Police Mobile Units/Forces discussed in the previous chapter. In other British territories, these units were used to put down African nationalist protests.

⁵³⁹ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 July 1960.

⁵⁴⁰ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 July 1960.

and Special Branch personnel at the Northern Division Headquarters in Francistown by 14 policemen. This was because Francistown was an urban centre with large African townships where political incitement was believed to be highly probable.⁵⁴¹ An adequately staffed CID and Special Branch would, therefore, be better suited to collect intelligence about impending political disturbances, thus giving the BPP's Security Platoon ample time to respond. Furthermore, the High Commissioner, expressed the need for an extra 47 policemen to create another Security Platoon in the Northern Division at Francistown in addition to the one already stationed at Gaborone. A single Security Platoon based in the south of the Protectorate was not adequate to cope with the potential political disturbances facing the Protectorate or those seen in the neighbouring Central African Federation, especially in Nyasaland.⁵⁴² Transport time from Gaborone to Francistown by road would have been about 5 hours, and therefore, relying on the Security Platoon in the south of the territory was not good enough. As experience had shown with the Bangwato disturbances 8 years prior, adequate security forces needed to be readily close by at the outbreak of any emergency in order to nip it in the bud. Reinforcements from the BSAP or other HCTs could not be relied upon in all contingencies, as it would take some time for them to arrive at the troubled areas.⁵⁴³

Another reason why the Protectorate government could not rely on the BSAP for reinforcements was because 1960 was a critical year for Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation in general. The BSAP and the Rhodesian army were deployed back and forth between Bulawayo and Salisbury on numerous occasions to confront the intermittent disturbances led by nationalist protestors.⁵⁴⁴ In October 1960, riots broke out in Harare

⁵⁴¹ TNA, DO. 35/7215, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 2 August 1960.

⁵⁴² For nationalist uprisings in Nyasaland, see J. McCracken, "Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi," *African Affairs*, 97: 1 (1998) pp. 231-249.

⁵⁴³ TNA, DO. 35/7215, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 2 August 1960.

⁵⁴⁴ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers...*, 193.

township when a European motorist hit an African pedestrian. Adhering to Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead's policy of rigid repression, the police shot and killed 10 men, while many others were injured at the township's main beerhall.⁵⁴⁵ The arrests, injuries and deaths that resulted from confrontation between the Africans and the security forces in Bulawayo, Salisbury and Gweru marked a monumental point in the history of Southern Rhodesia. As historian Michael O. West states, "Collectively, these events amounted to a political and psychological turning point, marking as they did, the first time since the uprisings of the 1890s that blood had been shed in open confrontations between the security forces and the colonized people."⁵⁴⁶

Deputy Inspector General of Colonial Police, J.W Deegan, was scheduled to go on a tour of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1963, where he would assess the internal security and defence of the territory and thereafter make recommendations to the Colonial Office. Despite the scheduled tour, High Commissioner Sir John Maud stressed the dangers of delay in the strengthening of the BPP, especially the Security Platoon. He cited the political situation developing in places as close as Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia and how they could easily affect the Protectorate.⁵⁴⁷ As this was in August 1960 before the police shootings mentioned above, what John Maud was referring to were the Zhii riots of July in the same year, which engulfed Bulawayo following the arrest of 3 National Democratic Party (NDP) leaders and the subsequent suppression of riots in Salisbury. When the Southern Rhodesian government banned a scheduled NDP meeting in Bulawayo, residents of the African townships took to the streets in protests that culminated in looting and vandalism, while the Rhodesian security forces

⁵⁴⁵ T. Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964*. (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 97.

⁵⁴⁶ M.O. West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); 223.

⁵⁴⁷ TNA, DO. 35/7215, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 2 August 1960.

only protected the areas of white settlement and left the townships to burn.⁵⁴⁸ Even though colonial officials considered the Batswana to be peacefully inclined, there was no guarantee that events such as those in Bulawayo would not spill over into the Protectorate. Therefore, a police force with a total strength of 436 men was not adequate for a vast territory like the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In view of the concern and warning expressed by High Commissioner Maud about the inadequate state of the BPP, the Commonwealth Relations Office attempted to intervene in the matter. The High Commissioner had made a strong case for the modest increase in the establishment of the force in order to improve the CID and Special Branch in Francistown as well as to form a second Security Platoon for the Northern Division. The fact that 16 of the 42 men in the existing Security Platoon at Gaborone were members of the Police Band and not part of the trained riot control unit was also misleading.⁵⁴⁹ The reality was that, in essence the Security Platoon had 26 men. Considering that Police Mobile Forces/Units in other British territories normally consisted of no less than 50 constables plus higher ranks, the Commonwealth Relations Office supported High Commissioner Maud's request for an additional 47 men to the BPP. This would allow for the posting of half the Security Platoon in Francistown, which represented the minimum required.⁵⁵⁰ Despite these attempts however, the Treasury and Colonial Offices in London rejected the requests. It was noted that increasing the establishment of the BPP by 47 would involve an annual recurrent cost of £ 12,000 plus another once-off £22,000. The course of action, instead, was for the Protectorate administration to wait for the scheduled tour by Deputy Inspector General J. W Deegan in 1963. The Treasury Office

⁵⁴⁸ T. O. Ranger, *Bulawayo Burning: A Social History of a Southern African City, 1893-1960*. (Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, 2010), 224.

⁵⁴⁹ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Commonwealth Relations Office, London, to Treasury Office, London, 12 August 1960.

⁵⁵⁰ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Commonwealth Relations Office, London, to Treasury Office, London, 12 August 1960.

thought it more cost effective to await the recommendations of Deegan before spending any more money on the BPP.⁵⁵¹

Meanwhile, the BPP and particularly the inadequate Security Platoon at Gaborone was called upon repeatedly over imagined and real disturbances in the 2 years preceding Deegan's tour of the Protectorate. In August 1960, the Security Platoon was called to Francistown given European settlers' fears of an imminent strike over higher wages by Africans in the town. This was based on the fact that at the beginning of the month, Africans working on European owned property were reported to be stock-piling foodstuffs and encouraging each other to leave their living quarters and to move to the locations.⁵⁵² Nothing materialized of the said imminent strike and the government officials believed it was deterred by the presence of the Security Platoon in Francistown. In late August, further rumours circulated about a worker's strike at the railway town of Palapye. The Rhodesian Railways Workers Union was said to have a small branch in Palapye among other railway towns like Francistown and Lobatse and it was believed that it was the Rhodesian influence, that would lead to such a strike if it occurred. As a precautionary measure, a section of the Security Platoon was sent to Francistown to be on standby if any troubles occurred, although nothing happened.⁵⁵³

In early 1961, the Security Platoon's name changed to Police Mobile Unit (PMU), and a couple of its sections were posted at Francistown and Lobatse and employed on general township patrols when not required for operational duties.⁵⁵⁴ In the same year, the PMU was called upon to attend two major incidents that were considered threatening to European lives. On 10 August, it was brought in to quell a disturbance at the St. Joseph's College at Kgale on the

⁵⁵¹ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Treasury, London to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 16 August 1960.

⁵⁵² TNA, DO. 35/7215, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 5 August 1960.

⁵⁵³ TNA, DO. 35/7215, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 20 August 1960.

⁵⁵⁴ BNARS, BNB. 900, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1961.

southern fringes of Gaborone where students were reported to have attacked 2 European teachers, which incited more defiant behaviour across the student body at the school. The students were brought under control with the arrival of the PMU and a number of arrests were made.⁵⁵⁵ In September that year, a labour dispute involving 180 workers at the Moshaneng Asbestos Mine just outside of Kanye necessitated the deployment of the PMU. The dispute was resolved without any action by the police unit as 48 of the workers were paid off and returned to their homes. It is possible that the presence of the unit served to intimidate the workers. Thereafter, the unit remained at Moshaneng for several days before returning to Gaborone.⁵⁵⁶

By 1962, the activities of the People's Party at its strongholds of Lobatse and Francistown had led to major concerns for the Protectorate government. In January, there were boycotts of retail trading stores at Lobatse, while in May, the PMU was called on to disperse picketing and demonstrations by members of the People's Party in Francistown. Later in August, large numbers of protesters caused a disturbance outside of the Northern Division Police Headquarters at Francistown where teargas was used to disperse the demonstrators. Although sources are not clear about the causes of this disturbance, the BPP arrested and charged 38 people for public disorder and convicted 32 of them.⁵⁵⁷ The People's Party had become notorious for encouraging boycotts and strikes as a way of mobilising the masses against the government. The involvement of People's Party Vice President P.G Matante at the

⁵⁵⁵ BNARS, BNB. 900, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1961.

⁵⁵⁶ BNARS, BNB. 900, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1961.

⁵⁵⁷ BNARS, BNB. 901, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1962.

Francistown demonstrations led to a dispute between him and President K.T Motsete, which resulted in the latter being replaced by the former as party leader.⁵⁵⁸

On 13 November 1963, a dispute broke out between the residents of the Tati township and the European-owned Tati Company at Francistown. In an attempt to monopolise the brewing and sale of traditional beer, the Tati Company had managed to obtain government support in prohibiting Africans from participating in the business. The Women's Wing of the People's Party led a protest against the Tati Company and the PMU was called upon to forcefully disperse the predominantly female protesters, many of whom were in the business of brewing and selling traditional beer.⁵⁵⁹ The PMU used tear gas and batons to break up the crowd of protesters. About 108 people were arrested and charged with incitement to commit public violence. On the following day the Youth Wing of the People's Party, armed with stones, sticks and petrol bombs, marched to the police station demanding the immediate release of their 'mothers and sisters'. Petrol bombs were also thrown at a store and a public building during the protests of that day although no significant damage was caused because the bombs were not properly used. The police arrested and charged 23 people with arson, although no convictions were obtained due to lack of corroborative evidence.⁵⁶⁰ While the PMU was successful in putting down the disturbances that did break out, it would not have had the same success if such troubles had flared in 2 or more towns simultaneously. This particular point became the central argument leading to the reorganization of the BPP and the expansion of the PMU. Considering the close relationship between the ANC and the People's Party, it is possible that the disturbances in Lobatse and Francistown were influenced by the start of the armed struggle in South Africa. Although the ANC and PAC methods of the early 1960s had failed,

⁵⁵⁸ "The BPP Golden Jubilee That Was Never Celebrated," *Mmegi Online*, 31 January 2011.

⁵⁵⁹ "The BPP Golden Jubilee That Was Never Celebrated," *Mmegi Online*, 31 January 2011.

⁵⁶⁰ BNARS, BNB. 902, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1963.

they led to more refugees and exiles entering Bechuanaland, which may have influenced the events in Lobatse and Francistown.

In Pursuit of a General Service Unit

At a Joint Territorial Intelligence and Security Committee held in March 1962 at the High Commissioner's office in Pretoria, representatives from all 3 HCTs agreed on the formation of General Service Units (GSU) within their respective police forces.⁵⁶¹ While it is not clear whether the South Africans were part of this committee, it is possible that there was some security cooperation between the 3 colonial British administrations and the apartheid government. The General Service Units would essentially be similar to the anti-riot Police Mobile Forces in other territories like Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, except that the GSU in each of the HCTs would be liable to be deployed in any of the 3 territories in the event of major uprisings.⁵⁶² This arrangement inherently meant cooperating with the apartheid government as these forces would have to travel through South Africa to get to the different HCTs. Dealing with the ever-growing African nationalist activities was the main agenda for the conference in Pretoria and the political situation in the Bechuanaland Protectorate was cited as a good example of why there was a need to form a GSU.

While disturbances in the Protectorate before 1960 were mainly confined to disputes within and among ethnic groups and not necessarily nationalist and anti-government in nature, this had recently changed with the establishment of political parties in the territory. The Protectorate was not isolated from the events in other parts of Africa and its exposure to the militant and subversive influences of nationalist movements in neighbouring territories could

⁵⁶¹ The GSU was another name for a PMU/PMF. In fact, GSU and PMU were used interchangeably in the official records of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

⁵⁶² TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner's Memo on the Establishment of a Police General Service Unit, 9 January 1963.

no longer be prevented.⁵⁶³ The result of this exposure had been the disturbances at Francistown and Lobatse and to a lesser degree, other places along the railway line. Containing these security threats had been achieved by moving the small PMU to the scene of trouble, where its presence often served as a deterrent. What was clear, however, was that the existing PMU would not be able to deal with a deliberate and resolutely led territory-wide protest. Against this background, and the growing influences of African nationalists from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in the Protectorate, the BPP authorities advocated the formation of a GSU as a self-contained and highly trained mobile striking force.⁵⁶⁴

The formation of a GSU also appealed to the Executive Council of the Protectorate, including the unofficial members. Seretse Khama in particular, as leader of the Democratic Party, expressed support for the formation of a GSU, explaining that the Protectorate needed as large a police auxiliary as finances would permit, and that it should approximate to a military force in equipment and organization. Although the Protectorate was considered intrinsically peaceful, there was likely to be major political disorders as a result of the external forces of the ANC and PAC using Bechuanaland as a springboard for offensive action against the apartheid regime.⁵⁶⁵

In making these remarks, Khama touched on the tip of an iceberg in a conspiracy that almost no one in the Protectorate was aware of except a select few. Bechuanaland had indeed received an influx of South African refugees beginning in 1960, but when South Africa declared itself a republic and withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961, the British government allegedly developed an informal and secret security structure in the Protectorate that was known as ‘the pipeline’. This was a clandestine system by which prominent South

⁵⁶³ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner’s Memo on the Establishment of a Police General Service Unit, 9 January 1963.

⁵⁶⁴ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner’s Memo on the Establishment of a Police General Service Unit, 9 January 1963.

⁵⁶⁵ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner, Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 9 January 1963.

African political refugees were passed through the Protectorate to Tanganyika.⁵⁶⁶ What is particularly interesting about the pipeline as it relates to the government's pursuit of a GSU, is that it was the Protectorate administration and police authorities who were concerned about the political refugees entering into the territory and their undesirable influences on Batswana. Ironically, however, historian Neil Parsons has claimed that the pipeline in the Protectorate was operated by a couple of undisclosed colonial officials and one senior police officer who reported to Resident Commissioner Fawcus, who in turn took orders from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) in London.⁵⁶⁷ In a recent article using declassified British intelligence files and South African Department of Justice files that Parsons had not used in his work, historian Garth Benneyworth discloses the small circle of officials that Fawcus used to operate the pipeline. These were John Shepperd, a Lobatse based BPP inspector, Kasane District Commissioner Brian Egnor and Francistown District Commissioner Philippus Steenkamp. Their designated liaison in the Protectorate was the deported ANC activist Fish Keitseng.⁵⁶⁸

Fawcus and his 3 trusted men supposedly protected the pipeline from interference by the BPP's CID and Special Branch, which reported to the older imperial security network commonly known as MI5. In its objective to circumvent the South African Police's persecution of African nationalists, the British government had chosen to use MI6 because MI5 was seen to be compromised due to its close connections with the Central African Federation and South Africa.⁵⁶⁹ Using MI6 funding, Fawcus' government transported South African political refugees through an 'aerial pipeline' that flew from Lobatse in the southern Protectorate via Kasane in the north to Mbeya and Dar es Salam in Tanganyika. The 'aerial pipeline' was

⁵⁶⁶ N. Parsons, "The Pipeline: Botswana's Reception of Refugees, 1956-68," *Social Dynamics*, 34: 1 (2008): 20.

⁵⁶⁷ Parsons, "The Pipeline...", 20.

⁵⁶⁸ G. Benneyworth, "Bechuanaland's Aerial Pipeline: Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Operations against the South African Liberation Movements, 1960-1965," *South African Historical Journal*, 70: 1 (2018): 111.

⁵⁶⁹ Parsons, "The Pipeline...", 20.

operated by a small newly established airline called Bechuanaland Safaris.⁵⁷⁰ Nelson Mandela was one of the many high profile South African refugees airlifted to and from Tanganyika through the Bechuanaland pipeline. In August 1962, just a week after returning from Tanganyika, Mandela was captured by the South African security forces in Natal, possibly having been sold out by Bechuanaland Safaris owner, Captain Bartaune and his pilot, both of whom had become informants of the South African Police.⁵⁷¹ As the South Africans began to challenge the British government about Mandela's movements in Bechuanaland, MI6 panicked and withdrew the BPP's Inspector Shepperd and District Commissioner Egner from the Protectorate out fear that they would be kidnapped by the South African Police.⁵⁷²

Despite Fawcus' on-going central role in the Protectorate's pipeline, his resolution from the joint territorial meeting at Pretoria was to militarize the BPP. This was to be achieved through the establishment of a GSU headquarters at Gaborone for 3 platoons, and another site at Francistown where a fourth platoon would be stationed. The existing PMU at Gaborone was to form the nucleus of the expanded GSU. It was of platoon strength and had 2 of its sections stationed at Francistown and Lobatse where they served as a supplement to the regular police.⁵⁷³ The creation of a full-fledged GSU was to enable the police force to deal with the worst-case scenario of a state of emergency involving 2 or more places simultaneously. In that event, the places likely to be involved were Francistown and Lobatse, and they would require at least 3 platoons to quell the disturbances. The minimum required strength for the GSU was, therefore, 3 platoons, with the fourth one serving as a reserve to be drawn upon to make up for shortages owing to illness, leave, or any other casualties. With the existing PMU making up 1

⁵⁷⁰ Parsons, "The Pipeline...", 21. For more on Bechuanaland Safaris, see S. I. Bayani, "Civil Aviation and Scheduled Air Services in Colonial Botswana, 1935-1966: A History of Underdevelopment," Master's Thesis, (Trent University, 2017), 113-119.

⁵⁷¹ Benneyworth, "Bechuanaland's Aerial Pipeline...", 120.

⁵⁷² Benneyworth, "Bechuanaland's Aerial Pipeline...", 120.

⁵⁷³ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner's Memo on the Establishment of a Police General Service Unit, 9 January 1963.

platoon, the BPP was to recruit for the 3 other platoons, enlisting constables on contract terms with their commanding officers seconded from the permanent establishment of the police force.⁵⁷⁴

To make the GSU fully mobile, the minimum transport requirements for each platoon were; 1 Land Rover, 1 5-ton Bedford troop carrier, 1 5-ton stores and equipment carrier, and a 1 and half ton general-purpose vehicle. This was meant to enable each platoon to operate independently. Fixed radio communication stations were to be established at the Unit headquarters at Gaborone and at the Francistown site. Furthermore, each platoon Land Rover and general-purpose vehicle was to have a mobile radio communications set installed to ensure communication not only with the headquarters but also between sections of the unit while out in the field.⁵⁷⁵ The Colonial Office, however, favoured the purchasing of a few Land Rovers for each platoon instead of a single 5-ton Bedford troop carrier. If a troop carrier broke down or was attacked on route to the scene of a disturbance, the whole platoon would be potentially stranded. The use of Land Rovers on the other hand, would allow for a number of mobile patrols in disturbed areas and also allow the platoons to be deployed in sections to deal with minor disturbances.⁵⁷⁶ It is also likely that the Colonial Office favoured Land Rovers because that is what had proven more efficient in other British colonies where PMUs or their equivalent already existed. From about 1959, for example, the Police Mobile Force in Nyasaland consisted of 12 platoons, which mainly utilized Land Rovers protected by canopies of wire mesh.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁴ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner's Memo on the Establishment of a Police General Service Unit, 9 January 1963.

⁵⁷⁵ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Resident Commissioner's Memo on the Establishment of a Police General Service Unit, 9 January 1963.

⁵⁷⁶ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 26 April 1963.

⁵⁷⁷ McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland...", 140.

