

Questions in Natural Speech:  
Problems of Recognition, Usage and Analysis\*

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1. Introduction

This paper concerns itself with certain problems in naturally occurring speech, with our intuitive knowledge of what questions are. The problems that I want to discuss are not exclusively limited to 'questions' and could be applied to other types of utterance. However in this paper 'questions' will serve as a focus for the discussion, although I may draw on other types of examples to illustrate more general points. My first task will be to try and categorize, in some formal way, what enables speakers in conversation to be able to recognize a question. Knowing that not all utterances are questions, what is it that differentiates them from other types of utterance? Thus I am interested in the types of criteria people use in natural speech so as to be able to know that a certain utterance was a question. Notice that I am concerning myself with not just an abstract definition of what a question is, but how people actually use their ideas and knowledge of what questions are in conversation. Secondly I will take certain utterances which are questions and illustrate the different ways they can be used in conversation, e.g. how they are able to imply a command rather than a request for information.

Lastly, and following from the prior discussion, I will show that the problems which stem from the problems of usage and recognizability of questions also lead to further difficulties if we as analysts attempt to make formal studies of naturally occurring speech. I will then propose a tentative suggestion for accommodating these problems within the context of speech act analysis.

2. In this part of the paper, I want to deal with how we as members of a culture with the same language are able to know such things as what constitutes a 'question', and how do we recognize it as such. I will look at some of the features which have been said to be indicative of a 'question' and compare these features with the way in which questions are used in natural speech, in order to estimate how applicable these features are.

Most traditional analyses start from the premise that questions may be framed in syntactic forms (e.g. Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik 1972:386). Thus, word inversion, the presence of the wh- interrogative at the beginning of a sentence, and rising intonation may all indicate a question. However it has been noted that questions such as 'Can I have a penny?', 'May I have the salt?' although framed in this syntactic question form, are not really questions but are requests. This is pointed out by the argument that in either of the questions a simple yes/no type answer may well be insufficient to satisfy the questioner. But Searle notices,

The sentences... have literal utterances in which they are not also indirect requests. Thus 'Can you reach the salt?' can be uttered as a simple question about your abilities (say by an orthopedist wishing to know the

medical progress of your arm injury) (Cole and Morgan 1975:69)

Thus he says that 'Can you reach the salt?' can have two meanings, a literal one and a request one, dependent on context. This difference between a question and a request is well exemplified here, in that these two descriptions of 'Can you reach the salt?' are, in these instances, mutually exclusive. However, occasions often arise when an utterance contains both question and request elements in it. In such cases people do not feel the necessity to delineate precisely the status of the utterance and feel justified in calling it either a request or a question.

Another commonly stated feature of questions is that they have rising intonation at the end of the sentence. This may or may not be accompanying the syntactic form of the question.

"Are you going to the office?"

"You're going to the office?"

Here it is said that intonation is able to show that a question is present. However rising intonation at the end of a sentence does not necessarily mark it as a question. Rising intonation can be used for other purposes, e.g. calling someone, expressing surprise. An utterance like B below:

A: I killed the cat.

B: You killed it.

is often difficult to label in any precise way, it frequently being taken as an expression of surprise or a question. Thus both or either interpretation may be put on B's utterance because of its rising intonation form. Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik also indicate that rising intonation may be used "to indicate that our utterance is non-final, or that we are leaving it open and inconclusive." (1972:1044) I.e. that we are not finished with our speech and are going to continue.

Rising intonation may also not be present at the end of a syntactic question. Characteristically, many yes/no type questions (those seeking an answer 'yes' or 'no') do not have the rising intonation, and have a falling tone at the end of sentences. Falling tones in questions can also indicate displeasure.

"Are you coming or not?"

"Are you coming?"

From these discrepancies it seems that the system of simple (mainly syntactic) rules invoking certain characteristic features often used for categorizing utterances as questions is not adequate. In order to satisfy our demand for how questions are recognized as such, we must examine other additional ways in which people know what questions are. Because of the factor mentioned earlier that, often, questions and requests may be incorporated into the same utterance, I want to examine how utterances which can be classified as question/request are differentiated from other types of utterance e.g. commands, threats, snubs.

