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The Genesis and Evolution of Humanitarian Operations in the Second Sudanese Civil War  
(1983-2005)

by

Yusuf Oluwaseun Sholeye

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## **Abstract**

This thesis focuses on the beginning and development of the symbiotic relationship between the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army(SPLA) and humanitarian agencies during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). To critically examine the origins of humanitarianism in Southern Sudan, this study analyzes the roles of colonial administrators and Christian missionaries in creating the foundation for humanitarian and developmental projects among the Southerners during the Anglo-Egyptian period (1899-1955). These happenings shaped the multifaceted differences between Northern and Southern Sudan during the post-colonial period.

To understand the causes and effects of relief aid among the Southerners throughout the First Civil War (1955-1972), this study explores the roles of religious groups such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Caritas International in the unfolding and resolving of the conflict. Against this backdrop, the interwar years witnessed the ubiquitous activities of aid agencies in the Southern regions. Subsequently, the advent of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) initially affected the progress of relief and rehabilitation projects. However, by the late 1980s, the warfare caused unprecedented devastation among the Southerners, creating the context for the interdependent relationship between SPLA and aid organizations within Southern Sudan. Concurrently, the liberation army exploited the influx of Southern refugees into camps in Ethiopia and Uganda to strengthen SPLA's mutual relationship with International Organizations (IOs)and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) beyond the Southern regions.

Based on these occurrences, this thesis uses a historical approach to further examine the emergence and impacts of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) as a catalyst that propelled the collaborative relationship between relief agencies and SPLA. Following the genesis of SPLA's interaction with humanitarian agencies, different happenings determined the contraction and expansion of relief operations in the Southern regions, shaping the mutual connections between the liberation army and relief agencies during the post-Cold War period. As such, rather than examine the humanitarian operation of a specific NGO within a locality in Southern Sudan, this thesis uses a comparative analysis to examine factors that enhanced and hindered the feasibility of mounting relief aid in the Southern regions till the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 2005.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AAA – Addis Ababa Agreement

AACC – All Africa Conference of Churches

AAIN – Action Africa in Need

ACROSS – Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan

ADRA – Adventist Development and Relief Agency

AI – Amnesty International

AMU– African Malagasy Union

ANAF – National Armed Forces

BNA – British National Archives

BYDA – Bahr-el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency

CAFOD – Catholic Agency for Overseas Development

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CAR – Central African Republic

CARE – Cooperative for American Remittance to Europe

CART – Combined Agencies Relief Team

CCIA – Commission of the Churches on International Affairs

CMS – Church Mission Society

CRR or CUSH – Cush Relief and Rehabilitation Society

CRS – Catholic Relief Service

CSI – Christian Solidarity International

DC – District Commissioner

DHA – Director of Humanitarian Affairs

DOP- Declaration of Principle

DOT – Diocese of Torit

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

DUP – Democratic Unionist Party

ECS/DRD – Episcopal Church of Sudan Department of Relief and Development

EEC – European Economic Community

ELF- Eritrea Liberation Front

EPB – Equatorial Projects Board

EPLF – Eritrea People’s Liberation Front

EPI – Expanded Program on Immunization

FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization

FLN – Algerian National Liberation Front

FRRA – Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Agency

GCC – Graduate General Congress

GOS – Government of Sudan

HRW – Human Rights Watch

IAS – International Aid Sweden

IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICBP – Institution and Capacity Building Program

ICRC – International Committee of Red Cross and Crescent

IDPs- Internally Displaced Persons

IGADD – Intergovernmental Authority against Drought and Desertification

IOs – International Organizations

JRC – Joint Relief Committee

KDRBD – Kajo-Kaji District Relief and Development Board

KVPPD – Kidepo Valley Peace Project and Development

LWF – Lutheran World Federation

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

MRDA – Mundari Relief and Development Association

MSF– Médecins San Frontières

MT – Metric Tonnes

NCA– Norwegian Church Aid

NGO- Non-governmental Organizations

NIF – National Islamic Front

NPA– Norwegian People’s Aid

NRA – National Resistance Army

NSCC – New Sudan Council of Churches

NSIC – New Sudan Islamic Council

NUP – Nationalist Union Party

OAU– Organization of African Unity

OFDA – Office of Disaster Assistance

OLF – Oromo Liberation Front

OLS – Operation Lifeline Sudan

OSO – Other Shades of Opinion

PDF – Popular Defense Forces

PHC – Primary Health Care

PMHC – Politico-Military High Command

RASS – Relief Association of South Sudan

RRC – Rehabilitation and Relief Commission

SACDNU – Sudan African Closed Districts National Union

SAD – Sudan Archive Durham

SAF – Sudan Armed Forces

SALF – Southern Azania Liberation Front

SANU – Sudan African National Union

SCC– Sudan Council of Churches

SCF– Save the Children Fund

SFP – Southern Federal party

SINGO – Sudan Indigenous NGO

SIM – Sudan Interior Mission

SMC– Sudan Medical Care

SPF – Sudan Peace Fund

SPLM/A– Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SRAD – Southern Region Agricultural Development

SRRA – Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency

SRRAP – Southern Sudan Rehabilitation Assistance Project

SSDF – South Sudan Defense Force

SSIM/A– South Sudan Independence Movement

SSLM – Southern Sudan Liberation Movement



SSUA – South Sudan Unity Movement/Army

SORMAR– Southern Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation

SPF– Sudan Peace Fund

SSPG– Southern Sudan Provisional Government

SUPRAID – Sudan Production Aid

SWAN – Sudanese Women’s Association

TMC – Transitional Military Council

TPLF – Tigray Peoples Liberation Front

UN – United Nations

UNEOG – United Nations Emergency Operation Group

UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Education Fund

UNLA – Ugandan National Liberation Army

UNRA – United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

USAID- United States Agency for International Development

USG – Under Secretary General

VOSS – Voice of Southern Sudan

WAT – Wunlit Assessment Team

WCC- World Council of Churches

WFP – World Food Program

WHO – World Health Organization


WODRANS – Widows, Orphans, and the Disabled Rehabilitation Association of the New Sudan

## Map of South Sudan and Neighbouring Countries in 2011<sup>1</sup>



1. Google <https://www.geographicguide.com/africa-maps/south-sudan.htm> (accessed January 22, 2024).

**Map and legend of Government garrisoned territories and SPLA rival factions-controlled areas in Southern Sudan by 1991<sup>2</sup>**



2. SAD.310/3/1-183 Justice Africa Newspaper Cuttings and Press Releases. Created August 28, 1991-March 26, 2002.

### ICRC's Airlift Operation in Tonj area Southern Sudan on August 1998<sup>3</sup>



3. Bernard Thomas Barrett, *Tonj. Dechargement de secours d'un avion du CICR: Unloading of Relief Aid from ICRC Airplane in Tonj area.* (ICRC Audiovisual Archives: August 1998) picture tag: V-P-SD-N-00150 <https://avarchives.icrc.org/Search/AdvancedSearch?DisplayPicture.CollectionType> (accessed January 22, 2024).

## Introduction

The history of warfare is intertwined with the development and evolution of humanitarianism. For instance, the First Geneva Convention and the creation of the International Committee of Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC), the custodian of international humanitarian law, were some of the aftermaths of the Second Italian War of Independence of 1859. Hence, scholars have observed the impact of war on the development of humanitarianism and vice versa. Therefore, the destructive impacts of the First and Second World Wars(1914-1918 and 1939-1945) caused the emergence of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) like Save the Children UK (SCF-UK), Oxfam, Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and International Organizations (IOs), such as United Nations (UN) with its branches to mitigate the devastating impacts of these conflicts.<sup>4</sup> Scholars have divided the history of humanitarian relief into three phases; “Imperial Humanitarianism,” “Neo-Humanitarianism,” and “Liberal Humanitarianism.”

These relief agencies' altruistic and selfless ventures were inherited from their predecessors, evangelical missionaries who spearheaded the “Imperial Humanitarian” era from around the 19th century to the end of the Second World War(1939-1945). During this period, Christian clergy collaborated with the abolitionist movement in their campaign against slavery. By the early 1900s, the missionaries' interest in spreading Christianity, commerce, and civilization became incompatible with the European powers' colonial interest geared towards exploiting human and natural resources in Africa and other parts of the world. Nevertheless, European missionaries and colonial officials often collaborated to facilitate humanitarian in areas including Southern Sudan. Concurrently, British administrators restricted Christian evangelical activities in predominantly Muslim population areas, such as in the Northern parts of Nigeria and Sudan, to avoid provoking resistance in these regions.<sup>5</sup>

After the Second World War, the “Neo-humanitarian” period emerged whereby a host of new organizations augmented the activities of the ecumenical groups. During this era, NGOs and IOs proliferated and dominated humanitarian operations globally. In particular, NGOs such as CRS, Lutheran World Relief (LWF), Oxfam, Médecin San Frontières (MSF), and SCF-UK, recognized as independent and non-profit organizations, were created by private individuals, religious organizations, or social groups. These relief organizations focused on redressing issues, including poverty, famine, refugee crisis, human rights violations, and illiteracy among children. For instance, the global displacement of Polish refugees after the Second World War led to the foundation of religious NGOs such as the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) in 1941 by a group of American Catholic bishops dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance to displaced Polish Catholic refugees scattered worldwide. Soon, CRS assisted many of these displaced Polish

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4. Micheal Barnett, *Empire of Humanity : A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

5. *Ibid*

Catholics in relocating to the United States.<sup>6</sup> Subsequently, CRS's scope of aid operations expanded globally from extricating young women forced into prostitution in the Philippines to providing relief assistance to about 100,000 civilians afflicted by the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1972.<sup>7</sup>

Some NGOs were founded before the "Neo-humanitarian" era such as SCF-UK, established in 1919 by British philanthropists Dorothy Buxton and Eglantyne Jebb to assist children affected by the aftermath of the First World War (1914-1918). SCF-UK broadened its purview by campaigning for humanitarian aid in conflict regions worldwide. As such, during the Russian Revolution (1917-1923), British newspapers, including the *Guardian* and *Lancashire Evening News*, launched donation requests for SCF-UK's humanitarian program for children and famine victims affected by this crisis.<sup>8</sup> Eventually, SCF-UK garnered around \$55 million for the above-mentioned aid program from the British government and other donors, outstripping the value of Biafra's famine appeal in the late 1960s and Band-Aid's donation initiative for Ethiopia's food crisis in the 1980s. Afterwards, between the 1930s and 1960s, coinciding with the Neo-humanitarian period, SCF-UK's affiliation with British government agencies, such as the Council for Relief Board during the Second World War, and its collaboration with the British colonial office during the 1950s Mau Mau crisis in Kenya and other colonial events broadened SCF-UK's involvement in global issues. Moreover, the interdependent relief activities of ICRC and SCF-UK during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) reinforced the latter's capacity to effectively deal with the humanitarian crisis during the conflict and institute rehabilitation programs after the war. Beyond operating in conflict-affected regions, SCF-UK assisted victims of natural disasters, including the Sahel and Ethiopian drought in the 1970s.<sup>9</sup>

During the early years of the "Neo-humanitarian" period, including the Second World War, Europe's prevalent famine crisis prompted a group of Christians, social activists, and academics living in Oxford in 1942 to create the British NGO Oxford Committee for Famine Relief or Oxfam aimed at eradicating the causes of hunger. Accordingly, Oxfam focused on issues of food security and, from the 1960s, motivated by the United Nations' agenda for a "Decade of Development", expanded its food aid program to encompass the education of farmers about novel agricultural techniques and the creation of new rural cooperatives in different countries.<sup>10</sup>

Meanwhile, International Organizations (IOs) such as the UN, World Health Organization (WHO), and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) also facilitated the evolution and growth of humanitarianism during the Neo-humanitarian period. An IO is composed of member states from different countries who are committed to its ideals and principles based on a charter. For instance, the UN was created in 1945 just after the end of the Second World War.

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6.*Ibid.*

7.Eileen Egan, *Catholic Relief Services: The Beginning Years* (New York: Catholic Relief Service, 1988), 292-293.

8.Emily Baughan, *Saving The Children: Humanitarianism, Internationalism, and Europe* (California: University of California Press, 2022), 45-47.

9.*Ibid.*, 48-205.

10.Barnett *Empire of Humanity*, 122-123.

By June 16 1945, 51 member states signed its charter underlining their recognition of the UN as the custodian of global peace, security, and friendly relations among participating countries. This development exemplified their commitment and collective interventionist roles in facilitating truces, such as during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-1988, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan of 1979-89. Furthermore, the UN's widespread humanitarian activities are enhanced by the efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and other UN specialized agencies.<sup>11</sup>

These humanitarian organizations highlight the diversification and omnipresent nature of UN operations to tackle global health problems, food insecurity, refugee crisis, climate change, poverty and unemployment, especially in less developed countries. Therefore, IOs, such as WHO, often collaborate with the Gates Foundation and other donors to facilitate the development of healthcare systems in low-income states by providing funds for programs aimed at eradicating polio, malaria prevention, and developing child and maternal health. Almost every African country has been a beneficiary of these initiatives.<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, an IO, UNHCR was created in 1957 as a UN-specialized agency focused on addressing refugee issues globally. Consequently, UNHCR's scope of operation covers facilitating emergency relief assistance, including food, shelter and medical aid to displaced victims of manmade and natural disasters globally. Whittaker's work further examines UNHCR's engagement in the repatriation and resettlement of illegal immigrants and in establishing and maintaining reception centres for asylum seekers, thereby portraying the broad and complicated nature of UNHCR's relief operation, often necessitating its collaboration with NGOs such as MSF, SCF-UK, Oxfam and other NGOs.<sup>13</sup>

Other IOs comprise branches of national governments meant to enable developed countries to participate in rehabilitation projects worldwide. Examples include the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) of the United States, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) for the United Kingdom, and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). Established in 1961 by US President John F. Kennedy(1961-1963), USAID focused on promoting socioeconomic development among Third World countries. Portraying a common feature among state-owned aid agencies during the Neo-humanitarian and Cold War periods, USAID projected Washington's foreign policy abroad. Accordingly, by 1985, as an ally to the Sudanese government, the Reagan administration (1981-1989) supported Khartoum's relief projects in Darfur through the collaboration between USAID and SCF-UK food aid program in the region.<sup>14</sup> This development coincided with the consistent US military support

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11. David J. Whittaker, *United Nations in The Contemporary World* (London: Routledge, 1997) 10-11.

12. Amy S. Patterson, "Public Health" in *Understanding Contemporary Africa* ed Peter J. Schraeder (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2020) 217-238.

13. David J. Whittaker, *United Nations in The Contemporary World* (London: Routledge, 1997), 89-95.

14. William I. Torry, "Rainfed Agricultural Development Project Performance in the Context of Drought: The Western Savannah Project, South Darfur, Sudan, and the Drought of 1984-1985" in *The Political Economy of African Famine* edited by R.E. Downs et al (Reading: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1991) 95-96.

for Khartoum during the 1980s as a means of sustaining its control over Darfur and compromising the activities of Libya, a Soviet ally, in the territory.<sup>15</sup>

The post-Cold War era ushered IOs and NGOs into the age of “Liberal Humanitarianism” characterised by humanitarian agencies' involvement in preventing the escalation of conflicts, facilitating early warning programs to mitigate the effects of famine, and enhancing peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in post-conflict regions. Slim argues that the complexities of emergency responses in war-affected countries, including Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Mozambique, and Sudan, prompted the creation of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) around 1992 and charged with the duty of managing relief aid in war-affected regions.<sup>16</sup> To achieve these goals, Goodhand emphasizes throughout the 1990s that, under the aegis of the UN, aid organizations involved themselves in several “humanitarian experiments” to find new strategies for managing relief in conflict-affected regions.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, this development propelled the interdependent relationship between relief agencies and belligerents, enhancing IOs and NGOs' capacity to mount relief and rehabilitation programs and observe and report on the adherence to international humanitarian laws among belligerents in war zones. This development underlines the expansive and prevalent operations of contemporary aid organizations.

### ***AN OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIANISM IN SOUTHERN SUDAN***

The foundation of modern humanitarianism in Africa was initiated during the Imperial humanitarian period in the 19th and early 20th century by the Christian Missionary Society (CMS), Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Caritas International, and other ecumenical organizations that spearheaded humanitarian activities globally. Hence, missionaries collaborated with the abolitionist movement in the campaign against slavery, intertwining with the clergies' aims of spreading Christianity among Africans. CMS and other religious groups facilitated humanitarian and educational projects to achieve these objectives, establishing Fourah Bay College in Freetown in 1827 and Lagos CMS Grammar School in 1859.<sup>18</sup>

This development propelled the rise of pioneering mission-educated African academics and nationalist leaders, such as Herbert Macaulay (1864-1946), most of whom challenged the implementation of colonial rule and policies by the early 1900s. Thus, colonial administrators had their misgivings about the missionaries' civilization mission.<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, evangelists and colonial officials collaborated in facilitating humanitarian projects in Southern Sudan, including building schools and other social services. Tounsel observes that the Nugent schools founded by

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15. J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins *Darfur The Long Road to Disaster* (Princeton: Markus Reiner Publishers, 2007) 194.

16. Hugo Slim and Angela Penrose, “UN Reform in a Changing World: Responding to Complex Emergencies” in *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies* (ed) Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (London: Zed Book, 1994) 195-201.

17. Jonathan Goodhand *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006),

18. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*.

19. *Ibid.*



the CMS and other educational programs supported by the Christian missionaries in the South served as a unifying force among Southerners.<sup>20</sup> This thesis explores how the clergy's ecumenical activities in Southern Sudan during the colonial period initiated humanitarian activities, encouraging the interdependent relationship between the Southern Sudanese and religious NGOs.

Following the inception of the post-colonial period in the 1950s, Christian missionaries' vanguard role in humanitarian ventures in Africa was gradually supplanted by the emergence of IOs and NGOs, underlining the beginning of the Neo-humanitarian age. This also reflected a change in missionaries' broad objectives from simply converting people to Christianity to pursuing Christian values of alleviating suffering.<sup>21</sup> To achieve this aim, from the mid-1950s, the World Council of Churches (WCC), through its advisory agency, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), became involved in promoting its member states' human rights and religious liberty. CCIA also consulted with the UN on matters pertaining to constitutional development, race relations, and economic development in newly independent African countries.<sup>22</sup>

Concurrently, different factors determined the goals of various humanitarian agencies' operations among newly independent African states. For example, the UN initiated the Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC) of 1960 to end global starvation by implementing large and small-scale agricultural projects, especially in the rural areas of newly independent African countries. The implementation of these projects was strengthened by the British government's staunch support for FFHC's program, matched with the establishment of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 1960, dedicated to tackling international developmental issues. Baughan further highlights that the US provided around 80 per cent of ODIs' aid and development funds to Commonwealth countries to checkmate the influences of Communist ideologies among them. It is also important to note that former colonial administrators became the heads of NGOs, such as Edward Windley, who chaired SCF-UK during the 1960s. Windley, Kenya's minister of African Affairs during the Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s, maintained that Britain should still "take responsibility" for its former colonies during the post-colonial period. Thus, Windley and his colleagues influenced SCF-UK partnerships with post-colonial African states to implement developmental projects. However, Jimmy Betts, an ex-colonial officer in Nigeria and Oxfam's first overseas director, viewed humanitarianism among newly independent countries as a means of atoning for the shortcomings of the colonial empire among Africans. In fact, Oxfam's leaders depicted hunger as an indication of the exploitation of less developed countries by Western powers. Betts and his colleagues sought to redress these issues by educating their supporters on the causes

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20. Christopher Tounsel, *Chosen Peoples: Christianity and Political Imagination in South Sudan* (London: Duke University Press, 2021)

21. *The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs Report 1959-1960* Library of the World Council of Churches(WCC) 37-40.

22. Ibid.

of poverty and inequality and, through this means, lobbying the government to enhance its role in international development.<sup>23</sup>

However, the tumultuous political crises in post-colonial Africa, including the Congo Crisis (1960-65), the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70), and the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-72) challenged IOs and NGOs' development agenda and tested their capacity to mount relief aid amid these conflicts and to facilitate rehabilitation programs in post-conflict periods. Religious humanitarian agencies, including WCC, were also involved in these humanitarian operations, underlining ecumenical NGOs' interests and interventionist role in post-colonial African conflicts.<sup>24</sup>

Few studies have examined the genesis of the mutual relationship between ecumenical humanitarian agencies and Southern Sudanese rebel groups during the First Sudanese Civil War, coinciding with the Neo-humanitarian period. For instance, Tounsel focuses on the events leading to the expulsion of the missionaries from the Southern regions in the 1960s, followed by the formation of Christian associations dedicated to providing relief assistance for Southern Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, Poggo underscores the roles of religious humanitarian groups as crucial mediators in resolving the seventeen-year civil war between Khartoum and the Southern rebels in 1972.<sup>26</sup> This study explores the divergent reasons ecumenical relief agencies supported the Southerners and the impacts of these activities on the beginning of the mutual relationship between Southern rebel groups and relief organizations during the First Civil War.<sup>27</sup>

Encompassing the Neo-humanitarian period, the 1970s and 1980s coincided with the interwar years in Southern Sudan and the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War and witnessed the expansion of IOs and NGOs' overarching influences in Africa. During this period, the prevalent unemployment among Africa's growing population, lack of infrastructural facilities, slow-paced industrial development, and incessant civil wars undermined the prospect of economic progress within the continent. To redress these issues, Sudan, like many other African countries, appealed for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the two main Western financial IOs. The IMF and World Bank offered financial aid to Sudan and many other African countries based on several conditionalities, including the liberalization of their economies,

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23. Baughan, *Saving The Children*, 170-178. Maggie Black, *A Cause For Our Time: Oxfam The First 50 years* (Oxford:Oxford University Press 1992) 72-75.

24. Joseph E. Thompson, *American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War 1966-1970* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990),83-85. Jeremy Rich, *Protestant Missionaries and Humanitarianism in the DRC: The Politics of Aid in Cold War Africa* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2020) 115.

25. Christopher Tounsel, *Chosen Peoples: Christianity and Political Imagination in South Sudan* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2021),76.

26. Scopus S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in The Southern Sudan, 1955-1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),181-182.

27. Jurjen A. Zelistra, *Visser't Hooft, 1900-1985: Living for The Unity of the Church* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 357.

shaping the happenings in these countries since the 1970s. In some cases, the World Bank collaborated with the UN in facilitating developmental projects in Sudan.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, the advent of the civil wars in Ethiopia (1974 to 1991) and in Uganda (1981-1986), causing the influx of refugees from these countries into Northern and Southern Sudan, encouraged Khartoum's dependency on humanitarian agencies for assistance. As such, Karadawi argues that by the early 1980s, Sudan had become inundated with asylum seekers, causing Khartoum to request financial and technical assistance from IOs such as USAID. Khartoum substantiated its plea for aid from these agencies because the Sudanese government was confronted with internal problems and sheltered refugees from neighbouring countries affected by conflicts. Accordingly, Sudan required international assistance to facilitate the resettlement of these asylum seekers. Meanwhile, UNHCR, Oxfam, and other relief agencies implemented various relief and rehabilitation projects among the Southerners. How these humanitarian projects in Southern Sudan impacted the affinities between the Southerners and aid agencies during the interwar years are analyzed in this study.<sup>29</sup>

The above-cited events serve as the precursor to this study's primary objective to examine the symbiotic relationship between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army(SPLM/A) and humanitarian organizations during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). Why is this topic important? During this conflict, the relationship between the SPLA and humanitarian organizations created the momentum for IOs and NGOs to expand their influence by reporting human rights violations, mounting relief aid, and providing other social services to civilians. This development encapsulates the ubiquitous nature of relief agencies' operations during the "Liberal Humanitarian" era, emerging after the Cold War period. Hence, Barnett argues that many states and non-state actors perceived NGOs and IOs as bastions of liberal values such as a free press and the rule of law required for "creating more progressive and peaceful societies."<sup>30</sup> Relief agencies were also recognized as the best basic social services and protection providers. Accordingly, the number of IOs and NGOs engaged in socio-economic development worldwide increased from around 22,000 in 1990 to 45,000 in 2000. By 1996, approximately 120 of these aid agencies operated in Southern Sudan making it difficult to examine them all. Nevertheless, the activities of ICRC, SCF-UK, and some of their counterparts are explored in this study.<sup>31</sup>

As such, the "Liberal Humanitarian" age, coinciding with the Second Civil War, was a period that underscored the broad and omnipresent operations of relief organisations in the Southern regions. For instance, the UN expended around \$2 billion to boost agricultural, educational, and employment programmes. By 2005, Sudan became ICRC's largest humanitarian operation in Africa, and it was subsequently replaced by South Sudan while ranking second in the world to

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28. Michael B. Brown, *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995)108-109.

29. Ahmed Karadawi *Refugee Policy in Sudan 1967-1984* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999)

30. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 164-165.

31. *Ibid.*

date. These happenings shaped the prevalent activities and influences of humanitarian agencies in Southern Sudan throughout the 1990s and their impacts on the emergence and recognition of SPLA as the government of Southern Sudan.

During the “Liberal Humanitarian” period, scholars of humanitarian studies have argued that relief aid mounted in war zones was often hijacked by the belligerents for their benefit, thereby compromising the efficacy of humanitarian projects initiated for war victims. In this regard, Keen observes that SPLA and Sudan state forces commandeered aid provided by relief by agencies to facilitate their insurgency and counterinsurgency during the war, creating the platform for constant interactions between humanitarian organizations and warring factions.<sup>32</sup> What factors determined the feasibility of humanitarian agencies’ operations in both government and SPLA-controlled areas and how this situation prompted relief organizations’ involvement in the conflict management process between the warring factions are analyzed in this thesis.

### ***Literature Review: The Genesis of Humanitarianism and War in Southern Sudan Before 1972***

During the Condominium or Anglo-Egyptian era (1899-1955), scholars of Sudan, spearheaded by anthropologists, were interested and inspired by the distinct character of Nuer, Dinka, Azande, and other ethnic groups in Southern Sudan.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, Anglo-Egyptian officials sought the expertise of scholars, including Charles Gabriel Seligman (1873-1940), a pioneering British anthropologist, to gain more understanding of the cultural peculiarities of the Southerners. According to Moore, since the 19th century, the preeminence of Seligman and other anthropologists’ knowledge about African ethnic groups was based on their curiosity and quest to identify a commonality among humans despite cultural differences, coupled with these scholars’ avid interest in the evolution of different societies.<sup>34</sup>

Seligman’s research in Southern Sudan culminated in the publication of *Pagan Tribes of The Nilotic Sudan* and was supported by two successive governors-general of Sudan: General Reginald Wingate (1899-1916) and Major-General Lee Stack (1917-1919). Seligman’s work intertwined with these colonial officials’ interest in enhancing British rule among the Southerners. Through the instrumentality of the Rockefeller Research Fund, the London School of Economics, where Seligman served as the chair of Ethnology (1913-1934), provided the financial resources for his fieldwork in the Southern regions from 1909 to 1922. During his fieldwork in Southern Sudan, Seligman was accompanied by his wife Brenda Zara Salman who was also an anthropologist.<sup>35</sup>

Given the author’s support for the Hamitic hypothesis, a colonial racist idea that attributed the origin of centralized states in Africa to external inspiration, Seligman highlighted the

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32. David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southernwestern Sudan 1983-1989* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008).

33. Barnett, 60-64.

34. Sally Falk Moore, *Anthropology and Africa: Changing Perspective* (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1994)8.

35. Charles G. and Brenda Seligman, *Pagan Tribes of The Nilotic Sudan* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932) xii-xiii.

influences of the Egyptian and Ethiopian civilizations on sociopolitical and economic development among the Southerners during the pre-colonial period. As such, the Shilluk and Azande's centralized and organized political systems, predating the inception of British rule in the Southern regions, were ascribed to ancestral linkages to the imagined Hamites situated to the North of Sudan.<sup>36</sup>

The importance of Seligman's studies and those of subsequent anthropologists on British colonial rule in Africa is intertwined with the colonial policy of indirect rule, using traditional institutions among Africans to facilitate colonial administration. Therefore, anthropologists such as Seligman enlightened colonial officers about the peculiarities of African culture and traditions by identifying acephalous and stratified political institutions among different ethnic groups.<sup>37</sup>

In this regard, Seligman's observations reinforced the need for imperial humanitarianism among the Southerners by implementing various developmental projects in the Southern regions. Although Seligman's work is now perceived as "white supremacist", it influenced the scholarship of Edward Evans-Pritchard (1902-1973) and other anthropologists whose research focused mainly on the sociopolitical activities and institutions of the Azande, Nuer, and various ethnic groups among the Southerners.

Pritchard's work influenced the studies of subsequent anthropologists and historians focusing on Sudan and Southern Sudan. After obtaining his B.A in Modern History at the University of Oxford (1921-1924), Pritchard proceeded to the London School of Economics, where he obtained his PhD (1927) in Anthropology under the supervision of Seligman. In his dissertation, Pritchard examines the influences of traditional practices of witchcraft, oracles, and magic among the Azande. During his fieldwork among the Azande and based on his background in History, Pritchard used oral traditions in gathering facts about the detection of witchcraft activities and traditional rites for the deceased among the Azande during the pre-colonial period.<sup>38</sup>

After completing his PhD, Pritchard was appointed as a lecturer in Anthropology at the London School of Economics from 1928 to 1931. Thereafter, he assisted the Anglo-Egyptian government in studying the Nuer, prompted by the difficulty colonial officials encountered in administering them. According to Hutchinson and Johnson, during the late 1920s, attacks by the Nuer on colonial officials became problematic in the Upper Nile caused by colonial officers seizing livestock from

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36. Seligman, *Pagan Tribes of The Nilotic Sudan*. 4-5.

37. Sally Falk Moore, *Anthropology and Africa: Changing Perspectives on a Changing Scene* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), 18-20. M. Fortes and E.E Evans-Pritchard (ed), *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940) is a comparative study of political organization among precolonial African kingdoms.

38. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 14-15.

the Nuer and also by the Anglo-Egyptian officials' attempt to supplant the Nuer's acephalous system with indirect rule.<sup>39</sup>

To mitigate these incidents, Pritchard's *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of A Nilotic People* examined the sociopolitical and economic activities of the Nuer in the Upper Nile. Pritchard's fieldwork among the Nuer was supplemented by additional details provided by colonial officers. Concurrently, colonial administrators in Southern Sudan used Pritchard's study of Nuer society to enhance their policies in the Upper Nile.<sup>40</sup> Through these efforts, Pritchard's ethnography created the background for further studies on the Nuer and other Southern ethnic groups by subsequent scholars. As such, Hutchinson's *Nuer Dilemmas* explored the impact of war, humanitarianism, and religion among the Nuer in the Upper Nile during the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars. In this regard, Hutchinson observes that the food aid provided by the UN in the Upper Nile region reduced the Nuer's reliance on cattle and grain as their staples. Hutchinson concluded that this occurrence compromised the Nuer's traditional custom of collaborative assistance among themselves during austere periods, as highlighted by Pritchard.<sup>41</sup>

Until the early 1960s, the works of British anthropologists, including *Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka* by Godfrey Lienhardt, Pritchard's student, continued to dominate academic discussions about the ethnic groups in Southern Sudan. However, immediately after the end of the Anglo-Egyptian administration in 1956, the scholarly interest of Richard Leslie Hill (1901-1996) and Peter Malcolm Holt (1918-2006), Anglo-Egyptian administrators in Sudan, influenced subsequent research on the evolution of humanitarianism in Southern Sudan.<sup>42</sup>

From 1927 to 1945, Richard Hill worked in Sudan and made friends with two amateur local historians, al-Shatir Busayli Abd al Jalil, who was an Egyptian and Muhammed Abd al-Rahim, a Sudanese secretary at the Sudan Railways headquarters in Atbara. Abd al-Rahim also pioneered the collection of oral traditions in Sudan. Upon his retirement from the Sudanese Railways, Hill became a senior lecturer in History at the University College, Khartoum, renamed the University of Khartoum in 1956. After leaving the University College, Hill was appointed as a lecturer of Near Eastern History at Durham University, where he also facilitated the creation of the Sudan Archive by imploring former British officials to submit files on the Anglo-Egyptian at Durham following Sudan's independence in 1956. To date, the Sudan Archive has become an indispensable depository for relevant documents about humanitarianism and war in Northern and Southern Sudan. Christian missionaries, aid workers, and scholars of Sudan have deposited various sources

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39. Sharon E. Hutchinson's *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State* (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), 114-116. and Douglas H. Johnson's *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 198-199.

40. Douglas H. Johnson, *Evans-Pritchard, the Nuer, and the Sudan Political Service* African Affairs Vol. 81, No 323 1982.

41. Pritchard, *Nuer*, 84-85. Hutchinson's *Nuer Dilemmas*, 352.

42. Godfrey Lienhardt's *Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)

about humanitarian activities and events leading to the First and Second Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) in the archive.<sup>43</sup>

In 1958, Hill published *Egypt in Sudan 1820-1881*, which examines the Egyptian administration of Sudan before the Anglo-Egyptian period. Despite his critical analysis of corrupt and inefficient practices among the Turco-Egyptian officials, Hill highlights some of their achievements, such as promoting Sudan's unity and modernizing the Sudanese communication system. Hill's use of Arabic and Turkish primary sources enabled his detailed analysis.<sup>44</sup> In particular, Hill's book explores the foundation of humanitarianism in Sudan in the 19th century during the reign of Ismail Pasha (1863-1879). Parts of Ismail's developmental projects in Sudan included promoting literacy among Sudanese youths, developing an effective communication and transportation system, and curbing slave trading activities.<sup>45</sup>

Another prominent Sudan scholar, P.M. Holt, shaped the development of studies in Sudanese history and humanitarianism. Holt studied History at University College, Oxford, from 1937 to 1940, obtained another diploma in education and joined the Education Department of Sudan in 1941. Afterwards, from 1952 to 1955, the Government of Sudan employed Holt as an archivist and part-time lecturer at the University College of Khartoum, providing him with the opportunity to research the period of Mahdist rule in Sudan around 1881 to 1898 based on copious primary sources seized by Anglo-Egyptian forces when they conquered the Mahdist territories. These documents were later lodged in the Government Archives or Central Record Office in Khartoum and used by Holt for his PhD thesis and his first book, *The Mahdist State in Sudan*.<sup>46</sup> Holt's role in developing the Central Record Office in Khartoum facilitated research about the origins and development of humanitarian operations and the civil wars in Sudan and Southern Sudan in the twentieth century, highlighted in the works of Robert Collins, Douglas Johnson, and other contemporary scholars of Sudan.<sup>47</sup>

By the early 1960s, the publications of two historians, Richard Gray's *A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889*, and Robert Collins' *The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control* pioneered the historical analysis of Southern Sudan in the 19th century. Their works were published during the First Sudan Civil War when the Southern regions became inaccessible, making both scholars rely on primary sources located outside of Southern Sudan. *A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889*, published as a book in 1961, was Gray's Ph.D. dissertation under the supervision of the eminent historian Roland Oliver as his first research student. Gray's work on

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43.R.S. O'Fahey, *Richard Leslie Hill 1901-1996*, Sudanic Africa Vol.8 (1997).

44.*Ibid.*

45.Richard Hill, *Egypt in The Sudan 1820-1881* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959)135-137.

46.Peter Malcolm Holt 1918-2006 [www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk](http://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk) (accessed March 25, 2024).

47.P,M Holt's *The Mahdist State in Sudan 1881-1989: A Study of Its Origins, Development, and Overthrow* (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1966) Robert Collins' *Shadows in The Grass: Britain in The Southern Sudan, 1918-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), and in Douglas H. Johnson's *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy From The Upper Nile in The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1994).

Southern Sudan covered various humanitarian projects instituted among the Southerners by the Christian missionaries and Turco-Egyptian rulers in Khartoum in the 19th century.<sup>48</sup>

Gray analyzed relevant primary sources from the Anti-Slavery Society, the Church Missionary Society, and the Verona Fathers in Rome in recounting the evangelical humanitarian efforts in abolishing the slave trade in the Southern regions in the 19th century. As such, Gray's study establishes the background for the genesis of the interdependent relationship between Southerners and Christian missionaries in the 19th century, paving the way for Christian clergy to enhance their evangelical and social services among the Southerners in subsequent years.<sup>49</sup>

In 1962, Collins' *The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control* expanded the scope of study on the Southern regions. This book created the foundation for Collins' subsequent works and achievements, including *Shadows in the Grass: Britain in Southern Sudan, 1918-1956*, and his other publications. Throughout his academic career, Collins' work emphasized the impacts of colonialism, World War I and II, the Cold War, and events in the early 21st century on the history of Sudan and Southern Sudan.<sup>50</sup>

Following Sudan's independence in 1956, Collins started his research on the history of Sudan, around the same time that provincial records of the Southern regions were removed from Juba, Malakal, and Wau and deposited in the Government Archives in Khartoum. Given this situation, coupled with the advent of the First Civil War, Collins mainly used primary sources located in Khartoum while researching *The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898* as his PhD thesis at Yale University. However, due to the peace in the interwar years, Collins' *Shadow in the Grass* utilized a wide range of primary sources collated from Northern and Southern Sudan, complemented by oral interviews with former colonial officials stationed in the Southern regions and Southern academics and politicians.<sup>51</sup>

*Shadows in the Grass* focused on the impacts of British rule in Southern Sudan and the events that poisoned the relationship between Northern and Southern Sudanese. Compared with Gray's work, *Shadows in the Grass* emphasized the foundation of ecumenical humanitarianism in the Southern regions in the 20th century through the instrumentality of Christian missionaries. Additionally, Gray pointed out that the affinities between Christian clergy and the Southerners during the Condominium period affected the sociopolitical and economic differences between Northern and Southern Sudan and became some of the causes of the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars.<sup>52</sup>

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48. Andrew Roberts, *Richard Gray, 1929-2005* <https://doi.org/10.1080/00672700509480429> (accessed March 2024).

49. *Ibid.*

50. Robert L. Tignor, "Recollections of Robert Collins" *Northeast African Studies* Volume 11, No 1 141-144, 2010. During their years as graduate students Collins and Tignor were both colleagues at Yale University.

51. Robert O. Collins, *Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan 1918-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 434.

52. *Ibid.*, 197-240.



*Literature Review: Emerging Scholars of Sudan and Humanitarianism in Southern Sudan  
After 1972*

The interwar years from 1972 to 1983 allowed scholars of Sudan to enhance their research. Thus, Douglas Johnson, Mark Duffield, Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, Alex de Waal, Raphael Koba Badal, and George Tombe Lako pursued their PhDs in different European and North American universities, focusing on various aspects of Sudanese history. It is also important to note that NGOs, IOs, and academic institutions, including SCF-UK, the Social Science Research Council UK, the American Council of Learned Societies, the British Council, and the University of Juba often sponsored the fieldwork of some of these scholars. Eventually, when the Second Civil War started in 1983, these scholars were employed as aid workers by NGOs and IOs operating in Sudan and Southern Sudan.<sup>53</sup>

Before the advent of the Second Civil War, the importance of facilitating collaborative relationships between academics and humanitarian agencies was exemplified in the fieldwork of the American-born British social anthropologist Barbara Harrell-Bond in Southern Sudan from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. Harrell-Bond's interest in refugee problems started in the 1950s while working in Los Angeles with the Church Federation in resettling Hungarian refugees. Harrell-Bond's fieldwork in the Equatoria region of Sudan, aimed at evaluating the UNHCR refugee resettlement program in the town of Yei was sponsored by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), a UK governmental agency focused on economic development and welfare of developing countries.<sup>54</sup>

Consequently, Harrell-Bond's *Imposing Aid* compiled a comprehensive report about UNHCR and other relief agencies' operations in Yei, upbraiding these aid organizations for compromising the welfare of refugees. In a case between 1982 and 1983, the World Health Organization (WHO) was accused of delaying the hiring of Ugandan doctors in refugee camps. Such criticism was needed to improve humanitarian agencies' operations and to make them more accountable to their donors. Nonetheless, Harrell-Bond's study emphasized the prevalent operations of UNHCR, Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), Oxfam and other relief agencies involved in relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts in Southern Sudan after the First Civil War, underling the revitalization of the Southerners and humanitarian agencies' collaborations.<sup>55</sup> Harrell-Bond's studies on refugees eventually led to the creation of the Refugee Studies Center at Oxford University, where scholars of Sudan, David Keen, Alex de Waal, and Wendy James, Douglas Johnson's wife, completed their PhD theses.

Their incisive and novel analysis of topical issues, including food insecurity and refugee crises in Africa, reinforced the popularity of these scholars among humanitarian agencies. In particular,

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53. Douglas H. Johnson, *South Sudan: A New History for A New Nation* (Ohio: Ohio University Press Athens, 2016) 17.

54. B.E Harrell Bond, *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 1-21.

55. *Ibid*, 215.

their firsthand experiences with humanitarian problems affecting many people in Africa underscored their expertise. For instance, as Sudan's Commissioner for refugees, Dr Ahmed Abdel-Wadoud Karadawi's in-depth knowledge about refugees and humanitarian aid made him renowned among aid agencies.<sup>56</sup> After receiving his doctorate from Oxford, Karadawi joined the Commission for Refugees in Khartoum in 1970, coinciding with the influx of Eritrean refugees into Sudan caused by the Ethiopian government's draconian policies against them. Similarly, in the late 1970s, the Equatoria region in Southern Sudan became inundated by Ugandan refugees. In his study, Karadawi underlined that these happenings coincided with the reconstruction efforts in the Southern regions, prompting Khartoum's request for additional financial and logistical support from the UN to manage the burgeoning asylum seekers in Sudan.<sup>57</sup>

With these events, Karadawi viewed that providing refugees employment and other economic opportunities served as a means of supporting their host societies, creating a nexus between relief aid and development. Nonetheless, based on his deep understanding of the likely problems that foreign aid workers create in society, Karadawi argued that refugees should be first consulted about their needs. Therefore, the developmental efforts by IOs and NGOs in the Southern regions during the interwar years by engaging asylum seekers in agricultural production and providing social services underscore the Sudanese government's reliance on relief agencies to manage its socioeconomic issues.<sup>58</sup>

Throughout the 1980s, the recurring incidence of famine and drought in Sudan and its neighbouring countries worsened the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa, coinciding with Alex de Waal's fieldwork research from 1985 to 1987 within western Sudan's region of Darfur. Dr Ahmed Karadawi, Sudan's Commissioner for refugees and de Waal's host and guide, advised him about researching the Chadian refugee crisis in Darfur and mass displacement caused by famine. De Waal's firsthand experiences about the devastating impacts of famine in Darfur prodded his criticism of erroneous mainstream perceptions about food insecurity in Africa. According to de Waal, previous analyses of food shortages, such as the Sahel famine of 1969-1974 and the Ethiopian famine of 1973, were inaccurate owing to errors in statistical data, researchers' diversion of focus away from the leading causes of the food crisis to the social institutions affected by food insecurity, ineffective use of early warning systems by relief agencies, and other factors. Accordingly, de Waal concluded that these situations created a gap between Africans' and Western humanitarian agencies' understandings of the causes and impacts of famine.<sup>59</sup>

De Waal further observed that providing clean water, better sanitation, and employment schemes were some of the local initiatives that strengthened the resilience of Darfur's populace against famine rather than international relief aid. Thus, building the local capacity of Africans

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56. Alex de Waal, *Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018)7.

57. Ahmed Karadawi, *Refugee Policy in Sudan 1976-1994* (New York: Berghahn, 1999), 165-190.

58. Barbara Harrell-Bond, *Obituary: Ahmed Abdel-Wadoud Karadawi 19 October 1945-20 November 1995* *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol 9. No.1, 1996.

59. Alex de Waal, *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

should be prioritized during food shortages.<sup>60</sup> Before de Waal ended his fieldwork, the Second Sudanese Civil War unfolded, allowing him to observe the influx of Southern Sudanese into the Northern territories. Hence, de Waal's observation of this tumultuous event was recounted in *Some Comments on Militias in the Contemporary Sudan* and *Starving Out The South, 1984-1989*, coinciding with his employment with Africa Watch, an independent human rights organization. Moreover, de Waal consulted with some of his colleagues, including Wendy James and Mark Duffield, while preparing this book.<sup>61</sup> By 1989, Oxford University Press in collaboration with Save the Children UK (SCF-UK) published de Waal's PhD dissertation as *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan*, coinciding with the initiation of Operation Lifeline Sudan in Northern and Southern Sudan, underscoring SCF-UK's interest in Sudan's humanitarian crisis.<sup>62</sup>

On the eve of the Second Sudanese Civil War, reports about the political and civil unrest in the Southern regions aggravated disputes between Khartoum and Southern politicians and galvanized the interest of humanitarian agencies, including the Minority Rights Group (MRG), an NGO involved in publicizing human rights abuses. Consequently, in 1982, MRG employed Douglas Johnson to investigate the emerging sociopolitical crises in Sudan based on his fieldwork experiences among the Nuer of Southern Sudan during his PhD at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA, 1974-1980) coupled with his work experience with the Regional Ministry of Culture and Information in Juba (1980-1983). Johnson's report focused on the prelude to the Second Civil War which broke out in 1983.<sup>63</sup>

Johnson's research interest in Southern Sudan started during his undergraduate studies at Haverford College in Pennsylvania and sustained during his studies at Makerere University College in Uganda amid the First Sudanese Civil War in 1969, where he befriended several Southern Sudanese students. Towards the end of the civil war, Johnson sought to understand Southern Sudan's problems within the context of the Southerners' nationalism and their resistance movements based on the "Dar es Salaam School" of African nationalist history pioneered by Terence Ranger, who became Johnson's PhD supervisor at UCLA.<sup>64</sup> During his tenure as the African History Professor at UCLA (1969-1974), Ranger's interest in "African religious systems and beliefs" and "the role of the prophets and prophetic movements in social change" during the colonial era influenced Johnson's study of the Nuer prophets.<sup>65</sup> Johnson's access to some primary source documents from the Government Archives in Khartoum and the University of Durham's Sudan Archives enhanced his study, eventually leading to the publication of *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* in 1994.<sup>66</sup> It

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60. *Ibid*, 8.

61. Alex de Waal, *Starving Out The South, 1984-1989 in Civil War in The Sudan* (ed) M.W Daly and Ahmed Alawad Sikainga (New York: IB Tauris, 1993), 157-185.

62. de Waal, *Famine that Kills*.

63. Douglas Johnson, *The Southern Sudan* The Minority Rights Group Report No.78, April 1988.

64. Douglas Johnson (1980), *History and Prophecy Among The Nuer of The Southern Sudan* doctoral thesis University of California Los Angeles.

65. Megan Vaughan and Luise White, "Terence Ranger" *The Past and Present* No. 228 (August 2015), 3-14.

66. *Ibid* (1980) 4.

is important to note that in the 1970s when Johnson proceeded with his fieldwork research among the Nuer in the Upper Nile region, Norwegian Christian Aid (NCA), Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and other aid organizations implemented their relief and rehabilitation programs in Malakal the Upper Nile's capital. In fact, LWF provided assistance to Johnson during his investigation of the Nuer prophets, facilitating the camaraderie between both parties.<sup>67</sup>

### ***Literature Review: Scholars of Sudan, Relief Agencies, and the Second Civil War (1983-2005)***

The advent of the Second Sudanese Civil War led to a convergence of activities between academics of Southern Sudan and aid agencies situated in the region based on their collective interest about the impacts of the conflict on the Southerners. Thus, during the Second Civil War, the consistent interaction between humanitarian agencies and scholars of Sudan enhanced publicity about the conflict, its impacts on the Southerners, and relief operations in the Southern regions.

Before the advent of the Second Sudanese Civil War, Robert Collins' expertise on issues about Sudan's sociopolitical and economic development was confirmed by his appointment as a consultant to the High Executive Council of the Southern Sudan regional government (1975-1983). Collins also served as the special adviser to Chevron oil company in Southern Sudan (1981-1991), and in 1980, as the recognition of his scholarship on the Upper Nile, Sudan's President Nimeiry (1969-1985) awarded Collins with the Order of Sciences, Literature and Arts.<sup>68</sup>

Amid the civil war, Collins' work underlined his support for unity between Northern and Southern Sudan.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, in his book *The Waters of the Nile*, focusing on the history of the Jonglei Canal from 1900 to 1988, Collins intertwines the rise of SPLA in 1983 with the events leading to the neglect of the Jonglei Canal project sponsored by UN agencies and other foreign governments. During the civil war, SPLA's archrival, Anya-Nya II, a reincarnation of the Anya-Nya rebels of the First Civil War who fought for the separation of Southern and Northern Sudan, caused a disturbance in the Upper Nile region. By comparing John Garang's leadership of "SPLA as representing all Sudanese" to Gai Tut's command of Anya-Nya II, whose narrow political objective aimed at the separation of the Southern regions, Collins' *The Water of the Nile* subtly highlights his support for Sudan's unity.<sup>70</sup>

Towards the end of his career as an African History Professor (1965-1994) at the University of California Santa Barbara, Collins became more involved in issues around the Sudan conflict by offering his expertise to members of the United States Congress Subcommittee on Africa chaired by Senator Paul Simon. Accordingly, Collins shared his view concerning the splitting of the SPLA

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67. *Ibid.*, ix.

68. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert\\_O.\\_Collins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_O._Collins) Robert O. Collins, Wikipedia (accessed March 17, 2024).

69. Robert Collins, *The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and The Jonglei Canal, 1900-1988* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1990).

70. *Ibid.*

into factions, the possibility of their reconciliation, and policy recommendations regarding the humanitarian crises in the Southern regions.<sup>71</sup>

Collins' despair about Sudan's conflict was captured in *Requiem for The Sudan: Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile*, co-authored with John Millard Burr, a former relief coordinator for OLS and USAID. Published in 1994, *Requiem for The Sudan* focuses on the genesis of relief operations and humanitarian challenges encountered by NGOs and IOs in Southern Sudan from 1983 to 1993. In this book, Collins and Burr address thematic issues, including international response to relief crises, politics of food aid between the GOS and the SPLA, the United States' humanitarianism in the Cold War, Western media's influence on relief aid, and Southern Sudan's relief crisis.<sup>72</sup> In *Requiem for The Sudan*, both scholars emphasized USAID's role in enhancing the delivery of relief aid and rehabilitation projects among the Southerners despite the logistical challenges NGOs and IOs experienced while operating in the Southern regions.<sup>73</sup> Although Chevron's role in facilitating the creation of relief centers for Southern refugees is highlighted, the multinational oil company's involvement in the recruitment of militia forces in cahoots with Khartoum around the Upper Nile region where Chevron operated went unmentioned. Chevron's exploration activities in the Upper Nile coincided with Collins' appointment as a consultant for the oil company in Southern Sudan. In 1997, Collins donated his primary source documents to Durham University's Sudan Archive.<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, during the Second Civil War, humanitarian agencies and scholars of Sudan often collaborated in organizing seminars and workshops, providing these stakeholders a forum for expressing their divergent views about the conflict and later published as grey literature. For instance, from February 19 to 23, 1991, the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), a graduate institution focused on policy studies, together with NGOs, IOs, and scholars focusing on the Horn of Africa, organized a conference titled "*Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospect for Peace, Recovery, and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan*" held at The Hague in the Netherlands. The rationale behind the conference was to provide feasible means of resolving the myriad and prolonged conflicts in East Africa and to envisage solutions to likely problems that would be encountered after the attainment of peace.<sup>75</sup>

During the seminar, a scholar of Sudan, Mark Duffield discussed issues relating to SPLA's political economy and food insecurity in Southern Sudan.<sup>76</sup> Duffield's argument about SPLA's

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71. SAD.922/1/61-67 R.O. Collins Advisory Work for The Sudan Government and the US Government created, April 30 1993.

72. Robert Collins and John Millard Burr, *Requiem for The Sudan: Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995)

73. Robert L. Tignor, *Recollections of Robert Collins* Northeast African Studies Volume 11 No 1 (2004-2010), 141-145.

74. Collins and Burr, *Requiem for The Sudan*, 130.

75. Martin Doorbos et al (ed) in *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospect for Peace, Recovery, and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan* (London: The Institute of Social Studies and James Currey, 1992), 1.

76. Mark Duffield, "Famine, Conflict, and the Internationalization of Public Welfare" (ed) in Martin Doorbos et al (London: The Institute of Social Studies and James Currey, 1992)

political economy at the conference in The Hague was based on his fieldwork experiences while working with Oxfam as its representative in Sudan from 1985 to 1989.<sup>77</sup> In fact, Duffield and de Waal used their firsthand experiences in Sudan to expand the horizon of their research into other East African countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia also affected by famine and refugee crises caused by war.

John Luk, SPLA's deputy representative and spokesman in the UK, was a panelist at the ISS conference. After studying law at the University of Khartoum (1974-1977), Luk proceeded with his Master's in Law at the London School of Economics. Before the beginning of the Second Civil War, Luk also served as a legal assistant in the Regional Ministry of Legal Affairs in Juba.<sup>78</sup> While addressing participants at The Hague conference, Luk highlighted the destruction of infrastructure in the Southern regions during the war. In 1992, ISS compiled and published the above discussions among the panelists at the conference.<sup>79</sup>

During the post-Cold War era, the sustained interest of Western humanitarian agencies and research institutes in African issues reinforced their involvement in conferences and publications germane to Sudan scholars. Accordingly, in 1992, the Norwegian Research Council for Science and Humanities, in conjunction with the University of Bergen, based on their longstanding interest in Sudanese history, archaeology, philosophy, anthropology, and geography, organized a workshop titled "A Short-Cut to Decay-The Case of the Sudan". Bergen-based Sudan academics, including Gunnar Håland, Richard H. Pierce and Sean O'Fahey, P.M Holt's PhD student, were influential in facilitating the workshop. Terje Tvedt, Douglas Johnson, Sharif Harir, and Raphael K. Badal were some of the panelists at the seminar. In 1994, the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies published the discussions of the panelists.<sup>80</sup>

The diversity of the workshop's panelists reflected its host's broad interest in Sudan. For example, Raphael Badal, a discussant at the conference, focused on the political crisis in the Southern regions towards the beginning of the Second Civil War. Badal's authority on this matter was based on his appointment as the regional finance minister of Bahr-el-Ghazal from 1985 to 1986 complemented by his educational qualifications in Political Science and Philosophy.<sup>81</sup>

Douglas Johnson, a speaker at the conference, explored the revitalization and destruction of the Southern economy before and during the Second Civil War. Johnson's familiarity with the Southerners' culture, coupled with his employment as World Food Program consultant and his affiliations with other NGOs and IOs operating in Southern Sudan underlined his expertise on

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77. Mark Duffield, *War and Famine in Africa: An Oxfam Working Paper* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1991).

78. Kuyok Abol Kuyok, *South Sudan: The Notable Firsts* (Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2015), 661.

79. John Luk, "Return to Normalcy: Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction in the SPLM/SPLA Administrated Areas during the Transitional Phase and Beyond" in *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospect for Peace, Recovery, and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan* edited by Martin Doorbos et al (London: The Institute of Social Studies and James Currey, 1992), 42-47.

80. Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (ed) *Short-Cut To Decay: The Case of the Sudan* (Motala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), 8.

81. Kuyok *South Sudan*, 777-778.

these issues. Thus, Johnson provided eyewitness accounts about the devastation in the Southern regions.<sup>82</sup>

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the UN's multidisciplinary research institute, also gathered and published Johnsons' reports about the Southern regions and those of aid workers operating in other conflict-affected countries. UNRISD was created to complement the work of different UN agencies to provide government development organizations and stakeholders with a thorough understanding of issues about the displacement of refugees, ethnic conflict, and other problems.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, in 1996, UNRISD published Johnson's report on humanitarian agencies' logistical problems to enlighten new aid organizations operating in Southern Sudan about the likely challenges they might encounter.<sup>84</sup>

Published towards the end of the twentieth century, de Waal's *Famine Crimes* portrayed the past and contemporary challenges encountered by relief agencies operating in Southern Sudan and other parts of Africa. Thus, de Waal's book explores the commencement and evolution of humanitarian operations in different parts of Africa and criticizes NGOs' and IOs' inability to find a lasting solution to the reoccurring famine crises. Before the publication of *Famine Crimes*, de Waal had worked with different human rights organizations, including Africa Watch and African Rights.<sup>85</sup>

A turning point in de Waal's career was when Omaar Rakiya, his colleague at Africa Watch, criticized *Operation Restore Hope*, a US-led, UN-sanctioned military intervention in her native Somalia, leading to Rakiya's dismissal from Africa Watch in 1992. Reacting to this incident, de Waal also resigned his position as Africa Watch's assistant director leading to Rakiya and de Waal establishing African Rights in 1993. Hence, African Rights focused on human rights abuses and reactions to such incidents, especially in Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan, caused by autocratic leadership, famine, civil war and other sociopolitical issues. African Rights evaluation of these matters revealed IOs' and NGOs' interest in human rights issues, conflict resolution, tackling the causes of unemployment and poverty, and related problems affecting the progress of civil liberties and providing social amenities. Nonetheless, a reoccurring leitmotif of both Africa Rights publications and *Famine Crimes* is that the inability of NGOs and IOs to find lasting solutions to the humanitarian crises in Africa makes it imperative for Africans to find pragmatic solutions to African problems.<sup>86</sup> Based on all these cited works, this thesis examines the evolution of IO and NGO relief operations during the Second Sudanese Civil War, leading to the symbiotic

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82. Douglas H. Johnson, *Destruction and Reconstruction in the Economy of the Southern Sudan* (ed) Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt, 126-143.

83. Tim Allen (ed) *In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa* (London: UNRISD Africa World Press and James Currey, 1996), 8.

84. Douglas Johnson, *Increasing the Trauma of Return: An Assessment of the UN Emergency Response to the Evacuation of the Sudanese Refugee Camps in Ethiopia 1991* (ed) Tim Allen, 171-180.

85. Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and The Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (London: African Rights and James Currey, 1997).

86. de Waal.

relationship between these humanitarian agencies and SPLA. This development served as a springboard for the expansive and ubiquitous operations of aid organizations in Southern Sudan during the conflict.

### ***Methodology and Limitations***

The primary sources used in this thesis were gathered from different archives, complemented with some digitized documents available online. The Sudan Archives at Durham University in the UK houses a substantial number of documents containing reports about the relief operations of humanitarian agencies in Southern Sudan, including Save the Children UK (SCF-UK), International Committee of Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC), Oxfam, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Some of these files were deposited by Douglas Johnson, Robert Collins, and other scholars of Sudan and were useful in reconstructing the operations of aid organizations in Southern Sudan from 1983 to 2005.

However, locating and collating other primary sources from the British National Archive at Kew and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Archive based in Geneva were challenging experiences, especially after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 when the fieldwork for this thesis was suspended. The global pandemic led to the postponement of all travel plans until October 2022.

Nevertheless, freelance researchers based in the UK were paid to retrieve some files in Kew, which were useful in writing chapters two and three of this study. Due to COVID-19, UNHCR's archive remained closed to visitors, however, the UN's archivist emailed digitized copies of primary sources about UNHCR and other relief agencies' operations in Southern Sudan. Most of these documents were supplemented by those retrieved from Kew and the Sudan archives at Durham University. Other relevant documents were retrieved from the online digital libraries of ICRC, the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Sudan Open Archive (SOA). The files gathered from these sources provided useful information about the humanitarian activities of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in the Southern regions. For instance, files from the CIA's online library contained vital documents about interactions between SPLA and relief agencies operating in Ethiopia's refugee camps, while SOA contained a variety of sources dealing with SPLA and OLS operations in the Southern regions, which were used in almost all the chapters of this thesis.

Eventually, and in the context of increasingly depleted funds, the fieldwork for this study was undertaken in South Sudan in October and November 2022 some two years late. Attempts to find sources relevant to this thesis in South Sudan were unsuccessful because the prolonged civil war in the new country affected the storage of archival documents. All the documents in the South Sudan archive in Juba dated from the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian government in 1899 to the end of the First Civil War in 1972. Most of these files focused on events during the colonial period in the Upper Nile and Equatoria region only. The archivist mentioned that files on the Bahr-el-Ghazal area were all burnt. The South Sudan Center for Strategic Studies and SPLM/A's



secretariat were also visited, but potential informants declined to be interviewed because of the ongoing tension among different political groups in South Sudan, making Southern politicians suspicious of each other and any unfamiliar visitors. In fact, throughout my stay in Juba, there was a curfew in the city from 7 pm to 6am daily, given concern over the fragile security situation.

### *Structure and Organization*

This thesis is divided into five chronological chapters. Chapter one focuses on the background of events in Southern Sudan from the 19th century to 1955, the year before Sudan gained its independence from Britain, coinciding with the beginning of the First Civil War. This section explores British colonial policies and their impacts on socioeconomic and political development in Southern Sudan.

Chapter two delves into the First Civil War by examining the key events that aggravated the crisis in the Southern regions, including Khartoum's expulsion of Christian missionaries, the Southern guerrillas' operation in the South, and political rivalry among the Southern leaders. Additionally, this section highlights the assistance religious NGOs such as the Catholic Church's Caritas International Aid and Verona Fathers provided the Southerners during the war. The concluding part of this chapter underlines the consistent efforts of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and other ecumenical groups in collaboration with Oxfam and other NGOs in the resolution of the First Civil War based on the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Moreover, under the aegis of WCC, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) embarked on various rehabilitation and relief projects among the Southerners.

Chapter three examines the relief and rehabilitation operations of UNHCR, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), USAID, and other aid agencies among the Southerners during the interwar years of 1972 to 1983. Against this background, this chapter further explores the challenges encountered by IOs and NGOs in the Southern regions immediately following the outbreak of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983 and its impacts on various developmental projects among the Southerners. Concurrently, the emergence of SPLA, the Southern rebel group, and its operations within and beyond the Southern areas initiated its emerging symbiotic relationship with humanitarian organizations. Centred on this development, this section analyzes the impact of the support of Mengistu's Ethiopia on SPLA, the exodus of Southern refugees into neighbouring countries, and the relief operations of the Red Cross and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) on the genesis of the mutually supporting relationship between humanitarian agencies and the liberation army.

Chapter four focuses on the creation of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and its role as an indispensable linkage between relief agencies and SPLA in the Southern regions. In this regard, the impacts of the UN, United States, and UNICEF on the formation and actualization of OLS relief operations among the Southerners are analyzed. However, the emergence of Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum in 1989 cut short the humanitarian activities of IOs and NGOs operating in the Southern regions. Nevertheless, NGOs such as ICRC and Norwegian People's

Aid (NPA) adopted different humanitarian strategies to mount the delivery of relief aid and execute their rehabilitation projects among the Southerners. These events strengthened SPLA's symbiotic relationship with relief agencies and highlighted IOs and NGOs' sociopolitical activities among the Southerners by facilitating rehabilitation projects in Southern Sudan. Towards the end of this chapter, the OLS's role in SPLA's internal crisis in 1991 and its impact on the creation of "Ground Rules", a set of humanitarian principles created to protect humanitarian workers, are examined.

Within the context of the post-Cold War era, chapter five critiques the factors that prompted the growth and transformation of humanitarian organizations in Southern Sudan amid the continuing civil war. As such, this section critiques the influences of IOs and NGOs in creating Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs) and the problems of these domestic NGOs among the Southerners. The chapter also discusses the causes for the growth of relief agencies in Southern Sudan, including Khartoum's engagements with IOs and NGOs, the peace process initiated by IOs among the warring factions, and other factors prominent during the 1990s. The challenges of various humanitarian organizations in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile regions and their impacts on events leading to the end of the civil war conclude this study.

## CHAPTER ONE

### *THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOUTHERN SUDAN FROM THE 19th CENTURY TO 1955*

#### INTRODUCTION

Since the 19th century, the geographical location of Southern Sudan, the traditional occupation of its ethnic groups, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, and the presence of foreign invaders shaped the region's history. This chapter examines how these factors influenced the course of sociopolitical and economic events in Southern Sudan from the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. Within the context of this timeline, the first part of this chapter examines the peculiarity of Southern Sudan's geography and the ethnic groups inhabiting the region since the 19th century. The next two sections examine the impacts of the Turco-Egyptian rule, and the rise of the Mahdist movement on the sociopolitical events in the Southern regions, Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Equatoria, the reconquest of these areas by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, and the challenges encountered by the British colonial officials from 1900 to the late 1920s. Against this background, the subsequent sections analyze how the sociopolitical and economic events in Europe and in the Southern regions determined the changes in colonial policies after World War I (1914-1918) leading to the gradual implementation of the Southern Policy through the efforts of colonial officials and the evangelical activities of Christian missionaries. The last two parts of this chapter focuses on why and how the British reversed the Southern policy, after World War II (1939-45), and how these events led to the genesis of the First Sudanese Civil War (1955 to 1972).

#### *SOUTHERN SUDAN SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY*

Southern Sudan is situated to the South of the tenth parallel and extends to the North of Lake Albert in Uganda. By the middle of the twentieth century, Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria became the three main Southern regions, encompassing 250,000mm or about one-fourth of the total area of Sudan. In contrast to the sparse rainfall in North Sudan, the annual rainfall in the Southern regions ranged from 400mm to 2200mm, which shaped the transhumant and pastoral occupation among its ethnic groups. Southern ethnic groups are divided into three major linguistic groups: the Central Sudanic, and Western, and Eastern Nilotes.<sup>87</sup>

The Central Sudanic speakers include ethnic groups such as the Azande, Lugbara, Baka, Mundu and Auvkaya. They predominantly inhabit the Equatoria region and neighbouring countries such as the Central African Republic(CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC).<sup>88</sup> Different

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87. Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: A Background to Conflict*. (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1968), 2.

88. Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: African, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan 1955-1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 13.

scholars have varying perspectives about the ethnic classification of the Nilotes. According to Pritchard, the first Nilotic groups in Southern Sudan were the Nuer and Dinka recognized as the Western Nilotes. They share similar cultural traits such as their pastoral lifestyle, and physically they are tall. The second consist of the Eastern Nilotic group such as the Shilluk, Anuak and Lango and other ethnic groups.<sup>89</sup> In Ogot's view, the Nilotes can be divided into the Northern, Central, and Southern blocs. The Northern bloc consist of the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anuak and their offshoots such as the Jikany Nuer, Atuot, Agar Dinka, Bor Dinka, and Luo of the town of Wau. The Central bloc consist of the Acholi, Lango, Alur, and Palwo who were separated from the Southern Luo found in Kenya and other parts of East Africa. Furthermore, Ogot explains that the evolution of the Nilotes into distinct ethnic groups in Southern Sudan and different parts of East Africa started around 1000AD.<sup>90</sup>

In Johnson's view, the term "Nilotic" overtime has acquired diversified usage making its definition problematic. For instance, in Ethiopia, it is a generic term for lowland people from diverse ethnic backgrounds whereas Ugandans used "Nilotic" as a reference to the people of the North associated with past dictatorial regimes. However, not all of them speak the Nilotic language. Similarly, such political overtones are used in South Sudan in referring to Western Nilotic speakers such as the Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk. Whereas the Atuot and Anuak are rarely classified under the linguistic group, the Acholi, Mabaan, and Pari are excluded.<sup>91</sup>

Despite the linguistic differences among ethnic groups in the region, Southern Sudan's peculiar ecology influenced the traditional occupation of these ethnic groups and the process of interethnic relations among them. The ecological regions of Southern Sudan can be divided into three. These are the Central Rainland Region, the Flood Region, and the Equatorial Region. The Central Rainland Region, located in the Upper Nile, is subdivided into the northern and southern parts. In the northern part, the annual rainfall is about 400 to 600mm and its rainy season is only for four months in a year and the soil in this region is mainly clayey and sandy with a vegetation of open grassland alternating with thickets. In the southern part, the rainy season is about four to six months with about 600 to 700 mm of rainfall annually. There are heavy alkaline clay and loamy soils in this area which crack during the dry season. The vegetation here is predominantly tall annual grassland alternating with thorn woodland.<sup>92</sup>

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89. Evans Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 2.

90. Bethwell Ogot, *The History of the Southern Luo: Volume 1 Migration and Settlement 1500-1900*. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), 40-48.

91. Douglas Johnson, *South Sudan: A New History for a New Nation*. (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2016), 20-21.

92. Sudan Open Archive (SOA) *Natural Resources and Development Potential in the Southern Provinces of The Sudan: A Preliminary Report by the Southern Development Investigation Team 1954*. 35-37, <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txf=txIN%7CtxTI%7CtxAU&txq=Natural+Resources+and+Development+Potential+in+the+Southern+Provinces+of+The+Sudan%3A+A+Preliminary+Report+by+the+Southern+Development+Investigation+Team+&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CtxTI%7CtxAU-----> (accessed 15 December, 2021).

The Flood Region encompasses parts of the Upper Nile region, the eastern and north-eastern parts of Bahr-el-Ghazal, and the north-eastern Equatoria region. Heavy waterlogging and flooding during rainy seasons occur in these areas. This is due to the lack of slopes, the heavy impermeable soils, and a comparatively heavy annual rainfall (750-1000mm). Moreover, the insufficient drainage channels in the region affect the flooding in the area. The Flood Region can be subdivided into four parts which are the Highland, Flood Region, Toich land, and Sudd. The Highland is only a few centimeters above the level of surrounding plains and is relatively flood-free even during heavy rainfall. There are also the intermediate lands with flat and low lying plains of the Flood Region. They are vulnerable to heavy flooding or waterlogging during rainy seasons and almost waterless in the dry season. The soil in this area is alkaline and the vegetation here is predominantly open grassland with some acacia woodland. Secondly, there is the Intermediate Land which lies just below the highland. The soil here is usually heavier and more impermeable therefore in the rainy season it is waterlogged or flooded. The vast areas of open grassland with perennial species are the predominant feature of this region. There is also the Toich Land which is connected to rivers and inland watercourses. The growth of the vegetation here, mainly open grassland, is sustained by the fluctuation of water levels in the adjoining watercourses. Lastly, the Sudd or papyrus swamp located at the lowest levels of the floodplains are inundated annually.<sup>93</sup>

The ecological zones of the Equatorial region, characterized by woodland, are subdivided into the Iron Plateau, the Central Hills, Green Belt, and the Southeastern Hills. Each of these regions has its own unique ecological features which shaped the traditional occupation among the ethnic groups in the region.<sup>94</sup>

#### ***SOUTHERN SUDAN BEFORE 1898: TURCO-EGYPTIAN PERIOD AND THE MAHDIST INVASION***

The quest for the headstream of the Nile by Arab and European explorers in the mid 19th century coincided with the discovery of Southern Sudan. Hitherto, the ancient Greek historian Herodotus (484-425BC) visited Egypt around 460 BC and wrote about the Nile and its sources. Eratosthenes (276-195\194 BC), the renowned geographer and mathematician, and custodian of Alexandria's library during the third century discussed the origins of the Nile. None of these scholars and their successors visited the Southern regions therefore it remained obscure to the outside world.<sup>95</sup>

By the 16th century, the rise of the Funj Kingdom, which spanned present day Sudan, northwestern Eritrea, and western Ethiopia, provided the outside world more information about the Southern regions. A collection of ethnic groups from Southern Egypt, Northern and Southern Sudan known as Nubian, who have their unique history, created the Funj Kingdom. During the Kingdom's heyday (1504-1821) ethnic groups in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equatoria regions were constantly embroiled in warfare. The strongest ethnic groups conquered the weaker ones. For instance, the Azande absorbed smaller and more vulnerable groups such as the Bongo, Kreish, and

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93. *Ibid.*

94. *Ibid.*

95. Beshir, *The Southern Sudan*, 9.

the Shatt.<sup>96</sup> Subsequently, the advent of the Turco-Egyptian rule, which supplanted the Funj Kingdom, rekindled foreign interest in the quest for the source of the Nile coupled with the prospect of importing slaves and ivory from Southern Sudan. In 1838, conflicting accounts about the goldfields in the Southern regions were obtained by Muhammed Ali, the autonomous ruler of the Ottoman Egypt and Sudan, who had recently conquered Sudan and founded Khartoum. Consequently, in November 1839 Muhammed Ali sponsored an expeditionary force into Southern Sudan led by Salim Quantan. Soon, the expedition contacted the Shilluk and then other ethnic groups. Reports about these events coupled with the possibility of procuring slaves and ivory, prodded the interest of prospective European explorers and travellers in the Southern regions.<sup>97</sup>

The acquisition of ivory had an enormous impact on the pre-existing slave trading activities in Southern Sudan. Its procurement required the assistance of enslaved people who would carry the tusks from the interior regions to the Nile. However, when ivory trade declined due to the rising cost of cartage, the slave trade became the next lucrative venture. In Collins' view, Northern merchants, such as the Khartoumers, Turks, Arabs, and Europeans, who owned trading forts (zariba), and were determined to protect their investments supported this development.<sup>98</sup> By the 1860s, these traders established their zariba in the Bahr el Ghazal region from where the enslaved were exported to Khartoum slave markets and later conscripted into the Egyptian army or served as servants, wives, and soldiers within the zariba.<sup>99</sup> The alliance between traders and local leaders in the Southern regions facilitated the trade in slaves and ivory. Traders secured slaves, ivory, provisions, porters, and security around their zariba. In return, their local allies such as the Dinka were rewarded for their services, as mercenaries, with cattle, trade goods, military support, and exemption from being enslaved.<sup>100</sup>

These events coincided with the heyday of Turco-Egyptian rule in Sudan, during the reign of Khedive Ismail (1863-1879), when several modernization projects and policies were initiated in Khartoum and in the Southern regions. For instance, through the loans provided by European creditors, the Khedive completed the construction of the Suez Canal, officially on November 17, 1869. Against this backdrop, Holt and Daly explain that three significant events dominated Ismail's rule in Sudan. These included the Khedive's unprecedented territorial expansion together with his struggle against the slave trade and policies against human trafficking influenced by the Khedive's European creditors, proponents of the abolitionist movement in Europe. Lastly, Ismail recruited foreigners, especially European Christians, into military and civil offices which also furthered modernization and abolitionist policies. Thus, in June 1864, the River Police were established and delegated to intercept and thwart slave trading in the White Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal. Unfortunately, three factors compromised the Khedive's efforts in combatting the slave

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96. *Ibid.*,10.

97. Beshir, *The Southern Sudan* 10.

98. Robert Collins "Slavery in the Sudan in history" *Slavery and Abolition* Volume 20, Issue 3 (1999): 79.

99. *Ibid.*

100. A.N.M Mawson, "*The Triumph of Life: Political and Dispute and Religious Ceremonial Among the Agar Dinka of Southern Sudan.*" (PhD dissertation Darwin College 1989), 74.

trade. The vested interest of Northern merchants in the trade, discontented officers in charge of curbing slave trading, and the absence of any provision for the future of the confiscated slaves.<sup>101</sup>

To address these problems, the veteran British officer Charles George Gordon was appointed as the governor general of Sudan in February 1877. Charged with the elimination of slavery in Sudan, Gordon recruited European Christian mercenaries for this mission. However, by May 2, 1876, the Khedive's grandiose modernization projects and consequent indebtedness to his European creditors compelled Ismail to sign the decree which instituted *La Cassie de la Dette publique* (Public Debt Commission). The European representatives, including France and Russia, who compromised the Commission managed the Khedive's finances. Then, by August 1877, the British representative on the Commission, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), convinced the Khedive to sign the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention, terminating slave trading in Sudan around 1880. Soon afterwards, the Khedive's overwhelming financial issues, pressure from his European creditors and other sociopolitical issues in Egypt led to his deposition in 1879 by the Egyptian people during the Urabi revolt. Thereafter, Tewfik Pasha succeeded Ismail as the next Khedive.<sup>102</sup>

Concurrently, other European powers, such as France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, were embroiled in the scramble and quest for their spheres of influence in different parts of Africa. The popularization of the ideas of Social Darwinism, the quest for national prestige, the search for steady sources of raw materials for European industries, and the desire to facilitate European civilization in different parts of the continent were some of the factors that propelled the Great Powers' interest in the continent. Since the Urabi rebellion threatened British access to the strategically important Suez Canal that shortened the sea route between Europe and Asia, the British invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882. As historian Robinson and Gallagher explain, this conquest represented a key opening move in the European Scramble for Africa.<sup>103</sup>

Soon, British colonialism instigated widespread discontent and sociopolitical unrest in Egypt, reverberating into Sudan, compromising the Turco-Egyptian control over Khartoum, and creating a political vacuum. These events led to the rise of Muhammed Ahmed ibn Abdallah, the self-acclaimed Mahdi, the guided one, who declared Jihad against the Turco-Egyptian government in Sudan in 1881.<sup>104</sup>

The rise of jihadist movements was prevalent among African Muslim communities in the 19th century. Compared to the Sokoto Jihad of 1804, and the Masina Jihad of 1818, the Mahdist Sudanese believed in the advent of the Mahdi at the beginning of every century. They believed

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101.P.M Holt and M.W Daly, *A History of Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*. (Edinburg: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 66.

102.*Ibid*, 69. Colonel Ahmed Urabi a member of the Egyptian army spearheaded the uprising.

103. Robins and Gallagher, *Africans and the Victorian: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent*. (New York: St Martin Press, 1961)76. Thomas Pakenham *The Scramble for Africa 1876-1912* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) also examines events leading to the British conquest of Egypt and other parts of Africa.

104. Robert L. Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882-1914*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966),12-13.

that the Mahdi, a religious reformer, would be delegated with the sacred responsibility of revitalizing the faith of the Muslim community, expunging irreligious practices, and waging Jihad, a religious war, against unbelievers and political oppressors if required. Apart from the belief in the Mahdi, other sociopolitical and economic grievances instigated the Jihadists' revolution against ruling elites in the 19th century Sudan.<sup>105</sup>

In Bahr-el-Ghazal, the grievances of its inhabitants against the Khedivate's rule were caused by its permissive attitude towards autocratic rulers in their localities and worsened by the alienation of renowned merchants and slave traders from the Turco-Egyptian administration in Bahr-el-Ghazal through its antislavery policy. Therefore, the Mahdists' rise in the region allowed its disgruntled inhabitants to extricate themselves from the Khedive's regime. Eventually, by 1883, the Khedivate rule in the region became precarious as the Mahdists' supporters increased. Even the newly appointed governor of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Frank Miller Lupton, had intimations about the impending upheaval. Eventually, most of the region's regular troops were lost during battles with the Mahdi's followers. In addition, shortage of ammunition and the covert operations of spies made the Southern regions vulnerable to attacks for the Mahdist.<sup>106</sup>

Nevertheless, Turco-Egyptian forces were still deployed in different parts of Southern Sudan to mitigate the civil unrest. Unfortunately, the greatest threat to the restoration of peace and order came from the Dinka. Although the Dinka were defeated in several battles, the Khedival forces could not subdue them. Compared with Bahr-el-Ghazal merchants and slave traders, Dinkas in the territory were also affected by the sociopolitical and economic changes that happened during the Khedivate era. Their rebellions against the government forces were less influenced by religious fervour for the Mahdi but based on their aversion for the activities of Arab slave merchants and those of the Sudan government which intruded into their traditional lifestyle.<sup>107</sup> In some cases, based on their mutual benefits, the Dinka collaborated with the Mahdist forces against the government troops. Yet violent conflicts between the Dinka and jihadists were inevitable. These were some significant problems that made Bahr-el-Ghazal indefensible for the Khedives' troops amid the Mahdist uprising. Thus, on April 20, 1884, Lupton surrendered the region after ostensibly converting to Islam and was deserted by his troops. These events underlined the success of the Mahdist forces in conquering one of the three regions in Southern Sudan. By January 1885, the jihadists conquered Khartoum, leading to the evacuation of the Anglo-Egyptian forces after the death of General Charles Gordon.<sup>108</sup>

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105. Joseph. P. Smaldone, *Warfare in Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspectives*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 20. Other relevant works include Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L Pouwels, (eds.) *The History of Islam in Africa*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000) and R.A Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906: The Sokoto Caliphate and Its Enemies* (London: Longman Press, 1977).

106. Collins, *The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898*, 26-31.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Ibid.*



Despite their conquest of Bahr-el-Ghazal in 1884, the Mahdists could not control the region and other parts of the South. After the death of the Mahdi, on June 22, 1885, a council of notables elected Abd Allah Muhammed Turshain as the Khalifa Mahdi, the successor of the Mahdi. After that, Karam Allah, the Mahdist military general in Bahr-el-Ghazal and other officials were summoned to renew their oath of allegiance to the Khalifa Mahdi. In response to the summons, about 3,000 armed Mahdist troops and enslaved people were evacuated from the territory. In October 1885, while heading towards Khartoum, Karam Allah and his forces were redirected towards Darfur, where Madibbu, the Rizeigat ethnic group's chief, reluctantly acknowledged Muhammed Ibn AbdAllah as the Khalifa, the Mahdi's successor. To aggrandize his political power, Madibbu furtively orchestrated to oust and supplant the Mahdi's loyalists in Darfur, thereby controlling the border between Darfur and Bahr-el-Ghazal. In an open revolt, Madibbu's forces were defeated by Karam Allah's troops. Afterwards, the Mahdist troops from Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Khalifa made no attempt to reassert his control over the territory, but it relapsed into the pre-Turco-Egyptian situation when conflict pervaded among the local ethnic groups.<sup>109</sup>

In contrast with the foray into Bahr-el-Ghazal, the Khalifa's military campaign in the Equatoria region was more demanding as it was almost impossible to subdue its ethnic groups. Initially, and partly fomented by the success of the Dinka uprising further north in Bahr-el-Ghazal, the Agar Dinka in Rumbek instigated the uprising, causing the massacre of 70 men and officers. Also, the constant raids perpetrated by the Turco-Egyptian officials against the Dinka for cattle and slaves in Rumbek were some of the immediate causes of the Dinka's rebellion against the Turco-Egyptian forces. Eventually, the relatively calm security situation in Equatoria was interrupted in May 1884 after the region's governor Emin Pasha and other notable leaders received a letter from Mahdist leader Karam Allah. The message informed them about the conquest of Bahr-el-Ghazal and demanded that they surrender to the Mahdi. Immediately, consternation and devastation pervaded the region, causing the Khedivate officials, including the Arab merchant slavers among them, to become sympathizers of the Mahdi's jihadist movement. However, before the arrival of Karam's forces, forces loyal to the Khedive prepared for battle as garrison stations were refortified and provided with required weapons.<sup>110</sup>

As Karam prepared to conquer Equatoria and join forces with the Khalifa's supporters in the region, Southern slave-soldiers situated between Wau and Rumbek rebelled and took up arms against their masters, the Arab slavers, who were now supporters of the Mahdi. According to Collins, these Southerners harboured animosity against their masters, which was exacerbated by the inhumane treatment meted out against Southern Sudanese. Although Karam's forces defeated the Southern forces, it took Mahdist troops about six months after this encounter to focus on the conquest of Equatoria. Subsequently, Karam's forces proceeded further into the hinterland. However, their frequent victories were undermined by the innumerable challenges they encountered. The two significant bulwarks against the jihadist campaign were the steadfastness of

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109.*Ibid*, 40-53.

110.*Ibid*.

the Egyptian armed forces and the unflinching loyalty of the Equatorial battalions, mainly composed of Southerners, to the Turco-Egyptian state. Although some of them were nominal Muslims, they were less influenced by the religious belief of the Mahdists. The Equatorial battalion also shared the view that resisting the Mahdists was tantamount to defending the region not only on behalf of the Khedive but also for themselves, strengthening the Equatorial battalion's morale.<sup>111</sup>

The Mahdist's inability to conquer Southern Sudan undermined the movement's influence and coincided with France, Belgium, and Britain attempting to gain a foothold in the Upper Nile and Equatoria regions in the last decades of the 19th century. Rivalry among the colonial powers in Upper Nile culminated the Nile Fashoda Crisis, later settled after Anglo-Egyptian army defeated the Mahdist army at the Battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898, and reconquered Sudan, providing the British with some leverage over Cairo. In particular, Egyptian agriculture depended on irrigation from the Nile River, derived from the Blue and White Nile that converge at Khartoum and flow north, underlining Sudan's strategic importance.<sup>112</sup>

#### *GENESIS OF ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RULE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN*

The reconquest of Sudan ushered in the Anglo-Egyptian administration, also known as the Condominium government. Although Egypt and Great Britain had the dual responsibility of administering the reconquered territory of Sudan, the British dominated colonial administration in the Southern territories. After the reconquest of the Southern regions, the Anglo-Egyptian forces, under British general Horatio Herbert Kitchener's command, encountered the oppressed situation of the ethnic groups in the South. They had been devastated by the Mahdist forces and slave traders from the North; therefore, most Southerners were imbued with turbulent and suspicious feelings toward foreigners.<sup>113</sup>

Against this background, Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Equatoria, the three Southern regions, were viewed by the colonial authorities in Khartoum as primitive, inhabited by unruly Africans, and a region different from the Arabized Northern Sudan.<sup>114</sup> Within the context of this situation, different sociopolitical and logistical considerations encumbered the gradual implementation of Anglo-Egyptian rule in Southern Sudan. Its vast and varying geography in which ethnic groups with different customs and traditions were scattered was one of the challenges. Furthermore, the reconquest of Sudan coincided with the extension of the British colonies in different parts of Africa. On January 1901, the British conquered Bahr-el-Ghazal which was inhabited by ethnic groups such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk.<sup>115</sup>

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111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.*

113. Sudan Archive at Durham University (SAD) 77/4/180 2. *Southern Policy During the Period of the Anglo-Egyptian government of the Sudan.*

114. *Ibid.*, 2.

115. Robert Collins, *The Land Beyond the River: The Southern Sudan 1898-1918* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 79-80.

The relative conflicts and cooperation between the colonial authorities and these ethnic groups were shaped by existing sociopolitical institutions and economic activities of the autochthones. For instance, the Shilluk's centralized system of sociopolitical administration and their sedentary occupation, fishing, and cultivation made them amenable to the early influences of the colonial administration. Furthermore, Reth's recognition as the king and patrilineal ruler strengthened by its theocratic position facilitated British rule among the Shilluk. These circumstances facilitated a centralized system of administration of the Shilluk under the rulership of the Reth which promoted the preservation of their integrity despite the incursion of invaders into the Southern regions throughout the 19th century. Through the Reths, the British forestalled any form of resistance among them and facilitated early colonial administration in parts of the Upper Nile region where they were located.<sup>116</sup>

In fact, by 1903 when the Sudan Government's administrative policies in most parts of the Southern regions were still inchoate, the British were already involved in the appointment and deposition of the Reth. Thus, based on the authority of the colonial district commissioner, the Reth adjudicated all local cases which were beyond the scope of Sudan Penal Code instituted by the British in 1899. Hence, the system of colonial administration, known as indirect rule, which involved the use of traditional rulers as an intermediary between the colonial authority and people, was gradually instituted among the Shilluks.<sup>117</sup>

In contrast, the Nuer and Dinka acephalous sociopolitical structure, their transhumant traditional occupation, and the sub-division of ethnic groups among them sprawling in different parts of Southern Sudan hindered the effective colonial administration among them until after the first two decades of twentieth century. Dinka groups such as Ngok, Alor, Agar, Ciec, Gok, Atoc, Ghol, Twi, and Aliab inhabited different parts of Southern Sudan. For instance, the Ngok Dinka inhabited the northern part of the Bahr-el-Ghazal region, southern Kordofan, and the Abeyi region located on the frontier between North and Southern Sudan. Concurrently, the Aliab Dinka were predominantly located in the Southern part of Bahr-el-Ghazal.<sup>118</sup>

Similarly, the Nuer subgroups such as the Eastern Jikany, Leek, and Gawaar Nuer were scattered in the Central, Western, and Eastern parts of Southern Sudan, encompassing the Bahr-el-Gazal and Upper Nile regions.<sup>119</sup> Despite the acephalous nature of the Nuer, they revered traditional leaders known as prophets (or Kujurs) and recognized as the spear-masters among the Dinka. The Nuer prophets maintained their prosperity by performing certain religious and social functions, including dissuading groups from cattle raiding and making sacrifices with cattle for rain, good crops, fat cattle, fertile women, and victory in battle.<sup>120</sup> A subtle difference between the

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116. *Ibid.* 57

117. *The Upper Nile Province Handbook: A Report on the Peoples and Government in the Southern Sudan in 1931.* Compiled by C.A. Willis and edited by Douglas H. Johnson, (Africa World Books, 2017) 157.

118. Paul Howell et al, *The Jonglei Canal: Impact and Opportunity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 206-207.

119. Hutchison, *The Nuer Dilemma*, 24.

120. Collins, *Shadow in the Grass* 18.

sociocultural practices of both ethnic groups is that unlike the Nuer, the Dinka remained together during the wet season since pastures were available within their communities in the savannah forest. In addition, during the wet season the Dinka were less restrictive about movement and expansion compared with the Nuer.<sup>121</sup>

Until the late 1920s, the reinforcement of colonial administration over both ethnic groups, especially the Nuer, was hindered by different factors. Pritchard explains that before the advent of the Condominium period, neither the Turko-Egyptian nor the Mahdist regimes were able to conquer the regions inhabited by the Nuer. The inhospitable nature of their environment hindered communication, constraining the establishment of colonial security posts within this area. As such, this region was almost impassable for colonial administrators until the 1920s, when British engineers used dredgers to penetrate through the swampy areas of the Upper Nile known as Sudd. Even the Nuer were lackluster about travelling outside their environment, affecting their ability to converse in Arabic. Therefore, the Dinka and Anuak, whom they distrusted, often served as their interpreters and intermediaries with the colonial officials. Notwithstanding, the Nuer self-sufficiency and preoccupation with their cattle made them indifferent to the presence of the colonial authority.<sup>122</sup>

Furthermore, the scattered locations of the Nuer subgroups represented another logistical problem the British contended with during the first two decades of the 20th century. In Hutchison's view, the immediate priorities of the Condominium government among the Eastern Nuer were to checkmate the cross-border importation of arms and ammunition from Ethiopia. Consequently, the incessant hostilities between the Nuer and Anuak along the Ethiopian border had to be suppressed. Unfortunately, the government later discovered that mitigation of the conflict between these groups by disarming them escalated, rather than reduced, the proliferation of arms and ammunition in the western parts of the region. By the early 1910s, the Eastern Gajaak Nuer imported firearms from Ethiopia and bartered them for cattle with the Shilluk, Dinka, Nuba and even the Baggara Arabs, nomadic cattle herders of Arab ancestry. Concurrently, the British were preoccupied with preventing the central Nuer, Gaawar, Lak, and Thiang from making incursions into tributary Dinka communities.<sup>123</sup>

The colonial government's parsimonious attitude also affected the efficacy of its administrative policies in Southern Sudan. According to Passmore, the Sudan government's reluctance to expend human and material resources affected its ability to provide beneficial services and proffer pragmatic solutions to sociopolitical and economic problems affecting the region. In certain situations, this often led to the recalcitrant stance of Southern ethnic groups against the colonial authorities. For instance, before 1916, the Agar, Chich, and Luaich Dinka became allies of the colonial government by paying taxes. However, the government's inability to protect them from

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121. Godfrey Lienhardt, *The Western Dinka in Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in Segmentary African System* (Oxford: Routledge and Keagan, 2004), 101.

122. Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 134.

123. Hutchison, *Nuer Dilemmas*, 111-114.

incursions into their territory by the Western Nuer led to their refusal to pay their taxes. Subsequently, in 1917, an attempt to collect tax from the Agar Dinka under duress instigated a flagrant insurrection. Although the government attempted to protect the Dinka by distributing arms and ammunition among them, competition for grazing grounds and for the acquisition of cattle inevitably led to clashes between them and the Nuer or Anuak.<sup>124</sup>

#### *INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AMONG THE SOUTHERNERS AND COLONIALISM*

Not all the conflicting encounters among the ethnic groups were instigated by the advent of the colonial administration. In the 19th century, the spread of rinderpest, a cattle plague, affected pastoralists in different parts of Africa. The most well-known outbreak of rinderpest in East and Southern Africa occurred in the late nineteenth century with the spread of the disease accelerated by war as troops moved with cattle for provisions. Hitherto, the earliest cases of rinderpest were reported in 1841 when the disease infected 66500 cattle in Egypt.<sup>125</sup> Among the Nuer, the spread of rinderpest and bovine pleuro-pneumonia coincided with the invasion of their territory by the Arabs in the late 19th century. Consequently, Nuer cattle herds were constantly affected and depleted by this disease. As a recourse to this situation, they raided the Dinka's cattle.<sup>126</sup>

This situation often led to competition and strife over cattle and grazing grounds between the Nuer and Dinka. Cattle ownership was a shared economic interest between both groups used for different sociopolitical and cultural practices such as the payment of bride price, the settlement of murder cases, and other societal rituals. Thus, the competition for increasing cattle herds incessantly led to conflict between the Dinka and Nuer. Meanwhile, the British attempted to establish colonial administration in the Upper Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal regions in the first two decades of the twentieth century.<sup>127</sup>

Furthermore, ethnic groups such as Azande, Pari, Mandari, Murle, Toposa, Anuak, Acholi, and Kichepo inhabited the Equatoria region. Some of these groups sprawled into territories bordering Southern Sudan. For example, the Azande are predominantly located along the border between present-day northeastern DRC and South Sudan. Similarly, the Acholi inhabit present day Northern Uganda and Southern Equatoria. Located within the borders of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Southern Sudan, the Ilemi triangle facilitated cross-cultural influences among the ethnic groups in this region. As such, the Toposa used this opportunity to acquire arms and ammunition from Ethiopians in exchange for their ivory, and they were also engaged in pastoralism and farming.<sup>128</sup>

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124. Lilian Passmore and Neville Sanderson, *Education, Religion, and Politics in Southern Sudan 1899-1964*, (London: Ithaca Press 1981),113-114.

125. John A. Rowe and Kjell Hodnebo, "Rinderpest in the Sudan 1888-1890: The Mystery of the Missing Panzootic," *Sudanic Africa* Vol.5 (1994) 149-178. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25653249> (accessed November 2021).

126. Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 68.

127. Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*,183.

128. Pamela and P.H. Gulliver, *The Central Nilo-Hamites: East-Africa Part VII: Ethnography of Africa*. (London: Routledge, 1954), 87-88.

Thus, before the advent of the colonial administration in the Equatoria region, its ethnic groups had their own sociopolitical and economic characteristics. For instance, the pre-colonial sociopolitical structure of the Azande kingdom was rigidly stratified, and they became united by 1800. The king, a descendant of the Avungara ruling aristocracy, was at the apex of the sociopolitical structure, and chiefs in the society were also included in the Avungara ruling class, and patrilineal inheritance served as a criterion for membership into the Avungara elite group. The sociopolitical stratification between the Avungara aristocrats and the Azande commoners underlined the hierarchical organization of the society.<sup>129</sup>

However, the British conquest of the Zande region in 1904 altered the function and position of traditional chiefs in the society. Hence, the colonial officials intervened in domestic tribal affairs formerly settled by local chief undermining their authority and prestige. In these moments, Reining explains that traditional law and order in the society was supplanted by British colonial law. Brutal punishments were forbidden, local warrior groups were disbanded while their firearms were confiscated, and the use of shields was prohibited.<sup>130</sup> The Sudan government allowed local chiefs to retain some political powers and concurrently curbed their excesses. Therefore, the British administrators in the Southern regions presided over court cases formerly within the purview of traditional leaders. In some instances, senior chiefs declined to judge traditional cases because they were uncertain about their own final verdict within the context of colonial policies. As such, Azande chiefs frequently relied on colonial officials to intervene in some cases, delaying the implementation of indirect rule among the Azande until 1922.<sup>131</sup>

Similarly, prior to the establishment of the colonial administration among the Toposa in the 1930s, the local elders regulated sociopolitical activities in the society. The elders acted as advisors and regularly convened to discuss issues such as warfare, and cattle raids. New members were admitted into the elders' council through their oratory skills or age. However, the advent of colonial administration overturned this cultural practice. Hence, chief and subchief were appointed by British officials and they were delegated with the responsibility of facilitating colonial administration among the Toposa. The initial contact between the Toposa and colonial authorities in 1912 was cordial. However, several issues including the British administrator's unwillingness to commit human and material resources in taking over the Ilemi Triangle, and the intolerable nature of the hostilities between the Toposa and Longarim, affected the efficacy of colonial administration in this locality. This situation was exacerbated by conflicts over sparse grazing lands and waterholes between the Toposa and Turkana, instigating tensions between the Colonial Office and Foreign Office in London. These events coupled with the financial constraints of the colonial administration delayed the implementation of colonial policy in the Ilemi triangle.<sup>132</sup>

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129. Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, 62-63.

130. Conrad C. Reining, *The Zande Scheme: An Anthropological Case Study of Economic Development in Africa*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1966), 17.

131. *Ibid*, 19

132. Robert. O. Collins, "The Toposa Question, 1912-1927," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol.3 No.3 (1981-1982): 77-88.

One of the underlying causes of the colonial administration's budgetary constraints in the Equatoria region can be traced to London's expectation that colonial territories in Africa be economically self-sustaining. Thus, colonial officers in Southern Sudan and in other parts of the continent struggled to manage their financial resources especially in the first decade of the twentieth century apart from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast which steadily generated surpluses after 1900. Initial expenditure on colonies was directed towards administrative requirements, provision of infrastructural facilities, and security needs.<sup>133</sup> Accordingly, in the process of establishing colonial rule in Southern Sudan, the British expense surpassed income, especially in the Bahr-el-Ghazal region. In 1902, Bahr-el-Ghazal's expenditure totalled £11,573 compared with an estimated revenue of £2,500. The presence of numerous colonial officials in the region due to its vastness, and the absence of centralized political administration among the Dinka and Nuer, who were unaccustomed to paying tax, hindered the efficacy of colonial administration in Bahr-el-Ghazal in the early 19th century.<sup>134</sup> However, the Upper Nile was easier to administer due to its compactness and the centralized political institution of the Shilluks which required few colonial officials coupled with the ease of tax collection.<sup>135</sup>

From 1914 to 1918, World War I strained the human and material resources available for managing British colonies in Africa. This situation hampered the development of effective communication and transportation systems in Southern Sudan and other parts of the continent.<sup>136</sup> Thus, human portage and carriers became the significant means of transportation till the end of WWI, in the Southern regions. While using porters was expensive, it became the primary means of commuting and facilitating the duties of British officers who were arbitrators of interethnic conflicts. Sometimes, they also placated recalcitrant groups such as the Nuer, which necessitated the presence of these officers in different parts of the region.<sup>137</sup>

Against this backdrop, Collins explains that British military officers seconded from the Egyptian army or the King's African Rifles (KAR) were deployed as administrative officers in the Southern regions during the first two decades of colonial rule. Unlike the members of the political services who dominated the administration of the North and eschewed the South, military administrators, also known as Bog Barons, were preferred in the Southern region. In most situations, they ruled the Southerners independently without consulting Khartoum unless troop reinforcement was required to quell resistance in the region. Eventually, the Bog Barons' isolation in the Southern regions made them oblivious of the constant sociopolitical and economic changes in the North. These happenings widened the differences between Northern and Southern Sudan.<sup>138</sup>

#### ***COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND SOUTHERN REGIONS***

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133. Leigh Gardner, *Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 32-33.

134. Collins, *The Land Beyond the River*, 235-236.

135. *Ibid.*

136. Hew Strachan, *The First World War. Volume I: To Arms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 497.

137. Collins, *The Land Beyond the Rivers*, 238.

138. Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, 15.

The policies and influences of the colonial powers over their African territories were reinforced after WWI. By the 1920s, economic problems such as the high rate of unemployment, stagnating trade, a slump in export trade due to trade protectionist policy abroad, and rising inflation affected the economy of colonial powers including Britain. Yet, the attainment of economic self-sufficiency and secured access to raw materials and markets to export finished goods were envisaged as the solution to these problems.<sup>139</sup> This perception led to the creation of economic programs geared towards the development of the colonies. Subsequently, research and funding of tropical agriculture and better transportation facilities for cotton growing regions especially in Uganda, Sudan, and later in the 1930s in Tanganyika were encouraged.<sup>140</sup>

In Sudan, serendipitous events fomented the British investment in large-scale cotton plantations. After the Great War, the incessant political uprising against the colonial government in Egypt, a major supplier of cotton to Britain, prompted the colonial administrators in London, Khartoum, and Cairo to reassess their strategic interests in both Egypt and Sudan. In particular, the expansion of the Gezira scheme, an irrigation project aimed at harnessing the Nile waters flowing through Sudan into Egypt was prioritized to facilitate cotton production around Khartoum. British officials also focused on how to mitigate Egyptian influences in Sudan's administration since most of Egypt's nationalist leaders were keen on attaining self-government both for Cairo and Khartoum. In addition, the Milner Report of 1920 proffered that the creation of native administration, also known as indirect rule, involving the use of traditional rulers as proxies between the local population and colonial administrators, should be established in Northern Sudan. Within the British empire, the proclivity for the native administration was based on the efficacy of Lord Lugard's indirect rule system of administering in Northern Nigeria.<sup>141</sup>

Furthermore, the 1920 Report recommended that the Southern regions should be separated from Northern Sudan, and all forms of Muslim influences should be eradicated from the former. Members of the Milner Report committee also suggested that a nexus should be initiated between Southern Sudan and other British East-Central African colonies such as Uganda to create a Central African Federation controlled by the British.<sup>142</sup> One of the underlying rationales behind this policy was based on the impact of the Mahdi era in Southern Sudan which led to the decimation of its ethnic groups. Upon the reconquest of the region, the British perceived that the Southerners were still in the Dark Ages. Against this background, restoration, and civilization of the region became the main objectives of the British administrators spearheaded by the Bog Barons.<sup>143</sup>

By 1922, the Bog Barons were formally granted direct territorial responsibility over the South; thereafter, they were given the title of District Commissioner (DC). Countering the spread

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139. E.A Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Changes 1919-1939*. (London: Heinemann Publishers, 1973), 117-123.

140. *Ibid.*

141. P.M Holt and M.W Daly, *A History of The Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day* (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2000),110-122.

142. *Ibid.*

143. *Ibid.*



of Islamic influences and facilitating the traditional culture of Southern Sudanese were major considerations that guided the administrative policies of the Barons. The DCs' policies were also determined by contemporaneous events such as the agitation for Sudan independence by Ali Abd al-Latif, a Dinka army officer who founded the White Flag League, a nationalist resistance movement, with financial assistance from Egypt. The League championed Sudanese independence and clamored for unity between Cairo and Khartoum, an anathema to the British political and economic interest in Sudan. Southern Muslims spearheaded the League's political activism making the colonial officials concerned about the percolating influences of Islam in the South.<sup>144</sup>

One of the initial measures taken to prevent the activities of Egyptians and Northern Muslims in the Southern regions was the Passport and Permit Ordinance of October 1922. Without this Permit, Northerners and Egyptians were restrained from traveling into the Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria and other adjacent regions which were declared as *Closed Districts*. Under certain circumstances, even if the permit was granted to non-Southerners, the governor-general had the right to withdraw or cancel such privileges at any time. The Ordinance was also intended to discourage the movement of migrant labor from the South to the North as prospective Northern employers were required to deposit at least one pound and a maximum of one hundred and fifty pounds before the permits were issued to prospective Southern employees. The implementation of the Ordinance coupled with the closed districts was intended to serve as a recourse to two major administrative challenges confronted by the DCs in the early 1920s.<sup>145</sup>

#### ***CLOSED DISTRICT ORDINANCE IN THE SOUTHERN REGIONS***

The first reason for implementation of the Ordinance was the insecurity along the borders of the South while the second pertained to the development of Native administration within the region. In addition, the internal security within the Southern regions was dependent upon security along its borders through which interlopers penetrated the South as poachers and slave raiders. Occasionally, recalcitrant ethnic groups such as the Eastern Nuer crossed into Ethiopia, through Southern Sudan's eastern border, to seek refuge from the punitive measures of the colonial administration.<sup>146</sup> As a means of curbing some of these problems, the Bog Barons were inclined towards the Native administration policy and buttressed by their perception that each of the ethnic groups, within each district under their jurisdiction, had their peculiar custom and tradition, requiring special attention and care for their development.<sup>147</sup>

Another factor that spurred the implementation of indirect rule in Southern Sudan was that before its implementation in the 1920s, the DCs were inundated by direct consultation from the people on issues about judicial, executive, and legislative matters which became perplexing. These proceedings compromised the functions of traditional institutions and leaders. Alternatively, the

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144. *Ibid.*

145. M. Abdel Rahim, *The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan 1899-1947* Middle Eastern Studies Volume 2, No.3 (April 1966): 227-249.

146. Collins *Shadows in The Grass*, 20-60.

147. *Ibid.*

introduction of the native administration served to revamp the position of traditional leaders, within the context of the colonial administration, and to give colonial officials some respite from local administrative duties. Furthermore, Passmore argues that by 1924, the Barons became suspicious of political influences from the North due to the political agitation from members of the White Flag League and the assassination of General Lee Stack, the governor-general of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.<sup>148</sup> In the DCs' views, the institutionalization of the indirect rule policy coupled with the Passport Permit Ordinance would serve as a bulwark against the spread of Northern Islamic influences among the Southerners.<sup>149</sup>

Colonial officials' concerns about the spread of Northern Islamic influences in the South were not unfounded. In the Equatoria region, especially in Central Equatoria, the northern merchants and travelers were scattered among the Toposa, Didinga, and Longarim. Moreover, in urban areas such as Juba, the presence of Muslim traders and other Arabic speakers was conspicuous. Similarly, in Wau, located in western Bahr-el-Ghazal, its Egyptian officials were part of the city's administration and facilitated Islamic influences by 1910. The Jellaba and Fellata were the two types of Arab merchants in the city. Before the advent of the condominium government, the Jellaba were pioneers of the slave trade in Wau. Despite the British presence in the region, they were still involved in slave trading activities. The Fellata were another group of Northern traders in Wau. Originally, they were West African immigrants, mostly Hausas, who had crossed into Sudan while they traveled for the pilgrimage to Mecca and eventually settled in the city. Their proficiency as agriculturalists and gardeners made their cultural influences in Wau prevalent.<sup>150</sup> Similarly in Malakal, the large presence of Northern Sudanese employed by the Egyptian Irrigation Department often intimidated the Southerners. Egyptian cultural activities in the region was often challenged by the British officials.<sup>151</sup>

Despite these challenges, indirect rules was gradually instituted in the Southern regions from the early 1920s. Although the egalitarian nature of Dinka and Nuer societies hindered the progress of the new administrative policy, the development of chiefly courts was encouraged in Bahr-el-Ghazal by 1922.<sup>152</sup> In the Upper Nile region, inhabited by an amalgam of Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk and other ethnic groups, the efficacy of the native policy was relative. For instance, the hierarchical structure of the Shilluk's traditional organization facilitated the recognition and appointment of the Reth as the intermediary between the colonial officials and the people. In contrast, among the Nuer and Dinka institutionalization of the policy was problematic.<sup>153</sup>

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148. Passmore, 125-126.

149. *Ibid.*

150. Sudan Open Archive (SOA) Stefano Santandrea *A Popular History of Wau Bahr-el-Ghazal Sudan: From its Foundation to about 1940*. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=NBD19770000-01.1.1&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-Stefano+Santandrea+-----> (accessed November, 2021).

151. Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, 174.

152. Passmore, 123.

153. Douglas H. Johnson (ed) *The Upper Nile Province Handbook: A Report on Peoples and Government in the Southern Sudan* 155.

For all the early challenges the Anglo-Egyptian administration encountered in the Equatoria region, the native administrative policy was amenable among the Azande. Thus, by the mid-1920s, the DCs were gradually relieved from the burden of presiding over local court cases through the establishment of informal courts, moderated by a rotating panel of chiefs charged with duties of collecting taxes and selecting laborers for government works. Yet the bureaucratic nature of these duties led to a situation whereby chiefs and subchiefs were given the freedom to hold private court sessions in their homes; nonetheless, the executive and legislative powers of the chiefs were circumscribed by the DC's supervision of their activities. For example, the method of tax collection was based on the chief's discretion; however, the amount of taxes remitted by the chief to the colonial government was determined by the DC. Nevertheless, the indirect rule system reinforced the chief's traditional position in the society as the nexus between the people and colonial administration.<sup>154</sup>

### *EVANGELICAL MISSIONARIES AND THE SOUTHERN POLICY*

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the evangelical activities of Christian missionaries had an indelible impact on sociopolitical change in Africa. From the end of the 19th century, missionaries in different parts of Sub-Saharan Africa facilitated their evangelical venture through expeditions into the hinterland, the campaign against the slave trade, the creation of mission posts and the spread of western education.<sup>155</sup> The humanitarian activities of the missionaries coincided with the colonial powers' invasion and conquest of Africa. Moreover, the fact that all colonial powers were Christian countries reinforced the evangelical activities of the missionaries in many European colonies in Africa. Nonetheless, Christian missionaries' evangelical activities were not always supported by the colonial administration, such as in Northern Nigeria where they were viewed as potentially destabilizing indirect rule through the Muslim emirs.<sup>156</sup>

After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan in 1898-1899, different Christian denominations and their respective missionary movements such as the Catholic Verona Fathers' Mission based in Rome, the American United Presbyterian Mission, and other evangelical societies established their presence in the Southern regions. To avoid conflict among them, the colonial government allotted each of these missions an area to operate under the 'sphere system'. As such, each of these religious denominations was granted the freedom to operate within specific regions in the South.<sup>157</sup>

By the early twentieth century, the colonial government in Sudan encouraged the evangelical activities of Christian missionaries in the South for two main reasons. Firstly, their presence in the region would facilitate administrative convenience through the creation of missionary schools wherein clerks and other essential skilled laborers needed by the administration would be trained.

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154. Reining, *The Zande Scheme*, 105-110.

155. Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present*, (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1995), 219.

156. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 71-72.

157. David Joseph Sconyers, *British Policy and Mission Education in The Southern Sudan 1928-1946*, Ph.D. Dissertation University of Pennsylvania 1978, 106.

This measure would also assist the Condominium government to manage its meagre financial resources in the South as it would not have to fund education. The second rationale was based on the consideration that missionaries' presence in the region would serve as a buffer against the spread of Muslim influences and Islamic culture in the South.<sup>158</sup>

Although the missionary movements were rivals for coverts, they closed ranks against the spread of Islam among the Southerners through the presence of Northern Sudanese troops, Muslim traders, and the Arabic language. By the early 1900s, the colonial authorities took several measures to allay the missionaries' misgivings about the encroaching influences of Muslims in the South. This measure led to the formation of a contingent of Southern soldiers known as the Equatorial Corps in 1913 which replaced the Northern Sudanese troops as the garrison of the South in 1917.<sup>159</sup>

Subsequently, the missionaries were given free rein to facilitate their educational programs in the South. However, this decision was overturned by the colonial government in the mid-1920s leading to the government's adopting an interventionist role in supporting missionary schools' activities. The Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1922 on educational development in West and Southern Africa influenced the government decision. Based on the Commission's report, missionary education would be supported through grant-in-aid while supervised by the government. Furthermore, in the 1920s the need to reinforce the native policy among the Southerners influenced the colonial government's interventionist role in missionary education. This idea was based on the premise that the success of native policy depended on the availability of clerks who were literate in their local languages. Therefore, educational schemes in the South would have an impact on the progress of native administration as well.<sup>160</sup>

#### ***POST-WAR YEARS AND SOCIOPOLITICAL REFORMATION IN THE SOUTHERN REGIONS***

The Rejaf Conference of 1928 convened to crystallize the cooperation between the government and missionaries on educational development. One of the main objectives of the conference was the eradication of the Arabic language from the Southern regions. To achieve this end, a list of languages among the Southerners was compiled and classified.<sup>161</sup> Participants at the conference, including missionaries, and colonial officials, agreed that the best languages suitable as medium of instruction should be selected for use in schools, a guideline for standard orthography among the southerners should be provided, and research should be undertaken regarding the possibilities of producing local textbooks and standard primers. Based on these policies, the colonial government facilitated the native administrative policy through the instrumentality of educational development.<sup>162</sup>

Two years after the conference, Harold McMichael, the civil secretary of the Anglo-Egyptian government, formalized the implementation of the native policy now recognized as the Southern

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158.Collins, *The Land Beyond the Rivers*, 310.

159.*Ibid*, 177-178.

160.Passmore, 131.

161.*Ibid*, 160.

162.*Ibid*.

Policy. Compared to the Passport and Permit Ordinance, the Southern Policy reaffirmed the native administration by preserving traditional institutions and expelling Northern and Islamic influences from the South. However, its promulgation in 1930 coincided with the gradual rise of the nationalist movement in Khartoum. At this point, the intelligentsia in the North regarded the Southern Policy as an epitome of the British divide and rule colonial strategy, which severed the ties between the North and South. Moreover, the use of traditional leaders, an integral feature of the native policy, while the educated elites were ostracized was one of the main criticisms against the colonial government.<sup>163</sup>

Meanwhile, the Great Depression of the 1930s followed by the outbreak of World War II (1939-1945) affected the Sudan government's further interest in educational development in the Southern regions. From 1930 to 1933, Khartoum's revenue from cotton dropped by nearly 25 percent from 4.7 to 3.6 million pounds due to the slump in cotton prices in the international market. Consequently, this affected the Condominium government's expenditure on educational development in the South. Moreover, the Southern regions were in a dire economic situation. In the late 1920s droughts, floods, and locusts compounded by the fall in commodity prices by 1930 affected the DCs' attempts to facilitate cash-crop production. Inevitably, these events affected the colonial government attempt to finance educational development in Southern Sudan.<sup>164</sup>

Rather than suspending its plans for educational development in the Southern regions, the colonial administration of Sudan tacitly divested this responsibility to the missionaries with minimal interference. Accordingly, the development of Southern education now focused on building the moral character of the Southerners based on the missionaries' belief in their ordained role as the moral proctor of the people. In Collins' view, most Southern schools were administered by the Verona Fathers but their limited grasp of English hampered the progress of educational development. However, the advent of WWII hampered attempts to recruit British teachers to improve the quality of instruction and undermined efforts to acquire building materials and facilities for the teacher training institutes. Moreover, wartime inflation reduced the value of grant-in-aid provided by the government to the missionaries. Despite these obstacles, the missionaries still played a frontline role in the preservation of the Southern Policy.<sup>165</sup>

The end of the Second World War triggered unprecedented sociopolitical and economic changes in African colonies and different parts of the world. These events gradually weakened the control European powers had over their colonies on the continent. Thus, around 1945, the British parliament, based on the recommendations of the commission for Development and Welfare of colonies, changed its colonial policies during the post war years. Initially, the commission focused on the causes of discontent and unrest within the British colonies in the West Indies in 1938.

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163.Collins, *Shadow Under the Grass*, 174.

164. Passmore, 175. Another work that provides a detailed account of how the Great Depression impacted colonial rule is Moses Ochonu's *Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression* (Ohio: Ohio University Press 2009).

165.Collins, 229-230.

Afterwards, the colonial administrators agreed that the promoting of social welfare and economic development of colonial territories would become the leitmotif of British colonial policy.<sup>166</sup>

Before the enactment of the Development and Welfare Act, India's agitation against British colonial rule, from the 1920s to 1947, challenged the ethical appraisal of colonialism in Africa. Within the context of these events, the publication of the Atlantic Charter in 1942 which focused on the right of self-government became the mantra of trade union and nationalist leaders against the dominance of colonial rule.<sup>167</sup> Against this background, the surge in urban workforce and rising inflation in many cities affected the working-class standard of living during the post-war years. Thus, cities such as Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia and Enugu in Nigeria were impacted by the expanding urbanization expanded during the war.<sup>168</sup> As such, these localities became the epicenter of trade unionism and strikes as workers clamored for better working conditions while they struggled with economic hardship in the post-war years.<sup>169</sup>

Cities in Southern Sudan were also impacted by the urbanization and economic hardship during the post-war years. At the outbreak of the war in 1939, the shortage of British personnel, compelled the colonial administrators to recruit Northern Sudanese for administrative and other miscellaneous duties in the South.<sup>170</sup> Thus, Southern towns and cities such as Malakal became melting pots of African and Arab cultures where government officials from the South and North interacted with each other. The implementation of the Southern Policy had always been a worrisome issue for Malakal's officials. Its proximity to the North, and the innumerable presence of northern traders and Egyptians made it difficult to forestall Islamic cultural influences from the region.<sup>171</sup> Eventually, the presence of wealthy Arab merchants in Malakal followed by a surge in the price of essential commodities underlined the socioeconomic differences between the Northerners and Southerners, instigating the March 25, 1943, strike by the staff of the Malakal Hospital. These events underlined the socio-economic chasm between the North and South.<sup>172</sup>

#### ***THE NEW DEAL FOR THE SOUTH***

Sir Douglas Newbold, the Civil Secretary of the Sudan government (1939-1945), expressed his interest in implementing a series of New Deal policies in the North and South. The

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166. James S Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971). 230-231. John Flint's "Planned Decolonization and Its Failure in British Africa" *African Affairs* Vol.82 No.328 (Jul.1983)389-411. This article highlights some of the causes of decolonization of European colonies in Africa before and after the World Wars, leading to the emergence of new African political elites who supplanted colonial officials during decolonization period.

167. *Ibid.*

168. Terence Ranger, *Bulawayo Burning: The Social History of A Southern African City 1893-1960* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2010), 149.

169. Carolyn A. Brown, *To Be Treated As A Man: Wartime Struggles Over Masculinity, Race, and Honor in The Nigerian Coal Industry in Africa and World War II* edited by Judith Byfield et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 281.

170. Raphael Koba Badal, *British Administration in Southern Sudan* PhD thesis (University of London 1977).

171. Collins, *Shadow Under the Grass*, 418.

172. *Ibid.*

Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and the Atlantic Charter of 1942 were the underlying basis of Newbold's New Deal policies in the South. These policies focused on the removal of the barriers between the North and South, the creation of a new native administrative structure which would encompass higher education, and legislative and provincial councils; hence, the Southern policy was gradually reversed.<sup>173</sup> Newbold's interest in revamping the structure and objective of educational development in the Southern regions led to termination of the missionaries' control over it. The new objective in Southern regions was to make Southerners self-reliant through education and economic development.<sup>174</sup>

Meanwhile, economic projects such as the Zande Scheme exemplified attempts to revitalize the Southern economy. Conceived by Dr J.D. Tothill, the former Director of the Sudan Department of Agriculture, the scheme was intended to serve as a springboard for the socioeconomic development of the Azande people. The ideas for the project were initiated in 1943 and commenced in 1946 with about £1,000,000 earmarked for its development from 1946 to 1951.<sup>175</sup> The success of the Gezira cotton scheme in the North served as a model for the project. The main objective of the scheme was to make the Azande community economically self-sufficient by encouraging each family to practice crop-rotation. Thus, cotton would be cultivated in rotation with subsistent food crops. The Equatorial Projects Board (EPB) organized and managed the project.<sup>176</sup>

Simultaneously, in Khartoum, the low standard of living among the surging urban workforce worsened the discontent against the colonial government of Sudan. This situation led to agitation for better conditions of services by labor and trade union groups and the growth of nationalist movement in the north. The most proactive nationalist group that spearheaded the quest for Sudan's independence was the Graduates General Congress (GCC) which was established in February 1938. By 1942, the GCC published its memorandum, consisting of four main agendas focused on the future of Sudan's relations with the British. Firstly, Sudan's right to self-determination immediately after the war topped the nationalists' demands. The second request focused on amalgamating Southern and Northern Sudan by removing barriers and restrictions between both regions, improving the standard of education, and ending the subventions to Christian schools. The third demand focused on government modernization, including creating a representative body in charge of budget and ordinance approval. The last issue underlined the importance of the Sudanization agenda, which meant the relinquishment of British control of different aspects of Sudanese society to Sudanese, such as the civil service.<sup>177</sup>

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173. K.D.D Henderson C.M.G, *The Making of Modern Sudan: The Life and Letters of Sir Douglas Newbold K.B.E of The Political Service Governor of Kordofan 1932-1938, Civil Secretary 1939-1945*. (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1953), 348.

174. Collins, *Shadow Under the Grass*, 242-243.

175. William Hance, *The Zande Scheme in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Economic Geography* Vol. 31 No.2. (1955), 149-156.

176. Collins, *Shadow Under the Grass*, 316-317.

177. Peter Woodward, *Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism*, (London: Rex Colling Limited, 1979), 23-24.

Until 1946, when the Northern nationalists demanded the transformation of the Advisory Council into a legislative forum, the colonial administrators were unconcerned about this issue due to the exigencies of the war. Eventually, the focus on this demand rekindled questions about the level of the Southerners' preparedness, compared with the Northern nationalists, to participate in the legislative council. Thus, the Sudan colonial government faced the dilemma of whether Southern representatives should be included in the council thereby allowing the South to be part of the united Sudan, or should they be excluded from the council until they were politically matured enough to engage in legislative deliberations. Another option considered was to integrate the Southern Sudan with its southeastern neighbors of Kenya and Uganda. The British indecisiveness reflected their confusion about the Southerners' unpreparedness for self-government.<sup>178</sup>

Thereafter, on January 8, 1947, the Sudan Administrative Conference convened in Khartoum during which the possibility of Southern participation in the proposed legislative council was discussed. After being informed about this development, the Southern colonial administrators expressed their concerns to the Sudan government about the unpreparedness of the Southern Sudanese. As a solution to this problem, the administrators suggested that in the South an Administrative Conference for the Southerners composed of the colonial officials, Northern Sudanese and at least ten Southerners should be convened based on the assumption that the South and North will be united. In addition, the Southern administrators suggested that feasible means of facilitating the political development in the South aimed at making the Southerners equally as prepared as their Northern counterparts in engaging in political discussions concerning their future should be discussed at the conference. At this point, the pace of sociopolitical and economic development in the North and South were worlds apart. Therefore, the DC's and other colonial administrators in the South had reservations about the participation of the Southerners in the conference.<sup>179</sup>

#### ***CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH***

In the North, the establishment of the Gezira cotton-growing scheme in the 1920s became a significant source of revenue for the Sudan government which encouraged the region's socioeconomic development. However, in the South, until the development of the Zande Scheme, which later floundered, factors such as the territory's peculiar geography, its recalcitrant ethnic groups, its subsistence economy, and the restrictive nature of the Southern Policy hampered the possibilities of expanding the economy. Thus, compared with the surplus budget of the North, that of the South was mostly in a deficit.<sup>180</sup> Moreover, a distinct administrative policy for the Southerners would compromise the British relationship with the Umma party. In the late 1940s, despite the disparities between the Umma and the National Union Party (NUP), the two main

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178. Robert Collins, *Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2006), 59.

179. *Ibid.*, 60.

180. Robert Collins, *Pounds and Piastres: The Beginning of Economic Development in The Southern Sudan* NorthEast African Studies: Vol.5 No.1 (1983) 39-55.



parties in the North, they were united against any form of special privilege or safeguard granted to the South. Formed in 1945, the Umma party was headed by Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, son of the 19th-century Mahdi, until his death in 1961. The Umma and its core members in the North campaigned for Sudan's independence while its archrival NUP, created in 1952, and its loyalists clamored for the unification of Egypt and Sudan.<sup>181</sup>

Towards the early 1950s, the presence of colonial officials in the Southern region became the only safeguard against the impending domination of the North over the South. Nevertheless, Khartoum wanted to extend its sociopolitical influence over the South as a means of preserving Sudanese government control over resources in the Southern regions including the Nile River. Moreover, compared to Southern Sudan's backwater situation, socioeconomic development in the North throughout the colonial period provided Khartoum with the human resources to administer the Southern territories in the post-colonial period. To forestall this possibility, Ranald Boyle, the Southern region's District Commissioner suggested that the Southern representatives, due to their political naiveté, should be enlightened about issues such as the Sudanization policy, and the functions of a legislative assembly where they would serve as the representatives of the South.<sup>182</sup>

Eventually, these issues were mooted at the Juba conference from June 12 to 13 of 1947 and chaired by James Wilson Robertson, the Civil Secretary. The attendees also included the colonial administrators of the Southern regions, seventeen Southern chiefs, and colonial government officials, and six prominent Northern delegates. On the first day of the conference, the Southerners conceded to the Northerners' demand for a united Sudan, however, they insisted on a separate advisory council until the South was prepared to participate in the legislative assembly in the future. During the next meeting, Robertson criticized the mutual suspicion which pervaded between Northerners and Southerners. In these moments, the Northerners suspected the Southerners of intending to separate from the North. Concomitantly, the Southerners' mistrust of the Northerners was based on the Northern delegates' intimation about Khartoum's determination to dominate the Southerners.<sup>183</sup>

Nevertheless, at the conference, two major decisions precipitated the British decision to unite the North and South in subsequent years. The first focused on the debate on whether the Southerners should send their representatives to the proposed legislative assembly. According to Collins, the Southern representatives argued about this issue on the first day until they were coerced and threatened by Judge Shingeiti, a representative from the North, to acknowledge that Southern representatives would be participating in the new legislative assembly. By 15 December

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181. Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of the Sudan's Civil Wars: Old Wine and New Wars* (New York: Boydell and Brewer Inc, 2016), 24.

182. *Ibid.* During the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) Ranald Boyle's son Fergus Boyle worked with Save the Children UK in Bahr-el-Ghazal region. He is currently a member of the Rift Valley Institute which is a non-profit organization operating in East and Central African countries, including Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Democratic Republic of Congo.

183. Francis M. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 88-89.

1948, the Sudan's first legislative council convened with thirteen nominated members representing the South.

### *From the Legislative Assembly to the Insurrection of 1955*

While the inauguration of the legislative assembly became the nexus between Northern and Southern Sudanese, their divergent postures towards different policies underlined the impending tensions between them. The parliamentarians from Khartoum focused on the attainment of self-government for Sudan, whereas the Southerners tabled issues related to the rapid development of the South; therefore, the legislative assembly became a house divided against itself. Reports from the South reached its representatives, during the legislative recess, about how the Southerners were scorned by the Northerners, exacerbating the tense situation in the parliament. In Albino's view, many Southerners vented their grievances by urging their "representatives to inform the government that they preferred to join East Africa."<sup>184</sup>

However, the Southern parliamentarians advised against this move but instead, they demanded both rapid development and autonomy of the Southern regions. Henceforth, the Southern parliamentarians advocated for a federal system, through which the Southerners could retain their autonomy in the assembly and serve as a safeguard against Northern domination. However, the Khartoum delegates' opposition to this proposal compromised the realization of self-government for the Southerners through peaceful means. By March 26, 1951, this situation came to a climax when a Constitution Commission was delegated with the responsibility of advising the Governor-General on steps to facilitate the attainment of self-government by Sudan. Both Diu, the Southern delegate in the Commission, touted the idea of a federal constitution, but the Northern delegates rejected it. Afterward, Diu withdrew his membership from the commission thereby leaving the Northerners and the British officials to determine the future of the South within the context of a united Sudan. The Southern Sudanese Political Party, later known as the Liberal Party, was formed in the same year.<sup>185</sup>

Subsequently, Sudan was granted the right of self-government through the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953. However, the exclusion of the Southerners from this Agreement fomented their distrust and suspicion against the North. Moreover, there were no safeguards for the Southerners against the possibility of domination by the Northerners. According to Albino, this situation crystallized and increased the political consciousness in the Southern regions. Under the flagship of the Liberal Party, formed after Diu withdrew from the Constitution Commission, the Southerners contested the Federal election of 1953. They were granted 22 out of 97 seats while the northern-based NUP, with 51 out of 97 seats, won most of the seats in the House of Assembly.<sup>186</sup>

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184. Oliver Albino, *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint* (Oxford: University Press Glasgow, 1970), 30.

185. *Ibid.*

186. Collins *A History of Modern Sudan*, 62-63.

### *THE SOUTHERN MUTINY*

The next major step in facilitating self-government in Sudan was the creation of the Sudanization committee. Constituted in February 1954, the Northerners dominated the committee. Unfortunately, the abrupt and reckless way the NUP government handled the Sudanization program reinforced the Southerners' fear of domination by the Northerners as they dominated civil service positions in the South.<sup>187</sup> Consequently, members of the Liberal Party held a meeting at Malakal where more than 300 Southerners demanded that Southern officials should be promoted to better positions. Yet, the Sudanization policy continued in the South without consideration for the Southerners' outcry. Meanwhile, these events galvanized tensions in the South which culminated in the Torit Mutiny of August 18, 1955. Members of the Equatorial Corps, based in the South, spearheaded the mutiny since they were affected by the Sudanization policy. Since its establishment in 1910, English-speaking and Christian British officers commanded the Corps rank-and-file who were mostly Southern Sudanese. In Collin's view, the replacement of the British with Northern officers amid the Sudanization process worried the Southern troops who comprised the Corps. Moreover, the Northern officers who replaced the British were ignorant about the Southern regions and inexperienced in dealing with the Corps members.<sup>188</sup>

Four days before the fateful mutiny, No. 2 Company of the Corps, based in Torit situated in the Equatoria, was ordered to redeploy North to commemorate the departure of British troops from Sudan. However, the arrest of Lieutenant M.T Taffeng, a Southern member of the Corps, confirmed the Southern troops' suspicions about their redeployment to the North. Before his arrest, Taffeng disclosed that orders from Khartoum to move Corps members from their base to the North was a stratagem, that would lead to their deaths and the execution of their families. However, Poggo argues that the underlying rationale for the redeployment of Southern forces to the North was to thwart the possibility of an uprising in the Southern regions which could degenerate into its secession from Khartoum.<sup>189</sup>

The First Sudan Civil War 1955-1972 broke out just before Sudan became independent on January 1, 1956. In the Equatoria region, the epicenter of the uprisings, the Corps members attacked the Northern officials and merchants. Throughout the first morning of the uprising, the Corps members disrupted communication with Torit. These incidents recurred in proximate regions such as Kapoeta, Yei, Lainya, Maridi, and Yambio.<sup>190</sup> Moreover, a month before the Southern corps mutinied, 300 Southern textile workers were dismissed from the Equatoria Project Board cotton mill while the Northerners took over the administrative positions from the British and other foreign workers. These incidents worsened the tensions between Northerners and Southerners. Compared with the situation in the Equatoria region, Upper Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal were relatively stable. Although a few violent incidents occurred in Malakal and Wau, these events

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187. *Ibid.*

188. *Ibid.*

189 *Ibid.*

190. Institute of Commonwealth Studies *British Documents on The End of the Empire: Sudan Series B Volume 5* edited by Douglas H. Johnson (London: The Stationary Office, 1998), 427.

were effectively handled by government officials in these areas. Overall, the disturbances in the Southern territories marked the commencement of Southerners' quest for independence.<sup>191</sup>

## CONCLUSION

From the beginning of the Turko-Egyptian rule in the 19th century to the end of the Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan in 1956, the presence of external forces determined the course of events in Southern Sudan. The timeline of these events reflected how the sociopolitical and economic development in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria regions reflected the changes from the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. The presence of the Turko-Egyptians in the Southern regions in the 19th century coincided with the gradual decline of slave trade in Africa. While Khedive Ismail attempt to satisfy European demands to end human trafficking in the Southern regions, this venture was challenged by the Khartoumers, Turks, and Arabs interested in the slave trade.

