University of Calgary

PRISM Repository **https://prism.ucalgary.ca**

The Vault Open Theses and Dissertations

2021-05-14

Turkish Radical Filmmaking: A Retrospective Study

Örsler, M. Mert

Örsler, M. M. (2021). Turkish Radical Filmmaking: A Retrospective Study (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.

http://hdl.handle.net/1880/113437

Downloaded from PRISM Repository, University of Calgary

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Turkish Radical Filmmaking: A Retrospective Study

by

M. Mert Örsler

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

MAY, 2021

© M. Mert Örsler 2021

ABSTRACT

This thesis situates the history of Turkish political cinema in conversation with a new parameter and theoretical concept in the discipline of Film and Media Studies, the *militant image*. The thesis historicizes and contextualizes the key figures and major tendencies of radical filmmaking in Turkey, presenting a retrospective survey from the 1960s to the 2000s. It begins with an analysis of cross-cultural interactions at the heart of an amateur film collective, associated with *Genç Sinema Devrimci Sinema Dergisi* (*Young Cinema: Revolutionary Cinema Journal*, 1968-1971), and this collective's practice of the *simple image*. The thesis continues with a discussion of the non-professional political filmmaking scene of the middle/late 1970s and the short documentaries that this scene had produced. As a bridge to 1980s (and 1990s) post-militant cinema, the thesis takes Bilge Olgaç as its foci and marks a genealogical intersection between militant cinema and women's films. Throughout, Yılmaz Güney unsurprisingly appears as an *intertext* to thematically connect the chapters. This thesis concludes with a brief examination of Özcan Alper's *Sonbahar* [*Autumn*] (2008), framing Alper's work as an instance wherein the rich heritage of radical cinema serves as a reference point for the contemporary political film.

Keywords: Bilge Olgaç, militant image, political cinema, radical filmmaking, simple image, Turkish cinema, Turkish film, Turkey, Yılmaz Güney, Young Cinema.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my family, Mehmet Nuri Örsler and Bilgin Örsler, for their unrequited love. I thank my best friends, Halil İbrahim Demirci and Mücahid Mutluer, for their absolute cheerfulness. I thank Elif Horasan for being someone special to dream about the future.

This Master's thesis would be impossible without the guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Matthew Croombs. Thank you for your encouragement and trust in me since my first days as a graduate student, which resulted in our co-authored journal article based on an early version of chapter one of this thesis. I am so intrigued to imagine that I would continue my collaboration with you in the future!

I thank my department head, Dr. Charles Tepperman, for his generous support over the past two years at the Department of Communication, Media, and Film.

Also, I thank Dr. Colleen Kennedy-Karpat, from Ankara, Turkey, for being a mentor and an academic friend to ask questions.

I extend my thankfulness to Önder Özdemir for sharing *Genç Sinema Devrimci Sinema Dergisi* (*Young Cinema: Revolutionary Cinema Journal*, 1968-1971)'s issues with me.

Lastly, I must thank everyone whose work(s) is/are (selfishly) referenced and, sometimes, both translated and referenced in this thesis.

I am extremely grateful for how my time at the University of Calgary has prepared me for my future adventures as a doctoral student at the University of Toronto.

Dedicated to my country, the Turkish Republic.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………...ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………….iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………….iv

INTRODUCTION

A *Militant* Turn in Film Studies…………………………………………………………1

CHAPTER ONE

1960s Simple Image……………………………………………………………………...7

1.1 Contexts and Key Tendencies in Turkish Political Cinema……………………….12

1.1.1 The Green Pine……………………………………………………………….15

1.1.2 The National Cinema Group…………………………………………………...16

1.1.3 Yılmaz Güney…………………………………………………………………...18

1.2. The Young Cinema of Turkey……………………………………………………....20

CHAPTER TWO

1970s Militant Documentary: Conditions and Praxes……………………………………..34

2.1 Sociopolitical Conditions and Trends in Cinema…………………………………..34

2.1.1 The Green Pine's Two Trends……………………………………………………43

2.1.2 Yılmaz Güney's *Hope* of Revolutionary Cinema………………………….45

2.2 Turkish Militant Documentary Praxes………………………………………..........47

CHAPTER THREE

1980s (and 1990s) Post-militant Cinema: Bilge Olgaç……………………………………..59

3.1 Olgaç's Socialist Years…………………………………………………………….63

3.2 Olgaç after Feminism……………………………………………………………69

CONCLUSION

Political Cinema Now: Özcan Alper's *Autumn*……………………………………...81

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………..88

INTRODUCTION

A *Militant* Turn in Film Studies

Militant cinema points to a specific *tradition* of filmmaking. According to Matthew Croombs, this tradition emanated from the "Great Revolutionary Style of the Soviet cinemas of the 1920s" and infused with the new waves of the Global North and the third cinemas of the Global South.[1] The international tradition encompassed the mass social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, urging audiences to take an active stand against the "situated sites of struggle" and the "broader, structural forms of oppression."[2] The tradition frequently worked outside the realm of art houses and Hollywood theaters and screened films in places like factories, intellectual gatherings, and schools.[3] Militant cinema often harnessed dialectical montage, documentary aesthetics, and multiple production roles and sometimes utilized the affordances of cheap/portable equipment, such as the light 16-millimeter cameras, Brechtian tactics of estrangement, and the extra-institutional matrices of exhibition/distribution.

Recent scholarship in Film Studies has signaled the emergence of what we might call, somewhat prognostically, a *militant* turn. The militant turn is manifest in a number of writings, including Trevor Stark's journal article, "'Cinema in the Hands of the People': Chris Marker, the Medvedkin Group, and the Potential of Militant Film" (2012), Scott MacKenzie's edited volume, *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology* (2014), and Kodwo Eshun

[1] Matthew Croombs, "In the Wake of Militant Cinema: Challenges for Film Studies," *Discourse: Journal for Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture* 41, no. 1 (2020): 69.
[2] Croombs, "In the Wake of Militant Cinema," 70.
[3] Ibid., 71.

and Ros Gray's special issue of *Third Text*, "The Militant Image: A Ciné-Geography" (2011).[4] The militant turn has reinvigorated some of the animating questions of the 1960s and 1970s.

In the contemporary debates on militant cinema, the focus has been on the movement's internationalism. Eshun and Gray's introduction to "the militant image," for example, calls for a "relational geography," tasked with mapping the shared, yet distinct, ideological orientations and formal, distribution, and exhibition strategies of different national cinemas.[5] From Buenos Aires to Paris, Eshun and Gray track the trajectories between specific films in multiple contexts and frame "cinematic militancy" as part of a "Tri-continental" media flow.[6] Eshun and Gray's reengagement with May '68—and its international reverberations—aims to encourage new generations of researchers both to rethink political cinema's relationship to the global (and the political) and imagine an alternative film history of the 1960s and 1970s. The authors' insights have led film scholars to retread will-worn ground in the discipline, such as the French cinema of the 1950s and 1960s.

Behind the *romantic* narrative of the French New Wave, May '68 gave rise to a radically different picture of cinema, as embodied by militant filmmakers and film collectives, including the Medvedkine and Dziga Vertov groups.[7] Accordingly, Trevor Stark's "'Cinema in the Hands of the People': Chris Marker, the Medvedkin Group, and the Potential of Militant Film" (2012) focuses on the parallel cases of these film collectives, illustrating a key epistemological conflict

---

[4] See Trevor Stark, "'Cinema in the Hands of the People': Chris Marker, the Medvedkin Group, and the Potential of Militant Film," *October* 138 (Winter 2012): 117; Christina Gerhardt, and Sara Saljoughi, "Looking Back: Global Cinema and the Legacy of New Waves around 1968," in *1968 and Global Cinema*, ed. Christina Gerhardt and Sara Saljoughi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2018), 2; Kodwo Eshun, and Ros Gray, "The Militant Image: A Ciné-Geography: Editors' Introduction," *Third Text* 25, 1 (January 2011): 1.
[5] Kodwo Eshun, and Ros Gray, "The Militant Image: A Ciné-Geography: Editors' Introduction," 2.
[6] Ibid., 3.
[7] Paul Douglas Grant, *Cinéma Militant: Political Filmmaking and May 1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 27.

in militant filmmaking. Generally, French "*Cinema militant*" was screened in "an atmosphere of debate and discussion" and intervened in the distribution structures of national cinema.[8] But the mode of production was notably different between Chris Marker's Medvedkine Group and Jean-Luc Godard's Dziga Vertov Group. The group connected with Marker idealized collectivism as an approach to militant filmmaking, as exemplified by their *Classe de lutte* (1969), made in full collaboration with factory workers, whereas Godard's group embraced a sharp polarization between the director/intellectual and the worker.[9] Stark endorses the approach taken by the Medvedkine Group with Marker, which called for a break with social identities, predefined by the French state: the worker had dis-identified with himself/herself as a worker as much as the director had done with himself as a filmmaker; in turn, the worker had direct access to cultural production while the director could access the realities of the working class.[10] The worker-members of the Medvedkine Group appeared as the people empowered to take the means of production themselves as filmmakers, while the Dziga Vertov Group framed the director as the *true* interpreter of the workers' struggle. Stark, thus, recaptures *Cinema militant* as the "cinema in the hands of the people" by contrasting the two groups' *militancy*.[11] After Stark's (and others') account(s) of French militant cinephilia, scholarly focus has gone beyond the national boundaries of France to examine the effects of *global* 1968 on the cinemas all over the world, particularly on the third cinemas of the Global South.