While the Colonial Office generally supported the formation of a GSU within the BPP, they urged the Protectorate administration to lower its expectations for financial reasons. The formation of 3 new platoons in addition to the existing one was seen as amounting to over-insurance on the part of the Protectorate administration and was likely to be too costly for the Imperial Treasury Office. The Colonial Office decided that a total of 3 platoons would be adequate insurance, and that the personnel of the Police Training Depot at Gaborone could be used as a reserve for the GSU in times of trouble, provided that there were no less than 20 recruits there at all times.⁵⁷⁸ Following some disagreements between the Colonial Office and the Protectorate administration on how the envisaged GSU should be comprised, it was decided that the matter be left to the Deputy Inspector General of Colonial Police, to make his observations and recommendations on the matter.⁵⁷⁹

From 14 to 24 July 1963, Deputy Inspector General J. W Deegan undertook an official tour of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. At the time of Deegan's visit, the BPP had 24 gazetted officers, 39 men in the inspectorate and 480 rank and file. Apart from the headquarters in Mafikeng, which housed the police top administration, the CID and Special Branch, the force was distributed across 9 police districts which were grouped into 2 divisions, northern and southern. The Police Training Depot, Band, PMU, Criminal Records Office and Fingerprint Bureau, Central Arms Registry and Quartermaster's stores, which under normal circumstances would form part of the command at the police headquarters, were all situated in Gaborone.⁵⁸⁰ This reflected the unique nature of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which was administered from outside of its borders, although there was a plan to move the capital to Gaborone in the near future.

⁵⁷⁸ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 26 April 1963.

⁵⁷⁹ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 26 April 1963.

⁵⁸⁰ BNARS, OP/47/2, Colonial Office, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria 12 August 1963.

Before Deegan completed his report on the BPP, Police Commissioner Bailey, who was his host during the tour of inspection, filled him in on the groundwork already laid for the formation of a GSU. This, therefore, informed much of Deegan's report and recommendations about the BPP. Deegan found the existing PMU to be insufficient to cope with widespread disturbances in the territory and recommended that it should be expanded from 1 platoon to 3, with each platoon containing 39 men. The 3 platoons would be further divided into 3 sections comprising 13 men each. This would allow enough flexibility to enable a small self-contained section to be detached and deal with minor disturbances, leaving the rest of the platoon available for other roles.⁵⁸¹ Apart from the fact that Deegan recommended a total of 3 platoons, while the Protectorate government proposed 4, his recommendations were a lot similar to the whole proposal for GSU.

Deegan also recommended that after its formation, the GSU provide much-needed advanced training for the rest of the police force. The Unit would operate as the highest training school for the BPP when not engaged on operational duties. This would give the GSU a dual purpose as a striking force-cum-higher training unit which would make it an integral part of the BPP.⁵⁸² There was also a need for interchangeability between the GSU and the rest of the force. After completing their advanced training in the Unit, members of the GSU were to be periodically posted to normal police duty, while men from the regular force would also be posted to the Unit. The object of having a GSU was, therefore, two-fold; to have a highly trained and mobile unit to cope with internal security threats and disturbances, but also to have a higher training wing through which all if not most men of the BPP would pass, undergoing refresher and promotional courses as well as up to date anti-riot training.⁵⁸³ The GSU could,

⁵⁸¹ BNARS, OP/47/2, Colonial Office, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria 12 August 1963.

⁵⁸² BNARS, OP/47/2, Colonial Office, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria 12 August 1963.

⁵⁸³ BNARS, OP/47/2, Colonial Office, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 12 August 1963.

therefore, be seen as a sort of ‘force multiplier’, which was a small group used to enhance the quality of the entire police force.

Another purpose for having the GSU, as agreed at the March 1962 Joint Territorial Intelligence and Security Committee meeting in Pretoria, was to allow for the unit to be deployed to the other HCTs in the case of major disturbances. Indeed, in June 1963, while the Protectorate administration was still striving for the creation of a GSU, 35 men from the existing PMU under the command of an inspector, were airlifted from Gaborone to Manzini in Swaziland to assist in putting down a series of labour strikes in that territory.⁵⁸⁴ Although the Resident Commissioner of Swaziland had asked King Sobhuza II to bring his people to order, the latter refused to get involved, which necessitated the help of the BPP’s PMU and 600 British troops from Kenya. The Swaziland incident, therefore, became the case in point, by which the Bechuanaland government argued for the creation of a GSU in the Protectorate.⁵⁸⁵

As a result, the recommendations of Deputy Inspector General Deegan were implemented at the end of 1964 after more than a year of pleading on the part of the Protectorate administration for the formation of a GSU. The existing PMU was thus renamed GSU and increased to 3 platoons, 2 at Gaborone and 1 at Francistown. It was commanded by a senior superintendent stationed at Gaborone, while each platoon was headed by an assistant superintendent.⁵⁸⁶ The GSU came to represent a self-contained mobile police contingent that was dedicated to riot control and internal security in the Protectorate. It was equipped with Lee Enfield .303 rifles, batons and tear smoke grenades to deal with local disturbances.⁵⁸⁷ As the scholar of Botswana military history, Bafumiki Mocheregwa notes, the PMU [GSU], wore a

⁵⁸⁴ BNARS, BNB. 902, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1963.

⁵⁸⁵ TNA, DO. 1048/795, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Secretary of State, London, 19 June 1963.

⁵⁸⁶ BNARS, BNB. 903, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1964.

⁵⁸⁷ TNA, OD. 31/295, Memorandum by the Commissioner of Police on the Proposals for the Increase and Reorganization of the Police Mobile Unit, 7 November 1966.

distinctively different uniform from their counterparts in the regular police force. They dressed more like soldiers than police, which reflected the paramilitary nature of their work. The unit also received substantial training from the British and developed high standards of discipline.⁵⁸⁸

Reorganizing the BPP for the Move to Gaborone

In 1964, British Commissioner Fawcus announced the first general elections of the Bechuanaland Protectorate scheduled for 1 March 1965 as well as the envisaged move of the colonial administration from Mafikeng to Gaborone, the new capital. The transfer of government departments to Gaborone was set to begin in February 1965, following the completion of the construction of the Gaborone Dam, which was built to ensure adequate water supply at the Protectorate's new capital.⁵⁸⁹ The transfer of the Protectorate administration to Gaborone was to be a symbolic milestone on the territory's road to independence. Apart from impending self-government and independence, the move to Gaborone was informed by the Protectorate administration's desire to establish a multiracial centre within the territory to serve as an example for its neighbouring racist minority governments.⁵⁹⁰ The issue of transfer was supported by the leaders of the Protectorate's rival political parties. The People's Party in particular claimed that prevalent racism in the Protectorate was partly due to the territory being administered from within racist South Africa and, therefore, argued that the transfer of the administrative headquarters to Gaborone was overdue.⁵⁹¹

In light of the envisaged move to Gaborone, the BPP authorities and the Protectorate administration envisioned a different structure for the police force to better suit its new location once at Gaborone. The general growth of the population and the rising crime rates, all within the context of impending self-government in the Protectorate, were seen as warranting a

⁵⁸⁸ Mocheregwa, "The Police Mobile Unit...", 105.

⁵⁸⁹ Munger, *Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland...*, 30.

⁵⁹⁰ P.T. Mgadla, "Of Botswana's Administrative Centres and their Movements: Vryburg, Mahikeng and Gaborone, 1885-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 48: 1 (2016): 30.

⁵⁹¹ Mgadla, "Of Botswana's Administrative Centres and their Movements...", 30.

reorganization of the BPP to style it as a professional post-independence police force.⁵⁹² A major part of this reorganization involved the creation of new duty posts in the BPP and the increasing of some of the already existing ones to allow for more decentralization in the hierarchy of the force. Fawcus and Police Commissioner Bailey drafted a new structure which called for the creation of 2 posts of assistant commissioner in the BPP to command the Southern and Northern Divisions of the Protectorate. Hitherto, the BPP had only had the commissioner and his deputy stationed at Mafikeng, with senior superintendents commanding the 2 Divisions from within the Protectorate. In light of the police headquarters moving to Gaborone, therefore, it was believed that the 2 posts of assistant commissioner should be added to the new structure of the force.⁵⁹³ There was also to be an increase of about 43 men in the BPP across various ranks which would result in the following structure;

The BPP's Proposed Structure for the 1965 Move to Gaborone

Posts	1964	Proposed
Commissioner	1	1
Deputy Commissioner	1	1
Assistant Commissioner	-	2
Senior Superintendent	3	4
Superintendent	4	7
Assistant Superintendent	18	18
Inspector	43	38
Sub Inspector	12	34

⁵⁹² BNARS, OP/47/2, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 23 November 1964.

⁵⁹³ BNARS, OP/47/2, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 23 November 1964.

Sergeant	22	22
Constable	545	565
Recruits	30	30
Total	679	722

The colonial administration and police authorities' plan to reorganize the BPP to better suite its new headquarters at Gaborone coincided with a tour of the Protectorate by I. Stourton who was now the Inspector General of Colonial Police. Stourton concurred with Fawcus and Bailey on the creation of the 2 assistant commissioner posts as well as the new posts of senior superintendent to be held by the heads of CID and Special Branch as this was common practice in other British colonies.⁵⁹⁴ Despite having the support of Inspector General Stourton, the reorganization of the BPP was not considered acceptable by the Colonial Office, and as usual, this was on the basis of financial difficulties.

Instead of the creation of 2 assistant commissioner posts for example, the Colonial Office insisted on only 1 post specifically for the Southern Division at Gaborone where the new police headquarters would be. The Northern Division was to remain under the command of a senior superintendent. For the constabulary and assistant superintendent ranks, the Colonial Office insisted on omitting any relief posts that were to be created in order to reduce recurrent expenditure. As for the sub-inspector rank, which Bailey had requested to increase from 12 to 34 to allow for some training posts, the Colonial Office limited its increase to 17, arguing that anything more could not be financed from the 1965/66 budget.⁵⁹⁵ This represented

⁵⁹⁴ BNARS, OP/47/2, Colonial Office, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng, 27 November 1964.

⁵⁹⁵ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Secretary of State, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng, 29 December 1964.

a struggle that the colonial administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate had painstakingly contended with since the imposition of British rule on the territory in 1885.

Due to the Protectorate's marginal nature and its lack of economic significance, the British government often opposed any costly development in the territory, which has led scholars like Jack Halpern to argue that Britain reluctantly took over the HCTs only to neglect them for about half a century.⁵⁹⁶ This notion has been challenged by historian Philip Steenkamp, who argued instead, that colonial administrators like Charles Rey in the 1930s, came up with remarkable schemes for the development of the Protectorate's communications and water systems, which in turn expanded the territory's livestock sector. He, therefore, maintains that Rey's projects were of a developmental character, which dismisses the arguments advanced by proponents of the underdevelopment theory.⁵⁹⁷ The one misgiving about Steenkamp's argument, however, is that it relies on Rey's 8 year-tenure (1929-37) as Resident Commissioner to dispel the notion of Britain's negligence towards the development of the Protectorate. Another point that bears mentioning is that colonial administrators on the ground, including Rey, often had the interests of the colony at heart but were met with a lot of resistance from the British government, usually on financial grounds. Indeed, Steenkamp himself admits that the loans and grants-in-aid that the Protectorate received from the British government were inadequate compared to its needs, although he also states that the territory received a larger share of the financial aid while larger and more profitable colonies like Nigeria received less.⁵⁹⁸

While appreciating the stringency of the British government's finances, the Protectorate officials saw these arbitrary restrictions on general administration and police expansion as

⁵⁹⁶ J. Halpern. *South Africa's Hostages...*, 108.

⁵⁹⁷ P. Steenkamp, "'Cinderella of the Empire?': development and policy in Bechuanaland in the 1930s," *Journal of Southern African*, 17: 2 (1991): 300.

⁵⁹⁸ Steenkamp, "'Cinderella of the Empire?' ...", 294.

representing a lack of foresight. This was particularly because considering the Protectorate's impending independence, the next year or more were to require proficient administration and security control in the territory.⁵⁹⁹ Fawcus also called the Colonial Office out on its provision for a £6 million recurrent expenditure for newly independent Malawi (formerly Nyasaland), and argued that the British government's responsibilities to the Bechuanaland Protectorate were just as important. This was even more so considering the unprecedented political development as well as the social and economic change taking place in the Protectorate. Moreover, the Protectorate was now the largest dependent British territory in Africa, which required greater delegation of responsibility to the Africans in many levels of administration.⁶⁰⁰ Following Fawcus' criticism, the Colonial Office and the Treasury in London conceded and accepted the proposed reorganization of the BPP in April 1965. While it is not clear where the funding for the implementation of this reorganization came from, it is evident that the Colonial Office and Treasury had initially not considered the expansion of the BPP a priority.

The Bechuanaland Protectorate's first parliamentary elections were held in March 1965. Following the publication of the Bechuanaland Electoral Provisions Order in June 1964, a delimitation commission was established and charged with a task of delimiting 31 constituencies in the Protectorate. The task was hastily carried out and completed within 16 days, and the constituencies were demarcated along the existing 'tribal' boundaries, therefore reinforcing the old indirect rule system.⁶⁰¹ In a landslide victory, Seretse Khama's Democratic Party won over 80% of the vote and took 28 of the 31 seats in parliament. Khama, therefore, became prime minister and created the Protectorate's first African government.⁶⁰² The overwhelming victory of the Democratic Party was in a way connected to the fact that the

⁵⁹⁹ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 5 January 1965.

⁶⁰⁰ TNA, DO. 1048/795, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 5 January 1965.

⁶⁰¹ Mokopakgosi, "The 1965 Self-Government Elections...", 91.

⁶⁰² Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 158.

constituencies were demarcated along ‘tribal’ boundaries. Seeing as the Democratic Party had a great appeal among conservatives and the chiefs, the delimitation of constituencies served to reinforce ‘tribal’ loyalties and gave Khama’s party an advantage over the so-called ‘radical’ parties whose founders were former activists of the ANC and PAC in South Africa.⁶⁰³ In February 1966, a constitutional conference was held in London to prepare for the independence of Bechuanaland. It was decided at the conference that the Bechuanaland Protectorate would be granted independence on 30 September 1966.⁶⁰⁴

The Quest for Localization in the BPP

The localization of higher ranks in the BPP represented another contentious issue between the Protectorate and British governments. First, it must be made clear that the term localization here refers to what in other territories has been called Africanization. But as it shall be seen in the next chapter, the Protectorate administration and indeed Seretse Khama with his moderate politics and affinity to the British government, preferred the term ‘localization’ because it was seen as non-racial and less radical. It must be also pointed out here, that localization only meant the replacement of European personnel with Africans and not necessarily a shift in the nature and functions of the police force. The decolonization and post-independence periods in Africa were characterized by the continuity of colonial systems and structures as the soon-to-be and the newly independent governments simply took over from the colonists.⁶⁰⁵

Following the constitutional review conference in November 1963, the Protectorate government had committed itself to submitting a White Paper setting out the steps to be taken

⁶⁰³ Mokopagosi, “The 1965 Self-Government Elections...”, 91.

⁶⁰⁴ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History...*, 159.

⁶⁰⁵ E, Bayeh, “The Political and Economic Legacy of Colonialism in the Post-Independence African States,” *International Journal in Commerce, IT & Social Sciences*, 2: 2 (2015): 89-90. See also F, Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6.

for the localization of posts in the police force and the civil service proper.⁶⁰⁶ By September 1964, the government was under pressure from local politicians to speed up localization in the BPP which unlike other colonial police forces, still had a large number of expatriate Europeans in the inspectorate and gazetted ranks. The recruitment of expatriate officers into the BPP was, therefore ceased, while the Protectorate administration devised ways of promoting Africans to the gazetted ranks and increasing those in the inspectorate cadre.⁶⁰⁷

One way that Fawcus considered for localizing the force included direct entry by suitable candidates into the inspectorate ranks as cadets. He considered this option in light of the 26 Batswana who had attained their Cambridge School Certificate in 1963, although there was a high possibility of them being absorbed by the civil service. Another option was the promotion of senior NCOs, who although lacking the educational requirements for inspectorate ranks (O level), could be considered based on their long service, practical experience as well as good character and leadership.⁶⁰⁸ Fawcus, however, decided on the creation of 7 assistant superintendent posts, with a corresponding reduction in the inspectorate. This would allow the promotion of 7 inspectors, including the 2 most senior local ones, Bokowe and Motlhatlhedhi, to the rank of assistant superintendent. Since the salary scale for gazetted officers (R2,316-R3,780 a year) and that of inspectors (R1,956-R2,904 a year) overlapped to some degree, Fawcus's plan for localization would not lead to an increase in the BPP's recurrent expenditure.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁶ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 14 September 1964.

⁶⁰⁷ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 14 September 1964.

⁶⁰⁸ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 14 September 1964.

⁶⁰⁹ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 14 September 1964.

The creation of substantive posts in the rank of assistant superintendent in the BPP to avoid superseding expatriate officers that were senior to the African candidates presented two potential challenges for the force. Firstly, it would upset the numerical balance between gazetted and non-gazetted ranks, which would lead to a top-heavy structure that was not conducive for the efficiency of the force.⁶¹⁰ Secondly, this approach would set a precedence that would be difficult to avoid when the government extended the localization process to the departments of the civil service. A similar top-heavy structure would be formed in the civil service and it would represent an added burden on the Protectorate's budget, which was already dependent on grant-in-aid from the British government.⁶¹¹

Instead of creating 7 assistant superintendent posts in the establishment of the force, the Colonial Office thought it better if the BPP would create a small number of supernumerary posts to which African candidates would be appointed on probation and sometimes on an acting basis for eventual absorption into the established posts. The system of creating supernumerary or shadow posts for African officers was common practice in many colonies and the Colonial Office's assumption that it could be applied to the Bechuanaland Protectorate was a natural one.⁶¹² To the Colonial Office, supernumerary posts would afford African candidates an opportunity to serve in higher ranks and eventually being absorbed into them without necessarily altering the promotion structures of the force. Since the supernumerary approach worked better where candidates had taken some training courses, the Protectorate government

⁶¹⁰ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Secretary of State, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng, 12 October 1964.

⁶¹¹ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Secretary of State, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng, 12 October 1964.

⁶¹² TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 23 November 1964.

was encouraged to consider sending suitable men to attend such courses at the training centres of larger African police forces like those of Nigeria and Kenya but this never happened.⁶¹³

The supernumerary approach was flawed because it represented a device with which to side-track deserving African members of the BPP. This was because although appointed to these supernumerary posts, the African police had to be considered for actual promotion on the basis of the usual criteria of seniority, educational qualification and experience. This would, therefore, likely lead to discontentment among the African police upon discovering that the expatriate inspectors who they superseded on promotion to the supernumerary posts, were still their seniors.⁶¹⁴ The supernumerary approach conversely presented the risk of the expatriate officers in the BPP and other departments of the civil service losing confidence in the colonial government. Her Majesty's Commissioner Fawcus feared that to the expatriate officers, this approach would give an impression that the government did not have their interests at heart, and that their careers could not be safeguarded.⁶¹⁵ This might have also reflected an adherence to the colonial racial hierarchy in the dying days of colonialism.

Despite the Protectorate administration's argument that supernumerary posts were not the best approach to the localization of the BPP, the Colonial Office went ahead and imposed this conventional device. Two supernumerary posts of assistant superintendent were created and filled by the African inspectors Bokowe and Motlhatlhedhi. It was intended that after 9 to 12 months, 2 other supernumerary posts of superintendent would be created, to which Bokowe and Motlhatlhedhi would be advanced, and their places filled by 2 other African police.⁶¹⁶ By

⁶¹³ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Secretary of State, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng, 12 October 1964.

⁶¹⁴ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 23 November 1964.

⁶¹⁵ TNA, DO. 1048/796, Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng to Colonial Office, London, 23 November 1964.

⁶¹⁶ BNARS, OP/47/2, Colonial Office, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Mafikeng, 27 November 1964.