By the late 19th century, when the Mahdists toppled the Turco-Egyptian rule in Khartoum, these occurrences determined the course of events in the South. The short-lived presence of the jihadist movement in the Southern territories reflected the relative lack of Muslim influence among Southerners. While some Southerners became allies of the Jihadists, others fought against them in the South. These events caused the Mahdists' failure to conquer the entire Southern territory.

Subsequently, the Mahdists' defeat by the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898 opened a new chapter in Southern Sudan's history. Although the combined forces of Britain and Egypt reconquered Sudan and Southern Sudan from the Jihadist forces, the British dictated the policies of the Condominium government until the end of the colonial administration in both regions in 1955. The British encountered different vicissitudes during the fifty-seven years of their colonial rule in the Southern regions. Until the late 1920s, the encounters between the British and the Southerners were either amicable or confrontational which were determined by factors such as the structure of pre-colonial traditional institutions and the economic activities of the Dinka, Nuer, Azande and other ethnic groups. Financial constraints also affected the effectiveness of the British colonial administration in Southern Sudan.

After the Great War in 1918, the Condominium government reinforced its sociopolitical and economic influences on Southern Sudan fomented by both the impact of the Great Depression and the early involvements of Southerners in protest against the colonial administration. Afterwards, the Southern Policy became instituted among the Southerners aimed at curtailing and eradicating Islamic influences among them. The policy also served as a means of preserving the cultural peculiarities and traditional institutions of the Southerners. The Bog Barons, British colonial administrators based in the Southern regions, and the Christian missionaries influenced the

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191. Storrs McCall and Lam Akol, *The Genesis and Struggle of the Anya-Nya in Southern Sudan* (Milton Keynes: Africa World Books Limited, 2020), 5-10.

implementation and preservation of the Southern Policy which promoted the spread of English language and Christianity.

After the Second Civil War, the re-evaluation of the British colonial policies, sociopolitical and economic changes in Southern cities such as Malakal, and Khartoum's vehement agitation for self-government led to the termination of the Southern Policy. Hence, the reunification of the North and South, and the revitalization of the Southern economy were prioritized by the British. The realization that the pace of sociopolitical and economic development in the North outstripped that of the South worried the British administrators in Sudan especially the Bog Barons. Even the Southerners had misgivings about their reunification with the Northerners and involvement in the new legislative assembly. The exclusion of the Southerners from the February 12, 1953 Agreement which granted Sudan the right of self-government confirmed the South's forebodings about the post-colonial years. Subsequent events such as the domination of the legislative assembly by the Northerners, the abrupt Sudanization policy in the South, and the Torit mutiny of 1955 led to the beginning of the struggle for Southern autonomy during the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972).

## CHAPTER TWO

### *THE FIRST SUDANESE CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH (1955-1972)*

#### INTRODUCTION

From 1955, Southern Sudan became the epicenter of the First Sudanese Civil War between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Southern rebel forces. Unavoidably, the war affected the Southern regions, widening the disparities between Northerners and Southerners. In 1964, Khartoum expelled Christian missionaries, progenitors of humanitarian projects in Southern Sudan, worsening the catastrophic impacts of the civil war in Southern Sudan. These incidents prompted the interventionist roles of the World Council of Churches (WCC), an international ecumenical aid organization, and its counterparts to assist the Southerners, revamping the operations and influences of religious humanitarian groups among Southern Sudanese.

Based on these occurrences, this chapter critically examines events leading up to the First Civil War that broke out the year before Sudan's independence in 1956 caused by the sociopolitical differences and prejudice between Northern and Southern Sudanese. Disputes over the adoption of a federal constitution, the proscription on religious activities in the Southern regions coupled with the Abboud regime's imposition of Islamization and Arabization policies on the Southerners aggravated their grievances against Khartoum. Accordingly, this chapter shows that these events spurred the exodus of Southerners into neighbouring countries, galvanizing the creation of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), the Southerners' political group and the Sudan Church Association (SCA) positioned to provide relief assistance to Southern refugees in neighboring countries. This development underlines the genesis of the collaborative relationship between relief agencies and rebel groups in Southern Sudan.

During the First Civil War, amid the upheaval in the Southern regions, political parties such as the Southern Front (SF) and prominent Southern Sudanese politicians including Clement Mboro, Abel Alier, Joseph Oduho, Aggrey Jaden, and Joseph Lagu became involved in addressing various political issues affecting the Southerners. The fellowship of these Southern politicians became compromised over issues such as ethnic rivalry, the quest for political power, and opposing views about the relationship between Northern and Southern Sudan. This chapter highlights and examines these problems based on the Southern politicians' participation in the ineffectual Roundtable Conference of 1965.

The last two sections of the chapter focus on key events that highlight the emerging and eventually indispensable roles of humanitarian groups in Southern Sudan. From the mid-1960s Khartoum magnified its hardline policies against the Southerners, coinciding with the revitalization of the Southern insurgency led by Joseph Lagu. Within the context of these events, the impacts of the Congo Crisis (1960-1965) and the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of 1967 on the resurgence of Lagu's forces are evaluated. The activities of the Southern fighters were further reinforced by logistical support provided by Caritas International and Verona Fathers, Catholic NGOs based in Europe. The final section of this chapter critically analyzes the key roles of WCC,

Lutheran World Federation (LWF), German Caritas, and Oxfam in resolving the seventeen-year civil war. These mostly religious NGOs collaborated with their secular counterparts in implementing relief and rehabilitation programs among the Southerners.

### *Preclude to the First Civil War in Southern Sudan*

The decolonization of many African countries started in the 1950s and by the 1960s most of these countries gained independence from their European colonizers. Nevertheless, unresolved sociopolitical and economic issues since the colonial era including the arbitrary division of African borders, uneven economic development, and disunity among ethnic groups, led to civil war and secessionist movements. Unavoidably, these problems compromised the peaceful co-existence between North and South Sudanese even before their independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on 1 January 1956.<sup>192</sup>

The implementation of the Closed District Order and the Southern Policy during the colonial era exacerbated the racial and religious differences between the Arab Muslims in the North and the African Christians and animists in the South. Furthermore, the progressive and modernized economy in the North compared with the stagnated and underdeveloped Southern territory, underlined the differences between them. Consequently, the Southerners, unlike the Northerners, were devoid of patriotic and nationalistic feelings towards Sudan after its independence. Thus, the Southern politicians, who dominated the South-based Liberal Party, prioritized sociopolitical and economic issues affecting their Southern constituencies, not Sudan as a political entity. Hence, the Southerners were skeptical about their inclusion in Sudan while Pan-Southern sentiments, the desire to make the South autonomous, became prevalent among them.<sup>193</sup>

In December 1957, the prime minister of Sudan, Abdallah Khalil, and his colleagues in the Northern-based Umma Party expressed their skepticism about adopting a federal constitution for Sudan. According to Sanderson, this event led to the emergence of the Southern Federal Party (SFP), formed by the educated youths in the South.<sup>194</sup> These youths were disgruntled about the vacillating and lackadaisical attitude towards political activities in the South. Some of the Liberal Party delegates, through the inducements of bribes, defected to Northern political parties. Furthermore, leadership rivalry among the Liberal Party members compromised their unity, prompting the gradual rise of the SFP among the Southerners. SFP's collaboration with other Southern parties such as the Dinka Youth Organization overshadowed the Liberal Party's popularity among the Southerners.<sup>195</sup>

Thereafter, before the February 1958 election for Sudan's Constituent Assembly, Ezbon Mondiri Gwanza, a pioneering Southern politician, drafted the SFP's manifesto, underlining the major sociopolitical concerns of the Southerners. The manifesto emphasized the demand for a

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192. Timothy Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in The Twentieth Century*, (New York: Routledge 2018) 65.

193. Sudan Archive Durham University (SAD) PK 1647 *Southern Sudan Disturbance August 1955: Report of the Commission of Enquiry*.

194. Lilian Passmore and Neville Sanderson, *Education, Religion, and Politics in Southern Sudan 1899-1964*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), 352-353.

195. SOA *Unpublished Manuscript on the History of The First Civil War in South Sudan (Any-Nya)* compiled by McCall Storr in Sudan Open Archive accessed December 31, 2021.

federal constitution, the recognition of both Christianity and Islam as state religions, the acceptance of Arabic and English as Sudan's official languages, and the relocation of the Maridi Teachers Training College, Rumbek, and Juba Secondary School from Khartoum back to the South. Following the 1955 upheaval in the Southern localities, these institutions had been relocated to the North for security reasons.<sup>196</sup>

Furthermore, SFP's manifesto emphasized the need for a separate civil service, and educational system in the South, and recommended "the transfer of Sudan from the Arab to the African world" since Sudan joined almost every pan-Arab organization immediately after its independence without consulting the Southerners. Although Ezbon's manifesto seemed outrageous to the Northerners, it focused on the causes of Khartoum's discrimination against the Southerners.<sup>197</sup> After the elections, Southerners leaders such as Father Saturnino Lohure, a prominent member of SFP, and Joseph Oduho won forty out of the forty-six seats allotted to the South in the parliament. Some Southerners were not members of the SFP, yet they supported its demand for a federal constitution. In opposition to the Southerners' expectations, the Northern politicians tabled their draft for a unitary constitution in May 1958. Its implementation would centralize political power in the North and compromise the political participation of the Southerners. Consequently, this situation led to the withdrawal of SFP's members from the parliament on 16 June 1958. Thereafter, Father Saturnino openly declared and forewarned the Northerners that the Southern delegates prioritized the demand for a federal union with the North and not separation.<sup>198</sup>

Soon the Southerners became tense with the arrest of Ezbon Mondiri by Sudanese authorities after they found some incriminating documents with him. They contained details of SFP's original manifesto drafted in 1956, parts of which were omitted in the 1958's draft. The first draft outlined information on the campaign, through legal means, for a federalist system in Sudan based on the interest of the Southerners. If this attempt failed, the Southern delegates would make a Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) of Southern Sudan even if it would plunge Sudan into a civil war. These incriminating documents contained relevant information about the mutineers of 1955, the location of their fastness in Eastern Equatoria, and the names of their members such as Lotada Hilir. Furthermore, some threatening letters addressed to the Northern leaders allegedly written by Mondiri strengthened the legal case against him which led to his nine-year jail sentence.<sup>199</sup>

The uncompromising stance of Khalil's government and the Southern delegates on constitutional issues coupled with political wrangling among the Northern politicians prompted the military coup of 16 November 1958 under the leadership of General Ibrahim Abboud. Immediately, the military government suppressed the parliament, political parties, and press freedom. Moreover, the military regime became more hostile towards the Southerners' discussions about federalism than the previous administration thereby aggravating the upheavals in the South

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196. Lilian and Neville Sanderson, 354-355.

197. *Ibid.*

198. *Ibid.*

199. SOA *Unpublished Manuscript on the History of The First Civil War in South Sudan*  
<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txf=txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU&txq=Unpublished+Manuscript+on+the+History+of+The+First+Civil+War+in+South+Sudan+&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU-->  
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as security forces became more vigilant.<sup>200</sup> While Abboud's regime had no predetermined policy in resolving the deteriorating situation in the South, it abruptly implemented repressive policies against the Southerners.<sup>201</sup>

The Islamization and Arabization of the Southerners and the proscription of the activities of Christian missionaries were implemented by the northern officials among the Southern Sudanese to facilitate cultural homogeneity and national unity. Meanwhile, Abboud initiated several economic projects in the South such as the construction of an agricultural research station in Yambio, forestry sawmills in Torit, and a rice scheme in Aweil. Abboud expected that through these projects the Southern economy would be revitalized.<sup>202</sup> These initiatives coupled with the Islamization of the Southerners by coercing their traditional rulers to become Muslims served as the basis of Abboud's reformist policies. Moreover, religious instruction in Southern schools became Islamic and compulsory while the victimization of recalcitrant students became pervasive. The Sabbath day in the South changed from Sunday to Friday. By the early 1960s, these policies instigated vociferous protests from students spearheaded by those from Rumbek and Juba Commercial Secondary Schools. Later in 1962, these occurrences prompted the exodus of Southern students from the South into exile.<sup>203</sup> Many became refugees in neighboring countries such as Congo, Uganda, and Kenya. A few continued their educational pursuits, while others joined the burgeoning guerrilla movements formed by Southerners.<sup>204</sup>

Southern officials and politicians were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, and disappearance. These draconian policies made Southern politicians such as Father Saturnino Lohure, and Joseph Oduho Aworu seek refuge in Uganda where they established the Sudan Christian Association (SCA) in 1961. Afterward, they relocated to Leopoldville, the capital of Congo, and were later joined by William Deng Nhial, a young Dinka administrator from Bahr-el-Ghazal. Together they created the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) but changed its name to the Sudan African National Union (SANU) in 1963 when they returned to Uganda. In Kampala, they sought relief aid for about 60,000 Southerners residing in refugee camps established in 1964 by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRA) in Uganda and the former Belgian Congo, later known as Zaire in 1971.<sup>205</sup>

Meanwhile, SCA's prominent members informed the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva and other Christian groups about the Southerners' plight. Hence, these ecumenical organizations and other international groups used SCA as the conduit for providing aid to Southern refugees.<sup>206</sup> Additionally, displaced Southerners situated in Uganda were assisted by Catholic and Anglican churches in the country. Indeed, some of these religious groups partnered with WCC and UNHCR to facilitate educational activities for Southern Sudanese youths among the refugees. This

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200.Oystein H. Rolandsen, *A False Start: Between War and Peace in Southern Sudan, 1956-1972* Journal of African History 52(2011), 105-213.

201. Passmore, 357-358.

202.Oystein H. Rolandsen and Cherry Leonardi, "Discourses of Violence in The Transition From Colonialism to Independence in Southern Sudan 1955-1960" *Journal of Eastern African Studies* Vol.8, No. 4 (2014): 609-625.

203.Storr, 33.

204.Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 68.

205.Collins *A History of Modern Sudan*, 79.

206.Kuyok Abol Kuyok *South Sudan: The Notable Firsts* (Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2015) 330.

situation marked the beginning of the mutual relationship between the Southern political movement and relief organizations in Southern Sudan.<sup>207</sup>

Eventually, SANU absorbed the SCA and launched the party's bulletin, the *Voice of Southern Sudan* (VOSS). The periodical publicized the situation of the Southerners within and outside the South and illustrated the differences between the Northern and Southern territories.<sup>208</sup> SANU's emerging years coincided with the heightened security situation in the South towards the end of 1963 when the crisis escalated into a full civil war. Earlier that year, about 400 volunteers from the Latuka ethnic group formed the nucleus of the guerrilla force at Agu Camp in Eastern Equatoria under the command of Lieutenant Emedio Tafeng Odongi, a Latuka and former lieutenant in the Equatorial Corps.<sup>209</sup> By September, Oduho convened a meeting at his residence in Kampala attended by a half-dozen Southerners, including Father Saturnino and Lieutenant Joseph Lagu Yakobo, a Madi. This meeting led to the creation of *Anya-nya*, SANU's military wing. The appellation *Anya-Nya* was derived from a Madi word *inyanya*, a fatal poison extracted from a river snake dreaded by the people in eastern Equatoria. *Anya-Nya*'s emergence coincided with reports about the return of Lotada Hillir, leader of the 1955 mutiny, among the Equatorians magnifying the uneasiness in Southern Sudan.<sup>210</sup>

These incidents prompted Khartoum to reinforce its draconian policies in the Southern areas through the reenactment of the Closed District Ordinance of 1922, therefore anyone going to Southern Sudan required special permission from Khartoum. VOSS reported that the Ordinance hampered sociopolitical and economic activities in the Southern territory. Around 1963, this led to the refusal of Mr K Beechgard, a member of the International Commission of Jurists, to conduct an inquiry about the human right situation in the South.<sup>211</sup> Despite these restrictive policies, international newspapers like the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, and *The Observer* reported on the prevalent insecurity in Southern Sudan, aggravated by *Anya-Nya*'s covert activities, oppressive state policies, and *Anya-Nya*'s sporadic attacks on Sudanese armed forces.<sup>212</sup> Against this backdrop, Khartoum uncovered an operational order from an unknown source outlining details about a planned invasion of the Southern regions by a Southern dissident group.<sup>213</sup>

The Southern freedom fighters (*Anya-Nya*), the masterminds of the operational plan, intended to use the invasion to alert the world about the dismal and inhumane condition of the Southerners, and their readiness to struggle and die for their national liberty. The Southern rebels schemed to achieve these objectives by an armed attack in different parts of the Southern territories, followed

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207. Roland Werner et al *Day of Devastation Day of Contentment: The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 years* (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2010), 317.

208. Collins *A History of Modern Sudan*, 79.

209. *Ibid.*

210. *Ibid.*

211. Sudan Open Archive (SOA) *Voice of Southern Sudan* Volume 1 No.4 1963 published by SANU. 9

212. British National Archive (BNA) FO 371/173230 "Security Situation in Southern Sudan" snippets from the *Daily Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, and *The Observer* 6-8 October 1963.

213. BNA FO 371/173230 *Summary of Present Situation in Southern Sudan. A. R Walmsley (Khartoum) to Mr Scrivener Summary of Present Operational Order Captured and held by Hassan Beshir, deputy commander-in-chief. Enclosed Copy of Security Situation in Southern Sudan Summary of Present Situation in Southern Sudan.* October 5, 1963. 1-5.

by the conquest and liberation of areas bordering Uganda and Kenya in the South. This mission would be executed by an invasion force headed by a commander-in-chief, four officers, eight corporals, and 400 trained men. Half of these men would be armed with rifles, hand grenades, and machine guns. The other two hundred insurgents would be armed with knives, Molotov cocktails, or weapons captured during combat with government forces, underling the weakness of the invading force. These troops would be deployed a week before the invasion after proper training and preparation.<sup>214</sup>

Details about the Southern rebels' reconnaissance activities months before the invasion were highlighted in the operational plan. This involved a surreptitious patrol of the target area to determine the number of police and soldiers stationed in Torit, Nimule, Katire, Mongalla, Bor, Kapoeta, and Pibor Post. Intelligence gathering would include details about SAF's arms, the number, and identities of Southerners in the army, and the road conditions between towns. While the commander-in-chief would consult SANU's president on the exact day of the operation, the invasion would commence in the early morning just before sunrise. Simultaneously, all means of communication in the target area, such as telegraph and telephone utilized by Khartoum, would be sabotaged. Details on the treatment of prisoners taken by the invasion force, the process of court-martialing of Northern troops, and how the international community would be informed about the emergence of a new nation, Southern Sudan, were outlined in the concluding section of the Operational Order. However, these plans never materialized as Khartoum's security forces discovered them.<sup>215</sup>

After the discovery of the invasion plan, the army replaced the police in patrolling Southern Sudan's borders. Concomitantly, Southerners in the civil service and military were relocated to the North due to the defection of several of them to neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, families of northern officials and merchants residing in the remote parts of Equatoria province were evacuated to Juba for security reasons. Northern officials, military personnel, and civilians restricted their movement outside the city unless escorted by armed bodyguards. The arrest, interrogation, and persecution of suspected dissidents, and the imposition of curfews in Southern towns, became prevalent and underscored the tension in the South.<sup>216</sup> These incidents led many Southerners to seek refuge in the adjacent countries of Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Uganda. However, Ugandan security officers arrested some of these refugees accused of orchestrating the upheaval in Sudan.<sup>217</sup>

Some weeks later, a wave of violence engulfed Southern Sudan, leading to the death of 64 people including seven soldiers, three police, and three civilians. The commander of the Sudan military in the South confirmed that the other 51 casualties were all bandits. Although no evidence indicated the involvement of Anya-Nya in this dreadful episode, the surreptitious activities of the guerrilla group became threatening. Consequently, Khartoum reinforced its security measures in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria by implementing rigid martial law in these areas. In

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214. *Ibid.*

215. *Ibid.*

216. FO371/173230 *Increased Tension in the Southern Sudan*. 7 October 1963 BNA.

217. SOA Congo Refugee's Messenger Uganda Argus November 5, 1963. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed February 5, 2022).

addition, Sudanese forces searched for Anya-Nya's forest hideouts, where evidence was discovered confirming the existence and activities of the Southern rebels.<sup>218</sup>

### **WAR PROPAGANDA IN THE SOUTH**

The 1960s opened a new chapter in the sociopolitical history of Africa as thirty-four countries on the continent gained their independence from colonial rule. Hence, their political leaders initiated new socio-economic policies aimed at facilitating the path to development and progress. Despite the sociocultural differences among these nations, international political organizations such as the African and Malagasy Union (AMU), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) attempted to foster harmony and cooperation among member states.<sup>219</sup> Contemporaneously, the Cold War (1945-1990) rivalry between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies galvanized extended their sphere of influence into Africa which defined the course of events on the continent. To minimize the influences of these superpowers, newly independent African countries joined the Non-Aligned Movement. Nevertheless, these countries' developing economies made them recipients of economic and sometimes military aid from either Washington or Moscow.<sup>220</sup>

In Sudan, Abboud's regime embarked on several projects to revitalize the country's economy. After an unprecedented profit from cotton export in December 1960, Khartoum saved about \$165,000,000 in its treasury. Thereafter, Abboud consolidated this economic gain by developing a ten-year development plan (1961-1971) to revitalize Sudan's industrial and agricultural sectors.<sup>221</sup> Washington also extended a \$20,000,000 loan to Khartoum used for the realization of these projects, and the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD) extended another \$15,500,000 loan for the expansion of the Gezira irrigation project from 1,000,000 to 1,800,000 acres to increase Sudan's capacity to produce more cotton. The World Bank provided another \$65,000,000 for the construction of a hydroelectric power dam along the Blue Nile River.<sup>222</sup> However, the developmental initiatives in the Southern areas, such as a coffee plan in Equatoria and a pilot-project for rice plantation in Bahr-el-Ghazal, were moribund. Therefore, the South's economic growth became stagnated while industrial development progressed in the North.<sup>223</sup>

To mollify public opinion in the Southern territories concerning these issues, Abboud's regime took several measures in controlling media in the South. Thus, *El-Ayam*, a Khartoum based newspaper, was published in Arabic and English to facilitate Abboud's policies among the English-speaking Southern intelligentsia. Initially, the newspaper's articles criticized government policies; however, Khartoum overturned this situation by bribing its publishers with modern

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218. BNA FO371/173230 *Encloses Osman Report of His Tour of South Sudan: From John Osman, Sunday Telegraph Special Correspondent, Juba South Sudan*. 6 November 1963.

219. Henning Melber, *Dag Hammarskjöld, The United Nations and The Decolonization of Africa*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) 21-22.

220. *Ibid.*

221. Jay Walze, *Sudan Economy Enjoy A Boom: Nation's Economy Advances Under Abboud Regime-U. S Aid Help Growth*, *The New York Times* December 20 1960.

222. *Ibid.*

223. Alden Young, *Transforming Sudan: Decolonization, Economic Development, and State Formation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press 2017), 119.

printing equipment to facilitate *El-Ayam's* operation.<sup>224</sup> Thus, despite Abboud's draconian policies in the South, *El-Ayam* downplayed Khartoum's highhanded measures among the Southerners by blaming the British colonial policies for the disparities and feud between the North and South.<sup>225</sup>

Subsequently, in October 1963, Abboud's regime censored news reports about the tumultuous situations in the South by confiscating foreign media outlets such as the UK Britain's '*The Times*', and '*The Daily Telegraph*' and the Egyptian '*Al Ahram*'. Indeed, the Sudanese government downplayed the intensity of the crisis in the South, when U.S diplomats enquired about it, to avoid compromising Khartoum's diplomatic ties with its Western allies. Nonetheless, William M. Roundtree, the United States ambassador to Sudan (1962-1965), received confidential information about the unrest in the South from British officials. These reports informed Roundtree about the prevalent insecurity in Southern territories such as in the town of Yei, causing its Northern inhabitants to abandon their houses. Thus, factories and business situated in Yei came to a standstill.<sup>226</sup>

Other media outlets based in Khartoum mitigated the extent of the Southern chaos through their publications. For instance, *The Morning News* focused on the alleged successful attempts by the government security forces to obstruct the unruly activities of miscreants and rebels among the Southerners. However, the discriminative and dehumanizing effects of these security measures were overlooked. Moreover, during the expulsion of foreign Christian missionaries from Southern Sudan, which started on 29 February 1964, *The Morning News* justified the government's policy based on the rationale that some clergymen vented their hostility towards the Sudanese government and their colleagues failed to condemn such activities. Although the government had no concrete evidence against the missionaries, Khartoum rationalized its reactionary policy against foreign missionaries based on the need to foster unity between the Northerners and Southerners. Other publications authored by Sudanese scholars focused on how colonial rule and Christian evangelical activities in Sudan instigated the sociopolitical division between the North and South. Yet the immediate causes of the Southern crises were unexamined.<sup>227</sup>

Khartoum further reinforced its propaganda in Southern Sudan through the creation of Radio Juba in 1961 using it as medium to divert the Southerners' thinking away from any sentiments against the Sudanese government following the uprising of 1955. Therefore, Abboud's regime used Radio Juba to inform Southern Sudanese about the military policies aimed at restoring peace and stability in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile region. The radio station also served as a means of encouraging development and unity among the diverse ethnic groups in the South by using different languages to make Khartoum's announcements and by broadcasting traditional

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224. SAD. 851/13/1-67 Erisa Penesi Memoirs.

225. BNA FO 371/173230 *El-Ayam News and Views 16-10-1963: "A Message from the Southern Provinces Containing Healthy Criticism and Constructive Views: Incidents and Politics Play Their Role in Sowing Seeds of Embitterment and Hatred. What are the Means For Correcting Wrong Ideas and Ensuring Confidence and Cooperation."*

226. BNA FO 371/173230 *Situation in The South Exaggerated in Press. Police Reinforcement but no Military. Airforce Returned to Khartoum.* October 12, 1963.

227. Mahgoub Saleh, "Clergymen To Be Deported," *The Moring News*, February 28, 1964.

music from the Southern regions. Nonetheless, due to the prevalent insecurity in Equatoria, Radio Juba ended its operation in 1965.<sup>228</sup>

Meanwhile, through the instrumentality of its bulletin VOSS, the exiled rebel movement SANU propagated its own political agenda in the South. As such, and in contrast to the state's Arab ethos, it framed itself as an epitome of Pan-Africanism by placing the emboldened mantra '*Negritude and Progress*' on the VOSS front page.<sup>229</sup> Thereby, VOSS championed SANU's quest for Southern Sudan's independence through a proposed plebiscite within the context of African unity. Furthermore, VOSS highlighted issues pertaining to the racial differences between the Arabs in the North and the Africans in the South and their divergent affiliations with Islamic culture and African culture respectively underlining the South's campaign for self-determination. However, the subtle sociocultural differences among the ethnic groups, such as language and customary laws, in the South were ignored, while VOSS cited the presence of different cultural groups such as the Acholi, Lango, and Madi in both Southern Sudan and Uganda as evidence of a shared African cultural heritage.<sup>230</sup>

Nonetheless, VOSS provided SANU with the platform to publicize the underlying rationale for Khartoum's hardline policies in the Southern regions and its impacts on the Southerners. Accordingly, VOSS highlighted that the real reason the Government of Sudan (GOS) expelled missionaries from the South was to facilitate the Islamization of Southern Sudanese unhindered and to withdraw all foreign witnesses among the Southerners, thereby making the world oblivious to the dehumanizing situation in the South. Following the deportation of the clergies from the Southern regions, VOSS underlined that the Southerners were deprived of medical facilities including hospitals, dispensaries, maternity homes, and other humanitarian assistances provided by the Christian missionaries.<sup>231</sup>

### ***INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE SOUTHERN CRISIS***

In contrast to its repressive policies against the Southerners, Khartoum's foreign policy supported liberation movements and Pan-Africanism. Accordingly, by 1963, Khartoum closed its airports and harbors to South Africa's apartheid government and Portugal's colonial government based on their discriminative and dehumanizing policies against Africans in their territories. In addition, Sudan facilitated the creation of the Zambia Solidarity Committee, founded in 1966 to support Lusaka's struggling economy due to its support for liberation movements opposing white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. These political gestures made it difficult for African leaders to criticize Khartoum's oppressive policies in the South.<sup>232</sup> Moreover, on 25 May 1963 thirty-four African countries formed the OAU, including Sudan, with a charter which

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228. Victor Keri Wani, *A History of Broadcasting in South Sudan: with Reference to Sudan 1961 to 1992* (Juba: Rafiki for Printing and Publishing, 2020), 31-35.

229. Sebatso.C. Manoeli *Sudan's Southern Problem: Race, Rhetoric, and International Relations, 1961-1991*. (New York Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 43.

230. SOA Voice of Southern Sudan Vol.1 No.1 April 1963 15-18.

231. SOA Voice of Southern Sudan Vol.2 No.1 April 1964 4-5.

232. Manoeli, *Sudan's Southern Problem*, 70-119.

included the “non-interference in the internal affairs of members’ states” and “respect for territorial integrity.” This development discouraged the involvement of other African states in Sudan’s conflict.<sup>233</sup>

Despite Khartoum’s good relations with most of the rest of Africa, VOSS publicized the Northern military regime’s rampant dehumanization and persecution of the Southerners, including coercive conversion to Islam and the arbitrary arrest and torture of civilians.<sup>234</sup> The expulsion of foreign missionaries from the South by the military regime provoked vociferous reactions from the international Christian communities, especially from evangelical movements in Europe. Consequently, before General Abboud’s anticipated visit to the United Kingdom in May 1964, the President, and Secretary General of the British-based Church Missionary Society (CMS) Dr John Taylor censured the unreasonable eviction of foreign missionaries from Southern Sudan and expressed the group’s repugnance about Abboud’s scheduled visit. Dr Taylor also criticized the Royal Air Force and Navy for training and providing assistance to the Sudanese Airforce deployed in the South.<sup>235</sup> Nevertheless, Abboud’s visit to London proceeded as scheduled. According to Manoeli, Abboud’s visit provided the United Kingdom with the opportunity to secure its civil and military overfly rights with Sudan making it possible for British aircraft to fly through the shortest route to reach Singapore, Australia, the Gulf, and other Eastern territories. The UK government also retained its military bases in Sudan.<sup>236</sup>

In London, British clergymen deported from Southern Sudan advocated for the Southerners by spreading the news about their deplorable situation. The clergy also appealed to members of parliament (MPs) within their congregations to dissuade London’s indifference concerning the Southern Sudanese and to discourage Britain from providing ammunition and financial aid to Khartoum. Later in 1964, the British government’s decision not to grant independence as a majority rule state to Southern Rhodesia and the transfer of military equipment to the territory’s white minority regime compromised London’s diplomatic relation with Khartoum and many other African capitals. By 1965, diplomatic relations between both countries resumed.<sup>237</sup> Similarly, in Washington, after the expulsion of the missionaries from Southern Sudan, the US State Department issued a communique titled ‘*Religious Persecution in The Sudan*’. The Department confirmed the political nature of the conflict and opposed all forms of religious discrimination in Sudan. Yet it preserved its interest in the socio-economic development of the country. Thus, the US had no intention of reducing its aid to Sudan as the Soviet Union provided Khartoum technical aid and loans.<sup>238</sup>

Among post-colonial African countries, their diplomatic relations with Khartoum, adherence to the OAU’s charter, and the influx of Southern refugees determined their stance and reaction to the

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233. Howard Adelman and John Sorenson (ed), *African Refugees: Development and Reparation* (New York Routledge, 2018), 7.

234. SOA Voice of Southern Sudan *Sudan Africans Die: Long Live African Unity* April 1964 4-11.

235. SOA Voice of Southern Sudan *Storms Over Abboud’s State Visit* Vol.2 No.6 July 1964 3.

236. Manoeli, *Sudan’s Southern Problem* 70-119.

237. BNA FO371/190417 *Letter from a Constituent Expressing Concern over the Religious Situation in Southern Sudan*.

238. Mahgoub Saleh, “Soviet Technical and Economic Delegation To Khartoum,” *The Morning News*, February 28, 1964.

upheaval in Southern Sudan. Initially, most Southern refugees moved into neighboring countries such as Uganda, DRC, Kenya, Central African Republic (CAR), and Ethiopia.<sup>239</sup> In Uganda, after its independence on 9 October 1962, rumors about the intent of Southern refugees to invade Sudan instigated their arrest by Ugandan security forces. Though they were later released from prison, their presence raised concerns about social problems relating to projects to resettle Southern refugees into a healthy environment that were hampered by the shortage of funds. Unfortunately, the continuous influx of Southern Sudanese, especially into Northern Uganda, aggravated the refugees' plight.<sup>240</sup>

By July 1964, Ugandan parliamentarians expressed their concerns about the unfortunate situation of 60,000 Southern refugees, which they attributed to Kampala's lackluster attitude about the matter due to its diplomatic ties with Khartoum. In particular, Ugandan parliamentarians from the Acholi ethnic group, also situated in Southern Sudan, spearheaded the criticism against Prime Minister Milton Obote's nonchalant attitude towards the Southern refugees. These parliamentarians also complained about how Abboud's regime obstructed the OAU's attempt and that of a commission from Uganda to investigate the Southern crisis.<sup>241</sup> Moreover, the porous borders between these countries, inhabited by the same ethnic groups, and the influx of Southern refugees into Uganda became an issue of critical concern for both countries. This situation made it imperative for Kampala and Khartoum to preserve their diplomatic ties. Thus, in March 1963, Obote made a courtesy visit to Khartoum and some months later he warned the Southern refugees from orchestrating any act of aggression against Sudan.<sup>242</sup> Afterwards, Kampala and Khartoum signed an extradition agreement that enforced the repatriation of Southerners charged with criminal offenses in Sudan but seeking refuge in Uganda.<sup>243</sup>

Like Kampala, Addis Ababa maintained its diplomatic relation with Abboud's regime during the Southern crisis. Nevertheless, based on its engagement with Christianity, Ethiopia extended its hospitality towards the influx of Southern refugees, especially those from the Upper Nile and it placed few restrictions on SANU's activities within its territory. In fact, during the OAU conference on 23 May 1963, SANU members lobbied some of the participating delegates about the Southern crisis until Khartoum requested some restraint on their activities. Even though Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie tolerated the presence of the Southern refugees and SANU within his borders, he remained cautious about assisting them.<sup>244</sup> Addis Ababa's stance towards the Southerners was partly shaped by its intractable issues with Somalia's irredentist claim over the Ogaden region and the rise of an independence movement in Eritrea. Moreover, any overt support for the Southerners would compromise Ethiopia's recognition as a pioneer of African unity and solidarity based on its role in the formation of the OAU.<sup>245</sup>

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239.SOA Voice of Southern Sudan *Storms over Abboud's State Visit* Vol.2 No.6 July 1964. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed March 2022).

240.SOA Voice of Southern Sudan *Uganda Parliament Hold Debts on Southern Sudan* Vol. II No.3 October 1964 5-6. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed March 2022).

241.*Ibid.*

242.BNA FO 371/173230 *Attitude of Other African Countries.*

243.Maghoub Saleh, "Council Approves Extradition Agreement With Uganda" *The Morning News*, July 9, 1964.

244.BNA FO 371/173230 *Increased Tension in Southern Sudan* 28 October 1963.

245.*Ibid.*



The arrival of Southern refugees in DRC coincided with the Congo Crisis (1960-1965). Immediately after its independence in 1960, the DRC became embroiled in the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers. The unwillingness of the Belgian colonizers to relinquish their control over the Congo while the country's post-independent leaders tussled for political power fomented tension. The escalation of this crisis led to the presence of foreign mercenaries and the interventionist role of the UN in the Congo.<sup>246</sup> Consequently, the Sudanese government expected little or no assistance from the Congolese government since it tenuously controlled its borders with Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, Abboud's regime diligently strived at national and local levels to gain the cooperation of the Congolese authorities against exiled Southern dissident groups within their border. In some cases, Abboud's military officers and those of the Congolese occasionally had meetings, preventing clashes between their military forces along the frontier.<sup>247</sup>

In Kenya, six months before its independence in December 1963, Nairobi's minister of home affairs initially expressed his support for SANU, but this was later rescinded by the country's Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta.<sup>248</sup> Nevertheless, SANU adamantly solicited support from Kenyan nationals while journalists in Nairobi interviewed Southern refugees and reported on the tensions in the South.<sup>249</sup> Indeed, Kenyan newspapers provided details about military activities in the North and South, and the conditions of Southern refugees in neighboring countries. They compared the unrest in the Equatoria area to the worst days of the *Mau Mau* emergency in Kenya during the 1950s.<sup>250</sup>

Central African Republic (CAR) became a feasible destination for Southern Sudanese refugees because of the proximity of Equatoria and the presence of Azande people along the border. Apart from the Azande, other ethnic groups from Southern Sudan also settled in CAR where they were accommodated. But the Southerners in CAR barely received any support for dissident activities against Khartoum. In addition, Bangui's membership in the Africa and Malagasy Union (UAM), created on 12 September 1961, and the OAU shaped its foreign policy with Khartoum during the Southern crisis. While Bangui aided the Southern refugees, it maintained diplomatic relations with Abboud's regime.<sup>251</sup>

### ***SANU AND ANYA-NYA DISCORD AND VICISSITUDES IN THE SOUTH***

By the end of October 1964, the inability of Sudan's military regime to resolve the Southern crisis, coupled with the security forces' failure to contain civil unrest in the North, led to the downfall of Abboud's regime. A month before this occurrence, SANU issued a communiqué reiterating its commitment to the Southerners' quest for self-determination through which they would choose to unite with the North based on a federal constitution. Otherwise, the South would

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246. Melber, 74-80.

247. BNA FO 371/17320 *Increased Tension in the Southern Region* 28 October 1963.

248. Manoeli, *Sudan's Southern Problem*, 177.

249. Ibid Alastair Matheson, *Sudan Revolt as Bad as Mau Mau* Nairobi 17 November.

250. BNA FO 371/17320 *Sudan Revolt as Bad as Mau Mau* The Observer 17 October 1963.

251. *Ibid*.

seek its independence through a plebiscite under the supervision of a neutral organization such as the United Nations.<sup>252</sup>

While SANU's leadership reinforced cooperation among its members, issues such as ethnic rivalry, lack of consensus about the coordination of Anya-Nya's operations, and divergent perspectives on various issues led to discord among SANU members. Moreover, the scattering of Southern refugees in neighboring countries compromised SANU's ability to communicate and garner cohesive support from Southern ethnic groups. The rivalry between William Deng and Father Saturnino Lohure, prominent members of the organization, exacerbated SANU's internal crises.<sup>253</sup>

This led to the divergence between SANU and Anya-Nya in the Southern areas. Although both SANU and Anya-Nya were committed to the quest for the independence of Southern Sudan, SANU preferred to negotiate with Khartoum and used other democratic means to attain this objective whereas Anya-Nya preferred the use of violence to achieve its own political goals.<sup>254</sup> In Allen's view, the inability of the Southern politicians to formulate a clearly defined revolutionary ideology instigated the divergence between SANU and Anya-Nya. Moreover, the diverse and uncompromising political views among Southern politicians in the early 1960s contributed to this situation.<sup>255</sup>

The decentralization of Anya-Nya activities in the South further compromised its nexus with SANU. Although SANU leaders in exile attempted to influence the Southern rebels' policies, Anya-Nya developed its own political and military tactics based on its encounters in the Southern territories. For instance, in the Upper Nile, from 1962 to 1963, many soldiers, police, and prison warders participated in the formation of SANU. Initially, the Southern rebels in this area were known as the Southern Sudanese Land Freedom Army or freedom fighters. Afterward, William Deng christened the Southern rebels in this area as Anya-Nya in 1964.<sup>256</sup> The predominant ethnic groups in this territory, such as the Nuer, joined the Anya-Nya force, they were armed with rifles and trained to lay traps and mine roads. Nevertheless, issues such as the unpreparedness of the Southern rebels, the lack of arms and ammunition, and the constant change of leadership, affected Anya-Nya's operation in the Upper Nile and other Southern localities. The feud between the Murle and Anya-Nya community compromised the Southern forces' operations in the Upper Nile.<sup>257</sup>

In Bahr-el-Ghazal, the area's proximity to refugee camps in nearby CAR and DRC shaped the emergence and activities of SANU and Anya-Nya. On 1 January 1964, during Sudan's eighth independence anniversary, the Southern rebels attacked the Sudanese forces residing in Wau. Although the rebel forces were unprepared for this encounter, the Southern civilians in this area provided information, firearms, and encouragement to the guerrilla force. Subsequently, this

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252. SOA Press Statement of "Sudan National African Union" by William Deng September 21 1964. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed March 2022).

253. BNA FO 371/17320 *SANU Capabilities and Intentions* 28 October 1963.

254. *Ibid.*

255. Tim Allen *Full Circle?: An Overview of Sudan's Southern Sudan Problem Since Independence* Northeast African Studies 1989 Vol. 11 No.2 (1989), 41-66.

256. McCall and Akol. 39-65

257. *Ibid.*

operation became a fiasco due to the Southern rebel forces' tactical errors, leading to the death of Anya-Nya commander Captain Bernardino Mou. Afterwards, the Southern rebel aborted this mission, and their recruits dispersed. These events instigated feuds and ethnic rivalry among the Anya-Nya forces in Bahr-el-Ghazal.<sup>258</sup>

Conversely, the town of Abeyi, situated in the Northern part of Bahr-el-Ghazal, remained unaffected by the upheaval in the South until 1965. Factors such as the effectiveness of the city's native administration, intermarriages between Ngok Dinka and Arabs, and the Ngok Dinka's dexterity in resolving interethnic conflict fostered cordial relations, mitigated conflict and facilitated ethnic relations in the Abeyi region.<sup>259</sup>

In Equatoria, Anya-Nya operations in its Central, Western, and Eastern parts varied. For instance, in Eastern Equatoria, Anya-Nya facilitated its operation by their visiting and enlisting support from villages. The Southern rebels enlightened villagers about the rationale of their activities and used the opportunity to collect poll tax. Nonetheless, Anya-Nya's uncordial relationship with some of the locals affected its popularity in areas such as Yei.<sup>260</sup> Leonardi argues that in Yei, local authorities and civilians often acted as double agents for both Anya-Nya and Khartoum forces. These instances gave the Anya-Nya commanders the leverage to interfere in the communal affairs of its residents.<sup>261</sup> Accordingly, cattle plundering by the Anya-Nya forces became a reoccurring incident weakening their relations with the Toposa and other ethnic groups. Moreover, leadership rivalry between Emido Taffeng and Joseph Lagu, prominent Anya-Nya commanders, affected the unity among the Southern rebels in Equatoria.<sup>262</sup>

In Western Equatoria, its proximity to Southerner refugee camps in DRC and the preponderance of Azande along both sides of the border determined Anya-Nya's operation and made the acquisition of modern small arms feasible through the black market. Through these means, Azande communities within DRC, CAR, and Western Equatoria were instrumental in the development of Anya-Nya operations. Furthermore, the centralized, traditional structure of the Azande society reinforced the cohesion among the Azande rebels recruited from refugee camps in DRC.<sup>263</sup> In nearby Congo, the Simba rebellion (1964-1965) shaped the Anya-Nya's operation. The Simba rebels were loyalists of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of DRC assassinated in 1961. After the overthrow of Abboud's regime in October 1964, the interim government in Khartoum supported the Simba rebels. In Khartoum's view, the Simba revolt represented another

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258. Scopus S. Poggio, *The First Sudanese Civil War: African, Arabs, Israelis in the Southern Sudan 1955-1972* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 67-68.

259. David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan 1983-1989* (Oxford James Currey Publishers, 2008) 34-35. Other works provide detailed background about historical and sociopolitical development in the Abeyi region such as Douglas Johnson, *When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impacts of Boundary making in Southern-Sudan's Frontier Zones*. Nairobi Kenya Rift Valley Institute 2010 and Francis Mading Deng, *The Man Called Deng Majok: A Biography of Power, Polygyny, and Change*, (New Haven Yale University Press, 1986).

260. Cherry Leonardi, *Dealing with Government in South Sudan: History of Chiefship, Community and State*, (Suffolk James Currey, 2015), 167-168.

261. *Ibid.*

262. McCall and Akol 62-64.

263. Poggio, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 145-146.

struggle against neo-colonialism comparable to other contemporaneous liberation movements in Southern Africa struggling against colonialism and racist regimes. Consequently, Khartoum provided logistical support and ammunition, reinforced by military aid from Algeria and the United Arab Republic (UAR), for the Simba rebels.<sup>264</sup> Given these ties, Southern Sudanese leaders, located in the DRC town of Aba and Aru, became wary about initiating cordial relations with the Congolese rebels. Reports that the Simba rebels were in cahoots with the Sudanese army made the Southerners wary of the Congolese insurgents.<sup>265</sup>

From November 1964 to June 1965, communication, and transfer of supplies from DRC and other neighbouring countries to the Southern Sudanese rebels wavered. McCall and Akol argue that the disregard for the ceasefire agreement, aimed at quelling the fighting between Anya-Nya and the Sudanese army throughout the Southern regions, caused this problem.<sup>266</sup> Meanwhile, Khartoum's scorched earth policy, encompassing Southern Sudan's borders with Uganda, DRC, Kenya, CAR, and Ethiopia hindered cross-border movements between Southern Sudan and its neighbours. The extant Closed District Ordinance also restricted movement in the Southern territories and debilitated the Anya-Nya's operation in Southern Sudan and its interaction with SANU leaders in neighbouring countries.<sup>267</sup>

#### ***ECUMENICAL AID AND INTERVENTIONIST IN THE SOUTH***

In 1964, following the expulsion of Christian missionaries from the Southern regions, Khartoum justified its hardline policy based on the conclusion that Western humanitarian agencies, especially Christian ones, provided material assistance to Southern Sudanese refugees abroad. The Sudanese government also viewed the missionaries' assistance to displaced Southerners in neighboring countries as a means of supporting dissident groups fighting against Khartoum.<sup>268</sup>

In reality, the World Council of Christians (WCC) and other religious agencies' interest in the Sudanese civil war were shaped by different factors. From 1948 to 1966, under the charismatic leadership of Visser't Hooft, WCC evolved into a global religious NGO, galvanizing its involvement in international events, such as the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and Arab-Israeli conflicts in the Middle East.<sup>269</sup> Under the umbrella of WCC, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) projected the Council of Christians' commitment and interest in issues relating to human rights and race relations, and religious liberty in conflict regions wherever Christian populations were affected including Southern Sudan.<sup>270</sup> Reacting to the eviction of Christian missionaries from the Southern territories, CCIA's chairman

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264. Ahmed Karadawi, *Refugee Policy in Sudan 1967-1984* (New York: Berghnan, 1999).

265. McCall and Akol, 70-71.

266. *Ibid.*

267. SOA Press Statement by Sudan African National Union (SANU) 21 September 1964.

268. Karadawi *Refugee Policy in Sudan*, 53.

269. Jurjen Zeilstra, *Visser't Hooft, 1900-1985: Living for the Unity of the Church* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 291-360.

270. *The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs Report 1959-1960* Library of the World Council of Churches (WCC) 34-36.

Sir Kenneth Grubb expressed that the deportation would affect the progress of theological education among the Southerners, and Khartoum's relation with its international friends.<sup>271</sup>

These incidents prompted the unification between the Northern and Southern Sudan Christian Council, leading to formation of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) on 29 January 1965. Afterward, SCC sought to associate itself with the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), an association of African churches, and WCC, garnering more support for the Southerners from different parts of the world.<sup>272</sup> Subsequently, by October, members of the Christian Missionary Society reported that rampant acts of murder, torture, unprecedented looting, and destruction were committed by Khartoum's troops against Christians in Southern Sudan. Consequently, leaders of Southern churches and their congregations were forced to flee into the bush or they crossed into Congo or Uganda. Some clergy also reported that churches and pastors' residences in the South were burned. Furthermore, Bishop Oliver Allison, a renowned cleric among the Southerners, informed WCC about the destruction of hospitals and parish churches amid the fighting in Equatoria. Accordingly, the Sudanese Air Force's bombardment of Kajo Keji, situated in Central Equatoria, caused the looting and demolition of eight parishes forcing village pastors and evangelists to escape with their congregations to Uganda. Regardless of these challenges, Bishop Allison and some other clerics continued with the training of priests and other religious activities outside Southern Sudan.<sup>273</sup>

Meanwhile, after consultation with AACC, WCC expressed its concern about the conflict in the South and sent its representatives to Sudan to determine assistance churches might need because of the civil war. Afterward, WCC appealed to Christians for increased aid to Southern refugees, including scholarships. Additionally, WCC provided around \$65,000 for the humanitarian needs of displaced Southerners in Malakal, Juba, and Khartoum and continued sponsoring some of these relief projects after the civil war ended in 1972. The Council of Christians also prodded CCIA to take all necessary measures, even approaching national governments to end the ongoing civil war in the South. Subsequently, the prospect of facilitating a peace agreement between Khartoum and the Southern rebels was botched by political changes in the Sudanese government and structural changes in AACC and WCC.<sup>274</sup>

Southern rebel leaders such as Ibrahim Nyigilo, a former member of Anya-Nya, exploited WCC's emergence as an ecumenical relief agency. From 1962 to 1966, as the president of the Sudan Christian Association (SCA), Nyigilo informed WCC and other international Christian organizations about the predicaments of Southern Sudanese Christians during the war. Consequently, SCA became recognized as a religious charity through which Nyigilo received donations and financial support from Europe to support Southern Sudanese refugees in East Africa.

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271. *The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs Report 1963-1964* Library of the World Council of Churches 43.

272. United Nation High Commission For Refugee (UNHCR) Archive 11/3/41-410. WCC.SUD *Non-governmental and governmental (National) Organizations-Specific Non-governmental Organizations-World Council of Churches Sudan* .

273. *New Reports Documents Violence in Sudan* WCC Ecumenical Press Service No. 36 October 14, 1965 14.

274. UNHCR Archive 11/3/41-410. WCC.SUD *Non-governmental and governmental (National) Organizations-Specific Non-governmental Organizations-World Council of Churches Sudan* .

Nyigilo used some of this relief assistance to procure weapons for Anya-Nya's operation in Southern Sudan. Thus, surreptitiously, SCA became Anya-Nya's humanitarian wing, serving as Southern rebels' conduit for receiving material support from WCC and other international Christian organizations. As such, SCA's mutual relationship with Anya-Nya served as the precedent for the symbiotic relationship between relief agencies and rebel groups in Southern Sudan.<sup>275</sup>

While supporting SCA's relief efforts for Southern refugees, WCC also collaborated with AACC, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and Ugandan churches in facilitating humanitarian projects for Southern refugees. These collective efforts enhanced the educational development of many Southern Sudanese, obtaining their secondary, university, and professional degree qualifications in Uganda and other East African countries. For instance, many Southerners obtained their university degrees at Makerere University. Additionally, Sudanese churches in exile used their presence in neighboring countries to train and ordain more clerics. This development enabled students at Bishop Gwynne College in Mundri who fled Southern Sudan to proceed and complete their studies at Bishop Tucker Theological College in Uganda, and St. Paul's United Theological College in Limuru, Kenya. WCC and AACC's participation in facilitating these relief and rehabilitation projects among Southern Sudanese refugees would reinforce their involvement in upcoming events ending the civil war. Moreover, the growth of Christianity among the Southern refugees sustained their relationship with WCC and other international religious NGOs, increasing their efforts to implement relief and rehabilitation programs in Southern Sudan after the civil war.<sup>276</sup>

Apart from providing humanitarian assistance for Southern Sudanese, Ugandan clerics also protested against Khartoum's maltreatment of the Southerners. In August 1965, the Anglican Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka and Roman Catholic Archbishop Leslie W. Brown conjointly issued a letter to the Sudanese government and OAU, highlighting the relentless killing of the Southerners and that both Christian and Muslim faithful in Sudan assisting the Southerners had also become unfortunate victims of the war. Archbishop Kiwanuka and Brown further urged the Sudanese government to allow OAU to investigate the tumultuous situation. Concurrently, Rome's Vatican Radio discussed the Ugandan Archbishops' letter and appealed to Christian authorities to take action against the persecution of Southern Sudanese.<sup>277</sup>

By December 1966, AACC sent its representatives to Khartoum to settle the Sudanese government's issues with clergy members in the South. However, in preserving its relationship with OAU, AACC avoided highlighting the Southerners' campaign for separation while meeting the Sudanese government. In fact, during their discussions, the ecumenical emissaries adopted Khartoum's term 'outlaws' for the Anya-Nya forces. Nonetheless, AACC's officials urged the Sudanese government to negotiate with the Southern rebels. AACC left Khartoum with the feeling of having established a mutual relationship with Khartoum. Soon, the news of these events made

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275. Kuyok, 331-332.

276. Werner, 317.

277. *Anglican Leaders Protest Against Persecution in South Sudan* WCC Ecumenical Press Service No. 28 August 5 1965, 8.

Anya-Nya and some Southern Church leaders regard AACC's visit as an act of betrayal, instigating their mistrust of AACC. Yet one of the positive outcomes of AACC's visit to Sudan was that Khartoum agreed to allow African missionaries to operate in the Southern regions based on AACC's recommendations. These events served as the forerunner for the indispensable roles religious agencies would play in resolving the civil war between Khartoum.<sup>278</sup>

### ***PARTIES AND POLITICS IN THE TRANSITIONAL YEARS***

After the fall of Abboud's regime in October 1964, the new prime minister Al-Khatim Al Khalifa led the transitional government later succeeded by a transitional committee which helmed the Sudanese state until July 1965. During these months, Khartoum's liberal policies facilitated the restart of political activities in Southern Sudan, providing the Southern Front (SF) and other new political parties the chance to operate in the South. Moreover, SF's collaboration with Northern political groups against Abboud's regime reinforced the Front's popularity. SF members included Southern political veterans such as Clement Mboro, Ezboni Mundri, and Abel Alier. The Front aimed to rally all Southerners to achieve sociopolitical and economic emancipation from the Northern Arabs. It also intended to use peaceful and constitutional means to solve the Southern problem and to guard against and expose any form of foreign subversive activities affecting the Southerners.<sup>279</sup>

SF's agenda included the declaration of a ceasefire in the South, the release of all Southern political detainees by the interim government, and the organization and convening of the Round-Table Conference to deliberate on the solution to the Southern problem. SF also envisaged facilitating negotiation with Southern politicians in exile.<sup>280</sup> Later in 1964, the ceasefire agreement between Khartoum and the Southern rebels gradually restored normalcy in different parts of Southern Sudan. For instance, in Maridi, situated in Western Equatoria, political prisoners were released, and the restoration of freedom of expression became a prevalent feature of the society.<sup>281</sup>

By November, three members of the Front were sent by Khartoum to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to enlighten the exiled Southern politicians and refugees about the changes occurring in the South and to determine their reactions to these events. The emissaries located Father Saturnino in Nairobi and they found Aggrey Jaden and Joseph Oduho in Kampala. Saturnino had reservations about how the interim government could resolve the discrimination and dehumanization against the Southerners. Furthermore, Saturnino referred to the marginalization of Southerners from the civil service during the Sudanization policy of 1954 as a testament against the sincerity of Khartoum in resolving its feud with the Southerners.<sup>282</sup>

In Kampala, the arrival of the Southern Front emissaries coincided with SANU's first national convention from 7 to 16 November 1964 where they witnessed the power struggle among the party's leaders. The political rivalry among William Deng, Saturnino, and Joseph Oduho fomented

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278. Werner et al, *Day of Devastation Day of Contentment* 293-341.

279. SOA *The Constitution of the Southern Front*. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed April 2022).

280. *Ibid.*

281. SOA *Why I Escaped My Mission: Accounts of Father Gabriel W. Dwatuka* 6 July 1965. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed 2022).

282. Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored*, (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1999), 42.

this issue. Eventually, the tussle for political power within SANU resulted in the emergence of Aggrey Jaden as the party's leader, and former vice-president Dominic Muorwel as the party's national chairman.<sup>283</sup> However, Joseph Oduho, the former president, still served as its executive secretary for constitutional affairs and William Deng, the party's former secretary general became its secretary for external affairs. SANU allegedly stated that Deng's disagreement with other members of the executive council on certain policies led to his dismissal as the party's secretary.<sup>284</sup> Personality clashes among the party members fomented the reshuffling of executive positions. In particular, as the party's patron, Father Saturnino's irreconcilable differences with both Deng and Oduho aggravated the internal crisis. Moreover, the exploitation of ethnic and regional affinities by the party's leaders coupled with their political and personal ambitions affected the Southerners' loyalty and commitment to SANU.<sup>285</sup> Thus, Aggrey Jaden announced that:

Countrymen and brother, at this stage of our movement, it is now absolutely important more than ever that we need unity of aims. To be united does not mean to abolish differences of opinion or points of view.... but it is very necessary that we must be united in our common and final goal which is independence from the North. We must try to bury our personal, tribal, or sectional interests for the sake of our beloved country.... only unity will be our strength.<sup>286</sup>

The dispute within SANU overshadowed the SF emissaries' mission in Kampala. While Aggrey Jaden, SANU's new leader, promised to consider Khartoum's policies and their impact on Southerners, he shared Saturnino's skepticism about the safety of Southern politicians and refugees if they returned to the South.<sup>287</sup> When the emissaries arrived in Khartoum, Sudan's interior minister, Clement Mboro, appealed to the Southern forces in the South to adhere to the ceasefire agreement. Eventually, some 258 Southern rebels relinquished their weapons and ammunition to the state authorities, and over 2,600 Southern refugees in Uganda also expressed their desire to return to the South.<sup>288</sup>

The restoration of peace gradually spread in Southern Sudan and on the first week of December 1964, and Sunday became recognized as the Sabbath day. Consequently, the vivacity among Southern Christians led to their massive turnout for church service as they enjoyed their restored religious freedom. On Friday, the mosque in the city of Maridi was empty as the Southern Christians were no longer coerced by the Northern administrators to become Muslims.<sup>289</sup> Civilian northern administrators in the South shared the joy and sense of freedom. Hitherto, their political positions and executive powers were revoked and supplanted by those of military governors

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283. *Ibid.*

284. SOA *Voice of Southern Sudan: Change in SANU Leadership*. Vol.2 No.4 February 1965.

<https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed April 2022)

285. Alier 42.

286. SAD.20/5/31-43 E N Wakoson: *The Southern Sudan: The Political Leadership of The Anya-Nya Movement*.

287. Alier, *Southern Sudan* 42-43.

288. Mohamed Beshir Said "The Interior Minister Concludes Visit To Southern Sudan," *The Morning News* 7 December 1964.

289. SOA *Why I Escaped My Mission: Accounts of Father Gabriel W. Dwatuka* 6 July 1965.

<https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed April 2022).



stationed in different parts of the South during Abboud's regime.<sup>290</sup> After the inception of the interim administration, the Northern administrators' hopes of reclaiming their political powers and privileges were short-lived after Khartoum's announcement that all civil service positions in the Southern territories, including the police force and prison wardens, would be Southernized as part of its measures taken to restore peace. Hence, the Northern political elites based in Southern Sudan became disillusioned with Al Khalifa's administration. Even members of Sudan's armed forces were disgruntled about the ceasefire. Thus, the Northern political elites and the state armed forces in the South had a common grudge against Khartoum. Simultaneously, the government announced that Southerners scattered in different parts of the Northern provinces should relocate to the South to take up their new positions.<sup>291</sup>

Meanwhile, on the morning of 6 December 1964, a riot occurred between Southerners and Northerners living in Khartoum while the former awaited the arrival of Interior Minister Clement Mboro at the airport. Immediately, the Sudanese government declared a curfew on Southern cities. These incidents reinforced the powers of Northern politicians and armed forces based in Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, the Southern areas remained relatively stable.<sup>292</sup> Subsequently, Prime Minister Al-Khalifa decided to visit the territory to personally assess the security situation, prompting Khartoum to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward resolving the Southern problems. As such, the government initiated developmental policies aimed at providing social amenities in Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, Khartoum initiated dialogue with SANU's members in exile and simultaneously, the prime minister appealed to all Southerners to return to the South, and he declared a general amnesty for all Southerners who left Sudan in January 1955. Furthermore, Khartoum rescinded its Southernization policy, encouraged the resettlement of Southern refugees into the South, and discouraged the emigration of Northerners in the area to strengthen the fragile unity between the Southerners and Northerners.<sup>293</sup>

Against this background, Khartoum focused more on creating an atmosphere of peace and stability in Southern Sudan by prioritizing the region's problems. Concurrently, the Southern Front reinforced these efforts by reassuring the Southerners about Al-Khalifa's proactive attempts to restore stability among them.<sup>294</sup> Similarly in Wau, SF sent its delegates to the bush to persuade the Anya-Nya rebels to surrender their weapons after they clashed with the security forces. Simultaneously, the governor of Equatoria created a committee for improving peaceful relations between Northerners and Southerners.<sup>295</sup>

Accordingly, during the Christmas of 1964, in Yambio members of the Sudanese army, police, wardens, and the Anya-Nya all participated in the celebration. Anya-Nya forces in the city freely carried their weapons without any concerns about being detained by the Sudanese troops who were

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290. *Ibid.*

291. Mohamed Beshir Said "Interior Minister Concludes Visit To Southern Sudan: Situation Improves As Mutineers Lay Down Arms" *The Morning News* 7 December 1964.

292. Mahgoub Mohammed Saleh "Khartoum Continues To Be Quiet as Strong Security Forces Maintains Order", *The Morning News* December 10, 1964.

293. Saleh, "Situation in South Calls for Close Supervision," *The Morning News* December 14, 1964.

294. Saleh, "1500 Southern Refugees to Return Home," *The Morning News* December 16, 1964.

295. Saleh, "Southern Front in Wau Calls for A Cease-Fire," *The Morning News* December 17, 1964.

also on alert. This pleasant atmosphere provided the city's inhabitants with freedom of expression, which facilitated the prevalence of political meetings, especially among the Azande. These gatherings deliberated about political events in Khartoum and Southern Sudan. Anya-Nya rebels, arriving from refugee camps in DRC and CAR, attended these meetings even with security forces and warders as regular bystanders. During one of these events a representative of the Anya-Nya from Congo questioned the justification for the ceasefire because both Clement Mboro and Al-Khalifa who initiated its implementation were politicians, not soldiers therefore, fighting in the South must continue. In another meeting, a Southern intellectual expressed his opposition to war and emphasized the possibility of an amicable compromise between Khartoum and Southerners. These events depicted the gradual resurgence of liberal politics in the South.<sup>296</sup>

### ***THE ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE OF 1965 AND THE FALL OF SOUTHERN PARTIES***

After the inauguration of the interim government, William Deng wrote a letter to Al-Khalifa about the need for a conference between the Southern and Northern leaders. Khartoum acknowledged this idea based on its domestic policy of restoring stability and peace in the South. Eventually, the conference convened on 16 March 1965 in Khartoum. The participants included representatives of SANU and SF from the South, and the Umma Party, National Union Party, Sudan Communist Party, and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) from the North. In addition, representatives from Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Egypt served as external observers. Professor Nasir Dafalla, Chancellor of Khartoum University, chaired the conference, while Mohammed Omer Beshir, a renowned Sudanese historian, and Khartoum University's Academic Secretary, headed the secretariat.<sup>297</sup>

At the conference, issues highlighted included the historical feud between the North and South, their socioeconomic disparities, the impact of the lop-sided colonial and post-colonial policies on the South, and the evolution of constitutional development up to Sudan's independence. The pre-existing feud among the Southern representatives made them indecisive on whether the South wanted self-determination or co-existence with the North as a federated country.<sup>298</sup> Thus, Aggrey Jaden's SANU faction, whose members operated outside Sudan, advocated for the South's separation from the North while William Deng's SANU, constituted by Southern politicians within Sudan, preferred federal status for the South. Between these choices, SF proposed the option of self-determination for the South through a plebiscite. The prevalent unrest in the South made provided impertinent providing the Northern delegates with the opportunity to temporize about resolving the Southern crisis.<sup>299</sup>

Accordingly, the Northern politicians pointed to colonial practices such the Southern Policy as the root of the Southern crisis. In this context, Al-Khalifa contended that the South and North's division during the Condominium era had undermined the possibility of unification throughout the post-colonial period. Moreover, by deciding the pace and path of educational growth in Southern

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296. SAD.851/13/1-67 Penesi Erisa Memoirs.