Mass movements like May '68 had inspired the political contents, production modes, and the reception contexts of Latin American third cinemas; Scott MacKenzie's edited collection,

---

[8] See Trevor Stark, "'Cinema in the Hands of the People': Chris Marker, the Medvedkin Group, and the Potential of Militant Film," *October* 138 (Winter 2012): 118; Croombs, "In the Wake of Militant Cinema: 59; Grant, *Cinéma Militant*, 1.
[9] Stark, "'Cinema in the Hands of the People'," 119.
[10] Ibid., 123.
[11] Ibid., 147.

Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology (2014), brings some key third cinema manifestos together.[12] Making the anti-colonialist *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* [*Black God, White Devil*] (1964), Glauber Rocha expressed the desire for a "violent" cinema in his famous "Aesthetics of Hunger," an early, establishing text of Brazilian *Cinema Novo* and other third cinema examples.[13] With the co-directed *La Hora de los Hornos* [*The Hour of the Furnaces*] (1968), Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino later echoed Rocha's far cry in their influential essay known as "Towards a Third Cinema," declaring the shape(s) that militant third cinema would take.[14] In manifesting a commitment to solidarity, Solanas and Getino also argued that journals and pamphlets could circulate their ideas.[15] Besides these two film manifestos from Brazil and Argentina, Cuban director Julio García Espinosa proposed an alternative approach to militant filmmaking in his essay, "For an Imperfect Cinema."[16] Raising a set of questions related to the networks of distribution, Espinosa aligned with far more amateur films than Rocha's as well as Solanas and Getino's sophisticated works. These Latin American directors' films and writings intended to map out the route for a revolutionary arm of cinema in the wake of May '68 and within the context of the underdeveloped world. More recently, Christina Gerhardt and Sara Saljoughi's edited volume, *1968 and Global Cinema* (2018), has revisited the broader genealogy of militant cinema, particularly in the Global South.[17]

---

[12] Scott MacKenzie, *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014), 207-8.

[13] Glauber Rocha, "The Aesthetics of Hunger (Brazil, 1965)," in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 218 (my emphasis).

[14] Fernando Solanas, and Octavio Getino, "Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World (Argentina, 1969)," in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 231 (my emphasis).

[15] See Solanas and Getino, "Towards a Third Cinema," 230-50.

[16] Julio García Espinosa, "For an Imperfect Cinema (Cuba, 1969)" in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 220 (my emphasis).

[17] Christina Gerhardt, and Sara Saljoughi, "Looking Back: Global Cinema and the Legacy of New Waves around 1968," in *1968 and Global Cinema*, ed. Christina Gerhardt and Sara Saljoughi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2018), 1 (my emphasis).

The militant image does not necessarily designate the kind of cinema rooted in a particular geography; rather, it means an *attitude* toward filmmaking. While long being assumed to be passé, specific to the political struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, militant cinema has been evolving and shape-shifting, namely from the short film to the activist video online.[18] The militant image is thus more a dynamic "*method*" than a "stable genre" or mode.[19]

This thesis engages an understudied, repressed case of filmmaking in a particular country. Film scholars like the ones mentioned above paid fastidious attention to radical cinephilia in Europe and Latin America, yet they have left specific cases like Turkey (neither European nor Latin American) underexplored. I aim to bring this missing chapter into the historiography of militant cinema. Moreover, orthodox Turkish film historiography—preconceived here as Agah Özgüç's, Giovanni Scognamillo's, and Savaş Arslan's book projects—does not even mention the objects of analysis in the upcoming chapters, especially chapter one and two.[20] These instances of scholarly repression underscore the contribution that I aim to make.

Within the scope of this thesis, terms, such as militancy and radicalism, may need further clarification since they appear throughout the chapters. These terms are situated in dialogue with the local history of the Turkish left and not with ethnic separatism and Islamism in Turkey.[21] I explore the ciné-cultural reflection of the left—often expressed with phrases like militant film and radical cinema in the thesis—by focusing on some early moments of both amateur and women's filmmaking from the 1960s to the 2000s. Accordingly, chapter one analyzes a loosely

[18] Hito Steyerl, "In Defense of the Poor Image," *e-flux journal* 10, no. 11 (2009): 6.
[19] Croombs, "In the Wake of Militant Cinema," 70.
[20] See, for instance, Agah Özgüç, and Giovanni Scognamillo, *A Chronological History of the Turkish Cinema: 1914 – 1988* (İstanbul: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1988); Savaş Arslan, *Cinema in Turkey: A New Critical History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[21] Throughout this thesis work, the author's understanding of the Turkish left (in the twentieth-century) is based to a significant extent on George S. Harris's view. See George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems of Communism*, 29, no. 4 (1980): 27-41.

organized film collective, affiliated with *Genç Sinema Devrimci Sinema Dergisi* (*Young Cinema: Revolutionary Cinema Journal*), active in the late 1960s and the (early) 1970s.[22] This period is more extensively reviewed in chapter two, which presents a closer look at the non-professional political film scene of the middle/late 1970s and the short documentaries that it had produced. Chapter three discusses Bilge Olgaç, a unique figure of post-militant cinema, and illuminates how cinematic militancy came to intersect with women's films. The thesis concludes with an examination of Özcan Alper's *Sonbahar* [Autumn] (2008), implying a connection between the rich history of radical cinema and contemporary political film. Throughout these chapters, Yılmaz Güney appears as a *militant*, thematic element that brings them together.

[22] Throughout this thesis work, all translations are the author's, except the film titles available on the IMDb website (https://www.imdb.com/), unless otherwise noted. Brackets indicate these titles, and the author also uses italicized words (and quotation marks) when appropriate.

CHAPTER ONE

1960s Simple Image

Turkey had been at the center of global media discourse since the beginning of a diplomatic relationship between Donald Trump and the country's president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for a long time. This relationship manifested itself in cases like the Brunson crisis and one of Turkish military operations in Syria in late 2020.[23] Following Turkey's Operation Peace Spring against the YPG/PKK, which was launched right after Trump's decision to pull back US troops from northeast Syria, ABC News aired a video with the subtitle, "Slaughter in Syria," purporting to depict the *true* face of the operation on Sunday's "World News Tonight."[24] While anchor Tom Llamas was narrating the supposed fact that "Turkey's military [is] bombing Kurd civilians," foreign correspondent Ian Pannell commented: "this video, obtained by ABC News, appears to show the fury of the Turkish attack on the border town of Tal Abyad two nights ago."[25] Within less than a week's time, it was revealed that the combat footage, which served as proof that a humanitarian crisis was unfolding, was in fact taken from a gun range video filmed at Knob Creek in West Point, Kentucky. ABC subsequently announced that the network regrets the error.

---

[23] The arrest of American Pastor Andrew Brunson—working at a small church called Diriliş Kilisesi ("Resurrection Church") in İzmir, Turkey—transformed from an internal affair into a crisis, after Trump's involvement. The Brunson case was also one symptom of the growing tension between Erdoğan and Trump because of the full US support for the Kurdish terrorist groups in Syria. See Ciara Nugent, "Who Is Andrew Brunson, the American Pastor Freed in Turkey?," *Time*, accessed December 9, 2019, https://time.com/5351025/andrew-brunson-trump-turkey/.

[24] Despite the West's anti-Turkish framing of Operation Peace Spring, the Turkish authorities had repeated that the operation is not targeting any civilians and is against national security threats. The PKK (or the Kurdistan Workers' Party) is globally recognized as a terrorist organization, and the authorities rightly consider its Syrian branch, the YPG (or the People's Defense Units), a national security threat. See, for more about the PKK, Mitchel P. Roth, and Murat Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, a Case Study," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007): 901-20.

[25] The ABC video has widely circulated on many American media outlets as well. See Ben Tobin, "ABC News Mistakenly Airs Video from Kentucky Gun Show as Syria Bombing Footage," USA Today accessed December 9, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/10/15/abc-news-airs-knob-creek-kentucky-gun-range-video-as-syria-bombing/3984400002/.

This scandal should be registered as something more than just another instance of broadcast news media's susceptibility to misinformation. ABC's blunder reminds us that the Western media still treats the history of conflict between Kurdish armed groups and Turkish army as a spectacle, offering little to no analysis of the geopolitical and sociocultural issues behind the curtain.[26]

It is perhaps ironic that this longstanding struggle has been rendered unintelligible on the international stage because Turkey is a country in which the radical left has cultivated a rich tradition of documentary practices of counter-information. This tradition has recently presented itself in the form of citizen journalism. The Gezi Park Protests between 2013 and 2014, for example, reignited tensions between the conservative majority and factions of the left and bore witness to a rejuvenation of earlier models of documentary dissent in the digital age, as expressed through online news platforms, such as "Çapul TV."[27] In considering the genealogy of such contemporary acts of citizen journalism, this first chapter returns to an earlier moment in Turkish visual culture, in which local media practices intersected with the internationalist impulses of militant film in Europe and third cinema in South America. I aim to show that, in the realm of political self-representation, cinema played a key role in laying the foundations for the country's future expressions of resistance.