November 1965, there were still no African gazetted officers in the BPP despite the adoption of the supernumerary approach. Difficulty in finding suitable men with the requisite academic qualifications was cited by the High Commissioner as the reason for the slow-paced localization of the police force.⁶¹⁷ This represented a major contradiction on the part of the British government because the supernumerary approach was adopted to circumvent that very challenge. It appeared, therefore, that the Colonial Office was disingenuous about their commitment to localizing the gazetted ranks of the BPP.

As mentioned in the third chapter, the replacement of Europeans with Africans in the officer corps of the colonial police and militaries transpired at different degrees and speed usually depending on the political developments in the colonies.⁶¹⁸ However, the slow, foot-dragging process of localization in Bechuanaland also took place in other colonies as they transitioned to independence. In Nigeria for example, the colonial administration had made modest attempts to localize the officer corps of the army in preparation for independence, but the results were scant. It, therefore, took so much time that a serious process of localizing the officer corps of the Nigerian army was undertaken after independence in 1960.⁶¹⁹ As historian Norman J. Miners explains, the ineffectiveness of the policy of Nigerianization in the army before 1960 represented a form of hypocrisy and racial prejudice on the part of the British army officers who proclaimed the need for an increased Nigerian officer corps.⁶²⁰ However, the issue was complicated by 2 factors. Prior to 1958, the British army officers were not allowed to offer financial inducements that made military life attractive to the educated Nigerians. Secondly, and in relation to the first reason, British army officers found it absurd that the right type of

⁶¹⁷ TNA, DO. 1048/796, High Commissioner's Note on the State of the Police in Bechuanaland and Progress towards Localization, 24 November 1965.

⁶¹⁸ Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 31.

⁶¹⁹ R. Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority & Revolt, 1960-67*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 163.

⁶²⁰ N.J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966*. (London: Methuen & CO LTD, 1971), 57.

Nigerian suitable for commissioned rank had to be attracted to the army by high salaries. This was seen by the British officers at the top to be antithetical to the virtues of service and self-sacrifice, which formed the ethos of army life.⁶²¹ The issue of localization in the BPP, therefore, seemed to have followed a similar pattern to that of the Nigerian army, although to a varying degree.

It was only in August 1966, following another tour and recommendations by the Deputy Inspector General of Colonial Police, that the Colonial Office became clear that the expatriate officers of the BPP would be retained until after independence, which was scheduled for 30 September 1966.⁶²² At the request of Prime Minister Seretse Khama and Police Commissioner Bailey, the Colonial Office agreed to save 2 places per leadership course at the West Riding Police Training School in Wakefield, England for Batswana men. It was thought that by the end of 1967, 12 Batswana would have completed advanced police training courses, which would help accelerate the progressive localization of command posts in the BPP.⁶²³ This, however, was later than the Protectorate administration had hoped for. It also revealed an inconsistency in the Colonial Office's attitude towards the HCTs especially considering the fact that the Basutoland Mounted Police had already made strides in its localization of gazetted ranks through the same supernumerary approach. By November 1964, the Basutoland Mounted Police had 11 African gazetted officers out of an establishment of 28. These were 1 assistant commissioner, 3 superintendents, and 7 assistant superintendents.⁶²⁴ Although there is no available evidence of how many African gazetted officers were in the Swaziland Police by August 1966, it was clear that the Bechuanaland Protectorate would go into independence without any, while the Basutoland Protectorate had 11 of them 2 years before its independence.

⁶²¹ Miners, *The Nigerian Army...*, 57.

⁶²² BNARS, OP/47/8, Colonial Office, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Gaborone 23 August 1966.

⁶²³ BNARS, OP/47/8, Colonial Office, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Gaborone 23 August 1966.

⁶²⁴ TNA, FCO. 141/963, The Report of the Inspector General of Colonial Police on the Basutoland Mounted Police, November 1964.

It is also possible that the British government's slow paced and nonchalant attitude towards the issue of localization in Bechuanaland was enabled by the moderate and pro-British nature of Khama's Democratic Party, which probably did not mount enough pressure as it should have to achieve the objective of localization.

Compared to a number of other British colonies, the Bechuanaland Protectorate represented a unique case as it went into independence without a single African gazetted officer in its police force. Within the context of the post-war colonial reforms, some of the larger police forces in Africa began appointing African gazetted officers in the late 1940s. In 1947, for example, 13 years before Nigeria became independent, the Nigeria Police Force had 10 African assistant superintendents. In Uganda, the first 2 African assistant superintendents were appointed in 1957, and by 1959, just 2 years before independence, there were 18 of them. In 1948, when the Kenya Police created its Emergency Company (renamed General Service Unit in 1953), it comprised 1 European assistant superintendent and 81 rank and file. By 1951, 12 years before the independence of Kenya, the Emergency Company had 4 European and 5 African gazetted officers.⁶²⁵ While the Gold Coast Police had 2 African gazetted officers and 120 Europeans in 1948, these numbers were almost the reverse in 1960, just 3 years after independence. By the independence of Tanganyika in 1961, the Police force had 4 African superintendents. In Northern Rhodesia, the localization process was delayed by the Central African Federation and yet, by 1963, just a year before independence, the police force had a handful of African gazetted officers.⁶²⁶ While the territories mentioned here admittedly had larger police forces and populations compared to the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the early localization of their gazetted ranks raises doubts about the British government's commitment to do the same with the BPP.

⁶²⁵ Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 114.

⁶²⁶ G. Sinclair, *At the End of the Line...*, 71.

Conclusion

The 1960s ushered in political changes that reflected the British government's efforts towards granting the Bechuanaland Protectorate self-governance and independence. This began with the creation of the Legislative, African and Executive Councils in 1960. In the same period, the South African government banned the anti-apartheid movements there, and this led to a rush of political refugees to the Protectorate, including some Batswana who were members of these movements. The significance of the presence of these nationalist elements in the Protectorate was the creation of the Bechuanaland People's Party as the first major opposition to the colonial administration.

The early 1960s also represented the BPP's most challenging period as there was a series of protests and riots in the towns of Lobatse and Francistown where the People's Party had a strong following. Although the BPP's small anti-riot unit, the Security Platoon put down these disturbances, the Protectorate government became increasingly concerned about the state of internal security in the territory. This led to the government's unrelenting pursuit for the establishment of a larger and stronger anti-riot unit that was named the General Service Unit. This, however, did not come easy as the Colonial Office continuously attempted to limit any developments in the structure of the BPP arguing that there was not enough funding for the reorganization of the force.

In the context of decolonization, the localization of the gazetted ranks of the BPP represented another struggle between the Protectorate government and the Colonial Office. While the former attempted to devolve senior positions of the police force to the Africans, the latter rejected this, and chose to depend on expatriate officers until after 1967. This meant, therefore, that while other territories like the Basutoland Protectorate (Lesotho) had significant numbers of African gazetted officers in their police force by the time of their independence,

the Bechuanaland Protectorate had none, which revealed an inconsistency in the attitude of the Colonial Office towards its dependent territories. The lack of political pressure from the dominant but conservative Democratic Party may have also contributed to the British government's reluctance to localize the gazetted ranks in the BPP.

Chapter 6: The Botswana Police and Post-Independence Challenges, 1966-1975

Introduction

By September 1966 when Botswana attained independence from Britain, the localized African uprisings in the Southern African region had drastically escalated into armed liberation struggles against white minority rule in South Africa, Rhodesia, South African-ruled South-West Africa as well as in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Geographically located at the centre of Southern Africa, newly independent Botswana found herself unwittingly involved in the liberation struggles of her neighbouring territories. This chapter, therefore, places these developments into context and shows how they affected and informed developments in Botswana's police force. The chapter also explores other challenges faced by the Botswana Police in the immediate post-independence years, and how they reveal the neglectful nature of British administration during Botswana's colonial period.

The Central African Relay Station and the Expansion of the PMU

Following Botswana's independence in 1966, the Khama administration deliberately chose not to create a national army for the country. During the parliamentary sessions of the self-government period (1965-66), the opposition People's Party warned against the dangers of going into independence without an army to defend the country, but the majority Democratic Party failed to take heed of this.⁶²⁷ The British government on the other hand, unlike what the French did with their former colonies, offered no security guarantee to Botswana in the form

⁶²⁷ R. Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa*. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 49.

of a defence agreement. This meant that in the case of an invasion of Botswana by another sovereign state, Britain would not be obligated to intervene.⁶²⁸

On Seretse Khama's part, the decision not to prioritize a national army was informed by the financial challenges faced by Botswana, as the country did not have the capacity to support a large public sector shortly after its independence.⁶²⁹ The PMU, which was primarily an anti-riot unit of the Botswana Police was considered by Khama's government to be adequate to cope with the territory's then modest security needs.⁶³⁰ This, however, would soon prove to be a blunder on the part of the government of Botswana as the armed liberation struggles in South Africa, South-West Africa and Rhodesia began to spill over into the country. As the white minority governments surrounding Botswana refused to cede power to the majority Africans, the resort to armed struggle in Rhodesia quickly became the most pressing national security threat for Khama's government.⁶³¹

Following in the direction of the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa, the African nationalists in Rhodesia and South-West Africa also turned to armed liberation struggles in the mid-1960s. In Rhodesia, the government's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 can be said to have been the "straw that broke the camel's back" and led to an armed struggle. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved in 1963, leading to the independence of Zambia and Malawi in 1964, the Rhodesian government was still not prepared to cede power to the African majority, and they demanded 'dominion' status like that of Canada or Australia from Britain.⁶³² When this was not forthcoming, Prime Minister

⁶²⁸ Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa...*, 49.

⁶²⁹ D. Henk, *The Botswana Defence Force in the Struggle for an African Environment*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 33.

⁶³⁰ Henk, *The Botswana Defence Force...*, 33.

⁶³¹ M.M.M. Bolaane, "Cross-Border Lives, Warfare and Rape in Independence-Era Botswana," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39: 3 (2013): 557.

⁶³² E. Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1961-1987: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*. (Trenton: African World Press, 2005), 75.

Ian Smith announced the UDI which was unacceptable to the African nationalist movements like the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). By announcing the UDI as an attempt to attain political freedom from Britain, the Smith government had also indirectly declared a civil war in Rhodesia. Through support from the Soviet Union, ZAPU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) operated from exile in Zambia.⁶³³ By 1967, the ANC had formed an alliance with ZAPU to allow for the former's MK guerrillas to infiltrate South Africa through Rhodesia. In 1966 while at their camp in Kongwa, Tanzania, a group of MK guerrillas had expressed their grievances and frustrations to the ANC leadership about taking too long to deploy them to fight in South Africa.⁶³⁴ The alliance with ZAPU, therefore, presented an opportunity for MK guerrillas to engage in the much-awaited action.

To the west and north of Botswana lay South-West Africa, a former German colony which came under South African administration through a League Nations mandate at the end of WWI. The South African government had extended its racial policies to South-West Africa, where the economic exploitation of the black majority was ensured through repressive state apparatus held together by the legal system.⁶³⁵ By the early 1960s, the major African nationalist movements in South-West Africa were the South-West Africa National Union (SWANU) and South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) founded in 1959 and 1960, respectively. In 1966, the Organization of African Union (OAU)'s Liberation Committee raised about £20,000 in contributions from member states to fund a liberation struggle in South-West Africa. As SWANU had displayed some scepticism about the feasibility of an armed struggle against the more powerful South African security forces, SWAPO was awarded the funds, and recognized by the OAU as the authentic representative of the people with sole control of the

⁶³³ Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War...*, 32-33.

⁶³⁴ J. Cherry, *Umkhonto weSizwe...*, 36-37.

⁶³⁵ P.H. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance in Namibia*. (London: James Currey, 1988), 15.

armed struggle for the independence of South-West Africa.⁶³⁶ Apart from the OAU, SWAPO also enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union, where its fighters received military training. As the provision of arms, food and other supplies from the OAU Liberation Committee slowly declined during the course of the armed struggle, SWAPO received them from Moscow instead, as well as training for more cadres to fight the South African security forces.⁶³⁷

In October 1966, just a month after Botswana's independence, Police Commissioner Bailey informed the government about the need to expand and rearm the PMU in light of serious threats to the territorial integrity of the country. The Special Branch of the Botswana Police had become aware of groups of freedom fighters armed with automatic weapons and believed to be trained in guerrilla warfare, crossing into the northern part of Botswana in transit to Rhodesia and South Africa.⁶³⁸ The Special Branch was convinced that these freedom fighters intended to use Botswana as a base from which to carry out armed raids into neighbouring territories. Furthermore, there was a perceived risk of the Rhodesian and South African guerrillas with links to local opposition political movements endeavouring to organize uprisings in Francistown and other towns in an attempt to overthrow the government of Botswana. Although the latter concern may have represented some paranoia, Police Commissioner Bailey expressed the need to have a strong enough para-military unit to deter further incursions into Botswana. The PMU, which at that stage was 118 strong, was in no state to deal with such a commitment as it had neither the manpower nor the modern armaments and equipment required.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁶ L. Dobell, *SWAPO's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means*. (Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1998), 35.

⁶³⁷ V. Shubin, *The Hot Cold War: The USSR in Southern Africa*. (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 199.

⁶³⁸ TNA, OD. 31/295, Memorandum by the Commissioner of Police on the Proposals for the Increase and Reorganization of the Police Mobile Unit, 17 October 1966.

⁶³⁹ TNA, OD. 31/295, Memorandum by the Commissioner of Police on the Proposals for the Increase and Reorganization of the Police Mobile Unit, 17 October 1966.

Although there were no further sightings of guerrillas in Botswana until September 1967, Police Commissioner Bailey considered it imperative to increase the establishment of the PMU to provide a para-military unit equipped and trained in the use of automatic weapons and military tactics to enable it to deal with the guerrilla incursions in the north. In order to meet this new role and still uphold its traditional anti-riot mission, the PMU was to be expanded from 3 to 6 platoons, divided into 2 companies, each commanded by a superintendent, with headquarters at Gaborone and Francistown. The Company at Francistown was to be responsible for deploying constant operational patrols in the Maun, Kasane and Kazungula areas where guerrilla activity was reported the most.⁶⁴⁰ Furthermore, the PMU was to be armed with military weapons comprising British 7.62 mm, Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs), 6 Bren light machine guns and some No. 36 Mills Bombs (hand grenades). There was also going to be an increase in the PMU's fleet of vehicles and accommodation for the 3 new platoons.⁶⁴¹

Anticipating the government of Botswana's need for assistance in the expansion and armament of the PMU, the British government sought to obtain something of a quid pro quo agreement from the former regarding the future of the Central African Relay Station (CARS) at Francistown. Following the Rhodesian government's UDI in 1965, the British government had established the CARS within the borders of the nearly independent Botswana to transmit the British Broadcasting Corporation's broadcasts into Rhodesia. It was hoped that these broadcasts would help undermine Ian Smith's government and give some reassurance to those Rhodesians who were against the UDI.⁶⁴²

⁶⁴⁰ TNA, OD. 31/295, Memorandum by the Commissioner of Police on the Proposals for the Increase and Reorganization of the Police Mobile Unit, 17 October 1966.

⁶⁴¹ TNA, OD. 31/295, Memorandum by the Commissioner of Police on the Proposals for the Increase and Reorganization of the Police Mobile Unit, 17 October 1966.

⁶⁴² R. Dale, "The Creation and Use of the Botswana Defence Force," *The Round Table*, 73: 290 (1984): 217. See also Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy...*, 48.

In November 1966, the British Defence and Overseas Policy Committee met in London to discuss the future of the CARS considering the impending withdrawal of the British Army garrison from Swaziland. The CARS was at the time, guarded by British troops from the Swaziland garrison although in late 1965 President Khama had assured the British government that once strong enough, the Botswana Police would assume the responsibility of guarding the station.⁶⁴³ The committee, therefore, decided to take Khama up on his offer. The British government had fears that if left unguarded, the CARS would be sabotaged by those local settlers who sympathized with the Rhodesian and South African regimes. Khama's agreement to commit the Botswana Police to guarding the CARS was likely informed by his anticipation of backlash from opposition parties following the stationing of British troops at Francistown. Indeed, Motsamai Mpho's Independence Party (though without any seats in parliament), protested what they saw as a military occupation of Francistown.⁶⁴⁴ In parliament, members of the opposition People's Party used the British troops in Francistown as a case in point to once again table a motion for the creation of Botswana's own national army. The motion was, however, rejected.⁶⁴⁵

After the British Defence and Overseas Policy Committee determined that the security requirements for the CARS could be adequately met by 1 armed platoon of the PMU, it made the resolution to persuade the government of Botswana to assume the responsibility of protecting the station. In exchange, the British government was to provide the financial assistance for expanding the PMU to 6 platoons as well as supply the weapons and the training instructors for the unit.⁶⁴⁶ The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, therefore, resolved to

⁶⁴³ TNA, OD. 31/295, Note by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on the Protection of the Francistown Relay Station. n.d.

⁶⁴⁴ Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa...*, 49.

⁶⁴⁵ Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa...*, 49.

⁶⁴⁶ TNA, OD. 31/295, Note by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on the Protection of the Francistown Relay Station. n.d.

request the Ministry of Overseas Development to cover the total cost of the expansion and arming of the PMU through a supplementary grant-in-aid to Botswana. Any remaining costs could then be incurred by the government of Botswana from aid already allocated to them for other development projects.⁶⁴⁷

While the government of Botswana was anxious to go forward with this arrangement, the various departments within the British government clashed on the nature of support to be given to Botswana and the future of the CARS. The Ministry of Overseas Development pointed out that the security of the CARS was a strictly British affair that had nothing to do with the development needs of Botswana. It would, therefore, be inadmissible to charge the cost of protecting the station against the overseas aid programme.⁶⁴⁸ The Treasury Office too, was critical about this approach, arguing that Botswana had been overestimating its expenditures and could likely effect the expansion of the PMU on her own without a supplementary grant-in-aid. The Treasury also felt that the government of Botswana had a misguided tendency of perceiving British famine relief and other forms of aid as a heaven-sent excuse for embarking on other projects that may not be urgent.⁶⁴⁹ This, however, can be seen as the results of nearly a century of colonial Botswana's dependency on British aid for both administration and development purposes. The government of Botswana had simply inherited the culture of reliance from the former colonial administration.

Nevertheless, the Treasury Office's attacks on Botswana were uncalled for as it was the British government that needed help with the protection of the CARS. The Commonwealth Office understood the matter at hand and perceived British aid to Botswana as having special

⁶⁴⁷ TNA, OD. 31/295, Note by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on the Protection of the Francistown Relay Station. n.d.

⁶⁴⁸ TNA, OD. 31/295, Ministry of Overseas Development, London, to Commonwealth Office, London, 15 December 1966.

⁶⁴⁹ TNA, OD. 31/295, Treasury Chambers, London to Ministry of Overseas Development, London, 20 December 1966.

political and military overtones arising out of the Rhodesia situation. With the withdrawal of the British Army garrison in Swaziland, the troops at Francistown would be left out on a limb and would have to be maintained from the British Middle East Command in Aden.⁶⁵⁰ This view was echoed by the British Ministry of Defence, arguing that the cost of expanding and rearming the PMU would be less than that of keeping the British troops at Francistown. The Ministry of Defence, therefore, recommended that it be made a matter of urgency to help the government of Botswana in taking over the responsibility of guarding the CARS.⁶⁵¹

In January 1967, the Botswana Police discovered a cache of arms and ammunition of Soviet origin, with marked maps of Rhodesia about 80 miles north of Francistown. Convinced that these weapons belonged to Rhodesian guerrillas spotted in Botswana a couple of months prior, the government of Botswana pressured the British government for an early decision about the issue of PMU expansion and the security of the CARS.⁶⁵² In February 1967, while Khama's government waited to hear from the British government about its help with the expansion of the PMU, the unit encountered a group of 10 SWAPO guerrillas in northern Botswana, close to the Caprivi Strip of South-West Africa. As they fled across the border into the Caprivi Strip, the SWAPO men left behind 8 Chinese light automatic rifles, 2 Bren light machine guns, some 2500 rounds of ammunition and other small supplies.⁶⁵³ Just a month later in March 1967, 10 SWAPO guerrillas from Zambia attacked South African security forces in the Caprivi Strip. Eight of the guerrillas were killed, one captured by the South Africans, while the last one fled to Maun, Botswana.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵⁰ TNA, OD. 31/295, Commonwealth Office, London to Ministry of Overseas Development, London, 22 December 1966.