297. Alier, 44-46.

298. *Ibid.*

299. *Ibid.*

Sudan, the missionaries widened this division by miseducating the Southerners, thereby, compromising the harmony between the Northerners and Southerners.<sup>300</sup>

Therefore, the Northerners concluded that granting the South the privilege to either federate or secede would be tantamount to conceding to imperialistic and missionary influences, which allegedly spurred the Southerners' political demands. At this point, the Northern representatives questioned the legitimacy of the Southern representatives based on the Southern guerrillas' absence from the conference coupled with the Southern politicians' inability to enforce the ceasefire in the South. In addition, the Northerners argued that not all the Southern political groups participated in the conference by alluding to the Other Shades of Opinion (OSO). The Northerners haphazardly organized this group of Southern politicians to compromise the unity between SANU and Southern Front. However, the Southern leaders' resentment against the emergence of OSO led to its withdrawal from the conference.<sup>301</sup>

The Northern and Southern delegations abruptly adjourned the summit after days of heated dispute. The Northern delegates used this situation to conceal the perception that the conference's deadlock escalated the Anya-Nya hostilities in the South and to reassure the international community about the amicable relationship between the Northern and Southern Sudan. Therefore, the Northern participants postponed the meeting for three months and afterwards reconvened it and formed a 12-member committee, constituted by Northern and Southern members, that would examine constitutional, administrative, and financial links between the South and the central government. These recommendations would be submitted to Khartoum for consideration during the second round-table conference. Furthermore, the committee would initiate a crash programme for the South aimed at the resettlement of Southern refugees, the Southernization of the South's administrative system, the equalisation of salaries between the North and South for similar work, and the creation of a university and a girl's secondary school in the South. To reinforce these policies, religious freedom would be guaranteed and funding for socio-economic development would be provided.<sup>302</sup>

After the second conference, the rivalry and disagreement among SANU members became intense. According to Alier, Northern politicians exploited this situation by supporting William Deng and securing his participation in the twelve-man committee. Additionally, the Northern politicians from the Umma Party backed Deng as a potential ally in the South. However, Aggrey Jaden's SANU was ostracized from the committee on the grounds that Jaden's faction conducted its activities in exile. These events aggravated the feud between Deng and Jaden's SANU factions and culminated with the official dismissal of Deng from SANU. Nevertheless, Deng's SANU retained its foothold among the political parties in the North.<sup>303</sup>

By June 1965, the Southern Front became officially registered as a political party with Clement Mboro as its president, Gordon Muortat as its vice president, and Hilary Paul Logali as the party's secretary general. The *Vigilant*, SF's official bulletin, became the media outlet for

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300. Manoeli, 92.

301. *Ibid*, 93-94.

302. Alier, 47.

303. *Ibid*.

popularizing the groups' policies and activities. Against this backdrop, Deng's SANU and SF vied for the hearts and minds of the Southerners. Therefore, on 16 March 1966, SANU held a symposium in commemoration of the Roundtable Conference during which Deng castigated the Front's political activities in the South since the fall of Abboud's regime. According to Deng, the Front took advantage of SANU's exiled years from the South to further its own political agenda among the Southerners at the expense of SANU. Rather than relinquishing its political influence on SANU when it returned to the Southern region in January 1965, Southern Front continued its activities. SFs' leaders were also chastised for professing to be a Southern party yet refusing to visit the South owing to widespread insecurity. Deng highlighted this predicament as the reason the Front delayed its participation in the Southern elections.<sup>304</sup>

As a retort to these accusations, the Front's *Vigilant* criticized the unholy alliance between Deng and the Umma party. From the Front's perspective, Khartoum's support for Deng's faction reinforced its proposition for an election in the South. The Front's leaders also admitted their wariness of visiting the South due to its insecurity. They even accused Deng of being unable to visit the South without the presence of an army escort based on the fear of attack. Eventually, neither party achieved its political objectives worsening their acrimony. Later, the Southern Front's political clout in the South and Khartoum waned, especially after Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub became the prime minister of Sudan in April 1965 under the umbrella of the Umma Party. Hence, Deng's faction, Southern politicians based in Khartoum, became the most recognized Southern party in the North. However, before Deng's assassination in 1968 his SANU faction splintered into rival Dinka political groups.<sup>305</sup>

Meanwhile, disagreement among members of Jaden's SANU faction, especially between Aggrey Jaden and Joseph Oduho, led to its splintering into several political groups such as the Azania Liberation Front, the Nile Provisional Government, and the Aniyidi government. This situation portrayed the fragile political unity and rivalry among the Southern leaders.<sup>306</sup> Nevertheless, the personality clashes between Southern leaders were often resolved, such as the feud between Oduho and Aggrey and led to the emergence of the Southern Azania Liberation Front (SALF). The Southern leaders' access to diverse sources of funds, from external donors and other sources, fomented divisiveness among them undermining the possibility of uniting Southern ethnic groups. For instance, Father Saturnino refused to transfer financial aid received on behalf of SALF owing to the opposition against Oduho's leadership of the party.<sup>307</sup>

Afterwards, Jaden formed the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) and made a concerted effort to resolve the leadership crisis within the Southern movement in exile. To achieve this objective, Jaden revamped the Anya-Nya's activities by renaming the Southern rebel as Anya-Nya National Armed Forces (ANAF) to reflect its national mission and a hierarchical structure

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304. BNA/FO/371/190417 *A Symposium held by the Sudan National Union on 16th March 1966 About the Southern Question.*

305. Tim Allen "Full Circle? : An Overview of Sudan's Southern Problem Since Independence", *Northeast African Studies* 1989 Vol II, No.2 (1989) 41-46.

306. SAD.32/31 *The Political leadership of The Anya-Nya Movement by Nyamllell Wakoson.*

307. SOA *The Rise of the Provisional Government in Southern Sudan* presented by McCall Storr at the University of College Nairobi from December 8 to 12 1969.

was instituted within the guerrilla force. Akuot Atem, a Dinka politician from Bahr-el-Ghazal, became SSPG's defence minister, and Joseph Lagu, the chief of staff. Furthermore, Emmanuel Abur, Samuel Abujohn, and Fedrick Brian Maggot were appointed as general staff. The new tiered organization attempted to end the problems of decentralization and ethnocentrism within the Anya-Nya troops. Moreover, this restructuring would simplify the coordination of military operations and distribution of resources among the Southern rebel troops.<sup>308</sup>

Yet different issues undermined SSPG's initiatives, resulting in its demise. This included ineffective communication, which hampered SSPG's operational activities in the South. For example, it took the Provisional Government 45 days to convey communications by foot between several Upper Nile towns, and messages transmitted from Western Equatoria to Eastern Equatoria took three to four weeks to arrive. Furthermore, the disparities in the level of education between the more educated new recruits and illiteracy among old members of the ANAF affected the coordination among the Southern troops. These issues and the leadership rivalry forced Jaden to resign from the SSPG in late 1968. Concurrently, fighting continued between the Southern rebels and Khartoum forces in the Southern region.<sup>309</sup>

### ***RESURGENCE OF THE SOUTHERN FORCES IN THE COLD WAR***

As Sudan's foreign minister in 1958, Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub was one of Khartoum's political ideologues who refuted the Southerners' aspiration for a federation and recommended the use of military force against Anya-Nya's rebellion in Southern Sudan.<sup>310</sup> Therefore, after Maghoub became Sudan's prime minister in 1965, Khartoum resumed an aggressive policy toward the unrest in the South. Hence, stern measures in dealing with the chaotic situation led to the creation of "Peace Villages or Camps" in the Southern territories.<sup>311</sup>

Initially, Khartoum established these camps in cities or along important roadways to provide a haven for Southern refugees and others seeking safety from Anya-Nya assaults. Survivors of arson and turmoil in the Southern areas were brought to these camps, and two-thirds of the residents were women, children, and the elderly. As in other counterinsurgency campaigns concentrating civilians in fortified camps served to break their connections with the rebels. The conditions in these camps were akin to concentration camps. Hunger, poor sanitation, and sickness became prevalent in these camps.<sup>312</sup> Maghoub's administration orchestrated the massacre of Southern intellectuals a few months after the inauguration of these camps.<sup>313</sup> Consequently, the number of

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308. *Ibid.*

309. SOA *The Rise of the Provisional Government in Southern Sudan* presented by McCall Storr at the University of College Nairobi from December 8 to 12 1969. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed May 2022).

310. McCall and Akol, 114-115.

311. Karadawi, *Refugee Policy in Sudan 1967-1984* 31. Huw Bennett's *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counterinsurgency in Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) and Michael Shafer's *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014) illustrate how peace camps and villages were used as a counterinsurgency measure in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising (1952-1960) and during the Vietnam War (1955- 1975).

312. SOA Voice of Southern Sudan *Peace Camps* 15 March 1969. No.3 New Series. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed May 2022).

313. Poggio, *The First Sudanese Civil War*. 87-88.

Southerners that fled into neighbouring countries such as DRC increased from 8,000 in January 1965 to 22,000 in January 1966 which coincided with the end of the Congo Crisis.<sup>314</sup>

Afterwards, the defeated Simba rebels bartered their ammunition with the Southern Sudanese for food, clothing and shelter. Similarly, mercenaries in Congo either sold or exchanged their weapons and those captured from Simba rebels to the Anya-Nya for ivory, leopard skins, rhinoceros' horn, and crocodile skins.<sup>315</sup> Some of these mercenaries and the Southern Sudanese rebels inevitably formed a relationship. Moreover, the Anya-Nya troops foiled the Simba's attempt to compromise the mercenaries' operations between the border of Southern Sudan and Congo. Thus, mercenary soldiers like Colonel Bell Syer, an ex-British officer, had an amicable relationship with the Southern insurgents. Eventually, before Syer departed Congo in 1965, Lagu solicited the colonel's aid as a military consultant and as a conduit for the acquisition of armaments from Kenya, Uganda, or Ethiopia.<sup>316</sup>

In retaliation against Khartoum's support for the Simba rebels, the Congolese army transferred weaponry recovered from the insurgents to the Anya-Nya. As a result, soldiers from various sections of Southern Sudan went to Congo's borders to acquire these weapons. According to Poggo, these events provided Anya-Nya soldiers, mainly those stationed in the Central and Equatoria provinces, with unusual access to weaponry and ammunition, assisting their activity in South Sudan. Simultaneously, before the collapse of SSPG, Aggrey Jaden met with Moise Tshombe, the Congolese Prime Minister, in Leopoldville and solicited military assistance on behalf of the Southern guerrillas. After this meeting, the Congolese provided Lagu with military paraphernalia including radio facilities. Lagu also used this opportunity to establish an Anya-Nya training camp in Garamba Park in Congo.<sup>317</sup>

By mid-1965, Maghoub's emergence as Sudan's prime minister followed by Khartoum's amicable foreign policy towards the West and its allies, including the Congolese government, affected the Anya-Nya forces' access to arms and ammunition. Thus, Leopoldville cancelled its military aid to the Southern rebels while Lagu abandoned military training in Garamba Park and relocated to Eastern Equatoria.<sup>318</sup> Later in 1965, Israel supplanted the Congolese as the Southern rebels' supplier of arms and ammunition countering Khartoum's alliance with other Arab countries whose armies' Israeli forces defeated during the June 1967 Six Day War. Within the context of the Cold War, this situation provided the Soviets with the opportunity to reinforce their diplomatic ties with Khartoum and other Arab countries while they became estranged from Washington.<sup>319</sup> Moreover, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Khartoum expedited the arms deal it initiated with the Eastern Bloc a year earlier. As such, Sudan acquired some obsolete MG-17 jet fighters, naval equipment, and other weaponry.<sup>320</sup> Afterwards, the Maghoub administration sponsored the fourth

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314. Karadawi, 32-33.

315. *Ibid.*

316. BNA FO 371/190417 *Colonel Bell-Syre mercenary operating on the Sudan/Congo Border asked by Anya-Nya to return to the Sudan as their chief military advisor and to supply them with arms.*

317. Poggo, 154.

318. *Ibid.*

319. SAD.851/13/1-67 *Penesi Erisa Memoirs.*

320. Pace Eric "Sudan Said to Buy Russian Weapons," *New York Times* August 10, 1967.

Arab Summit held in Khartoum during which participating Arab countries vented their opposition against Israeli occupation of territories in Palestine.<sup>321</sup>

Back in the South, SSPG facilitated the communication between Lagu and Israeli officials, resulting in the revitalization and reinforcement of Anya-Nya's operation throughout Southern Sudan. Concurrently, this development strengthened Lagu's position as the head of the Southern force.<sup>322</sup> Afterwards, Lagu and a few Southern cadets received training in military science, communications, administration, medical treatment, intelligence, demolition, and battlefield tactics in Tel Aviv. In addition, through Israeli military aid, Lagu established a military academy at Anya-Nya's headquarters at Owiny-ku-Bul, located in the Equatoria area. Moreover, Israel's diplomatic relations with Uganda facilitated the transfer of arms and ammunition from Kampala to the Southern rebels. Soon, diplomatic ties between Israel and Uganda became estranged which compromised Ana-Nya's operation. Nevertheless, other neighbouring and pro-Western African governments such as Ethiopia, Zaire, and Kenya, under the leadership of Emperor Haile Selassie, President Mobutu Sese Seko and Jomo Kenyatta respectively espoused their sympathies for the cause of the Southerners. Thus, these leaders aided the transfer of Israeli arms and ammunition to the Southern rebels through their countries.<sup>323</sup>

Religious humanitarian groups such as the Catholic Church's Caritas International Aid and Verona Fathers, through the instrumentality of German mercenary Rolf Steiner, a German mercenary, provided logistical support for the Southerners. Hitherto, Steiner and Caritas International aided the Biafran rebels against the Federal government of Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).<sup>324</sup> In 1969, Steiner illegally entered Sudan with a false West German passport provided by the Frankfurt based Society for The Support for Africa while the Sudan-Biafra committee provided him with an exit visa. After arriving in Southern Sudan, Steiner's mission focused on gathering information about the assistance that could be provided to the Southern rebels.<sup>325</sup> Hence, Steiner committed himself to the Southern cause by imploring missionary groups in West Germany and other philanthropic groups to aid the Southern Sudanese. This development provided various leaders of the Southern rebels with the opportunity to communicate with the Biafran-Sudan Action Committee which had aided the secessionist Biafran government during the Nigerian Civil War.<sup>326</sup> Steiner also made it possible to smuggle drugs, hire mercenaries, and organize and train Southern rebels to use different weapons. Despite Steiner's commitment to the Southerners' cause, the Israeli military advisors indicated their displeasure with the soldier of fortune's presence in Lagu's military headquarters at Owiny-ki-Bul because of Steiner's German heritage. Afterward, Lagu advised Steiner to return to Germany and solicit funds

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321. Yoram Meital "The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy After the 1967 War: A Reexamination," *Middle East Journal* 2000, Vol. 54, No 1. (2000), 64-82.

322. Poggo, 158-161.

323. *Ibid.*

324. *Mercenary on Trial: The Opening Speech of The Persecution* The Sudan Standard 9 August 1971. Joseph E. Thompson's *American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War 1966-1970* (New York: Greenwood, Press 1990) examines the role of Caritas International and other religious groups in providing relief aid for the Biafrans during the Nigerian Civil War.

325. *Ibid.*

326. Poggo, 161-163.

on behalf of the Southerners. These occurrences underline the consistent roles of ecumenical groups in supporting the Southerners' cause.<sup>327</sup>

By 1970, given his access to military resources from the Israelis, Lagu successfully united the warring factions in the South under the umbrella of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Lagu's ability to unify the entire Anya-Nya Southern forces, and weapons from Israel, transformed the Southern rebels into a formidable fighting force. Then, Anya-Nya regionalised its Southern operations, thus, Bari Anya-Nya remained in central Equatoria, Dinka Anya-Nya in Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Nuer Anya-Nya in the Upper Nile. Therefore, the Southern rebels were now divided into ethnic factions, operating in different parts of the Southern regions. Then the Equatorians easily received military equipment from Owiny-ki-Bul, the Dinka in Bahr-el-Ghazal obtained arms from Angundri, a town in East Equatoria, the Nuer in the Upper Nile remained independent from external military aid due to the logistical problems. As such, Lagu had a nominal rather than an actual authority over the area.<sup>328</sup>

The emergence of SSLM revitalized operations of Anya-Nya which embarked on an aggressive offensive against Khartoum's forces. Subsequently, General Jafar Nimeiry spearheaded a coup which toppled the irresolute civilian administration in Khartoum on 29 May 1969. After coming to power, Nimeiry reinforced the Sudanese forces' war efforts in the South by providing them with helicopters, MIG-17s, and Soviet advisors.<sup>329</sup> Around 26,000 men were conscripted into the Sudanese army, which consisted of four infantry brigades each made up of four infantry battalions, one armoured and one paratroop regiment. Nimeiry's forces employed a broad range of counterinsurgency tactics against the Southern rebels, including aerial bombardment of cattle enclosures in the Upper Nile and bombing and firing rockets at Anya-Nya camps and bases. Furthermore, Soviet helicopters provided close support for government troops while they attacked Anya-Nya bases, camps, and blocked escape routes.<sup>330</sup>

The return of Northern prison guards and police officers to Southern Sudan aggravated the chaotic situation in the territory. They maltreated civilians while they indiscriminately searched for Anya-Nya loyalists among them. In addition, since 1962, the conversion of many Southern schools into army barracks spurred many schoolboys between the ages of eight to twelve to join the Anya-Nya youth camps where they became ardent members of the guerrilla forces till the end of the war.<sup>331</sup> Meanwhile, the Southern rebels sabotaged streamers, attacked riverboats, and derailed trains to compromise the communication and movement of Sudanese troops in the South.<sup>332</sup> For instance, in late July and August 1971, seven Sudanese military vehicles were destroyed by Anya-Nya's mines and ambushes near Okulu along Torit-Magawi Road.

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327. *Ibid.*

328. *Ibid.*

329. *Ibid.*

330. Edgar O. Ballance *Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism* (London: MacMillan, Press 2000) 71-72.

331. SAD.851/13/68-103 Erisa Penesi Memoirs.

332. SAD.642/13/14 Grass Curtain *Anya-Nya: Anya-Nya Hits Enemy Communications in All Provinces* No 6. November 1971.



Concurrently, in April, the Southern rebels disrupted and later destroyed Wau's railroad operation. As such, the battle between the warring factions became a deadlock.<sup>333</sup>

### ***A CONTROVERSIAL PEACE TREATY: ADDIS ABABA PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE REVITALIZATION OF HUMANITARIANISM IN SOUTHERN SUDAN***

The impact of the humanitarian efforts of WCC, SCC, and other ecumenical agencies among the Southern Sudanese determined the vital roles of these agencies in facilitating the peace process that would end the war in 1972. Afterward, these religious NGOs significantly contributed to the relief and rehabilitation programs in the Southern regions. Before the commencement of these events, the Sudanese government had to deal with its political problems. On 19 July 1971, the Sudanese Communist Party, together with other political groups in Khartoum, orchestrated a bloodless coup against Nimeiry, given his waning political base in the North. Thereafter, Egyptian and Libyan forces facilitated the reinstatement of Nimeiry. Henceforward, Nimeiry's domestic policy focused on reviving his regime's popularity in Sudan by finding feasible solutions to the intractable Southern crisis, which affected Sudan's economic progress.<sup>334</sup>

To resolve the turmoil in the South, Nimeiry appointed Abel Alier as one of the vice presidents of Sudan, and as the liaison between Khartoum and the Southern rebels. Alier's renown as a lawyer and politician, his moderate political views, and popularity among Southerners led to his appointment as a mediator between Khartoum and the Southern insurgents now controlled by SSLM.<sup>335</sup> Subsequently, Alier sought to involve the participation of religious and humanitarian agencies in Europe such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the Verona Fathers, German Caritas, and Oxfam in resolving the civil war. Besides, these religious and humanitarian agencies' involvement in relief and reconstruction projects in Southern Sudan after the war necessitated their inclusion in the peace process.<sup>336</sup>

For instance, the WCC provided financial and logistical support for the Sudan Council of Churches, established in 1965 and comprised of Catholic and Protestant churches situated in Northern and Southern Sudan. While the concerned mediators discussed the peace process between the belligerents, WCC appealed for around \$500,000 from other related relief agencies for SCC's relief and rehabilitation programs in the Southern regions.<sup>337</sup> Subsequently, the latter ecumenical organization established its own Commission on Relief and Rehabilitation which instituted various humanitarian projects on behalf of churches in Sudan. Hence, within the South, SCC concentrated on three main relief operations the first focusing on the creation of reception centers, catering for Southern refugees returning from neighbouring countries. Second, SCC became involved in the renovation of educational and medical facilities in the South, and lastly

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333. SOA. Grass Curtain, *Any-Nya Operation Bulletin July-August 1971* Vol.2 No. 2 October 1971. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed May 2022).

334. Poggio, 175-179.

335. *Ibid*, 178-79.

336. Alier *Southern Sudan* 90-91.

337. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Archive 11/2/41-410.WCC.SUD.South 1972-1974 Records of the Central Registry.

SCC was charged with the responsibility of constructing new educational and medical facilities in strategic localities in the Southern territories.<sup>338</sup>

Similarly, the African Committee for Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan (ACROSS) constituted by a group of African based evangelical missions, churches, and other religious bodies engaged in implementing several relief and rehabilitation schemes among the Southerners. In August 1972, ACROSS stakeholders declared the religious NGO's relief and rehabilitation initiatives for the Southern regions, including the provision of temporary dispensaries in Nimule, delivery of agricultural implements for returnees in the Southern regions, and the creation of vocational centers at Juba. ACROSS also prioritized the harnessing of resources situated in the Southern regions by consulting experts on the best ways to utilize the locality's agricultural and forestry resources. Additionally, ACROSS also prioritized the development of manpower skills among the Southerners by establishing medical training schools in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile region.<sup>339</sup>

Meanwhile, Khartoum's ceasefire order in December 1971 culminated in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of February 1972, leading to the compromise between the Sudanese government and the Southern rebel movement. Under Lagu's leadership, prominent SSLM members such as Ezbon Mundri, Lawrence Wol Wol, and Mading De Garang spearheaded the peace talks on behalf of the Southerners. In Poggo's view, war fatigue among the Southern rebels and issues of insubordination among the Anya-Nya commanders galvanized SSLM's participation in the peace negotiations.<sup>340</sup>

Although Alier and Lagu attempted to invite exiled Southern politicians such as Gordon Muortat, and Elia Lupe, to the talks in Ethiopia, they expressed their reservations about the viability of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The exiled politicians' animosity towards Lagu's leadership of the Southern delegates on the eve of the peace initiatives made them indifferent. Thus, the absence of these exiled politicians during the negotiations fomented controversies about the clauses of the peace agreement of 1972.<sup>341</sup> Five considerations encapsulated the peace treaty, including the regional autonomy of the Southern territories, the creation of a Southern Assembly, and the provision of amnesty for exiled Southerners. The incorporation of Southern rebels into the national armed forces, and the implementation of developmental policies and projects, and the education and training of Southerners were agreed during the peace talks.<sup>342</sup>

Despite these clauses, the critics of the peace agreement cited the hasty manner through which Southern Sudan became recognized an autonomous region without proper deliberation which compromised the Southerners' independence from Khartoum. For instance, Article I of the treaty

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338. Roland Werner, William Anderson, Andrew Wheeler *Day of Devastation Day of Contentment: History of The Sudanese Church Across 2000 years* (Nairobi: Paulines Publications, Africa 2000), 341-343.

339. UNHCR Archive 11/2/41-410 *Non-governmental Organizations-Africa Committee for Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan 1972-1972*. Records of the Central Registry.

340. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War* 178-181.

341. Alier, *Southern Sudan* 111-113.

342. M.A. Mohamed Salih, "Responding to Situations of Mass Voluntary Return: Past Experience in Sudan" in *In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa* edited by Tim Allen. Geneva United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 164-169.

underlined the autonomous status of the South. However, the appointment of the High Executive Council (HEC) president would be ratified by the Sudanese president. Therefore, Khartoum still controlled Southern Sudan despite its autonomous status. Furthermore, Article 12 of the treaty gave Khartoum the power to monitor the administrative processes in the South if needed. Based on this clause, the Southern critics highlighted the underlying restrictions on political activities in the South.<sup>343</sup>

The Addis Ababa Agreement also eschewed HEC deliberation on national defence, foreign affairs, nationality and immigration, economic planning, and development. Gordon M. Mayen, an exiled Southern politician, argued that apart from issues concerning defence, foreign affairs, and currency, the Southern Regional Assembly should have the power to legislate over the immigration, trade, communication, and educational development of the South. As such, these limitations would hinder the Southern Regional Assembly's responsiveness to the Southerners. Moreover, the Agreement failed to address issues relating to the judicial process for the Southerners therefore Khartoum retained its monopoly of judicial powers over the South.<sup>344</sup>

After 1972, secular NGOs and international organizations such as Red Cross, UNHCR, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund, and others became involved in the rehabilitation and resettlement process in different parts of Southern Sudan. Hence, these aid organizations implemented various relief and rehabilitation programs among the Southerners. For instance, UNHCR facilitated educational programs among returnees especially among children. By 1974, around 80,000 children in the South benefited from UNHCR's literacy scheme. The World Bank and other foreign donors also provided dispensaries, health centers, hospitals, and other social amenities needed in the Southern regions were provided by various foreign donors. In some cases, religious and secular NGOs collaborated like the Norwegian Church Aid and UNHCR in the Equatoria region to broaden their capacities to provide humanitarian assistance for the Southerners. Through these efforts aid organizations gradually established their influence in Southern Sudan.<sup>345</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The beginning and end of the First Sudanese Civil War were watershed moments in the history of Sudan. The legacies of colonialism in Sudan, post-colonial politics, and the global Cold War determined the civil war's causes, course, and consequences. On the eve of Sudan's independence, the lingering disparities between the Northerners and Southerners, amplified during the colonial period, became a national issue. Unfortunately, Khartoum's hardline policies towards Southern Sudan worsened the tensions between the North and South. Moreover, the advent of Abboud's regime emboldened the Northerners' authoritarian attitude towards the Southerners. Despite the challenges encountered among the Southerners, the war facilitated the formation of SANU and its military wing Anya-Nya. Hence, SANU championed the Southerners' civil rights and catered for

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343.SOA *The Addis Ababa Agreement on Southern Sudan is Being Scrapped*. <https://sudanarchive.net/> (accessed June 2022).

344.SAD.944/7/6-8 *Comments on the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of the Southern Sudan by Gordon Murotat Mayen* March 21, 1972.

345. Alier, 150-151.

Southern refugees in neighbouring countries. Importantly, the civil war also prompted the interventionist role of the religious NGOs including Verona Fathers, Caritas International and World Council of Church(WCC) in the affairs of the Southerners. This development also highlighted the emerging roles of international ecumenical NGOs and their partners in the affairs of the Southerners. Moreover, through the instrumentality of SCA, Anya-Nya procured miscellaneous support from WCC. These events set the precedence for the collaborative relationship between relief agencies and rebel groups in Southern Sudan.

However, issues such as ethnic rivalry, competition for political power, ideological differences, corruption, and nepotism compromised the development SANU and the Southern Front's political activities in the South. Before the emergence of Maghoub's administration in Sudan in 1965, Khartoum attempted to reconcile with the Southerners yet the division among the Southern leaders compromised this possibility. Eventually, the Roundtable Conference of 1965 reflected the fragile unity among the Southern politicians. The revitalization of the Southern rebel's operation depicts how the war became internationalized through external aid from WCC, Caritas International, Verona Fathers, Israel, and other African countries. Concurrently, Lagu effectively reorganized the Southern forces under the umbrella of SSLM, yet the unresolved internal division and rivalry among SANU instigated the controversy over the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the First Civil War between North and South but not the ethnic issues among the Southerners. Within the context of these events, the involvement of different aid agencies facilitating various humanitarian projects underlined the emerging influences of these non-state actors in Southern Sudan.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### ***THE SECOND SUDANESE CIVIL WAR: THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SPLM/A) AND HUMANITARIANISM IN SOUTHERN SUDAN (1973-1988)***

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The longest civil war in post-colonial African history the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), initiated the symbiotic relationship between the Southern Sudan rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), International Organizations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). The genesis of this mutual relationship started after the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) when IOs and NGOs such as Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan (ACROSS) and World Health Organization (WHO) collaborated with the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Regional Government (SRG) to facilitate developmental projects and relief aid for the Southern Sudanese. By the mid-1970s, Khartoum and SRG's economic and political problems hampered their commitment to the development of Southern Sudan. Concurrently, IOs and NGOs' ability to effectively contain the outbreak of Marburg in 1976 and manage the influx of Ugandan refugees into the Southern regions in the early 1980s underscored their indispensable role among the Southerners. In contrast, Khartoum's indifference towards the Southerners' welfare, followed by the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) of 1972, which ended the First Civil War, rekindled the grievances and the insurgence of Southern rebels such as Anya-Nya II. By May 1983, the prevalent civil disturbances in the South and the mutiny of the southern military officers culminated in the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War between the SPLA, which eventually supplanted Anya-Nya II, and the Sudanese government.

This chapter examines the effects of these events on the collapse of IO and NGO developmental projects at the advent of the Second Sudanese Civil War, which later led to the evacuation of relief workers from different parts of the Southern regions. Concurrently in the North, the civil war reinforced IO and NGO operations in Khartoum as they catered for the influx of Southern refugees. Meanwhile, Khartoum's recruitment of militia forces against the SPLA in the South compounded the issue of famine and insecurity, prompting the exodus of Southerners to the North and neighbouring countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The IOs and NGOs in these countries provided relief aid to the influx of Southern refugees and airlifted humanitarian relief to Southern Sudan. By the mid-1980s, SPLA and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) battled to control different parts of Southern Sudan, coinciding with the attempt by IOs and NGOs to gain access and provide relief aid to Southerners. These crises worsened the South's famine crisis.

This chapter argues that the constrained access of IOs and NGOs to areas controlled by Khartoum and SPLA galvanized their attempt to broker a ceasefire between the warring factions. It also analyzes humanitarian agencies' capacity to confront and harness different challenges they encountered in the South, expanding the scope of their mandate beyond providing relief aid. This

development laid the groundwork for their concurrent humanitarian operations within both government-controlled and SPLA-held regions thereby establishing their interdependent relationship with the liberation army. Farther from Southern Sudan, the final part of this chapter explores the convergence between SPLA and relief agency operations from the mid-1980s during the civil war in Ethiopia, the refugee crisis in Uganda, and the Kenyan government's strained relations with Khartoum. It examines the impacts of these events on SPLA's affiliation with NGOs and IOs, which resulted in the expansion of SPLA's operations in East Africa and the formation of its relief wing, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA). Eventually, SRRA, in conjunction with NGOs, facilitated the liberation army's coordination of relief aid in Southern Sudan.

### ***A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM: RELIEF AGENCIES AND WAR IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT***

The abolitionist movement and Christian missionaries who campaigned against the dehumanization and inhumanity perpetrated by slavery in the late 18th century represented the forerunners of contemporary humanitarian agencies. These groups argued against slavery as it compromised the fundamental human rights of enslaved people and contradicted Christian beliefs. Thereafter, by the early 19th century, the missionaries collaborated with the British Empire in establishing new colonies in different parts of the world, thereby facilitating the institutionalization of imperial humanitarianism through the spread of Christianity, commerce, and civilization.<sup>346</sup> Concurrently, in Europe, the aftermaths of conflicts such as the Crimean War (1854-1856) and the Battle of Solferino in 1859 in Italy facilitated the development of humanitarianism in the 19th century. Hence, innovative health reforms, the enactment of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the first Geneva Convention of 1864, and the creation of the International Committee of Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC) underlined a new era in humanitarianism globally.<sup>347</sup>

In contrast with the armed conflicts in the late 19th century, World War I (1914-1918) and II (1939-1945) caused more casualties with advanced weapons and the pursuit of total war. Consequently, these catastrophic events galvanized the creation of NGOs in Britain and the US after WWI that provided humanitarian aid for their European allies. Nevertheless, humanitarian agencies such as Save the Children Fund (SCF), a British-based NGO established in 1919, delivered relief aid to those in need regardless of their country. In the aftermath of WW II, the operations of humanitarian agencies expanded with the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiary agencies, including the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).<sup>348</sup> Other specialized UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Relief Organization, later known as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) were also established during the post-war years. This development coincided with the emergence of NGOs such as Cooperative for American Remittance to Europe (CARE) and Catholic Relief Service (CRS) aimed at facilitating relief aid during the post-war years in Europe. Inevitably,

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346. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 57-75.

347. Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss *Humanitarianism, War and Politics*, (New York: Rowman and Little Field, 2018), 41.

348. Barnett, 107-131.

through the instrumentality of the War Relief Control Board and legislation, the US government tightened its control over the operations of these US NGOs overseas. In subsequent years, relief agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) were affiliated with the US and Norwegian governments, respectively, while UNHCR and WHO are UN agencies, and Oxfam and ICRC are NGOs with national branches in different countries.<sup>349</sup>

By the mid-1950s, different circumstances determined IOs' and NGOs' responses to political crises globally. For instance, the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) highlights ICRC's circumscribed operations within Algeria's political milieu. The French government viewed the conflict as an internal issue and banned the phrase "Algerian Civil War", which it perceived as an insurrection against French colonial authority. Initially, these issues constrained ICRC's operation in the region, however, by 1955, Paris permitted ICRC to visit detention sites and offer relief aid to detainees but refuted the implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) on their behalf. Subsequently, ICRC approached FLN, labelled as a terrorist group by the French government, and encouraged its National Liberation Army to observe IHL in dealing with its prisoners. FLN exploited its communication with ICRC as a means of publicizing the international dimension of the conflict.<sup>350</sup> Moreover, the meeting between the ICRC and FLN representatives led to the creation of the Algerian Red Cross, which ICRC agreed to collaborate with despite its non-recognition as a national organization due to Algeria's colonial status. On January 5, 1960, *Le Monde*, a French newspaper, published ICRC reports about the dehumanization of Algerian prisoners, which led to the closure of clandestine French detention centers.<sup>351</sup>

Not all NGOs could maintain their independence and neutrality while operating in war-torn regions. For instance, CRS and CARE's affiliations with the US government during the Cold War shaped their operations during the Vietnam War (1955-1975). Therefore, based on US Cold War foreign policy, both NGOs supported the Washington-backed Diem government in South Vietnam against the communist rebels backed by North Vietnam. By the mid-1950s, the resettlement of Northern refugees in the South determined CRS's concentration of all its humanitarian projects in the South.<sup>352</sup> Furthermore, by 1967, CRS implemented its most extensive food aid programme in Vietnam, mainly among the US-allied Popular Force militia group and their dependents. Soon, this situation became a controversial issue, compromising CRS's association with the US government.<sup>353</sup>

Meanwhile, the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) between the Nigerian federal government and Biafra secessionist forces became the next major disaster relief operation for many NGOs. During

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349. *Ibid.*

350. Ashley Jackson and Eleanor Davey *From the Spanish Civil War to the War in Afghanistan: Historical and Contemporary Reflections on Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Actors*. London Humanitarian Policy Group 2014. <https://odi.org/en/publications/from-the-spanish-civil-war-to-afghanistan-historical-and-contemporary-reflections-on-humanitarian-engagement-with-non-state-armed-groups/> (accessed June 7, 2023)

351. David P. Forsythe, *The Humanitarian: The International Committee of the Red Cross*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 59-60.

352. Jackson and Davey *From the Spanish Civil War to the War in Afghanistan*.

353. Barnett, 133-148.

the civil war, the Nigerian government's military campaign involved the blockade of relief aid to Biafra in Eastern Nigeria, depriving the secessionist state of external support. By July 1968, international publicity about the famine crisis in Eastern Nigeria, which portrayed cases of malnutrition among children, compromised this stratagem. Hence, the Biafrans effectively exploited the famine crisis by turning it into an instrument of propaganda.<sup>354</sup>

Against this backdrop, the dilemma of either providing relief aid for the Biafrans or acknowledging the Federal government's blockage confronted ICRC, Oxfam, and other NGOs. Simultaneously, based on the predominance of Catholic Christians in Eastern Nigeria, CRS pressured Washington to organize an airlift to counter the Biafran famine.<sup>355</sup> Eventually, by August 1968, without the federal government's approval, Oxfam, CRS, and ICRC airlifted food aid into Biafra in Eastern Nigeria. This action compromised Article 55, section III of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which recognized the Nigerian government's sovereignty over its territory and the right to manage the delivery of relief aid into its country. On June 5, 1969, the Nigerian military shot down an ICRC aircraft as a reaction to the NGOs' breach of the blockade. The NGOs' responses to the famine crisis in Eastern Nigeria became the first major humanitarian operation in post-colonial Africa, which indelibly impacted subsequent emergency responses throughout the 20th century. In fact, the activities of relief agencies during the civil war eventually led to the creation of Médecin San Frontiers (MSF), a medical humanitarian organization, in 1971.<sup>356</sup>

### ***THE CHALLENGES OF SOUTHERNERS AFTER THE FIRST CIVIL WAR***

After the First Sudanese Civil War ended in 1972, SRG's insufficient resources constrained its ability to meet the needs of the South. Consequently, the Sudanese government alleviated this situation by sponsoring an international conference on relief aid for the Southerners. Ten of the United Nations (UN) specialized agencies and twenty-six humanitarian organizations, including Caritas International, Danish Church Aid, the Swedish Red Cross, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the German Protestant Aid Organization, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund (SCF), the League of Red Cross societies, and the World Council of Churches were invited to the conference. Although some of these relief organizations were accused of aiding and abetting the activities of foreign mercenaries in Southern Sudan during the First Sudanese Civil War, Sudan's military Nimeiri overlooked this issue and focused more on the urgent humanitarian needs of the Southerners. During the conference, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1966-1977), Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, pledged the international community's support for Sudan's appeal for humanitarian assistance for the Southerners and promised to facilitate the reconstruction of the South and the relocation of Southern refugees from neighbouring countries.<sup>357</sup>

Humanitarian aid provided by foreign governments, IOs and NGOs mitigated these crises, giving Southern Sudanese access to food, shelter, medicine, and miscellaneous support. Khartoum

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354. *Ibid.*

355. Joseph E. Thompson, *American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War 1966-1970*, (New York: Greenwood, Press 1990) 68-70.

356. Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, "Organizing the Unpredictable: The Nigeria-Biafra War and Its Impacts on ICRC," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 94 Number 888 Winter 2012. <https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc-888-desgrandchamps.pdf> (access June 4, 2023) 1409-1432.

357. Legum Collin, "Sudan Asks for World Help," *Nile Mirror*, March 9, 1972.



complemented these efforts by creating the Reparation and Resettlement Commission tasked with coordinating the resettlement of Southern refugees to their respective communities, providing necessities for returnees, and revitalizing agricultural production and social services in the South. Concomitantly, Nimeiri's regime initiated the First Development Plan (1970-1975) aimed at revamping the Sudanese economy while Khartoum controlled economic planning and social development, currency, communication, and transportation in Southern Sudan despite its regional autonomy based on the peace treaty of 1972.<sup>358</sup> Unfettered by this situation, the SRG set its own development goals for the South. To achieve these objectives, the SRG intended to promote self-sufficiency by increasing cash crop production and commercialization of the traditional agricultural sector, developing transportation and communication facilities, and revamping educational and industrial activities in the South. Nonetheless, the divergence between budgeted revenues and actual receipts, scarcity of building materials, and lack of social amenities hindered the implementation of these objectives.<sup>359</sup>

Later in the 1970s, Khartoum supplanted the First Development Plan with the Six Years Development Plan (1977/78-1982/83), signifying its shift in Cold War affiliation from Eastern to the Western bloc. Hence, rich Arab oil-producing countries provided capital earmarked for projects, complemented by Western technology to revitalize the productivity of Sudan's agricultural sector. Undoubtedly, the tentacles of these developmental projects penetrated the South through the construction of the Jonglei Canal and the Kenan Sugar project.<sup>360</sup> In particular, the discovery of oil in the South on November 24, 1974, by Chevron oil company reinforced Nimeiri's interest in exploiting the South's resources as a means of reversing the downturn in the Sudanese economy. Khartoum's budget deficit, excessive importation of expensive products, and over-reliance on foreign loans from the International Monetary Funds (IMF), and World Bank compounded its economic crises. Accordingly, in 1979/80, Khartoum decreased its budgetary allocation to the South from £S271 to £S40 million while 38 percent of the Sudanese population inhabited the South. Eventually, Khartoum's dire economic situation hindered its developmental programs and those of SRG in the South.<sup>361</sup>

During this period, most Southerners felt neglected by Khartoum since all government-sponsored projects in their areas were ineffectual while unemployment became prevalent. Besides, the construction of the Jonglei Canal and oil exploration in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces, underlined the Sudanese government's exploitation of the Southerners' resources. Southern critics of the Jonglei Canal, which would provide water for irrigated commercial farming, argued that the project's financiers in Khartoum and Cairo were its primary beneficiaries. Indeed, the Southern Sudanese expected little benefit from the canal's construction as its actualization would affect the flooding of the Sudd, a vast swamp in the South, which would damage the

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358. Tim Niblock, *Class, and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898-1985*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 256-262.

359. Benaiah Yongo-Bure *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, (Maryland: University Press of America, 2007), 30.

360. Sudan Archive Durham University (SAD) 71/9/57 *The Sudan: which way now?*, draft article by A. Mawson concerning the political and economic crisis in the Sudan following the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, with covering note from Mawson to Paul Philip Howell.

361. BNA/ FCO93/2528 *The Southern Sudan*.

transhumant activities of the Dinka and other ethnic groups who depended on the Sudd's inundation.<sup>362</sup> In addition, Khartoum and SRG tussled over issues concerning the sharing of proceeds accrued from the oil revenue and the suitable location for the proposed oil refinery. SRG argued in favor of building the oil refinery within the Upper Nile to stimulate the South's economic potential. The Sudanese government challenged SRG's proposition based on its preference for the refinery's construction in the North. Later Nimeiri worsened this situation by redividing the Southern borders and situating the Upper Niles' oil fields in Bentiu in the North. This measure contravened article four of the AAA, which acknowledged the status of Southern Sudan's territories as self-governing.<sup>363</sup>

### ***DILEMMAS OF PEACE: HUMANITARIANISM AND SOUTHERN POLITICS***

On May 1972, the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim delegated the UNHCR to organize humanitarian activities in Southern Sudan. Beyond facilitating the resettlement of returnees and assisting the internally displaced in the South, UNHCR spearheaded the UN efforts to improve the region's economic condition. Moreover, under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR supported the implementation of long-term development schemes in Southern Sudan.<sup>364</sup> Other IOs and NGOs such as the Norwegian Church Aid, and the Lutheran World Service (LWS) used this opportunity to facilitate rural developmental projects, revitalize educational programs, and provide agricultural tools, and horticultural seeds on credit.<sup>365</sup> In Torit, Save the Children Fund (SCF) managed a hospital visited by sick children and created a distribution center for milk and plain flour. In some cases, the UNHCR, CRS, and SC collaborated in facilitating the transportation and provision of relief aid.<sup>366</sup>

During this period, WHO initiated its operations in Southern Sudan, focusing on primary and preventive health care programs. To facilitate and sustain these programs, WHO subdivided its activities in the South into the public health advisory service, treatment of infectious diseases such as sleeping sickness, training of health practitioners in the South, and providing water for the Southerners.<sup>367</sup> Around June 1976, the indispensable activities of WHO, the Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan (ACROSS), and Caritas International curbed an outbreak of the Marburg virus. Subsequently, in the Equatoria region, ACROSS, and Caritas catered for the logistical needs of WHO's foreign medical team in the South. Thereupon, the WHO medical team focused on understanding the epidemiology of the disease, finding all active cases of the infection, and devising means of isolation and control of the virus. Then WHO recruited its surveillance team from among the Southerners given the directive to find active cases of the

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362. SAD 71/9/57 The Sudan: which way now?"

363. Johnson *The Root Causes of The Sudan's Civil Wars* 45-46.

364. Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics; A Perilous Path*. (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 150-151.

365. Terje Tvedt, "The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan After the Addis Ababa Agreement: A Study of Internal Causes and the Role of the NGOs" in *Short-Cut to Decay; The Case of the Sudan* edited by Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (Motala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), 89-98.

366. *Rapport de Mission de M. Beau du 12 au 25.3.1973. Concerne : Voyage au Soudan dans le cadre des envois fait selon accord CEE*. ICRC Archive Geneva.

367. Yongo-Bure, *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, 156.

infection within Maridi community, the outbreak's epicentre. Through these collective efforts, by November 20, 1976, the WHO team contained the epidemic.<sup>368</sup>

The outbreak of the Bush War in Uganda (1981-1986) led to an influx of refugees in the Equatoria region of Sudan thereby increasing IOs and NGOs' activities in this vicinity. By April 1980, international donors such as USAID pledged to provide the needed support and resources to cater for the influx of refugees. These events expanded the funding and presence of NGOs operating in Southern Sudan, encouraging the influx of Ugandan refugees. The Equatoria region's proximity to Northern Uganda, and the cultural affinity between the ethnic groups from both areas including their shared occupational experiences as agriculturalists pulled refugees from Uganda into Yei and other Equatoria areas.<sup>369</sup> The arrival of these Ugandan refugees among the Equatorians enlarged Joseph Lagu's supporters based on their cross-border ethnic affinities with the Acholi and Madi people in Equatoria, against those of his political rival Abel Alier whose loyalists were based in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile. On March 1, 1978, Lagu replaced Alier as the next HEC president, which reflected the extent of Lagu's popularity. But in 1979, Alier re-emerged as HEC's president.<sup>370</sup>

From the early 1980s, the political tussle between these politicians illustrated the ethnic rivalry among the Equatorians and the Dinka situated in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile. In particular, the Equatorians campaigned for the redivision of the Southern regions caused by their fear of being dominated by the Dinka who opposed the division of the South.<sup>371</sup> Inevitably, the continued debate about the Southern partition enfeebled the SRG, fomenting Khartoum's intrusion into the Southern affairs. Eventually, by June 1983, Nimeiri decreed the creation of three regions in the South namely Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria. Consequently, the parting of the South into three provinces decreased each region's financial and human resources compromising their capacity to cater for the Southerners' welfare.<sup>372</sup>

Despite these challenges, Southern-based NGOs such as the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) with its well-developed logistical system and effective communication network maintained its operation in Southern Sudan. Thus, the NCA administrative center in Torit had an excellent secretarial service, and stable radio communication with Khartoum, and Kenya, reinforcing its capacity to support projects such as the Arapi Rural Development Center (RDC) in the Eastern Equatoria region. By 1983, NCA's Sudanese staff numbered around 317 while 69 of them worked in its RDC program.<sup>373</sup>

In contrast, Southern based IOs such as UNHCR embarked on a large-scale humanitarian operation in the Southern regions. Accordingly, under UNHCR's umbrella, ACROSS, NCA, German Church Aid, Oxfam, and Lutheran World Service provided Southerners with food, shelter,

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368. British National Archives (BNA) /FD23/4345 Outbreak of Marburg Virus in Southern Sudan.

369. B.E. Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986) 69. Mark Leopold's *Idi Amin: The Story of Africa's Icon of Evil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020) 31-48, briefly examines how members of the Anya-Nya reinforced Amin's regime.

370. *Ibid.*

371. Terje Tvedt, 89-98.

372. *Ibid.*

373. *Ibid.*

and housing. Moreover, the purview of UNHCR's operation included the repatriation of Southern Sudanese to their respective communities. However, the large-scale destruction in the Southern regions, emphasized by the lack of social amenities, insufficient human resources, and scarcity of raw materials, constrained UNHCR's broad relief efforts. Therefore, Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, requested Sadruddin Agha Khan, the UNHCR's commissioner, to take the responsibility for coordinating the repatriation of Southern refugees back to the South from 1972. In this regard, UNHCR focused on organizing a prompt resettlement and relief program for Southern refugees from neighbouring countries.<sup>374</sup>

Furthermore, the arrival of Ugandan refugees in the Equatoria region expanded the scope of UNHCR's operation as it catered to the humanitarian needs of both Southern Sudanese and Ugandans. As the refugee crisis persisted, UNHCR and NGOs addressing the situation needed more resources. Still, they were constrained by temporary policies which made provisions for their operation on a short-term basis. Moreover, the dearth of social amenities, lack of professional workers, the inexperience of expatriate workers with Southern Sudanese social norms, a communication gap between NGOs and SRG parastatals, and competition among NGOs compromised their operations.<sup>375</sup>

Nevertheless, UNDP complemented UNHCR developmental projects in the South. On May 8, 1972, the UN Secretary-General directed Rudolph A. Peterson, UNDP's administrator, to focus on long-term projects, involving other UN agencies, in the South.<sup>376</sup> Based on this responsibility, UNDP expended about \$35million in providing both relief aid and facilitating developmental projects from 1972 to 1982. This supported cooperative activities in areas such as fisheries development, agricultural production, and handicrafts. UNDP also provided technical assistance to the SRG in management, finance, and planning. In addition, UNDP also supported a small dairy project aimed at supplying Juba, Malakal, and Wau with fresh milk.<sup>377</sup>

Establishing different kinds of cooperative committees, especially among the Equatorians, became one of the most enduring impacts of IOs and NGOs in Southern Sudan. In the 1970s, NGOs such as Norwegian Church Aid encouraged the creation of these cooperatives. SRG reinforced the existence of various cooperatives among the Southerners through the 1976 Cooperative Act and the 1977 Cooperative regulation, which underlined their importance to the socioeconomic development of the Southern regions.<sup>378</sup> Cooperatives such as the Southern Sudan Rehabilitation Assistance Project (SSRAP), financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provided its members among Southern farmers with trucks for hire at

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374. *Sudan* United Nations Archives and Record Management. <https://search.archives.un.org/informationobject/browse?topLod=0&sort=relevance&query=S-0990-0004-02-00003.PDF> (accessed July 2022).

375. B.E. Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid*, 80-87. Harrell-Bond's work focused on Yei area in the Equatoria region from the late 1970s to early 1980s. The experiences of Ugandan refugees, Southerners, and NGOs are examined in detail.

376. *Sudan* United Nations Archives and Record Management. <https://search.archives.un.org/informationobject/browse?topLod=0&sort=relevance&query=S-0990-0004-02-00003.PDF> (accessed July 2022).

377. Yongo-Bure, *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, 160.

378. Abenyo Ahichar Mark, "Meaning of Cooperative," *Nile Mirror*, August 1, 1981.

subsidized rates to market their produce in Juba. Church parishes served as a medium for informing people about the potential benefits of SSRAP and to sustain the camaraderie among them. Consequently, these Southerner farmers bypassed the Northern merchants who exploited them by charging exorbitant rates to transport their produce to market. Nevertheless, the lack of maintenance of SSRAPs' trucks, the weakness of SSRAP's administrative structure, and political instability in the South compromised SSRAP activities.<sup>379</sup>

### ***THE EMERGENCE OF SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SPLM/A) AND THE FRAGILITY OF HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS***

The Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) aimed at fostering unity and harmony in Sudan included the integration of ex-Anya-Nya forces into the Southern Command within the SAF dominated by northern soldiers. The Joint Technical Military Command (JMC), comprised of three members from each of the SAF and Anya-Nya, facilitated the integration process. Of 15,900 ex-Anya-Nya combatants who applied for absorption into the national army, only 6,139 were inducted into the Southern Command since many ex-Anya-Nya were deemed unqualified during the selection process. The JMC based its recruitment criteria on military experience, academic qualification, medical fitness, and willingness to continue in service. However, the high level of illiteracy in the South and the indiscriminate recruitment policy of the Anya-Nya forces, marred by nepotism, disqualified many Southern applicants making them disillusioned about the entire selection process. To mitigate illiteracy in the South, NGOs such as NCA funded the establishment of schools as part of its humanitarian program in the region.<sup>380</sup>

Meanwhile, the selected ex-Anya-Nya personnel from the three Southern provinces were absorbed into the Southern Command and expected to become fully integrated into the SAF five years after the peace treaty of 1972. During the implementation of the integration program, the hasty nature of the plan and the divergence between SAF's professional training compared with Anya-Nya's irregular character highlighted the Northerners' and the Southerners' divided views on unification. Indeed, logistical problems and shortage of funds in the South frustrated the integration process aggravated by the welfare services provided to the SAF but unavailable to Southern forces.<sup>381</sup> In 1976, these events precipitated an abortive mutiny of the 107<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Aweil led by Captain Aguet Alfred. Although Aguet and his accomplices were executed, this insurrection foreshadowed the revolutionary tendencies among the Southern troops.<sup>382</sup>

Many Southern soldiers became skeptical about Khartoum's sincerity in implementing the AAA as they observed the decline in the number of Southerners recruited into the army. During this period, ex-Anya-Nya officers absorbed into the SAF were either retired or dismissed from service. These events coincided with Nimeiri's inauguration of the National Reconciliation Agreement (NRA) in the late 1970s, which permitted the integration of former opponents of his

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379.SAD.1034/2/1-191 Douglas H. Johnson, *Southern Sudan Agencies* created, 1989-1992.

380.Joshua O. Akol, "A Crisis of Expectation; Returning to Southern Sudan in The 1970s" in *When Refugees Go Home* edited by Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 1994), 78-95.

381. Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreement Dishonoured* (Khartoum: Ithaca Press, 2003), 164-167.

382. *Ibid.*

regime and diehard critics of the AAA into Khartoum's political milieu. These groups comprised members of the Umma Party, Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamic fundamentalist groups based in the North. Nimeiri's affiliation with the NRA led to the desecularization of the ruling Sudan Socialist Union, revocation of the AAA, and abrogation of religious freedom in the South. These policies shattered the secularism within the SAF and led to the replacement of its left-wing officers with men affiliated with conservative Muslim groups such as the Khatmiyya, a Sufi religious group in Sudan.<sup>383</sup>

By the early 1980s, these events prodded some Southern officers, who joined the army when secular ideals were prominent, to perceive armed struggle as a means of attaining equality within the society. Many Southerners dreaded the impacts of Khartoum's Islamic rulings on their daily lives. Simultaneously, civil unrest and insecurity became prevalent in Southern Sudan, aggravated by Anya-Nya II whereby rebels from the First Civil War resumed attacks on army detachments, police posts, and Arab merchants in the Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Eastern Equatoria. Most of Anya-Nya II's founding members, including Samuel Gai Tut, were disillusioned about the South's political future after the AAA. Therefore, they encouraged Anya-Nya II members' interest in separating Southern Sudan from the North. Pitted against these Southern separatists were Southern officers such as Major Kerubino Kuanyin, who led the state's military operation against Anya-Nya II in the Upper Nile province. Soon these officers also became disenchanted with Khartoum when Nimeiri ordered their redeployment to the North and replacement by Northern officers to quell the unrest in the South. Despite the widespread insecurity in the South, developmental projects such as the construction of the Jonglei Canal funded by IOs, including the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and FAO, and supported by Khartoum, and the Egyptian and the Netherlands governments proceeded.<sup>384</sup>

In May 1983, the turmoil in the South culminated with the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War when the Southern officers of the 105th Battalion, stationed in their Southern garrison in Bor, mutinied against their redeployment to the North.<sup>385</sup> In reaction to these incidents, on May 17, the Sudanese army defeated Major Kuanyen's mutineers from the Bor garrison. Initially, President Nimeiri sent Colonel John Garang to negotiate a settlement with the mutineers. However, Garang aligned with them based on his sympathy for their cause and his indignation against the corruption of Nimeiri's regime. News about the Bor mutiny spread, prompting further desertions, mutinies, and revolts across Southern areas. Following these events, the Southern mutineers,

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383. SAD.923/10/69-85 *Conferences Attended by R.O Collins including copies of papers presented: Le S.P.L.A Les Parties Sudistes Legaux et La Question Religieuse* by Gerard Prunier. J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins in *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster* (Princeton Markus Weiner Publishers, 2008) 235, highlight that during this period Hassan al-Turabi methodically recruited young officers at the military academy including Omer-al-Bashir into the National Islamic Front (NIF).

384. Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of the Sudan's Civil War: Old Wars and New Wars* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2016), 60-61.

385. Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier "The Foundation and Expansion of The Sudan People's Liberation Army" in *Civil War in the Sudan* (ed) M.W Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, (London: I.B Tauris & Co LTD, 1993), 117-130.

Anya-Nya II forces, and other dissident groups fled Sudan and found refuge with Mengistu's regime (1977-1991) in Ethiopia.<sup>386</sup>

The renewal of the civil war affected IOs and NGOs' operations in Southern Sudan. By 1985, the prevalent insecurity stalled USAID's projects, including the Southern Region Agricultural Development Project (SRAD) and the Southern Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project I (SORMAR I). Before the resumption of civil war, these projects aimed at promoting Southern farmers' productivity, road rehabilitation, and maintenance in Equatoria and Bahr-el-Ghazal regions. Similarly, the unrest in the South affected the activities of Southern technical schools sponsored by foreign donors. By 1985, SPLA's uprisings led to the closure of the May Vocational Training Center in Wau and the Technical Secondary School in Torit.<sup>387</sup> Hence, the Laniya Vocational Training Center established in 1980, conjointly funded by USAID and Southern Sudan Rehabilitation Assistance Project (SRRAP), became the only functional training center in the South. In fact, when SRRAP's financial support ended in 1985, Laniya's director solicited more funding from the Ford Foundation and other donors. However, by mid-1986, the SPLA's offensive around the vocational school's area affected the latter's activities. After hearing about the insecurity around the vocational center, donors such as Catholic Relief and Band-Aid became skeptical about supporting the center.<sup>388</sup>

Simultaneously, Ethiopia's Mengistu's regime aided the Southern mutineers as a countermeasure against Sudan's support for rebels such as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in Ethiopia. Moreover, Ethiopia and Sudan were on different sides of the Cold War as the former allied with the Soviet Union and the latter the United States.<sup>389</sup> By July 1983, under the auspices of the Ethiopian government, the Southern dissident groups converged and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Kerubino Kuanyen, John Garang, Samuel Gai Tut, Akuot Atem, and William Nyuon were some of the experienced Southern officers involved in forming the liberation army. Thereafter, the SPLM/A issued its manifesto, which enumerated its "socialist transformative agenda" for the whole of Sudan.<sup>390</sup>

Colonel Garang's commitment to the creation of a socialist-oriented, united and secular Sudan, in contrast with Anya-Nya II's separatist agenda, which Addis Ababa opposed, and the integration of all rebel forces under the SPLM/A umbrella reinforced Mengistu's support for Garang's leadership.<sup>391</sup> Battling a secessionist insurgency in Eritrea, Mengistu's Ethiopia could not support a separatist movement in neighbouring Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A's manifesto further reflected the radical orientations of the younger generation of Southern Sudanese in the early 1980s shaped by Mengistu's socialist ideals, involving the use of state power to control and transform

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386.Ibid.

387. Beatrice Khamisa Baya, "Aid at a Standstill" in *War Wounds: Development Costs of Conflict in Southern Sudan* edited by Abdul Rahman Abu Zayd Ahmed et al, (London Panos Institute, 1988), 17-28.

388. Thomas Kendi, "The Challenges To Survive" in *War Wounds*, 29-34.

389. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omar *Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism*, (London African Rights Publication, 1997) 64.

390. SAD. 89/6/75 *Sudan People's Liberation Movement Manifesto* .

391. Samson S. Wassara "The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army: Between Separation and Unity" in *Routledge Handbook of the Horn of Africa* edited by Jean-Nicolas Bach et al, (New York Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2022), 43-52.

the society.<sup>392</sup> Accordingly, the Southern movement imbibed Ethiopia's military doctrine which combined its traditional practice of a mass army based on the Soviet military dogma of strength in numbers. Therefore, massive, forced conscription and rudimentary training became prevalent within the Ethiopian military.<sup>393</sup> SPLA adopted similar recruitment measures and by the mid-1980s, 200 to 300 recruits joined its forces daily. These early influences shaped the liberation army's militant posture, which overwhelmed its political wing or movement.<sup>394</sup>

Despite the Marxist rhetoric in the SPLM/A's manifesto, Deng argues that the ideals of African socialism and Pan-Africanism espoused by Africanist scholars in the 1970s at the University of Dar es Salaam shaped its political agenda. At Dar es Salaam, a seedbed of African liberation movements, Garang became involved in Pan-Africanist affairs globally through his acquaintances with Guyanese academic Walter Rodney and Ugandan revolutionary Yoweri Museveni.<sup>395</sup> The imprints of Dar es Salaam's ideologies, Pan-Africanism and African socialism, molded some of the SPLM/A's objectives as its manifesto underscored colonialism and neocolonialism as the underlying cause of economic inequalities in postcolonial African countries. Thus, the dedication to a socialist program for Sudan, not just in the South, became a primary objective of SPLA.<sup>396</sup>

Many Southerners, and some Northerners, found the SPLA's transformative agenda appealing. The liberation movement's program focused on creating a New Sudan by developing rural areas inhabited by 91% of Southerners who engaged in subsistence farming. In the South, small-scale landowners who used simple hand tools to cultivate lands around their homesteads constituted 98% of farmers. Only 2% of agricultural production used animal traction and machinery. Before the advent of the Second Civil War, USAID's projects, such as SORMAR I and SRAD, aimed at alleviating this situation by boosting and marketing agricultural produce complemented with human resource development in the South. However, the SPLA attacks on vehicles and the planting of landmines on most roads hindered the feasibility of these projects.<sup>397</sup>

Nonetheless, until 1985, parts of the Equatoria region remained unaffected by the war including Yei, where feasible locations for research and development in agricultural productivity were sponsored by NGOs. Thus, Yei became a preferred settlement option for the Ugandan refugees, most of whom were traditional agriculturalists. While UNHCR managed the settlement of refugees in the area, Sudanaid, a local Catholic agency, ACROSS, SSRAP, and other relief agencies were delegated different responsibilities in these refugee settlements.<sup>398</sup> Inevitably, this situation led to a rivalry between the Commission for Refugees in Sudan (COMREF), Khartoum's refugee organization, and UNHCR over the management of refugee funds and complaints against the latter over the mismanagement of relief aid worsened the feud between both agencies.

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392.de Waal and Omar, 62-63.

393.*Ibid.*

394.BNA FCO 31/4589 *Sudan Hostages* 1985.

395.Lual A. Deng, *The Power of Creative Reasoning: The Ideas and Vision of John Garang* (Bloomington: IUniverse, Bloomington 2013),114-115.

396.SAD. 89/6/75 *Sudan People's Liberation Movement Manifesto*.

397.Beatrice Khamisa Baya, "Aid at a Standstill" in *War Wound* , 17-28.

398.Harrell-Bond, 72-76.



Eventually, these issues and COMREF's internal problems affected its capacity to deal with refugee matters. Therefore, UNHCR regulated the affairs of refugee settlement in Yei.<sup>399</sup>

### ***SPLA AND MILITIA FORCES: NGOs IN THE SOUTHERN CRISIS***

The rampant crisis in the South affected every institution within its vicinity, including relief agencies' humanitarian activities. Therefore, from the late 1980s, ecumenical NGOs such as the Bishop Gwynne College, a theological college in the Equatoria region, suspended its evangelical and educational programs as insecurity in the South became prevalent. As a precursor to these happenings, in September 1983, president Nimeiri promulgated Sharia Law, also known as the September Law, aimed at preserving Nimeiri's political power and transforming Sudan into an Islamic state. This implementation led to stern punishments such as flogging, amputation, and stoning for first-time offenders, especially in the North. Afterwards, the infusion of different Islamic laws into the Sudanese constitution confirmed the Southerners' misgivings about the restrictive impacts of these policies on their daily life. Some of these rulings restrained ACROSS and other Christian NGOs from proselytizing Southerners.<sup>400</sup> These constitutional changes also reinforced Nimeiri's political powers, granting him the title of an Imam, an Islamic religious leader, and the privilege to retain his political position as Sudan's president for life rather than the traditional six-year tenure.<sup>401</sup>

In the South, the SPLM/A's revolutionary fervour and its predisposition to establish a united socialist Sudan challenged the oppressive tendencies of the Sudanese government. The SPLA's manifesto also personified Khartoum's political elites and their religious fundamentalist groups as opponents of its socialist revolution, which would alleviate the sufferings of the masses, an ideological succour for the Southern Sudanese. Therefore, SPLA positioned itself as the Messiah of those oppressed by Nimeiri's policies.<sup>402</sup> As part of its transformative strategy, the liberation army focused on regrouping and reinforcing its influence over Anya-Nya II and other fighting forces scattered in different parts of the South. These policies necessitated providing military and political training for recruits in Ethiopia's Bilpam, Gambella, Itang, and Zinc camps. These objectives underlined SPLA's ideological differences from the Anya-Nya II, whose forces were keen on the secession of Southern Sudan.<sup>403</sup> Within these Ethiopian refugee camps, the Soviet Union, the Italian government, and secular and religious IOs such as the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) provided humanitarian assistance for the Southern refugees. SIM supplied Southerners with infant food, cooking pots, clothing, and educational materials.<sup>404</sup> Due to its presence in the Itang refugee camp, SIM constantly informed UNHCR about the humanitarian needs of the Southern

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399.*Ibid.*, 163-218. Ahmed Karadawi's *Refugee Policy in Sudan 1967-1984* (Berghahn Books New York, 1999), also provides an incisive analysis about refugee issues in Sudan in the 1960s and the controversy between UNHCR and COMREF.

400.SAD.814/18/1-53 Allision Oliver Claude Newspaper Cuttings and Press Releases 1988.

401.Robert O Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, (New York Cambridge University Press, 2008)155.

402.SAD. 89/6/75 *Sudan People's Liberation Movement Manifesto*.

403.*Ibid.*

404.UNHCR Archive 11/3/10-100.ETH.SUD *Refugee Situations-Special Groups of Refugees-Sudanese Refugees in Ethiopia*.