In tracing these attendant histories back to the early 1960s, this chapter will situate the politics of Turkish film in dialogue with the broader tradition of militant filmmaking. In

[26] Moreover, Trump's absurd allegory, which likens one of the reverberations of this conflict to a schoolyard fight, underscores neoimperialist underpinnings. See "Trump Compares Turkey and Kurds Fight to 'Two Kids in a Lot' – Video," *The Guardian*, accessed December 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2019/oct/18/trump-compares-turkey-and-kurds-fight-to-two-kids-in-a-lot-video.
[27] Following the censorship during the Gezi Park protests, the protestors created online platforms like "Çapul TV" to broadcast the events happening in the square. See Ergin Bulut and Haluk Mert Bal, "Disrupting the Spectacle: The Case of Capul TV During and After Turkey's Gezi Uprising," In *The Spectacle 2.0: Reading Debord in the Context of Digital Capitalism*, ed. Marco Briziarelli and Emiliana Armano (London: University of Westminster Press, 2017): 209-12.

alignment with this tradition, militant Turkish filmmakers were both idealist practitioners and marginal thinkers. Working toward the cause of socialism, they sought to use film as both a weapon and an analytical tool.[28] Similar to *Cinéma militant* in France and third cinema in Latin America, Turkish militant cinema was founded on the rejection of the tradition of the past, specifically Yeşilçam or the "Green Pine" film.[29] In rejecting what they perceived as the ultimate conservatism of Turkish filmmaking, the period's most insurgent film collective, Genç Sinema Grubu, the Young Filmmakers Group (YFG, active from 1967 to 1971), turned to the internationalism of the film radicalisms of the 1960s in order to apprehend how the global dialectic between capitalist modernization and colonial domination was operationalized in their own country.[30] It was the encounter with the film practices and theories of third cinema, in particular, that prompted their reconsideration of Turkey as itself a colonized, underdeveloped country.

This encounter with the internationalism of militant cinema shaped the YFG's aesthetic tactics and distribution strategies, but also their critical writings on film. The group developed a periodical, *Genç Sinema Devrimci Sinema Dergisi* (*Young Cinema: Revolutionary Cinema*

---

[28] Paul Douglas Grant, *Cinéma Militant: Political Filmmaking and May 1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 1-7.

[29] *Yeşilçam* literally translates as the Green Pine, a name derived from a street in İstanbul, where Turkish film production companies were once headquartered in the 20th century. The period from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s is commonly known as the "golden age" of Turkish cinema due primarily to the sheer rate of production; at the time, the Green Pine was one of the world's most productive film industries, with 229 films produced in 1966 alone. Throughout this thesis work, the author uses the English translation, the Green Pine. See Iain Robert Smith, "'Beam Me up, Ömer': Transnational Media Flow and the Cultural Politics of the Turkish *Star Trek* Remake," *The Velvet Light Trap* 61, no. 1 (2008): 4. See also Asuman Suner, "Horror of a Different Kind: Dissonant Voices of the New Turkish Cinema," *Screen* 45, no. 4 (2004): 305-10.

[30] Throughout this chapter, for consistency, the author uses Murat Akser's phrase/translation, the Young Filmmakers Group (abbreviated as YFG), to refer to the filmmakers associated with the *Young Cinema* journal. (The author only occasionally uses terms like the collective, the group, and the young filmmakers.) Akser's work on independent filmmaking in Turkey is one of the few academic sources to perceive the group essentially as a film collective, which mentions the YFG in a couple of sentences. See Murat Akser, "Turkish Independent Cinema: Between Bourgeois Auteurism and Political Radicalism," in *Independent Filmmaking around the Globe*, ed. Doris Baltuschat and Mary P. Erickson (University of Toronto Press, 2015), 139.

Journal, 1968-1971), which worked as a space to develop the theoretical premises that would be worked out in their films.[31] Specifically, the group's writings demonstrate profound similarities with the Latin American manifestos of the 1960s, such as Julio García Espinosa's and Espinosa's conception of "imperfect cinema," embracing amateurism as the privileged mode to reflect upon and, simultaneously, criticize the Turkish condition.[32] Contrary to the amateur film cultures of home moviemaking, the YFG embraced a radically politicized configuration of amateurism as a weapon necessary to fight the guerilla war against the country's once-dominant cinema industry—the Green Pine.[33] It was this primary objective that resulted in the creation of short films as a practice of counter-information. In amalgamating documentary modes with the narrative film, these shorts appeared in the shape of what Espinosa refers to as "partisan" images or what the young filmmakers defined as "simple" images.[34]

The concept of the *simple image* encapsulates tactics that are familiar within the repertoire of militant cinema: dialectical montage, disjunctions between sound and image, and a preference for the documentary mode.[35] However, the YFG placed particular investment in the notion of re-appropriation. Although the group was combating an industry of film adaptation—the Green Pine, one of its most prevalent approaches in constructing the simple image was the re-appropriation of pre-existing auditory and visual texts. Using heterogeneous texts as source

---

[31] Throughout this thesis, the author refers to *Young Cinema: Revolutionary Cinema Journal* either as *Young Cinema* or the journal.
[32] See Stark, "'Cinema in the Hands of the People': Chris Marker, the Medvedkin Group, and the Potential of Militant Film," *October* 138 (Winter 2012): 117-50; See also Christina Gerhardt and Sara Saljoughi, "Looking Back: Global Cinema and the Legacy of New Waves around 1968," in *1968 and Global Cinema*, ed. Christina Gerhardt and Sara Saljoughi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2018), 8.
[33] Charles Tepperman, *Amateur Cinema: The Rise of North American Moviemaking 1923-1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 228.
[34] Both Espinosa's "For an Imperfect Cinema" and Yakub Barokas's "Simple Cinema" essays were published (originally) in 1969. See Julio García Espinosa, "For an Imperfect Cinema (Cuba, 1969)" in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 220-30; Yakup Barokas, "Basit Sinema," *Genç Sinema* 10, (October 1969): 11-2.
[35] The key source of inspiration behind this term is Kodwo Eshun and Ros Gray's *originary* concept, the "militant image." See Kodwo Eshun, and Ros Gray, "The Militant Image: A Ciné-Geography: Editors' Introduction," 1.

materials, the simple image altered the terms of appropriation in the country by contrasting the image of the oppressed with that of the oppressor and revealing composite soundtracks deprived of dialogue. The young filmmakers screened their amateur, remixed, and ripped-off images for free in workers' syndicates, university halls, and village streets in order to critique Turkey's ascending consumer culture, to reveal the poverty overtaking urban spaces, and to demonstrate the class struggle in the country. This set of imperatives created both a different artistic appeal and distinct reception context from the Green Pine (as well as the brief social-realist movements of Turkish cinema that came before this aggressive culture of cinephilia). The YFG's combination of amateurism, re-appropriation, and extra-institutional distribution thus challenged the very terms of ciné-cultural resistance in Turkey.

While the YFG was a major engine of aesthetic innovation, today their cinema and its surrounding discourses have scarcely survived decades of repression. The group members lost their long battle against various disciplinary mechanisms of the state, faced censorship legislation and the destruction of their filmography, and became almost invisible to activists, cinephiles, and students in Turkey and beyond. Although the collective's work speaks to present-day activist film and video in Turkey, it is largely absent in discussions surrounding political filmmaking in the country.[36] By examining the young filmmakers' shorts in light of their film-theoretical writings, the rest of this chapter re-engages with the YFG's under-studied work and investigates the permutations of the simple image in the view of the broader history of political cinema in 1960s Turkey. I aim to show how the collision between Turkish cinema and the film radicalisms of Latin America and France catalyzed a new direction for politicized filmmaking in

[36] Akser, "Turkish Independent Cinema," 139-40.

the country and largely anticipated both the contemporary video activism and documentary practice of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

1.1 Contexts and Key Tendencies in Turkish Political Cinema

The YFG arose within a complex political landscape, with distinct cinematic production contexts, as well as the contemporaneous cinematic movements that set up the conditions for the collective's arrival. This period witnessed both the rise of Turkish "second cinema" of a sort, as exemplified by Metin Erksan's Golden Bear-winning *Susuz Yaz* [*Dry Summer*] (1963), and the emergence of a "revolutionary" cinema, bearing some resemblance to Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino's concept of "third cinema," most famously associated with the works of Yılmaz Güney.[37] Solanas and Getino's influential classificatory terms require some clarification in the Turkish context. Unlike countries in the Global South, Turkey was not a colonized state as such, despite several military interventions, including those in 1960, 1971, and 1980.[38] Nonetheless, the political cultures surrounding May 1968, both in Europe and Latin America, had a profound impact on how the nation's underclasses would learn to identify with the liberation struggles of the Global South, informing the future of both cultural production and political life in the country for at least a decade.

The postwar public policies of the governments of Turkey accelerated a series of socioeconomic crises; the state's eagerness for rapid modernization created industrialized urban spaces inhabited by the nation's underclasses. The Turkish political agenda of the 1950s and

---

[37] Fernando Solanas, and Octavio Getino, "Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World (Argentina, 1969)," in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 231-38.
[38] Dennis Giles and Haluk Sahin, "Yílmaz Güney Revolutionary Cinema in Turkey," *Jump Cut* 27 (July 1982): 35-7.