As examples of the latter one could include:

"What do you think you are playing at?" (command)

"Are you man or mouse?" (threat)

"Are you the man who still believes in Santa Claus?" (snub)

I do not want to restrict this paper just to what criteria delimit the form that questions can take, but also want to propose certain forms of utterances which might be recognized as questions, but which are not covered by the above conditions, and which as a consequence will make the task of formulating specific rules to enable us to attach the label 'a question' to an utterance more difficult.

This study emerges from the light which analysts such as Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1975) have thrown on the question of utterances, and uses their analyses as a base point to begin the investigation. Austin (1962) was the first to notice that utterances have both locutionary and illocutionary force. The locutionary force is associated with ideas of sense and reference, and is primarily descriptive.

"It is raining."

This is subject to notions of truth and falsity, and can be verified, for instance, by looking at the weather. The other type of utterance, the illocutionary, is a slightly more involved idea to handle, and is concerned with the intentions and consequences of the utterance. To take one of Austin's examples, the statement 'France is hexagonal.' cannot be evaluated very easily on the true-false scale that was proposed above. It may be that the speaker is only giving an approximate description, he may be confusing 'hexagonal' with 'square', or he may just be mistaken in that he meant another country not France. In order to find out what the speaker meant by that statement, we can either allow him to elaborate or ask him exactly what he means. However, it is probable that we would come to the same conclusion as Austin on this statement, i.e. that it is a rough description rather than a right or wrong one. (But consider what inferences we might make if the speaker went on to say 'each angle measuring sixty degrees.')

This notion of a speaker's intention as expressed in speech, is a tricky one and Austin deliberately differentiates between illocutionary acts and another type, the perlocutionary, because of this problem. The latter type of act is defined in terms of its consequences rather than its intentions. Thus if I say 'I alarmed him,' then this would be a perlocutionary act, according to Austin, because 'alarmed' is measured in terms of the consequences on 'him' rather than my intentions.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary is important in my analysis of questions. If I say that one can identify questions because they are followed by answers, then this is to be confusing the perlocutionary aspects and the illocutionary aspects of the notion of a question.

Austin also notes that utterances have 'performative' functions, a type of locutionary act that utterances can perform certain actions rather than just describe them. Thus 'I do' at a wedding can be said not just to describe the event, but to perform it, in that, if the 'I do' was not included, then the event -- the marriage -- would be said to have not taken place. But these performative functions may be encased in utterances which do not use an explicit 'performative' verb. Austin gives the example that 'I promise I shall come.' may sometimes be given in the form, 'I shall come.' This utterance conveys the sense of promise implicitly. But it is

important to note that Austin says that not always is the sense of promising given by the second utterance, 'I shall come.'

Thus I want to suggest that questions may also occur like promises with illocutionary force in otherwise formally unmarked sentences (unmarked -- indicating that they do not convey the sense of a question by any outward syntactic or intonational form). If I say, for example,

"I'm going to the store now."

in the context of my own home, in the presence of my family, then I think it may sometimes be heard as a question, but that it will not be heard as a question on every occasion of its occurrence, whether in the same context or in a different one. Listeners might reply to it,

"O.k. fine, see you."

or "Could you get me a packet of cigarettes while you're there."

(which would be an adequate reply to the more easily identifiable question, "Do you want anything from the store?"). I propose that contextual and situational variables (rather than syntactic variables) are at work here in enabling us to hear this as a question/request rather than a mere statement of intention. Notice that this does not resolve in any neat way Austin's problem of illocutionary and perlocutionary force. Remember that perlocutionary force is the force of an utterance measured in terms of its consequences, e.g. 'I alarmed him.' (Here one cannot infer from this that the speaker's intention was to alarm.) The perlocutionary force of the utterance, "I'm going to the store now." may be given as, "Do you want anything from the store?" because of the reply concerning the cigarettes. But it is crucial to realize that the actual intention of the utterance may or may not have been that. That the listener interpreted it as a question does not enable us to categorize the utterance unambiguously as a question. The problem is a recurrent one and I will return to it in the final section of this paper.

In this part of the paper, I have outlined certain types of utterance which could be called questions, I have described conventional question labels, and also introduced an utterance which has the force of a question but not any overt marking. I have indicated that conventional questions, which ask for a response may not be marked in the conventional manner (i.e. by the lack of syntactic markers) and that unconventional formulations may serve the purpose of asking for a response (i.e. 'I'm going to the store now') thus indicating two main differences in this loosely held notion of question.