Sudanese. Médecin San Frontières (MSF) and Save the Children Fund also catered for the refugees' relief aid in these camps.<sup>405</sup>

Some of the Southern boys within these camps came from Bahr-el-Ghazal, where the Dinka youths dominated the liberation movement, reinforcing the perception of SPLA as an exclusive Dinka organization. By 1984, youths in the province joined the liberation army with the hope of protecting themselves and their livestock from plunder by nomadic Baggara Arabs, such as the Messiriya, and Rizeigat, from Kordofan and Darfur regions.<sup>406</sup> Until the mid-1970s, the Dinka and neighbouring Arabs managed their relationship effectively. However, by the early 1980s, severe droughts and famine in Western Sudan fomented the Baggara Arabs' cattle raids in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal. Keen further explains that the expropriation of the Dinka's land in the province to construct agricultural estates for Northern bourgeoisie aggravated the Dinka's grievances against Nimeiri's regime. Thus, SPLA loyalists among the Dinka vented their resentment against the regime by sabotaging various Southern developmental projects, including the Jonglei Canal Scheme sponsored by Khartoum in collaboration with FAO and UNCDF.<sup>407</sup>

In April 1985, the Transitional Military Council (TMC), which included some Baggara politicians, overthrew Nimeiri's regime. Hence, as a cheap counterinsurgency in the South, the TMC fomented conflict between the Dinka and Baggara Arabs. Khartoum deployed this strategy against the Dinka supporters of the SPLA. The battle between the liberation army and Baggara Arabs led to the destruction of lives and properties. Many Dinka were either killed or kidnapped for enslavement, which disrupted their farming activities and resulted in a widespread famine among the inhabitants of this area.<sup>408</sup> As the insecurity in the South became prevalent, UN officials and other humanitarian workers in Wau, Malakal, and Juba were evacuated from the three Southern capitals. In Wau, the capital of Bahr-el-Ghazal, security deteriorated after the killing of the leader of a German leprosy team around July 1985. Although SPLA was not involved in the incident, its constant attacks on government vehicles compounded the insecurity within Wau.<sup>409</sup> In this situation, Wau was only reachable by air during the wet season. Equally, vehicles coming from the North were vulnerable to SPLA attacks during the dry season. Military convoys hit landmines while passing through the roads connecting Wau with other areas.<sup>410</sup>

Concomitantly, SPLA started extending its guerrilla operations toward Northern Sudan. Henceforth, all foreigners, including IO and NGO staff, were warned to evacuate the region. Similar warnings were issued to expatriates in the South three months earlier, leading to disruptions in oil exploration in the region. Indeed, SPLA reinforced its threat by kidnapping two

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405.*Ibid.*

406.Nicki Kindersley *Politics, Power, and Chiefship in Famine and War*,(Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2018)17-18.

407.David Keen *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan 1989-89* (Oxford, James Currey Publishers,1994), 50-52.

408. Sudan Open Archive (SOA) Ushari Ahmed Mahmud and Suleyman Ali Baldo, *Human Right Abuses in Sudan 1987: The Dhein Massacre Slavery in the Sudan* (London: Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, 1987), 25-27.

409.SAD.950/3/1-95 R.O Collins Press Cuttings and Statement created, 1985.

410. Jasper Mortimer, "Sudan: The Tortoise Fights Back," *New African Magazine*, December Tuesday,1985, 20-21.

West German aid officials, two Swiss journalists, and French, British, and Kenyan construction workers associated with the Jonglei Canal project.<sup>411</sup>

Against this backdrop, most NGOs could not operate in Bahr-el-Ghazal and different parts of Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, Amnesty International (AI), a human rights NGO in the South, revealed some of the atrocities committed by the warring factions during this period. According to AI's report, in 1985, Murhaleen Arab raids on the Dinka cattle camps and villages in Abeyi, Aweil, and Gogrial areas escalated after senior members of the TMC met with the militia leaders in Muglad situated in Southern Kordofan. Consequently, these forays precipitated the Southerners' departure from their localities to Northern cities, including Khartoum, El-Meriam, Babanousa and other parts of the region. Similarly, in the southern city of Wau, AI reported that the SPLA's attacks against the Arab Muslim Fertit, towards the end of 1986 worsened the city's famine and refugee crises affecting other parts of Bahr-el-Ghazal.<sup>412</sup>

By 1987, with the expansion of the civil war, around 13,000 displaced Southerners from Bahr-el-Ghazal migrated towards areas in Northern Sudan, including El-Meriam, Babanousa, Khartoum, Southern Darfur, and Kordofan. Most of these Southern émigrés took their livestock with them.<sup>413</sup> In Khartoum, most Northerners treated these displaced Southerners as a potential fifth column, in cahoots with the liberation army, who were overrunning the city. Even so, most of these displaced Southerners lived in squalid conditions in Khartoum. Throughout August 1988, the city's torrential rainfall worsened the predicaments of these Southern refugees by making it difficult to meet their basic needs for clothing, food, and shelter. In this situation, the relief aid provided by SCC, GOAL, and SC assuaged the hardships of these displaced people. SCC, in collaboration with Christian Aid, a British based ecumenical NGO, provided Southern refugees affected by the flooding with blankets, plastic sheeting, and grains for emergency shelters and food. Moreover, the Disasters Emergency Committee Appeal, supported by six relief agencies from Britain which included Christian Aid, Oxfam, Help the Aged, Save the Children Fund, and the Red Cross, collectively raised £5.5million for the flooding incident.<sup>414</sup> The magnitude of the destruction caused by the flooding prompted the UN to highlight its intensity and urge the international community to provide Khartoum with more humanitarian assistance.<sup>415</sup>

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411. SAD.950/3/1-95 R.O Collins Press Cuttings and Statement created, 1985.

412. SOA, Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of the Civil war Amnesty International, 1989, <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txq=amnesty> (accessed March 28, 2023).

413. SOA John Ryle and Kwaja Yai *Displaced Southern Sudanese in Northern Sudan with Special Reference to Southern Darfur and Kordofan* 26. Gamal Hamid Mahmoud's *Coping with Displacement in the Sudan; Popular Versus Institutional Responses* (PhD thesis University of California 1992) examines how different sociopolitical and economic factors determined the influx of Southern refugees into Khartoum's environ and their impacts on urbanization from the mid-1980s to around early 1990s. Agnes de Geoffroy's *What Place in Khartoum for the Displaced: Between State Regulation and Individual Strategies in Multidimensional Changes in Sudan (1989-2011) Reshaping Livelihoods Conflicts and Identities* edited by Barbara Casciarri et al (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), critiques the effects of how urban planning and policies in the North have affected the displaced population in the region.

414. SAD.814/18/1-53 Allison Oliver Claude Newspaper, Cuttings, and Press Releases, 1988.

415. United Nations Digital Library (UNDL) Emergency Assistance to The Sudan October 13, 1988, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/47760?ln=en> (accessed March 28, 2023).

In the Upper Nile area, the SPLA struggled with Anya-Nya II and other militia groups in the territory. During this period, Anya-Nya II veterans Akot Atem, and Samuel Gai Tut, challenged John Garang's leadership of the liberation army, which exacerbated the feud between SPLA and Anya-Nya II. Moreover, the ideological differences between both groups over secession or not worsened the tension. To reinforce its supremacy among the Southerners, SPLA focused on neutralizing Anya-Nya II by arguing against ethnic animosity, which appealed to youths who joined SPLA regardless of their ethnic background.<sup>416</sup>

Notwithstanding, the Sudanese government exploited the rift between Anya-Nya II and SPLA by providing the former with arms. In addition, Khartoum supported the incursion of the Murahleen Northern militia group into the Upper Nile to preserve the state's economic interest in oil reserves within the territory. On this account, Khartoum provided arms to different Anya-Nya II leaders and peddled the propaganda that the conflict between Anya-Nya, dominated by Nuer, and the SPLA, supported by the Dinka, was a Southern war. However, up until 1985, the Dinka and Nuer joined both rebel groups indiscriminately.<sup>417</sup>

Within this context, oil exploration in the Unity and Heglig regions, situated in the Upper Nile, was jeopardized by clashes between the warring factions. Yet Khartoum's attempts to harness the Upper Nile's oil resources led to the forceful displacement of its Nuer inhabitants. Later in the 1980s, human rights NGOs such as the Human Rights Watch publicized the humanitarian crises in the area.<sup>418</sup> In addition, through eyewitness accounts, AI reported incidents of dehumanization and atrocities perpetrated by the unpredictable alliances and conflicts among the Anya-Nya II, SPLA, and Sudanese forces. AI also highlighted how these combatants maltreated their captives.<sup>419</sup>

Unavoidably, the Upper Nile's tumult affected the operation of aid agencies including the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and Lutheran World Federation (LWF). Before the advent of the civil war, SIM's primary health care units provided different medical services in the Upper Nile such as engaging in disease control measures, organizing vaccination campaigns, and facilitating health education programs in different parts of the territory. Concurrently, in Malakal, LWF mounted its own rehabilitation program aimed at supporting Southerners employed in carpentry and auto mechanic workshops.<sup>420</sup>

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416. SAD.921/8/11-29 R.O Collins Advisory Work for the Sudan Government and US Government, 1984.

417. Douglas H. Johnson "The Nuer Civil War in Changing Identifications and Alliances" in *North-East Africa Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia-Sudan Borderlands* ed. Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth E. Watson, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 36-37.

418. *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights* Human Rights Watch (Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 146-153. Professor Sharon Hutchinson undertook her fieldwork among the Nuer in the Upper Nile which coincided with the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983. Her observations about the situation of Nuer were shared among NGOs, and journalists working in Southern Sudan including Human Rights Watch (phone interview with Sharon Hutchinson 13 December, 2020).

419. SOA, *Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of the Civil war* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txq=amnesty> (accessed July, 2023).

420. Denis Donald LeClaire *Rural Development in Southern Sudan: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations*, (Master's Thesis The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University, 1981), [https://ucalgary.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=cdi\\_proquest\\_journals\\_303006668&context=PC&vid=01UCALG\\_INST:UCALGARY&lang=en&search\\_scope=EVERYTHING&adaptor=Primo%20Central&t](https://ucalgary.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=cdi_proquest_journals_303006668&context=PC&vid=01UCALG_INST:UCALGARY&lang=en&search_scope=EVERYTHING&adaptor=Primo%20Central&t)

However, by 1983, the fighting between SPLA and Anya-Nya II affected the feasibility of these rehabilitation projects in the Upper Nile. Thus, the locality's insecurity led to the destruction of social amenities and hampered the activities of health care workers and commercial businesses. Moreover, the war prompted the displacement of Southerners and deployment of soldiers in the Western Upper Nile, making both the Southern Sudanese and Sudanese forces vulnerable to visceral leishmaniasis, an epidemic percolating the territory amid the war. This crisis was compounded by the fact that fighting disrupted agriculture and cattle rearing schemes instituted by LWF and other NGOs in the Upper Nile, causing health issues related to malnutrition among the Nuer and Dinka in the Western Upper Nile.<sup>421</sup>

MSF's medical team in the region also observed no medical services were available for the Southerners in the Western Upper Nile until MSF instituted "a clinic and feeding programme" in Leer by 1988. Concomitantly, local people in the area reported that "a killing disease" later identified as visceral leishmaniasis decimated the Southerners in the remote parts of Leer area. Eventually, MSF aid workers identified the epidemic among displaced Southerners who relocated to Khartoum from Western Upper Nile.<sup>422</sup>

While the belligerents continued fighting, concerned parties among the Southerners attempted to attenuate the conflict in the Upper Nile. However, Khartoum's consistent support for Paul Matiep's Anya-Nya II faction, which operated along the oil-producing areas, prolonged the conflict, and compromised SPLA's control over the entire territory.<sup>423</sup> In consequence, areas within the Upper Nile, including Nasir, Leer, Waat, and Renk were devastated by the civil war. By the end of 1988, 45,000 displaced Southerners were in Malakal, and another 2,000 stayed in Renk, needing relief aid. However, the lack of good transportation and communication systems hindered ICRC and other NGOs' humanitarian operations in the Upper Nile throughout this period.<sup>424</sup> Notwithstanding, the proximity to the Eastern part of the Upper Nile to Ethiopia prompted the migration of Nuer refugees from the former region into the Itang refugee camp in the latter. Moreover, under UNHCR's aegis, the camp provided the Nuer refugees from the South with health, educational, and other social services.<sup>425</sup>

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[ab=QuickSearch&query=any.contains,denis%20d%20leclair%20rural%20development%20in%20southern%20sudan%20the%20role%20of%20NGOs&offset=0](#) (accessed July 2023 University of Calgary library).

421. J Seman, A J Mercer and E Sondorp "The Epidemic of Visceral Leishmaniasis in Western Upper Nile, Southern Sudan: Course and Impact from 1984 to 1994," *International Journal of Epidemiology Association*, Volume 25, No.4 (1996) 863-864.

422. *Ibid.*

423. *Denying "The Honor of Living" Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1990), 131-132.

424. SAD.1034/3/1-175 Douglas H. Johnson *Southern Sudan Agencies* created, 1992-2000.

425. Dereje Feyisa "Alternative Citizenship: The Nuer Between Ethiopia and the Sudan in The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity" in *Contemporary and Historical Perspectives* edited by Christopher Vaughan et al (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 110-130. Katarzyna Grabska's *Gender, Home, and Identity: Nuer Repatriation To Southern Sudan* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2014), 86-164, examines the changing experiences and encounters of Nuer women, from Leer in the Upper Nile residing in the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. Based on this background, Katarzyna explores NGO and IOs efforts in enhancing Church based and educational programs in Kakuma camp these measures shaped the perceptions of Nuer men and women about the evolving nature of gender relations in the society. Consequently, educated refugee Nuer men and women were perceived as catalyst of social change and more privileged among the Southerners.

In the Equatoria region, the Sudanese government deployed militias from ethnic groups, including the Murle, Mundari, Toposa, and Bari, against the SPLA forces. In addition, the TMC appointed General Peter Cirilo, an ex-Anya-Nya officer, as the governor of the Equatoria Regional Government (1985-1988). During his tenure, Cirillo publicly legalised the wielding of arms and created an office for co-ordinating the Equatorian militia operations. Meanwhile, the Mundari, mainly from the Terakaka area, emerged as the most significant Equatorian militia force pitted against the SPLA. Before the civil war, the Mundari and Dinka shared borders and intermarried. Still, traditional battles over miscegenation and grazing grounds occurred between both ethnic groups. By 1985, the Mundari had formed their militia instigated by SPLA's ruthless and unbridled offensive operation in Terakaka.<sup>426</sup> Concurrently, the onerous impacts of the Sudanese government's Sharia law and the unruly attitude of the SPLA forces made ethnic groups in Equatoria skeptical about joining either side.<sup>427</sup> Notwithstanding, Khartoum exploited the Southerners' ethnic tensions by identifying the SPLA as a Dinka-dominated group as a stratagem to dissuade the Equatorians from joining the Southern movement.<sup>428</sup> Besides, the SPLA's inability to redress atrocities committed by its foot soldiers against the Equatorians compromised its popularity.<sup>429</sup>

In these circumstances, the battle between warring sides affected the operations of NGOs based in Juba and other parts of the region. Many aid workers left the city while most of their programs came to a standstill. As such, Oxfam America discontinued its \$75,000 community development program in Juba in 1985.<sup>430</sup> In the same year, the UN and the Norwegian Church Aid evacuated their offices in the city due to security concerns. Moreover, as SPLA advanced toward Juba and warned all expatriates to leave the city to avoid being killed, most of its residents became worrisome about their safety.<sup>431</sup> Later, in July 1986, two nuns affiliated with Missionaries of Mary in Juba, a Christian NGO based in Massachusetts, were taken captive by SPLA during a battle with SAF. Though the missionary sisters resided within areas controlled by Khartoum's forces in Juba, they assisted displaced Southerners and those sympathetic towards the movement.<sup>432</sup> As they journeyed towards the liberation army's camp, the teenage captors manhandled the sisters. However, after arriving at the SPLA's camp, the soldiers on guard treated the sisters well. Eventually, after negotiations among American, Khartoum, and SPLA officials, the sisters were released in August 1986. The possibility of such a scenario reoccurring deterred relief agencies' operations among the Equatorians.<sup>433</sup>

Meanwhile, the upheaval in Equatoria forced the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) based in Juba to terminate its humanitarian operation in the city by July 1986. After the

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426. Denying "The Honor of Living"97.

427. *Ibid.*

428. The Economic Intelligence Unit *Quarterly Economic Review of Sudan* October 1985.

429. Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, 45.

430. SAD.989/8/1-70 Catalogue Papers of M.W Daly Press Cuttings created, January 1971-December 1985.

431. Judith Miller, "South Sudan City Fears Rebel Attack," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1985. University of Calgary's HathiTrust domain. [http://www.hathitrust.org/access\\_use#pd-google](http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google) (accessed June 05, 2023).

432. SAD.989/8/1-70 Catalogue Papers of M.W Daly Press Cuttings created, January 1971-December 1985.

433. Sister Nina Underwood, "Memories of War: Sudan" *Healing and Development Medical Missionaries of Mary Yearbook 2002*. [http://mmmworlwide.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/2002\\_mmm\\_yearbook.pdf](http://mmmworlwide.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/2002_mmm_yearbook.pdf), (accessed June 26, 2023).

NGO's staff abandoned its premises, Mundari militia overran and ransacked ADRA's deserted compound for looting food and valuables. In other parts of Juba, the militia's rampage caused havoc among randomly attacked civilians. Against this backdrop, reports about SPLA's presence on the outskirts of Juba escalated the tension within the city.<sup>434</sup> By early 1988, the battle between SAF and SPLA worsened the city's insecurity, making its roads impassable. Hence, Khartoum airlifted ammunition and food, camouflaged as civilian cargo, for its troops in the city. However, the possibility of SPLA shooting down these airlifts deterred NGOs from embarking on similar operations to provide relief aid to the Equatorians.<sup>435</sup>

Subsequently, the Sudanese government expelled ACROSS (Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan) staff from Equatoria because the NGO proselytized Southerners working with it. Overwhelmed by these incidents, in April 1988, ACROSS evacuated twenty-seven of its foreign personnel from the South. Before their departure, stakeholders of the relief agency met and decided to maintain their presence in Kenya. At the same time, they evaluated the possibilities of continuing their operation in Sudan.<sup>436</sup> Concomitantly, to justify Khartoum's hardline policy against Christian NGOs in Juba, *El Rayah* and other newspapers in Sudan's capital city peddled the propaganda that the presence of these relief agencies in Juba worsened the city's security situation. In a reaction to this statement, Mr. Morris Lauya, the deputy governor of Equatoria, categorized such remarks as unfounded and that relief agencies' operations posed no threat to the region's peace and stability.<sup>437</sup>

### ***A PRELUDE TO RELIEF OPERATION IN SOUTHERN SUDAN***

In March 1986, the liberation army controlled around 90 percent of the Southern territory when it denied UN relief trucks access to Juba. Subsequently, by August, SPLA downed an airliner supposedly deploying SAF troops in the South leading to the death of 63 passengers onboard.<sup>438</sup> The liberation army justified its action by citing an earlier incident in February when Khartoum commandeered a UN barge to transport relief aid and equipment to SAF in Malakal.<sup>439</sup>

Until the late 1980s, SPLA adopted an ad hoc hardline policy limiting NGOs within its territory. Yet, the SPLA Codes of 1984, the liberation army's administrative policy within its territory, became the forerunner of the Southern Movement's relationship with NGOs in the 1990s. The SPLA Codes of 1984 incorporated both civil and customary laws and was used to resolve cases relating to ethnic disputes over land and cattle within SPLA-controlled areas, and issues between NGOs and the Southerners. Adopting traditional rules in settling conflict underscored the importance of Southern Sudan's local chiefs based on their knowledge of customs and traditions entrenched in the SPLA Codes of 1984.<sup>440</sup> Most of these traditional chiefs became indispensable

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434.SAD.989/9/1-70 *Catalogue Papers of M.W Daly's Press Cuttings* created, January-December 1986.

435.SAD.814/18/1-53 Oliver Claude Allison's Newspaper Cuttings and Press Releases, 1988.

436.Ibid.

437.Ibid.

438.Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism*, (London: African Rights, 1997), 85.

439.Ibid.

440. Kuol Monyluak Alor, *Administration of Justice in The SPLA/M Liberated Areas: Court Cases in War-Torn Southern Sudan* February 1997, <https://www.csrf-southsudan.org/repository/administration-justice-splam-liberated->

intermediaries between NGOs and the Southerners whenever relief agencies instituted their humanitarian projects in both SPLA-controlled and government-held areas. Therefore, these traditional rulers sustained the administration of the SPLA-controlled areas. Eventually, these local leaders became an essential nexus between the Southerners and NGOs when the liberation army began to tolerate the operations of relief agencies.<sup>441</sup>

Prior to the above period, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), an ecumenical NGO consisting of Protestant and Catholic churches, and Sudan Aid, a subsidiary of the Sudan Bishops' Conference operated in Southern Sudan. By May 1986, the Council of Churches reported that the prevalent drought of 1984, compounded by inadequate communication and transportation caused by war affected 2 million Southerners. Subsequently, in 1985, the reduced farming in the South, incessant cross-border cattle rustling, and reoccurring incidents of armed robbery thwarted the relief operation in the territory. In fact, the South's tumult affected the accuracy of SCC's needs assessment, a compiled list of the humanitarian requirements of Southern Sudan.<sup>442</sup>

Through the instrumentality of SCC's local relief committees established by churches in the Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Equatoria region, Sudan Council emergency desk responded to the Southerners' relief needs. The SCC regional field offices complemented these efforts by assisting their church members and their relief committees to cope with the widespread famine by providing them with food and financial assistance.<sup>443</sup> In the Upper Nile, the SCC relief committee consisted of members of the Catholic Episcopalian and Presbyterian churches, local chiefs, and SCC personnel. They provided information about the depletion of relief stocks, causing tensions in Malakal and aggravated by the influx of 25,000 displaced persons into the town thereby increasing its population to about 90,000. To mitigate the possibility of humanitarian crises in Malakal and other urban areas, SCC organized an "Early Warning Conference" in August 1986 held in Khartoum aimed at reporting on the humanitarian situation in these localities. Consequently, Sudan Council's relief committee provided an account of the inflated price of food commodities and drought as causes of food insecurity. Until 1988, when MSF started its operation in the Western part of the Upper Nile, only SCC and Sudan Aid operated in the region.<sup>444</sup>

Concurrently, in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Band-Aid and World Vision collaborated with SCC to deliver around 1,403 metric tons of food aid to Wau's Emergency Relief team and SCC stored some of this food. Until the death of Bishop John Malou, the chairman of SCC's emergency relief committee, Sudan Council provided displaced persons (DPs) within Wau and its environ with food aid. Nevertheless, the widespread insecurity in different parts of Bahr-el-Ghazal fomented by the fighting between SPLA and Khartoum's forces, led to the influx of DPs into Wau, a government-controlled town.<sup>445</sup> Elsewhere, in localities such as Yirol and Rumbek, due to the government's

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[areas-court-cases-war-torn-southern-sudan/](#) (Last accessed 25 March, 2023). The author served as a judge within the SPLA-held areas during the war.

441. Cherry Leonardi's *Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship Community and State* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2015), 181-195.

442. UNHCR Archives 11/3/41-410.WCC.SUD *Non-Governmental and Governmental (National) Organizations-Specific Non-Governmental Organizations-World Council of Churches-Sudan 1986-1991*.

443. *Ibid.*

444. *Ibid.*

445. *Ibid.*



scorched earth policy, Southerners either fled these territories or temporarily escaped from these towns. During its “Early Warning Conference” in Khartoum, SCC provided IOs and NGOs, such as UNCHR, with reports about the impending causes of famine in Bahr-el-Ghazal. These included sporadic rainfall, leading to limited grazing areas for livestock and farming activities, instigating the conflict over space among the local groups within the region. Sudan Council further enlightened the conference attendees about different methods of gathering information by radio, air, and documentation as a means of providing timely humanitarian reports.<sup>446</sup>

Among the Equatorians, some of the problems encountered by SCC’s staff included sporadic attacks by bandits, difficulty in travelling due to the conflict among armed groups, and inaccessibility of besieged towns such as Kapoeta. In Terekeka town, five kilometres North of Juba, SPLA operation within this locality displaced around 10,000 people from the Mundari and Bari ethnic groups. Consequently, the traditional herders among these groups migrated to Juba with about 10,000 head of cattle, and they grazed around Juba airport and other parts of the city in the process, destroying about 100 hectares of farmland and garden crops. The widespread insecurity along Uganda’s border compromised the possibility of mounting any cross-border relief operation into Equatoria. Previous attempts by SCC personnel to undertake this venturesome plan led to the killing of truck drivers by armed groups. As a recourse to these security issues, Band-Aid and the World Food Program (WFP) planned to airlift supplies from Uganda and Kenya to the Equatoria region. SCC provided this information to IOs and NGOs in anticipation of their encounters in the South.<sup>447</sup>

Meanwhile, an unprecedented surge in the humanitarian crisis in Wau and obstacles in operating from Southern Sudan prompted ICRC to begin using the town of Narus as a staging area for relief operations among the Southerners. With the SPLA’s capture of Narus in 1985, amicable relations between the liberation army and the local Kapoeta community facilitated the establishment and development of Narus, a locality in Eastern Equatoria, as an indispensable center for humanitarian activities during the civil war.<sup>448</sup> By 1987, SPLA’s control over parts of the Southern regions briefly provided ICRC with an opportunity to provide humanitarian assistance from its base at Narus. Moreover, the town’s proximity to ICRC’s hospital in Lokichogio, in the North-Western part of Kenya, reinforced its recognition as the nerve center for humanitarian activities in the South in subsequent years.<sup>449</sup>

### ***THE CHALLENGES OF HUMANITARIANISM IN SOUTHERN SUDAN***

Throughout the 1980s, countries along the Sahel region of Africa, such as Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Sudan, were affected by famine and drought. Simultaneously, the civil wars in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda prompting the sporadic movements of refugees across their respective borders, compounded this situation. Thus, from 1984, while Sub-Saharan African

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446. UNHCR Archives 11/3/40-400.SUD/*Non-governmental and Governmental Organizations-Sudan*, 1986-1995.

447. UNHCR Archives 11/3/41-410.WCC.SUD *Non-Governmental and Governmental Organizations-Specific Non-Governmental Organizations-World Council of Churches-Sudan*, 1986-1991.

448. Kuyok A. *Kuyok South Sudan*, 681-683.

449. *East and Central Africa Roundup: Sudan*, ICRC Bulletin January 1987. No. 132  
[https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00336.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00336.pdf) (accessed April 4, 2023).

countries received about 75% of the global emergency aid, Ethiopia and Sudan received the most significant food aid. Invariably, the increase in emergency food aid facilitated the presence of NGOs in Sudan and other countries afflicted by various types of humanitarian crises.<sup>450</sup> By the mid-1980s, Khartoum became the destination point for refugees from Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, and Zaire. NGOs such as the ICRC, established in Khartoum in 1978, instituted different kinds of humanitarian aid for these refugees. Many impoverished people received medical and food assistance from the ICRC in Khartoum.<sup>451</sup> Subsequently, in the mid-1980s, when the famine and drought in Sudan coincided with the arrival of approximately 500,000 refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia, about fifty NGOs assisted these refugees and Sudanese affected by the famine crises. At the end of the drought caused famine from 1983 to 1986, affecting parts of northern Sudan, including Darfur, Kordofan, Omdurman, and Khartoum, NGOs in these areas now focused on those afflicted by war and famine in the South. International concerts such as Bob Geldoff's Live Aid rekindled global attention on the famine crises in Sudan and Ethiopia.<sup>452</sup>

The complexity of the military and political situation in the South made providing relief aid problematic for many NGOs. At the same time, the SPLA controlled most of the South, mainly rural areas, and laid siege to garrison towns. As such, a meaningful humanitarian program could only be initiated with the consent of the liberation army. Nevertheless, providing aid for the Southerners, especially those in the SPLA-controlled areas, without authorization from Khartoum would be equivalent to compromising Sudan's sovereignty.<sup>453</sup> In consequence, from August to September 1986, a consortium of NGOs became embroiled in the issue of gaining access and providing aid to Southern civilians within the SPLA-held town of Ayod and the government-controlled cities of Wau and Juba.<sup>454</sup>

In this situation, around 160,000 Southerners faced starvation in Wau, while roughly 40,000 people attempting to escape from the war and hunger became displaced in the city. Camps mushroomed along the edges of the town where the displaced built their tukuls, cone-shaped mud houses with thatched roofs.<sup>455</sup> Concurrently, to prevent food from reaching the SAF in the area and weaken Khartoum's influence in the city, the SPLA besieged Wau. The liberation army exploited the siege to coerce Khartoum to meet its demands. Hence, SPLA's siege strategy prevented food and relief aid from reaching Wau, and other garrison cities in the South, as a stratagem to starve and deprive SAF of relief aid.<sup>456</sup> Eventually, in Wau, the incidence of famine worsened as 59% of the children there became malnourished, and 18% were in severe condition.

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450. Susanne Jasper, *Food Aid in Sudan: A History of Power, Politics, and Profit* (London :Zed books, 2018) 60-75.

451. *Sudan: A Diverse Programme*, ICRC News Releases Library January 11, 1984, No.96, [https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00322.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00322.pdf) (accessed April 4, 2023).

452. Francis M. Deng and Larry Miner, *The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan*, (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 1992), 30-119.

453. SAD.989/10/23 *In Sudan Masses Die as Rebels Government Uses Food As A Weapon* 1986.

454. SAD.989/9/6 *Catalogue Papers of M W Daly Press* Cuttings created, January-December 1986.

455. *Wau: A City at the Breaking Point*, ICRC News Releases Library January 1986, No.120 [https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00332.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00332.pdf) (accessed April 5, 2023).

456. *Ibid.*

The roads and rails became impassable because of the fighting, therefore, airlift became the only feasible option for delivering food aid to the people in Wau.<sup>457</sup>

These events precipitated “Operation Rainbow” in 1986 as the first major UN humanitarian initiative for the Southerners during the Civil War. Sponsored by a consortium of NGOs from Canada, the Netherlands, the United States, and the UN, Operation Rainbow brokered a ceasefire deal between the SPLA and Khartoum to facilitate the airlifting of food aid to the South. Thus, food aid would be airlifted by chartered C-130 airplanes to both the government-held area in Wau and the SPLA-controlled region in Yirol. By September 1986, however, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Sudanese senate vetoed these airlifts of food aid to Wau and Yirol for security reasons.<sup>458</sup>

Simultaneously, the ICRC attempted to negotiate with the liberation army and Khartoum for the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians in the South. Thus, ICRC’s delegates intensified their efforts in holding talks with Sudanese authorities about the feasibility of operating in Southern Sudan and gaining access to political detainees. Members of the humanitarian agencies also met with SPLM/As’ representatives without fruition. In this regard, Khartoum, and the Southern movement’s uncompromising stance about not granting ICRC access to provide relief aid in the South jeopardized humanitarian operations among the Southerners. Furthermore, on August 16, 1986, after SPLA shot down a Sudanese aircraft flying over Southern Sudan, ICRC’s chartered C-130 discontinued its relief aid shuttle flights from Entebbe in Uganda to Wau. Yet, ICRC officials continued communicating with SPLM/A officials to no avail.<sup>459</sup>

Despite these challenges, other NGOs, such as the Combined Agencies Relief Team (CART), established in March 1986 by the European Commission and private agencies, still attempted to provide humanitarian aid for the Southerners. CART wanted relief aid delivered to the Southerners without any military escorts based on the humanitarian principle of neutrality and non-partisanship with belligerents. However, by the end of 1986, CART’s operations were thwarted by Khartoum’s hardline policies against providing humanitarian aid. In addition, SPLA targeted vehicles owned by relief agencies given the possibility of them being used by SAF. These occurrences disrupted the allocation of human and material resources required to complete developmental projects in urban and rural areas and prompted CART to end its operation in Juba.<sup>460</sup> Unsurprisingly, the liberation army’s operation weakened NGOs’ capacity to initiate and provide essential services to the Southerners, including health care services, digging, and maintaining of boreholes and wells for clean drinking water, and extension of support services.<sup>461</sup>

In the North, Khartoum’s accusations against ACROSS, World Vision, and Lutheran World Service for conspiring with the SPLA stifled their operations. As such, on March 22, 1986, TMC accused ACROSS, while operating in Darfur, of leaking intelligence information about the SAF’s

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457. *Ibid.*

458. SAD.989/9/6 *Catalogue Papers of M W Daly* created, January-December 1986.

459. *Sudan* The Annual Report of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 1986. [https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/RA\\_1986\\_ENG.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/RA_1986_ENG.pdf) 26, (accessed April 23, 2023).

460. de Waal and Omar, *Food and Power in Sudan*, 104-107.

461. SAD/77/4/195 *Press Conference: Sudanese People Report on Their War*, October 24, 1988.

movement in the South and providing SPLA with food aid. Yet, according to Radio SPLA, the underlying reasons for TMC's accusation against ACROSS were based on the Sudanese government's intent to create military training centers in Nyala, Al-Fahsir, and Al-Duyam, situated in Darfur, where the relief agency operated.<sup>462</sup> Later, in February 1988, Khartoum expelled ACROSS and two NGOs from Sudan because their activities would sabotage the security of the country.<sup>463</sup> Accordingly, the fear of reprisal from Khartoum made NGOs reluctant about publicizing the Southerners' tragedies amid the civil war and famine crises. Therefore, the Sudanese government intensified its draconian policies over NGOs and reportage about their activities.<sup>464</sup>

Undaunted by these challenges, the SCC, constituted by the Protestant and Catholic churches, and Sudanaid, a subsidiary of the Sudan Bishops' Conference, alerted the international community about the famine crisis in the South. Afterward, in 1987, SCC initiated a cattle vaccination program, in both government-controlled and SPLA-held areas, especially important for Southerners whose livestock embodied a vital economic and nutritional resource.<sup>465</sup> Thereafter, on October 24, 1988, the concerted efforts of NGOs including the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Christian Aid, Danish International Development Agency, Oxfam, UNICEF, Commission of the European Communities, DanChurch Aid, the National Gypsum of Saudi Arabia, and Norwegian Church Aid in collaboration with Panos Institute, a UK based think tank and media company, published a booklet *War Wounds: Development Costs of Conflict in Southern Sudan*. Authored by nineteen scholars from North and South Sudan, *War Wounds* depicted how the civil war impacted the lives of the Southerners.<sup>466</sup>

Thus, through the instrumentality of *War Wounds*, Marcello Lado Jada, the assistant director of Equatoria region's field management, critiqued how the operations of the government forces, SPLA, and militias, and famine encroached upon the daily activities and existence of the Southerners. For instance, by 1988, both the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns of the SPLA and SAF, respectively, aggravated the displacement and famine situation in the government-controlled city of Juba. Later in July, about 12 camps existed in the city catering to the needs of Southerners displaced by the war and who were provided with food and clothing by relief agencies. However, the growing number of displaced in Juba made it challenging to meet their needs.<sup>467</sup> The shortage of grains, rising transportation and food costs, and prevalent insecurity in the city compounded the provision of food aid for the displaced Southerners. In this situation, about 40% of the city's inhabitants were unemployed, and another 39.3% to 12.3% of the city's workers earned around \$25 and \$50, respectively, monthly.<sup>468</sup> Additionally, the publication of *War Wounds*

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462. CIA digital archive *Radio SPLA Reports on TMC's tricks* EA142110(Clandestine) 1300GMT April 14, 1986. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90B01390R000500610010-7.pdf> (accessed April 15, 2023).

463. SAD/77/4/195 *Press Conference: Sudanese People Report on Their War* October 24, 1988.

464. SAD.950/5/1-55 R.O Collins Press Cuttings and Statements, 1988.

465. Larry Minear et al *Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan*, (New Jersey: Red Sea Press,1991), 6-7.

466. SAD/77/4/145 *Sudanese People Report on their War Press Conference* October 28, 1988.

467. Marcello L. Jada "The Four Enemies" in Abdul Rahman Abu Zayd Ahmed et al *War Wounds: Development Costs of Conflict in Southern Sudan* (London: Panos Institute, 1988), 125-129.

468. *Ibid.*

coincided with the growing consensus among international agencies in the late 1980s that the situation in Southern Sudan represented a tragedy in Africa while about two million Southerners faced starvation and an additional 1.5 million fled their homes to seek refuge in Khartoum and Ethiopia.<sup>469</sup>

Regardless of the challenges encountered by NGOs in Southern Sudan, ICRC strove to aid victims of the conflict based on Article III of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which underlined the need to offer minimum protection to non-combatants and civilians during civil wars.<sup>470</sup> By early March 1988, Khartoum, a signatory of the Geneva Convention, permitted ICRC to proceed with its plan to survey the needs of Southerners in the government-held areas including Wau, Malakal, and Juba and within the SPLA-controlled regions of Yirol, Kongor, and Pochalla. Afterward, on March 16, 1988, SPLM/A corresponded with ICRC and acknowledged its readiness to compromise with a Red Cross plan of action in Southern Sudan which rekindled the communication between ICRC and the liberation army. However, Khartoum and SPLA later reversed their mandates permitting ICRC's operation in the South because they squabbled over the departure point of the NGO's airlift to both SPLA-controlled areas (Yirol, Kongor, and Pochalla), and SAF-held regions (Wau, Malakal, and Juba). The deadlock between the warring sides obstructed ICRC's relief operation as the famine crisis in the South worsened. Moreover, the reluctance of NGOs based in the North to publicize the devastation in the South and foreign countries' unwillingness to censure Khartoum over the conflict delayed a concerted humanitarian response.<sup>471</sup> By September 1988, as the famine crisis in the South worsened, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), an NGO operating in the North, in its report *The Bells of the Apocalypse Starts to Toll* emphasized the unprecedented nature of the crises in the Southern areas. The MSF report garnered international attention and prompted a visit to famine-affected areas by officials from the European Community. In addition, the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* and other international media outlets began publishing stories about the worsening situation in the South.<sup>472</sup>

Despite the constraints to NGOs operating in the South, the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), from its base in Kenya, provided relief aid for Southerners in the SPLA-controlled areas. Egil Hagen, a former soldier and NPA's regional manager in East Africa, influenced the Norwegian NGO's support for the liberation army based on his sympathy for its cause and the Southerners' dehumanizing situation.<sup>473</sup> Consequently, a camaraderie developed between Hagen and SPLA leaders, which reinforced the relationship between NPA and the liberation army.<sup>474</sup> In October 1988, NPA delivered thirty-five tons of food overland to the SPLA-held town of Narus and airlifted thirty million medical supplies from Nairobi to the liberation army's towns of Pibor and Kapoeta.

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469. SAD/77/4/145 *Sudanese People Report on their War Press Conference* October 28, 1988.

470. Sudan *The Annual Report: International Committee of Red Cross*, 1988.

[https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/RA\\_1988\\_ENG.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/RA_1988_ENG.pdf) 30, (accessed April 23, 2023).

471. SAD/71/8/66 *Paul Philip Howell Papers Relating to Human Rights and Charity Organizations Working the Sudan*, created 1991.

472. *Ibid.*

473. Hallen Jorn Hanssen, *Lives At Stake: South Sudan during the Liberation Struggle* (Africa World Books, 2018), 45-49. Hanssen's memoir recounts his experience with SPLA while working as the director of the NPA from 1994 to 2001 and afterwards continued as the NGO's advisor.

474. *Ibid.*

NPA, the humanitarian wing of the Norwegian Labour Movement founded in 1939, supported SPLA based on its ideal, which underscores the need to assist vulnerable and oppressed groups in Norway and abroad. The Norwegian government and European churches also funded NPA's humanitarian activities in Southern Sudan.<sup>475</sup>

On November 16, 1988, SPLM/A and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a member of the Sudanese coalition government based in Khartoum, reached an accord after meeting in Ethiopia. Some of the agreements during the meeting included a moratorium on the enactment of Sharia law until after a national constitutional conference, during which a final decision would be made regarding the implementation of the law. Both parties also discussed issues about NGOs' access to the South and the delivery of humanitarian aid based on the needs of Southerners in government-held areas and SPLA-controlled regions. Thus, SPLM/A and DUP appealed to both government institutions and NGOs all over the world to provide humanitarian assistance for all Sudanese devastated and displaced by the famine, flooding, and war crises.<sup>476</sup>

Simultaneously, Washington's Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) mounted pressure on Khartoum to be more proactive about providing relief assistance for Southerners afflicted by the famine crises. Subsequently, OFDA's Director, Julia V. Taft provided the airlifts and financial resources needed to mitigate Southern Sudan's refugee and food crises.<sup>477</sup> Eventually, Khartoum conceded to the pressure from the international community to provide humanitarian aid for the Southerners. Therefore, by December 1988, SPLA conceded to ICRC humanitarian assistance in the South based on its appeal the previous month. Immediately, ICRC opened offices in Wau, Aweil, Yirol, and Akon and delivered relief aid to Southerners in these areas. These events underscored the growing interrelation between SPLA and ICRC. The NGO needed the liberation army's assistance with gaining access to the SPLA-controlled areas, while the liberation army also needed relief aid provided by ICRC and other humanitarian agencies.<sup>478</sup>

### ***HUMANITARIAN AID AND REFUGEES: SPLA OPERATIONS BEYOND THE SOUTHERN FRONTIERS***

As mentioned earlier, Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia supported the SPLA activities in various ways. In return, SPLA fought against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF), Eritrea's People Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) within Ethiopia. In retaliation, for Mengistu's sponsorship of SPLA, Khartoum supported EPLF and ELF's campaign for Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia. SPLA's military assistance against rebel forces in Ethiopia cemented the allegiance between Mengistu and Garang. Mengistu supported SPLA by providing access to training bases, refugee camps, and weapons within Ethiopia. Towards the end of the 1980s, Ethiopia hosted around 400,000 Southern Sudanese

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475. SAD/71/8/66 *Paul Philip Howell Papers Relating to Human Rights and Charity Organizations Working the Sudan* created, 1991.

476. SAD/985/2/45 *Catalogue Papers of M.W.Daly on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army* created, January 26, 1991.

477. SAD/71/8/66 *Paul Philip Howell Papers Relating to Human Rights and Charity Organizations Working the Sudan* created, 1991.

478. SAD/17/AID *ICRC Emergency Appeal for Southern Sudan* created, 1988.

refugees.<sup>479</sup> Nonetheless, Ethiopia's preoccupation with its internal conflict made it difficult to effectively manage Southern Sudanese within its refugee camps, which provided the SPLA with the opportunity to exploit this situation by controlling the security and other logistics within these settlements.<sup>480</sup>

In this context, by 1986, SPLA strengthened its control over the UN-sponsored refugee camp in Gambella, in western Ethiopia, which borders the southeastern part of Southern Sudan. Hence, Mengistu's regime tasked the liberation army with the responsibility of patrolling and arresting lawbreakers along Gambella's borders. Inevitably, SPLA exploited its presence within Gambella by commandeering relief aid NGOs dispensed to Southern refugees within the area. Therefore, towards the end of February 1987, SPLA systematically diverted large quantities of food aid provided by UNHCR and other relief agencies operating in Gambella for its use. SPLA officials even obtained medical supplies from ICRC within the area, which underlined the relief agency's association with the liberation army. Indeed, the fact that the Ethiopian Refugee Coordination Committee was in cahoots with the liberation army reinforced the latter's operation in Gambella. In some instances, SPLA inflated the number of refugees within this vicinity to gain more access to international aid. In particular, the SPLA's interest in facilitating and controlling humanitarian activities in the South prompted the rebel movement to create its own aid organization called the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) in Itang, situated in Ethiopia.<sup>481</sup>

Hence, in the Itang camp, SPLA concurrently coordinated its guerrilla operation and managed the influx of Southern refugees in neighbouring countries. Accordingly, towards the end of the 1980s, UNHCR, some NGOs, and the Ethiopian government organized the settlement of about 10,000 to 35,000 Southern Sudanese refugees in the Itang refugee camp in Ethiopia. The Southerners' settlement in Itang was prodded by SPLA's capacity to safely organize their movement from Bahr-el-Ghazal to the camp and the liberation army's effective security measures against Khartoum forces' intrusion in Itang. Soon the overcrowding of Itang by Southern refugees caused the creation of the Fugnido camp, around 53 kilometers away from Itang. More than 23,500 refugees, predominately Dinka and Nuer, resided in the camp by March 1988. To the south of Fugnido, Dimma camp also emerged, and 52% of its inhabitants were Dinka. The Southern Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer's cultural affinities, the lucrative trading activities, the educational

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479. Assefaw Bariagaber, *Conflict and The Refugee Experiences: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in The Horn of Africa* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 84-85. Jesse A. Zink's *Christianity and Catastrophe in South Sudan: Civil War, Migration, and the Rise of Dinka Anglicanism* (Texas: Baylor University Press, 2018) examines different factors that facilitated the conversion of Dinka to Christianity in Ethiopian, and later Kenyan, refugee camps. Zink also underlines how these events gradually changed the nature of gender relations among the Dinka men and women. 480. *Ibid.*

481. CIA digital archive *Sudan's Southern Insurgency: The Importance of Ethiopian Sanctuary* <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP05S02029R000300990001-5.pdf> (accessed April 24, 2023). Dereje Feyissa's *Playing Different Games: The Paradox of Anywaa and Nuer Identification Strategies in the Gambella Region Ethiopia* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011) examines the conflict between the SPLA and the Nuer sub group (Gaat-Jak) during the 1980s and also notes how the Nuer compared with other Southern ethnic groups exploited UNHCR resources, especially education, within the refugee camps in Gambella.

opportunities for Southern youths, and the location of SPLA's logistical services within this vicinity spurred the Southerners' migration into these camps.<sup>482</sup>

Northern Uganda's proximity to Southern Sudan's Equatoria province influenced Kampala's role in the civil war. When Museveni became Uganda's president on January 29, 1986, he expressed his intent to make fundamental changes in Uganda's politics and foreign policy by enhancing regional stability and cooperation. However, Museveni's initial problems with Khartoum started when the ousted Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) and other Ugandan rebel groups took refuge in SAF garrison towns in the Equatoria area of Sudan. Hence, the Sudanese government equipped and deployed these exiled UNLA forces against SPLA. Undoubtedly, UNLA used this opportunity to foment its cross-border operation against Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in northern Uganda's Kitgum and Gulu Districts. Immediately, Uganda closed its borders with Sudan, but these attacks persisted. Subsequently, in the mid-1980s, Al-Mahdi and Museveni met several times to resolve this situation, but the border insecurity continued.<sup>483</sup>

Meanwhile, Ugandan refugees based in Equatoria, in Aru and Yei vicinities, through the concerted humanitarian efforts of UNHCR and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), became self-sufficient in food production and sold their surplus produce in Yei and Kajo Keji markets. However, by 1986, the SPLA evicted them from their settlements and expropriated their plantations which secured the liberation army a food supply for their operations along the Ugandan and Southern Sudan borders without alienating the Southerners living there. Besides, the ethnic affinities between Southern Sudan and Northern Ugandan Acholi and Madi located there blurred their difference, making it possible for the SPLA to recruit from both sides of these borders. Concurrently, NCA's sustained relief aid in Equatoria encouraged the influx of more Ugandan refugees despite the widespread insecurity.<sup>484</sup>

The incapacities of UNHCR and NCA to manage the upheaval within these refugee camps prompted Ugandan Acholi refugees, affiliated with UNLA forces, to infiltrate the liberation army. Together they looted Ugandan refugee settlements in Southern Sudan. In consequence, different groups disguised as SPLA forces made incursions into Northern Uganda ostensibly in search of Khartoum forces but they used this opportunity to loot gold panning sites, especially in the Moyo district.<sup>485</sup> Amid these events, SPLA arrested around 500 to 600 Ugandan men crossing into Southern Sudan from Karamoja situated in northern Uganda. Afterwards, some of these prisoners were taken to the liberation army's Dima Camp in Ethiopia for military training where they were coerced to disguise as Southerners whenever they were visiting adjacent refugee camps. Other

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482.SAD/1024/3/1-255 D H. Johnson *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, 1992-1995.

483.Thomas P. Ofcansky, "Warfare and Instability Along The Sudan-Uganda Border: A Look at the 20th Century" in *White Nile Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity From Khartoum to Kampala*, ed. Jay Spaulding and Stephanie Beswick (Asmara: The Red Sea Press Inc, 2000), 195-208.

484.Tim Allen, *A Flight from Refuge: The Return of Refugees from Southern Sudan to Northwest Uganda in The Late 1980s, In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa* (ed) Tim Allen (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute (UNRISD) and James Currey, 1996), 230-246.

485.*Ibid.*



internees died of sickness, starvation, or fatal wounds while those alive were incarcerated in refugee camps located in SPLA-controlled areas in the South.<sup>486</sup>

Around June 1988, the border crisis intensified when SPLA forces crossed into Uganda's Arua and Moyo districts, seemingly searching for food and other supplies, as they assaulted and pillaged the inhabitants. Many Ugandans sought refuge among their relatives in Southern Sudan as a recourse. Even when the NCA repatriated Ugandan refugees from Equatoria, the liberation army attacked and commandeered their vehicles. Kampala and Khartoum responded to these events by convening the Ugandan-Sudanese Permanent Joint Ministerial Commission of Cooperation in September. During the meeting, both countries' governments promised to improve border security and permit the mutual exchange of refugees. This and subsequent initiatives failed due to a lack of resources and political will.<sup>487</sup> Kampala and Khartoum's inability to resolve their border issues eventually affected the course of economic and social activities in these areas. In effect, the roads connecting Yei to Uganda and Eastern and Western Equatoria became inaccessible due to frequent ambushes and landmine incidents. Consequently, the region's insecurity prompted the Central African Republic and Zaire to close their adjacent borders to Western Equatoria, which stifled the course of trading activities along these frontiers. As such, inhabitants of Yei and proximate areas depended on military-escorted convoys and airlifts from Juba, Uganda, and Kenya for their food supplies and miscellaneous needs.<sup>488</sup>

Through the humanitarian activities of NGOs in Kenya and Uganda, Southern Sudanese received relief aid from these countries. For instance, while the deadlock between the warring factions ensued, ICRC facilitated its relief operation from Narus, around 30 kilometers from Southern Sudan's border, in Kenya.<sup>489</sup> Within this part of Kenya, in Lokichogio, ICRC created a medical clinic where Southern Sudanese wounded during the war were treated. Furthermore, the Narus feeding center, established by ICRC in 1986, admitted malnourished children and their mothers. Towards the end of the same year, ICRC's collaboration with Médecins San Frontiers strengthened their humanitarian assistance to Southern Sudanese families in Narus by providing them with an assortment of seeds (sorghum, beans, marrows, and okra) and agricultural tools, and blankets to encourage Southerners to return to Sudan before the next rainy season in March 1987.<sup>490</sup>

Kenya's permissive posture towards the activities of NGOs within its borders, coupled with President Arap Moi's sympathy with SPLM/A, led to the creation of another SRRA office in Nairobi in 1986. Initially, SRRA's office in Kenya designated itself as an NGO and later adopted the "relief wing of the SPLA" mantra. Nevertheless, there were doubts about the SRRA's

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486. UNHCR Archives 11/3/10-100.UGA.SUD Refugee Situations-Special Groups of Refugees-Sudanese Refugees in Uganda, 1986.

487. Ofcansky, "Warfare and Instability Along The Sudan-Uganda Border," 195-208.

488. SAD 959/4/26-64 R.O Collins *Final Report on Yei, Eastern Equatoria region and the region of Western Equatoria* June 21 to July 9, 1989.

489. International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Information Department digital archive, *ICRC Relief Operation Starts in Southern Sudan* Press Release No. 1594 Geneva, 5 December 1988,

[https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00340.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00340.pdf) (accessed March 15, 2023).

490. Cornelio Sommaruga *International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Annual Report 1987*, [https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/RA\\_1987\\_ENG.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/RA_1987_ENG.pdf) (accessed April 25, 2023).

autonomy as a relief agency since its office in Nairobi also served as SPLM/A's liaison center.<sup>491</sup> A group of NGOs, including Band-Aid, SC, and Oxfam, gave the SRRA office in Nairobi about \$20,000 which was misappropriated, delaying subsequent relief funding from these donors. Therefore, through the instrumentality of SRRA, SPLA sustained its ties with humanitarian organizations. However, NGOs such as NPA avoided dealing with SRRA and preferred working directly with SPLA commanders.<sup>492</sup>

Unavoidably, SPLA and SRRA operations in Nairobi strained diplomatic relations between Kenya and Sudan. Soon, Al-Mahdi's government accused Arap Moi of abetting SPLM/A activities by hosting its office in Nairobi and dismissed Kenya's claim that the office supplied relief aid for Southerners afflicted by the war. Thus, the Sudanese government threatened to support the clandestine operation of *Mwakenya*, Kenya's underground socialist group, unless the Kenyan government closed the Red Cross and other NGO offices providing relief aid to Southern Sudanese. In response to these accusations, President Arap Moi stated that Kenya neither armed nor provided SPLM with a regional office and cited Addis Ababa as the location of the liberation army's regional headquarters. Meanwhile, Moi's relationship with SPLA became apparent when he successfully negotiated the release of humanitarian workers, two Americans and two British, abducted by the Southern movement. Even Radio SPLA acknowledged Moi's assistance in facilitating the release of the hostages. In fact, Moi admitted his amiable relations with SPLA based on his desire for peace in Southern Sudan.<sup>493</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Before the advent of the Second Sudanese Civil War in Southern Sudan, the proactive roles of IOs and NGOs in facilitating and providing the resources needed for sociopolitical and economic development underlined their importance among the Southerners. For instance, UNHCR, CRS, SC, and Oxfam not only provided humanitarian aid for the Southerners but also initiated and facilitated the implementation of developmental projects in the South, such as reducing the level of illiteracy, rehabilitation of medical care and facilitating and boosting agricultural productivity in rural areas. These projects highlighted humanitarian agencies' dynamic and multifaceted roles among the Southerners during the inter-war years (1972-1983).

Moreover, NGOs continued operating in the South amid the war until the mid-1980s, when the warring factions frustrated their presence and operations. Initially, these humanitarian groups and Khartoum collaborated in the planning and implementing of developmental projects in Southern Sudan. However, the inability of the Sudanese government and SRG to cater for the socioeconomic welfare in the South made the Southerners disillusioned. Moreover, Khartoum's interest in the exploitation of the South's oil wealth and the construction of the Jonglei Canal

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491. SAD.1030/6/1-160 Douglas H. Johnson *Operation Lifeline Sudan* created, June 1995.

492. *Ibid.* Fergus D. Boyle *Under Shading Trees: Twenty Years in The Sudans* (Independently Published, 2019) 21. Boyle who worked with both Save the Children Fund UK and United Nations Mission in Sudan (1993-2013) viewed most SRRA personnel also served as SPLA soldiers. Many of these officers strived to make sure that their respective communities received various forms of relief aid.

493. Blamuel Njururi, "Kenya and Sudan: Cause of Complaint," *New African Magazine*, August 1988, 22.

aggravated the Southerners' grievances since these projects were geared towards the economic development of the North while the South stagnated. These issues highlighted the economic contention between Khartoum and the Southerners. Concurrently, the competence and reliability of these NGOs were confirmed by their proactive roles in containing the outbreak of the Marburg virus in 1976 and their responsiveness to the Ugandan refugee crises in the Equatoria region.

The emergence of the SPLM/A, which instigated the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983, also obstructed IOs and NGO developmental projects and relief efforts in Southern Sudan. During its burgeoning years, SPLA battled Anya-Nya II and Southern militias in different parts of the South. These incidents hampered the liberation army's control over the Southern territories until the mid-1980s. However, by 1986 as SPLA gradually gained control of the South, SCC and ICRC gradually provided relief aid for Southern refugees within and outside Southern Sudan. Therefore, these relief agencies' operations became intertwined with the course of the civil war in Southern Sudan. For instance, during "Operation Rainbow" in 1986, the UN brokered a short-lived ceasefire between Khartoum and SPLA. Concomitantly, ICRC embarked upon a diplomatic shuttle between the warring sides. These instances highlighted the nexus between humanitarian aid and diplomacy. Subsequently, as Khartoum and SPLA stalled the delivery of humanitarian aid in the South based on their divergent political interests, the duration of the war was extended.

Consequently, the humanitarian crises in Southern Sudan, and the resilient attempts by IOs and NGOs to mitigate the catastrophic situation, inadvertently led to the genesis of the symbiotic relationship between SPLA and humanitarian organizations operating in Southern Sudan. In particular, the efforts of ICRC culminated in the commencement of its humanitarian operation in the South by December 1988, which served as a forerunner for other NGO operations in the South amid the war. Furthermore, the Ethiopian government's staunch support for the liberation army's activities within its borders reinforced SPLA's guerrilla operation within the Southern territories and strengthened the liberation army's relationship with UNHCR, ICRC, and other relief agencies in Ethiopia during its civil war in the mid-1980s. Indeed, SPLA exploited these events to its advantage, which led to the creation of its own SRRA in both Ethiopia and Kenya. The leeway granted to the liberation army's activities in both countries and the consistent operations of NGOs within Southern Sudan underpinned the relationship between SPLA and NGOs during the civil war.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### *OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS): A NEXUS BETWEEN SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES (1989-1992)*

#### INTRODUCTION

In 1988, during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), the death of Southern Sudanese prompted the formation of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), an innovative humanitarian scheme aimed at providing relief aid to civilians. To avoid more carnage amid the war, the United Nations agencies, the government of Sudan (GOS), and NGOs conjointly launched the OLS program within both government-controlled areas and rebel-controlled areas in Southern Sudan. OLS created havens for the transportation of relief aid, reinforced by the ceasefire between the liberation army and Khartoum, magnifying the scheme's popularity among the belligerents. Inevitably, OLS operations in Southern Sudan became the fulcrum of the collaborative relationship between IOs, NGOs, and SPLA.

This chapter uses these events to examine the relief operations of IOs and NGOs in government-controlled areas and SPLA-liberated territories. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC) and UN agencies operated in both Khartoum-held and SPLA-controlled territories, whereas the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and International Swedish Aid (IAS) concentrated their humanitarian operations within SPLA areas. Concurrently, ICRC and NPA operated outside the umbrella of Lifeline to maintain the independence of their relief policies within the SPLA-held localities. Within the Southern Sector, the Red Cross engaged in cattle vaccination, fixing water pumps, distributing mosquito nets, and rehabilitating socioeconomic resources among the Southerners. ICRC's collaboration with the Sudan Rehabilitation and Relief Association (SRRA), SPLA's relief wing, and local chiefs enhanced the distribution of aid packages in the South. The cooperation among NGOs and IOs complemented by SRRA logistical support ensured OLS's success at its inception and sustained the interdependence between these organizations and the liberation army.

This chapter further examines the impacts of the United States, British, and other governments in promoting the implementation of OLS. Towards the end of the Cold War (1945-1990), religious NGO and IOs' such as the Mennonite Central Committee, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), influenced Washington's stance towards the civil war in Southern Sudan. John Garang, SPLA's chairman, also exploited the international community's interest in the civil war to meet and inform foreign governments about the situation in Sudan, to declare SPLA's commitment to OLS operations in the South, and to request more humanitarian assistance for Southerners.

Centered on these events, this chapter analyzes the impacts of Omar al-Bashir's government (1989-2019) on the implementation of OLS II, a continuation of OLS. During this period, Bashir's regime banned relief operations within SPLA-held areas, but ICRC, International Swedish Aid (IAS), and NPA, through the instrumentality of different humanitarian strategies, sustained their relief operations in the South and reinforced the Southerners' self-sufficiency. Within the context

of the post-Cold War period, the last two sections of this chapter argue that the events leading to the division within SPLA followed by the prevalent insecurity in Southern Sudan compromised the interdependent relationship between the liberation army and humanitarian agencies. Afterward, the creation and acknowledgment of the Ground Rules, a body of humanitarian policies, rekindled NGOs and IOs' harmonious relationship with SPLA and its rival factions in Southern Sudan.

### ***THE GENESIS OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN IN SOUTHERN SUDAN***

By the end of 1988, about 250,000 Southern Sudanese had died of hunger and disease during the Second Sudanese Civil War. As a result, the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, discussed with Sadiq al Mahdi, Sudan's prime minister, in January 1989 about the need to avoid more tragedy in the South. Thereafter, Khartoum convened a high-level meeting from 8 to 9 March 1989, leading to an urgent appeal to the international community for financial and material assistance to forestall an impending catastrophe in the Southern regions.<sup>494</sup> Sadiq-al-Mahdi and some of his cabinet ministers led Khartoum's delegates to the meeting. The representatives of the UN included Mr. James P. Grant from the US, executive director of the United Nations Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), Mr. James C. Ingram an Australian diplomat, and executive director of the World Food Program (WFP), and Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, a Welsh-Somali diplomat, UN under-secretary-general for special political questions, regional co-operation, decolonization, and trusteeship. Other Sudanese and international NGOs also participated in the meeting. Overall, the participants at the conference agreed upon a plan of action aimed at providing relief aid for Southerners affected by the conflict.<sup>495</sup>

At the end of the meeting, the participants concluded that all NGOs operating within the war zones in Northern and Southern Sudan come under the purview of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).<sup>496</sup> The UN Secretary-General appointed Mr. James Grant as his representative for OLS and with authorization to contact governments and international organizations to facilitate support for Lifeline operations. In addition, Mr. Grant served as the liaison officer between the Government of Sudan and SPLA. Accordingly, UNICEF, headed by Grant, became the lead agency in SPLA-controlled areas rather than the UN which only engaged legitimate governments. Hence, UNICEF opened its Southern Sudan offices to manage and monitor OLS programs in SPLA-held areas.<sup>497</sup>

Grant's mandate included facilitating negotiations between Khartoum and SPLA during the "month of tranquillity", a ceasefire period between the warring factions, enabling the transportation of relief aid along specific conflict-free routes. Also known as "corridors of

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494. Sudan Open Archive (SOA) *Plan of Action, Sudan Emergency Relief Operation*

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=is&oid=VGD19890000-01&type=staticpdf&e=> (accessed July 2023).

495. United Nations Digital Archive (UNDA) *Emergency Assistance to the Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General* September 1989, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/76980?ln=en> (accessed July 2023).

496. SOA *Plan of Action, Sudan Emergency Relief Operation*, March 14, 1989, The appointment of Mr. Grant as the interlocutor between Khartoum and SPLA was based on his previous experiences. After graduating from Harvard-Law School in 1951, he worked in USAID from 1964-1969 where he served as its mission director to Turkey and later as its assistant director. By 1969, Grant formed and headed the Overseas Development Council (ODC) until his appointment as UNICEF director in 1980. ODC is a think-tank based in Washington DC focused on promoting multilateral cooperation to effectively tackle global related problems.

497. UNDA *Emergency Assistance to the Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General* September 27, 1989.

tranquillity or safe passages”, these pathways comprised airlift, railway, roads, and waterways to transport relief aid to SPLA-held and government-controlled areas in the Southern regions. Routes in localities such as in Aweil, Malakal, Kaya, Yei, Nimule, Torit, Juba, Wau, and Ikotos were some of the highlighted “safe passages.” For instance, Aweil, located between SPLA and Khartoum forces, was recognized as a railroad route while Malakal, an SPLA-held area, was identified as a water route for barges.<sup>498</sup>

On April 23, 1989, Grant and John Garang met and discussed the modalities of relief aid delivery along the “safe passages.” Garang remained doubtful about the feasibility of using four of these pathways. These included the Wau to Raga Road planted with mines and contested between the liberation army and SAF. Similarly, the belligerents mined and battled over the road from Yei, in Southern Sudan, to Uganda. The absence of any road and the flooding of the western Ethiopian route into Southern Sudan made the area impassable. Thus, the SPLA’s chairman emphasized the need for NGOs and IOs to expedite the delivery of relief aid to around 300,000 Southerners in the region before it became inaccessible during the rainy season.<sup>499</sup>

Furthermore, during the meeting, both parties agreed that barges, trains, and vehicles passing through the Southern regions would drop off relief aid along the approved safe passages. The discussions about the usage of airdrops were inconclusive and postponed until further notice. The meeting ended positively for both parties, and Garang requested an extension of the ceasefire along the safe routes beyond one month. The SPLA’s chairman also guaranteed the liberation army’s readiness to assist with the delivery of humanitarian aid for the Southerners.<sup>500</sup>

Simultaneously, the support of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government for OLS operations facilitated the delivery of relief aid in Northern and Southern Sudan. At the inception of the aid program in April 1989, the Government of Sudan (GOS) expedited the processing time of relief workers’ visas and authorized a favorable exchange rate between the US dollar and Sudanese pounds for all OLS-related operations. The GOS created a coordinating and monitoring structure in collaboration with NGOs, potential donors, and the UN technical committee. In addition, pre-existing aid agencies in Khartoum, such as the United Nations Emergency Operation Group (UNEOG), exchanged information and cooperated with UN officials in facilitating OLS activities. In collaboration with OLS stakeholders, GOS provided an effective communication system enhancing the communication among aid workers in Sudan. In early April 1989, the GOS donated and installed donating special satellite transmission equipment in Sudan to reinforce the communication system of NGOs operating within the country. This development provided Khartoum’s relief agency Rehabilitation and Relief Commission (RRC), responsible for coordinating and controlling NGOs, with an enlarged radio network coverage of major food storage and distribution centers in government-controlled areas and SPLA-held localities. To accelerate the delivery of relief aid and to monitor food distribution in the Southern regions,

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498. SOA, *SPLA Leader Meets UNICEF Director in Southern Sudan* April 27, 1989.  
<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ZCRG19890427-01.1.1&srpos> (accessed July 2023)

499.Ibid

500.Ibid

Khartoum encouraged the creation of radio communication within areas controlled by the liberation army.<sup>501</sup>

Both the liberation army and Khartoum supported Lifeline in a period when it suited their disparate interests. By 1989, the beleaguered Sudanese army became demoralized by its recurrent defeats in Southern Sudan, exacerbating the unrest in Khartoum. Unavoidably, the Sudanese military and Northern political parties, excluding Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF), clamored to end the war. Therefore, Lifeline provided Khartoum with some reprieve from the tumultuous situation in the South. Similarly, through OLS, SPLA sought to strengthen its control and provide social services for Southerners within liberated areas.<sup>502</sup> Moreover, after the compromise between SPLA and DUP in 1988, and their concerted appeal for humanitarian assistance, the liberation army changed its hardline policies towards relief aid by conceding to ICRC's action plan for the South. Concurrently, the fading dominance of Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia, Garang's staunch ally, prompted SPLA to change its posture towards the operations of IOs and NGOs within its liberated regions.<sup>503</sup>

Consequently, the "month of tranquility" provided both warring sides with some respite, coinciding with the commencement of OLS on April 1, 1989. Hence, OLS enabled IOs and NGOs including ICRC, United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) to extend their relief operations throughout the South.<sup>504</sup> In particular, ICRC and NPA operated outside the umbrella of Lifeline in SPLA-held areas to maintain the independence of their humanitarian mandates in the region. Notwithstanding, ICRC collaborated with Lifeline agencies in facilitating humanitarian aid in different parts of the South during the ceasefire and consistently maintained its mandate to work in Southern regions. Regardless of the ceasefire, the Red Cross directive included assisting and protecting civilians, wounded and sick soldiers, and other victims of the conflict. Against this backdrop, the ICRC operation in Southern Sudan encompassed its traditional relief work, including visits and exchange of messages among the war victims and providing medical care to the injured.<sup>505</sup>

To mitigate the plights of the Southerners and encourage them to return to their traditional activities, ICRC initiated its emergency rehabilitation program in the South. The rehabilitation program included water and sanitation projects, reconstruction of hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination of women and children, educating local health workers, and providing fishing nets and hooks for Southerners. Against this backdrop, the "month of tranquility" allowed ICRC to expand its humanitarian operation into eighteen locations by May 1989 in both SPLA-held and government-controlled areas in the South. Red Cross achieved these feats by adding four

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501. UNDA *Emergency Assistance to the Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General* September 27, 1989. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/76980?ln=en> (accessed July 2023).