1960s included a group of government reform programs and state-supported industrialization initiatives that were designed to eschew the Ottoman legacy and orient the country towards the West. As Turkey took part in the Marshall Plan and then joined NATO, both of which boosted the US economic aid, Americanization came to dominate the projects of modernization.[39] This process ultimately resulted in domestic migration from the rural provinces to the urban centers, giving rise to the emergence of a new class—the "*lumpenproletariat*."[40] Because of the rapid expansion of mechanized farming across the country, the largely illiterate peasantry lost their old jobs and left their villages for the cities to find employment in a newly industrialized economy. Yet the modernized environment did not warmly welcome the masses from the Eastern rural areas of Turkey (such as Kurds). Consequently, the new suburbs where the poor workers "had to toil all day and return to their uncomfortable homes" were displaced from the metropoles.[41] Government services failed to meet basic needs for education and healthcare, while the underpaid migrants increasingly constituted a hardworking underclass. The sociocultural backdrop of modernization and its concomitant segregations of space along class lines, provided a key basis for the political upheavals of the late 1960s.

The early 1960s thus set the stage for Turkey's youthful leftists, inspired in part by the climate of revolt surrounding May '68, rallied against the nation state's project of Americanized modernization. The summer of 1968 launched years of countrywide turmoil in the universities, public institutions, and urban suburbia. As was the case throughout Europe, the powerful identification with the Vietnamese struggle was spreading among both students and workers. A

---

[39] Nezih Erdoğan, "Powerless Signs: Hybridity and the Logic of Excess of Turkish Trash," in *Mapping the Margins: Identity, Politics, and the Media*, ed. Karen Ross, Brenda Dervin, and Deniz Derman (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2003), 163-66.
[40] Murat Akser, "Yılmaz Güney's Beautiful Losers: Idiom and Performance in Turkish Political Film," in *Cinema and Politics: Turkish Cinema and the New Europe*, ed. Deniz Bayraktar, Asli Kotaman, and Samav Ugursoy (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), 147.
[41] Akser, "Yılmaz Güney's Beautiful Losers," 148.

break with state-imposed identities eventually formed a collective front against capitalist imperialism. President Lyndon Johnson's letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, a national hero during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-23), concerning the Cyprus dispute of the mid-1960s, was relatively less ill-mannered than Trump's famous letter to Erdoğan before Operation Peace Spring yet equally patronizing. Johnson's threats served to reinforce the leftist factions' anti-Americanist stand.[42] Centering on such issues as the presence of the US 6th Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, the chaotic political climate sharply increased the youths' radicalism. Countless student marches across Ankara and İstanbul further escalated tensions within the country. While the nationwide protests together with workers' strikes continued, a group of young amateur filmmakers published the first issue of *Young Cinema* (in October 1968) to take an active stand in support of revolutionary aims and ideals.

When the journal's first issue came out, the cultural influence of the collectivist movement was at its peak. The Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1968) caused ruptures and splits in the leftist faction and groups, especially among the youth. Türkiye İşçi Partisi (the "Workers' Party of Turkey"), one of the first socialist parties, was losing momentum and popularity while the revolutionary student leaders entered the country's political life. In Murat Belge's sense, this new, youthful movement was "eye-opening" for cultural production.[43] Underground press circulated many independent journals, including *Young Cinema*, and some translations from Marxist-Leninist literature. Through this circulation, young revolutionaries familiarized themselves with the corpus of poets, such as the *romantic* communist Nazım Hikmet

[42] Emin Alper's discussion of May '68 in Turkey covers the Cyprus issue of 1964, focusing on the US's intervention in the Six-Day War (1967). See Emin Alper, "Protest Diffusion and Rising Political Violence in the Turkish '68 Movement: The Arab-Israeli War," in *Dynamics of Political Violence: a Process-oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*, ed. Chares Demetriou (London: Routledge, 2016), 255-57.
[43] Murat Belge, "Türkiye'de Sosyalizm Tarihinin Ana Çizgileri," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, ed. Murat Gültekingil (İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 20-2.

whose works had been banned for decades. Musician Cem Karaca's 45s, known for their social-realist underpinnings, and Anatolian Rock—a fusion of the rock and roll genre and Turkish folk music tradition—hit the country's cultural market as well. But the movement of social realism fully manifested itself in the works of novelists, playwrights, and short story writers, some of whom were especially influenced by Brechtian aesthetics and epic theatre, such as Haldun Taner. In the case of filmmaking, however, the late 1960s marked the rise of an ultimately conservative and commercial cinema that would anticipate the "golden years" of popular Turkish cinema.[44]

1.1.1 The Green Pine

Turkey has a long and celebrated history of appropriation in its filmmaking. This began with the golden age known as the Green Pine, a metonym for the period between 1960s and 1980s. During this period of Turkish film, characters, imagery, plots, and sound were pulled from foreign films, particularly Hollywood fare, and then retooled for the local industry.[45] The period largely capitalized on melodrama, the most popular genre of the time, comedy, and historical action/adventure together with many subgenres like the erotic thriller, the Euro-western, and the superhero picture.[46] Financial hardships, high levels of local audience demand, and tight production schedules forced directors to define the Green Pine's output as low-budget "*quickies*"—written, shot, and edited in less than a month.[47] Circulating in movie theatres across the country, the Green Pine's quickies created long-running series and stable star personas. In viewing the Green Pine as a capitalist monopoly and representation of the imperialist production

---

[44] See note 10.
[45] Ahmet Gürata, "Hollywood in Vernacular: Translation and Cross-cultural Reception of American films in Turkey," in *Going to the movies: Hollywood and the Social Experience of Cinema*, ed. Melvyn Stokes, Robert C. Allen, and Richard Maltby (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2007), 334-35.
[46] Nezih Erdoğan and Deniz Göktürk, "Turkish Cinema," in *Companion Encyclopaedia of Middle Eastern and North African Film*, ed. Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 2001), 535-37.
[47] See note 9 and Smith, "Beam Me up Ömer," 4.

system, the YFG was determined to undermine this movement at the levels of production, exhibition/distribution, and reception.[48] Through *Young Cinema*, the group articulated the counter-objective to create an independent and revolutionary cinema. To enact such a counter-cinema, the YFG refused not only the Green Pine, but also all the previous and concurrent attempts that framed themselves as alternatives to the Green Pine. The first of these efforts to displace the Green Pine from its role at the center of cinema was the National Cinema Group.

1.1.2 The National Cinema Group

Inspired both by the growing social-realist tendencies in the areas of cultural production and Italian neorealism, a loosely organized group of directors created the cinematic movement Ulusal Sinema (the National Cinema) in the early 1960s. Making the groundbreaking films of the country's *second* cinema, young auteurs like Halit Refiğ and Metin Erksan mainly used a thematic approach to depict the social problems stemming from class distinction. Accordingly, their outputs appeared as distinct from the Green Pine's genre pictures.[49] As Refiğ and Erksan shifted the Green Pine classics' regular setting—the urban areas of modern İstanbul—to the rural areas of Anatolia, a different aesthetic from the Green Pine's films emerged. Refiğ's *Şehirdeki Yabancı* [*Stranger in the City*] (1962), which blends the semantics of the Green Pine melodrama with a critique of an emergent technocratic class and middle-class working conditions, announced the birth of the movement. This tactic, the thematic incorporation of sociocultural criticism in a Green Pine-type film, is also apparent in Erksan's 1962 adaptation of Fakir

[48] M. Mert Örsler and Colleen Kennedy-Karpat, "Cem Yılmaz and Genre Parody in Turkish National Cinema," *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 48, no.1 (2020), 38-48.
[49] Aslı Daldal, "The Concept of 'National Cinema' and the 'New Turkish Cinema'," in *New Cinema, New Media: Reinventing Turkish Cinema*, ed. Murat Akser, and Deniz Bayrakdar (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2014), 92-3.

Baykurt's eponymous social-realist novel *Yılanların Öcü* [*Revenge of the Snakes*] (1954). But the National Cinema's films challenged neither the classical Green Pine film style nor its capitalist distribution structure.[50] The movement's films had been in fact funded by the Green Pine's producers, such as Nusret İkbal.[51] Hence, in the context of the Green Pine, whose industrial spirit was defined by cycles and series, the longevity of the National Cinema depended chiefly on success at the box office. This inherent dependence on existing dominant structures was the main criticism made by the YFG toward the National Cinema, which led to a long debate between the two groups regarding a possible alternative to the Green Pine.