⁶⁵¹ TNA, OD. 31/295, Ministry of Defence, London to Commonwealth Office, London 3 January 1967.

⁶⁵² TNA, FCO. 31/26, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London 5 January 1967.

⁶⁵³ "Botswana Police Encounter with Guerrillas," *Botswana Daily News*, 21 March 1967.

⁶⁵⁴ Parsons, "The Pipeline...", 27.

An agreement was finally reached in March 1967, whereby the government of Botswana would commit one platoon of the PMU to guarding the CARS, but liable to be redeployed elsewhere in the event of a state of emergency in the country.⁶⁵⁵ But the British government's side of the bargain turned out different from what had been envisaged in November 1966. Britain provided 35 SLR weapons for the PMU platoon engaged in operational border patrols in the north of Botswana as well as some funding for the recruitment of 1 new platoon to relieve the British troops at Francistown. This platoon was recruited on 1 April 1967 and it was intended to take over from the British troops at Francistown by August of the same year.⁶⁵⁶

Due to financial challenges, the British government claimed to be unable to fully fund the expansion and armament of the PMU except for the 35 SLR weapons and the funding for the recruitment of 1 platoon. The government of Botswana was further offered a discounted deal to purchase from Britain, an additional 35 second-hand SLR weapons that were delivered from the Middle East Command in May 1967 as well as all the equipment previously in the use of the British troops at Francistown.⁶⁵⁷ As was planned, the British troops at Francistown were withdrawn in August 1967 when the new PMU platoon took over the protection of the CARS. By late 1967, therefore, the expansion of the PMU was still not complete as only 1 of the 3 new platoons were recruited. The government of Botswana required £132,000 for the recruitment of the rest of the platoons and for the accommodation and equipment to be used by them. The request for British assistance to cover these costs was ultimately unsuccessful as the British government claimed it had done all within its abilities to assist with the expansion of the PMU.⁶⁵⁸ The reality was that the British government had only facilitated the protection of

⁶⁵⁵ TNA, FCO. 31/26, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 6 March 1967.

⁶⁵⁶ TNA, FCO. 31/26, Overseas Police Advisor's Report on Botswana's Police Mobile Unit Expansion and the Security of the Central African Relay Station, Francistown, March 1967.

⁶⁵⁷ TNA, FCO. 31/27, Middle East Command, Aden to British Foreign Office, London, 24 April 1967.

⁶⁵⁸ TNA, OD. 31/296, Ministry of Defence, London to Treasury Chambers, London, 16 November 1967.

the CARS by the PMU before withdrawing its troops from Botswana and the latter had gained very little from this agreement.

The Botswana Police, Freedom Fighters and Neighbouring Security Forces

In the midst of trying to get assistance from the British government for completing the expansion of the PMU, the government of Botswana was soon faced with more guerrilla activity in the northern part of the country. By the beginning of September 1967, the PMU platoon on operational patrols in the north had apprehended 32 armed guerrillas on 2 different occasions. Among these men, some of whom were badly wounded, 22 claimed to be members of the ANC, while 3 identified with the PAC. The other 7 men claimed to be members of ZIPRA.⁶⁵⁹ President Khama informed British High Commissioner John Gandee that these guerrillas were well trained and armed with Soviet automatic rifles, and that they had just had a bloody encounter with the Rhodesian security forces in the Wankie (Hwange) Game Reserve.⁶⁶⁰

The bloody campaign that Khama was referring to later came to be known as the Wankie Campaign of August to September 1967. A combined force of about 90 ZIPRA and MK guerrillas crossed the Zambezi River into Rhodesia's Wankie Game Reserve with the intention of establishing a recruiting base in the Tjolutjo Tribal Trust Land and later proceed through Botswana to conduct operations in South Africa.⁶⁶¹ In one of the engagements of the Wankie campaign, the Rhodesian security forces killed 47 guerrillas while 20 more were captured. The rest of the guerrillas managed to escape into Botswana where the PMU arrested them. As a result of the ANC's involvement in the Wankie Campaign, the apartheid

⁶⁵⁹ TNA, OD. 31/295, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 4 September 1967.

⁶⁶⁰ TNA, OD. 31/295, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 4 September 1967.

⁶⁶¹ Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War...*, 32.

government sent South African police units to bolster Rhodesian security forces and continued to provide this manpower for the next several years.⁶⁶² The success of the Rhodesian security forces in the Wankie Campaign meant that the ZAPU and ANC alliance had failed in its attempts to establish a lasting guerrilla presence in Rhodesia, which was meant to serve as a conduit for campaigns in South Africa.⁶⁶³

President Khama stated that there was likely going to be more encounters with these exiled guerrillas as Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was hosting about 2000 of them and was anxious to send them on their way. The Botswana Police had charged some of those arrested with illegal possession of firearms in Botswana as well as immigration offenses and sentenced 13 of them to 2 years and 9 months in prison. There were concerns, however, that charging and sentencing these guerrillas in Botswana might encourage them to resist arrest and possibly open fire upon encounters with the PMU, which was not as heavily armed as they were.⁶⁶⁴ Furthermore, the government of Botswana feared that the success of the Rhodesian security forces would lead to more ANC guerrillas coming into Botswana, which could upset relations with the South African government seeing as it had already deployed troops in the Zambezi Valley.⁶⁶⁵

While it is not clear whether Khama was aware of this, from around 1965 the Special Branch of the Botswana Police at Francistown had been involved in helping ZAPU members go through the country on their way to Zambia. British Commissioner Fawcus had informed police authorities that any demands of extradition of Africans by the Rhodesian government

⁶⁶² Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War...*, 32.

⁶⁶³ Davis, *The ANC's War against Apartheid...*, 62.

⁶⁶⁴ TNA, OD. 31/295, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 4 September 1967.

⁶⁶⁵ TNA, OD. 31/295, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 4 September 1967.

had to be weighed against the legality of that state.⁶⁶⁶ Members of ZAPU were, therefore, given temporary refuge in the then nearly independent Bechuanaland until their comrades from Lusaka could come and get them. By the time of Botswana's independence, the Special Branch at Francistown was becoming concerned about what type of ZAPU members to keep in the county. Well-trained and armed guerrillas were deported to Zambia as soon as possible to avoid implicating Botswana in their activities. An example of this was Stanley Moyo, a ZAPU member who had received training in the USSR, who was now operating with a small group of guerrillas to attack Rhodesian farms from Botswana. When he was arrested in September 1966, the Special Branch handed him to the Zambian authorities at once.⁶⁶⁷

In 1967, the government of Botswana passed a law that required anyone entering the country without the proper documentation to apply for refugee status. Once granted refugee status, these people were prohibited from engaging in any political activity lest they draw more of the attention of the South African and Rhodesian governments to Botswana.⁶⁶⁸ Many of those granted refugee status were members of ZAPU (occasionally ZANU, ANC and PAC), and they were given accommodation in a house at Francistown where the Christian Council of Botswana gave them a subsistence allowance. They would remain there while a list of their names was sent to the Botswana High Commissioner in Lusaka, who would then pass it to the Zambian government before arrangements were made to bring them in to Zambia. Only those guerrillas who were arrested in possession of arms in Botswana were given prison sentences. The government of Botswana ceased imprisoning the armed guerrillas in 1968 after criticism from the OAU and began to hand them over to the Zambian government upon arrest.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ L. White, "Students, ZAPU, and the Special Branch in Francistown, 1964-1972," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40: 6 (2014): 1293.

⁶⁶⁷ White, "Students, ZAPU, and the Special Branch in Francistown, 1964-1972...", 1294.

⁶⁶⁸ P.T. Mgadla, "'A good measure of sacrifice': Botswana and the liberation struggles of Southern Rhodesia (1965-1985)," *Social Dynamics*, 34: 1 (2008): 7.

⁶⁶⁹ White, "Students, ZAPU, and the Special Branch in Francistown, 1964-1972...", 1295.

Considering this acceptance of refugees, therefore, it is apparent that the government of Botswana was sympathetic towards the freedom fighters' cause, and that it was the guerrillas who entered Botswana bearing arms that Khama was mostly concerned about. These posed a grave threat for Botswana considering the country's economic dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa. Furthermore, the continued use of Botswana as a corridor by armed guerrillas perpetuated the country's vulnerability to attack by its neighbouring settler minority regimes.⁶⁷⁰

In light of the vast areas patrolled by the PMU along the northern border of Botswana and how heavily armed the guerrillas were, President Khama told British High Commissioner Gandee, that the police force needed better wireless communications, new armoured scout vehicles and possibly helicopters. Although acknowledging that Botswana had no defence treaty with Britain upon which to call for assistance, Khama hoped that the required resources could be obtained from the British Army and the Royal Air Force.⁶⁷¹ While the Commonwealth Office was willing to consider the possibility of providing communication equipment for the PMU, they were clear that armoured scout vehicles and helicopters were out of the question. Botswana would have to find the funds to buy these from her own budget.⁶⁷² Khama's natural assumption that the British Army and Royal Air Force could be requested to provide these resources to his country was a further indication of how deeply entrenched Botswana's dependence on aid was. Although British financial aid was not as forthcoming after independence, Botswana's dependence represented a form of colonial legacy.

By 22 September 1967, the PMU had arrested 6 more freedom fighters, bringing the total number to 38. The Commonwealth Office in London soon became concerned that if any shooting occurred between the PMU and the guerrillas, President Khama would be forced to

⁶⁷⁰ Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa...*, 17-19.

⁶⁷¹ TNA, OD. 31/295, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 4 September 1967

⁶⁷² TNA, OD. 31/295, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 7 September 1967.

withdraw the platoon that was guarding the CARS and deploy it on operational duties along Botswana's northern border. Indeed, this was the president's prerogative as confirmed by the British government that in the case of a state of emergency in Botswana, the commander-in-chief would have to prioritize the security of the country over that of the CARS.⁶⁷³ The envisaged total strength of an expanded PMU with 6 platoons had been 290. However, since the British government had manipulated Khama's administration into guarding the CARS for less than what had been initially offered, the Botswana Police was still in the process of recruiting for the remaining 2 platoons which would not complete their training until 1968. This meant that the platoon guarding the CARS at Francistown represented 25% of Botswana's small para-military police force and this left the country in a vulnerable position.⁶⁷⁴ Faced with the option to send British troops to take over the security of the CARS or to provide the government of Botswana with the assistance it needed, the British government decided to take no action and observe the situation for some time.⁶⁷⁵

On 6 November 1967, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thompson met with President Khama and some of his ministers and officials in Gaborone. Asked about the Commonwealth Office's position on the issue of Rhodesia and guerrilla incursions into Botswana, Thompson said his office had no solutions to offer because there had been no act of aggression from Rhodesia or South Africa against Botswana.⁶⁷⁶ President Khama expressed his government's frustration and disappointment with Britain's inability to help Botswana deal with issues arising out of the Rhodesian problem. He pointed out that unless there was a legitimate internationally recognized government in Rhodesia with which to cooperate, his country's security position would remain delicate as both the guerrillas and

⁶⁷³ TNA, FCO. 31/26, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 6 March 1967.

⁶⁷⁴ TNA, OD. 31/295, Commonwealth Office, London to Ministry of Defence, London, 22 September 1967.

⁶⁷⁵ TNA, OD. 31/295, Commonwealth Office, London to Ministry of Defence, London, 22 September 1967.

⁶⁷⁶ TNA, OD. 31/296, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 7 November 1967.

state forces would likely carry their war into Botswana. The government of South Africa had already sent troops to support the Rhodesian security forces and had allegedly stated that their boundary was the Zambezi River and not the Limpopo, implying that they had no regard for Botswana's territorial integrity in their pursuit of South African and Rhodesian guerrillas.⁶⁷⁷

By the end of 1967, the government of Botswana had found savings from their own budget to cover the cost of recruiting, housing and equipping the remaining 2 PMU platoons. In another plea for help from the seemingly indifferent British government, Khama's government requested to be loaned 2 warrant officers from the British Army for 6 months to train the newly raised PMU platoons in the use of SLR weapons and bush war tactics.⁶⁷⁸ At the recommendation of the British High Commissioner in Gaborone, the Ministry of Defence in London considered the secondment of the 2 warrant officers to the Botswana Police as well as sending 2 of Botswana's police inspectors for an arms tactical training course in Britain for 6 weeks. Although this would all cost the government of Botswana about £3,500, the British Ministry of Defence decided to do it for free. The British Ministry of Defence believed that this gesture would make a good impression on the government of Botswana who were already critical about what they saw as Britain's unsympathetic attitude towards their security problem.⁶⁷⁹ Another self-serving reason behind the British government providing this assistance to Botswana was to ensure that the CARS remained protected by the PMU. Financial provision for this minimal assistance was charged against the Commonwealth Office's funds

⁶⁷⁷ TNA, OD. 31/296, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 7 November 1967.

⁶⁷⁸ TNA, OD. 31/296, British High Commission, Gaborone to Commonwealth Office, London, 7 November 1967.

⁶⁷⁹ TNA, OD. 31/296, Ministry of Defence, London to Treasury Chambers, London, 16 November 1967.

including air fares and secondment allowances for the 2 warrant officers. The government of Botswana was only required to provide accommodation and food for the 2 instructors.⁶⁸⁰

Although British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Thompson had told Khama that the British government could not intervene on the Rhodesian problem because there had been no act of aggression towards Botswana, this situation soon changed, and the Commonwealth Office still turned a blind eye. On 20 January 1969, an armed Rhodesian military convoy of about company strength was reported to have crossed the border into Botswana at Pandamatenga supposedly in pursuit of guerrillas. Because the government of Botswana did not recognize the illegal regime in Rhodesia, no official protest was launched by the former, although some contact was made through police channels at station commander level.⁶⁸¹ As the Botswana Police maintained communications with the BSAP on strictly criminal investigation matters, the station commander at Kasane was able to raise the matter with his counterpart at Victoria Falls. Although the BSAP offered an apology and an assurance that such an incident would not reoccur, this had only been the beginning of a series of acts of aggression and/or intimidation by the Rhodesian and South African forces against Botswana.⁶⁸²

In February 1970, a driver for the Botswana Department of Agriculture and three other Botswana citizens were intercepted by Rhodesian security forces while they were travelling in a tractor along the Rhodesian border near Pandamatenga. The 4 Botswana were all subjected to humiliating body searches at gun point before being allowed to resume their journey.⁶⁸³ This incident, and that of January 1969, made Police Commissioner Bailey averse to the PMU

⁶⁸⁰ TNA, OD. 31/296, Commonwealth Office, London to British High Commission, Gaborone, 21 November 1967.

⁶⁸¹ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone to British High Commission, Gaborone, 31 March 1971.

⁶⁸² BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone to British High Commission, Gaborone, 31 March 1971.

⁶⁸³ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone, 17 February 1970.

carrying on with patrols along Botswana's border with Rhodesia although nothing was done about this. Bailey felt that there was no telling what would happen if the Rhodesian security forces came across armed African members of the PMU along the sometimes-ill-defined border.⁶⁸⁴ Another border incident occurred on 12 April 1970, when a Department of Water Affairs driver was en route to Pandamatenga from Kasane with several government employees including Constable Monang of the Botswana Police who was proceeding to Pandamatenga on transfer. While stopped a few miles from their destination to collect firewood, the Botswana party was approached by a Land Rover carrying several armed Europeans and 1 African which stopped on the Rhodesian side of the border.⁶⁸⁵ The occupants of the Botswana government vehicle were asked if they had seen any "terrorists", to which they all gave negative replies. Following the brief but friendly conversation, one of the Rhodesian men fired a shot over the heads of the Batswana. Although he was reprimanded by his superior, 2 more shots were fired at the general direction of Botswana as the Land Rover drove away from the border fence. Since there were still no formal ties between the Botswana and Rhodesia governments, Bailey recommended that the public in Botswana be warned against regularly travelling along the Kasane-Pandamatenga road.⁶⁸⁶

In early March 1970, the South African troops stationed on the Rhodesia-Botswana border along the Zambezi River threatened to shoot Botswana's ferry operator if he allowed it to drift into Rhodesian waters again. With the river current recently increased due to flood waters from Angola, the ferry's engine had failed during a crossing and the ferry was swept 2 miles downstream where it came to stop on the Rhodesian bank. Highly suspicious about

⁶⁸⁴ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone, 17 February 1970.

⁶⁸⁵ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone, 12 May 1970.

⁶⁸⁶ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone, 12 May 1970.

guerrillas sneaking into Rhodesia, the South African men threatened the life of the ferry operator.⁶⁸⁷ A more serious act of aggression occurred on 21 March 1971 in the Zambezi River at the quadripoint of Botswana, Zambia, South-West Africa and Rhodesia. A football team from Kasane accompanied by 5 members of the Botswana Police boarded the ferry at Kazungula to travel across the river to Zambia for a match. When the ferry was midstream, the occupants noticed 3 European soldiers standing on the Rhodesian bank near the border fence, with one of them vigorously waving at the ferry. One of the 3 soldiers ran off into the bush, returning with a rifle which he aimed at the ferry and fired twice, 1 shot going into the water just near the outboard motor engine.⁶⁸⁸ When the first shot was fired, all passengers threw themselves on the deck of the ferry and laid there until they were safely across the river in Zambia. Although no one was injured, the incident caused great concern in Kasane and it prompted the ruling party's member of parliament for Chobe, Mr. Monwela, to pose a question in the legislative assembly asking government what they intended to do about the safety of his constituents.⁶⁸⁹

While recognizing that Britain exercised no power on the ground in Rhodesia, the government of Botswana believed that such border incidents should cause some concern to the British government as 'de jure' authority. President Khama warned that these occurrences were not in the interest of peace and stability in the region and that their continuance, despite his government's efforts to play them down, were bound to create public concern in Botswana and attract unwanted attention from the media both regionally and internationally.⁶⁹⁰ On behalf of

⁶⁸⁷ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Report on Shooting Incident: Kazungula Pantoon. By Assistant Superintendent W.B Anderson, Officer Commanding Kasane District, n.d.

⁶⁸⁸ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Report on Shooting Incident: Kazungula Pantoon. By Assistant Superintendent W.B Anderson, Officer Commanding Kasane District, n.d.

⁶⁸⁹ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone to British High Commission, Gaborone, 31 March 1971.

⁶⁹⁰ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 31 March 1971.

the British government, the High Commissioner in Botswana, G.D Anderson acknowledged that while all the border incidents since 1969 could not be taken lightly, the latest one was more serious. Considering that South African troops had recently threatened the life of Botswana's ferry operator, Anderson advised the government of Botswana to privately enquire with the South Africans if their men were responsible for the last incident and to inform him of the outcomes.⁶⁹¹ Although the British government did not want to be seen to be involved in any way in the security issue between Botswana and her neighbouring settler states, the High Commissioner followed these developments closely, informing the Colonial Office of everything that transpired.⁶⁹²

After some enquiries with the BSAP and the South African government, the BSAP station commander at Victoria Falls in Rhodesia discovered that the Kazungula ferry had been shot at by the South African Police (SAP) detachment stationed there. Upon investigations by the SAP liaison at Victoria Falls, the 3 men involved explained that they had been experimenting with their automatic rifles to determine how far a single round could go into the trunk of a tree. They further denied the allegations of intentionally firing at the ferry and maintained that it was coincidental that a crossing was being made at the time of their 'experiment'.⁶⁹³ This explanation contradicted with eyewitness accounts from civilians in Botswana and Rhodesia and this allegedly infuriated the BSAP commissioner. The SAP authorities also reached out to the Botswana Police, profusely apologizing for the misconduct

⁶⁹¹ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, British High Commission, Gaborone, to Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone, 2 April 1971.