502. Ibid.

503. SAD Middle East Documentation Unit (MEDU) 17/3/GEN/59 *Imposing Empowerment? Aid and Civil Institutions in Southern Sudan*. African Rights (London: Discussion Paper 1996).

504. Larry Minear et al, *Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan*, (Washington: Red Sea Press, 1991), 6-8.

505. SAD/Middle East Documentation Unit (MEDU)/17/4/AID *ICRC Emergency Appeal for Southern Sudan*.

additional airplanes to its 10 chartered aircraft to airlift food and medical supplies from Khartoum, Uganda, and Kenya to different parts of the South. By mid-April, these airlifts delivered around 150 tons of food to the South daily.<sup>506</sup>

In the government-controlled areas of Wau and Aweil, ICRC provided around 36,500 displaced people with food and supplementary rations. Similarly, the Red Cross supported over 110,000 people in Juba and Malakal, Khartoum-controlled areas. Before May's rainy season, when airstrips and roads become impassable, ICRC stockpiled food in rural areas to assist around 300,000 people in moments of need.<sup>507</sup> The Red Cross also implemented medical programs wherever its personnel operated, and they evacuated the sick and wounded from the rural areas to regional hospitals. In Wau, the ICRC team vaccinated most of its population against Meningitis, and in the Aweil, they provided logistical support for the vaccination programs of other relief agencies.<sup>508</sup>

Apart from the Red Cross, WFP, Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also airlifted food from Nairobi, Entebbe, and Khartoum to Juba. By October 1988, these IOs and NGOs airlifted around 800 metric tons of food aid into the city. Although harvests in Eastern Equatoria were good, landmines planted within the locality and flooding in its central areas affected the production and access to food.<sup>509</sup> In SPLA-held areas, including Yirol, Akon, and Kongor, ICRC had assisted around 70,000 Southerners and anticipated to assist another 230,000 people before the end of 1989. Though fighting had stopped in some parts of the region, the August 1988 flooding destroyed farm crops and decimated livestock among the Southern pastoralists. Therefore, ICRC focused on rehabilitating the socioeconomic resources of the Southerners within these regions. To achieve this objective, Red Cross vaccinated around 300,000 out of 800,000 cattle before the end of 1989. ICRC's reconstruction efforts also involved repairing water pumps and distributing mosquito nets, cooking utensils, axes, and seeds.<sup>510</sup> Through the instrumentality of traditional institutions, including the chiefs and sub-chiefs in the SPLA-controlled areas, ICRC distributed relief aid among the Southerners. As SPLA's own relief organization, SRRA in collaboration with traditional chiefs selected potential beneficiaries for ICRC's aid packages, and these were mainly vulnerable farmers. The unified structure of the Southern societies based on kinship ties determined the Red Cross's strategy of sharing relief among the Southerners.<sup>511</sup>

Other IOs and NGOs, including UNICEF, WFP, ACROSS, and MSF, in collaboration with SRRA, organized non-food programs within the SPLA-controlled areas. SRRA's collaboration with UNICEF facilitated the development of the primary healthcare (PHC) system. After sensitizing SRRA about the importance of PHC to improve the Southerners' overall health,

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506. *The ICRC Reaches 18 Areas in Southern Sudan* International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Bulletin, No.160 May 1989, [https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00351.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00351.pdf) (accessed July, 2023).

507. *Southern Sudan: The Race Against the Rains* ICRC Bulletin, No.161 June 1989, [https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00351.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00351.pdf) (July 2023).

508. Ibid.

509. Ibid.

510. Ibid.

511. SAD.945/10/18-32 *Report on The Subsistence Economy in Southern Sudan by an Unnamed ICRC Agronomist* December 2, 1989.



UNICEF focused on reopening many healthcare centers, training all potential healthcare workers, and developing a comprehensive health program for all IOs and NGOs. Consequently, UNICEF requested SRRA's assistance with recruiting former civil servants to revamp the health infrastructure and other essential services. Concomitantly, UNICEF provided the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) with some financial assistance to repair the solar-powered lighting, refrigeration, and water supply at the Torit Hospital.<sup>512</sup>

By the end of July 1989, UNICEF and ICRC collaborative efforts in Southern Sudan led to vaccinating 61,000 children against measles, diphtheria, whooping cough, tuberculosis, and polio. UNICEF reinforced its operational capacities by providing nine vehicles, two pickups, two ambulances, and five land cruisers to support its OLS operation in Southern Sudan and Lokichoggio in Kenya, the nerve center of NGOs operating in Southern Sudan. In addition, to prevent the spread of black fever, SRRA solicited Médecin San Frontières (MSF) assistance in creating treatment centers for the disease in Leer, situated in the Upper Nile, and vaccination centers throughout the region. In addition, SRRA requested medications against typhoid and sleeping sickness for the Southerners. Accordingly, within the SPLA-held areas, SRRA's cordial relation with MSF and other aid groups strengthened the interdependent relationship between the liberation army and relief agencies.<sup>513</sup>

### ***EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON OLS AND SPLAs' FOREIGN RELATIONS***

On June 26, 1988, the *Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitutional* editorial "The Weapon of Famine: Politics of Starvation" in the Horn of Africa highlighted Ethiopia and Sudan's famine and humanitarian crises. Several aid experts and US diplomats emphasized that Khartoum's political and military policies worsened the famine crisis in Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, Washington, under the Reagan Administration (1981-1989), maintained its diplomatic relations with Khartoum based on the strategic importance of Sudan during the Cold War and eschewed the Southern crisis.<sup>514</sup>

Despite Washington's passivity towards the humanitarian crisis in Southern Sudan, the Black Caucus (BC), African American members of the United States Congress, highlighted the need for the disentanglement of US food aid policy and Cold War politics. In particular, the BC members highlighted that the human rights abuses and tyranny in Ethiopia and Southern Sudan were the main causes of famine in both areas. By 1985, BC became the most influential African American political group in the United States, coinciding with a period when the Caucus members broached civil and human rights issues in Congress. In fact, the BC chairman, Senator Mickey Leland

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512. Sudan Open Archive (SOA) *Operation Lifeline Sudan Nairobi Situation Report No.14* August 25, 1989. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=is&oid=ND19890825-01&type=staticpdf&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-August+1989+Operation+Lifeline+Sudan-----> (accessed July 17, 2023).

513. *Ibid.*

514. The United State House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Select Committee on Hunger: Ethiopia and Sudan Warfare, Politics and Famine*, 100th Congress Second Session July 14, 1988. <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015039032910> (accessed July 17, 2023, University of Calgary's Library)110.

personally witnessed these abysmal crises in these countries, prompting his campaign, supported by Bill Emerson and other US politicians, for US relief aid in both regions.<sup>515</sup>

The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), a subsidiary of the Mennonite and Brethren Church in North America, corroborated the plights of the Southerners before the Congress Select Committee on Hunger, chaired by Leland. Since 1972, MCC in collaboration with the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), operated in Sudan. However, by December 1987, it terminated its operation in the South for security reasons. MCC debriefed the Congress about the upheaval within the SPLA-controlled area and Khartoum garrisoned towns, including Juba, based on eyewitness accounts of its members. The Mennonite group accentuated that the fighting between SPLA and Khartoum perpetuated the human rights atrocities against Southern civilians, especially the Dinka, by arming their traditional enemies among the Southerners.<sup>516</sup>

MCC also argued that the famine in the South, caused by Khartoum's hardline policies including the blockade of relief aid and deployment of militia forces exacerbated the starvation among the Southerners. Overall, MCC emphasized the need for the US to prioritize its concern about the civil war and work towards its resolution. During the proceedings, the Congress queried Walter G. Bollinger, deputy assistant administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) bureau in Africa, about the agency's efforts to provide humanitarian aid for the Southerners. Bollinger debriefed the Select Committee about USAID's endeavors to transport food and other essential needs to the South but also mentioned how the fighting between the warring factions and other logistical problems often hindered NGOs and the agency's efficacy in providing relief aid for the Southerners.<sup>517</sup>

After the inauguration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) followed by the appointment of Herman J. Cohen as the assistant secretary of state for African Affairs (1989-1993), Washington became more involved in sociopolitical issues in Africa at the end of the Cold War. This also coincided with the international community's concerted efforts in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in the South through OLS. To support the Lifeline initiative, Leland organized a delegation of US officials, including Bill Emerson, Michael McNulty, and Julia Taft, to guarantee the success of OLS. They focused on ensuring that regional leaders endorsed the "Corridors of Tranquility" guaranteeing the safety of relief aid during the ceasefire between the liberation army and SAF. The fact that the US government donated \$72 million towards the realization of OLS, making Washington the leading foreign donor to Lifeline, underscored US officials' commitment to its success. As such, Leland's delegation travelled to Kenya where they met with President Arap Moi and inspected Port Mombasa from where IOs and NGOs imported and conveyed relief aid into parts of Southern Sudan controlled by SPLA. From Kenya's capital Nairobi, the US delegation traveled to Ethiopia and successfully persuaded Mengistu to endorse

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515. Benjamin Talton, *In This Land of Plenty: Mickey Leland and Africa in America Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 92-108. The Black Caucus group was formed in 1971 by several African Americans in the US Congress.

516. The United State House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Select Committee on Hunger: Ethiopia and Sudan Warfare, Politics and Famine*, 100th Congress Second Session, July 14, 1988. <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015039032910> (accessed July 17, 2023, University of Calgary's Library).

517. *Ibid.*

OLS and the Americans promised to work with SPLA leader John Garang on the details of the delivery process. Concurrently, Cohen informed Garang and Sudan's Prime Minister Al-Mahdi about the changes in US approaches towards Sudan and advised both leaders to cooperate in enabling the US-sponsored food aid to reach impoverished Southerners.<sup>518</sup>

On April 1, 1989, Leland's team departed Ethiopia for Khartoum, where they met with Sadiq al Mahdi. During the two-hours meeting, Leland expressed his concern about the humanitarian crises in Southern Sudan. He accused Khartoum of using Juba's inhabitants as human shields against the liberation army. Al-Mahdi disproved and countered the allegations, stating that people settled in the city for security reasons. Regarding Khartoum's deployment of militia forces against the Dinka and Nuer in the Southern regions, the prime minister retorted that the militias were reacting to SPLA attacks against them. In addition, he claimed that the Sudanese government attempted to control the militia forces. Although Al-Mahdi expressed his security concerns about the OLS initiative, he professed his support for the relief program.<sup>519</sup>

Thereafter, on April 5, Leland met with Garang in Ethiopia since SPLA controlled around 90 percent of the Southern regions. Therefore, no meaningful relief aid could be mounted in the South without its cooperation. Leland's delegation started the meeting by imploring Garang to end the fighting with Khartoum, a proposition the SPLA leader remained adamantly against. Nevertheless, he agreed to support the Lifeline program within the SPLA-held areas and warned the GOS against airlifting food aid from Khartoum to its stronghold in Juba. The SPLA chairman also forewarned that all relief convoys of IOs and NGOs within the SPLA's liberated areas must be escorted by members of the liberation army because some of its forces might be unaware OLS activities.<sup>520</sup>

Garang traveled around Europe and North America to further enlighten the international community about Southern Sudan's situation, appeal for more humanitarian assistance, and promote the SPLA's cause. Thus, from June 4 to 12, 1989, Garang completed a nine-day visit to the US. During his trip, the SPLM/A's chairman met with several US dignitaries including Herman Cohen, former US president Jimmy Carter, the mayor of Atlanta Andrew Young, Senator Mickey Leland, and other notable personalities. On June 7, while addressing members of the US Congress in Washington, Garang extended his gratitude to Leland and other members of the Congress who visited Sudan during the civil war. The SPLA chairman recounted the sociopolitical background of the conflict in Sudan and reiterated that the SPLM/A stood for Sudan's Unity, not the separation of the South from the North. On issues pertaining to the delivery of relief aid to the Southerners, Garang mentioned that the liberation army cooperated with ICRC, NPA, and other humanitarian agencies.<sup>521</sup> Yet Garang appealed to other humanitarian organizations in the US to join the effort in providing more relief assistance to the Southerners. The SPLA's chairman not only emphasized the Southern Sudanese need for humanitarian aid but also the necessity to make them become self-

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518. Talton, *In This Land of Plenty*, 173-198.

519. *Ibid.*

520. *Ibid.*

521. John Garang *The Call for Democracy in Sudan* edited and introduced by Mansour Khalid (London: Kegan Paul International, 1992), 192-196.

sufficient by providing them with agricultural tools to sustain the development of the Southern regions.<sup>522</sup>

Garang also explained how Khartoum violated the Southerners' human rights through the activities of SAF and armed militias. These groups fought against the SPLA, kidnapped children, and plundered cattle camps with impunity. Regarding the liberation army's violation of human rights, Garang stated that SPLA was a guerrilla group not bound by the Geneva Convention, regulating the rules of warfare. Notwithstanding, the chairman reassured his audience that over 1,000 prisoners of war were held by the liberation army and ICRC was given the authorization to visit them.<sup>523</sup>

After addressing the US Congress, Garang met with Cohen, and they discussed several issues, including the possibility of peace talks between Khartoum and the Southern Movement, the SPLA/DUP negotiation of 1988, US mediation in the civil war, and the establishment of a SRRA office in Washington. Cohen expressed hope for a compromise between SPLA and Khartoum as the US support for either side was predicated on a peaceful resolution of the civil war. Furthermore, the Assistant Secretary cautioned Garang concerning American speculation about the liberation army's source of military support especially from Libya, which was an enemy of the United States. In response, the chairman informed Cohen that no weapons were received from Ethiopia, but in 1984 Libya, the Southern movement's erstwhile ally, provided SPLA with arms, most of which were stockpiled and supplemented by ammunition captured from SAF.<sup>524</sup> After opening SRRA's office in the US, to serve as SPLA's voice in the country, Garang expressed the intent of continuously seeking friendship and material assistance from Washington. The SPLA's leader declined Jimmy Carter's offer to serve as a mediator between Khartoum and the liberation army but recognized the possibility of Washington serving as a sponsor of negotiations.<sup>525</sup>

Towards the end of 1980s the Soviet Union's influences dwindled affecting its capacity to provide military assistance to Ethiopia. These happenings informed Garang's decision to seek new allies in anticipation of changing geopolitics at the end of the Cold War. Therefore, on June 13, 1989, Garang visited the United Kingdom where he addressed an audience of around two hundred people, including some Sudanese, at the Africa Centre in London. During his presentation, the SPLM/A chairman focused on his vision for a new, united, multi-national, and secular Sudan. Garang also highlighted the goal of transforming the liberation army into a political group supported by Southerners and Northerners dissatisfied with Khartoum.<sup>526</sup>

Regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid in the Southern regions, Garang expressed how the concerted efforts of Khartoum, SPLA, UN, and foreign donors under the umbrella of OLS provided food and non-food aid within the SPLA-held regions. Whereas in Khartoum-controlled areas and other parts of the North, the SPLA chairman highlighted that the UK, US, and foreign

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522.*Ibid.*

523.*Ibid.*

524. British National Archives (BNA) FCO 93/5806 *Possible Visit by Colonel Garang of the SPLM/A To the UK and Other Countries* 1989.

525.*Ibid.*

526.*Ibid.*

governments propped up an unjust and unpopular government through their development and military aid.<sup>527</sup>

Following Garang's address, the SPLA chairman met with British MPs Mr. Jim Lester and David Gore-Booth. During their meeting, Garang explicitly stated that secularism, rather than secessionism, was the political goal of SPLM/A and guaranteed the liberation army's commitment to sustaining the "corridors of tranquility". Furthermore, Garang declared the extension of the ceasefire for relief assistance. The parliamentarians were impressed by the SPLA chairman's candor and commanding presence. Consequently, the British MPs donated £1million to NGOs operating in Southern Sudan towards enhancing emergency relief operations throughout the region. Garang broached the possibility of channelling British development aid through SPLA's relief wing, Sudan Rehabilitation and Relief Agency (SRRA), into SPLA-liberated areas in the South.<sup>528</sup> The SPLA chairman also visited Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, meeting with government officials and discussing human rights issues in Sudan. While in Geneva, Garang held meetings with humanitarian agencies including the ICRC. Through these dialogues, the chairman reiterated the extension of the ceasefire agreement.<sup>529</sup>

## ***THE RE-EMERGENCE OF MILITARY RULE IN SUDAN AND CONSTRAINTS ON OLS*** ***II***

By October 1989, the UN General Assembly declared the need to prolong Lifeline operations due to the unending humanitarian crises in Sudan, leading to the planning of the OLS II relief program. Simultaneously, hostilities resumed between SPLA and the new military regime in Khartoum constituted by the National Salvation Revolution Command Council (NSRCC). The NSRCC officers who orchestrated the June 1989 bloodless coup against the al-Mahdi government were spearheaded by Colonel Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir in cahoots with Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF). Initially, NSRCC allayed relief workers' misgivings about the regime's posture towards OLS II operations by allowing IOs and NGOs to continue their humanitarian activities in the Southern regions while ceasefire was briefly maintained until fighting resumed between the belligerents around October.<sup>530</sup>

However, before the year ended, NSRCC the new regime in Khartoum gradually stifled the operations of NGOs through its restrictive policies by invalidating the travel permits of all expatriates and imposing travel restrictions within Sudan. SAF also sequestered food aid provided by donors, and commandeered trucks hired by NGOs for transporting food items in the North.<sup>531</sup> The Northern ideologues and Islamists reinforced NSRCC's restrictions against humanitarian agencies based on their perception of OLS as a means of supporting SPLM/A activities in the South and undermining Khartoum's control over the Southerners.<sup>532</sup>

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527. *Ibid.*

528. *Ibid.*

529. *Ibid.*

530. Burr and Collins, *Requiem for the Sudan*, 208-210.

531. *Ibid.*

532. Susanne Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan: A History of Power, Politics, and Profit* (London: Zed books, 2018) 85-92.

Newspapers in Khartoum further perpetuated the bias against OLS by denouncing it as a violation of Sudanese sovereignty. Allegations against OLS's operation in the South also included the purported evidence that Lifeline provided SPLA with ammunition, begging the question about the impartiality of IOs and NGOs affiliated with Lifeline activities in the South. These arguments reinforced Khartoum's claim that NGOs and IOs delayed providing humanitarian aid in Khartoum-held regions compared to their brisk response in SPLA-controlled areas, revealing a bias against the Sudanese forces.<sup>533</sup> These incidents coincided with the short-lived reoccurrence of famine in the North in 1991 caused by the exorbitant price of food commodities, prevalent drought in mechanized farming areas, inflation and devaluation of the Sudanese pound, and the reduction of food aid from USAID and other donors to Sudan caused by its human rights issues.<sup>534</sup>

Khartoum's heavy-handed policies in dealing with this food crisis involved fixing prices on food commodities, banning grain transportation to prevent hoarding, and requisitioning traders' food commodities. Inevitably, these policies constrained USAID, CARE, and Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) humanitarian operations within government-controlled areas in the South. Accordingly, Sudanese state security forces commandeered SCC's grain earmarked for displaced persons. Similarly, USAID and CARE warehouses for food relief were either forcibly closed or requisitioned. NGO radios were confiscated, and foreign aid workers were compelled to exchange their foreign currencies at unreasonable rates into Sudanese pounds. In addition, Bashir's regime dissolved the Sudanese Red Crescent Society's constitution, and dismissed its senior personnel.<sup>535</sup>

The military regime's economic agenda focused on self-sufficiency as its national goal, underpinning its domineering attitude towards IOs and NGOs. Consequently, Khartoum considered the reliance on Western food aid as an anathema to its economic agenda hinged on improving the agricultural production of staple food items such as wheat. Simultaneously, al-Bashir's humanitarian policy focused more on rehabilitation and development rather than on relief aid.<sup>536</sup> To implement its relief program, the Sudanese government prioritized the provision of infrastructure facilities directed toward the expansion of mechanized farming as a means of discontinuing Sudan's dependence on food aid from the West. Another part of NSRCC's developmental plans involved the establishment of peace camps along the transition zones, situated between Northern and Southern Sudan. Khartoum planned to use the camps' internees and recipients of relief aid as cheap labour on farms within these localities.<sup>537</sup>

Unavoidably, the implementation of these schemes fomented the eviction of Southerners and other East African refugees from the transition zones. In some instances, after the GOS convened meetings with Khartoum's landlords, Southern IDPs and refugees were ejected from their residences. Additionally, the Sudanese army conducted illegal raids against Southern Sudanese

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533.SOA, *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996*, <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=LD19960000-01> (accessed July 2023).

534.Sudan: *Nationwide Famine* Africa Watch Report November 7, 1990.<https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/s/sudan/sudan90n.pdf> (accessed July, 2023).

535.*Ibid.*

536. Jaspas, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 85-92.

537. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omar *Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism* (London:African Rights,1997),159.

and refugees accused of being involved in brewing beer or liquor and running brothels. These incidents underlined the Sudanese government's human rights violations of the IDPs and refugees in the North. Hence, Khartoum's harsh policies against Southern IDPs and its absence from the Joint Technical Committee meeting in Nairobi, around May 1990, aimed at settling the needs of the Northern and Southern sectors reflected GOS's non-committal posture toward OLS operations. Eventually, Khartoum's OLS team refused to provide any reports concerning the humanitarian needs in the North.<sup>538</sup>

By mid-October 1990, UNICEF reported the Bashir government's non-committal posture towards OLS, depicted by its obstruction of trains and barges transporting relief aid from the North to the South and the accusation against the UN for lack of impartiality and transparency. Even the donor community became disenchanted with OLS II operations based on the human rights abuses in the transitory region within the Northern sector, including Southern Kordofan.<sup>539</sup> In these circumstances, when the Nairobi-based WFP-OLS, designated to provide aid for the Southerners, submitted its logistical plan to its operational headquarters based in Khartoum for approval, Bashir's regime terminated OLS II until its technical operational modalities were reviewed.<sup>540</sup>

The location of WFP and UNICEF offices in Khartoum overseeing the implementation of OLS relief and development in the South allowed the Sudan government to impose restrictions on Lifeline programs within SPLA-controlled areas. Consequently, this led to the cancellation of all UNICEF-funded relief programs in liberated parts of the South. Notwithstanding, OLS II continued within the government-controlled areas of Wau and Juba in Southern Sudan.<sup>541</sup> In 1991, the escalation of famine in the North reinforced Khartoum's control over Lifeline's Northern Sector relief operation and later affected OLS programs in the South. During the food crisis, the GOS pressured WFP-Khartoum to coordinate the transportation of relief aid from all Sudanese ports and to manage the imminent food crises in the North effectively. Initially, WFP-Khartoum, coordinating the WFP's Southern operations, declined to undertake this responsibility since the US and other OLS donors became alarmed by the Sudanese government policies in the transitional zones.<sup>542</sup>

However, by January 10, 1991, WFP acknowledged its assistance with the looming food crisis and collaborated with the military regime to undertake a comprehensive emergency relief operational plan encompassing the Northern and Southern sectors of Lifeline. The relief operation aimed to provide more food aid in the North, while the SPLA-controlled areas would receive between 10 to 20% of the allotted humanitarian assistance. Despite the proposition's favoritism toward the North, Khartoum requested that all OLS operations in the SPLA-controlled areas in the South must end because the GOS had no confidence in the UN Nairobi office's capacity to

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538. UNHCR Archive 11/3/10-100.SUD.ETH *Refugee Situations-Special groups of Refugees-Refugees from Ethiopia in Sudan* 1986-1994.

539. SAD.1026/4/1-134, Douglas H. Johnson *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, created, 1990-1991.

540. *Ibid.*

541. Douglas H. Johnson "Destruction and Reconstruction in The Economy of The Southern Sudan," in *Short Cut to Decay The Case of the Sudan* edited by Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1993), 126-143.

542. SAD.1026/4/1-134, Douglas H. Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, 1990-1991.

facilitate humanitarian operations in the South. The military regime buttressed its arguments by indicating that SPLA-held areas received 19603 metric tonnes (MT) of relief aid instead of the anticipated 17478 MT to liberated areas, providing an excess of 2125MT to the liberation army's controlled territories under OLS II. In contrast, GOS expected to receive 74,629MT but received 65961MT having a shortfall of 8,668MT. The surplus aid received by the liberation army compared to the shortage in the GOS's relief package encouraged the impression that OLS supported SPLA, prompting Khartoum to pressure OLS to end its operations in the South while humanitarian operations in the Northern sector recommenced. Consequently, Khartoum prioritized its sovereignty over providing relief aid to SPLA-held areas in the South.<sup>543</sup>

Eventually, by February 18, Bashir's regime reached a compromise with the UN officials about the modalities of providing humanitarian aid in the Northern and Southern sectors of OLS. Based on these agreements, the GOS conceded to the UN coordination of emergency and relief operations throughout Sudan while the WFP handled the food aid distribution in the North. Although both parties reaffirmed their commitments toward OLS principles, the Northern sector would be treated differently due to the urgency of the new drought situation in the area. Therefore, the humanitarian operation within the North would be managed differently from the Southern Sector. Hence, the Sudanese government in collaboration with WFP Khartoum, agreed to reassess the food needs in the SPLA-controlled areas before the delivery of aid.<sup>544</sup>

However, in subsequent months, the GOS constantly rescinded its agreement with the UN about delivering relief aid to SPLA-controlled areas under the aegis of OLS. In rare instances, when Khartoum granted an interim airlift to the South, officials delayed approving the delivery of humanitarian aid in SPLA-liberated areas until the rainy season when most parts of the South became impassable. In September 1991, Khartoum and SPLA were at loggerheads over creating new safe corridors for transporting relief aid, thwarting the operation of relief agencies in Southern liberated localities. Inevitably, the GOS's recalcitrant posture affected humanitarian operations in the SPLA-held territories in the South. Amid these unresolved issues, fighting between the belligerents continued.<sup>545</sup>

Organizational changes within the UN also allowed Khartoum to strengthen its control over OLS operations in the Southern sectors. By September 1989, Michael Priestly, a UNDP representative, replaced James Grant, UNICEF director, as the UN's interlocutor between Khartoum and SPLA. In this capacity, Priestly also became the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs special coordinator based in Khartoum. Based on convention, UNDP operated through the government's authority. As such, this scenario tacitly acknowledged Khartoum's control over the Northern sector's relief operations and its influence over relief policies in the Southern regions.<sup>546</sup>

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543. *Ibid.*

544. *Ibid.*

545. *Ibid.*

546. SOA, *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review*, 1996. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=LD19960000-01.1.318&srpos=5&e> (accessed July 20, 2023).



## ***HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN SPLA-HELD AREAS***

Within the SPLA-held areas, its relief wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), in collaboration with IOs, NGOs, and other local institutions in the South coordinated the implementation of relief and developmental projects. Established in the mid-1980s, SRRA commenced its operation in the liberation army's staging areas in Ethiopia and Kenya. After the launch of OLS operations in the Southern Sector, SRRA operated in the South and provided relief aid to displaced Southerners experiencing hardship and in need of assistance caused by the civil war, famine, and other natural disasters. Another of SRRAs' responsibilities included the preservation and protection of the physical and mental health of refugees and the education and training of Southern refugees and IDPs to support their advancement and rehabilitation. Therefore, the purview of SRRA functions also involved research into the condition of refugees and displaced persons in the South.<sup>547</sup>

Accordingly, SRRA conducted research on issues affecting the Southerners and shared its information with IOs and NGOs. The daily activities of SRRA and its relationship with other groups were carried out by its secretaries for health and services, women and childcare, education and training, youth development, culture and information, and management committee. In 1989, after Khartoum blockaded humanitarian aid and projects within SPLA's liberated areas, SRRA assisted ICRC, NPA, and International Aid Sweden (IAS) with the implementation of their relief and rehabilitation projects.<sup>548</sup>

Before the Sudanese government banned humanitarian projects in SPLA-held areas, IAS started its relief operations in Southern Sudan in April 1989 from across the border in Kenya and Uganda. Under the umbrella of OLS, IAS became one of the pioneering NGOs providing relief items behind the SPLA lines for Southern civilians in Kajo-Keji, situated in the Equatoria region. Prompted by its mission focused of supporting relief and development in developing countries, IAS conducted humanitarian assistance for the Southerners during the war and maintained its partnership with SRRA and other Southern-based institutions including the New Sudan Women Association, National Economic Council, and the New Sudan Council of Churches, representing all churches in the South.<sup>549</sup>

Based on its humanitarian objective, IAS encouraged local institutions and communities to initiate realistic relief and rehabilitation projects. These practices were underpinned by the principle that the progress of the Southern communities depended upon the Southerners. Therefore, the Southerners become the owners of these developmental projects supported by funds and miscellaneous resources provided by IAS. Moreover, the Swedish NGO prioritized the use of local resources, both human and material resources, in implementing development projects within designated localities. To enhance the delivery and distribution of relief aid within the Kajo-Keji area, IAS collaborated with community members and created the Kajo-Kaji District Relief and Development Board (KDRBD). KDRBD members comprised SRRA personnel, local community chiefs, and representatives from the Sudan Pentecostal church, and other churches. The board

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547.SAD.1034/2/1-191, Douglas H. Johnson, *Southern Sudan Agencies* created, 1989-1992.

548.*Ibid.*

549.*Ibid.*

members deliberated on the vital needs of the area and forwarded his information to IAS or other potential donors. After receiving the requested items, the development board members distributed them and reported their actions to the donors.<sup>550</sup>

Subsequently, while SRRA partnered with IAS, several committees created to facilitate relief and rehabilitation projects among the Southerners were formed to suit the needs of different areas. These committees were comprised of SRRA-appointed secretaries and IAS monitoring representatives who supervised the progress of community projects. Based on its policy to distribute relief items in all SPLA's liberated areas to every impoverished Southerner, SRRA shared IAS relief items such as hoes, axes, pangas, and clothes, with localities proximate to Kajo-Kaji including Laniya. Furthermore, IAS reinforced its operation and presence in the Equatoria region by holding meetings with SPLA leaders and social groups. Accordingly, on November 17, 1990, IAS officials met with SPLA commander James Wani Igga and discussed the welfare of the Southerners within the liberated regions.<sup>551</sup>

Thus, commander Igga highlighted the impacts of the IDP movement into Equatoria and its effects on the region's food security. To alleviate this problem, Igga implored IAS and other NGOs to assist Southerners in enhancing agricultural productivity in liberated areas. The SPLA commander also emphasized the need for a good health care system and clean water especially in the rural areas. Furthermore, Igga emphasized the retardation of Southern youths' education due to the war and the need for humanitarian assistance in this field. IAS made no commitment to redressing these issues but reassured the SPLA commander about soliciting funds needed to tackle these issues. Through its relief operations, IAS strengthened its interdependent relationship with SPLA and provided Southerners with some basic social amenities.<sup>552</sup>

Following this discussion, IAS officials met with the Kajo-Keji education committee. The meeting's objective focused on ascertaining how IAS could assist local initiatives in developing the community's educational system and identifying the basic academic needs in the area. In addition, Mr. Simaya Lomuding, the SRRA secretary for education, highlighted the basic needs of schools within the locality. These included stationeries, textbooks, building materials, incentives for teachers, games equipment, and agricultural tools. The provision of these items reinforced the possibility of facilitating socioeconomic development within SPLA-held areas amid the war.<sup>553</sup>

Kajo-Keji, renowned as Juba's agricultural hub, and dominated by cultivators who grew maize, millet, sorghum, cassava, groundnuts, beans, and vegetables, provided IAS with the springboard to support farming in the region. Thus, by 1989, IAS supplied the locality with agricultural tools, improving its productive acreage. Thus, around 20,000 families were provided with food produce during the war. Other NGOs including Action Africa in Need (AAIN) and Action Internationale Contre La Faim, complemented IAS's efforts by providing additional farming tools to cultivators

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550.*Ibid.*

551.*Ibid.*

552.*Ibid.*

553.*Ibid.*

living around Kajo-Keji. SRRA, in conjunction with local churches, distributed these hoes, pangas, axes, sickles, and seeds among the farmers.<sup>554</sup>

After Bashir's regime banned humanitarian activities in SPLA-held areas, including Kajo-Keji, IAS circumvented this obstacle by using travelers traversing the Southern Sudan and Uganda borders as human portage carrying relief items on their heads. Afterward, vehicles and motorcycles conveyed relief items thereby mitigating the transportation problems while SRRA complemented these efforts by constructing riverbed bridges and repairing damaged roads. Additionally, SPLA's relief wing provided shipping containers and other storage facilities as required by the Swedish NGO for keeping relief items. Through these efforts in 1990, IAS donated eight containers of used clothing shared among Northern Ugandan refugees, and Southern Sudanese in the Bor and Kajo-Keji localities. Indeed, SRRA and local churches within these territories distributed this clothing. Through the instrumentality of SRRA, SPLA and IAS maintained their symbiotic relationship.<sup>555</sup>

Despite Khartoum's proscription of relief operations in SPLA's liberated areas, ICRC officials continued catering to the needs of the Southerners. Operating outside the purview of OLS II, ICRC, based on its mandate to assist wartime victims, proceeded with its humanitarian operations within the SPLA area.<sup>556</sup> Thus, in 1989, ICRC provided relief aid including food and medical assistance to the newly displaced and helpless people. Until May 1990, when Bashir's regime temporarily lifted the ban on ICRC's humanitarian program in Southern Sudan, the Red Cross sustained its relief efforts through its stockpile of relief items in the Southern regions.<sup>557</sup> During the ban on relief operations in the South, the ICRC humanitarian programs in the Southern regions focused on distributing food during the severest months of famine, curbing the spread of cattle epidemics through veterinary programs, and sharing seeds among farmers for cultivation. These aid programs were geared towards making the Southerners more self-reliant. Before implementing its relief aid program within the SPLA-controlled areas, including Yirol, Akon, Leer, and Mayen Abun, an ICRC team, assisted by SRRA officials and local chiefs, embarked upon a need assessment exercise among the Southerners.<sup>558</sup>

Traditional customs in the South served as the basis for sharing ICRC's relief items through the chief, sub-chief, and family heads. The close kinship ties within the society emanating from the nuclear to the extended family shaped this distribution method. Yet, the process of distributing Red Cross humanitarian aid varied depending on the cultural values of different ethnic groups in the South. During the seed distribution process, ICRC prioritized those farmers deprived of any seed. SRRA and the traditional chiefs determined the potential seed beneficiaries by selecting the most vulnerable farmers. Soon, the Red Cross team became aware of the limitations of ICRC's

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554.*Ibid.*

556.*Ibid.*

557.*Ibid.*

558.*Flights to Southern Sudan Resume*, ICRC Bulletin No.173, June 1990,

[https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00352.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00352.pdf) (accessed August, 2023).

559.SAD.959/5/15-42 *Mission Report entitled "A Review of Agricultural Activities and Harvest Prospects Among the ICRC Population in Southern Sudan*, created November 23, 1989.

relief program and its distribution within SPLA-controlled areas.<sup>559</sup> These included the dwindling presence of Southerners in localities where ICRC operated due to the reoccurring crises of killing and abduction, insufficient manpower and tools after seed distribution, and the differing perception about sharing relief aid between ICRC and Southern ethnic groups. Before the civil war, during famine and drought, Dinka and Nuer enhanced intergroup relations through their traditional rules of hospitality by encouraging the sharing of meat, fish, and beer among themselves. Young men ate cow meat provided by their community while every household organized beer parties attended by their neighbors and kinsmen.<sup>560</sup> In contrast to these practices, ICRC provided aid to only the neediest in society and later realized that its method of providing relief packages became ineffectual because of the mutual coexisting activities and relationship among the Southerners.<sup>561</sup>

To recommence the delivery of relief items to the Southerners, on March 24, 1990, ICRC dialogued with Khartoum's relief agency known as the Relief, Rehabilitation, and Commission (RRC). The meeting focused on reviving the "technical liaison committee" established by GOS and ICRC in June 1988 aimed at facilitating ICRC operations in Southern Sudan during wartime situations.<sup>562</sup> At the end of the meeting, the RRC's commissioner promised to consider ICRC's request for airlift into both government-controlled and SPLA-held regions in the South. Yet, the Bashir regime refused to allow ICRC to operate in the South based on the accusation that the Red Cross airlifts to the Southerners flouted the GOS ban on humanitarian operations.<sup>563</sup>

By May 4, the Sudanese government and SPLA permitted the resumption of ICRC's airlifts into the Southern regions till June 6. Hence, from Khartoum, Red Cross provided relief aid to both government-controlled areas of Wau, Malakal, and Juba while from Lokichogio, in Kenya, ICRC supplied the SPLA-held regions of Leer and Kongor with humanitarian assistance.<sup>564</sup> Furthermore, before ICRC recommenced its airlift in the South, proactive measures were taken to revitalize the process of distributing relief aid among the Southerners. This involved local chiefs and SRRA collaboration with the Red Cross in gathering data on the number of people in their localities in the South. In the process of delivering relief aid, ICRC used this information to determine the location of its reception centers and facilitate the registration of potential beneficiaries.<sup>565</sup>

Compared with ICRC's operation in the South, the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) consistently operated outside the purview of OLS during the civil war. NPA's goal of supporting oppressed

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559. *Ibid.*

560. Pritchard, 84-130. In the 1930s, during Pritchard's fieldwork in the Upper Nile, a fluid process of intergroup relation between the Nuer and Dinka facilitated by interethnic marriages, seasonal migrations, and trading bolstered the sharing of custom and traditions among these ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the Nuer and Dinka competed for cattle and grazing grounds.

561. SAD.959/5/15-42, *Report on The Subsistence Economy in Southern Sudan by An Unnamed ICRC Agronomist* 1989. This report focused on the situation in Mayen Abun situated in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and populated by the Dinka who share some similar social traits with the Nuer.

562. UNHCR Archive 11/3/41-410. ICRC.SUD *non-governmental and governmental (National) Organizations-Specific Non-Governmental Organizations International Committee of the Red Cross-Sudan*, 1992.

563. SAD.1034/2/1-191 Douglas H. Johnson *Southern Sudan Agencies*, created 1989-1992.

564. *Flights To Southern Sudan Resume*, ICRC Bulletin No.173, June 1990.

[https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC\\_00352.pdf](https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/DOC/DOC_00352.pdf) (accessed August 2023).

565. SAD.959/5/15-42 *Mission Report entitled "A Review of Agricultural Activities and Harvest Prospects Among the ICRC Population in Southern Sudan* created, November 23, 1989.

and marginalized groups reinforced its commitment to the liberation army. Thus, from NPA's base in Lokichogio in Kenya, Egil Hagen, NPA's East Africa regional representative, met with SPLA and SRRA leaders to discuss issues about insurgency operations and delivery of relief aid. During Egil's incumbency, NPA expended around \$4 to \$9 million in facilitating humanitarian assistance and developmental projects in Southern Sudan. To enhance the delivery of aid to the Southerners, the NPA established its operational base in Lokichogio due to its proximity to the South.<sup>566</sup>

Therefore, by 1989, when Khartoum proscribed NGOs and IOs' operations in SPLA-held areas, NPA airlifted humanitarian supplies from Kenya into SPLA villages. Consequently, NPA provided around 100,000 Southerners in Kapoeta, Pibor, Narus, and Torit with relief assistance. Within these regions, the Southerners were safe from famine and starvation-related diseases.<sup>567</sup> To further strengthen its operational capacity in the South, NPA focused on revitalizing SRRA during its nascent years when weak structure and leadership enfeebled its effectiveness in managing relief operations. Also, the language barrier between SRRA officers, versed in Arabic and Dinka languages, and Southern speakers of the Nilotic language such as the Toposa, located in Eastern Equatoria affected the coordination of food aid. To rectify this situation, NPA's team of observers recommended the revitalization of SRRA's operation with a formalized agreement between SPLA's relief wing and NPA.<sup>568</sup> Similarly, at the inception of Lifeline, its stakeholders observed SRRA's administrative problems and supported the revitalization of its operations through the provision of funds, vehicles, management, training, and other technical support.<sup>569</sup>

Subsequently, external support from Kenya and the United States bolstered NPA's relief operation in Southern Sudan and its collaborative relationship with SPLA. In 1986, Egil Hagen met with Bethuel Kiplagat, a renowned Kenyan diplomat (1979-1991) and an interlocutor for SPLA with foreign governments, during John Garang's European tours in the late 1980s, to facilitate NPA's relation with the Kenyan government. However, in the late 1990s, officials from Kenya and NPA disputed issues concerning NPA's tax remittance to Nairobi and the employment of more Kenyans by the Norwegian NGO. Eventually, Kiplagat influenced settlement of this matter, providing NPA with the opportunity to sustain its operations in Southern Sudan. Nairobi also served as the meeting point between Hagen and Roger P Winter, director of the US Committee for Refugees, founded in 1911 to protect the rights and address the needs of displaced persons and refugees globally. The committee advocated for the cause of the Southerners and NPA's relief operations in Southern Sudan.<sup>570</sup>

In February 1989, Winter and American Senator Frank Wolf testified before the US Congress Subcommittee on African Affairs about NPA's exemplary humanitarian operation in Southern

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566.Halle Jorn Hanssen *Lives at Stake: South Sudan During the Liberation Struggle* (Africa World Books, 2018) 61-62. The team of NPA advisors included the author as well.

567. Burr and Collins, *Requiem for the Sudan*, 242-243.

568.Halle Jorn Hanssen, *Lives at Stake*, 61-62. The NPA's observer team included Halle. J Hassen and during their visit to Eastern Equatoria they met with ICRC and Médecin San Frontières staff in the locality who shared information about the relief aid needs within the locality.

569. Larry Minear et al, *Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan*, (Washington, Red Sea Press, 1991), 58-60.

570.Hanssen, *Lives at Stake*, 356-357.

Sudan. While traveling with NPA in Kapoeta, Senator Wolf commented on the NGO's efficacious relief aid for about 30,000 refugees situated in the town. Wolf also noted how SPLA allowed ICRC and NPA to operate freely in different parts of the Southern regions while other NGOs and IOs were granted restricted access to certain areas in the South. Furthermore, Winter bolstered Senator Wolf's arguments by emphasizing the effectiveness of NPA's cross-border relief operation and its need for additional support.<sup>571</sup>

This acknowledgment of NPA's relief operation in Southern Sudan led to the collaboration between the Norwegian NGO and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) liaison office in Kenya in 1993. Hence, through the US government's donation, the NPA's budget for Sudan increased from \$19 to 78 million. Also, the NPA received an additional \$59 million for food and miscellaneous humanitarian assistance for the Southerners. Immediately, NPA embarked on several developmental projects in collaboration with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA).<sup>572</sup>

The partnership between both agencies spurred several developmental projects in the SPLA-liberated areas till the late 1990s, such as the implementation of NPA's farming interventionist program in the South with a cost-effective approach focused on tackling the impediments to agricultural production. To redress these issues Southern farmers participated in training courses where they learnt the ox-ploughing method of farming to enhance their grain harvest. NPA combined these training sessions with food aid programs aimed at providing the most vulnerable families during the sowing seasons with relief food enabling them to focus on their cultivation. Through the ox-plow farming technique, farmers' agricultural productivity increased, and they sold excess food commodities to nearby local markets. Furthermore, the growth in NPA's financial resources encouraged the expansion of its medical programs in Southern Sudan.<sup>573</sup> Thus, by 1993, NPA in conjunction with SRRA launched a mobile veterinary program to curtail the spread of rinderpest, a contiguous cattle disease, in the Rumbek area. NPA acquired vaccines, solar-powered refrigerators, and other paraphernalia needed to facilitate the vaccination scheme.<sup>574</sup>

Afterwards, NPA embarked upon massive recruitment of Norwegian and Southern Sudanese health workers complemented by the creation of mobile medical units. Through this development, medical and moral support were provided for the liberation army in the frontline to boost their morale in battle. Additionally, NPA and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided John Garang with his satellite phone required for military and political purposes. Inevitably, the NPA relief operation in Southern Sudan underlines the fact that Khartoum's hardline policy against relief operations in liberated areas reinforced SPLA's symbiotic relationship with NPA pushing them closer together. Thus, the NPA preserved its commitment to

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571. The United States Committee on Foreign Relations *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs: War and Famine in Sudan*, 101 Congress Session February 23, 1989. <https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cbhear%2Fcbhearings4506&collection=congre> (accessed on University of Calgary's library on August 6, 2023).

572. Hanssen, *Lives at Stake*, 85.

573. *Ibid*, 86-151.

574. SAD.1032/10/1-91, Douglas .H Johnson, *Oxfam*, created, 1988-1992.

SPLA's cause.<sup>575</sup> Khartoum's imposed ban on humanitarian activities in SPLA-controlled areas reinforced the mutual relationship between the liberation army and relief agencies as they now operated through the rebel movement and its relief wing SRRA.

### ***THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: DIVISION AND REVITALIZATION OF SPLA AND HUMANITARIANISM***

By 1990, the liberation army allowed Southern Sudan church leaders to engage in their religious activities and maintain their relations with their supporters overseas. Eventually, these policies led to the formation of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), providing SPLA with the opportunity to become recognized abroad as a protector of Southern Christians against Bashir's Islamic regime in the North. NSCC also served as a conduit for more humanitarian assistance from international Christian organizations such as the Sudan Emergency Operations Committee Consortium (SEOC) formed by a group of international churches including the Lutheran World Federation (LWF).<sup>576</sup> In May 1991, the fall of Mengistu's regime prompted the exodus of Southern Christians from their refugee camps in Ethiopia, a seedbed for Christian evangelization, into the SPLA-liberated territories in Southern Sudan where their number swelled.<sup>577</sup>

Prior to the Southern returnee's arrival, SPLM/A, and SRRA allocated thirteen different sites with a capacity for 10,000 people each as their temporary resettlement area. Situated within the Upper Nile, these localities included Dhegdheg and Yomding around three to four hours walking distance from Nasir. Consequently, SRRA personnel and the liberation army persuaded the Southern returnees to stay in Nasir by providing them with land and security and promised relief aid from IOs and NGOs. On their arrival back in Southern Sudan, these Southern returnees were encouraged by local SRRA personnel and the SPLM/A to stay in Nasir.<sup>578</sup>

Reports about the traumatized conditions of Southern returnees in Nasir compelled OLS officials to prioritize the delivery of relief assistance in the region compared to other parts of its Southern sector operations under the control of SPLA. Further pressure from the international community prodded UN officials to procure Khartoum's approval for limited airdrops of 500 metric tons of food into Nasir. The concentration of Lifeline's operation in Nasir spurred Khartoum's interest in closely monitoring OLS humanitarian operations in the area and constrained various relief agencies, including by SRRA, in Nasir. Eventually, UNICEF and WFP established their presence within the locality and collaborated with Khartoum in managing the logistics of relief aid within the region.<sup>579</sup>

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575. Hanssen, *Lives at Stake*, 86-151.

576. Rakiya Omar and Alex de Waal, *Great Expectations: The Civil Roles of The Churches In Southern Sudan* (London: Discussion paper 6 African Rights, 1995).

577. Jesse A Zink, *Christianity, and Catastrophe in South Sudan: Civil War, Migration, and the Rise of Dinka Anglicanism*, (Texas: Baylor Press, 2018), 64-70.

578. Sudan Open Archive (SOA), Mark Cutts, *The Mass Exodus of Sudanese Refugees from Camps in Western Ethiopia and Programmes for Their Rehabilitation in Southern Sudan* July 1, 1991.

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD19910701-01.1.1&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-the+mass+exodus+of+sudanese+-----> (accessed August 10, 2023).

579. *Ibid.*

Nasir became the centerpiece of humanitarian operations in the South, providing local SPLA commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol with the opportunity to orchestrate a coup plot against John Garang's domineering leadership of the liberation army. Since the mid-1980s, festering internal issues within the SPLM/A included the non-consultation with prominent SPLM/A members during the establishment of SRRA in 1985, and the agreements and commencements of ICRC's operation in 1988 and that of Lifeline in 1989 within the SPLA-held regions. These occurrences reflected the lack of consensus among the SPLM/A commanders causing the underlying grievances Machar, Akol and other SPLA officers harboured against Garang's leadership. Inevitably, the entanglement of IOs and NGOs in the liberation army's internal crisis reshaped their interdependent relationship with the liberation army and the method of their operations within the Southern regions. Machar's romantic relationship and marriage with Emma McCune, a British relief worker for Street Kids International, became one of the precursors to these events.<sup>580</sup>

Under the umbrella of OLS, Street Kids International relief workers had access to UN radios for emergencies. Therefore, Emma radioed UN personnel about the Southern evacuees' movement from refugee camps in Ethiopia towards Nasir in Southern Sudan. The transmission of these messages magnified the concentration of humanitarian aid in the region. Through this means, incoming and outgoing airlifts from Nasir facilitated the delivery of Machar's letters and messages to other SPLA members planning to depose Garang as the SPLA leader. Eventually, in August 1991, the machinations to topple SPLA's chairman culminated in the division of the liberation army into the SPLA-Nasir headed by Riek Machar and Garang's SPLA-Mainstream.<sup>581</sup> Moreover, SPLA's internal split underlined the impact of ethnic differences within the liberation army evidenced by the fact that the Garang and Machar factions were supported by their Dinka and Nuer kinsmen respectively. Nonetheless, the Nuer and Dinka sometimes switched their allegiance between the SPLA-Nasir and Dinka Mainstream factions.<sup>582</sup>

The operations of SPLA-Nasir were reinforced by Khartoum's stratagem in courting this new Southern rebel group. Meanwhile, around June 1991, UNICEF and WHO established their presence in Nasir following the arrival of displaced Southerners in the territory, and they constantly transmitted radio messages to the OLS Southern Sector base in Nairobi about the surge of displaced Southerners arriving in Nasir from Ethiopia's refugee camps. These events shaped Nasir's recognition as the center of relief aid. Hence, barges and airdrops were used in delivering various aid items including tents, food aid, boats and other items enhancing the OLS operation in Nasir area. Thus, more displaced Southerners were attracted to this vicinity, strengthening SPLA-Nasir's recognition as a new OLS stakeholder among the Southerners.<sup>583</sup>

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580.SAD.985/4/1-116 M.W Daly *Catalogue Papers on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army* created, 1992.

581.Deborah Scroggins *Emma's War: Love, Betrayal, and Death in The Sudan*. (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003), 224-225.

582. Douglas H. Johnson *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) 346-347 Riek Machar's recognition as the lineal descendant of Teny, one the first Nuer Prophet, reinforced Nuer support for Machar's SPLA-Nasir.

583. Douglas H. Johnson *Increasing The Trauma of Return: An Assessment of The UN's Emergency Response to The Evacuation of the Sudanese Refugee Camps in Ethiopia, 1991* in *In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight and*



Some of the main objectives of SPLA-Nasir included the campaign for an independent Southern Sudan compared to Garang's aim of liberating the whole of Sudan. SPLA-Nasir also focused on the creation of political structures that would espouse popular participation, accountability, and transparency to facilitate the practice of democratic principles. Furthermore, the Nasir faction expressed its intent to create a judicial system to preserve the Southerners' fundamental human rights. Despite the appeal of these objectives, none of them were achieved and in subsequent years SPLA-Nasir compromised its legitimacy and popularity by accepting support from Khartoum.<sup>584</sup>

After the SPLA split, communication between members of OLS staff and leaders of the Nasir faction reinforced the latter's recognition among IOs and NGOs in the South. Immediately after the coup, the coordinator of the OLS Southern sector Thomas Ekwall visited Nasir and expressed his support for the new SPLM/A faction. Bernard Kouchner, the French minister for humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, visited both the Nasir and Mainstream groups. The Secretary General of the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) Mr. Jan P Erichsen also invited Lam Akol to a news conference in Oslo and recounted the events leading to the emergence of SPLA Nasir. In contrast, NPA declared its allegiance to SPLA-Mainstream and condemned SPLA-Nasir's rebellion.<sup>585</sup>

Unavoidably, SPLA's division into two factions prompted the splitting of the liberation army's relief wing. Accordingly, in the South around September 1991, Machar initiated correspondence with the UN Under-Secretary-General, James Jonah and the former acknowledged the Southern regions' corridors of tranquility used for moving humanitarian aid. In the same month, Machar informed Vincent O'Reilly, coordinator, and chief of operation for UNICEF OLS Southern Sector, about the appointment of Dr. Achol Marial as the new head of SRRA delegated with the responsibility of negotiating relief operations in SPLA-Nasir controlled regions. Subsequently, Akol informed Jonah about the need to change OLS modus operandi, and the inclusion of SPLA-Nasir in the Lifeline Southern Sector program due to the changes in SPLM/A leadership. Thus, the Relief Association for Southern Sudan (RASS) became SPLA-Nasir's relief wing in the South while Garang's Mainstream faction retained SRRA as its relief wing.<sup>586</sup> These unfolding events underscored the significance of humanitarian agencies to SPLA's rival factions and for their safety relief agencies collaborated with both rebel groups as a means of facilitating their relief and rehabilitation projects among the Southerners.

As Garang blamed OLS for the division of the liberation army, mounting accusations against SPLA-Mainstream about its recruitment of child soldiers also strained the relation between Garang's SPLA and the international aid community. Initially, SPLA and SRRA officials denied

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*Homecoming in Northeast Africa*, ed Tim Allen (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 1996), 172-179.

584. SAD 948/2/53-66 R.O Collins, *Press Statement No 1 by The Committee for The Reunification of the SPLM/A*, created August 11, 1993.

585. Hanssen, *Lives at Stake*, 190-191.

586. SAD.96/6/1-166 Justice Africa *Papers of Human Rights/Political Organizations: Internal Communications* created January 12, 1994, and 28 December 1995.

the accusation about the conscription of child soldiers into the liberation army.<sup>587</sup> However, in August 1991, Bernard Kouchner, ex-chairman of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), stumbled across a camp in the eastern part of Southern Sudan, controlled by SPLA-Mainstream, where over 10,000 Southern boys were found. Hence, the plight of these children abducted by SPLA became publicized, uncovering the liberation army's connivance with Ethiopia's Mengistu regime to use them to create a planned the SPLA's Red Army. After conscripting and training in Ethiopia, these boys were taken to Cuba where some continued their education and others worked on plantation farms.<sup>588</sup> In December, during an interview, Garang denied allegations about the enlistment of minors while SPLA-Mainstream loyalists justified the presence of these boys among the liberation army arguing that these youths embarked upon the journey to Ethiopia seeking the educational opportunities provided in SPLA's refugee camps.<sup>589</sup>

These controversies and the splintering of the SPLM/A propelled members of the SPLM/A Politico Military High Command (PMHC) to convene a meeting from September 9 to 12, 1991 at Torit situated in the Equatoria region. During the meeting commanders Salva Kiir Mayardit, William Nyuon Bany, James Wani, and Yusuf Mekki and other members reaffirmed their commitment to support Garang as the leader of the SPLA-Mainstream and they outrightly denounced and condemned Machar and Akol for orchestrating the August 1991 coup. To sustain peace and harmony within SPLA-liberated areas, the PMHC members resolved to redress their internal problems and promote sociopolitical development for the South. The military commanders' resolutions also focused on the decentralization of civil administration in Southern Sudan to encourage popular participation in the South's political affairs.<sup>590</sup>

To facilitate the administration of SPLA's liberated areas based on the rule of law, members of the Mainstream faction agreed on the need for the establishment of an independent judicial organ in the South. Furthermore, a panel of judges, ex-soldiers, police, and others responsible were delegated the duty of drafting new laws for the South while civil, and military laws would be separated from each other. Regarding the coordination of relief assistance in the South, SPLA-Mainstream agreed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need in all SPLA-held and government-controlled regions in the South. Nevertheless, to expand relief efforts within Southern liberated areas, through resettlement, rehabilitation, and development programs, the Mainstream faction appealed to IOs and NGOs. Indeed, SRRA still coordinated and managed relief efforts on behalf of SPLA-Mainstream. Due to the role of IOs and NGOs such as Street Kids International and Lifeline in the events leading to SPLA's internal division, SPLA-Mainstream's resolution reminded such organizations to maintain their neutrality in Southern political issues.

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587.SOA *The Mass Exodus of Sudanese Refugees from Camps in Western Ethiopia and Programmes for Their Rehabilitation in Southern Sudan* July 1, 1999.

588.UNHCR Archives 11/3/01-010.SUD External Relations-Relations with Governments-Sudan 1987-1994. Carol Berger's *The Child Soldiers of Africa's Red Army: The Role of Social Process and Routinised Violence in South Sudan's Military* (New York: Routledge,2022) explores the origins of the formation SPLA's Red Army in the mid-1980s and examines the encounters and experiences of the young recruits in Ethiopia and Cuba. Some of the Red Army conscripts currently live in Calgary, Alberta.

589. *Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in The War in Southern Sudan* (London: Human Rights Watch/ Africa, 1994), 200-201.

590.SAD.947/4/41-64 R.O Collins *Copies of Documents Relating to the SPLM/A*, August 31- September 25, 1991.

Otherwise, IOs, NGOs, and humanitarian officials embroiled in such affairs would be declared *persona non grata* and expelled from the Southern sector.<sup>591</sup>

Inevitably, based on the allegations of human rights abuse against Garang on several issues, the Mainstream faction highlighted its policies on civil liberties. Thus, SPLM/A-Mainstream expressed its willingness to adhere to international norms and standards on human rights and respect the civil liberties of all people living within the SPLA-held areas without prejudice to ethnicity, religion, and gender. In accordance with the Geneva convention, the Mainstream faction expressed its desire to treat all prisoners of war fairly and respectfully. Furthermore, Mainstream faction also guaranteed freedom of worship and proselytization to all religious groups without bias. Moreover, this principle encouraged the formation of both the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and the New Sudan Islamic Council (NSIC) within the SPLA-controlled areas.<sup>592</sup>

SPLA-Mainstream also recognized the need for women's rights and participation in Southern issues in a society where underdevelopment, poverty, religious bias, and traditional customs had marginalized their roles. In redressing these issues, the liberation army reaffirmed the equality of women with men. In addition, the Mainstream faction declared its intent about promoting underrepresented groups like women to facilitate policies reinforcing their rights and dignity in the South.<sup>593</sup> In subsequent years, this initiative encouraged Southern Sudanese women to create different social organizations including the Sudanese Women's Association (SWAN), the Widows, Orphans, and the Disabled Rehabilitation Association of the New Sudan(WODRANS), and the Mundari Relief and Development Association (MRDA). These local Southern NGOs, supported by IOs and NGOs, aimed at assisting women in marginalized and war-affected areas in the South.<sup>594</sup>

The internal division of the liberation army into two factions, SPLA-Mainstream and Nasir, changed and affected OLS operation throughout the Southern regions. Hence, the Upper Nile region became the base of SPLA-Nasir while the activities of IOs and NGOs within the locality underlined the recognition of the Nasir faction within the international community. However, this development compromised SPLA-Mainstream's military strength in the South and affected its interdependent relationship with OLS due to its involvement in the events leading to the splintering of SPLA into two rival groups.

### ***HUMANITARIANISM IMPERILED: UPHEAVAL IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR AND THE GROUND RULES***

A year after the Nasir coup, a series of unfortunate events beleaguered and affected SPLA-Mainstream's military gains in the Southern regions. By January 1992, an unholy alliance between Bashir's regime and Lam Akol reinforced the attack of Nasir's forces against SPLA- Mainstream. Later that year, Commander William Nyuon, a member of the PMHC, defected from the Mainstream to the Nasir faction while Kerubino Kuanyin and other prisoners' escaped from

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591.*Ibid.*

592.*Ibid.*

593.*Ibid.*

594.Mary Anne Fitzgerald, *Throwing the Stick Forward: The Impact of War on Southern Sudanese Women*. (Nairobi UNIFEM and UNICEF 2002).

Garang's detention. These events illustrated the enfeebled position of SPLA-Mainstream and affected the South's security.<sup>595</sup> In the midst of this crisis, Khartoum's offensive against the Mainstream faction affected relief convoys bound for the Southern regions. Simultaneously, the jamming of OLS radio network and cancellation of airlifts into SPLA-Mainstream held areas by the GOS forced IOs and NGOs to suspend their aid projects and evacuate their personnel from the South. Moreover, the contraction in the OLS funding caused by UN agencies inability to raise funds from donors compromised the implementation of most relief programs among the Southerners.<sup>596</sup>

Within the context of these challenges, SRRA's relationship with the UN deteriorated. Initially, OLS involvement in events that fractured the liberation army fomented this tension and was later aggravated by the personality clash between SRRA's executive director, Elijah Malok Aleng, and Thomas Ekwall, UNICEF co-ordinator in the Southern Sector.<sup>597</sup> On August 1992, Aleng accused OLS personnel, including Ekwall, of allowing the National Islamic Front (NIF), an ally of Bashir's regime, to commandeer a UN airplane to transport troops and military equipment from Khartoum to Juba to counter an SPLA-Mainstream attempt to conquer the city. Consequently, SRRA's director accused OLS personnel of bias because they allowed Khartoum to use OLS planes to transport its troops and their military equipment from Khartoum to Juba, compromising the neutrality and independence of IOs and NGOs during the civil war<sup>598</sup>

Thereafter, on August 9, 1992, the SPLM/A Politico Military High Command, declared Ekwall persona non grata within SPLA-Mainstream-controlled areas. Hence, all cooperation and communication between SRRA and Ekwall was terminated. In addition, SPLM/A-Mainstream informed Lifeline, donors, and NGOs that the liberation army and its relief wing, SRRA no longer recognized Thomas Ekwall as UNICEF's representative in the Southern Sector.<sup>599</sup> Following these events, the death of OLS workers including Myint Maung, Helge Hummelvoll, Vilma Gomez, and Francis Ngure further weakened the relationship between SPLA and the UN. The fact that both Gomez and Ngure were shot in the head disconcerted aid workers in the Southern region. After this ghastly incident, the UN created an investigation team charged with inquiring into the events leading to the death of OLS staff with a view to improving the security of IO and NGO workers deployed in the South. The investigation team, headed by UNICEF's assistant secretary-general Abodu Ciss, interviewed people from IOs, NGOs, and SPLA factions on the events around the deaths of the aid workers.<sup>600</sup> At the end of its mission, the team highlighted the need for "Ground Rules" (GRs) or a set of humanitarian laws and principles focused on regulating the relationship

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595. Douglas Johnson, *The Nuer Civil Wars: Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa* edited by Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth E. Watson. (New York : Berghahn Books, 2009), 38-39.

596. SAD.1032/8/60-89 Douglas H. Johnson, Agence de Coopération et de Recherche Pour le Développement (ACORD) created November 14 1992.

597. *Ibid.*

598. UNHCR Archives 11/3/61-610KEN.SUD *Protection and General Legal Matters-Special Protection Problems-Repatriation-Refugees from Sudan in Kenya*. Records of the Central Registry 1993-1995.

599. *Ibid.*

600. SAD.1024/2/1-93 Douglas H Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan* created, August-November 1992.

between OLS humanitarian agencies and SPLM/A factions, and their relief wings SRRA and RASS.<sup>601</sup>

The Ground Rules underscored the need for UN and NGO personnel to have unrestricted access to radio communication equipment only during emergency relief situations, with aid workers using written messages in all other situations. The GRs also emphasized the need for the SPLM/A factions to become responsible for the safety and protection of all relief personnel and properties in the Southern Sector. For this reason, the liberation army duties included informing UN and NGO staff about any potential danger and providing them with adequate safety in such occurrences. The Ground Rules prohibited all military personnel and warring factions among the Southerners from commandeering IO and NGO vehicles. The GRs also underlined the need for humanitarian personnel to have freedom of movement throughout Southern Sudan.<sup>602</sup>

After the inception of the GRs, humanitarian agencies operating within the SPLA controlled areas remained skeptical about the intention of Garang's faction in implementing these humanitarian laws. Philip Winter, Save the Children Fund (SCF) UK coordinator in the Southern Sector, expressed his misgivings about the prevalent insecurity within the liberated areas. Nonetheless, under the umbrella of OLS, SCF-UK decided to still focus its humanitarian operation in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile, providing Southerners there with education, seeds, and tools for farming. Other aid workers observed that the relationship between SRRA and the UN had seriously deteriorated, worsened by the competition among the former's officials. To guarantee their security among the Southerners, some relief personnel posited that OLS and SRRA should stipulate their specific roles in the Southern regions.<sup>603</sup>

By April 1993, concerns about the safety of humanitarian workers in SPLA-held areas prompted Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international non-governmental organization based in New York, to correspond with John Garang about the cases of human right abuses against NGO staff. HRW also broached issues about pilfered relief supplies, restrictions on the movements of aid workers, and atrocities against Southern civilians committed by SPLA-Mainstream forces.<sup>604</sup> The incessant pressure from the international community urging the SPLA factions to respect human rights and humanitarian principles prompted SRRA in collaboration with OLS agencies to create the SPLAs' GRs. Based on its humanitarian policies, SPLAs' GRs emphasized the need for its rebel forces to adhere to these principles under threat of punishments. Through these rules, the liberation army guaranteed the protection of relief workers and property. The freedom of movement of aid personnel and non-exploitation of relief supplies and properties were also guaranteed.<sup>605</sup>

Compared with SPLA-Mainstream's fragile relationship with UN and OLS agencies, Riek Machar's SPLA-Nasir faction had a better encounter with IOs and NGOs within Lifeline.