Particularly, an epistemological conflict between the YFG and the National Cinema Group was grounded in their fundamental difference in understanding 1960s Turkey. For the National Cinema directors, the sociocultural specificity of Turkey's Ottoman legacy could not be framed in terms of the colonial pasts of Europe or the Global South.[52] Drawing upon a practical Marxist analysis of history, Refiğ, for instance, especially underlines the enduring links between the Ottoman mode of production, feudalism, and mid-century Turkey.[53] Accordingly, Turkish culture "was different and it had to be judged in its own terms," in Dennis Giles and Haluk Sahin's words.[54] Based on this line of thought, the National Cinema Group did not adapt filmmaking models from capitalist states or socialist countries to the particular Turkish context.[55] But the young filmmakers who perceived Turkey as an underdeveloped country—similar to Solanas and Getino's understanding of the "third world" countries—made the opposite

[50] Daldal, "The Concept of 'National Cinema' and the 'New Turkish Cinema'," 94 (my emphasis).
[51] Ibid., 95.
[52] Akser, Murat and Didem Durak-Akser. "Fight for a National Cinema: An Introductory Text and Translation (Halit Refiğ, 1971)." *Film Studies* 16, no. 1 (2017): 60-5.
[53] Ibid., 61-3.
[54] Giles and Sahin, "Yílmaz Güney Revolutionary Cinema in Turkey," 35.
[55] Ibid., 36.

argument.[56] Regardless of its Ottoman past, the capitalist mode of production was dominant in Turkey, prompting the group to adopt militant strategies in the cinematic fight against the Green Pine. This difference in perception laid the foundation of the YFG's infused method of filmmaking between 1967 and 1971—a blend of French *Cinéma militant* and Latin American third cinema. During this period between the two military coups of 1960 and 1971, the flame of progressive cinema sparked by the National Cinema received full individual support from an independent director from both groups—the legendary figure of exilic and diasporic filmmaking: Yılmaz Güney.

1.1.3 Yılmaz Güney

Running concurrent with the amateur cinema of the YFG, Kurdish-Turkish actor-turned-director Yılmaz Güney represents the professional arm of militant third cinema in Turkey, as marked by *Umut* [*Hope*] (1970), which became a *cause célèbre* in the country.[57] While discussing some key third cinema directors across the world ranging from Jorge Sanjinés to Ousmane Sembène, Roy Armes describes Güney's life as among the most dramatic of filmmakers, a life in which imprisonment was as ordinary as writing scenarios and directing movies from jail.[58] Distinct from the documentary aesthetic of his late films, Güney's early films include a couple of quasi-westerns, such as *Aç Kurtlar* [*The Hungry Wolves*] (1969). These genre pictures illuminate a transition point where Güney starts dissociating himself with the star aura of Çirkin Kral (the

[56] Solanas and Getino, "Towards a Third Cinema," 231-3.
[57] Giles and Sahin regards *Umut [Hope]* (1970) as the flagship of revolutionary cinema in Turkey. See Giles and Sahin, "Yílmaz Güney Revolutionary Cinema in Turkey," 37.
[58] Roy Armes, *Third World Film Making and the West* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 269. Güney's dramatic life story led one of his friends from the exile years in Paris—Fernando Solanas—to dedicate *Tangos, el exilio de Gardel [Tangos, the Exile of Gardel]* (1986) to him after Güney's death as a stateless person. See also Hamid Naficy, *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 108.

“Ugly King”), his moniker derived from the Green Pine’s cycle of western appropriations in which he repeatedly played the lead characters.[59] This transition in Güney’s filmography from popular film cycles to radical political cinema is explicitly manifest, for instance, in *Seyyit Han: Toprağın Gelini* [*Seyyit Han: Bride of the Earth*] (1968). The film blends the western genre’s iconography with a social-realist critique of southeastern rural areas in which the majority of the Kurdish population lived.

Similar to *Hope*, *Seyyit Han* is a semi-autobiographical film that ultimately reflects the Kurdish experience in the ancient region Cilicia of southern Anatolia. The film’s setting is the region’s Yenice village where Güney’s family emigrated to from southeast Turkey. In reference to the western film iconography, the heroic title character Seyyit Han (played by Güney himself)—a bandit in a white hat wanted by the Gendarme—represents the force of good, whereas the antagonist Haydar—a (feudal) landlord who wears a black hat—portrays the oppression against the Kurdish peasantry. The Green Pine’s aesthetics, however, still dominate the black-and-white frames. For example, an appropriated non-diegetic musical score composed by Ennio Morricone for Sergio Leone’s spaghetti-westerns accompanies the film’s conversations filmed in single, unnaturally blocked two-shots rather than shot/reverse shot sequences. Yet, produced in a period when the very existence of Kurdish ethnicity was (widely) unrecognized by the Turkish government, *Seyyit Han* is revolutionary as a film with characters that bear Kurdish names, and that depicts the social realities of rural areas where feudal landowners continued to oppress the illiterate local peasantry. Güney’s attempts at third cinema, including *Seyyit Han*, were important for crystallizing the energy of the YFG; the first screening of *Seyyit Han* in the small office of *Türk Sinematek Derneği* (the Turkish Cinematheque Association, the

[59] Ali F. Sengul, “On the Spatial Ideology of Turkish Cinema (the West as ‘Outside’),” in *International Westerns: Re-Locating the Frontier*, ed. Cynthia J. Miller, and A. Bowdoin Van Riper (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2014), 32-4.

Cinematheque hereafter) was attended by youth who would go on to officially form the YFG later that year.

1.2 The Young Cinema of Turkey

Rather than acting (only) as a film archive and preservation center, the Cinematheque was one of the very few organizations that enabled the country's young cinephiles to keep up with cinematic movements and their outputs around the globe. Wanting to establish an institution similar to the famous *La Cinémathèque française* in Turkey, poet and writer Onat Kutlar (who later awarded *L'Ordre des Arts et des Lettres* by the French government) formed İstanbul's cinematheque in 1965, with significant support from his friend Henri Langlois, who was born in the Turkish city of Izmir.[60] From its establishment to its dissolution (in the wake of the 1980 Turkish *coup d'état*), the Cinematheque had been a sociocultural hub for both amateur and professional cineastes to watch the works of the period's prominent auteurs, ranging from Chris Marker to Glauber Rocha, accompanied by debates, discussions, and talks after each screening.[61] Apart from its function as an informal school for young cinephiles, the Cinematheque published a few film magazines, such as *Yeni Sinema* (*New Cinema*, 1966-1970). *New Cinema* also featured articles about the French New Wave as well as the Left Bank Group and Marker.[62] Although this liberal intellectual environment gave rise to the YFG's radical political stance, its relationship with the Cinematheque was full of tensions and breaks.

---

[60] See Ay, Ayşecan, (2019) A Brief History of Turkish Cinémathèque Association, Observatoire de la Turquie Contemporaine Short Paper Series, No: 1, Institut Français de Géopolitique, Paris 8th University, Available at: http://observatoireturquie.fr.
[61] Mert Kaplan, "Üçüncü Sinemada Devrimci Kimliğin Sunumu: Türk Sinemasından Örnekler," *Istanbul Journal of Social Sciences* 20 (Spring 2018), 42.
[62] Tuncan Okan, "Neden Yeni Dalga/Kısa Bir Tarihçe ve Sinematek'teki Yeni Dalga Filmleri," *Yeni Sinema* 1, (March 1966), 13-6.

The Cinematheque's financial dependence on a Turkish business, the Ezcacıbaşı family, along with numerous other disagreements with its members, led a handful of amateurs to start making films and writing articles themselves. Artun Yeres, Engin Ayça, Mutlu Parkan, and Üstün Barışta organized around the then-forthcoming film journal *Young Cinema*. They formed the skeleton crew of the YFG, although Ayça did not immediately dissociate himself with the Cinematheque. Later, Gaye Petek, Jak Şalom, and Yakup Barokas together with İbrahim Bergman from Ankara and Muammer Özer from Eskişehir became the "young filmmakers," and the total number of the collective's members reached thirty.[63] Coming from different ethnic, racial, and religious communities—which included the country's Armenian, Jewish, Kurdish, and Turkish cultures—the group members shared an ideological orientation with one another. None of the YFG members, except Ayça and Barışta, received any formal education in filmmaking while they were active in the group; however, they paid attention to amateur film circuits, contests, and festivals.

The informal networks of circulation and exhibition, such as *Young Cinema* itself and non-professional short film contests, offered venues through which the YFG could convey its messages to attentive audiences. The first issue of *Young Cinema* came out with a concise film manifesto and several short essays by Barışta, Petek, Şalom, Parkan, Soner, and Ayça, which announced the group's agenda.[64] The editorial content of the journal comprised mainly of think pieces about the global political events of the 1960s, ranging from the civil rights movement in

---

[63] Ahmet Soner's short article published in the journal *Belgesel Sinema Belgesel Defterleri* ("Documentary Cinema: Documentary Notebooks") provides a brief history of the group in Turkish. See Ahmet Soner, "Eski Defterler," *Belgesel Sinema 3* (Spring 2003), 73-8.