1. They can ask for answers, replies, or information despite their form.
2. They can have a conventional syntactic question form and 'do' other things.

Throughout, I have not tried to define in any strict way what a question is, as this problem constitutes a major focus of the paper. Although questions may not always follow the conventional rule formulations (i.e. intonation, word inversion) which they are supposed to, this does not usually

present a problem for interactants. That is, they are able to formulate and 'hear' questions based on other criteria quite easily in conversation. In the next part of this paper, I want to look at this second category, the more easily identifiable, syntactic questions, and examine the varied uses that they have.

3. I now want to concentrate on those analyses which have investigated syntactic questions, i.e. ones which from their grammatical form or their intonation pattern can be regarded as questions. (This is not to infer that the type of distinction which I made between utterances which have the form of questions and those which have the force of questions, is not an important one, but only that syntactic questions have been discussed more in the literature.)<sup>2</sup>

The most detailed study of questions, as an object of inquiry in natural speech, is given by Goody (1978), who classifies questions into four main types: Control, Rhetorical, Deference and Information. Although this research was based on a community in West Africa, its purpose is a more general one:

This essay is a first exploration of the nature of questioning -- what is it that we do when we ask questions. (Goody 1978:17)

She accepts the implications of Austin's work and gives instances of questions in which the illocutionary force of an utterance is present in the locutionary act. Thus she cites as an example of an Intention-Deference question, "Are you going to greet X today?" (1978:32) said by her subordinate to her while they were working (at weaving) in the village. She analyses this as being a statement by the speaker to the effect that "We should greet X today." Goody goes on to describe the reasons for this reading of the utterance. The person who addressed her was her subordinate, and

It is wrong for the subordinate to tell his senior what he should do. Instead he asks him what is ostensibly an Information question. The superior may then answer 'Yes I shall greet X (the chief)' thus assuming the initiative; or he may say, 'No, I must visit the farm today.' thus denying the need to greet the chief, but without having to admit that he has been told to do so by a subordinate. (1978:32-33)

The main point of Goody's argument is that this use of different types of questions for different purposes can be explained in terms of the relative status and level of intimacy of the interactants. Thus, for example control questions often occur in the speech of adults to children because of the high status differences between them; but she points out that when adults try to use other types of questions to children, these questions are still often heard as Control questions.

Adult: What are you doing?  
Child: Nothing. (Goody 1978:34)

Goody says that in this example, this was intended as a deference question by the adult to the child, but was treated as a control question. Its

original intention was to express interest and concern in the activities of the child. But Goody realized that often this would not have the desired effect on the child unless 'this form of questioning has to be done very gently.' (1978:34) to prevent the child treating it as a control question. This example hints at some of the problems involved in 'hearing' a question correctly.

Another use which the 'question' can be put to and which has been carefully documented is the 'Clarification Request' used by adults to young children. Corsaro (1977) isolates the 'Clarification Request', and says that it is used mainly by adults in their talk with young children, featuring less frequently in interaction with older children, and these clarification requests are rarely produced by the children in this interaction. They are interrogatives which take one of three linguistic forms.

The first is a clarification marker of some type (i.e. what, huh, hum...). Although it would be difficult to specify all the possible clarification markers, it is clear that they belong to a definite set of constructions, all of which would be recognizable as such by native speakers. (1977:186)

A second type is the simple repetition of the last speaker's utterance, but they are always interrogatives either by intonation or by slight modification of the initial utterance, e.g.

Child: I can't do it.  
Adult: You can't?

and,

Child: I'm going to put a band-aid on it.  
Adult: You're going to put a band-aid on it? (Corsaro 1977:187)

The third type is the 'expansion' whereby the adult expands and paraphrases the speaker's utterance.