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601.*Ibid.*

602.*Ibid.*

603.*Ibid.*

604.Human Rights Watch, *Africa Watch Letters Protest Abuses of Human Rights by All Parties to The Conflict in Southern Sudan*, Volume 5 No.5 April 1993.

605.SOA, *Letter from John Garang to Philip O'Brien on The Ground Rules* May 1, 1993.

Machar's affable personality towards relief workers facilitated the recognition and support for SPLA-Nasir among the humanitarian agencies in the South.<sup>606</sup> In contrast with SPLA-Mainstream's SRRA, SPLA-Nasir's RASS provided Lifeline agencies with more accessibility to refugees and Southerners within SPLA-Nasir controlled areas. However, the Nasir faction exploited its ostensible liberal gestures towards IOs, NGOs and Southerners within its localities as a means of commandeering relief supplies for its own forces. In some instances, Machar's forces harassed displaced Southerners. Until late 1992, expatriate aid workers in Nasir were oblivious when these cases were reported to UN officials in Nairobi.<sup>607</sup>

## CONCLUSION

By 1993, the Ground Rules, a set of humanitarian policies, regulated the interdependent relationship between NGOs, IOs and SPLA factions. This development underlined the evolution of OLS since its inception in 1989, and shaped NGOs and IOs' modus operandi within SPLA-controlled areas. Hence, different events shaped the implementation and metamorphosis of Lifeline within SPLA-held and Khartoum administered regions in Southern Sudan. During Sadiq al Mahdi's administration (May 1986-June 1989) Lifeline engaged in novel relief initiatives aimed at providing war affected civilians with humanitarian assistance and brokering a truce between the liberation army and Khartoum. Al-Mahdi's support for OLS and the ceasefire among the warring factions in the South provided IOs, NGOs, GOS, and SPLA with some respite in the five-year old civil war. Thus, ICRC used this opportunity to expand its humanitarian operations in the remote parts of the South through gradually developing its humanitarian strategy of stockpiling supplies ahead of unforeseen emergencies common to the region.

Simultaneously, IAS, SCF-UK, and other OLS agencies facilitated their humanitarian operations as well. Although NPA and ICRC operated outside the umbrella of Lifeline, Red Cross, based on its humanitarian experience in the South, collaborated with OLS in providing humanitarian aid for the Southerners. In contrast, NPA supported SPLA based on its ideal of assisting the oppressed and vulnerable in wartime situations. This objective coupled with the cordial relationship between NPA officials and SPLA leaders, and US financial aid to NPA's operation in Southern Sudan strengthened the symbiotic relationship between the liberation army and the Norwegian NGO. Simultaneously, OLS's ubiquitous relief operations throughout the South reinforced SRRA's collaborative relationship with NGOs and IOs. Accordingly, SRRA provided logistical support during the implementation of aid programmes initiated by humanitarian organizations.

In 1989, Omar al-Bashir's regime banned the operations of IOs and NGOs in SPLA-controlled territories. The discrepancies between the inferior quantity of relief aid provided to government-held areas compared to the surplus allocated to liberated territories fomented the Sudanese government's draconian policies against IOs and NGOs. Afterwards, in 1991, famine in the North and Khartoum's espousal of self-sufficiency as its economic policy together with the GOS harsh posture towards Southern refugees underlined the Bashir regime's opposition to relief operations

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606.SAD.1024/2/1-93 Douglas H Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan* created, August-November 1992.

607.Ibid.

in the South. Against this background, Khartoum's indecisive and recalcitrant attitude towards the delivery of relief aid to SPLA-held areas compromised OLS independence as a humanitarian agency and obstructed the activities of IOs and NGOs within liberated areas in the South.

Despite these constraints, ICRC, NPA, and IAS deployed different humanitarian strategies in providing relief aid for the Southerners. This situation provided SPLA and SRRA with the opportunity to consolidate their symbiotic relationship with NGOs operating in the South through SRRA's provision of logistical and technical support required for relief and rehabilitation projects. In particular, the creation of Kajo-Kaji District Relief and Development Board (KDRBD) was a testament to the interdependent relationship between IAS and SRRA. Concomitantly, NPA, in collaboration with SRRA, initiated a mobile veterinary programme to curtail the spread of cattle disease. NPA also provided a mobile medical unit to facilitate the recovery of wounded SPLA forces on the frontline. Hence, NGOs provided social amenities needed by the Southerners situated within SPLA-controlled areas, reinforcing their independence from Khartoum.

After the Cold war ended in 1991, the operation of humanitarian agencies changed in the South caused by the fall of Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia and followed by the exodus of Southern refugees from Ethiopia back to the South. Hence, this led to the concentration of humanitarian operations in Nasir later exploited by Riek Machar and other disgruntled members of SPLA to orchestrate a coup against Garang's leadership. Thereafter, the liberation army splintered into Machar's SPLA-Nasir and Garang's SPLA-Mainstream. These events coupled with prevalent insecurity within the South threatened the feasibility of humanitarian work within the region. Moreover, the involvement of OLS personnel in the events leading to the SPLA division and the killing of UN personnel by unknown assailants within SPLA-held territories compromised the relationship between SPLA and OLS. Eventually, the establishment of Ground Rules served as a means of revitalizing and sustaining the collaborative relationship between IOs, NGOs and the liberation army.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### *THE EXPANSIVE AND TRANSFORMATIVE YEARS OF RELIEF AGENCY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN (1993-2005)*

#### INTRODUCTION

From the mid-1990s, the spread and diversification of humanitarian activities in Southern Sudan were propelled by different events, enhancing aid agencies' operational capacity during the Civil War. Accordingly, the creation of Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs) and their collaboration with aid organizations broadened the purview of relief organizations among the Southerners. Hence, through the instrumentality of SINGOs, humanitarian agencies not only facilitated their relief operations but also facilitated socioeconomic and political happenings in the Southern regions, including the revitalizing farming activities and monitoring human rights abuses till the end of the civil war.

As such, this chapter analyzes the events leading to the evolution and expansion of humanitarian activities following the SPLA-Mainstream's first National Convention in 1994, supported by relief agencies. Despite the ambivalence about the formation and relief operations of domestic NGOs or SINGOs such as Sudan Medical Care (SMC), international humanitarian organizations, including USAID encouraged their development. Simultaneously, NGOs and IOs sought to redress misgivings about domestic NGOs through the instrumentality of the Sudan Rehabilitation and Relief Agency (SRRA) and Relief Association of South Sudan (RASS), SPLA-Mainstream and SPLA-Nasir's relief wings respectively, in assessing the operations of SINGOs. Hence, SRRA and RASS maintained their collaborative relationships with humanitarian organizations, creating the cornerstone for the enlargement of CARE, USAID, SCF-UK, and their counterparts' influences among the Southerners.

This chapter further examines the UN's efforts and influences in resuscitating IO and NGO activities in Southern Sudan from the mid-1990s by exploring UN officials' interactions with both Khartoum and SPLA factions. These efforts highlight Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a group of IOs and NGOs, expanded its influences during the war by facilitating conflict resolution among the belligerents to enhance the delivery of relief aid among the Southerners. Hence, the Intergovernmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD) and OLS collaborated to coordinate IGADD's 1994 peace efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Khartoum and SPLA factions. Accordingly, OLS, GOS, and the SPLAs' rival sides became the custodians of the IGADD's 1994 peace accord, reinforcing the interdependent relationship between the SPLA rebels and relief agencies, extending the engagement of IOs and NGOs in conflict and humanitarian agreements.

This chapter uses the above-mentioned events to assess and exemplify the diversification and proliferation of humanitarian agencies and their activities amid security challenges in the Southern regions from the mid-1990s to the end of the war in 2005. Eventually, these occurrences determined the varying number and activities of aid organizations in the Southern regions controlled by different SPLA factions. The impacts of these circumstances on SPLA-Mainstream's conquest of Western Equatoria and its flourishing humanitarian and economic



activities, encompassing farming and barter trading activities, within Western Equatoria through the instrumentality of IOs, NGOs, and SINGOs are thoroughly evaluated. However, fighting among warring sides in the Upper Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal affected the relief operations in these territories, prompting the formation of local relief committees. These relief committees' consistent roles in preserving the mutual relationship between humanitarian agencies and the SPLA factions controlling these vicinities are examined.

The last two sections of this chapter argue that the humanitarian crises and dehumanizing situation in the South were aggravated by the relentless fighting among the Southern factions and compounded by Khartoum's interest in exploiting the South's oil resources. These issues are explored by examining their effects on OLS's relief effort and the possibility of achieving sustainable peace among the belligerents. These events galvanized humanitarian agencies and SINGOs' collaboration in human rights advocacy for the Southerners facilitating peace efforts aimed at ending the civil war. These happenings culminated in the gradual ceasefire in the South, enhanced the security and delivery of aid in Southern Sudan, and initiated local mediation efforts such as the Wunlit Conference of 1999. The connections between these events, coupled with the influences of relief agencies on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, which ended the war, highlights the broadened activities of IOs and NGOs in resolving the longest civil war in Africa.

#### ***NEW SUDAN AND HUMANITARIANISM: THE EMERGENCE OF SINGOs***

In February 1993, in Uganda, Donald Petterson, the US Ambassador to Sudan, and other Washington officials met and urged John Garang, SPLA-Mainstream's chairman, to democratize the state of affairs in areas controlled by the liberation army in Southern Sudan.<sup>608</sup> Before this meeting, the rivalry between the SPLA-Nasir and Mainstream factions, and their entanglement in the death of four aid workers in the South in 1992, marred Mainstream's human rights record and reputation. Additionally, the alliance between SPLA-Nasir and the Sudanese government facilitated the former's conquest of areas hitherto controlled by the Mainstream faction, including the Upper Nile region, dampening the Southerners' confidence in Garang. Against this backdrop, SPLA-Mainstream prepared for the National Convention of 1994, held in Chukudum, aimed at revitalizing its agenda for a New Sudan wherein democracy, secularity, and diversity would unite the Southerners.<sup>609</sup>

Humanitarian agencies including the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Lutheran World Foundation (LWF), and the World Christian Council (WCC) facilitated the convention attended by around 1000 participants.<sup>610</sup> In his commencement speech at the meeting, Garang expressed his gratitude to Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), LWF, NPA, and other relief agencies for their humanitarian assistance during the civil war. Some of the significant outcomes of the conference included the formal separation of civil and military administration

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608.Rakiya Omar and Alex de Waal, *Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism* (London: African Rights, 1997), 305-307.

609.*Ibid.*

610.Hallen Jorn Hanssen, *Live At Stake: South Sudan During The Liberation Struggle* (Africa World Books, 2018), 263.

throughout the liberated regions in the South. The National Executive Council (NEC) of SPLA-Mainstream became its highest executive organ in its controlled areas in the Southern regions. These localities were composed of several counties, and each county comprised of Payams, an administrative unit in the South, further subdivided into villages. Amid the changes in the liberated zones, the rebel army still retained SRRA as its relief wing.<sup>611</sup>

The Chukudum conference underscored the feasibility of collaborative engagement between Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs) and humanitarian agencies while the latter facilitated socioeconomic development in the liberation army's localities. Moreover, the conference delegates emphasized the need for Southerners to be involved in social service projects and development programs. As such, Garang viewed SINGOs as a means of achieving this end by encouraging ambitious, and resourceful Southern Sudanese in the diaspora especially those living in Nairobi to participate in the development of the South.<sup>612</sup> In fact, before the Southerners' national convention, through USAID, Washington encouraged the prospect of developing SINGOs by providing OLS Southern Sector with grants for establishing the Institution and Capacity Building Programme (ICBP). After 1991, the Sudanese government's support for Islamic radical groups and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a particularly violent rebel group in northern Uganda, affected Khartoum's diplomatic ties with Washington, shaping American assistance for SPLA-Mainstream. The ICBP focused on identifying and developing the humanitarian capacity of indigenous groups among the Southerners.<sup>613</sup>

At Chukudum, SPLA-Mainstream underlined its foreign policy encompassing the liberation army's interest in fostering mutual understanding and cooperation with all countries, IOs, and NGOs. Additionally, the Mainstream faction expressed its support for human rights, democracy, justice, and equality. Therefore, issues concerning marginalized Southern Sudanese women were tabled during the Chukudum Conference. As such, SPLA-Mainstream supported the establishment

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611. Sudan Open Archive (SOA), *A Major Watershed: SPLM/A First National Convention Resolutions, Appointments, and Protocol* April 12, 1994. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND19940412-01.1.39&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-national+convention+1994-----> (accessed October 5, 2023). The New Sudan now encompassed SPLA-Mainstream controlled localities including, Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile region. However, in SPLM/A's original manifesto of 1983, the New Sudan referred to the creation of a secular and unified state Sudanese in the North and South Sudan.

612.SAD.1035/6/1-54 Douglas Johnson *Human Rights Reports*, created 1987-2001.

613.*Ibid.* J. Millard Burr and Robert O Collins *Sudan in Turmoil: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist State 1989-2003* (Princeton: Markus Publishers, 2010) explores the Sudanese government's alliance with Iraq during the Gulf War (1990-1991), Osama Bin Laden's affiliation with Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF) based in Khartoum, and with other Islamic fundamentalist groups including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood compromising Khartoum's relationship with Washington. By 1992, the United States Department of State declared that Sudan had become the seedbed of Islamic revolutionary activities and later linked to the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States. These events determined US support for SPLA-Mainstream in the 1990s. Former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Jay Cohen wrote *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (London: MacMillian Press Limited, 2000) 80-83, emphasizing that from 1991, Khartoum's support for SPLA-Nasir coupled with the Sudanese government's close ties to Iran and its military aid to Algerian Islamic fighters, and Egyptian guerrillas emboldened Washington's interest in supporting SPLA-Mainstream.

of empowerment programs and organizations for Southern Sudanese women within and outside Southern Sudan.<sup>614</sup>

These initiatives encouraged the establishment of local NGOs or SINGOs such as the Widow, Orphans, and Disabled Rehabilitation Association of the New Sudan (WODRANS), and the Mundri Relief and Development Association (MRDA). Although these SINGOs were based in Kenya's capital, Nairobi, they worked within war-torn and marginalized localities in Southern Sudan. Their headquarters in Nairobi, the base of OLS Southern Sector, enhanced their interactions with their international donors.<sup>615</sup> These domestic NGOs' humanitarian values included providing humanitarian assistance to the Southerners regardless of their ethnic group and political affiliation. Additionally, SINGOs were expected to prioritize the needs of the most vulnerable groups, including children, and women in society and to proffer their views about the long-term effects of rehabilitation projects. Through these efforts, OLS expected SINGO members to facilitate peaceful dialogue among Southern Sudan's warring factions gradually. Based on these presuppositions, relief agencies' activities gradually extended beyond providing aid to the Southerners.<sup>616</sup>

Many SINGOs were created by Southerners, thereby reinforcing Operation Lifeline Sudan's (OLS) support for these domestic NGOs relief activities in the South.<sup>617</sup> Some of these SINGOs were created by Riek Machar's SPLA-Nasir faction. Within the SPLA-Mainstream controlled territory, Cush Relief and Rehabilitation Society (CRRS), or CUSH became the first local humanitarian agency John Garang allowed Southern Sudanese to establish. Dr Achol Marial, who defected from the Nasir faction to SPLA-Mainstream, and John Clement Kuc were the founders of CUSH. Until 1992, Kuc served as human rights adviser for the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), an ecumenical NGO based in Khartoum, and assisted SCC with the registration of NGOs.<sup>618</sup>

From 1994, IOs and NGOs reacted differently to the creation and operational capacity of SINGOs. OLS and USAID supported the development and progress of these local NGOs since they were cheaper to operate and had less likelihood of shutting down their operations because of insecurity. Indeed, UNICEF encouraged foreign donors to channel their resources through the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). As an ecumenical NGO representing churches in the South, NSCC also collaborated with relief agencies in providing aid for the Southerners and thereby identified as a SINGO. Despite this development, Save the Children Fund UK (SCF) argued that the best SINGOs were established by influential Southerners such as CUSH, created by Dr Achol Marial.<sup>619</sup> A year after completing his studies in medicine at the University of Juba in 1985, Dr Marial joined the SPLM/A and underwent military training and was commissioned as a captain in 1987. Thereafter, Marial became the medical coordinator for SRRA, the rebels' relief wing, and

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614. Sudan Open Archive (SOA), *A Major Watershed: SPLM/A First National Convention Resolutions, Appointments, and Protocol* April 12, 1994.

615. Mary Anne Fitzgerald *Throwing The Stick Forward: The Impact of War on Southern Sudanese Woman* (Nairobi: UNIFEM and UNICEF, 2002), 69-70.

616. SAD.1035/6/1-54 Douglas Johnson *Human Rights Reports*, created 1987-2001.

617. *Ibid.*

618. *Ibid.* John Clement Kuc's father fought alongside John Garang under the umbrella of Anya-Nya during the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972).

619. *Ibid.*

secured essential medical supplies from NGOs and IOs. However, after the split of the SPLA in 1991, he joined the SPLA-Nasir faction and became the director of its relief wing Relief Association of South Sudan (RASS), but rejoined SPLA-Mainstream in 1994.<sup>620</sup>

John Clement Kuc and Dr Achol Marial established a remarkable reputation among the humanitarian agencies in the South. They facilitated CUSH access to more than \$200,000 between 1993 and 1994, provided by Christian Aid, a British ecumenical NGO, and six other donors. However, the misappropriation of donors' funds by CUSH personnel, discovered by Christian Aid project officer Alison Ayer, led to the suspension of its funding. In addition, CUSH's weak link with the communities it served, and its staff's managerial incompetence were some of the criticisms levied against CUSH, and other SINGOs, relief activities. SCF decided to ameliorate these issues by employing some charismatic Southerners as its staff while using their in-depth understanding of the Southern territories to facilitate humanitarian operation. The efficacy of SCF's initiative relied on its Southern staff being given the autonomy to use their talents in implementing relief projects.<sup>621</sup> However, SCF later argued that the Southerners needed other social institutions than just SINGOs and therefore focused on educational development. Thus, Philip Winter, SCF director in Southern Sudan, later employed Fergus Boyle, a Scot, as the relief agency's project officer (1993-1997). During Boyle's incumbency SCF collaborated with other IOs, NGOs, and SRRA officers in facilitating educational development and other relief projects among Southern youths.<sup>622</sup>

Despite the ambivalence concerning the operational capacity of SINGOs, the feasibility of Sudan Medical Care (SMC) relief operations embodied their resilience among the Southerners. With administrative support from NPA, SMC managed the primary health care (PHC) program in the relief center of Narus situated in the Eastern Equatoria region. Before SMC commenced its operation in Narus around June 1993, only one PHC facility functioned there lacking any immunization program. Four months after the inception of its medical program, SMC achieved remarkable results by creating about 10 PHC facilities and providing clinical treatments for an average of 80 to 100 patients per day. The NGO's medical team, comprised of well-trained Southern Sudanese, created an efficacious cold chain system, a temperature regulated storage facility used for transporting vaccines for cattle and humans. These operations highlighted SMC's ability to handle the Southerners medical needs.<sup>623</sup>

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620. Kuyok Abol Kuyok, *South Sudan: The First Notable First* (Indiana: Author house 2015), 820-821.

621. (SAD).89/5/1-148 *Justice Africa Papers of Human Rights, Political Organizations: Constitutions and Charters* created, 1980s-2000s.

622. Fergus D. Boyle, *Under Shading Trees: Twenty Years in the Sudans* (Independently Published, 2019),10-21. Fergus Boyle's father Randall Boyle (1927-1997) worked with the Sudan Political Service until 1953. During the Anglo-Egyptian period in South Sudan (1899-1956) Randal served as the colonial administrator of Gogrial District situated in the present day Warrap state in South Sudan. Philip Winter, a South Sudan specialist, is a founding fellow of the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) and appointed as the Institute's executive director from October 2015 to June 2016. The RVI is an independent non-profit research and educational center. RVI also collaborates with communities and institutions in Eastern Africa such as Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and other regions in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. Some its members include Fergus Boyle, Jok Madut Jok, John Ryle, Gerard Prunier, Dereje Feyissa, Douglas Johnson, Alex de Waal, and others.

623.SAD.1030/5/1-70, Douglas Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, created, 1993-1996.

The inefficiency of many of their counterparts overshadowed SMC and a few other local NGOs' successes. This problem became pronounced by the end of 1994 with the proliferation of domestic NGOs, most of whom failed to fulfil their duties. As a solution to these issues, ICBP and OLS Southern Sector granted SINGO applicants' access to OLS facilities for a probationary period and gave them \$1500 each for their expenses. Subsequently, some of these local relief agencies disappeared, and those who returned became frustrated about the complicated procedures of obtaining funding through the international aid system.<sup>624</sup> Afterward, by November 1994, SRRA and RASS, SPLA-Mainstream and Nasir faction's relief wings respectively, were delegated the responsibility of scrutinizing and registering SINGOs. All registered local NGOs were expected to provide details about their mission statement, constitution, by-laws, and their organizational structure. These domestic NGOs were also required to outline their project proposals, lists and curriculum vitae of their founders and personnel, commitment to humanitarian principles, and references from other relief agencies.<sup>625</sup>

Since most of these requirements were constantly changing and challenging to attain for SINGO representatives, they ceded their relief operations to SPLA-Mainstream's SRRA and SPLA-Nasir's RASS, who also had their own administrative and financial problems. As such, ICBP organized seminars and workshops focused on revamping SRRA and RASS relief operations. During these meetings, staff were requested to identify local NGOs' problems and proffer feasible solutions.<sup>626</sup> As such, from October 16 to 18, 1994, in the town of Machakos in Kenya, twenty-three representatives from humanitarian agencies organized a workshop focused on the modalities of OLS operations and logistics in the South. Other participants included GOS, SINGOs, SPLA-Nasir, and SPLA-Mainstream representatives. Topical issues such as the efficacy of Lifeline coordination mechanisms, logistical constraints of IO and NGOs operations, the OLS relationship with SINGOs, and donor and media interest in OLS were tabled during the Machakos meeting. By the end of the meeting, some of its final recommendations encompassed the need to harmonize OLS security rules, clarify funding and support criteria for SINGOs, and establish agencies to monitor the abuses of humanitarian principles. They also discussed the need to create a broad program directed towards disseminating humanitarian principles to the SPLM/A factions and their relief wings. The meeting highlighted the importance of encouraging donor support for SINGOs and prioritizing the employment of Sudanese staff over expatriates whenever feasible among IOs and NGOs. Subsequently, SINGOs became involved in relief operations, diversifying the scope of humanitarian agency operations among the Southerners.<sup>627</sup>

### ***OLS REVITALIZED: THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY***

Since the late 1980s, the Government of Sudan's (GOS) heavy-handed policies on aid organizations affected the coordination of their relief activities in the Northern and Southern

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624. Rakiya Omar and Alex de Waal *Food and Power in Sudan*, 318-320.

625. SAD.89/5/1-148 *Justice Africa Papers of Human Rights, Political Organizations: Constitutions and Charters* created, 1980s-2000s.

626. *Ibid.*

627. SAD.1032/2/1-47 Douglas H. Johnson, *Recommendations of UN/NGO Workshop (OLS) Programme Coordination/ Operation and Logistics Machakos*, 16-18 1994.

sectors where OLS operated. In the early 1990s, the strained relationship between GOS and aid organizations worsened while Khartoum's ministries competed over the control of relief organizations. In addition, bureaucratic delays hampered the progress of most humanitarian agencies in delivering relief aid to civilians in the Northern and Southern regions.<sup>628</sup>

Undeterred by these challenges, the UN initiated diplomatic discussions with the Sudan government and SPLA-Mainstream to revamp OLS operations in Sudan. These efforts underlined UN's attempt to dialogue with both the GOS and SPLA factions in finding a political solution to end the civil war and in enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Southerners. Thus, in April 1992, in Ethiopia, Jan Kenneth Eliasson, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for the department of humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, met and discussed with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir about Sudan's humanitarian crisis. During the meeting, al-Bashir disclosed that during the initial phase of OLS, humanitarian agencies fairly and equally provided relief aid to civilians residing in SPLA-held and government-controlled regions. Subsequently, more humanitarian packages were allocated to the liberation army held areas than those delivered to Khartoum-controlled localities, compromising OLS's impartiality.<sup>629</sup>

These events instigated Khartoum's restrictive policy against relief agencies in the Southern Sector. Al-Bashir also expressed that OLS relief assistance in the Southern Sector facilitated the liberation army's political interest rather than resolving the humanitarian crisis of civilians in SPLA-held areas. Eliasson reassured the Sudanese president about OLS's impartiality and commitment to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Sudanese. Other matters discussed during the meeting included the conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Khartoum and the OLS need to receive authorization from Khartoum to resume its humanitarian flights into Southern Sudan. In the aftermath of Eliasson's talks with al-Bashir, the GOS allowed UN airlifts from Kenya to some Southern locations, including Nasir, until the end of April 1992 and rejected OLS flight requests to SPLA-Mainstream's controlled area in Pibor. Since SPLA's split in 1991, Khartoum often supported the provision of aid to SPLA-Nasir's faction which it supported against SPLA-Mainstream.<sup>630</sup>

Eliasson also met with other senior members of the GOS, emphasizing the need for Khartoum's transparency concerning the plight of IDPs and a reversal of the ban on OLS operations in SPLA-Mainstream controlled regions. Eliasson also used this opportunity to have audiences with the two SPLA factions. While in the SPLA-Mainstream controlled area, Eliasson interacted with Mr. Elijah Malok, SRRA's secretary general. Malok expressed his skepticism about Khartoum's sincerity in finding a political solution to the civil war because the GOS remained determined to defeat the

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628. SOA *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=LD19960000-01.1.17&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-a+REVIEW-----> (accessed October 7, 2023).

629. United Nations Archives and Record Management Section (UNARMS) Reference Code *Delegations-Sudan* created 1992 <https://search.archives.un.org/s-1086-0100-06-00001> (accessed October 7, 2023). Jan Eliasson started his diplomatic career in 1965 with the Swedish Ministry for foreign affairs and from 1982 to 1983 served as the diplomatic advisor to the Swedish prime minister Olof Palme. Then from 1983 to 1987, Eliasson became the Swedish director general for political affairs. Before Eliasson's appointment as the first UN Under Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator in Sudan, he served as part of the U.N mission meditating group during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).

630. *Ibid*

liberation army before seeking any amicable resolution. Regarding OLS accessibility to government-controlled towns in the South, Malok expressed his certainty that clearance would be granted for airlifts to Juba and Wau and highlighted the need for a similar gesture for SPLA-Mainstream's areas in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal. The SRRA secretary general reassured the UN under about the safety of all aid workers.<sup>631</sup>

Subsequently, Eliasson met with Lam Akol, a leader of the Nasir faction. During their meeting, they discussed the accessibility of relief aid, SPLA's internal division, and the need for cross-border relief operations. Akol expressed his concern about the lack of food in SPLA-Nasir-controlled areas, including Akobo, aggravated by the influx of IDPs into the locality. Akol also indicated his doubt about Khartoum's intent to seek a peaceful ending to the civil war. The SPLA-Nasir leader concluded the meeting by requesting the UN to reconsider the option of a cross-border relief operation through the Gambella corridor from Ethiopia as a means of alleviating the food insecurity in SPLA-Nasir-controlled localities.<sup>632</sup> Concurrently, in government-controlled Juba, Southerners were also affected by famine worsened by the influx of IDPs and SPLA-Mainstream's blockade of OLS airlifts into the area. Notwithstanding, the USG considered several diplomatic options, including imploring Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, to urge President Museveni of Uganda to influence John Garang's accordance with Juba's airlift plans. By August 20, 1992, the fruition of these diplomatic efforts prompted the recommencement of a UN airlift of around 45 metric tons of food aid and other relief items from Uganda's capital Entebbe into Juba.<sup>633</sup>

The success of the Juba airlift, reviving OLS relief efforts in a government-controlled area in the South, encouraged Eliasson to persuade Khartoum about OLS's need to access and deliver humanitarian aid in areas controlled by the SPLA factions. The UN USG and GOS also deliberated about the possibility of resolving the civil war. Initially, the international community hoped the Abuja Conference of June 1992 in Nigeria would prompt the political settlement of the civil war. However, its failure, coupled with the kidnapping and killing of OLS staff, Francis Ngure and Myint Maung, instigated by internal conflicts within SPLA-Mainstream, expedited the evacuation of many aid workers from Juba and other Southern locations. Amid these occurrences, two US Agency for International Development (USAID) Southern Sudanese employees, Dominic Morris and Chaplain Lako and Mark Laboke Jenner, an employee of the European Economic Community (EEC), were killed by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Juba. Before their deaths, the victims of these tragedies were accused of being either an SPLA's fifth column within the government-controlled region or preventing SAF from commandeering relief agency properties. Consequently, concerns about the safety and security of aid workers deployed in the South became the dominant focus of UN officials.<sup>634</sup>

Against this backdrop, the Sudanese government delayed OLS's request to conduct airlifts and recommence its relief operation in regions controlled by SPLA factions. Concurrently,

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631. *Ibid.*

632. *Ibid.*

633. *Ibid.*

634. *Ibid.* Some of these reports can also found in *Civilian Devastations: Abuses by All Parties in The War in Southern Sudan* (New York Human Rights Watch /Africa 1994), 61-64.

international pressure on GOS about its poor human rights record and the unending humanitarian crisis in the South coincided with Khartoum's intent on facilitating a political and economic transformative agenda. Therefore, GOS launched its Peace and Development Foundation program to incorporate rehabilitation and developmental policies in newly conquered Southern territories. These initiatives were predicated upon the revitalization and expansion of Sudan's agricultural economy to become self-sufficient in food production. In particular, lands located within government-controlled areas in the South, such as Wau, a settlement locality for IDPs, became the focus of Khartoum's farming project. Sudan's burgeoning agricultural policies facilitated the creation of "peace villages" within the government-controlled localities where IDPs worked as farm laborers and received limited aid from Khartoum.<sup>635</sup>

Inevitably, fostering the participation of IOs and NGOs became necessary to realize the Peace and Development project since the GOS needed funds to facilitate its proposed developmental plans. However, Khartoum's abysmal human rights record and its affiliations with Islamic fundamentalist groups prompted Washington and other international donors to cut their development assistance for Sudan. To resolve this situation, Charles Lamunier, the UN deputy director of humanitarian affairs (DHA) visited Khartoum in November 1992 and broached the idea of a joint GOS/UN/IO/NGO conference as a means of rekindling Khartoum's relationship within the international community.<sup>636</sup>

Afterwards, from January 24 to 28, 1993, the Sudanese government convened a meeting with aid organizations sponsored by the UN and attended by CARE, Medicins Sans Frontières (MSF), Dawa Islamiya, a local NGO based in North, and other IOs and NGOs. Khartoum used the conference as an opportunity to announce its Peace and Developmental agenda. Furthermore, the participating relief agencies and Khartoum signed a Country Agreement providing humanitarian agencies the option of submitting their semi and comprehensive annual reports rather than completing yearly registration processes. Consequently, aid workers were able to extend the duration of humanitarian operations without worrying about permission to operate in subsequent years. Nevertheless, IOs and NGOs had to adhere to the GOS policies. These initiatives gradually resuscitated the amicable engagement between Khartoum and aid organizations operating in Sudan.<sup>637</sup>

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635. SOA *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=LD19960000-01.1.17&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-a+REVIEW-----> 63-64 (accessed October 7, 2024). The rising cost of imported basic commodities such as flour also influenced the shift of Khartoum's economic policy from relief to development. Harry Verhoeven in *Water, Civilization, and Power in Sudan: The Political Economy of Military-Islamist State Building* (New York Cambridge University Press 2015) 101-105, highlights that Sudan's wheat flour imports rose from 233,000 in 1990 to 1,023,000 by 2000 while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) observed that Sudan's balance of payment deficit worsened from an average of \$417million (1986-1990) to \$538million (1991-1995). In the North, the GOS initiated the National Comprehensive Strategy to expand Sudan's irrigated lands for agriculture but failed to achieve its economic objective of reducing imports and making Sudan self-sufficient.

636. *Ibid.*, 63-64.

637. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Archives/11/3/40-400.SUD *Non-Governmental and Governmental Organizations-Sudan 1986-1995* Records of the Central Registry F17.



To foster this development, Khartoum encouraged “Twinning” meaning the collaboration between Sudanese NGOs with relief organizations. This new policy stimulated collaborative humanitarian projects between domestic and international aid agencies, enhancing the prospect of capacity building and human resource development among partnering agencies. The GOS also endorsed the cooperation between domestic and foreign relief organizations in gathering relevant data needed to facilitate humanitarian operations. The need for a reliable communication system to improve and facilitate relief operations was highlighted during the meeting. Based on these expectations, the Sudanese government guaranteed its commitment to expedite the transmission of messages among relief agencies and return all confiscated radio equipment. Relief agencies were also expected to focus solely on their relief operation while catering for the Sudanese humanitarian needs regardless of their religion, race, ethnicity, and political ideologies.<sup>638</sup>

Accordingly, throughout the 1990s, these policies reshaped Khartoum’s relationship with humanitarian agencies, providing SCF with the opportunity to lobby GOS and international donors about the relief needs of the Sudanese. SCF also championed apt responses to famine and drought crises.<sup>639</sup> From March 1993, Khartoum’s rekindled interdependent relationship with IOs and NGOs facilitated the resumption of OLS airlifts and humanitarian operations throughout Southern regions. Around two million Southerners affected by flood, drought, and war were provided food and other relief assistance. As such, the number of airlift locations in Southern Sudan increased from six locations in December 1992 to more than twenty in March 1993. A Buffalo aircraft flying from neighbouring countries delivered around 7.5 metric tons of relief aid into the South two to three times per day. In collaboration with UN agencies, the US and Canadian governments also supported the revitalization of OLS operation by sponsoring airlifts in the South. Hence, the rejuvenation and expansion of humanitarian activities in Southern Sudan underscored the growing influence of IOs and NGOs among the Southerners reinforced by SINGO activities.<sup>640</sup>

Against this backdrop, many humanitarian agencies operated within designated areas in the South where they concentrated on specific aid operations. In Bahr-el-Ghazal, SCF humanitarian projects focused on agriculture, fishing, and food security. Concurrently, SINGOs within areas controlled by the Mainstream and Nasir factions were involved in all kinds of aid projects, including health and agriculture, needed by the Southerners. For instance, Sudan Production Aid (SUPRAID) concentrated on developing agricultural activities. Indeed, later in 1994, in Akon area, SUPRAID and Save the Children Fund (SCF) collaborated in expanding and facilitating their rehabilitation projects for Southern Sudanese women.<sup>641</sup>

Different obstacles hampered the efficacy of OLS relief operations in the Southern regions. During its first months of operation in the South, the inability of the World Food Program (WFP)-Southern Sector to manage the cost of transporting food aid compromised its relief efforts. In Kongor, situated in the Jonglei region, the fighting between SPLA-Mainstream and SPLA-Nasir affected the implementation of WFP-Southern Sector food aid operation. Although SPLA-Nasir

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638.*Ibid.*

639.Susanne Jaspar, *Food Aid in Sudan: A History of Power Politics and Profit* (London Zed Books, 2018),125.

640.SAD.1024/3/1-225, Douglas Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, created, 1992-1995.

641.*Ibid.*

faction conquered Kongor, the conflict between the warring factions persisted within the locality and delayed WFP-Southern Sector's relief operation until June 1993.<sup>642</sup> Additionally, the South's rainy season disrupted airlift operations in the Southern regions, especially in Bahr-el-Ghazal by rendering airstrips unusable. Consequently, IOs, and NGOs were unable to stockpile and provide food aid for Southerners malnourished in Akon. These incidents exemplified the shared perception among aid workers that conflict among the Southern factions vitiated their relief and rehabilitation efforts among the Southerners.<sup>643</sup>

In the Upper Nile, the outbreak of Kala-azar or "Black fever," worsened by the lack of primary health care units, and fighting among SPLA-Mainstream, SPLA-Nasir, and Sudan state forces deterred humanitarian operations. Besides, the uncontrollable influx of IDPs into Ayod and other regions aggravated the Southern crises in the Upper Nile. Similarly, in Ayod, a RASS officer observed the malnourishment among the locality's population compounded by OLS irregular operation within the area caused by battle among the belligerents.<sup>644</sup>

These tragic occurrences led to Ayod's destruction followed by its reconstruction through WFP efforts while fighting in proximate areas such as Wau affected the delivery of relief aid. Therefore, on May 14, 1993, SPLA commanders in Ayod warned the Red Cross to remove its plane from the locality to avoid an impending attack. Subsequently, the Ayod security situation gradually regained its stabilized, but many relief items were looted, making most of its inhabitants seek refuge in the bush where many of them became malnourished and prone to Guinea worm, malaria, and other diseases. Moreover, fighting among the belligerents destroyed the medical facilities required to provide treatment for the sick.<sup>645</sup>

By late April 1993, aid agencies resumed their relief operations in Equatoria. Thus, UNICEF opened its healthcare center in Nimule where it started an expanded program on immunization (EPI) through six teams who managed UNICEF's vaccination facilities. Additionally, the Diocese of Torit (DOT), a Southern Sudanese ecumenical NGO, established its Tuberculosis treatment center in Nimule. However, the destruction of properties and insecurity in some parts of the Equatoria region compromised aid agencies' relief operations. For instance, in Lafon area SPLA-Mainstream forces burnt houses and brutalized the people in the locality. According to an OLS assessment mission in Lafon, around 200 civilians were killed, and 70,000 livestock were stolen. Likewise, in Chukudum locality, insecurity imperiled Oxfam operations, fomenting attack on Oxfam's hired vehicle carrying meningitis drugs and vaccines. These crises were instigated by the unbridled activities of unidentified SPLA factions in Chukudum, leading to attacks on several homesteads within the vicinity provoking the villagers' violent reactions against Oxfam relief activities. Despite humanitarian agencies' accessibility to the Southern territories,

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642.SOA SPLM/SPLA Press Release *We Are Fighting in Self Defence in Kongor*, March 1993. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=is&oid=JBRG19930329-01&type=staticpdf&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-defence+in+kongor+-----> (accessed October 15, 2023).

643.SAD.1024/3/1-255-pt6, Douglas H. Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan* created, 1992-1995.

644.*Ibid.*

645.*Ibid.*

fighting among the warring factions negated the effectiveness of relief and rehabilitation projects among the Southerners.<sup>646</sup>

### ***CONCURRENT CONFLICT MEDIATIONS AND RELIEF NEGOTIATIONS***

From 1993, several diplomatic efforts geared towards resolving the conflicts among the warring factions in the South became intertwined with the need to provide the Southerners humanitarian aid. Therefore, humanitarian diplomacy, focused on facilitating negotiations among belligerents to guarantee and secure the safety of aid workers, relief aid items, and Southerners afflicted by the war became imperative. The implementation of humanitarian diplomatic measures was propelled by the unending fighting among the SPLA factions, especially in the Upper Nile, disrupting the movement of relief aid and weakening the efficacy of OLS operations. These occurrences made the initiation of humanitarian diplomatic efforts by OLS and external parties concerned about the war in the South unavoidable.<sup>647</sup>

Moreover, by October 1993, the South's failed harvest, together with civil strife and displacement of Southerners in Bahr-el-Ghazal, were attributed to fighting and insecurity caused by SPLA's warring factions. Simultaneously, the escalation of clashes between SPLA Mainstream and Nasir in Waat, Ayod, and Kongor affected the Upper Nile's relief coordination by OLS. As the fighting among the Southern belligerents intensified, around 1.7 million Southerners became IDPs in transitional zones, situated between Northern and Southern Sudan, and another 1.5 million were in desperate need of food. These tragic events strengthened the need for diplomatic measures that would facilitate the resolution of the conflict and solve the South's humanitarian crises. The 1994 peace initiative or the Declaration of Peace Agreement (DOP) among the Sudanese belligerents initiated by the Intergovernmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD), an organization of East African states, focused on this agenda.<sup>648</sup>

Hitherto, the Abuja Peace Talks I and II, held in the early 1990s, were some of the peace meetings where Khartoum and the SPLA groups dialogued about resolving the civil war. President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria (1985-1993) chaired the peace talks in Abuja. During the peace meetings, issues about religious differences, political strife, socioeconomic development, security arrangements and the Southerners' quest for self-determination worsened the tension between Khartoum and SPLAs' factions.<sup>649</sup> Subsequently, the failure of the Abuja talks prompted the initiation of another peace dialogue between Garang and Machar, leaders of the Mainstream and Nasir factions, in Washington on October 21, 1993. Congressman Harry Johnston, the chairman of the U.S House of the Subcommittee on Africa led the meeting. The strained diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Washington caused the exclusion of GOS from this meeting. Other

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646. *Ibid.*

647. Herman J. Cohen *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (London: Macmillan Press limited, 2000), 83-84.

648. United Nations Digital Library (UNDL) *Emergency Assistance to The Sudan: Report of The Secretary General 1993*. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/177038?ln=en> (accessed October 16, 2023).

649. Arop Madut-Arop *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of The Founding and Development of SPLM/SPLA*. (Charleston: BookSurge, 2006), 360-374.

participants at the peace talks included Mr. George Moose, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, his aides, and those of Congressman Johnston.<sup>650</sup>

During the mediation summit, Garang and Machar had a lengthy discussion culminating in the Washington Declaration of 1993. The concluding agreements between both leaders focused on the Southerners' quest for self-determination and an immediate end to all hostilities between the SPLA factions monitored by international observers. This peace agreement did not apply to Khartoum since it did not participate in the mediation process. As a precondition for peace, both SPLA leaders agreed to unite and assist humanitarian operations in regions where Southerners were affected by war, famine, and disease. Additionally, the rival factions resolved to cooperate in opposing Khartoum's policies of denying Southern regions and all other marginalized areas in Sudan the right to self-determination. Accordingly, Garang and Machar agreed upon the need to resolve the civil war through democratic and peaceful means coupled with an agenda for peace, unity, and reconciliation.<sup>651</sup>

Back in Southern Sudan, the divergent political challenges of both SPLA faction leaders compromised their commitments towards implementing the Washington Declaration. Among SPLA-Nasir faction, Lam Akol and other top members of the group outrightly rebuked Machar for conceding to the agreements reached at the peace conference. Soon, these events galvanized the internal rivalry for SPLA-Nasir leadership, with Riek Machar, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and William Nyuon vying for this position. Concurrently, Khartoum's alliance with SPLA-Nasir commanders against the Mainstream faction, leading to the state's conquest of the latter's areas in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equatoria regions, compromised Garang's commitment to the Washington agreement.<sup>652</sup> Nonetheless, the SPLA-Mainstream faction sustained its hold over some parts of the South, including rural areas in Bahr-el-Ghazal, the entire Western Equatoria region, and the Nuba Mountains. Furthermore, SPLA-Mainstream controlled Southern Sudan's borders with Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire now DRC.<sup>653</sup>

The Washington Declaration's failure to resolve the conflict between the SPLA rival factions spurred the East African regional interventionist role of IGADD. Aimed at reviving peace dialogue between Khartoum and SPLA's rival factions, IGADD's peace initiative or the Declaration of Principle (DOP), from 17 to 20 May 1994, convened in Kenya's capital Nairobi chaired by

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650.SAD.310/3/95 *Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (United) Press Statement* October 22, 1993. John Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins in *Sudan in Turmoil: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist State* (Princeton Markus Wiener Publishers, 2003),174-180, highlights that the National Islamic Front's involvement in several terrorist activities including the bombing of the World Trade Center in May 1993 and Khartoum's cordial relationship with Osman Bin Laden strained the U.S relationship with the Sudanese government throughout the 1990s. This compromised Washington's capacity to coordinate a peace agreement between Khartoum and the SPLA factions.

651.SAD.305/7/8 *The Washington Declaration* , October 22, 1993.

652. Douglas H. Johnson "The Nuer Civil Wars" in *Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa Volume II: Sudan, Uganda, and the Ethiopia-Sudan Borderlands* (ed) Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth E. Watson (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 38-39.

653.Arop Madut-Arop *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of The Founding and Development of SPLM/SPLA*. (Charleston: BookSurge, 2006), 291-314. In Douglas Johnson's *The Nuer Civil Wars* (31-39), the collaboration between Khartoum and Nasir faction became formalized during the Frankfurt Agreement on 25 January 1992. Thereafter, SPLA-Nasir's military strategy focused on strengthening the GOS's offensive against SPLA-Mainstream .

President Arap Moi. The DOP involved the participation of the GOS, members of the SPLA factions, and Ambassador Vieri Traxler, the UN special envoy for humanitarian affairs for Sudan. The U.S. President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and the European Union also supported IGADD's peace initiative. By the end of the meeting, political and humanitarian resolutions were agreed upon by the Sudanese government, and SPLA-Nasir, and Mainstream factions, encompassing the Abuja I and II negotiations and other previous dialogues aimed at the political settlement of the Sudanese civil war. Concurrently, the DOP also emphasized that combatants allow OLS to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Southerners through the air, rail, road, and river "relief corridors" agreed upon during the meeting.<sup>654</sup>

Based on IGADD's 1994 peace initiative, the DOP further emphasized that "a peaceful and political solution" must be the goal of belligerents involved in the conflict. The Southern Sudanese rights to self-determination as affirmed through a referendum were underscored as an important proviso for resolving the Sudanese conflict. Within the clauses of IGADD's 1994 peace mediation, the acceptance and recognition of Sudan's ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity was also underlined as a vital precondition for peace and stability.<sup>655</sup>

Simultaneously, the humanitarian agreements among the belligerents focused on delivering relief aid by air, land, and water to areas controlled by GOS and the SPLA-factions. Under the auspices of the IGADD peace committee, Khartoum and the SPLA factions in collaboration with OLS were delegated the task of vigilantly monitoring the use of these "safe passages" or "relief corridors" only for OLS's operation. Hence, territories like Abyei, Akobo, Akon, Tambura, and Malakal were used for OLS airlifts while localities including Akobo, Pibor, Malakal and Nasir became OLS river passages for transporting humanitarian aid. Similarly, Juba, Torit, Ayod, Kongor, Narus, and Lokichogio were identified as OLS routes for conveying relief aid by land. In the situation where any of the prearranged humanitarian routes became unusable, the IGADD treaty stipulated the need for OLS and the warring sides to arrange alternate relief routes.<sup>656</sup>

IGADD's humanitarian negotiations also encompassed an immunization campaign for all Southern Sudanese children under five to eradicate the spread of measles and polio. UNICEF facilitated this project by providing all required vaccines and facilities to enhance the immunization process. The SPLA factions, Khartoum, and OLS were also expected to facilitate the safety and transportation of personnel and equipment needed during the inoculation exercise underlining the belligerents' commitments towards monitoring the implementation of the conflict and humanitarian resolution. In this regard, the IGADD peace process became a watchdog for

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654. UNHCR Archive 11/3/01-013.SUD *External Relations-Relations with Governments-Sudan (Volumes. 2-5) 1987-1994*. Records of the Central Registry F4. Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan were the founding members of IGADD in 1986 while Eritrea joined in 1993. South Sudan joined upon gaining independence in 2011 but was suspended in 2021 because of its failure to pay its membership fees. IGADD's mandate focused on the coordination of environmental protection, food security strategies, and natural resources management. The formation of IGADD in 1986 coincided with the prevalent conflicts in East Africa, galvanizing its interventionist roles in the Sudanese Civil War supported by the United Nations and the European Union. In 1996, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) succeeded IGADD.

655.*Ibid.*

656.*Ibid.*

monitoring the prospects of resolving the Sudanese Civil War, complemented by humanitarian cooperation and coordination among the belligerents.<sup>657</sup>

Consequently, in 1995, when GOS obstructed OLS delivery of relief aid into SPLA-Mainstream held regions, SRRA publicized this situation by issuing a complaint to the participants of IGADD's 1994 peace initiative. In the aftermath of Khartoum's interference with OLS's operation, a measles epidemic occurred in some SPLA-Mainstream areas, leading to the death of nearly three hundred and eighty-eight children in October 1995. Appalled by this situation, SRRA questioned OLS's inaction over Khartoum's manipulation of relief activities in the South since it contradicted the belligerents' commitment to IGADD's peace efforts of 1994.<sup>658</sup>

Compared to previous peace initiatives, the IGADD 1994 treaty became the first relief and peace negotiations in which the UN and belligerents embroiled in the civil war participated in together. Therefore, this development emphasized the widening roles of relief agencies as participants in efforts to resolve the conflict among the Sudanese warring factions. Concurrently, the SPLA factions became recognized as indispensable stakeholders in the prospect of humanitarian assistance and peace negotiations for the Southerners. This reaffirmed the interdependent relationship between relief agencies and the SPLA factions. Furthermore, the peace process underscored OLS Southern Sector's independence from Khartoum's diktat, strengthened by aid workers' free access to the South's relief corridors and the need for collective consultation whenever they were changed. Moreover, the Southern Sudanese right to self-determination espoused during IGADD's negotiation envisaged the possibility of the Southerners' independence from Sudan in the future.<sup>659</sup>

### ***EXPANSION AND CONSTRAINTS OF RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR***

In the mid-1990s, the growth and diversification of humanitarian operations in Southern Sudan were intertwined with the internal division of the SPLA-Nasir faction, and the insecurity in the Southern regions. Additionally, the resurgence of SPLA-Mainstream's military operation in parts of the Equatoria region and the creation of relief committees in other parts of the South facilitated the expansion of aid agencies among the Southerners. Some of the precursors to these events included the emergence of SINGOs in the early 1990s, Khartoum's compromise with relief agencies in 1992, and the IGADD meeting in 1994. Moreover, the Institution and Capacity Building Program (ICBP) strengthened the nexus between SINGOs and NGOs to foster Southern Sudan's development. Consequently, the number of humanitarian agencies specializing in

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657. *Ibid.*

658. SAD.1032/2/1-47 Douglas H. Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan: SRRA Position Paper on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)* by Mario Muor Muor executive director SRRA 27 November 1995. Created, 1992-1995.

659. SOA Mark Bradbury et al, *Humanitarian Policy Group The Agreement on Ground Rules in South Sudan: Study 3 in The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000), 29.

agriculture, veterinary services, education, and other operations fields expanded throughout the Southern regions.<sup>660</sup>

In this regard, by 1994, the internal rivalry among SPLA-Nasir leaders increased the number of humanitarian agencies operating in the Southern regions. In the aftermath of the Nasir faction's leadership struggle, Commander Riek Machar's group became known as the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), retaining RASS as its relief wing. Lam Akol headed the new SPLA-United faction, naming the Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association (FRRA) its relief wing. The creation of the FRRA reinforced the Akol faction's recognition among the aid community in the South, thereby using relief aid provided through FRRA to sustain SPLA-United's authority over the areas it controlled in the Upper Nile. Therefore, following the emergence of SPLA-United, MedAir, a Swiss NGO, and Medico, an Italian relief organization, provided humanitarian aid for Kodok, a town situated in the Upper Nile, controlled by SPLA-United.<sup>661</sup>

Later in 1994, SPLA-United confronted OLS about providing FRRA with similar privileges received by SRRA and RASS. OLS delayed conceding to this request, given SPLA-United's abduction of twenty-two people on board the World Food Programme's barge traversing the Upper Nile. OLS's hesitant posture towards FRRA was caused by the additional financial burden that would be incurred by providing aid to SPLA-United's relief wing, and to avoid encouraging further division among Southern factions based on benefits they would obtain from relief agencies.<sup>662</sup> Eventually, around January 10, 1995, OLS and Akol's faction reached a compromise, leading to the official recognition of FRRA as SPLA-United's relief wing. Thereafter, FRRA urgently requested humanitarian assistance from OLS for agriculture, education, medicine, and women's development. Although MedAir and Medico facilitated some of FRRA's relief needs, their limited resources caused SPLA-United to request extra support from OLS.<sup>663</sup>

In these moments, the South's unstable security environment rekindled by the further splintering among the SPLAs' factions affected IO and NGO operations and resulted in the emergence of Southern warlords, especially after the division within SPLA-Nasir. Thus, commander Kerubino Kuayin Bol, an erstwhile member of the Nasir faction, recruited his fighting forces among the Dinka ethnic group in Bahr-el-Ghazal and in 1994, Kuayin allied with Khartoum's forces against SPLA-Mainstream.<sup>664</sup> Similarly, by 1995, William Nyuon withdrew from SSIM/A and formed SSIM/A II as his faction. These events, coupled with the GOS's lackluster commitment towards the IGADD's peace process, caused by the Sudanese government's tense relationship with Uganda and other IGADD member states, aggravated Bahr-el-Ghazal's perilous situation. Besides,

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660. SOA *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=LD19960000-01.1.317&srpos=2&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-1996+OLS+REVIEW-----> (accessed 18 October, 2023), 78.

661. SOA *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996*. SPLA-United operations predominated the Mid-West part of the Upper Nile region encompassing, Tonga (or Papwojo) Pakang, Wau, Lul, Oriny, Oweci, Pakwar, and Detwok Delai Ajak, and Konam localities.

662. *Ibid.*

663. SAD.96/6/1-166 Justice Africa *Papers of Human Rights and Political Organizations: Internal Communications*, created January 1994-December 1995.

664. *Famine in Sudan 1998: The Human Right Causes* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 14-15.

Khartoum exploited this situation by rekindling its hardline policies over OLS activities in the Southern Sector while fighting among the emerging Southern factions compromised relief operations in most parts of Bahr-el-Ghazal.<sup>665</sup>

Similarly, towards the end of 1994, security tensions in the Equatoria region caused by impending conflict between SAF and SPLA-Mainstream in Yambio affected MSF and other humanitarian agencies' operations. These trepidations induced SPLA-Mainstream to tighten its control over Yambio's airstrip and to monitor the movement of aid workers.<sup>666</sup> Inevitably, friction occurred between SRRA and MSF staff after the latter's plane landed in Yambio without any prior clearance from SPLA-Mainstream. Also, the reoccurring issues of theft, diversion of relief aid, and Southerners' ignorance about the Ground Rules, affected relief operations in the Equatoria areas.<sup>667</sup> The South's faltering security situation gradually became prevalent after the Chukudum meeting and IGADD's peace negotiation of 1994. To redress the South's insecurity, SPLA-Mainstream and SSIA agreed with OLS in signing new Ground Rules around July and August 1995. Lam Akol's SPLA-United conceded to the same humanitarian principles by 1996.<sup>668</sup>

The Ground Rules (GRs), initiated in 1993, enumerated a set of humanitarian laws and rules aimed at guiding the relationship between OLS aid agencies and SPLA factions and their relief wings. Compared to the Ground Rules of 1993, initiated by only the Mainstream faction, those of 1995 were formulated through the collaborative involvement of SPLA-Mainstream, SSIA, SPLA-United and OLS. By acknowledging the Ground Rules of 1995, the Mainstream faction and its rivals affirmed their commitment to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, reinforced by the 1977 protocols. Through their recognition of the Convention on Rights of the Child 1989, SPLA-Mainstream and its Southern counterparts guaranteed their commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights of the Southern Sudanese children. Correspondingly, the participating Southern factions' concessions to the Geneva Protocols of 1949 and 1977 underlined their commitment to improve the delivery of relief aid and protect Southern civilians amid the civil war. The humanitarian principles of 1995 also revitalized OLS's commitment to humanitarian neutrality while operating in both Mainstream and SSIA's

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665. SOA Mark Bradbury et al, *Humanitarian Policy Group the Agreement on Ground Rules in South Sudan: Study 3 in The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice* (London: Overseas Development Institute 2000). J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins in *Sudan in Turmoil: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist State* explain that from 1995 Sudan's diplomatic relations with IGADD members including Ethiopia, and Uganda became strained for several reasons. Khartoum's involvement in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 while attending the Organization for African Unity's summit in Ethiopia affected Sudan diplomatic ties with other IGADD members. Meanwhile, President Isayas Afewerki of Eritrea (May 1993 to date) supported the Sudanese opposition party National Democratic Alliance alliance with SPLM/A. Concurrently, from around 1995, the al-Bashir government provided arms for the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) guerrilla rebels in Northern Uganda and parts of Southern Sudan. These developments displeased President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (January 1986-to date), who also supported SPLA-Mainstream. These political issues constantly compromised IGADD's interventionist role during the Sudan Civil War.

666. SOA Douglas Johnson *Yambio Visit November 8 1994* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND19941108-01.1.1&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-yAMBIO-----> (last accessed 22 October, 2023).

667. Ibid.

668. SOA *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=is&oid=LD19960000-01&type=staticpdf&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-1996+OLS+REVIEW-----> (last accessed 22 October, 2023), 53-55.



regions in the South. Based on these humanitarian principles, human needs subordinated political leanings, ethnic bias, and religious sentiments whenever OLS provided the Southerners with relief aid. All those involved in OLS's operations were expected to respect and uphold the principles of international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights.<sup>669</sup>

Additionally, the Ground Rules of 1995 guaranteed the safety of aid workers and created an enabling environment for delivering humanitarian assistance. Moreover, OLS, RASS, and SRRA had mutual obligations of upholding the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977, fundamental human rights of the Southerners and the other above-mentioned enshrined principles within the GRs of 1995. Accordingly, in cooperation with OLS, SRRA, RASS, and FRRA were expected to coordinate the provision of relief aid by providing accurate and timely information about the conditions and needs of Southerners in different areas.<sup>670</sup> To ensure that OLS and the rival Southern factions abided by these new relief policies, a Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (JRRC) was established comprising members from all parties committed to the implementation and respect of the Ground Rules. If any parties violated these humanitarian policies, the JRRC team would be used to resolve such matters. Overall, the humanitarian principles of 1995 became a means of gradually restoring civil order among the Southerners.<sup>671</sup>

Nonetheless, the implementation of these humanitarian policies was affected by Khartoum reimposing restrictions on relief agencies' airlifts, and SAF clashes with SPLA-Mainstream. Furthermore, fighting among Garang's forces, Kerubino's militia group and other new Southern armed groups controlled by Khartoum compromised the Ground Rules of 1995. These issues determined the uneven presence and operations of relief agencies in the South. Accordingly, four humanitarian groups operated in Bahr-el-Ghazal, fifteen in the Upper Nile, eight in Jonglei, thirteen in the Lakes area and twenty-two in the Equatoria region. In contrast to other Southern regions, Equatoria's relatively secure environment galvanized the spread of relief and rehabilitation programs facilitated by IOs, NGOs and SINGOs. Thus, by 1995, Mundri Relief and Development Association (MRDA) a domestic NGO with financial and logistical support from Christian Aid and International Aid Sweden (IAS), facilitated educational development in Western Equatoria. Similarly, the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) assisted the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), an ecumenical SINGO, in mounting a humanitarian program focused on agriculture, health, and community development in Eastern and Western Equatoria and other parts of the South. Concomitantly, Oxfam-UK, Catholic Relief Service, Action Africa in Need (AAIN) and other NGOs expedited relief and rehabilitation projects in the Equatoria area.<sup>672</sup>

In particular, the United States support for SPLA-Mainstream's operation strengthened its stronghold of Western Equatoria. Around 1995, the growth of relief and rehabilitation activities in Western Equatoria was expedited by SPLA-Mainstream's conquest of most of this territory. In

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669.SOA *SPLM/OLS Agreement on Ground Rules* 3 July 1995.

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txf=txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU&txq=SPLM%2FOLS+ground+rules+agreement&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU-----> (last accessed 23 October, 2023).

670.Ibid.

671.Ibid.

672.SOA *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, 1996* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=is&oid=LD19960000-01&type=staticpdf&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctXTI%7ctXAU-OLS+1996+REVIEW-----> 77-79

all likelihood, Garang's faction received external support in the form of arms and logistics from the United States' Clinton administration during this period. Washington's aid to SPLA-Mainstream was motivated by the former's foreign policy aimed at countering Khartoum's involvement with Islamic fundamentalist groups and their clandestine operations. Simultaneously, the US grants to NPA's operations in the Equatoria region encompassed 60 to 80 per cent of the NGO's annual budget from 1993 to 2005. Inevitably, hearsay spread that Washington used NPA, a staunch supporter of SPLA-Mainstream, as a conduit for smuggling ammunition to Garang's forces.<sup>673</sup>

However, Halle Hanssen, NPA's International Director and Secretary General in the South (1992-2001) argued that while moving aid items from Ethiopia and Uganda on behalf of NPA and other relief agencies, SPLA-Mainstream "exploited this situation by using its transportation company to move relief aid alongside arms into its controlled areas in the South."<sup>674</sup> These events contributed to the Garang faction's conquest of Western Equatoria and enhanced the SPLA-Mainstream's control over the region's security, creating a conducive environment for humanitarian agencies' activities.<sup>675</sup> The Mainstream faction further encouraged the development of economic activities in Western Equatoria by initiating and supporting the use of the old Sudanese pounds, popularly used during Nimeiry's administration (1969-1985). Furthermore, the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USAID supported AAIN, World Vision International (WVI) and CARE in expanding the bartering system in Western Equatoria. These three NGOs each received \$500,000 from OFDA for rehabilitating agricultural productivity by providing seeds, hand tools, and fishing nets for Southerners living and resettling in Western Equatoria.<sup>676</sup> WVI, AAIN, and CARE used this opportunity to create "barter shops" for exchanging blankets, clothes, jerrycans and other imported items for surplus agricultural produce cultivated by Western Equatoria farmers.<sup>677</sup>

Initiated towards the end of 1993, SPLA-Mainstream's bartering program allowed Southern farmers to exchange their food crops for farming equipment, seeds and essential paraphernalia provided by AAIN and its counterparts. These NGOs imported items such as soap, salt, clothes, mosquito nets, and cooking pots that were also exchanged for farm produce. In particular, the commencement of bartering in Western Equatoria, renowned for its agro-fecundity, increased the inhabitants' cultivation activities. Hitherto, during the civil war, the roads leading to the traditional markets of the Western Equatorial farmers in Juba, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Eastern Equatoria were insecure and impassable, hampering the distribution and marketing of farm produce. As a recourse,

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673. Terje Tvedt *The Nile History's Greatest River* (London: IB Tauris Bloomsbury Publishing Place, 2021), 166-167. Tvedt further argues that undoubtedly the United States smuggled arms to SPLA shipped through Ukrainian cargo vessels but hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia. *The Daily Telegraph*, a British Newspaper, and WikiLeaks uncovered these incidents.

674. Halle Jørn Hanssen *Lives At Stake: South-Sudan The Liberation Struggle* (Africa World Books, 2018), 187-207.

675. Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 245.

676. SAD.1031/2/1-145, Douglas H. Johnson *Operation Lifeline Sudan 1990, 1992-1996*.

677. Lual A. Deng *The Power of Creative Reasoning: The Ideas and Vision of John Garang* (Bloomington: IU Universe, Inc 2013), 27-28. Since Sudan's independence in 1956, the Sudanese pound was the recognized legal tender and was supplanted by the Sudanese dinar in 1992 coinciding with the use of pounds in SPLA-controlled areas. The use of the pounds among the Southerners ended in 2011, when South Sudan gained its independence and initiated the use of the South Sudanese Pound as its own legal tender. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese\\_pound](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_pound)

by 1994, NGOs operating in Western Equatoria transported its surplus agricultural produce to other Southern regions in need of food relief. From 1995, AAIN, CARE, and WVI served as the intermediary between Western Equatorian farmers and other relief agencies interested in the bartering scheme. Therefore, these NGOs played an important role in sustaining agricultural and economic activities within the SPLA-Mainstream controlled areas.<sup>678</sup>

During the initial phase of the bartering program, CARE and its counterparts exchanged their commodities for the Western Equatorian farmers' produce at designated bartering centers. However, as the quantity of bartered grains and the number of farmers involved in the exchange process increased, the participating NGOs revamped the exchange process by including SRRA as a supporting relief agency. Hence, SRRA monitored the activities of agricultural cooperatives delegated with the duty of checking the safety, quality, and weight of surplus food items provided by the Western Equatoria farmers. Additionally, the participating NGOs created many bartering centres, renovated stores for temporary storage of bartered commodities and transported them wherever they were needed. SRRA's participation in the bartering system strengthened its interdependent relationship with humanitarian agencies and exemplified the latter's support for SPLA-Mainstream.<sup>679</sup>

In some instances, the operation of the bartering system varied from one region to another. For example, in Tambura County in Western Equatoria, CARE allotted a specific bartering day for all chiefs when only farmers under those chiefs' authority could barter, supervised by CARE staff. After bartering, CARE transported all the sorghum, maize, and groundnuts to its central stores in Tambura, situated along Southern Sudan's borders with the Central African Republic and in Ezo, located on the South's border with Zaire (DRC).<sup>680</sup> Whereas, in Maridi and Yei counties, AAIN collaborated with the Episcopal Church of Sudan Department of Relief and Development (ECS/DRD), and agricultural cooperatives while facilitating its bartering scheme. In this process, on behalf of AAIN, ECS/DRD exchanged bartered items with farmers, and then ECS/DRD transferred AAIN's barter items to the cooperatives. Sometimes, ECS/DRD and agricultural cooperatives were delegated the responsibility of managing and storing surpluses of bartered food items in local stores.<sup>681</sup>

The barter scheme revamped Western Equatoria's moribund economy amid the civil war. The surplus agricultural commodities harvested by the region's cultivators gave them access to imported cultivation tools and seeds to facilitate farming activities and rehabilitate their society. Indeed, this development improved the food security in Yambio, Tambura, and Maridi counties located in Western Equatoria. The collective participation of the traditional chiefs, sub-chiefs, SRRA's agricultural coordinators, community cooperatives, and other local agencies in agricultural activities enhanced the distribution of goods between NGOs and Southern farmers during bartering. Thus, CARE and its counterparts facilitated the capacity building of Southern Sudan's customary institutions.<sup>682</sup> Through their cadre of Southern personnel, NGOs affiliated

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678.SAD.1031/2/1-145, Douglas H. Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan 1990; 1992-1996*.