⁶⁹² BNARS, OP2. 47/3, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 31 March 1971.

⁶⁹³ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Officer Commanding No. 7 District, Kasane to Commissioner of Police, Gaborone, 12 April 1971.

of their men and reckoning that 1 if not all of them would be dismissed from the police force following a court of enquiry.⁶⁹⁴

Despite these expressions of regret by the Rhodesian and South African police authorities, the SAP detachment involved in the shooting remained at its post and no further action was taken. The primary role of this detachment was to closely watch the Kazungula ferry, its passengers and all human activity along the quadripoint, with the aim of detecting guerrillas proceeding to Rhodesia from Zambia. In full view of the ferry and the Botswana side of the quadripoint, the SAP men always stood watch with a tripod and telescope, recording details of vehicles and passengers on the ferry.⁶⁹⁵ These border incidents had reflected Botswana's awkward position, finding herself surrounded by territories with on-going armed struggles. As the armed struggle in Botswana's neighbour to the north-east intensified in the late 1970s, so did the aggression of the Rhodesian security forces, who began to conduct regular cross-border raids into the country, in pursuit of ZIPRA guerrillas. These cross-border raids exposed the weaknesses of the Botswana Police and ultimately pushed the government to form the Botswana Defence Force in 1977, using the PMU as a nucleus.⁶⁹⁶

Seretse Khama's Rapid Localization of the Botswana Police

In 1966, Botswana became independent without African gazetted officers in the police force because of low education standards among the locals. This reflected a complete lack of planning for localization on the part of the British Colonial Office as well as the early self-government administration. As explained in the previous chapter, some parts of decolonizing

⁶⁹⁴ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Officer Commanding No. 7 District, Kasane to Commissioner of Police, Gaborone, 12 April 1971.

⁶⁹⁵ BNARS, OP2. 47/3, Report on Shooting Incident: Kazungula Pantoon. By Assistant Superintendent W.B Anderson, Officer Commanding Kasane District, n.d.

⁶⁹⁶ For cross-border raids in the late 1970s, see; Henk, *The Botswana Defence Force...*, 31. Bolaane, "Cross-Border Lives, Warfare and Rape...", 561, Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa...*, 51, Mocheregwa, "The Police Mobile Unit...", 112.

British Africa like Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda had some African gazetted officers in their police forces by independence. These African gazetted officers were, however, very few considering the population of those territories and the number of expatriate officers there. In other parts of the continent, the policy of localization came late, resulting in more dependence on expatriates to make up for the shortage of local officers.⁶⁹⁷

The localization of the African civil service too, transpired at varying degrees and paces during the self-government years and shortly after the independence of many countries. This had reflected a lack of planning on the part of the Colonial Office but also by the African leaders shortly after independence. From the early 1950s to independence, the Gold Coast (soon to be Ghana) government had increased the number of Africans in the civil service from 1000 to 1700.⁶⁹⁸ However, the increase of Africans in the civil service did not necessarily reflect a decline in the number of expatriate Europeans. President Kwame Nkrumah had been careful not to localize the civil service too rapidly and was supposedly uncertain about the loyalty of British-trained African civil servants. Therefore, localization proceeded slowly and was not completed until the mid-1960s.⁶⁹⁹

In self-governing Tanzania too, building on the reluctance of the Colonial Office, Prime Minister Nyerere had been averse to rapidly localizing the civil service out of fear that this would lead to poor leadership. Through the recommendations of the American Ford Foundation, Nyerere established an emergency training program to upgrade Africans' educational qualifications to prepare them to take over the civil service.⁷⁰⁰ Even then, however, Nyerere still emphasized the need to retain European expatriates in the civil service and, indeed

⁶⁹⁷ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line...*, 71.

⁶⁹⁸ R. M. Price, *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*. (Barkley: University of California Press, 1975), 45.

⁶⁹⁹ M. Grilli, *Nkrumalism and African Nationalism: Ghana's Pan-African Foreign Policy in the Age of Decolonization*. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 76.

⁷⁰⁰ R. Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanganyika*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 81.

at independence, 85% of them decided to remain in their positions. Although this number was higher than what he anticipated, Nyerere accepted this as it meant that his country avoided an immediate administrative crisis.⁷⁰¹ In Kenya, the Colonial Office had dragged its feet in localizing the civil service as well, but Jomo Kenyatta was more eager to complete the process. Considering the recent history of the Mau Mau Uprising in the country, Kenyatta may have been motivated to get rid of European administrators sooner than his counterparts in the aforementioned territories. As a result, the localization of the civil service in Kenya was slightly more rapid, and it was fully completed by 1965, just 2 years after independence. Although there were few Africans in the top civil service positions in the late 1950s, those with adequate qualifications were rapidly promoted and found themselves at the top shortly after independence.⁷⁰²

During Botswana's self-government period between 1965 and 1966, the Colonial Office had insisted on retaining expatriate officers in the then BPP for some time while arrangements were made with the British government to provide the necessary training for Botswana police at the West Riding Police Training School in Wakefield, England.⁷⁰³ By the end of 1969, 3 years after independence, there were 9 African gazetted officers in the Botswana Police. These were assistant superintendents Baletloa, Mogatle, Ntsape, Mophuting and Merafhe; superintendents Bokowe, Ndubiwa, Kgakge, and senior superintendent Hirschfeld. The police force, however, still had a sizeable cadre of European gazetted officers. Four of these expatriate Europeans occupied the top 4 command posts of commissioner, deputy commissioner, and the 2 assistant commissioner ones. All 4 expatriates in these command

⁷⁰¹ J. C. Taylor, *The Political Development of Tanganyika*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 219.

⁷⁰² D. K. Leonard, *African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 81.

⁷⁰³ BNARS, OP/47/8, Colonial Office, London to Her Majesty's Commissioner, Gaborone 23 August 1966.

positions were approaching the end of their careers as their contracts were set to expire between late 1970 and 1971.⁷⁰⁴

Despite the 9 African gazetted officers in the Botswana Police, President Khama was still anxious to accelerate the process of localization in the whole force, starting with the top 4 command posts. In October 1969, Khama's government brought in 2 advisors from the Ford Foundation namely, D.A. Anderson and F.J Glyn to review the administration of the country and advise on localization and training in Botswana's public sector.⁷⁰⁵ With the Ford Foundation being an American organization, Khama's decision to engage its services reflected a slight change in orientation from the former colonial power. While consulting for the government, Mr Anderson was requested by the president to meet with Police Commissioner Bailey, who was a British expatriate officer, to discuss the issue of localization in the Botswana Police.⁷⁰⁶ Anderson directed Bailey to formulate a comprehensive program for the localization of the top 4 command posts as well as the majority of the superintendent and senior superintendent ones by the end of 1971. For the top 4 posts, a corresponding number of African gazetted officers was to be nominated 1 at a time, to attend a 3-month command course in Britain in April, July, October 1970, and January 1971. After these command posts were filled, African non-gazetted officers (inspectorate) were to be sent 2 at a time, to Britain for the same course before promotion to gazetted ranks.⁷⁰⁷

Senior Superintendent Hirschfeld and Assistant Superintendent Merafhe were earmarked to be the first African commissioner and deputy commissioner of the Botswana Police. Upon return from the command course in Britain, the 35-year-old Hirschfeld was to be

⁷⁰⁴ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

⁷⁰⁵ Mentz, "Evaluation of the Role of the Presidential Commission...", 65.

⁷⁰⁶ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Note on Discussion with Lt. Col. JTA. Bailey CBE, OPM, Commissioner of Police on Friday 10 October 1969. 12 October 1969.

⁷⁰⁷ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Note on Discussion with Lt. Col. JTA. Bailey CBE, OPM, Commissioner of Police on Friday 10 October 1969. 12 October 1969.

promoted to the rank of assistant commissioner in July 1970, then deputy commissioner in February 1971, and ultimately police commissioner by October 1971 at Bailey's retirement.⁷⁰⁸ Based on his perceived aptitude, 34-year-old Merafhe was to skip the rank of superintendent and be promoted to senior superintendent upon his return from Britain in 1971. Thereafter, he was to become assistant commissioner briefly and then deputy commissioner in September 1971. The 2 assistant commissioner posts were, therefore, filled by Ndubiwa and Kgakge.⁷⁰⁹

Bailey was also required to develop a program of direct entry into the inspectorate ranks. The president expected Bailey to tour the country addressing secondary school students and encouraging them to consider a career in the Botswana Police. Beginning in 1970, 2 matriculants were to be recruited as cadet inspectors and trained in Botswana for 1 year before being seconded to the Kenya or Ghana police forces to gain some practical experience.⁷¹⁰ To ensure the success of the direct entry program, the Office of the President was to inform the Botswana Public Service Commission that selected matriculants should not be considered for any appointment in the public sector. The private sector, on the other hand, was to be given a verbal warning by the same office to keep away from matriculants whom the Botswana Police was interested in.⁷¹¹ While warning other departments to stay clear of the potential police recruits seemed excessive, it also reflected the president's eagerness to localize the Botswana Police while the process had not yet begun in the rest of the civil service.

In drawing up the required localization scheme in 1969, Bailey took heed of the president's wishes regarding the 4 command posts but dismissed many other areas of

⁷⁰⁸ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

⁷⁰⁹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

⁷¹⁰ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Note on Discussion with Lt. Col. JTA. Bailey CBE, OPM, Commissioner of Police on Friday 10 October 1969. 12 October 1969.

⁷¹¹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Note on Discussion with Lt. Col. JTA. Bailey CBE, OPM, Commissioner of Police on Friday 10 October 1969. 12 October 1969.

localization as impractical. Particularly problematic to Bailey, was what he saw as a crash localization of the Botswana Police, especially in the specialist branches of the force such as the CID, Special Branch and PMU. Bailey argued that the premature replacement of Europeans by inexperienced Africans in the higher ranks of these branches could have an adverse effect on their efficiency.⁷¹² The CID for example, had no African gazetted officers in 1969, and Bailey claimed that the 5 expatriate officers heading it would be required for some years to come as was the case in even larger police forces like Kenya, Zambia and Malawi. He denigratingly believed that the Botswana did not have the capacity to gain the knowledge it took to head the CID because of the sophisticated nature of the crimes and investigations involved. He, nevertheless, planned for the envisaged cadet inspectorate entrants, which the president had called for, to be earmarked for transfer into the CID following the 2 years of basic training and attachment to other police forces.⁷¹³ In the PMU, there were 5 European and 2 African gazetted officers. For this branch too, Bailey argued for retaining the Europeans for their invaluable para-military and administrative duties. The Special Branch had 4 European and 1 African gazetted officer. Although he emphasized the need for the branch to retain expatriates, Bailey was prepared to promote Assistant Superintendent Mophuting to the rank of superintendent and make him the deputy head of Special Branch.⁷¹⁴ Because the Special Branch was also involved in national security issues such as the aforementioned guerrilla infiltration, there were sovereignty implications in having it led by British officers and yet, Bailey chose to keep John Sheppard, an expatriate, as head of the branch.⁷¹⁵

⁷¹² TNA, FCO. 45/429, Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone to Commissioner of Police, Gaborone, 29 December 1969.

⁷¹³ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

⁷¹⁴ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

⁷¹⁵ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

Although reluctant to replace gazetted Europeans in the specialist branches of the Botswana Police with Africans, Bailey's localization scheme did propose the promotion of 3 Africans to gazetted rank. Inspectors Tebele, Gareforolwe, and Isaacs, were all to rise to the rank of assistant superintendent. The promotion of Tebele and Gareforolwe, both 50 years old, was based not on their academic qualifications, but their long service in the force. The 35-year-old Isaacs was deemed suitable for gazetted rank if he could complete a command course by 1971. Even with all the envisaged changes, Bailey's scheme would still leave 8 expatriate gazetted officers holding general duty positions such as district and sub-district command posts in various parts of the country.⁷¹⁶ This was a relatively unique case because as shown in the previous chapter, many former British colonies had fully localized their police forces by independence or shortly after. The situation in Botswana was almost similar to that of Malawi, where President Banda had encouraged the European expatriates in the police force to stay on after the country's independence. The Malawi Police, therefore, relied on European gazetted officers until the early 1970s.⁷¹⁷ The difference here was that unlike Banda, Khama had called for localization before independence. There were other smaller police forces such as those of Eritrea and British Somaliland where expatriate officers remained for some years after independence because of a lack of suitable African recruits.⁷¹⁸

President Khama was unimpressed with Bailey's localization scheme. Although it went some way in meeting the objectives of the president, especially with the top 4 command posts, the scheme did not go far enough in other areas. It was criticized by the Office of the President for being too vague on the issue of localization at district and sub-district levels.⁷¹⁹ Moreover,

⁷¹⁶ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police's Note on the Localization of the Botswana Police, 10 December 1969.

⁷¹⁷ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line...*, 71. See also Clayton & Killingray, *Khaki and Blue...*, 71.

⁷¹⁸ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line...*, 72.

⁷¹⁹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone to Commissioner of Police, Gaborone, 29 December 1969.

the scheme argued for retaining expatriates in the specialist branches of the Botswana Police but provided no plans or recommendations for their eventual localization except for the promotion of Mophuting to superintendent and deputy head of Special Branch. While government accepted that some expatriates, especially those in the specialist branches would have to remain for some time, they were going to be expected to train their African inspectorate officers and groom them to take over the command of those branches.⁷²⁰

By 1970, President Khama was convinced that Bailey was intentionally dragging his feet on the question of localization in an attempt to buy some time for the expatriate officers in the Botswana Police. It was reported that the morale of the expatriate officers had been low since the beginning of 1970 because Bailey had been informing them that full-scale localization was imminent and that there was no future for any of them in Botswana. Bailey's actions also dissuaded those expatriates who were planning to take on Botswana citizenship.⁷²¹ On 23 February, President Khama had a private, unofficial meeting with Overseas Police Advisor (formerly Inspector General of Colonial Police), Michael J. Macoun, in Gaborone to discuss the question of localization. To the president's relief, Macoun pointed out that by that time (4 years after independence), the only expatriate officers remaining in the force were supposed to be those at headquarters engaged in training the locals or performing some highly specialized roles for which there were no qualified Africans.⁷²² Macoun also expressed the importance of immediately withdrawing all expatriate officers in the field engaged as commanders in the districts or PMU platoons, where they could find themselves involved in law and order

⁷²⁰ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Permanent Secretary to the President, Gaborone to Commissioner of Police, Gaborone, 29 December 1969.

⁷²¹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, British High Commission, Gaborone to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 10 February 1970.

⁷²² TNA, FCO. 45/429, British High, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 26 February 1970.

operations against African nationals. This could have undesired political consequences, especially in an independent African country.⁷²³

After assuring Khama of his full support, Macoun met with Bailey the next day on an official capacity where he directed the latter on what was to be done with the question of localization in the Botswana Police. Apart from the 10 expatriate officers whose contracts or tours were set to end in 1971, including the top 4 command posts, Macoun recommended the dismissal of a further 6. The 6 officers, all of whom were in general duty posts, were to be forced into retirement through a 6 month notice for the permanent and pensionable ones, or by termination and/non-renewal of contracts for the others.⁷²⁴ Successful execution of Macoun's recommendations would mean that 16 of the 32 expatriate officers in the Botswana Police made way for Africans to take over. This exercise would, however, depend on the successful completion of training courses by the respective African gazetted officers.⁷²⁵

With the confidence gained from Macoun's recommendations, President Khama resolutely accelerated the localization process. On 20 March 1970, he summoned all available European and African gazetted men of the Botswana Police to the officer's mess at the PMU headquarters in Gaborone to make his big announcement. In December 1969, he had addressed the conference of the Botswana Teachers Union at Lobatse to explain to them government's intention to embark on a large-scale training, localization and recruitment process aimed at national development.⁷²⁶ After addressing the executive board of the Botswana Civil Service Association on the same matter in February 1970, Khama felt it was now time for all gazetted officers to hear his plans regarding localization in the police. He explained to them that

⁷²³ TNA, FCO. 45/429, British High, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 26 February 1970.

⁷²⁴ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Overseas Police Advisor M. J. Macoun's Memorandum on the Localization of the Botswana Police Force, 24 February 1970.

⁷²⁵ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Overseas Police Advisor M. J. Macoun's Memorandum on the Localization of the Botswana Police Force, 24 February 1970.

⁷²⁶ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Address by his Excellency the President to all Available Expatriate Police Officers and to all Local Gazetted Police Officers at 'B' Company, PMU Headquarters on Friday 20 March 1970.

localization, which did not only apply to the police force but to the public service and the commercial sector, was essential to achieving one of Botswana's key principles, namely, self-reliance. The independence of Botswana would, therefore, be superficial if the country relied indefinitely on non-citizens to perform all the work critical to national development.⁷²⁷

One of the main political objectives of Khama's government, dating back to the formation of the Democratic Party, was the creation of a non-racial, egalitarian society in Botswana. Unlike the radical People's Party, Khama's Democratic Party had promised to uphold liberal and democratic freedoms once in power, and this was what made his party more acceptable to the colonial administration.⁷²⁸ In line with this objective of multiracialism, Khama explained that a 'Motswana' did not simply mean someone whose mother tongue was Setswana, but rather a person of any racial and linguistic background who resided in Botswana and was a citizen by birth, marriage or immigration. As such, localization in government's terms, meant the replacement of non-citizens by citizens, whatever their race or ethnicity.⁷²⁹

After expressing his gratitude to all expatriate officers for their service in the Botswana Police, Khama announced that by the end of 1971, the top 4 command posts would be vacated by the incumbent officers and occupied by Batswana. Furthermore, in the course of 1970, about 16 of the currently serving expatriate officers would receive letters from the Office of the President requesting them to retire either through non-renewal of contracts or a compensation scheme for the permanent and pensionable ones.⁷³⁰ Besides the expatriate officers who would be retained for some time for purely training responsibilities and specialized roles, the general

⁷²⁷ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Address by his Excellency the President to all Available Expatriate Police Officers and to all Local Gazetted Police Officers at 'B' Company, PMU Headquarters on Friday 20 March 1970.

⁷²⁸ Kirby, "What has Ghana Got That We Haven't?" ..., 1053.

⁷²⁹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Address by his Excellency the President to all Available Expatriate Police Officers and to all Local Gazetted Police Officers at 'B' Company, PMU Headquarters on Friday 20 March 1970.

⁷³⁰ TNA, FCO. 45/429, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 26 March 1970.

duty posts were to be localized as rapidly as possible over the course of 18 months from the time of the president's speech in March 1970.⁷³¹

The president's speech did not come as a surprise to many British officers as Bailey had long told some of them about the imminent localization of the police. There was, however, a risk of some of the expatriate officers developing feelings of resentment towards government and possibly neglecting their responsibilities in attempt to retard the efficiency of the police force before the completion of localization.⁷³² Although the president's speech had not included the names of the Batswana men who were to assume the top 4 posts in the Botswana Police, many of the expatriate officers appeared to have a good idea of who these men were. This was possibly due to Bailey's indiscreetness but also the low numbers of high-ranking Africans in the force which made it easy to guess. In the days following Khama's speech, some of the expatriate officers began to endear themselves to Hirschfeld and Merafhe and bad-mouthed one another. As Hirschfeld would later recount, one of them desperately told him that, "These buggers are horrible, and when you fire them, please spare me. I am the only one who is good."⁷³³ Hirschfeld later discovered that the same European officer had approached Merafhe with the same plea. As Merafhe explains in his autobiography, it was not that difficult to tell who the first citizen commissioner of police and his deputy would be, as he and Hirschfeld were regarded by many in the force as stars in the ascendant.⁷³⁴

By June 1970, the general mood among the expatriate officers had become despondent. British High Commissioner G.A. Anderson, who sympathized with the outgoing Europeans explained that the low spirits in the force were caused by President Khama pushing localization

⁷³¹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Address by his Excellency the President to all Available Expatriate Police Officers and to all Local Gazetted Police Officers at 'B' Company, PMU Headquarters on Friday 20 March 1970.