Adult: O.k. Where'd you get 'em at? (Referring to strawberries.)  
Child: On place where (B looks up and says the following as if reading a sign) -- you pick your own strawberries.  
Adult: Pick your own strawberries? You got 'em at a place that says you pick your own strawberries? (1977:187)

Corsaro also assigns function to those C.R.s (Clarification Requests) and notes the typical places where they would occur in speech. He states that when there are communicative difficulties between speakers (i.e. when one speaker does not hear the utterance of another), one may call for a clarification marker. Clarification requests which ask for a clarification or a repetition of an utterance heard, but not clearly understood, may be formed from either of the last two types of C.R. Another function of the C.R. is to fill in 'one's turn in conversation'. Although it doesn't actually involve clarification, it usually takes the form of the first type of C.R. mentioned, and Corsaro gives it the label of 'marker of acknowledgement.' (An analytic problem may be noticed here in that it is now possible for Corsaro to label the same utterance as being either a clarification marker or a marker of acknowledgement, and the difference between them seems to be the intention of the speaker.)

In the next part of this paper I want to return to some important problems concerned explicitly (but not exclusively) with Corsaro's analysis, and try to relate them to more basic problems of conversation analysis.

Keenan, Schieffelin and Platt (hereafter K. S. P.) (1978) assert that two basic functions of questions are that they (1) are directives to attend; (2) express items of immediate concern to the speaker.

By the former they imply that a question shows by its form that it needs a response, and thus what it does is to make somebody attend to the speaker. The status of the response needed is unclear, however, e.g.

'What did I say about drinking it out of the can?' (K.S.P. 1978:51)

This may indicate that a verbal response is required or that it may be an imperative, and thus a reply might be thought of as being 'cheeky.' But it does seem to fulfill the criterion of directing a person to attend.<sup>3</sup>

That a question expresses an immediate concern of the speaker is less clear cut, and largely asserted, rather than argued for by K.S.P., and thus it is unclear as to what is exactly meant.

Although different analyses have focused on different aspects, it is clear that 'what may be regarded as utterances with a question like form' can function in many varied ways and that the main task of these analyses has been to classify these 'questions' into categories of 'what they really are.' The next part of this paper will examine the fruitfulness of this type of task, and outline in more detail the criteria that are used to classify utterances.

4. The features and uses of 'questions' in actual speech, because of their varied properties that I have outlined, present a number of potential problems for any analysis in terms of their analyzability. In this section I want to clarify the nature of these problems. To explicate my case, I will use data mainly from Corsaro's (1977) analysis of the 'Clarification Request.' The reason this is chosen is that it is a well-documented example and presents the data in a detailed, systematic way, rather than that the problems which I want to discuss are exclusive to it. In fact, these problems apply to many other types of analysis, but for the sake of brevity, will not be discussed here.

I have outlined in the earlier parts of this paper that questions can perform many other functions rather than just asking for information or a response, and that this is connected with the knowledge of what we, as ordinary speakers in society, see as being a 'question'. I have demonstrated that the knowledge which speakers use to understand what questions are, is not a simple analytic process of identifying features such as intonation or the presence of syntactic elements within an utterance. (Yet it is not true to say that speakers do not attend to these types of features in conversation.)

Thus, the type of knowledge which interactants possess includes the syntactic features which I have outlined in the early part of the paper. But these rules are not restrictive in the sense that one is compelled to make utterances or to hear them in such a narrow way. Thus

rules are known by speakers, but they must be considered in the context in which they occur. And the use or otherwise of these rules is a context-bound activity. Now by this I do not mean that they are predictive rules in that, if the context is specified then the appropriate utterance will be produced,<sup>4</sup> but that a speaker in an interaction knows that rules exist, but he is not bound to follow them. The consequence of this is that speakers can influence conversation by either attending to these rules or disregarding them, and that certain inferences will be made by the hearers on the basis of how the rule is applied or not applied. For example, if I do not return your greeting when I see you in the street, you may infer a number of things: that I am annoyed, that I am short-sighted, that I think you are being too familiar, that I am in a hurry. The actual reason for this lack of return of greeting cannot be specified in any exact way, but by using a speaker's 'cultural competence' (that common sense type knowledge that any ordinary person in that culture will have), you may come to a decision as to what the reason was, in this particular instance. But it is important to note the reason chosen for this occasion may not be applicable to other times when I fail to greet you. For example, on the first occasion of me not returning your greeting, you may posit the reason as 'being in a hurry.' If this happened on a number of occasions, consecutively, you might feel that this reason was invalid and might choose another one, although the actual occasion of the sixth 'meeting' might have an identical physical context to the first one.

It is also true that syntactic and intonational features may be present and CAN be used by speakers in order to make assertions such as the following hypothetical example.