679.*Ibid.*

680.*Ibid.*

681.*Ibid.*

682.*Ibid.*

with the barter program supported and developed “village level agricultural committees”, farms and cooperatives groups. Consequently, under the aegis of WVI, CARE, and AAIN many communities’ agricultural cooperatives were either established or revitalized in Western Equatoria. Relief agencies engaged in these agricultural and community cooperatives emphasized an extension of relief agencies functions from providing relief aid to enhancing socioeconomic and political development among the Southerners.<sup>683</sup>

In other parts of Southern Sudan, fighting among SPLA’s rival factions and clashes between SPLA-Mainstream and Khartoum’s forces hindered the implementation and efficacy of the barter system. For instance, compared to SPLA-Mainstream’s control over Western Equatoria, in Eastern Equatoria, the ongoing battle between Khartoum’s forces and the Mainstream faction persisted till 1999, compromising the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) humanitarian operations in the region. Notwithstanding, the Catholic Relief Service, Jesuit Relief Service, and the Diocese of Torit still aided the Southern IDPs situated in East Equatoria.<sup>684</sup> Additionally, fighting along the roads linking Western and Eastern Equatoria worsened by the destruction of bridges planting of landmines affected the communication and transportation in their localities. These problematic situations hindered Western Equatoria farmers from trading with other Southerners, including those situated in Bahr-el-Ghazal.<sup>685</sup>

Other factors, including Bahr-el-Ghazal’s remoteness from Lokichogio, the hub of OLS Southern Sector in Kenya, inhibited the relief operations within the territory. Additionally, from January to April, during the dry season, Bahr-el-Ghazal became accessible by road but during the rainy seasons, around July to October, the area’s roads became impassable due to flooding, and this affected the local Dinka’s farming and pastoral activities. Meanwhile, fighting among the SPLA rival factions, aggravated by continued cattle raiding within the Dinka and Nuer communities in Akon and other localities, worsened the situation in Bahr-el-Ghazal.<sup>686</sup> Compared to SPLA-Mainstream’s indisputable grip on Western Equatoria, in Bahr-el-Ghazal the GOS, SPLA-Mainstream, and SSIA wrestled for control over different parts of the area in the mid-1990s. These circumstances hindered the popularity of the barter system and the use of the old Sudanese pounds as legal tender within SPLA-Mainstream controlled localities in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Regardless of these challenges, NGOs and IOs still operated in the area.<sup>687</sup>

Against this backdrop, in Mayen Abun located in Bahr-el-Ghazal, the shortage of labour, lack of tools, insufficient seeds, and Kerubino Kuanyin’s forces’ frequent raids into the locale affected the prospect of developing the barter scheme and Save the Children Fund (SCF) humanitarian activities. The locality’s prevalent insecurity led to rustling and impeded the vaccination programs for cattle against rinderpest and other virulent infections. Thereby, the Dinka and Nuer’s livestock rapidly dwindled. Thus, Mayen Abun’s inhabitants became vulnerable to malnutrition and diseases

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683.*Ibid.*

684.SOA Simonse Simon *Conflict and Peace Initiative in East Bank Equatoria, South Sudan:1992-1999* 12 November 2000. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD20001112-01.1.1&srpos=18&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-pax+christi-----> (accessed 26 October, 2023).

685.SAD.1031/2/1-145, Douglas H. Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan 1990, 1992-1996*.

686.*Ibid.*

687.SAD.1034/3/1-175, Douglas Johnson, *Southern Sudan Agencies* created, 1992-2000.

such as guinea worm, tuberculosis, and diarrhoea. Despite these challenges, bartering of cows for grains occurred among the Southerners in the area's local markets but in localities such as Aweil area, crop failure and fighting among the belligerent forces made trading and relief operations difficult. To overcome these obstacles, airlifts became the primary means of providing relief aid for its inhabitants.<sup>688</sup>

To further mitigate food insecurity in Mayen Abun and other areas in Bahr-el-Ghazal, WFP supported NSCC, SRRA, local chiefs and sub-chiefs' formation of "Relief Committees" (RC). The RCs served as a liaison between the UN and the Southerners and distributed relief aid among the latter. Moreover, resolution nineteen of the Chukudum Conference of 1994 underscored the importance of community leaders, traditional rulers, and local and international organizations' roles in facilitating the development of the South. Thus, the RC became an embodiment of these objectives as local chiefs among the committee focused on solving rustling and famine-related issues. Women representatives were also elected as RC members based on their recognition as the breadwinners of their families during the war. Women among the RCs facilitated the identification of the most vulnerable groups before sharing relief aid. Other factors, including moral probity, generosity, and selflessness among community members, determined their election as RC members.<sup>689</sup>

Notwithstanding, several problems constrained RCs' activities including the difficulty of getting unanimous support among Southern communities especially from chiefs, and administrators, and SPLA's warring factions hindering the committees' relief operations. The failure of RC members, WFP, SRRA, RASS, and chiefs to meet regularly and deliberate on the expectations and roles of the committees created a communication gap among them. The inabilities of SRRA and RASS, the relief wings of SPLA-Mainstream and SSIA, respectively to adequately represent the Southerners' interest and to effectively communicate with NGOs and IOs also affected the RCs' operation.<sup>690</sup>

In the Upper Nile region, predominately controlled by Machar's SSIA forces, RASS, in collaboration with NGOs and IOs, formed the Joint Relief Committee (JRC) to manage the distribution of humanitarian aid. Compared with the problems of RC's, irregular meetings among JRC members weakened its operational capacity.<sup>691</sup> Nonetheless, Médecins San Frontier (MSF), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and other relief agencies provided humanitarian aid for the Dinka and Nuer situated in Ler, Adok, and other localities in the Upper Nile. From the start of the MSF operation in the Western Upper Nile in 1988, it focused mainly on health care services.<sup>692</sup>

By 1994, MSF and UNICEF facilitated the training of community health workers and the creation of health centers for the treatment of different ailments. Consequently, the cooperation

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688.*Ibid.*

689.SAD.1029/4/1-30, Doughlas Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, 1994-1995.

690.*Ibid.*

691.SAD.1028/9/1-95, Douglas Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan: Ler Women's Programme Annual Report* created, 1995-1996.

692.*Violence, Health, and Access to Aid in Unity State/Western Upper Nile, Sudan*, Report published by MSF Holland in April 2002. <https://www.msf.fr/sites/www.msf.fr/files/2002-04-01-MSFH.pdf> (accessed 2 November, 2023).

between humanitarian agencies and chiefs, church leaders, and RASS, and SSIA local commanders expedited the development of these relief operations in different vicinities. Meanwhile, NCA started self-help programs focused on skill acquisition and human resource development among women. Therefore, NCA's gardening program trained women on how to take care of their vegetable gardens and provided them with seeds, tools, and watering cans. Okra, cabbages, pumpkins, and carrots were cultivated by the participants. Through this means, women were expected to gradually depend less on food aid by providing for their own dietary needs. Highlighting their growing importance, NGOs and IOs collaborated with the SPLA factions to form various community groups, serving as a platform to preserve the symbiotic relationship between them.<sup>693</sup>

### ***HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN SPLA- CONTROLLED AREAS***

To undermine SPLA-Mainstream's victories and control over different parts of Southern Sudan, GOS signed the Political Charter of 1996 with Riek Machar's SSIM/A to sustain its influence in the South. Some of the clauses of the Charter included power and national wealth sharing between SSIA and GOS and collaboration between both parties for the stability and improvement of the Southerners' standard of living in war-affected territories.<sup>694</sup> Afterwards, in April 1997, SSIA and Khartoum incorporated the Political Charter into a Khartoum Peace Agreement they both acknowledged and signed with other Southern rebels. Consequently, this development led to the amalgamation of government garrison towns with SSIA-controlled areas in the Upper Nile and guarded by Southern factions allied with GOS.<sup>695</sup>

These events stimulated UNICEF and NGOs' collaborative humanitarian activities within the Upper Nile environs, encouraging the return of displaced Dinka and Nuer to their homes. Accordingly, in Malakal, relief agencies identified vulnerable groups needing humanitarian assistance. They also organized national immunization days for polio eradication and planned sanitation activities in Malakal town. Additionally, the concerted efforts among humanitarian organizations were reinforced by their weekly meetings with GOS officials, facilitating the review of their operations and they discussing solutions to the problems they encountered among vulnerable groups. These activities boosted the achievements of relief agencies in the Upper Nile. Therefore, the locality's immunization figure increased by 300 per cent compared to the previous year. The use of different means of transportation coupled with the combined efforts among stakeholders to revamp the health sector enhanced the involvement of local communities. Nevertheless, the inaccessibility of Unity and Jonglei areas from Malakal, the ineffectiveness of the primary health care system, shortage of medications, low levels of community participation,

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693. SAD.1028/9/1-95 Douglas Johnson, *Operation Lifeline Sudan: Ler Women's Programme Annual Report*, created 1995-1996.

694. SAD.1035/6/38 Douglas H. Johnson Human Rights Reports, created 1987-2001.

695. *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003 ),170-180. Other signatories to the Peace Agreement included Commander Kerubino leader of SPLA-Bahr-el Gahzal, Commander Kwac Makuei Mayar of South Sudan Independence Group, Dr Thisphohis Ochang Loti of the Equatoria Defense Force, and others.

and inadequate means of transportation compromised the efficacy of humanitarian activities throughout the Upper Nile.<sup>696</sup>

Meanwhile, the presence of humanitarian agencies in Upper Nile coincided with the Sudanese government interest in intensifying oil exploration in the region. Hitherto, in 1974, the GOS granted Chevron oil company the concession to operate in Upper Nile areas such as Bentiu. However, the prevalent insecurity in the South deterred Chevron from persisting with its operation. By February 1997, multinational oil companies, such as Sweden's Lundin and its counterparts, entered into agreements with Khartoum and revived oil operations in Western Upper Nile. These exploration ventures led to Sudan's first major export of 600,000 barrels of crude oil to Singapore in August 1999. Amid this development, Riek Machar's SSIM/A, renamed as South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), vied with the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUA), headed by Major General Paul Matiep, for control of Western Upper Nile and other oil-producing areas.<sup>697</sup>

Fighting among the rebel forces escalated the insecurity in the Upper Nile, endangering its inhabitants. By May 5, 1998, while operating within government garrisoned towns in Bentiu and Mayom, CARE reported that about 20,000 Southerners fled these war-riddled areas, which became inaccessible to aid workers. Consequently, on July 7, 1998, MSF declared that the prevalent insecurity in Western Upper Nile hindered the delivery of urgently needed food assistance. Eventually, the incessant battle among the belligerents forced MSF, WFP, and other humanitarian agencies to evacuate their premises while Khartoum forces looted them. Thus, relief agencies' health programs created to tackle the spread of Kalaazar, and tuberculosis were halted.<sup>698</sup>

Reacting to these crises, WFP appealed to the international community to urgently persuade the combatants to end the conflict in the Upper Nile. Ler, formerly a hub for relief agencies, became a ghost town given the ravages of Southern militia forces in the locality as its homes, schools, and medical centers were destroyed. According to WFP, around 24,000 cattle were stolen from Upper Nile's inhabitants, depriving many families of any assets to trade and barter for their essential needs. Subsequently, by December 1999, when the conflict reached the oil field areas, about 70,500 Southerners in Unity became IDPs and in dire need of humanitarian assistance.<sup>699</sup>

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696.SOA UNICEF/OLS Malakal January-June 1997 Report <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND19970600-01.1.1&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-unicef+northern+sector+1997-----> (accessed 4 November 2023).

697. *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 170-180.

698. *Ibid.*, 204-210.

699. *Ibid.*, 416-420. Luke Patey's *The New Kings of Crude: China, India, and The Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan* (London: Hurst and Company, 2014), examines the genesis and factors that determined Chevron, Lundin, and other multinational companies' oil exploration activities in South Sudan. From 1970s to 2013, events including the National Aeronautics and Space (NASA) Landsat satellite images in 1972 led to the discovery and commencement of Chevron's oil exploration activities in the South hampered by the civil war. In the mid-1990s, Western and Asian oil companies such as China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC), Lundin, Talisman oil company, based in Calgary Alberta, and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (ONGC) and others were some of the multinationals engaged in oil exploration and exportation in collaboration with Khartoum. However, in the late 1990s, Western oil companies relinquished their interest in Sudan due to the Civil War and allegations of human rights abuses against al-Bashir's government. Afterwards, Asian multinational oil companies such as Sinopec became the major operators of South Sudan's oil and gas industry even after its independence on July 11, 2011.

Amid these upheavals, Amnesty International (AI) expressed concerns about the violation of the Southerners' human rights perpetrated by Sudanese state security forces operating along the oil field areas. In Bentiu, Khartoum's troops forced Southerners out of their homes while the male villagers among them were killed in mass executions, just as women and children were nailed to trees with iron spikes. These attacks and dehumanizing treatments of Southerners were prompted by Khartoum's need to gain control over oil-rich areas. Moreover, the invasion of these areas led to the destruction of harvests, looting of livestock, and military occupation of civilian localities, causing famine in these areas and discouraging the return of the displaced population.<sup>700</sup>

These humanitarian catastrophes were highlighted by NSCC, Christian Aid and other human rights groups to prove that Khartoum's oil exploration interest in the Upper Nile infringed on the human rights of Southerners based in the region. Concomitantly, the GOS's accrued oil revenue from multinational companies operating in the Upper Nile increased from \$799.9 million in 1999 to \$370.0 billion in 2001. As such, from 2000 to 2001, the Sudanese government's defence expenditure soared from \$250.9 to 345million. Thus, Khartoum used these oil revenues to purchase twenty-two armored combat vehicles, twelve attack helicopters and ammunition from Russia. Concurrently, the GOS used Sudan's oil proceeds to invest in the development of its domestic arms industry by building factories to produce tanks and missiles.<sup>701</sup>

This development coincided with the collapse of the relationship between Machar's SSDF and Khartoum, compromising the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997. Nevertheless, the GOS continued providing AK-47 assault rifles and PKM machine guns to Matiep's SSUM and other Southern rebel factions based in the Upper Nile region. Inevitably, the Western Upper Nile vicinity became insecure as hostilities among rival factions forced the displacement of IOs and NGOs operating in Ler. In other parts of the Upper Nile, humanitarian agencies evacuated their staff and neglected their long-term projects. In other parts of the South, relief agencies persisted in their activities despite the security challenges they encountered.<sup>702</sup>

For many humanitarian agencies, the inoperable situation of the Upper Nile compounded by its insecurity galvanized relief organizations' reports about the dehumanization of Southern Sudanese within this territory. In this regard, in March 2001, Christian Aid's exposé *The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan* highlighted that Khartoum connived with its allies among the Southern rebels in the Upper Nile to enhance the security and development of oil exploration by Lundin, a Swedish oil company. In April 1999, Lundin discovered around 300 million barrels of oil in Thar Jath, prompting Khartoum to move its troops into the area to displace Southerners in the locality. By March 2000, Southern rival factions fought for control over Thar Jath, leading to the suspension of Lundin's drilling activities which resumed in January 2001. During the ten months of Lundin's suspension of its operation, SAF and Southern militia allied with Khartoum depopulated and expanded Lundin's oilfield in areas around Thar Jath. Christian Aid reported that Nuer civilians living in the territory were scattered and displaced into Bahr-el-Ghazal after SAF Antonov aircraft

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700.SAD.1035/6/1-54 Justice Africa *Papers of Human Rights/Political Organization* created, 1980s-2000s.

701. *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 460-470.

702. SOA Georgette Gagnon and John Ryle *Report of An Investigation into Oil Development, Conflict and Displacement in Western Upper Nile* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=UNEP20010000-01.1.2&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-report+of+an+investigation-----> (accessed November 6, 2023).



bombed their villages and communities. Aid workers operating in Upper Nile corroborated these reports, observing the destruction of villages and areas where they formerly provided humanitarian assistance for the Southerners.<sup>703</sup>

Eyewitness accounts from a local Nuer chief recounted that government troops airlifted into Thar Jath burnt villages along Lundin's oil road and shot residents. Many of the area's inhabitants fled and found sanctuary in the forest, subsisting on wild fruits.<sup>704</sup> Before the civil war, these Nuer communities engaged in cultivation, fishing, and cattle-herding to sustain themselves. However, the civil war and Lundin's oil exploration disrupted these economic activities, making the Nuer more dependent on food aid provided by IOs and NGOs while undermining their capacity for self-sufficiency.<sup>705</sup> These catastrophic events in the Upper Nile prompted Christian Aid to challenge Carl Bildt, the former Swedish Conservative Prime Minister (1991-1994) and a board member of Lundin, about relinquishing his position as the U.N. special envoy to the Balkans. These occurrences incited criticism from the Swedish media against Lundin's activities in Southern Sudan, while other shareholders of the oil company sold their stakes as these controversies escalated.<sup>706</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the prevalent insecurity in the Upper Nile affected Lundin's oil exploration activities. After the Khartoum Peace Agreement collapsed, the Southern rebels clashed over the control of oil blocks. The Southern militias' fickle allegiance to either SPLA-Mainstream or the GOS worsened the Upper Nile's insecurity that spread into Bahr-el-Ghazal. In some instances, Khartoum's loyalists among Southern forces clashed with Machar's fighters, and these skirmishes were complicated by SAF's intervention over the control and protection of Lundin's drilling operation. By January 2000, Machar's RASS officers exploited the Upper Nile's tenuous security situation by claiming to provide humanitarian assistance for Southerners in the region as a means of gaining support from IOs and NGOs.<sup>707</sup>

RASS achieved these machinations by using its radio system, a rare resource among relief agencies operating in the Upper Nile, to coordinate humanitarian aid with other aid groups. Therefore, Machar's SSDF created the misleading impression of controlling large areas of the Upper Nile, leading to the manipulation of relief aid. Eventually, RASS officers' inability to accompany OLS airlifts into territories controlled by rival groups in the Upper Nile revealed deception.<sup>708</sup> Nevertheless, RASS sustained its relief operation in some counties among the Nuer in the Jikany area while the SPLA-Mainstream's SRRA operated in only a few places in the same locality. Hence, SRRA and RASS assisted SCF, WFP, and OXFAM in facilitating their humanitarian activities by gathering information about the food crisis and coping mechanisms of the Jikany Nuer. SRRA and RASS also assisted aid agencies in identifying vulnerable and disadvantaged groups of children and recorded their physical and psychosocial needs and access

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703. SAD.1035/6/1-54 Justice Africa *Papers of Human Rights/Political Organization* created, 1980s-2000s.

704. Ibid.

705. Katarzyna Grabska *Gender, Home, and Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan* (New York: James Currey, 2014), 46-122.

706. *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 447-600.

707. Ibid.

708. Ibid.

to education. Accordingly, these activities sustained the interdependent relationship between SPLA factions and relief agencies while the latter planned humanitarian operations based on the reports provided by the former.<sup>709</sup>

SRRA officials facilitated humanitarian assistance for the inhabitants of Gumriak and Ruweng in the Upper Nile. Compared with other localities in the Upper Nile, fighting between SPLA-Mainstream and Khartoum forces led to the disruption and evacuation of Medair and UNICEF operations in Gumriak and Ruweng. Notwithstanding, SRRA's fieldwork provided relief agencies with details about the survival strategies of Ruweng's inhabitants and how flooding, shortage of seeds, and rodent infestation of food crops affected the food security of Dinka and Nuer living in the locality.<sup>710</sup>

The devastation caused by fighting in the oil-producing area of the Upper Nile region spread into proximate areas, including Aweil, situated in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Within Aweil, the battles between SPLA-Mainstream and Khartoum forces and unabated rustling worsened the region's incidence of food insecurity. Nevertheless, SCF, NCA, and Bahr-el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency (BYDA), a SINGO, delivered different kinds of relief aid for Southerners in Aweil.<sup>711</sup> Within the government-held areas in Aweil, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) stayed behind their barricades. At the same time, ethnic Arab Misseriya militias and other Southern rebels, recruited by Khartoum, launched a ground attack against SPLA-Mainstream's troops causing the evacuation and relocation of NGOs and IOs. Indeed, Khartoum-backed militia forces, called the Popular Defense Force (PDF) and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol's fighters used this opportunity to target and disrupt OLS relief centers, undermining the delivery of aid to the Southerners. Notwithstanding Aweil's security challenges, the reoccurring cases of abduction and enslavement of Southern Sudanese in its locale and other parts of Bahr-el-Ghazal spurred the interest of Christian Solidarity International (CSI), a human rights NGO, on this issue.<sup>712</sup>

After receiving unconfirmed reports about the occurrence of slavery in Southern Sudan, John Eibner, CSI's director, travelled to the region. Soon Eibner visited Nyamliel and witnessed Khartoum's Popular Defense Forces (PDF) enslavement of women and children. The PDF also burnt houses and looted cattle and grain, thereby aggravating the famine among the Dinka and Nuer living in Nyamliel. Meanwhile, the possibility of redeeming enslaved Southerners from their captors galvanized CSI's collaboration with Crossroads International, a Canadian IO focused on promoting the rights of women and girls and reducing poverty. The redeeming process involved buying back enslaved Southerners from their captors then freeing them. Through a CSI and CI joint effort around seven hundred Southern Sudanese were emancipated from their enslavers

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709. SOA *Western Upper Nile Mission, from March 18 to 30 2000*.

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txq=western+upper+nile+assessment&dafdq=&dafmq=&dafyq=&datdq=&datmq=&datyq=&ssnip=txt&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CxtTI%7CxtAU-western+upper+nile+regional+review-----> (accessed November 7, 2023).

710. Ibid.

711. SOA Peter N. Adwok *Report on the Trade Consultancy Conducted in Northern Bahr el Ghazal*

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD20020701-01.1.30&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-northern+bahr+el+ghazal-----> (accessed November 9, 2023).

712. Fergus Boyle, *Under Shading Trees: Twenty Years in The Sudans* (Ontario: Independently Published, 2019), 110-175.

through private donations from Canada and Europe. However, critics of the emancipation process still maintained that it encouraged the enslavement of the Southerners.<sup>713</sup>

CSI also presented the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva and the US congressional committees' evidence of slavery in Sudan and atrocities committed by Khartoum's militia forces. Consequently, CSI's advocacy generated international media coverage in *Time Magazine*, *The Times*, *Le Monde*, and *Reader's Digest*.<sup>714</sup> Additionally, CSI facilitated Arab-Dinka dialogues by visiting theocratic leaders in the North such as Mubarak El Fadil El Mahdi, a Muslim religious leader and general secretary of Sudan's National Democratic Alliance. Hamad Salih and Ahmed Ogeil, prominent leaders of Misseriya and Baggara Arabs, were also visited by CSI and accompanied by Bona Malwal, a renowned Dinka leader among the Southerners. During these meetings, the Dinka leaders affirmed their commitment towards peaceful coexistence with their Northern brothers. Similarly, the Northerners committed to amicable and congenial relations with the Southerners. Both groups reported that after the commencement of CSI's anti-slavery campaign, Khartoum's attempt to recruit militia forces became difficult, therefore resorting to conscription of school students.<sup>715</sup>

Indeed, Wau, a government-controlled town situated in Bahr-el-Ghazal, became the training area for Southern youths conscripted into Khartoum's militia forces. Most of these enlisted youths were students from the University of Bahr-el-Ghazal and Wau's College of Education, while other recruits were in their teenage years. Apart from training in military marching and wielding weapons, these conscripts were subjected to Islamic indoctrination by attending lectures of religious clerics and studying the Quran. Although the Christians among these draftees were exempted from these religious activities, they were still expected to participate in "Jihad" or the holy war against the Southerners. In fact, by 1997, this training became mandatory for Wau's inhabitants and civil servants. By late January 1998, Wau's PDF university students were ready for combat against SPLA-Mainstream forces.<sup>716</sup>

Pro-government forces controlled by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol were also stationed in Wau and separated from Khartoum's regular forces. Between December 1997 and January 1998, based on his intent of gaining political control over Wau, Bol and SPLA-Mainstream orchestrated a Trojan Horse plan, leading to the ostensible defection of Mainstream's forces to Bol's rebel group. However, Khartoum unraveled these machinations, leading to a violent conflict among the belligerents in the territory. As a reprisal for Mainstream's operation, Khartoum reinvoked its airlift ban on all OLS operations in Bahr-el-Ghazal and other parts of the Southern regions.<sup>717</sup> Against this backdrop, the GOS aerial bombing of relief centers, the rise in prices of essential commodities, and the widespread drought caused Bahr-el-Ghazal's famine in 1998 prompting its Dinka and Nuer population to migrate to the Equatoria region. Furthermore, OLS highlighted that the collection of

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713.SOA *Draft Preliminary Report-Slavery in Sudan* Caroline Cox and John Eibner <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txf=txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU&txq=csi&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU-----> (accessed November 9, 2023).

714.Ibid.

715.Ibid.

716.*Famine in Sudan, 1998: The Human Right Causes* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) 49-86.

717.Ibid.

“Tayeen,” a form of food tax collected from the Southerners by local chiefs in tandem with SPLA-Mainstream commanders, aggravated Bahr-el-Ghazal’s food insecurity. While the famine crisis percolated, the collection of Tayeen continued among the Southerners regardless of their economic situation, prompting relief agencies’ complaints about the food tax system.<sup>718</sup>

Since the inception of the civil war, the *Tayeen* system served as a means of providing food for SPLA forces deployed within their communities. SPLA and SRRA officials acknowledged that allowing traditional chiefs to facilitate the collection of food taxation led to the focus on vulnerable Southerners during the collection process. Eventually, this circumstance affected Bahr-el-Ghazal’s food security and compromised the “Tayeen” tax system. Also, SRRA, SPLA-Mainstream, and an OLS task force collectively investigated problems that hampered humanitarian operations during the 1998 famine. In the process, they observed that OLS insufficient funds, its delayed response to the famine crises, and disputes with SRRA over accurate population figures escalated the famine and humanitarian crises.<sup>719</sup> Additionally, fighting between Khartoum and SPLA-Mainstream forces hindered the supply and monitoring of relief aid among the Southerners in Bahr-el-Ghazal. These instances were evident by the attacks on relief agencies operating in the territory, causing the looting of relief items and the haphazard evacuation of humanitarian workers. Consequently, IOs and NGOs could not reach Southerners in Nyamliel, and other localities affected by the tumultuous situation.<sup>720</sup>

Despite these humanitarian challenges, the famine of 1998 marked the inception of SPLA-Mainstream, SRRA, and OLS collaboration known as OLS task force, based on the Ground Rules of 1995, in investigating the causes of food insecurity in the South. Besides, the task force created a platform for concerted interaction between OLS and SPLM/A-Mainstream since aid organizations needed the latter’s assistance with the delivery and distribution of aid items. Concurrently, relief packages provided by various IOs and NGOs to Southerners in SPLA-Mainstream-held areas sustained the liberation army’s control over its territories. The OLS task force also engaged in criticizing all the stakeholders involved in coordinating humanitarian activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal, leading to SPLA-Mainstream’s acknowledgment of the Tayeen

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718. Ibid, 190-121. Luka Biong Deng Kuol’s *Why Does Famine Persist in Africa?: The Case of South Sudan and Sudan Famine in 1998* (Milton Keynes: Africa World Books, 2021) 95-101, examines the remote and immediate causes of famine in Sudan from the 1880s to 1997. In addition to some of the causes already highlighted, Kuol argues that El-Nino, a climate change phenomenon relating to changes in the the ocean current, which affects the health of aquatic animals and the weather pattern of different parts of the world and caused a heavy rainfall and prolonged drought, aggravating the famine crisis in Bahr-el-Ghazal in 1998. National Geographic *El-Nino* <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/el-nino/> (accessed November 11, 2023).

719. SOA SPLM/SRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and Vulnerabilities Task Force Final Report, August 27 1998 <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=is&oid=ND19980827-01&type=staticpdf&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-TAYEEN-----> (accessed November 11, 2023).

720. SOA SPLA/SRRA-OLS Joint Assessment and Task Force Follow Up Mission: Final Report June 2 1999 <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND19990602-01.1.14&srpos=3&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-TAYEEN-----> (accessed November 11, 2023).

system problem. Hence, these events underscored OLS's emerging role in monitoring SPLA-Mainstream, and its relief wing SRRA in facilitating relief operations in the South.<sup>721</sup>

Issues affecting OLS's operation during the advent of the 1998 famine were also examined by the OLS task force. This included the ineffectiveness of relief agencies in disseminating information about the participation of local community members in facilitating the delivery of relief aid. Other highlighted problems encompassed the provision of inadequate seeds and tools by UNICEF, inadequate enlightenment of OLS staff on the humanitarian principles of 1995, and the inherent weakness of Bahr-el-Ghazal's relief committees. Overall, the findings of the task force underlined the obstacles encountered in providing relief aid for the Southerners during the food and humanitarian crises of 1998.<sup>722</sup>

To avert the recurrence of the humanitarian crisis of 1998 in the areas it occupied, Garang's faction imposed more control over IOs and NGOs through its memorandum of understanding (MOU). Moreover, Bahr-el-Ghazal's upheaval instigated fighting between SPLA-Mainstream and SSIM forces compromising their commitment with OLS on the Ground Rules of 1995 therefore necessitating its policy replacement with the MOU. Although SRRA and individual aid organizations were expected to sign the MOU, their reluctance to recognize SRRA's new terms for relief operations delayed its implementation. The MOU emphasized the Mainstream faction's unrestrained capacity to supervise the operation of humanitarian agencies and demand payment for their landing of aircraft within the areas it controlled.<sup>723</sup>

The relief agencies and OLS donors perceived the MOU as SPLA-Mainstream's means of controlling humanitarian agencies operating within its occupied areas. However, the Mainstream faction countered this argument by emphasizing that its democratic principles, and the Southerners' popular choice shaped the liberation army's initiation of the MOU. Unavoidably, the controversial debates about the new modalities for relief agencies' operation in SPLA-Mainstream-held localities compromised SRRA's interdependent relationship with IOs and NGOs. Therefore, aid organizations refused to acknowledge SRRA's new relief agenda as it compromised their neutrality. CARE, OXFAM, SCF, and World Vision challenged SPLA-Mainstream with their decision not to sign the MOU and were requested to leave Mainstream controlled areas. However,

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721. SOA Mark Bradbury et al *Humanitarian Policy Group The Agreement on Ground Rules in South Sudan: Study in: The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice* (London, Overseas Development Institute 2000)

722. SOA *SPLA/SRRA-OLS Joint Assessment and Task Force Follow Up Mission: Final Report* June 2 1999 <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND19990602-01.1.14&srpos=3&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-TAYEEN-----> (accessed November 11, 2023)

723. SAD.1035/6//1-54 Douglas Johnson *Human Rights Reports*. Creation date 1987-2001. Famine in Sudan, 1998: The Human Rights Causes Report emphasizes that throughout the famine period Riek Machar's SSIM/A remained Khartoum's ally. In fact, Machar's appointees were selected as governors of Wau and other government-controlled areas aggravating Machar's feud with Kerubino who also aspired for the governorship in Khartoum held areas in Bahr-el-Ghazal prompting Kerubino's allegiance with SPLA-Mainstream. These incidents compromised SPLA-Mainstream and SSIA commitment to the humanitarian principles of the 1995 Ground Rules.

around June 2000, SPLA-Mainstream permitted these NGOs to return to their respective areas of operations as by then more than twenty IOs and NGOs had signed the MOU.<sup>724</sup>

In the process of resolving the MOU controversy, UN officials met with SPLA-Mainstream, SRRA, OLS, and NGO officials. By March 2000, while meeting with senior SPLA-Mainstream and SRRA officials, the UN representatives were reassured that any requests from humanitarian agencies to resume their operations in Southern Sudan would be immediately considered and objectively reviewed. Concomitantly, SPLA reaffirmed its commitment to OLS humanitarian principles as well as the DOP Agreement of 1994 under the aegis of IGADD. Canada, Germany, and other international donors indicated their intent to stop funding NGO projects if the MOU issues were not resolved. These occurrences shaped SPLA-Mainstream's conciliatory approach toward the implementation of its relief policies among humanitarian organizations. Moreover, the MOU incidents portrayed relief agencies' capacity to influence policies within SPLA-Mainstream's controlled areas.<sup>725</sup>

### *The Peace Efforts by IOs, NGOs and SINGOs*

Towards the end of the 1990s, fighting among the Southern belligerents became a major obstacle to the peaceful resolution of the civil war and the delivery of relief aid to Southern Sudanese. Thus, aid agencies' concerns about these issues galvanized their proactive roles in the conflict resolution process among the warring factions, widening the roles of IOs, NGOs, and SINGOs beyond providing relief aid. This development was spurred by the UN's July 1998 report compiled by Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian diplomat and the UN's Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (1998-2003). Based on Mello's findings, the Sudanese civil war and drought related causes led to the death and displacement of around 5.5 million persons in Sudan, making it the epicenter of global relief crises at this point. In particular, the disastrous circumstances of Southerners situated in Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Upper Nile induced UN officials to reexamine OLS's effectiveness and the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan. Moreover, the persistent fighting in different parts of the North coincided with the South's reoccurring tragic incidents compelling OLS to launch its largest relief operation in Sudan in 1998. However, restricted access to conflict prone localities, and shortage of funding constrained OLS activities among the Southerners.<sup>726</sup>

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724. Zoe Marriage, *Not Breaking The Rules Not Playing The Game: International Assistance To Countries at War* (London: C. Hurston & CO, 2006), 139-148.

725. UNARMS Office for The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) January-June 2000 Reference Code S-1092-0110-04-00006 <https://search.archives.un.org/informationobject/browse?topLod=0&sort=relevance&query=S-1092-0110-04-00006> (accessed November 13, 2023).

726. UNARMS OCHA Reference Code S-1092-0128-00017 July-September 1998 <https://search.archives.un.org/s-1092-0128-08-00017> (accessed November 18, 2023). Sergio Vieira de Mello, a renowned Brazilian diplomat, started his career as UNHCR's editor in 1969. Through this opportunity, Mello became involved in humanitarian operations in different parts of the world including the Bangladesh War of Independence in 1971 and in Sudan following the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972). In fact, the Sudanese government honored Mello with the Order of the Two Niles, a state decoration given to Sudanese and foreigners who

Constant pressure from the international community eventually led to several ceasefire agreements among Khartoum, SPLA-Mainstream and other Southern factions in Bahr-el-Ghazal. On July 15, 1998, Derek Fatchett, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister (1997-1999), assisted by relief agencies operating in the South, achieved three-months cessations of hostilities among Bahr-el-Ghazal's belligerents.<sup>727</sup> Subsequently, through the instrumentality of IGAD, Fatchett, Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary General, (1997-2006) and other concerned parties, Khartoum and SPLA-Mainstream extended their armistice in Bahr-el-Ghazal for another three months. In addition, Garang's faction included Western Upper Nile as part of its recognized safe zones to facilitate aid programs for Southerners. At the same time, the GOS exempted the Upper Nile and Equatoria from its recognized safe zone regions. The battle between the forces of Garang and Khartoum continued in these territories.<sup>728</sup>

The possibility of maintaining and spreading the ceasefire agreement throughout the Southern regions became a major concern for relief agencies. In early October 1998, CARE, Oxfam, MSF, and Save the Children Fund (SCF), the four largest humanitarian agencies operating in Sudan or the "Big Four," communicated with Kofi Anan about Sudan's humanitarian situation. Accordingly, CARE's secretary general Guy Tousignant broached the possibility of debriefing members of the UN's Security Council about Sudan's looming crisis if the ceasefire among the belligerents was not sustained and expanded. Focused on these objectives, CARE and its counterparts consistently facilitated dialogue with top government officials in Khartoum, SPLA-Mainstream, UN officials, and other governments concerned about Sudan's civil war.<sup>729</sup> Eventually, representatives of the Big Four agencies engaged in Sudan met with the Security Council's members and expressed their indignation about the catastrophic and dehumanizing conditions encountered by the Northern and Southern Sudanese afflicted by the war. They emphasized that the peaceful resolution of the civil war was the only way to prevent further humanitarian crises.<sup>730</sup>

The Big Four relief agencies further underlined the need to extend the ceasefire in Bahr-el-Ghazal to other Southern and Northern regions in Sudan. Mark Rainer Bowden, SCF Regional Director for East and Central Africa, reemphasized the exigency of an effective peace process focused on mitigating the violent conflicts in every part of the Sudanese society and at all levels. Additionally, SCF and its counterparts urged the United Nations to enhance the humanitarian community's ability to respond to famine by facilitating and sustaining unhindered access to all

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have provided great services to the state. In 2003, Mello was killed during a bombing while on a UN Mission in Iraq. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A9rgio\\_Vieira\\_de\\_Mello](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A9rgio_Vieira_de_Mello) (November 18, 2023).

727. *Famine in Sudan*, 1998, 124-126.

728. UNARMS *Countries 1998-Sudan* Reference Code S-1096-0352-09-00026 <https://search.archives.un.org/s-1096-0325-09-00026> (November 18, 2023).

729. UNARMS *NGOs-NGO General ABC* 1998 created, March 31, 1998, Reference Code: S-1096-0326-13-00023. <https://search.archives.un.org/s-1096-0326-13-00023> (accessed November 18, 2023). Born in Quebec, Guy Tousignant was promoted to the position of a Major-General in the Canadian Army in 1993 and appointed as the Commandant of the National Defense College in the same year. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide (April 1994 to July 1994) Tousignant served as the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission of Rwanda (UNMIR) from August 1994 to December 1995 and thereafter he became CARE's Secretary General.

730. SAD.1035/6/44 Douglas Johnson *Human Rights Reports* created, 1987-2001.

Sudanese in need of relief assistance.<sup>731</sup> Jean Marie Kindermans, Secretary General of MSF, further stressed that the conflict and famine in Southern Sudan escalated the mortality rate, especially in inaccessible areas due to the insecurity and conflicting policies of the warring factions in these territories. Thus, unrestricted access to every part of the South was required to save more lives from the effects of famine and war.<sup>732</sup> CARE reinforced its pressure on the UN by imploring Madame Louise Fréchette, deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations (1998-2006), to consistently pressure the UN, Khartoum, and other concerned parties for a political settlement to the civil war.<sup>733</sup>

Nonetheless, Bahr-el-Ghazal's short-lived truce provided IOs, NGOs, and SINGOs with the opportunity to deliver relief aid and participate in the actualization of the Wunlit peace and reconciliation conference. Held between February and March 1999 in Bahr-el-Ghazal, the peace conference focused on "reconciliation and peacebuilding between the Dinka and Nuer communities."<sup>734</sup> Through the financial and logistical support provided by Christian Aid, USAID, NSCC, World Vision, World Council of Churches (WCC) and other external donors, the Wunlit Conference commenced around February 1999. NSCC played an instrumental role in gathering around 1500 Southerners in Wunlit village based on its recognition as the midway point between the Dinka and Nuer making the locality apt for the peace conference. The conference participants included church leaders, SPLA commanders, Southern women, international journalists, traditional chiefs and spiritual leaders among the Dinka and Nuer from the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile region.<sup>735</sup>

The Wunlit conference's main agenda focused on resolving intra-ethnic conflicts among the Dinka and interethnic feuds between the Dinka and Nuer. These issues were discussed and resolved among the meetings' participants reinforced by an agreement among Dinka and Nuer chiefs to promote and sustain peaceful relations among themselves. Part of the peace process involved spiritual leaders from both ethnic groups invoking their ancestors complemented with the slaughtering of white bulls eaten by the conference attendees signifying their pledge for peace. Simultaneously, church leaders and their congregations prayed while these traditional rites were observed. Dinka and Nuer women among these attendees stayed in different quarters but they

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731.Ibid, Mark Bowden, a British diplomat, has participated in different humanitarian activities in many countries. He served as the Director of Civil Affairs during the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and worked as the Conflict Management Adviser for Africa in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in UK from 1999 to 2001. UNARMS Department of Field Support <https://search.archives.un.org/s-1953-0022-0006-00002> (accessed November 19,2023)

732.Ibid.

733.UNARMS NGOs-NGO General ABC 1998 created March 1998-December 1998.

<https://search.archives.un.org/s-1096-0326-13-00017> (accessed November 19, 2023) Madame Louise Frechette served as a Canadian diplomat prior her duties as the deputy secretary general of the UN from 1998 to 2006. During her career in the Public Service of Canada, Madame Louise became Canada's Ambassador to Argentina and Uruguay (1985-1988), and later appointed as the Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN (1992-1994). Later in June 2016 she was elected as Chair of the new CARE's international Supervisory Board after joining the board of CARE Canada Board in 2007. [https://www.care-international.org/files/files/M\\_Frechette%20bio.pdf](https://www.care-international.org/files/files/M_Frechette%20bio.pdf)

734.UNARMS Countries-Sudan 1999 <https://search.archives.un.org/s-1096-0268-05-00010> (November 20, 2023)

735. Naomi Ruth Pendle *Spiritual Contestations: The Violence of Peace in South Sudan* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2023) 99-101.



fostered interaction among themselves by coordinating social activities together including cooking and cleaning the conference venue.<sup>736</sup>

The NSCC organizing committee facilitated the Wunlit peace talks by assigning people roles in social events. Moreover, NSCC communicated and coordinated with Garang's and Machar's SPLA factions to maintain a stable security situation while the Southerners convened. Meanwhile, SINGOs such as Bahr-el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency (BYDA) also assisted NSCC in mobilizing around 300 Southerners who constructed new roads, airstrips, halls, houses, and assisted with the provision cooking paraphernalia during the conference.<sup>737</sup> Some of outcomes of the Wunlit conference included the return of 148 abducted children and women to their families while stolen cattle were also returned to their owners. The peace conference also prompted the creation of a Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace Council instituted to resolve communal conflicts and issues. Based on their commitment to the peace treaty, the Dinka community accommodated around 20,000 displaced Nuer affected by Western Upper Nile's upheaval.<sup>738</sup>

By 2001, the realization of the Wunlit peace process prompted the formation of the Wunlit Assessment Team (WAT) comprising officials from OLS, UNICEF, WFP, BYDA, NSCC, SRRA and Tearfund, a Scottish based ecumenical NGO. WATs' officials analyzed the Southerners' commitment to the Wunlit peace talks in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Western Upper Nile and observed the impediments to the observance of the Wunlit Agreement between the Dinka and Nuer. WAT also provided reports about Western Upper Nile's displaced persons in different Southern areas by sending its officials to Bahr-el-Ghazal and other Southern localities where they noted cordial relation between Western Upper Niles' IDPs and their host communities. In some cases, the non-implementation of the Wunlit recommendations was caused by the lack of social amenities and services required for the resettlement of returnees and displaced persons. Competition and dispute over scarce resources between host communities and IDPs, fomenting cattle rustling among displaced Nuer in Tonj county situated in Bahr-el-Ghazal compromised the prospect of peace among the Southerners. WAT monitored the provision of cooking utensils, water containers,

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736. SOA Chief Dhal Anei, *Oral History of the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference of 1999*, interviewed by Chirilo Madut and Malek Henry Chuor September 30, 2019. <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=OLITV20190930-01.1.4&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-Chief+Anei+Dhal+by+Malek-----> (accessed November 20, 2023). Sharon Elaine Hutchinson's "Peace and Puzzlement: Grass-roots Peace Initiatives Between the Nuer and Dinka of South Sudan" in *Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa* (ed) Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 49-71, thoroughly examines how the humanitarian catastrophe in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Western Upper Nile in the late 1990s prompted the Wunlit conference. Hutchinson also compares the differences between Garang and Machar's posture towards the organization of the conference. Among the participating Dinka and Nuer chiefs' issues relating to the causes of the inter-ethnic conflict between them are highlighted in detail.

737. SOA Jenner Hadley *Reflecting on Peace Practice Project: Case Study "When Truth is Denied, Peace Will Not Come": The People to People Peace Process of the New Sudan Council Churches* <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=SLPD20001000-01.1.1&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-reflecting-----> (accessed November 20, 2023).

738. Ibid.

agricultural tools, and educational services to IDPs by either their host communities or relief agencies.<sup>739</sup>

Despite these challenges, the Wunlit conference rekindled the spirit of interethnic trust and unity personified by the participation of Dinka and Nuer traditional and religious leaders in the peace process. Eventually, on 7 January 2002, these efforts contributed to resolving the feud between Riek Machar and John Garang when they both announced that they had overcome their differences and reunited their forces as SPLA led by Garang. These achievements underscored the effectiveness of the Wunlit peace initiative as a model for facilitating dialogue and resolving conflicts at the grassroots level among the Southerners.<sup>740</sup> Encouraged by this development, USAID consolidated its support for the Wunlit Agreement and backed other local initiatives for conflict resolution among the Southerners in the Equatoria region. Moreover, in 2001, with around \$3million, USAID established the Sudan Peace Fund (SPF) to bolster and encourage conflict reconciliation among the Southerners by facilitating economic growth and rehabilitation within communities ravaged by the civil war.<sup>741</sup>

In November 2003, through SPF, USAID supported the Kidepo Valley Peace Project and Development (KVPPD) directed towards resolving the conflicts among Southerners located in the Eastern Equatoria region. The hostilities in this locality prolonged the suffering of children, youths, and women. Compared with the Wunlit Agreement, the KVPPD focused on involving local institutions as a means of mitigating conflict among the Equatorians reinforced by reconciliation programs among warring Southerners in the area. USAID also collaborated with NPA, NCA, CRS and other NGOs based in Equatoria to facilitate different developmental programs.<sup>742</sup>

Simultaneously, SPLA enacted its Non-governmental Organization Act of 2003 enumerating the guidelines for IO and NGO operations in Southern Sudan. Based on these policies, IOs and NGOs' primary objectives were expected to focus on providing relief services to war-affected and vulnerable Southerners. The purview of relief agency operations included the implementation of relief, repatriation, resettlement, and rehabilitation programs based on consultations with the SPLA's Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) and local authorities. Humanitarian agencies were expected to be non-discriminatory based on ethnicity, race, religious beliefs, and political views. NGO projects would also focus on building local capacity and sustainability to

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739.SOA Report on Assessment of Needs of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Review of Wunlit People to People Peace Agreement Conducted by: Operation Lifeline Sudan and New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) UNICEF/BYDA/NSCC/SRRA and TEARFUND in Collaboration with WFP

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND20010212-01.1.1&srpos=1&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU-+Report+on+Assessment+of+Needs+of+Internally+Displaced+Persons+-----> (accessed November 21 2023)

740. Sharon Hutchinson's *Peace and Puzzlement: Grass-roots Peace Initiatives Between the Nuer and Dinka of South Sudan in Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa*, ed. Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009),71.

741. SOA Kidepo Valley Cluster Integrated Peace and Recovery Plan Eastern Equatoria <https://sudanarchive.net/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txf=txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU&txq=kidepo+valley&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7CtXTI%7CtXAU-SUDAN+PEACE+FUND-----> (accessed November 22, 2023).

742.Ibid.

develop local communities' ability to become independent and self-reliant. Hence, SPLA's relief wing SRRC became the official regulator of IOs and NGOs operations in the South.<sup>743</sup>

Meanwhile, SPLM/A's political authority over humanitarian activities in Southern Sudan was underpinned by the Machakos Protocol of 2002 and the Navisha Agreement of 2003 facilitated and supported by IGADD, UN, and other international stakeholders. These peace initiatives reiterated some of the clauses highlighted in the IGADD Declaration of Principle (DOP) of 1994, emphasizing Southern Sudan's right to self-determination affirmed through a referendum. Compared with the DOP of 1994, the Machakos Protocol and Navisha Agreement broached issues concerning religious freedom of all Sudanese and an equitable wealth-sharing process between Khartoum and Southern Sudan under the leadership of SPLM/A. Eventually, these peace processes culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, marking the end of the twenty-two-year-long civil war. The indispensable role of IGADD, UN, and other relief agencies in facilitating the realization of the CPA highlights the expansion of IOs, and NGOs' purview beyond providing humanitarian aid to supporting the resolution of the civil war. In the aftermath of the CPA of 2005, through a referendum, the Southern Sudanese decided that Southern Sudan should become separated and independent from Sudan. Therefore, on July 2011, Southern Sudan was recognized as a sovereign state known as the Republic of South Sudan.<sup>744</sup>

## CONCLUSION

By 1995, the emergence of SPLA's rival factions, Mainstream faction's military supremacy, the initiation of the new Ground Rules and the reimposition of Khartoum's restrictions on humanitarian operations determined the uneven activities of IOs and NGOs in the Southern regions. Nonetheless, the creation of SINGOs following the SPLA-Mainstream National Convention of 1994 enabled aid agencies to extend and diversify the scope of their activities among the Southerners. Concomitantly, the IGADD peace talks of 1994 committed Khartoum, SPLA-Mainstream, and SPLA-Nasir to use "relief corridors" to guarantee the safety of relief workers while delivering aid items to the Southerners. As mentioned earlier, the re-enactment of the GOS's hardline policies against humanitarian agencies and the former's support for different Southern militia groups affected the progress of IOs and NGOs especially in Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Upper Nile.

Nonetheless, these issues created the opportunity for the realignment of the symbiotic relationship between OLS and SPLA rival factions based on the Ground Rules of 1995. Concurrently, the Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committee(JRRC), involving all stakeholders in the South, aimed at resolving the conflict among the belligerents as a means of preserving the implementation of the new humanitarian principles of 1995. Compared with the IGADD peace initiative of 1994, the Ground Rules of 1995 underlined the need to involve SPLA factions to guarantee the efficacy of OLS operations in Southern Sudan. However, in both Bahr-el-Ghazal

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743. SOA *Laws of The New Sudan: The Non-governmental Organizations Act, 2003*

<https://sudanarchive.net/?a=d&d=ND20030000-02.1.15&srpos=2&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN%7ctxTI%7ctxAU-new+sudan+NGO+law-----> (accessed November 22, 2023)

744. UNHCR Archive 11/3/01-013. *SUD External Relations-Relations with Governments-Sudan (Volumes. 2-5) 1987-1994.*

and Upper Nile region, SPLA factions' commitment to the humanitarian principles of 1995 were eroded by fact that different Southern militia forces clashed over the region, and incessant rustling among its inhabitants imperiled relief operations.

Undoubtedly, the prevalent famine of 1998 in Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Khartoum's Sudan state forces' tussle for the control of oil producing areas in Western Upper Nile negated the observance of the Ground Rules of 1995. Both developments weakened OLS's operational capacity, illustrating why the IGADD peace initiative of 1994 focused on humanitarian and political dialogue among the belligerents as a complementary issue. Hence, the effective operations of IOs and NGOs in the South depended on peaceful resolution of the civil war. Therefore, cooperation among the Southern belligerents was perceived within the humanitarian community as an indispensable determinant for the fruition of their relief efforts.

Otherwise, SPLA-Mainstream perceived that addressing the insecurity in the Southern regions depended upon its ability to establish and sustain its supremacy. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the Ground Rules of 1995 and the Garang faction's ability to establish and sustain its control over Western Equatoria gradually revitalized the perception of SPLA-Mainstream as the Messiah of South Sudan. Indeed, the Mainstream faction's control over Western Equatoria was reinforced by the vibrant socioeconomic activities and collaboration between relief agencies and SINGOs. This development highlighted the wide-ranging and constructive activities of humanitarian organizations and domestic NGOs while they facilitated the development of the barter trading system. The involvement of agricultural cooperatives, farmers, and local ecumenical NGOs in the exchange of goods based on the barter system revitalized and sustained Western Equatoria's economy during the civil war.

The revitalization of socioeconomic activities in Western Equatoria encouraged SPLA-Mainstream to facilitate similar feats in other parts of the Southern regions. Hence, Garang's faction initiated its MOU campaign as a means of creating a centralized administrative policy that would coordinate the affairs of all relief agencies operating among the Southerners. To avoid compromising their independence and neutrality, many NGOs and IOs operating in the South refused to concede to SPLA-Mainstream's MOU. Although OLS and other humanitarian agencies admitted their failings during the famine of 1998 in Bahr-el-Ghazal, they persevered in delivering relief aid to Southerners in Upper Nile amid the fighting among Southern militia forces.

Consequently, IOs, NGOs, and SINGOs situated in the Western Upper Nile advocated for the fundamental human rights of Southerners affected by violence caused by oil exploration activities in the area. Thus, Christian Aid and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) campaigned against the operation of multinational oil companies in the Upper Nile. These instances portrayed the dynamic influences of humanitarian agencies and domestic NGOs in the socioeconomic sphere of Southern Sudan. Undoubtedly, by 2005, humanitarian agencies and SINGOs became involved in the events that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the Second Sudanese civil war. As such, the Wunlit Conference of 1999, and the ceasefire agreements among the belligerents in the South in the same year were some of the conflict mediation efforts facilitated by international aid agencies and SINGOs aimed at ending the Civil War in the Southern regions. Overall, the resourcefulness and resilience of humanitarian organizations determined the extent of

their growth and operations in the South. Simultaneously, these factors enhanced the symbiotic relationship between OLS and SPLA and its rival factions.

## CONCLUSION

During the Second Sudanese Civil War, the mutual relationship between the SPLA and humanitarian agencies expanded and reinforced the latter's ubiquitous operations throughout Southern Sudan during and after the conflict. This development is intertwined with the genesis of evangelical activities of Christian missionaries in Southern Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian period, during which clergies facilitated various humanitarian and developmental projects among the Southerners. Afterwards, the advent of the First Sudanese Civil War caused by Khartoum's hardline policies against the activities and presence of missionaries in the Southern regions prompted the interventionist role of ecumenical NGOs such as WCC in the conflict while providing humanitarian assistance to Southern refugees in Uganda. Concurrently, WCC's collaboration with AACC enhanced their interventionist roles in the First Civil War, highlighting the burgeoning influence of international ecumenical NGOs in Southern Sudan. Furthermore, towards the late 1960s Caritas International and the Verona Fathers extended the scope of religious humanitarian groups' influences in the course of the conflict by sending logistical support to the Southern rebels.

As such, the tumultuous situation in the Southern regions allowed religious NGOs to gradually supplant the erstwhile roles of Christian clergy and religious institutions based in the South in providing social services to the Southerners. Moreover, the creation of the Sudan Christian Association (SCA) in 1961, followed by its humanitarian assistance for Southern refugees and support for Anya-Nya's insurgence in the Southern regions, strengthened the cordial relationship between religious NGOs and the Southerners. WCC, AACC, UNHCR, and Ugandan Churches' collective efforts in facilitating the education of Southern refugees magnified the recognition of these ecumenical and secular relief agencies among the Southerners. Thus, WCC, AACC, and other religious humanitarian groups became indispensable stakeholders in the sociopolitical happenings in the Southern regions, prompting Khartoum to request the assistance of ecumenical organizations toward the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972.

The interwar years shaped the Southerners' attitude towards the GOS and humanitarian agencies operating within the Southern regions. Khartoum's inability to cater to the social welfare of the Southern Sudanese weakened the prospect of unity between Northern and Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, the shortlived peace in the Southern regions led to Oxfam, UNHCR, Red Cross and other secular NGOs collaboration with their ecumenical counterparts in the South. Hence, IOs and NGOs' aid activities were challenged by a lack of infrastructural facilities and political issues among the Southern politicians. Nonetheless, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and UNHCR and their counterparts continued providing different social services to the Southerners. Moreover, during this period, many humanitarian agencies in the Southern regions diversified the purviews of their operations based on Southerners' exigencies. For instance, while collaborating with UNDP in facilitating developmental projects, UNHCR also catered to the resettlement of Southerners and facilitated rehabilitation projects in different areas. Unavoidably, UNHCR devolved some of its humanitarian projects to NCA, SCC, and other relief agencies, allowing them to extend the tentacles of their operations and influence among the Southerners. Accordingly, the SCC implemented developmental schemes, assisted displaced

Southerners, and acted as a liaison between the Southern Sudanese and relief organizations such as WCC and UNHCR.

When the Second Sudanese Civil War started in 1983, SCC became one of the few relief agencies that adapted its relief operations in Southern Sudan to the wartime situation until SPLA expelled it from the Southern regions and replaced it with the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in 1991. In particular, SCC's relief operation in Northern and Southern Sudan reflected Alex de Waal's comment about Africans finding solutions to African problems. By 1986, the advent of the civil war forced NCA, UNHCR, Oxfam, and other NGOs to evacuate the Southern regions. However, SCC continued operating in Southern Sudan, facilitated by its network of local relief communities created by churches and reinforced by the Sudan Council's emergency desk, which provided relief aid for the Southerners. Concurrently, SCC assisted displaced Southern refugees in Khartoum and collaborated with Christian Aid, BandAid, WFP, and other relief agencies to mount aid programs in the Southern regions. These events highlight SCC as the predecessor of SINGOs, emerging in the mid-1990s to enhance the operational capacity among the Southerners.

However, throughout the civil war, the feasibility of SINGO, IO, and NGO relief operations among the Southerners was predicated on the security situation in Southern Sudan affected by fickle alliances and consistent fighting among the belligerents. Beyond the upheaval in the Southern regions, Ethiopia and Kenya's support for SPLA's operations within their borders facilitated the symbiotic relationship between the liberation army and relief agencies. Concomitantly, in the late 1980s, SPLA's control over the Southern regions, Norwegian People's Aid cross-border relief operations among the Southerners, and ICRC's humanitarian and diplomatic efforts between Khartoum and SPLA were the precursors of the mutual relationship between the liberation army and aid organizations mutual relationship in the 1990s.

Hitherto, the staunch support of Ethiopia's Mengistu regime, a Cold War ally of the Soviet Union, for the liberation army facilitated the initial interactions between relief agencies and SPLA within Ethiopian refugee camps occupied by Southern Sudanese. This event influenced the interdependent relationship between the liberation army and aid organizations throughout the war. Firstly, SPLA's control over Gambella and other camps in Ethiopia encouraged the creation of SRRA, serving as the liberation army's official relief agency and its liaison with ICRC, UN, SCF-UK, and other humanitarian agencies. Additionally, the opportunity to coordinate the activities in some of Ethiopia's refugee camps provided SPLA with the elbow room to hijack and manipulate humanitarian aid. Accordingly, throughout the 1980s, these camps became the springboard of SPLA's insurgency operations in the Southern regions.

By 1991, following the fall of the Soviet Union, the collapse of Mengistu's regime prompted the exodus of Southern refugees from Ethiopia back into Southern Sudan, compromising SPLA's control over Gambella and other refugee camps. These occurrences expedited tensions and division in the liberation army that split into Garang's SPLA-Mainstream and Machar's SPLA-Nasir factions. Thus, matters about mounting relief aid within the Southern regions became contentious among SPLAs' leaders.

Concurrently, from 1989 to 1992, the SPLA's internal division affected the liberation army's ability to maintain its stronghold over the SPLA-controlled areas in the South. Additionally, the emergence of Omar al-Bashir's regime (1989-2019), the accusations of human rights abuses against SPLA-Garang, and the rise of SPLA-Nasir shaped the interdependent relationship between humanitarian agencies and SPLA factions during the civil war. For instance, by 1989, following the inception of al-Bashir's military administration, leading to the ban on all OLS operations in the Southern regions, International Aid Sweden (IAS), ICRC, and NPA, in collaboration with SRRA, continued their relief and rehabilitation projects among the Southerners. This development fostered relief agencies' symbiotic relationship with SPLA, magnifying the roles of aid organizations as the providers of social services and indispensable catalysts of economic activities within SPLA-controlled areas while the liberation army handled political and security matters. Therefore, SPLA and humanitarian agencies coordinated the political economy of localities controlled by the liberation army.

Against this backdrop, throughout the Southern region, the rivalry between Mainstream and Nasir factions weakened the interdependent relationship between humanitarian agencies and the liberation army. Garang's SPLA-Mainstream criticized OLS officials for their involvement in events causing the fracture of the liberation army. Concurrently, relief agencies accused SPLA factions of human rights violations after the death of OLS workers in the South. These controversial issues propelled the introduction of the Ground Rules, which aimed to regulate the relationship between aid organizations and the SPLA factions and consolidated with the Chukudum conference of 1994. Both the Ground Rules and the Chukudum Conference revitalized the foundation of the mutual relationship between SPLA and relief agencies through divergent avenues.

The aftermath of the Chukudum conference encouraged the creation of SINGOs and served as an indispensable linkage between humanitarian agencies and Southerners while providing relief and rehabilitation projects in the Southern regions. Other SINGOs, such as NSCC, SCC's successor in the South, collaborated with SRRA and WFP to create the Relief Committee to mitigate the advent of famine among the Southerners. As such, NSCC became instrumental in sustaining SPLA's interdependent relationship with aid organizations. The Wunilt conference in 1999 underscored the NSCC's involvement in grassroots development among the Southerners, and at the same time, NSCC, supported by international donors, facilitated the peace dialogue between the SPLA rival factions. In this regard, NSCC became the nexus for the belligerents and humanitarian stakeholders in the Southern regions.

Compared to SINGOs, the Ground Rules (GRs) focused more on establishing policies to guarantee the safety of humanitarian workers and unhindered delivery of relief aid based on relief agencies' concerns about the Southern region's unstable security situation. The GRs of 1993 initiated the rules of engagement between Garang's faction and relief agencies operating within areas controlled by the former. In contrast, the GRs of 1995 included the participation of the three main SPLA factions in the South controlled by Garang, Machar, and Akol, and OLS, therefore serving as a fulcrum that revived the collaborative relationship between the SPLA factions and OLS.

The humanitarian principles of 1995 were more comprehensive than those of 1993 because they included the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977, acknowledged by SPLA-Mainstream and its rival factions underling their commitment to the safety of civilians and the delivery of relief



aid amid the war. Hence, aid organizations recognized the Southern factions as indispensable stakeholders. In between the GRs of 1993 and 1995, the IGADD peace initiative of 1994 also aimed to secure the protection of aid workers and the movement of humanitarian aid throughout the Southern regions by involving the belligerents in the DOP. The major similarity between IGADD's 1994 peace efforts and the GRs of 1995 is that they both encouraged humanitarian diplomacy and conflict resolution among the warring factions. However, the reoccurring unstable security situation in Southern Sudan caused by the emergence of splinter groups among the SPLA factions and their fickle alliances with Khartoum eroded the implementation of IGAD's DOP and the GRs of 1995.

Meanwhile, SPLA-Mainstream's capacity to maintain its control over Western Equatoria and its desire to replicate this feat in other parts of the Southern regions, especially with the humanitarian crises in Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Upper Nile, prompted the introduction of the MOU by Garang's faction. Eventually, the controversy over the acknowledgement of the MOU between SPLA-Mainstream and relief agencies was settled by UN officials, revamping the interdependent relationship between Garang's faction and humanitarian organizations. Nonetheless, relief agencies' concern about the incessant fighting among the warring factions in the South and its effects on their relief and rehabilitation projects galvanized their interventionist role in the civil war by persuading UN officials to resolve the conflict and collaborating with NSCC. The convergence of these efforts culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, ending the Second Sudanese Civil War.

Despite the humanitarian agencies' instrumental role in facilitating the peace accords among the belligerents, the activities of these relief organizations had some negative impacts on Southern Sudan, mainly by prioritizing the military over political leaders. SRRA coordinated the symbiotic relationship between SPLA and aid organizations, therefore reinforcing the recognition of the liberation army and its relief wing, while the political wing of SPLM remained uninvolved in the coordination and enhancement of aid operations throughout the Southern regions. Consequently, this occurrence compromised SPLM's participation in civil administration among the Southerners while strengthening the popularity of the military wing of SPLA as the de facto representative of Southern Sudanese among IOs and NGOs. SPLA, SRRA, SINGOs and humanitarian agencies also dominated the initiation of the barter trading system. SPLM's exclusion from these aid initiatives affected its reputation as a political stakeholder in the South. Moreover, Washington's support for SPLA-Mainstream, through the instrumentality of NPA's relief operation in the Southern region, counteracted Khartoum's aid to radical Islamic groups in the 1990s. This also perpetrated the consistent reliance on the liberation army as the dominant political group in the South in the mid-1990s.

Overall, the evolution of the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) from a guerrilla group to the government of South Sudan is intertwined with its interdependent relationship with humanitarian agencies during the Second Sudanese Civil War. Concurrently, these happenings portray the transformation and expansive influences of relief agencies' operations in the Southern regions and in other parts of the world in the 21st century.

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