[64] Reading the Turkish politics of the 1960s through *Young Cinema*'s extra-cinematic activism and leftist radicalism, Esra Yıldız's book chapter—one of the very few, if not the only, published academic essay(s) on the YFG—includes a brief summary of the group's manifesto. See Esra Yıldız, "Lost Images, Silenced Past," in *The Politics of Culture in Turkey, Greece & Cyprus: Performing the Left Since the Sixties*, ed. Leonidas Karakatsanis, and Nikolaos Papadogiannis (Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis, 2017), 143.

the US to guerilla warfare in Bolivia, from the military junta in Peru to the French student-worker revolt, and from the Mexican student movement to American atrocities in Vietnam.[65] Planned at first to be a monthly paperback but published usually bimonthly and occasionally quarterly due to extreme financial difficulties, *Young Cinema* also featured audience interviews, articles on the collective's films, global cinema, and the Green Pine, manifestos on the YFG's philosophy of filmmaking, and some writings about the national political agenda. Hisar Kısa Film Şenlikleri (the Hisar Short Film Contests, 1967-1970), organized annually by a private high school in İstanbul, provided the first opportunity to showcase the YFG's films in non-35 mm format(s) and partially to fund their filmmaking activities. But the Anglo-Dutch oil and gas company Shell's presence as the main sponsor of the second contest—perceived as an indication of capitalist-imperialism—led the group to drop out of the competitions.[66] As a result, the YFG decided to organize their own film festival, Devrim Sineması Şenliği (the Revolutionary Cinema Festival, 1970), which rapidly became part of the collective's distribution network. Inherited from the Cinematheque, transnational influences inspired the group's later practices.

The works of the YFG reflect a keen awareness of third cinema and a vigorous interest in Rocha and other Latin American directors whose work, taken collectively, shaped their ideas. The most apparent example of such a transcultural interaction is the cover of *Young Cinema*'s first issue, embellished with an iconic image from Rocha's *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* [*Black God, White Devil*] (1964). The image depicts a young revolutionary shouting slogan while holding up his left hand in a fist. The YFG's infatuation with Rocha is further evident in the articles inside, for example, in an essay entitled "Reinvention of Cinema" (1968), which

[65] Cenk Cengiz's master's thesis, focusing specifically on the *Young Cinema* journal, overviews the thematic pattern between the journal's articles. See Cenk Cengiz, "Kısa Süreli Bir Sinema Dergisinin Analizi: Genç Sinema, Türkiye, 1968-1971," (Master's thesis, Sabancı University, 2010), 26-28.
[66] Yıldız, "Lost Images, Silenced Past," 145.

describes the YFG as "beginning at zero" in reference to the Brazilian director's eponymous article.[67] Rocha's works were known by the YFG because a 1964 special issue of the nationally circulated journal *Turkish Language* on cinema published a Turkish translation of his essay, "The Aesthetics of Hunger" (1964), and a *New Cinema* issue featured a dedicated section to the Brazilian director in 1968.[68] Also, before the publication of *Young Cinema*'s first issue, Ayça attended the Fourth Pesaro Film Festival in Italy—which is where he, Barışta, and Espinosa were once classmates at the Italian national film school, Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia. In subsequent issues of *Young Cinema*, Yakup Barokas cites Rocha's *Terre em Transe* [*Entranced Earth*] (1967) as an ideal example of political film falling in the "categories outside popular cinema."[69] Moreover, Barokas, in the same issues, defines the futuristic goal of the YFG as "creating a cinema," with aesthetic principles and financial resources, similar to Brazilian *Cinema Novo*'s in Turkey.[70] Impressed by Solanas and Getino's *La hora de los hornos* [*The Hour of the Furnaces*] (1968), Ayça also wrote a review about the co-directed film for *New Cinema* in the same year. The encounter between the YFG and militant third cinema did not only manifest in their writings, but it also influenced the collective's filmmaking and distribution practices.

The group's matrix of distribution/exhibition practices centered on two extra-institutional and non-professional channels. Both 16'lık Gezginci Sinema (the 16 mm Cinema on Wheels) and the Revolutionary Cinema Festival aimed to destroy the structures of the Green Pine movie

---

[67] Engin Ayça, "Sinemayı Yeniden İcadetmek," *Genç Sinema* 1, (October 1968): 14. See also Glauber Rocha and Joanne Pottlitzer, "Beginning at Zero: Notes on Cinema and Society," *The Drama Review: TDR* 14, no. 2 (Winter 1970), 146 (my emphasis).
[68] In a Turkish book about global cinematic movements, Esin Coşkun references Nijat Özön's translation of Rocha's famous manifesto. See Esen E. Coşkun. *Dünya Sinemasında Akımlar* (Ankara: Phonix Yayınları, 2017), 287.
[69] See Yakup Barokas, "Yeni Bir Aşamaya Doğru," *Genç Sinema* 5, (February 1969): 11; Yakup Barokas, "Devrimci Açıdan Öz ve Biçim II," *Genç Sinema* 7, (May 1969), 9.
[70] Ibid., 12; Ibid., 10.

palace. The YFG members' 16 mm Cinema on Wheels program is not unlike French militant film director René Vautier's "Vertov- and Medvedkin-inspired projection vans" in the anti-colonial context of 1960s Algeria, and yet the group was using a ciné-pickup in mid-century Turkey.[71] That is to say, in tune with Solanas and Getino's "Towards a Third Cinema" manifesto, the young filmmakers themselves "reinvented" their "revolutionary distribution system" in the Turkish context.[72] First, *Young Cinema* announced that the 16 mm Cinema on Wheels would start visiting universities, worker's syndicates, and any other organizations willing to screen the group's films.[73] Receiving many positive responses to the call, the collective's members showed some of their films at Middle East Technical University (METU)'s forums and in a student film society at Karadeniz Technical University as well as at the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey and the Oil, Chemical, and Rubber Workers' Union of Turkey.[74] Several YFG filmmakers also showed their films in many rural areas and villages to the local peasantry.[75] In Getino's words, the non-commercial and non-theatrical distribution of the group's films were predominantly circumscribed within the "underground circuits" and "screenings for a small number of audiences."[76] Distinct from the 16 mm Cinema on Wheels program, the Revolutionary Cinema Festival attempted primarily to reach audiences outside İstanbul; YFG films were screened in several Anatolian cities, including Ankara and Antalya.

---

[71] See Matthew Croombs, "Questions of Militant Cinema: René Vautier and the Anti-colonial Combat Film," filmed April 2014 at the Institute of African Studies – Carleton University, Ottawa, video, 1:20:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wavoGS42Nms&t=680s. See also Matthew Croombs, "In the Wake of Militant Cinema," 5.
[72] Solanas and Getino, "Towards a Third Cinema," 245.
[73] "Genç Sinema'dan," *Genç Sinema* 12, (March 1970), 2.
[74] "Genç Sinema'dan," *Genç Sinema* 7, (May 1969), 2.
[75] Hilmi Etikan's documentary about the history of the short film in Turkey includes interviews with the group's members like Ahmet Soner, commenting on their distribution mechanisms. See Hilmi Etikan, "Türkiye'de Kısa Filmin Tarihi: 1967-2006," filmed 2016, Istanbul, video, 1:37:23, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zBPQiyzU_M.
[76] Octavio Getino, "The Cinema as Political Fact," 45.

The Festival's included both 16 mm and 8 mm films, talks before and after the film screenings, and an awards system—the audience's votes in different cities determined the first, second, and third place winners for a city.[77] The parallel between militant third cinema and the YFG is particularly powerful at this level of circulation/exhibition.

In terms of production, the YFG developed the notion of a *simple* cinema, committed to destroying the dominant Green Pine film grammar through the use of techniques like dialectical montage. For Barokas, the "simplicity" of the simple image combines the conditions of dire economic hardships with a revolutionary attitude.[78] The young filmmaker, who certainly could not afford to make a 35 mm feature-length film, complete with an editing table and light meter, a camera dolly and fresh unexposed film, the only option was to integrate "documents" into cinematography, editing, and sound. Combined with the ideological goal to strengthen the revolutionary potential of cinema,[79] this militant tactic of the simple image corresponded with increased investment in the short film form. In the YFG's cinematic guerilla fight against the professional film industry, the young revolutionary filmmakers used borrowed 16 mm cameras and collected the film stocks from the Green Pine's garbage as weapons. The concept of simple cinema, which transforms the aesthetic limitations and poverty of cinematic militancy into a positive condition of possibility, has certain resonances with Espinosa's "Imperfect Cinema" for which the questions of "quality" and "good taste" are no longer relevant.[80]

The simple cinema of the young filmmakers was thus the outcome of a specifically politicized amateurism informed by third cinema. For İbrahim Bergman, in the production of the

[77] "Genç Sinema'dan," *Genç Sinema* 13, (June 1970), 2-4.
[78] Barokas uses the Turkish word "basit," which translates as "simple," in his essay. See Yakup Barokas, "Basit Sinema," 10.
[79] Ibid., 11.
[80] Julio García Espinosa, "For an Imperfect Cinema," 229.

simple image, the YFG "has to embrace amateurism" to stay outside the commercial domain of the Green Pine—which "relies on cliché images, far from telling the stories of the peoples' real problems."[81] Hence, as Masha Salazkina and Enrique Fibla-Gutierrez argue for amateur cinephilia, the young filmmakers created a "space" of non-professionalism to "engage in social reality" that "mainstream media often ignored."[82] But the *form* of amateurism was radically dissimilar, for instance, from that of North American amateur cinephilia. The conventional discourse of amateur cinema largely revolves around the "motion pictures of the family" and "travelogues or chronicle films" made by a class of wealthy aficionados.[83] Exhibited beyond the familial space, the simple image instead struggled to represent poverty and harsh living and working conditions. For example, in 1968 YFG filmmaker Muammer Özer made a documentary along with factory workers from Eskişehir, [84] demonstrating factory conditions in a way almost identical to French *Cinéma militant*, especially to Marker's Medvedkin Group. The YFG's combination of amateurism with the militant tradition is apparent in the three black-and-white, surviving simple films, *Asayiş Berkemal* (*All Quiet*, Ahmet Soner, 1967), *Beyoğlu 68* (Artun Yeres and Jak Şalom, 1968), and *Kördüğüm* (*Deadlock*, Muammer Özer, 1970), all of which evidence the aesthetic and narrative strategies of the young filmmakers.