- A: Have you washed the dishes?  
B: It's not my turn.  
A: O.k. I was only asking.

Thus in A's second utterance, we can see it as an appeal to certain features of A's first utterance which allow it to be a question, i.e. its syntactic form (although it appears to have been treated as a command).

That I have outlined different aspects of the term 'question' still leaves unresolved the problem of whether an utterance is a perlocutionary act or an illocutionary act (i.e. whether a question was intended as a question or merely heard as a question). In conversation, this problem is largely left unresolved, in that interactants do not feel the need to specifically ask whether or not some utterance was a question. (Although one can cite examples which actually question the status of utterances.

"Are you asking me or telling me?"

or seek clarification in some way.

"What do you mean?"

"What are you trying to say?"

and I do not dispute that these are legitimate types of utterances within conversation.)

This ambiguity in language seems intrinsic to it, by which I mean that in many of the conversations throughout this paper (which although some of them are hypothetical, I take it can be heard as conversations



which could naturally occur) I have demonstrated ambiguities which can and do occur, even though the hearer may know exactly the 'grammatical' meaning of the words used (i.e. it is not a case of the hearer somehow failing to hear, in an acoustic sense, what was said). This apparent paradox must be examined to see how conversationalists achieve this capacity to 'understand conversations.' How is it that they come to make sense of conversations?

Garfinkel's et-cetera principle (Garfinkel 1964) is one solution which has been proposed. This states that a hearer in a conversation will fill in or assume the existence of a common understanding of what is said when it is not immediately obvious.

Now I see it that what Corsaro is doing in his analysis, is using the same type of reasoning to make sense of the conversation such as that in the extract below. Corsaro is using his 'common understanding' of the conversation and all its background knowledge to make sense of what the conversation was about, as exhibited by his description which accompanies the text.

Transcription	Description
1. B-M: A present for you. Open it.	Buddy's mother employs the CR
2. M-B: For me?	(2) as a marker of acknowledgement.
3. [B nods head yes]	Note that the mother's
4. M-B: Are you sure?	use of the CR here momentarily
5. [B nods head yes]	takes control of the topic away
6. M-B: Does it have my name on it?	from Buddy and puts her in
7. B-M: Yes.	charge. At 6 she produces a
8. M-B: Where?	leading question which is aimed
9. B-M: Right on the box.	at producing the sequence which
10. M-B: (Inaudible) O.K. [opens pack-	follows (i.e. the mother's fail-
age].	ure to read the card). Subse-
11. B-M: You forgot to read the card!	quent discussion with the moth-
12. M-B: I blew it. I blew it. I	er confirmed the researcher's
don't even know who it's	belief that Buddy failed to
from? Read the card for me.	'read the card' several times
Come here.	on Christmas day. (1977:198)

Thus Corsaro is demonstrating how HE makes sense of the conversation, and the method which he uses is not different from that used by the interactants themselves. Now, if that problem of obtaining the meaning of utterances is problematic to the interactants, then Corsaro, employing the same methods, cannot be said to have obtained the correct unambiguous meaning of the interaction. He has only done what others could do and that is, form a CANDIDATE explanation of what occurred.

A candidate explanation is one which is a possible explanation of 'what really happened' which might differ from an explanation given by other people who saw exactly the same video-tape as Corsaro. I find that I am applying the word 'explanation' here to what, in effect, is a certain 'type of description of what happened.' Thus, different descriptions might be given as to what happened, but although all these descriptions might be accepted as describing what took place, they might be criti-

cized on the grounds that they were inadequate. Compare this with Austin's 'France is hexagonal.' It may be difficult to criticize this as being incorrect on most occasions of use, but we can criticize it for being inadequate in certain contexts (e.g. if we are trying to give the properties of hexagons).

In actual conversation, if a student asks another,

A: What happened in the lecture I missed?

B: Oh, he talked for 45 minutes.

This may be thought of as being inadequate in that, although it was a correct description, it did not 'answer the question' in some way. (Although once again, in certain contexts, this may be seen as an adequate answer and B will be satisfied with it.)