⁷³² TNA, FCO. 45/429, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 26 March 1970.

⁷³³ "Hirschfeld: From Std II to Police Commissioner", *The Monitor*, 15 February 2016.

⁷³⁴ M. S. Merafhe, *The General: In the Service of My Country*. (Gaborone: Diamond Educational Publishers, 2015), 45.

too fast and thoroughly while there were no competent Batswana to take up the responsibilities in the police force.⁷³⁵ Possibly embittered by the imminent departure of their fellow Europeans, some of the expatriate officers whom government had intended to retain for another 2 to 3 years had chosen to decline this offer and resign from the Botswana Police. About 6 out of the 16 men had given their notice to resign, while 3 more were still wavering.⁷³⁶ The expatriates in the Botswana Police had become disillusioned with the force and the government at large, and with their decision to resign, Khama's localization program stood a chance of backfiring.

High Commissioner Anderson also believed that the departure of those expatriate officers the government had wished to retain would render the Botswana Police, especially the specialist branches, ineffective. This in turn, would force government to embark on a crash recruitment program, which could be futile as no expatriates would likely want to come to Botswana following Khama's localization program.⁷³⁷ On his farewell call to the president, outgoing head of Special Branch, Bill Grant claimed that, despite being succeeded by a European officer, the Branch was still headed for a state of decay unless government recruited 3 new European expatriates and sent African junior officers overseas for training.⁷³⁸ Overseas Police Advisor Macoun dismissed these claims as nonsense, and expressed disappointment in the behaviour of the expatriate officers who did not seem to realize that the localization of the Botswana Police was necessary. Macoun was, however, optimistic about the future of the Botswana Police as all the Batswana men who had gone for command training courses in Britain had done and continued to do well. As for those expatriate officers who declined the Botswana government's offer to retain them, Macoun would look into getting the British

⁷³⁵ TNA, FCO. 45/429, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 17 September 1970.

⁷³⁶ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 24 September 1970.

⁷³⁷ TNA, FCO. 45/429, High Commissioner's Note on Discussions with Police Commissioner and Outgoing Head of Special Branch, 17 December 1970.

⁷³⁸ TNA, FCO. 45/429, High Commissioner's Note on Discussions with Police Commissioner and Outgoing Head of Special Branch, 17 December 1970.

Ministry of Overseas Development to recruit willing expatriates who could come into the force as contracted training officers and prepare more Batswana to eventually take over.⁷³⁹

After Hirschfeld and Merafhe succeeded Bailey and Clarke respectively as the first Batswana commissioner and deputy commissioner in 1971, they soon experienced challenges in the performance of their duties. They took over a force which still had a small number of European officers who as it seemed, expected them to fail.⁷⁴⁰ After his retirement, Bailey allegedly set out to frustrate his successor by withholding vital information about the job despite the president's orders for the outgoing officers to work closely with the incoming ones to ensure a smooth transition. Hirschfeld later deduced that Bailey's intention was to set him up for failure, which would force the president to bring him back in as a police advisor.⁷⁴¹ This, however, never happened.

The behaviour displayed by Bailey and the other expatriate officers had been meant to render localization a botched exercise. As Macoun explained, Bailey and his senior officers had done nothing by way of preparing the force for localization until after the president pushed the matter, just as the Colonial Office had done nothing prior to independence. The Botswana Police had, therefore, become home to a cadre of expatriate officers so professionally inbred that localization was anathema to them.⁷⁴² Some of their actions, such as the reluctance to train their successors and the spiteful decline to continue serving in the force when offered the opportunity to do so, ultimately brought more challenges to the Botswana Police.

Training and Staffing Issues in the Botswana Police

⁷³⁹ TNA, FCO. 45/429, Overseas Police Advisor, London, to British High Commission, Gaborone, 30 December 1970.

⁷⁴⁰ Merafhe, *The General: In the Service of My Country...*, 45.

⁷⁴¹ Hirschfeld: From Std II to Police Commissioner", *The Monitor*, 15 February 2016.

⁷⁴² TNA, FCO. 45/429, Overseas Police Advisor, London, to British High Commission, Gaborone, 30 December 1970.

While the African officers appointed to the top 4 command posts of the force had successfully completed command training courses in Britain, the majority of the newly appointed African gazetted officers had not. For those of them in specialist branches like the PMU and Special Branch, who took over command from embittered predecessors, there was a great deal to learn about the job. Although the Botswana and British governments worked together to bring in some training officers in the early 1970s, the challenges only became worse, which raised questions about the merits of Khama's localization program.⁷⁴³

In March 1973, Major Montgomery and Warrant Officer Price of the British Army were seconded to the PMU on an 18-month tour as part of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). This was part of the broader military advisory missions that Britain provided to various countries throughout the 20th century. Kenya, Zambia and after 1979, Zimbabwe were all provided with BMATT assistance.⁷⁴⁴ The objective of the BMATT in Botswana was to help improve the efficiency of the PMU. By December 1973, the team was frustrated by what Major Montgomery called 'weakness at the top levels of command'. Blaming the rapid localization program, Montgomery noted that 6 African inspectors had been promoted to gazetted ranks even though they were far from physically fit. The 2 company commanders were both 50 years old while the platoon commanders averaged 45 years. The men gave the impression of being at a stage in their careers where they were reluctant to learn new things and, therefore, content with the low standard of the PMU.⁷⁴⁵ As a para-military unit responsible for the internal security of Botswana, the standard of the PMU was unsatisfactory. Montgomery suggested the appointment of an expatriate officer as senior superintendent of the PMU with

⁷⁴³ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 28 December 1973.

⁷⁴⁴ B. H. Whitaker, "The 'New Model' Armies of Africa?: The British Military Advisory and Training Team and the Creation of the Zimbabwe National Army," PhD Dissertation, (Texas A&M University, 2014), ii.

⁷⁴⁵ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, British Army Training Team, Gaborone to British High Commission, Gaborone, 12 December 1973.

executive command of the unit. Such a man would have authority over the Batswana company and platoon commanders who Montgomery saw as the problem.⁷⁴⁶ Convinced that there was little hope for the PMU to become an effective para-military organization, Montgomery requested that the BMATT be allowed to cut their tour short. Having taught everything they could to all the ranks in the unit, Montgomery felt that no real change could be effected on the PMU unless drastic changes were taken with regards to the higher levels of command.⁷⁴⁷

Macoun acknowledged that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was aware that the PMU in Botswana was led by men who lacked motivation and that there was a need to replace them with more active and younger officers. He, however, vehemently discouraged the idea of appointing an expatriate senior superintendent as executive commander in the PMU. This would in effect, mean that the Botswana Police had an expatriate officer leading its para-military unit in operations against African freedom fighters and possibly neighbouring state security forces.⁷⁴⁸ The results of this would be criticism from not just Rhodesia and South Africa, but much of the international community. As a military man, Montgomery was criticized for expecting a lot too quickly from a police unit. Macoun suggested, instead, that a suitable officer with a police background could be recruited from Britain and engaged in the PMU as a support and training officer.⁷⁴⁹ It is not clear what a police support and training officer could do for a para-military unit that the British Army training team could not but, the fact that both Montgomery and Macoun felt that there was need for another expatriate officer in the PMU appeared to counter the whole localization exercise.

⁷⁴⁶ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, British High Commission, Gaborone to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 28 December 1973.

⁷⁴⁷ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, British Army Training Team, Gaborone to British High Commission, Gaborone, 12 December 1973.

⁷⁴⁸ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, Overseas Police Advisor, London to British High Commission Gaborone, 7 March 1974.

⁷⁴⁹ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, Overseas Police Advisor, London to British High Commission Gaborone, 7 March 1974.

After his visit to Botswana in May 1974, Macoun recommended the training of up to 14 Batswana non-gazetted officers at the British Army School of Infantry at Warminster, England. In September 1974, the PMU requested 7 places for 1975 and 7 more for 1976 in the platoon commanders battle course at the school.⁷⁵⁰ The government of Botswana had, however, not been allocated any funds under the United Kingdom Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS), which would have covered the cost of such training. The 10-week training course was £2,320 per individual. Besides the fact that the government of Botswana would likely have to pay for it, the platoon commanders battle course was also fully booked for 1975. Macoun, therefore, booked 4 places for PMU men in the 1976 course, and 4 more in the next year were subsequently offered to the Botswana Police and accepted.⁷⁵¹ Although this meant it would take a couple of years to get the PMU in the desired state, it was the only course of action available.

In the meantime, the government of Botswana found itself forced to revert to dependence on expatriate officers, although not to the same extent as before localization. Through British Crown Agents, the Botswana Police recruited 2 expatriate officers from Britain who were appointed to the PMU as senior staff officer and assistant force communications officer respectively in October 1974.⁷⁵² This was a huge blow to President Khama's localization program which sought to end reliance on non-citizens for the development of the country. It was 4 years since localization took place and yet, the Botswana Police still needed more expatriates to help in the force.

⁷⁵⁰ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, Report and Recommendations of Overseas Police Advisor's visit to Botswana from 10 to 14 May 1974.

⁷⁵¹ TNA, FCO. 45/1508, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London to British High Commission, Gaborone, 11 October 1974.

⁷⁵² TNA, FCO. 45/1508, Ministry of Overseas Development, London to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 29 October 1974.

In April 1975, John Sheppard announced his resignation from the post of head of Special Branch in the Botswana Police. Although there was a suitable African officer to succeed Sheppard, the resignation caused a lot of concern in the government and necessitated reliance on yet another expatriate officer.⁷⁵³ Sheppard's resignation became controversial because it followed a major disagreement with Police Commissioner Hirschfeld on how to deal with Assistant Superintendent Balosang of the Special Branch after he had allegedly stolen money used by the Botswana Police for paying informers. Balosang had been found guilty and sentenced to 2 years in prison for stealing government funds.⁷⁵⁴ Before going away for the Easter Weekend, Sheppard had warned Hirschfeld against prosecuting Balosang as it would reflect badly on the Special Branch if a member were dragged through the courts. He suggested instead that Hirschfeld explore other disciplinary measures within the police force and avoid bringing the work of the Special Branch into the public light. Although Hirschfeld had given his word, when Sheppard returned to work, he learnt that Hirschfeld had informed the president and the matter was in court. Infuriated by Hirschfeld's actions, Sheppard immediately submitted his notice to resign.⁷⁵⁵

Sheppard later told Macoun and High Commissioner Eleanor Emery, that the case of Balosang had been one of many incidents where he felt that Hirschfeld behaved irrationally. He further claimed that Hirschfeld seemed to be under a lot of stress and never seemed to know what he was doing.⁷⁵⁶ Although Sheppard's anger may have led him to exaggerate, the incident between himself and Hirschfeld represented what Macoun called a crossroads in the role and functions of expatriate officers in the Botswana Police. Hirschfeld's decision to prosecute

⁷⁵³ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 7 April 1975.

⁷⁵⁴ "High Court Upholds Policeman's Conviction," *Botswana Daily News*, 16 May 1975.

⁷⁵⁵ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, British High Commission, Gaborone, to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 14 May 1975.

⁷⁵⁶ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, British High Commission, Gaborone, to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 14 May 1975.

Balosang despite his promise not to do so, was influenced by his determination to be seen to be in command and not being told by expatriate officers how to run the police force.⁷⁵⁷ It is also possible that Hirschfeld's decision was informed by his loyalty to the president, which is why he informed Khama of Balosang's offence before taking him to court.⁷⁵⁸ Taking Sheppard's advice about dealing with Balosang through strictly internal disciplinary measures may have involved withholding such information from the president, something which Hirschfeld was likely not willing to do. Political scientist Alice Hills has asserted that there is a special relationship between African presidents and their police commissioners, whereby the latter are retained for as long as they are useful to the former and dismissed once they disappoint or offend.⁷⁵⁹ Hirschfeld, therefore, would not have wanted to be seen to be hiding anything from the president as this would have had a negative impact on his career.

Sheppard's resignation, however, posed a problem of staffing in the Special Branch. Although the president decided on Superintendent David Mophuting to succeed Sheppard, he instructed Hirschfeld to fill the post of deputy head of Special Branch with an expatriate recruited in Britain.⁷⁶⁰ The decision to seek an expatriate officer to assist Mophuting not only reflected the sensitive work of the Special Branch, but it also implied that the president himself was not confident enough to have the branch fully run by Botswana police. By the middle of 1975, President Khama was in fact reported to be increasingly worried about the Botswana Police because of the staffing challenges the force was facing. Apart from recruiting an expatriate for the post of deputy head of Special Branch, Hirschfeld was ordered to find more Europeans to fill the posts of head of CID, Officer Commanding Criminal Records Bureau,

⁷⁵⁷ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, Overseas Police Advisor, London to British High Commission, Gaborone, 22 May 1975.

⁷⁵⁸ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, British High Commission, Gaborone, to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 14 May 1975.

⁷⁵⁹ A. Hills, "Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45: 3 (2007): 411.

⁷⁶⁰ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, Commissioner of Police, Gaborone to Overseas Police Advisor, London, 7 April 1975.

and Senior Staff Officer at the police headquarters in Gaborone.⁷⁶¹ Khama expressed disappointment over his government's continued reliance on expatriate officers but pointed out that this would have to remain the case until the right standard of local policemen could be obtained.⁷⁶² These challenges represented a failure of the president's localization program which had been meant to end the Botswana Police's reliance on non-citizens. Although it would take some more years before the total localization of the force, much of the challenges discussed above were a result of the Colonial Office's lack of decisive planning before Botswana's independence.

In the end, Khama's enthusiasm about the localization of the Botswana Police died down, as he conceded to the reality of reliance on expatriate officers in the force. In fact, the failure to localize posts in the Botswana Police should be understood in the context of localization in the public service sector at large. At the recommendation of D.A. Anderson and F.J. Glyn of the Ford Foundation, Khama's government established the Presidential Commission on Localization and Training on 16 August 1971.⁷⁶³ Presented in the following year, the commission's findings included the absence of appropriate training facilities as undermining localization. In order to achieve an optimum utilization of students graduating from secondary and post-secondary levels, the commission recommended a modification of the education system of Botswana to include secretarial practice, bookkeeping, home economics and development studies in the syllabi.⁷⁶⁴ The commission also recommended that in-service training be provided across all government departments to equip serving candidates for various posts within the civil service. For those posts that required university or technical

⁷⁶¹ TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, British High Commission, Gaborone, to Foreign and Commonwealth office, London, 3 July 1975.

⁷⁶² TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706, British High Commission, Gaborone, to Foreign and Commonwealth office, London, 3 July 1975.

⁷⁶³ J.C.N. Mentz, "Evaluation of the Role of the Presidential Commission on Localization and Training in Implementing the Policy of Localization in Botswana," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 17: 1 (1985): 64.

⁷⁶⁴ Mentz, "Evaluation of the Role of the Presidential Commission...", 67.

training, which the civil service was unable to provide in-service training for, it was determined that their localization would depend on the output of Botswana graduates by the University of Botswana and Swaziland which was established in 1975.⁷⁶⁵ The government of Botswana accepted the 1972 commission's recommendations as a blueprint for the localization of the civil service and began their implementation. However, due to the lack of a proper governing body and other measures to ensure the complete implementation of the commission's recommendations, the localization of the civil service in Botswana failed, and it would take about 15 more years for it to be achieved.⁷⁶⁶

Conclusion

In their operations against the Rhodesian and South African security forces, the freedom fighters from these territories used the northern part of Botswana as a route to and from their bases in Zambia, and this represented a major security threat to the government of newly independent Botswana. The government had decided to go into independence without a national army, and the consequences of this decision were reflected in the liberation struggles of neighbouring territories spilling over into Botswana, where there was no appropriate force to defend the territorial integrity of the country.

In an attempt to reduce the country's reliance on non-citizens, the government of Botswana embarked on a localization program in the police force and other sectors of administration in the early 1970s. In the Botswana Police, the localization exercise saw the replacement of Europeans in the top 4 command posts by Africans. Although more Africans were promoted to gazetted ranks and assumed general duty posts in the districts and sub-

⁷⁶⁵ Mentz, "Evaluation of the Role of the Presidential Commission...", 66. For more on the history of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, see B. T. Mokopagosi, "Why the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Failed: Lessons from the Brief History of a Regional University in Southern Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39: 2 (2013): 465-480.

⁷⁶⁶ Mentz, "Evaluation of the Role of the Presidential Commission...", 73.

districts, the force still did not have qualified Africans to command the CID, PMU companies and platoons as well as the Special Branch. For this reason, the government resolved to retain the services of 50% of its expatriate officers who, however, declined the offers. The government of Botswana was, therefore, forced to recruit and rely on expatriate officers for some years to come while more efforts were made to train the Africans and prepare them to take command of all branches of the force.

Conclusion

Colonial authority in Africa and other parts of the colonized world rested upon a strong maintenance of law and order, which in essence meant the control and exploitation of the local peoples. In all colonies, it was the police forces that were charged with that responsibility. In that regard, a history of policing in Bechuanaland as presented in this study, offers a way of understanding the development and nature of British colonial rule in the territory, which was in some ways similar to other parts of the empire, and in other ways unique. This study, therefore, contributes to the body of knowledge on empire building, by showing the establishment of colonial authority, its maintenance, and the way that it functioned from the bottom up.

Due to the marginal position of the Bechuanaland Protectorate within the British Empire, policing in the territory developed in a different manner compared to many colonies where police forces were instrumental in protecting colonial economic enterprise and controlling labour. In 1885 when Britain declared a protectorate over Bechuanaland, the

motive was a strategic rather than economic one, and this was reflected in the nature of policing and the role played by the early police force, the BBP. Although it was created to defend the borders of both the colony of British Bechuanaland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate from Boer aggression, the BBP initially assumed an administrative role in the latter, and before 1891, some of its members performed the duties otherwise reserved for colonial officials in other colonies.⁷⁶⁷ This reflected the nature of Bechuanaland as a frontier of what would later become South Africa. As shown by the comparative use of the literature on the history of the North American West, policing in Bechuanaland was affected by various frontier conditions such as shortage of personnel as well as scattered and isolated posts/stations.

Just like in the neighbouring territories, the police force of Bechuanaland greatly relied on the recruitment of Africans as there were simply not enough Europeans to effectively police the territory. The African personnel of the police force were initially recruited from the Basutoland Protectorate because of the common British colonial practice of ‘policing strangers by strangers’ as well as their perception of Basotho as superior and more suitable for police work compared to Batswana. The Basotho, therefore, dominated the colonial police in Bechuanaland until the late 1940s when the Bangwato and Bakalanga began to dominate the force, among other local ethnic groups. Just like in other colonies in Africa, however, the police force in Bechuanaland was racially hierarchical, with the European police being superior to their African counterparts, even in cases where they held the same rank. As a result, conditions of service such as salaries and accommodation differed significantly between the European and African personnel of the colonial police in Bechuanaland.