An adaptation of the Turkish social-realist writer Samim Kocagöz's short story named *Teneke* ("Tinplate," 1954), Soner's *All Quiet* tells the story of poverty in urban suburbia and beyond. In Espinosa's sense, it is a film "of those who struggle" and "finds its theme in their problems."[85] Soner's short frames its central conflict through two characters: a poor homeless

[81] İbrahim Bergman, "Sanat Olayı ve Halk," *Genç Sinema* 2, (November 1968), 10.
[82] Masha Salazkina and Enrique Fibla-Gutierrez, "Introduction: Toward a Global History of Amateur Film Practices and Institutions," *Film History* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2018): xiii. See also Masha Salazkina, "Introduction to Juan Piqueras: Amateur Cinema in Nuestro Cinema." *Cinema Journal* 51, no. 4 (Summer 2012), 138-43.
[83] Tepperman, *Amateur Cinema*, 226.
[84] Muammer Özer, "Eskişehir'li Genç Sinemacıların Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını," *Genç Sinema* 10, (November 1969), 3.
[85] Espinosa, "For an Imperfect Cinema," 228.

youth—portraying the working class—and a meddlesome watchman—representing the state authority. The watchman starts chasing the poor youngster who earns a livelihood by collecting tinplates from the garbage. The homeless youth comes to stand in for the problem of poverty and unemployment in 1960s Turkey. Throughout, the hand-held camera movements synchronize with the non-diegetic sound that Soner himself made by creatively using a film projection device and a tinplate.[86] The spirit of amateurism manifests itself in casting as well. Erdal Özyağcılar, featured as the homeless youth, was the filmmaker's friend, a conservatory student at the time, who only became a professional actor much later.[87]

Using non-narrative footage of an actual street person who collects tinplates, the establishing shot of *All Quiet* incorporates "documents," in Barokas's sense, into its aesthetic tactics.[88] Hence Soner's amateur short film blurs the very boundaries between fiction and non-fiction, as was characteristic of the simple image. Following from this documentary footage, a sequence displays an arrangement of tinplates. Within seconds, they suddenly start vanishing without a trace, one by one. These abrupt disappearances point to an allegorical meaning, a message related to poverty: even jobs with the most uncomfortable conditions were scarce in 1960s Turkey. The tinplate sequence also reveals a specific aesthetic strategy of Brechtian distanciation effects; indeed, the use of a Bertolt Brecht quote about distancing effects as an epigraph of Gaye Petek's essay in the fifth issue of *Young Cinema* reiterates the affinity between the simple image and the "Brechtian tactics of estrangement."[89] Encouraging the viewer to be

---

[86] Soner explains how he made the film music in Etikan's documentary. See Etikan, "Türkiye'de Kısa Filmin Tarihi."

[87] Erdal Özyağcılar (eventually) became a popular actor both in and outside Turkey, especially for his appearance in *Yabancı Damat [The Foreign Groom]* (2004-2007).

[88] Barokas, "Basit Sinema," 11.

[89] Gaye Petek was also one of the very few women associated with the YFG. See Gaye Petek, "Etkin Bir Seyirci Yaratmak," *Genç Sinema* 5 (February 1969), 4. See also Croombs, "In the Wake of Militant Cinema: Challenges for Film Studies," 5.

conscious of the cinematic experience, *All Quiet*'s Brechtian tinplates, which instantaneously appear and disappear, call for action against both the living conditions within suburbia and the broader issue of unemployment. But beyond its status as a historical document, Soner's film eerily foreshadowed the class conditions of the future. Representing people who collect garbage to earn a living, *All Quiet* speaks to present-day Turkey where extreme poverty forces many groups of people like Syrian refugees and asylum seekers at the country's border to scavenge for survival.[90] The concluding moments of Soner's film seem hopeful about the future of the country, however, when the watchman eventually realizes and becomes sympathetic to the everyday poverty of urban street life.

The representation of social realities likewise marks *Beyoğlu 68*, which is a short documentary whose narrative strategies critique the ascending consumer society in Turkey. Impressed by *Paris vu par…* [*Six in Paris*] (1965)—co-directed by six directors in six provinces—as well as by the writings of Guy Debord—whose ideas in *La société du spectacle* [*The Society of the Spectacle*] (1967) influenced May '68 itself—filmmakers Yeres and Şalom decided to document the activity of Beyoğlu, İstanbul's art, fashion, and nightlife district. Focusing on Beyoğlu's visual culture, the dialectical juxtaposition of department stores and street beggars, businessmen and workers, and advertising billboards and streetcleaners work to condemn the conditions of everyday life in İstanbul's city center. The use of excerpts from several different sources—radio ads, news bulletins, and popular English, French, and Turkish songs—as non-diegetic sound further estranges the film's atmosphere. The Beatles' classic *I'm Only Sleeping* (1966) is ripped off and redeployed as a not-so-subtle signifier of the city's

[90] Turkey is currently hosting the world's largest number of refugees, most of whom are from Syria. See, "Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey - UNHCR Country," unhcr.org, accessed December 22, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey.

descent into a commodity dream-state. If sound is "*détourned*" to attack the "colonization of everyday life," in what was a recurrent theme across French critical theory at the time, then the film's visual strategies function as a method of counter-surveillance against an increasingly militarized police force.[91] Significantly, the final issue of *Young Cinema* featured an article that explored "8 rules for secret filming."[92] In *Beyoğlu 68*, Yeres and Şalom collaboratively operated a borrowed 16 mm camera on the streets,[93] putting these rules into practice by stealthily filming the city's streets during rush hour from high, oblique angles that allude the police's gaze. It is a strategy that recurs in the YFG's most ambitious film, *Deadlock*.

Deadlock represents a synthesis of the group's investment in the political modernisms of the 1920s and 1960s, relying heavily on both intellectual montage and grainy documentary images of the masses in their daily lives to thematize conditions of hunger. The film crosscuts between, on the one hand, a fictional narrative, which plays out as a master-slave relationship between a grotesque, physically abusive masked figure and an enslaved boy in chains, and, on the other hand, clandestine observational footage of the police and the urban proletariat. The film's "aesthetic of hunger" gains momentum as soon as the beaten and starving child tries to eat the leftovers of his persecutor's meal.[94] But it gathers full force when violence—which is "the most notable manifestation of the exploited," in Rocha's words—manifests itself.[95] Facing execution at gun point, the young boy kills the masked man with a hammer, appearing to animate a wave of dissent in the film's documentary universe.[96] The master's death is punctuated by

[91] Anselm Jappe, *Guy Debord* (Oakland: PM Press, 2018), 59.
[92] "Dziga Vertov ve Belgesel Sinema," *Genç Sinema* 16, (April 1970): 5-6.
[93] "Beyoğlu 68," Amateur Cinema Data Base (AMDB), accessed November 28, 2019, https://www.amateurcinema.org/index.php/film/beyolu-68
[94] Glauber Rocha, "The Aesthetics of Hunger (Brazil, 1965)," in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 218.
[95] Ibid., 219.
[96] Ibıd., 220.

images of the people taking up arms, throwing chairs and everyday objects against the militarized police. A string of quick cuts zooms in on newspaper headlines announcing the explosion of protests across the country, as the boy emerges victorious to the sounds of the Turkish socialist saz virtuoso, Ruhi Su.

In the film's closing minutes, Özer's critique of the state's military vigilance dilates outward from the Turkish context. Images of dissent within Turkey are woven into a montage sequence of protest footage from around the world. By showing us manifestations from across Europe and the Global South, the film argues that colonialism is not a third world problem, but a system that is indissociably tied to global capitalism and its guardians in the form of the police. In shaping its internationalist content, moreover, the film draws from the repertoire of internationalist film form. Borrowing a gesture from Eisenstein's *Strike* (1925), Özer concludes the film by juxtaposing the revolting people and the boy in chains with documentary images of cattle set out to slaughter and a lamb being butchered.[97] Made on the heels of February 16, 1969, or "Bloody Sunday" in İstanbul, in which two leftist protesters were killed by the state and the radical right, the film shares a vision with the history of militant cinema, insofar as it represents the counterinsurgency as a system of reducing the people to their brute species being.[98]

Physical repression was, of course, only one form of violence enacted by the state. In recounting the production history of the film itself, Özer describes how he was confronted with various barriers to representation and forms of symbolic violence. He was, first, faced with a scarcity of materials, and left to work with a broken camera that he had to

---

[97] Indeed, a *Young Cinema* article—which values the representation of Vladimir Lenin in Eisenstein's films over others—anticipates such Eisensteinian moments by implying the group's admiration of the Soviet cinemas of the early 20th century. "Sinemada Lenin," *Genç Sinema* 13 (June 1970), 8-10.