The second point which allows interactants to make sense of what is being said in conversation is called the 'Retrospective-Prospective Principle' (Cicourel 1970) and this in fact constitutes a more serious argument against Corsaro's attempt to assign meaning to conversation. This principle states that "routine conversation depends upon speakers and hearers waiting for later utterances in order to decide what was intended before" (Corsaro 1977:202). As Corsaro is in effect a listener in this conversation, then he seems to be ignoring this principle, in that his description which accompanies the conversation is his formulation of the conversation, and does not allow for different interpretations being inferred by the interactants in the course of the later conversation. One might argue against this and say that young children might not have the memory capacity to reflect on what was said previously in a conversation, and this point may be accepted. However, it does not invalidate the general claim, as both the adult and Corsaro (who may be thought of as a silent listener in the conversation) can and do reflect on what was said. This point emphasizes the importance of the Retrospective-Prospective principle and Corsaro's lack of attention to it.

The third point which I want to make concerning the analysis of conversation is to outline the notion of 'Undercutting' which other writers have noted as being a feature of conversations (Turner 1974; Atkinson and Drew 1979). With regard to the Corsaro tape on page 198, we can see that at line 20, the mother makes the utterance,

"A new ring?"

Corsaro, using his competence as an adult and a listener to the conversation, notes,

Here it is difficult to determine whether the C.R.s (Clarification Requests) reflect surprise or are markers of acknowledgement. I feel that they serve the latter function because they were produced with a high-pitched voice and paralleled the excitement of the young child.(1977:198)

Here we have evidence that what Corsaro is explaining is a candidate description and that it might be open to undercutting, i.e. that people might interpret it differently, both analysts and interactants.

A high-pitched voice may sometimes indicate surprise and sometimes a question, but it always depends on the context. Corsaro has shown the basis for his inference, but in order to assign that the status of being 'the correct meaning,' he may be seen to be saying that this is a 'reasonable' type of inference to make and one which 'anybody might have made' after seeing the tape. Although it may be a 'reasonable' inference, it does not make it correct. Thus others are still able to undercut him, e.g.

By stating that the mother had talked earlier about wanting a new ring and was thus surprised that Buddy should remember that piece of information.

In other words, people may draw on other relevant background knowledge and use it to either support or undercut certain utterances, this background information not necessarily being part of the present conversation, but knowledge which can be shown to be 'relevant' in this particular instance.

5. From these analytic problems of how we can obtain unambiguous descriptions of speech, it is apparent that although members have little problem in making sense of utterances, its analysis presents multiple problems which are not easily resolved.

As I have tried to demonstrate throughout the paper, the tools which the analyst uses are predominantly those of the interactants, i.e. natural speakers' knowledge. However, for this to enable him to obtain a correct unambiguous meaning of the interaction when this privilege is not allowed the interactants (in that interactants can dispute the meanings of utterances, misunderstand, be ambiguous, lead others astray, tell lies, etc.) is a dangerous exercise.

Throughout we have seen that interactants concern themselves with making sense of conversation by fitting it into the context, being aware that they may misinterpret, and holding meanings in abeyance if they are unclear (e.g. perhaps holding more than one interpretation of an utterance).

These then seem to be the guidelines that analysts should use. By making explicit the background knowledge which they are using to interpret an utterance, and by outlining the candidate nature of the description of it and thus accepting that other interpretations are possible and valid, one will hopefully be able to tackle more productively the task of speech analysis.

#### Footnotes

\*I wish to express my thanks to W. C. McCormack and R. H. Southerland for a number of valuable comments on this paper. However, I bear total responsibility for remaining errors and shortcomings.

<sup>1</sup>Austin's analysis of perlocutionary acts is more narrow than the one I envisage, in that he feels that certain verbs have perlocutionary force (e.g. 'to alarm'), but I feel that ordinary speakers in conversation do not feel so restricted; thus, they may say 'I alarmed him' without knowing for certain that their action definitely caused alarm in 'him.' Thus in speech, 'I alarmed him' may say something about the speaker's intention rather than the consequences on the 'him'.

<sup>2</sup>But see Grice, Searle, Gordon and Lakoff in Cole and Morgan ed. (1975) for discussions on related matters.

<sup>3</sup>The most detailed account of this property of questions and other related utterances is given in Sacks, H. 'On the Analyzability of Stories by Children' in R. Turner (ed.) (1974).

<sup>4</sup>For attempts at this type of analysis, see Ervin-Tripp 1971 'Sociolinguistics' in Fishman (1971) 'Advances in the Sociology of Language Vol. 1'.

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