During the inter-war period, many colonial powers were seeking ways of reducing the cost of administering their territories in order to cope with the financial challenges that

⁷⁶⁷ Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate*, 58-60.

followed the end of WWI, and subsequently the Great Depression. For most of British colonial Africa, this involved reducing the size of the police and military forces. In the case of the HCTs, the Dominions Office encouraged the use of Africans in the lower ranks of the colonial service and police as way of cutting costs. Interestingly, however, through the 1930s reorganization of the BPP, the colonial administration in Bechuanaland went against the grain by increasing the establishment of European police by more than 50%, even though they were more expensive to maintain compared to Africans. The decision by the Bechuanaland officials to do the opposite of what other British territories were doing during this period was influenced by the relationship between the Protectorate and the Union of South Africa. Because the Union of South Africa still had ambitions of taking over the administration of Bechuanaland from Britain, the colonial government in the territory increased the number of European police as a gesture showing that they were not willing to digress from their neighbour's policies. Although the SAP had more European police than Africans at the time, the opposite was true for the BPP despite the increase of white police by about 50%.

By the 1940s, particularly in the wake of WWII, the colonial police in Bechuanaland were transitioning from a coercive para-military force to a professional law enforcement organization. As the conquest and occupational period that required militaristic policing had long passed, colonial police forces were turning more to the modern methods of civil and consensual policing. For the Bechuanaland Police, this involved dropping military ranks for strictly police ones, and formally reconstructing the force into the common 3-tier structure consisting of gazetted officers, non-gazetted officers and the rank-and-file. Most importantly, the 1940s also saw the gradual replacement of subordinate European police with Africans as the latter's literacy level increased. Therefore, for the first time in the history of colonial policing in Bechuanaland, Africans joined the non-gazetted ranks while some joined the CID as detectives, which was to be important for policing in the context of urbanization.

The 1950s proved to be a decade of insecurity for the Bechuanaland colonial administration. This was due to several cases of civil unrest in the Bangwato Reserve including the deadly Serowe riots of 1952, where the Bechuanaland Police and its reinforcements from Basutoland and Swaziland suffered 3 fatalities. The Bangwato Reserve disturbances had been a reaction to the British government's exile of Seretse Khama for his marriage to English woman, Ruth Williams. However, the colonial administration's anxieties following the riots were compounded by the recent 1948 uprisings in Malaya and the Gold Coast, as well as rising African nationalist protest in other colonies during the 1950s. Due to the growing social and economic pressures in post-WWII Africa, coupled with the rising numbers of educated and politically conscious Africans, colonial authority began to be challenged through nationalist protests, leading to the militarization of most police forces to deal with such unrest. Fearing the spread of nationalist protest into the territory and considering the recent disturbances in the Bangwato Reserve, the Bechuanaland administration also took measures to militarize the police force. This represented a kind of 'remilitarization' of the police force considering that less than a decade prior, the BPP had transitioned from a para-military force to a professional law enforcement organization.

As the era of decolonization progressed, and some African colonies gained independence, the African anti-apartheid movements of South Africa turned to armed struggle in the early 1960s. At that point, the prospect of Bechuanaland becoming a part of South Africa was long over. However, African political activity in South Africa and the presence of some of the ANC and PAC members in exile in Bechuanaland, had a significant impact in the political atmosphere of Bechuanaland as it led to the development of party-based politics and nationalist protest in the territory. Just like in other British colonies faced with similar situations, the Bechuanaland administration sanctioned the creation of an armed mobile unit within the police force to combat African uprising. The significance of this period was that it reflected the

gradual close of empire in Africa in general, and Bechuanaland in particular. The Bechuanaland Police was faced with policing political unrest, while the colonial government was forced to prepare the territory for the eventual transfer of power to the African majority.

In the period immediately following the independence of Botswana, the centrality of the police force to national security became more apparent. Without the former colonial power to protect it, the newly independent country was forced to deal with security threats emanating from the wars of independence in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South-West Africa (Namibia). As Botswana had no military in the colonial period and did not create one at independence either, the para-military PMU, as the only line of defence, was called upon to guard the northern borders of the country from armed African freedom fighters and the Rhodesian and South African security forces in pursuit of them. The police force of the weak newly independent country of Botswana was no match for both the freedom fighters and the security forces of the neighbouring territories, and the latter continued to invade the borders of Botswana until well into the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, owing to a lack of proper planning on the part of the British Colonial Office, the police force of independent Botswana continued to rely on European expatriate officers in the higher ranks although the government managed to localize them after the late 1970s, a period beyond the scope of this study.

This study has followed the evolution of policing in Botswana from the time of colonization in 1885 to 1975, just 9 years after the country attained its independence from Britain. During this 90-year period, the police transitioned from a frontier para-military occupation force to a professional law enforcement organization, and to a partly re-militarized force countering internal protest and then incursions from neighbouring states. Utilizing the historical evidence from the archives in London and Gaborone, the study has shown the connection between the Bechuanaland colonial administration and its police force, as well as how they related with the British imperial government and other territories in the region. As an

economic backwater of the British Empire, Bechuanaland was virtually neglected by the colonizer. As a result, most proposed developments in the police force were met with resistance from the British government. This, therefore, slowed down and in some instances hampered the growth of the Bechuanaland Police.

Policing in post-independence Botswana represents an area of study that warrants attention from scholars. Although this study includes a discussion of some issues affecting Botswana's police force in the years immediately following the country's independence, it does not go far enough. Therefore, a comprehensive history of the Botswana Police Service from around 1966 remains to be written, with this study providing the necessary historical context and background.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Botswana National Archives and Records Services (BNARS)

BNARS, HC. 46/62, Investigation of BBP Officers Raping Native Women, 1886.

BNARS, HC. 110/1, Report of the Masson Brothers against the BBP, 1892.

BNARS, RC. 2/8/1, B.P Admin & Control of Police, 1895-1896.

BNARS, RC. 2/13/1, Functions of Forces in the B.P, 1896.

BNARS, RC. 4/6, Bechuanaland Police Unified Papers, 1901.

BNARS, RC. 44/3, Policing of Bakgatla-Transvaal Boundary, 1912-13.

BNARS, HC. 162: Conditions of Service in the BBP and PNP, 1890-97.

BNARS, HC. 163/1-2, Functions, Status & Jurisdiction of Colonial Police Forces, 1896- 98.

BNARS, HC. 195, Imperial Control of Police Forces, 1896.

BNARS, S. 294/15: BPP: Brief Account of Development, Strength, Method of Organization, nd.

BNARS, S. 251/9: Police European: Reorganization Scheme, nd.

BNARS, S. 35/8, Police Particulars as to Establishment, Pay and Uniform, 1916.

BNARS, S. 311/3: Reorganization: Revised Scheme for European and Native Police. 1933-35.

BNARS, S.443/5, Police, BP: Cooperation in Native Reserves with Tribal Police Appointed by the Chiefs.

BNARS, S. 302/4: Police Conferences, 1944.

BNARS, S. 218/2: Police: Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1946.

BNARS, S. 468/11: Police Department: Formation of African Police Reserve, 1946.

BNARS, S. 311/9/3: Police Reorganization, 1956-57.

BNARS, S. 207/2: Defence Force: Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Rifle Association Proclamation and Regulations, 1953-56.

BNARS, OP/47/2: Police Colonial: Reports by Inspectors General Stourton, Morris and Deegan, 1963-64.

BNARS, OP/47/8: Police Force: Rank and Structure, 1966.

BNARS, OP2. 47/3: Police Reports, 1970-71.

BNARS, BNB. 891, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1950.

BNARS, BNB. 895, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1956.

BNARS, BNB. 896, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1957.

BNARS, BNB. 897, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1958.

BNARS, BNB. 898, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1959.

BNARS, BNB. 900, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1961.

BNARS, BNB. 901, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1962.

BNARS, BNB. 902, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1963.

BNARS, BNB. 903, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1964.

BNARS, BNB. 904, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1965.

BNARS, BNB. 537, A General Report by Brigadier A. S. Mavrogordato on the Police Forces of the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. June 1946, Pretoria.

The National Archives, London (TNA)

TNA, FCO. 141/1239, Housing: Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, 1955.

TNA, DO. 35, 396/12: Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Staff, 1935-36:

TNA, DO. 35, 396/11: Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Staff, 1934.

TNA, DO. 35, 907/12: Police Staff: Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1937.

TNA, FCO. 141/1176: Report on the Efficiency of the BPP, 1948.

TNA, FCO. 141/1176: Individual Recommendations for Colonial Police Medals, 1951.

TNA, DO. 35/4150: Awards to Officers and Police involved in the Bamangwato Riots, 1952.

TNA, DO. 35/4281: Arrangements for Policing Bamangwato Reserve, 1952-55.

TNA, DO. 35/7215: Proposal for Increase in the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1960.

TNA, DO. 1048/795: Proposal to Increase Police in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1963-64.

TNA, DO. 1048/796: Localization of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, 1964-65.

TNA, FCO. 141/963: Staff: Basutoland Mounted Police, 1964.

TNA, OD. 31/295: Financial Aid for Expansion, 1966-67.

TNA, FCO. 31/26; Botswana Legal Affairs: Expansion of the Police Force, 1967.

TNA, FCO. 31/27; Botswana Legal Affairs: Expansion of the Police Force, 1967.

TNA, OD. 31/296: Financial Aid for Police Expansion, 1967.

TNA, FCO. 45/429: Police Force of Botswana, 1969-70.

TNA, FCO. 45/1508: Police Force of Botswana, 1973-74.

TNA, FCO, 45/ 1706: Police Force of Botswana, 1975.

UK House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Online.

House of Commons Command Papers (Cd.2648-25), Colonial Reports- Annual. No. 479.
Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1906.

Newspapers

Mmegi Online, 31 January 2011.

The Monitor, 15 February 2016.

Botswana Daily News, 21 March 1967.

Botswana Daily News, 16 May 1975.

Secondary Sources:

Books

- Aderinto, S. *Guns and Society in Colonial Nigeria: Firearms, Culture and Public Order*. Bloomington: University Press, 2018.
- Ahire, P. *Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria, 1860-1960*. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991.
- Aminzade, R. *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanganyika*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Anderson, D and Killingray, D. (eds.), *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Anderson, D and Killingray, D. "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 1-15. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Anderson, D. "Policing, Prosecution and the Law in Colonial Kenya, c. 1905-39," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 183-200. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Arrington-Sirois, A. L. *Vitoria Falls and Colonial Immigration in Colonial Southern Africa: Turning Water into Gold*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Baker, B. *Multi-Choice Policing in Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008.
- Baker, B. *Security in Post-Conflict Africa: The Role of Non-State Policing*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010.
- Beahen, W and Horrall, S. *Red Coats on the Prairies: The North-West Mounted Police, 1886-1900*. Regina: Print West Publishing Services, 1998.
- Beasley, E. *The Victorian Reinvention of Race: New Racisms and the Problems of Grouping in the Human Sciences*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Bennett, H. *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

- Betts, R. F. *Decolonization*. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Bird, E. *Special Branch War: Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush Southern Matabeleland, 1976-1980*. Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2014.
- Birmingham, D. *The Decolonization of Africa*. London: UCL Press, 1995.
- Breen, *The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier, 1874-1924*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.
- Bush, B. *Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919-1943*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Byfield, J.A, Brown, C.A, Parsons, T, and Sikainga, A.A. eds. *Africa and World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Cannadine, D. *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Careless, J.M.S, *Frontier and Metropolis: Regions, Cities, and Identities in Canada before 1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Carruthers, J. *The Kruger National Park: A Social and Political History*. (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995.
- Chaza, G. A. *Bhurakuwacha: The Story of a Black Policeman in Colonial Southern Rhodesia*. Harare: College Press, 1998.
- Cherry, J. *Umkhonto weSizwe: South Africa's Liberation Army, 1960s- 1990s*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2011.
- Child, G. "The Growth of Park Conservation in Botswana," in *Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation*, edited by H. Suich and B. Child, 51-66. London: Earthscan, 2009.
- Chingozha, M. P. and Mawere, M. *Negotiating Law, Policing and Morality in Africa: A Handbook for Policing in Zimbabwe*. Bamenda: Langaa Research and Publishing CIG, 2015.

- Clayton, A. and Killingray, D. *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1989.
- Colpitts, G. *Game in the Garden: A Human History of Wildlife in Western Canada to 1940*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002.
- Comber, L. *Malaya's Secret Police, 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency*. Victoria: Monash University Press, 2008.
- Commonwealth Human Right Initiative, *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*. New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Right Initiative, 2006.
- Cooper, F. *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Crowder, M and Parsons, N. *Sir Charles Rey, Monarch of All I Survey: Bechuanaland Diaries 1919-37*. Gaborone: The Botswana Society, 1988.
- Cross, M.S. *The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas: The debate on the Impact of the Canadian Environment*. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970.
- Dale, R. *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995.
- Davis, S.R. *The ANC's War against Apartheid: Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
- Dobell, L. *SWAPO's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means*. Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1998.
- Dyde, D. *The Empty Sleeve: The Story of the West India Regiments of the British Army*. London: Hansib Publications, 1997.
- Eldredge, E.A. *Power in Colonial Africa: Conflict and Discourse in Lesotho, 1870-1960*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007.
- Ellis, A. B. *The History of the First West India Regiment*. London: Chapman and Hall, LTD, 1885.
- Elkins, C. *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005.

- Elofson, *Cowboys, Gentlemen and Cattle Thieves: Ranching on the Western Frontier*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000.
- Elofson. *So Far and Yet so Close: Frontier Cattle Ranching in Western Prairie Canada and the Northern Territory of Australia*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2015.
- Foran, W. R. *The Kenya Police, 1887-1960*. London: Robert Hale Limited, 1962.
- Franklin, D. *A Pied Cloak: Memoirs of a Colonial Police (Special Branch) Officer*. London: Janus Publishing, 1996.
- Fredrickson, G. M. *Racism: A Short History*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Freund, B. "South Africa: The Union Years, 1910-1948-Political and Economic Foundations," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, edited by R. Ross, A.K. Mager and B. Nasson, 211-253. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Gaddis, J.L. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.
- Galbraith, J.S. *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company*. London: University of California Press, 1974.
- Gibbs, P. *The History of the British South Africa Police*. Vol. 1, *The First Line of Defence, 1889-1903*. Saulsbury, Rhodesia: British South Africa Police, 1972.
- Gibbs, P. Phillips, H. and Russell, N. *Blue and Old Gold: The History of the British South Africa Police, 1889-1980*. Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2009.
- Glass, S. *The Matabele War*. London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1968.
- Gon, P. *Send Carrington: The Story of an Imperial Frontiersman*. Johannesburg: AD. Donker, 1984.
- Gornall, J. *No Better Life: The Experiences of a Police Officer in Central Africa*. Nelson, New Zealand; privately published, 2008.

- Grilli, M. *Nkrumaism and African Nationalism: Ghana's Pan-African Foreign Policy in the Age of Decolonization*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Grundlingh, A. "‘Protectors and Friends of the People’? The South African Constabulary in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 1900-08," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 168-182. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Halpern, J. *South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*. London: Penguin African Library, 1965.
- Hargreaves, J. D. *Decolonization in Africa*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Hawkins, R. "The 'Irish Model' and the Empire: A Case for Reassessment," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 18-32. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Henk, D. *The Botswana Defence Force in the Struggle for an African Environment*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Hereward, S. *Constabulary: The Rise of Police Institutions in Britain, the Commonwealth and the United States*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997.
- Hewitt, P. *Kenya Cowboy: A Police Officer's Account of the Mau Mau Emergency*. Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2008.
- Hills, A. *Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization*. Oxford: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
- Hinton, M. S. and Newburn, T. (eds.), *Policing Developing Democracies*. New York, Routledge, 2009.
- Hole, H. M. *The Jameson Raid*. Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia, 1973.
- Hopkins, A. G. *An Economic History of West Africa*. London: Longman, 1973.

- Hyam, R. *The Failure of Southern African Expansion, 1908-1948*. London: The Macmillan Press, 1972.
- Inikori, J and Engerman, L. S. eds. *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the America, and Europe*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991.
- Jacoby, K. *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Jeffries, C. *The Colonial Police*. London: Parrish, 1952.
- Jeeves, A. H. *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour, 1890-1920*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985.
- Jenning, J. "Policemen and Poachers: Indian Relations on the Ranching Frontier", in *The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, 1873-1919*, edited by W.M. Baker, 41-51. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998.
- Katjavivi, P.H. *A History of Resistance in Namibia*. London: James Currey, 1988.
- Keppel-Jones, A. *Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-1902*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983.
- Killingray, D. "Imagined Martial Communities: Recruiting for the Military and Police in Colonial Ghana, 1860-1960," in *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention*, edited by C. Lentz & P. Nugent, 119-136. London: Macmillan Press, 2000.
- Killingray D. & Rathbone, R. "Introduction," in *Africa and the Second World War*, edited by D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, 1-19. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986.

- Killingray, D. "Guarding the Extending Frontier: Policing the Gold Coast, 1865-1913," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 106-125. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Killingray, D & Anderson, D. "An Orderly Retreat? Policing the end of Empire," in *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65*, edited by D. Anderson and D. Killingray, 1-21. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Killingray, D. "Gender Issues and African Colonial Armies," in *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers C. 1700-1964*, edited by D. Killingray and D. Omissi, 221-242. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
- Killingray, D. *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War*. (Rochester, N. Y: James Currey, 2010).
- Kondlo, K. *In the Twilight of Revolution: The Pan African Congress of Azania (South Africa), 1959-1994*. Basel, Switzerland: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2009.
- Kuss, S. *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.
- Laband, J. *The Transvaal Rebellion: The First Boer War 1800-1881*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Lambert, D. "[A] Mere Cloak for their Proud Contempt and Antipathy towards the African Race': Imagining Britain's West India Regiments in the Caribbean, 1795-1838," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 46: 4 (2018) pp. 627-250.
- Legassick, M. "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography", in *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, edited by S. Marks and A. Atmore, 46-79. London: Longman, 1980.
- Lenin, V. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Chippendale: Resistance Books, 1999.
- Leonard, D. K. *African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

- Lester, A. "Humanitarians and White Settlers in the Nineteenth Century", in *Missions and Empire*, edited by N. Etherington, 64-85. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Lin, Z. *Policing the Wild North-West: A Sociological Study of the Provincial Police in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1905-32*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007.
- Lockley, T. *Military Medicine and the Making of Race: Life and Death in the West India Regiments, 1795-1874*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Lorimer, D. A. *Science, Race Relations, and Resistance: Britain, 1870-1914*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013.
- Luckham, R. *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority & Revolt, 1960-67*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- MacKenzie, J. M. *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British Imperialism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
- Macleod, R. C. *The North-West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
- Macoun, M. J. *Wrong Place, Right Time: Policing the End of Empire*. London: Radcliffe Press, 1996.
- Mamdani, M. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Mann, K. *Slavery and the Birth of an African City: Lagos, 1760-1900*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.

- Mayfield, B. J. "The Interlude: The North-West Mounted Police and the Blackfoot Peoples, 1874-1877," in *The Mounted Police and Prairies Society, 1873-1919*, edited by W.M. Baker, 17-40. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998.
- Maylam, P. *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Conflict in the Bechunaland Protectorate, 1885-1899*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980.
- McCracken, J. "Authority and Legitimacy in Malawi: Policing and Politics in a Colonial State," in *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and Police, 1917-65*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 188-186. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Merafhe, M. S. *The General: In the Service of My Country*. Gaborone: Diamond Educational Publishers, 2015.
- Meredith, M. *Diamonds, Gold and War*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2007.
- Metclaf, T. R. *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
- Mills, W. G. "Millennial Christianity, British Imperialism, and African Nationalism". In *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social and Cultural History*, edited by R. Elphick and R. Davenport, 337-346. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Miners, N. J. *The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966*. London: Methuen & CO LTD, 1971.
- Moorcraft, P. L. and P. McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008.
- Moyd, M. R. *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014.
- Munger, E.S. *Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Myers, C. J. *Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming of Political Power*. New York: University of Rochester Press, 2008.
- Nasson, B. *The South African War, 1899-1902*. London: Hodder Arnold, 1999.

- Nwaubani, E. *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001.
- Ogot, B. A. "Mau Mau & Nationhood: The Untold Story," in *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority & Narration*, edited by E.S.A. Odhiambo & J. Lonsdale, 8-36. Oxford: James Currey, 2003.
- Omissi, D. *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
- Opolot, J. S. E. *Police Administration in Africa: Toward Theory and Practise in the English-Speaking Countries*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2008.
- Osborne, M. *Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya: Loyalty and Martial Race among the Kamba, c. 1800 to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Pakenham, T. *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*. New York: Random House, 1991.
- Page, M. *A History of the King's African Rifles and East African Forces*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2011.
- Parsons, N. *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen*. London: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Parsons, N, "The Economic History of Khama's Country in Botswana, 1844-1930", in *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, edited by N. Parsons and R. Palmer, 113-144. Berkley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Parsons, T. *The African Rank-And-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964*. Oxford: James Currey, 1999.
- Parsons, T. "All askaris are family men: sex, domesticity and discipline in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964," in *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers C. 1700-1964*, edited by D. Killingray and D. Omissi, 158-178. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.

- Percox, D. A. "Mau Mau & the Arming of the State," in *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority & Narration*, edited by E.S.A. Odhiambo & J. Lonsdale, 121-154. Oxford: James Currey, 2003.
- Price, R. M. *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Ranger, T. O. *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: A Study in African Resistance*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
- Ranger T. O. *Bulawayo Burning: A Social History of a Southern African City, 1893-1960*. Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, 2010.
- Robinson, R and Gallagher, J. *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*. London: Macmillan, 1961.
- Said, E. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge, 1978.
- Scarnecchia, T. *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964*. New York: University of Rochester Press, 2008.
- Schaller, D. J. "The Genocide of the Herero and Nama in German South-West Africa, 1904-1907," in *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, edited by S. Totten & W. S. Parsons, 89-116. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Schapera, I. *The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes*. London: London School of Economics, 1952.
- Schmid, D. A. *The Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners*. Westport: PRAEGER, 2006.
- Shepperson, G. and Price, T. *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915*. Edinburgh: The University Press, 1958.
- Shillington, K. *The Colonization of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900*. Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1985.
- Shillington, K. *Luka Jantjie: Resistance Hero of the South African Frontier*. London: Aldridge Press, 2011.

- Shubin, V. *The Hot Cold War: The USSR in Southern Africa*. London: Pluto Press, 2008.
- Sibanda, E. *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1961-1987: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*. Trenton: African World Press, 2005.
- Sillery, A. *Founding a Protectorate: History of Bechuanaland. 1885-1895*. London: Mouton & CO., 1965.
- Sillery, A. *John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, 1835-1899: A Study in Humanitarian Imperialism*. Cape Town: A. A Balkema, 1971.
- Sillery, A. *The Bechuanaland Protectorate*. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- Sillery, A. *Botswana: A Short Political History*. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974.
- Simpson, T. *Umkhonto We Sizwe: The ANC's Armed Struggle*. Cape Town: Penguin Books, 2016.
- Sinclair, G. *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
- Sinclair, G. "Hard-Headed, Hard-Bitten, Hard-Hitting and Courageous Men of Innate Detective Ability...' From Criminal Investigation to Political and Security Policing at the end of Empire, 1945-50," in *Police Detectives in History, 1750-1950*, edited by C. Emsley and H. Shpayer-Makov, 195-218. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006.
- Smith, D.M. *Apartheid in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Smith, I. *Bush Pig District Cop: Service with the British South Africa Police in the Rhodesian Conflict 1965-77*. Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2014.
- Stapleton, T. *A Military History of South Africa: From Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid*. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010.
- Stapleton, T. *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80*, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011.

- Stapleton, T. *A Military History of Africa. Vol 2: The Colonial Period: From the Scramble for Africa to the Algerian Independence War (ca. 1870-1963)*, Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2013.
- Steinhart, E. I. *Black Poachers, White Hunters: A Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya*. Oxford: James Currey, 2006.
- Storey, K.W. *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Streets, H. *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
- Taylor, J. C. *The Political Development of Tanganyika*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963.
- Thomas, M. *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Thompson, L and Lamar, H. "The North American and Southern African Frontiers", in *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*, edited by L. Thompson and H. Lamar, 14-40. London: Yale University Press, 1981.
- Throup, D. "Crime, Politics and the Police in Colonial Kenya, 1939-63," in *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism and Police, 1917-65*, edited by D. Anderson & D. Killingray, 127-157. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Trethowan, A. *Delta Scout: Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South, 2008.
- van der Bijl, N. *Mau Mau Rebellion: The Emergency in Kenya, 1952-1956*. South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2017.

van der Waag, I. "Rural Struggles and the Politics of a Colonial Command: The Southern Mounted Rifles of the Transvaal Volunteers, 1905-1912," in *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918*, edited by S. Miller, 251-286. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

van der Poel, J. *The Jameson Raid*. London: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Vengroff, R. *Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid*. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1977.

West, M. O. *The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.

Wetherell, D.G. *Wildlife, Land and People: A Century of Change in Prairie Canada*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016

Wisler, D. and Onwudiwe, I. (eds.), *Community Policing: International Patterns and Comparative Perspectives*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009.

Worden, N. *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994.

Worger, W. H. *South Africa's City of Diamonds: Mine Workers and Monopoly Capitalism in Kimberly, 1867-1895*. London: Yale University Press, 1987.

Wright, T. B. *The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police*. (Bristol: British Empire and Commonwealth Museum, 2001.

Young, C. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. London: Yale University Press, 1994.

Journal Articles

Arnold, C. "The cat's Paw of Dictatorship": Police Intelligence and Self-Rule in the Gold Coast, 1948-1952," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 11:2 (2020) pp. 161-177.

- Babou, C. A. "Decolonization or National Liberation: Debating the End of British Rule in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 632: 1 (2010) pp. 41-54.
- Bayeh, E. "The Political and Economic Legacy of Colonialism in the Post-Independence African States," *International Journal in Commerce, IT & Social Sciences*, 2: 2 (2015) pp. 89-93.
- Benneyworth, G. "Bechuanaland's Aerial Pipeline: Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Operations against the South African Liberation Movements, 1960-1965," *South African Historical Journal*, 70: 1 (2018) pp. 108-123.
- Boateng, F. and Darko, I. N. "Our Past: The Effect of Colonialism on Policing in Ghana," *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 18: 1 (2016) pp. 13-20.
- Bolaane, M.M.M. "Cross-Border Lives, Warfare and Rape in Independence-Era Botswana," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39: 3 (2013) pp. 557-576.
- Booth, A. R. "Lord Selborne and the British Protectorates," *The Journal of African History*, 10: 1 (1969) pp. 133-148.
- Burton, A. "'Brothers by day': Colonial Policing in Dar es Salaam under British Rule, 1919-1961", *Urban History*, 30:1 (2003) pp. 63-91.
- Butler, J. L. "Business and British Decolonization: Sir Ronald Prain, the Mining Industry and the Central African Federation," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 35:3 (2007) pp. 459-484.
- Campbell, A. "Establishment of Botswana's National Park and Game Reserve System," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 36: 1 (2004) pp. 55-66.
- Cantwell, L. "Chiefly Power in a Frontline State: Kgosi Linchwe II, the Bakgatla and Botswana in the South African Liberation Struggle, 1948-1994," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41:2, (2015) pp. 255-272.

- Careless, J.M.S. "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Review*, 35:1, (1954) pp. 1-21.
- Curtin, P. "The Black Experience of Colonialism and Imperialism," *Daedalus*, 103:2 (1974) pp. 17-29.
- Dale, R. "The Creation and Use of the Botswana Defence Force," *The Round Table*, 73: 290 (1984) pp. 216-235.
- Dedering, T. "Air Power in South Africa, 1914-1939," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41: 3 (2015) pp. 451-465.
- Deery, P. "Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 9:1 (2007) pp. 29-54.
- Deflem, M. "Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast and Kenya," *Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development*, vol. 17:1, (1994): pp. 45-68.
- Dennis, R. M. "Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race," *The Journal of Negro Education*, 64:3 (1995) pp. 243-252.
- Dorning, W. A. "A Concise History of the South African Defence Force, (1912-1987)," *South African Journal of Military Studies*, 17: 2 (1987) pp. 1-23.
- Drescher, S. "The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism," *Social Science History*, 14: 3 (1990) pp. 415-450.
- Ellis, S. "The Genesis of the ANC's Armed Struggle in South Africa, 1948-1961," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37: 4 (2011) pp. 657-676.
- Falconer, J. "History of the Botswana Veterinary Services-1905-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 3:1 (1971) pp. 74-78.

- Ghai, D. P. and Ghai, Y. P. "Asians in East Africa: Problems and Prospects," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3:1 (1965) pp. 35-51.
- Hack, K. "The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya, 1948," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 40:3 (2009) pp. 471-496.
- Hall, K. O. "British Bechuanaland: The Price of Protection," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 6:2 (1973) pp. 183-197.
- Halliday, R. J. "Social Darwinism: A Definition," *Victorian Studies*, 14:4 (1971) pp. 389-405.
- Harbeson, J. W. "Land Reforms and Politics in Kenya, 1954-70," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9:2 (1971) pp. 232-351.
- Harragin, W. Hudson, R.S. Nettelton, G.E. "Report of the Judicial Enquiry Re Seretse Khama of the Bamangwato Tribe," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 17:1 (1985) pp. 53-64.
- Henderson, W. "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation," *African Affairs*, 89:354 (1990) pp. 27-56.
- Hills, A. "Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45: 3 (2007) pp. 403-423.
- Hochleithner, S. "Beyond Contesting Limits: Land, Access, and Resistance at the Virunga National Park," *Conservation and Society*, 15:1, (2017) pp. 100-110.
- Hutchful, E. "The Development of the Army Officer Corps in Ghana, 1956-1966," *Journal of African Studies*, 12:3 (1989) pp. 163-173.
- Hyam, R. "African Interests and the South Africa Act, 1908-1910," *The Historical Journal*, 13:1 (1970) pp. 85-105.
- Hyam, R. "The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953," *The Historical Journal*, 30:1 (1987) pp. 145-172.
- Hyam, R. "The Political Consequences of Seretse Khama: Britain, the Bangwato and South Africa, 1948-1952," *The Historical Journal*, 29:4 (1986) pp. 921-947.
- Jackson, A. "Bechuanaland, the Caprivi Strip and the First World War", *War and Society*, 19:2 (2001) pp. 109-142.

- Kalinga, O. J. M. "Resistance, Politics of Protest, and Mass Nationalism in Colonial Malawi, 1950 to 1960: A Reconsideration," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 36: 143 (1996): 443-454.
- Kaushik, R. "Race and Recruitment in the Indian Army: 1880-1918," *Modern Asian Studies*, 47:4 (2013) pp. 1310-1347.
- Khama, T. "Chieftainship Under Indirect Rule", *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 35:1 (1936) pp. 251-261.
- Killingray, D. "Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa," *African Affairs*, 85: 340 (1986) pp. 411-437.
- Killingray, D. "Race and Rank in the British Army in the Twentieth Century," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 10: 3 (1987) pp. 276-290.
- Killingray, D. "The 'Rod of Empire': The Debate Over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888-1946," *Journal of African History*, 35: 2 (1994) pp. 201-216.
- Kirby, J. "'What has Ghana Got That We Haven't?': Party Politics and Anti-Colonialism in Botswana, 1960-66," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 45: 6 (2017) pp. 1049-1074.
- Landell-Mills, J. "An Extract from the Diaries of C.F. Rey," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 5:1 (1973) pp. 67-81.
- Leepile, M. "The Impact of Migrant Labour on the Economy of Kweneng, 1940-1980," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 13: 1 (1981) pp. 33-43.
- Lynn-Stevens, H. "The Bechuanaland Border Police in the Early Nineties," *Police Journal*, 4:2 (1931) pp. 211-224.
- Manson, A. "Christopher Bethell and the Securing of the Bechuanaland Frontier, 1878-1884," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 24:1, (1998) pp. 485-508.
- Makgala, C. J. "A Survey of Race Relations in Botswana, 1800-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 36, (2004) pp 11-26.

- Makgala, C. J. "Taxation in the Tribal Areas of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1899-1957," *Journal of African History*, 45: 1 (2004) pp. 279-303.
- Makgala, C.J. "The BNF and the BDP's 'Fight' for the Attention of the ANC, 1912-2004: A Historical Perspective," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 38:1 (2006) pp. 115-133.
- Makgala, C.J. "Limitations of British Territorial Control in Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1918- 1953," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36:1, (2010) pp. 57-71.
- McCracken, J. "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police Force", *The Journal of African History*, 27:1 (1986), pp. 127-147.
- McCracken, J. "Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi," *African Affairs*, 97: 1 (1998) pp. 231-249.
- Mentz, J.C.N. "Evaluation of the Role of the Presidential Commission on Localization and Training in Implementing the Policy of Localization in Botswana," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 17: 1 (1985) pp. 65-75.
- Mgadla, P.T. "'A good measure of sacrifice': Botswana and the liberation struggles of Southern Rhodesia (1965-1985)," *Social Dynamics*, 34: 1 (2008) pp. 5-16.
- Mgadla, P. T. "Of Botswana's Administrative Centres and their Movements: Vryburg, Mahikeng and Gaborone, 1885-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 48: 1 (2016) pp. 23-35.
- Mocheregwa, B. "The Police Mobile Unit: The Nucleus of the Botswana Defence Force, 1960s-1977," *Journal of African Military History*, 3: 1 (2019) pp. 93-122.
- Mokopakgosi, B.T. "The 1965 Self-Government Elections and the Transfer of Power in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," *South African Historical Journal*, 60:1 (2008) pp. 85-102.

- Mokopakgosi, B. T. "Why the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Failed: Lessons from the Brief History of a Regional University in Southern Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39: 2 (2013): 465-480.
- Mutwira, R. "Southern Rhodesian Wildlife Policy (1890-1953): A Question of Condoning Game Slaughter?" *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15:2, (1989), pp. 250-262.
- Murphy, P. "A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36: 4 (2010) pp. 765-780.
- Mwalimu, C. "Police, State Security Forces and Human in Nigeria and Zambia: Dynamic Perspectives in Comparative Constitutionalism," *Third World Legal Studies*, 9: 1 (1990) pp. 85-132.
- Myers, F. "Harold Macmillan's "Winds of Change" Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 3: 4 (2000) pp. 555-575.
- Ngwenya, B.N. "The Development of Transport Infrastructure in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1966," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 16, (1984) pp. 73-84.
- Njoh, A.J. "Colonial Philosophies: Urban Space, and Racial Segregation in British and French Colonial Africa," *Journal of Black Studies*, 38:4 (2008) pp. 579-599.
- Ntanda Nsereko, D. D. "The Police, Human Rights and the Constitution: An African Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15: 3 (1993) pp. 465-484.
- Obaro, O.A. "The Nigeria Police Force and the Crisis of Legitimacy: Re-Defining the Structure and Function of the Nigeria Police," *European Scientific Journal*, 10: 8 (2014) pp. 421-436.
- Owen, O. "The Police and the Public: Risk as Preoccupation," *Sociologist*, 63: 1 (2013) pp. 59-80.
- Parsons, N. "The Pipeline: Botswana's Reception of Refugees, 1956-68," *Social Dynamics*, 34: 1 (2008) pp. 17-32.

- Phimister, I.R. "Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1:1, (1974) pp.74-90.
- Pearce, R. "The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa," *African Affairs*, 83:330 (1984) pp. 77-93.
- Ramsay, J. "The 1962 BPP Split," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 25:1 (1993) pp. 79-87.
- Rathbone, R. "Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21:3 (1993) pp. 107-128.
- Shear, K. "Chiefs or Modern Bureaucrats? Managing Black Police in Early Twentieth-Century South Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 54:2 (2012) pp. 251-274.
- Spinage, "Gleanings of Game Affairs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 24:1, (1992) pp. 19-32.
- Stanley Adam, J. H. "The British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia: History, Present Organization and Work," *Police Journal*, 1:4, (1928) pp. 553-567.
- Stapleton, T. "'A Naughty Child with a Pen': Gahadzikwa Albert Chaza as an African Policeman and Author in Colonial Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1936-1963," *History in Africa*, 37: 1 (2010): pp. 159-187.
- Stapleton, T. "Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria (c.1900-1960)," *Journal of African Military History*, 3:1 (2019) pp. 1-32.
- Steenkamp, P. "'Cinderella of the Empire?': development and policy in Bechuanaland in the 1930s," *Journal of Southern African*, 17: 2 (1991) pp. 292-308.
- Stockwell, A. J. "'A Widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya'? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21: 3 (1993) pp. 66-88.
- Storey, K.W. "Guns, Race, and Skill in Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa," *Technology and Culture*, 45:4, (2004) pp. 687-711.
- Taylor, J. "Mine Labour Recruitment in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," *Botswana Notes and Records*, 10: 1 (1978) pp. 99-112.

- Thompson, A. O. "Race and Colour Prejudices and the Origin of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade," *Caribbean Studies*, 16: 3 (1973) pp. 29-59.
- Thompson, P. "The Natal Militia: Defence of the Colony, 1893-1910," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, 29:1 (2011) pp. 20-65.
- Torrance, D. E. "Britain, South Africa and the High Commission Territories: An Old Controversy Revisited," *The Historical Journal*, 14:3 (1998) pp. 751-772.
- Tylden, G. "The Permanent Colonial Forces of the Cape Colony," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 19: 75 (1940) pp. 149-159.
- Tylden, G. "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895." *Society for Army Historical Research*, 19: 76 (1940) pp. 236-242.
- White, L. "Students, ZAPU, and the Special Branch in Francistown, 1964-1972," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40: 6 (2014) pp. 1289-1303.
- Wolf, J. B. "Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 6: 3, (1973) pp. 401-412.
- Wiseman, J. A. "Multi-Partyism in Africa: The Case of Botswana," *African Affairs*, 76: 302 (1977) pp. 70-79.
- Zaffiro, J.J. "Twin Births: African Nationalism and Government Information Management in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1957-66," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 22: 1 (1989) pp. 51-77.
- Zezeza, T. "The Strike Movement in Colonial Kenya: The Era of the General Strikes," *Transafrican Journal of History*, 22:1 (1993) pp. 1-23.

Theses and Seminar papers:

- Bayani, S. I. "Civil Aviation and Scheduled Air Services in Colonial Botswana, 1935-1966: A History of Underdevelopment," Master's Thesis, Trent University, 2017.

- Hingkanonta, L. "The Police in Colonial Burma," PhD Dissertation." University of London, 2013.
- Maine, M. "The Role and Development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police Force, 1898 to 1966," Bachelor's Thesis, University of Botswana, 1989.
- Makgala, C.J. "The Development and Role of Tribal Police in Botswana, 1926-1973," Bachelor's Thesis, University of Botswana, 1997.
- Oliver, O. "The Nigeria Police Force: An Institutional Ethnography," PhD Thesis, St Cross College, 2012.
- Parsons, N. "Give us your Trousers!": The Role of Women in the Serowe Kgotla Riot in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, June 1952," Seminar Paper: Stanford University, African Studies Seminar, 2003.
- Parsons, N. "The Serowe Riot of 1952: Popular Opposition to Tshekedi Khama and Colonial Rule in Botswana," Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 40 (1990) pp. 24-36.
- Sedimo, O. L. "Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885-1895," Bachelor's Thesis, University of Botswana, 1986.
- Turner, F.J. "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," A Paper read at the Meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago, 12 July 1893.
- Whitaker, B. H. "The 'New Model' Armies of Africa?: The British Military Advisory and Training Team and the Creation of the Zimbabwe National Army," PhD Dissertation, Texas A&M University, 2014.