[98] Efecan Gürcan and Berk Mete's article (briefly) mentions the "Bloody Sunday." Efe Can Gürcan, and Berk Mete, "The Combined and Uneven Development of Working-class Capacities in Turkey, 1960–2016," *Labor History* 60, no. 3 (2019), 272.

repeatedly repair at the risk of exposing the film to sunlight.[99] During one such episode, Özer was spotted by police and subjected to a series of physical searches. Mistaking his light meter for a bomb, the police arrested him out of fear that he might be a spy.[100] This rather typical episode in the group's history points to the most persistent obstacle against the YFG: censorship.

State censorship, in explicit or implicit forms, has always been an issue for political filmmakers in Turkey, particularly during the periods before and after the military coups of the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout the late 1960s, all filmmakers had to apply for "recording permission" before shooting.[101] A filmmaker could receive this permission through Merkezi Film Kontrol Komisyonu (the Central Commission of Film Control). According to Osman Ertuğ's essay from the twelfth issue of *Young Cinema*, to obtain state permission the filmmakers needed to send the film and/or script to the Commission to initiate a lengthy process of oversight.[102] Ertuğ describes how the films were forbidden from representing the "elements of class consciousness," from criticizing allied countries, such as the US, and from depicting student protests or workers' strikes.[103] In the sixth issue, Soner also mentions that the Commission first rejected permitting *All Quiet* "due to the film's antagonism against the government."[104] When mechanisms of censorship failed to dissuade the collective, their work was subjected to more direct forms of state terror in 1971.

The military memorandum of 1971, known as the coup by memorandum, forcefully intervened with both *Young Cinema* and the YFG's filmmaking practices. Two weeks after the military coup, the journal was coerced into publishing its last, sixteenth issue, which was an

---

[99] Muammer Özer, "'Kördüğüm' Üzerine," *Genç Sinema* 14 (January 1971): 11.
[100] Ibid., 11.
[101] Cengiz, "Kısa Süreli Bir Sinema Dergisinin Analizi: Genç Sinema, Türkiye, 1968-1971," 73.
[102] Osman Ertuğ, "Dikkat Sansür Var (!)," *Genç Sinema* 12 (March 1970), 12-3.
[103] Ibid., 13.
[104] Ahmet Soner, "Sansürün Yılan Hikayesi," *Genç Sinema* 6 (March 1969), 11-2.

index of the military determination to silence the group. In the same week, military authorities destroyed a large portion of the YFG's films. Although Soner was able to hide some film negatives, the subsequent military coup of 1980 demolished the majority of collective's films.[105] Forced to dissolve the group, young filmmakers chose to have fulltime jobs later in their lives. Şalom went to Paris where he served as an assistant to Langlois at the *Cinémathèque française* shortly after the military coup. Soner started collaborating with many professionals, namely Güney. Özer immigrated to Europe to receive formal education and training in filmmaking. The YFG, however, still resonates with activist video and political film in Turkey.

The historical significance of the simple image for Turkish visual artists lies especially in the fact that it represents an attempt to achieve the impossible, despite financial difficulties and state-imposed censorship. The young filmmakers, who were literally selling their blood to afford the necessary equipment to display the sociopolitical realities of Turkey, are still an inspirational source for contemporary film and video collectives with a profoundly similar agenda.[106] One such collective is Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi Sinema Kollektifi (the Cinema Collective of Mesopotamia Cultural Center), particularly active in the late 1990s, when population shifts from southeastern Anatolia to the western metropolises accelerated. Kazım Öz's short documentary *Ellerimiz Kanat Olacak Uçup Gideceğiz* (*Our Hands Will Be the Wings, and We Will Fly Away*, 1996) depicts the interprovincial journey of a Kurdish family, caught up in the fight between the Turkish army and the PKK. Part of a documentary series produced by 2000s Özgür Açılım Kolektifi (the Free Opening Collective), *Unutturulanlar 3: Maraş Katliamı* (*Forgotten 3: Maraş Massacre*, 2004-2008) revisits the political violence against the country's oppressed Alawi

[105] See Etikan, "Türkiye'de Kısa Filmin Tarihi."
[106] Can Candan, "Documentary Cinema in Turkey: A Brief Survey of the Past and the Present (2014)," in *The City in Turkish Cinema*, ed. Hakkı Başgüney and Özge Özdüzen (Istanbul: Libra Yayınları, 2014), 117.

communities by right-wing groups. Artıkişler (the Leftover Works) video collective is another group that builds on the activist heritage of the YFG; the collective's video art installations focus on contemporary sociopolitical issues, such as gentrification, pollution, and refugees in Turkey.

Contrary to the cultures of misinformation and spectacle fostered by global media discourses, which frame Turkey as an intractably fragmented country, the history of the simple image demonstrates a radically different perspective. This perspective opened the promise of solidarity between Turks and peoples from wide-ranging communities in the country, working to represent their distinct but overlapping struggles. But the erasure of militant Turkish filmmakers from the canons of radical political cinema simultaneously threatens to eliminate this alternate vision of coalitional belonging. Today, digitized copies of the YFG's very few shorts are left to languish on Sinematek Dijital Sinema Kütüphanesi (the Sinematek Digital Cinema Library)—an autonomous online archive, founded as a successor of the original Cinematheque by a group of cinephiles along with Soner and Şalom.

By the mid-1970s, the YFG's simple cinema had already laid the groundwork for Turkish resurgent film radicalism. While a veteran of cinematic militancy—Muammer Özer—was adopting narrative tactics in line with Third-Worldism as a fully independent and semi-amateur filmmaker, short-lived radical film collectives like İshak Işıtan's Halk Sinema Grubu (the People's Cinema Group) with dedication to the local events were emerging. Furthermore, İstanbul-based amateur moviemakers in the spirit of citizen journalism, namely Kaya Tanyeri, came up with a couple of documentary shorts, made in a fashion similar to the Third World Newsreel film group in New York City. The following chapter focuses on those successors of the YFG that comprised a mini corpus of militant documentaries survived.

CHAPTER TWO

1970s Militant Documentary: Conditions and Praxes

This chapter offers a broader account of the practices of militant filmmaking that followed the dissolution of *Young Cinema* in the early 1970s. Similar to the works of the young filmmakers, these practices were amateur in nature but even more internationalist in tone, aligning with the liberation struggles of the Global South. Their practitioners were mostly lone individuals, though they were willing to collaborate with others and, collectively, disclose a fine spirit of citizen journalism.

The chapter focuses on a particular period between the two military interventions in Turkey, the 1971 coup by memorandum and the 1980 Turkish *coup d'état*. This period witnessed the rise of political radicalisms on the left (and right), which were even more extreme than their antecedents in the late 1960s, and thus motivating the resurgence of film praxes.[107] The first section of the chapter provides a portrait of the period's dense historical backdrop, taking sociopolitical life and national cinema as its center, and the second section presents a closer look at the Turkish cinematic militancy of the 1970s.

2.1 Sociopolitical Conditions and Trends in Cinema

Turkish militant documentary emerged from a highly politicized atmosphere. Social life in 1970s Turkey was largely shaped by militant extremism, which created a landscape of political chaos resembling that of civil war. Building on the momentum of the late 1960s, two ideologically opposed camps increased the level of radicalism countrywide, even more so than a decade

[107] Throughout this chapter on 1970s Turkey, the author uses the terms left and far-left when appropriate and, sometimes, interchangeably.

earlier. As the Turkish left's cultural impact was growing rapidly, the words *eşitsizlik* ("inequality") and *sömürü* ("exploitation") were becoming part of the daily vernacular while the right-wing counterforce was beginning to respond violently.[108] This politically polarized climate had a huge impact on Turkish cinema, especially on Yılmaz Güney's revolutionary films. Despite the military intervention in 1971, the republic of Turkey witnessed one of the deadliest decades of political violence in modern history between 1970 and 1980.

The spiraling of armed radicalism, emblematic of the clashes and fights between the two hostile political camps known as *Devrimciler* ("Revolutionaries") and *Ülkücüler* ("Idealist Hearts"), resembled some of the most explosive contemporaneous civil conflicts in the world. With various kinds of explosives and weapons introduced, extremism caused "more fatalities in one week during the early months of 1980 in Turkey than it did during an entire year in Italy and the full decade in West Germany alone."[109] From 1976 to 1980, politicized violence had claimed approximately five thousand lives and disrupted thousands of homes and schools.[110]

The leftist groups "growing up on the base of European socialist movements" and their "Maoist" and "Third World variants" played a "central role" in spreading the radicalism on campuses out from the universities that had already become the arsenals of small arms.[111] The militant ringleaders of *Devrimci Gençlik* ("Revolutionary Youth") abbreviated as *DEV-GENÇ* in Turkish, a Marxist-Leninist organization, advanced their activism. The basic reason behind this escalation was that they believed political turmoil could upset the order and bring down the system so strongly that a socialist regime could eventually take over control. These radical

---

[108] Ramazan Gülendam, "The Development of a Feminist Discourse and Feminist Writing in Turkey: 1970-1990," Kadın/Women 2000 2, no. 1 (2001): 94.
[109] Sabri Sayari, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (2010): 198.
[110] Sayari, "Political Violence," 199.
[111] George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems of Communism*, 29, no. 4 (1980): 27.

leaders hoped that the climate of unrest would urge a military intervention by the like-minded, progressive army officers who would make revolutionary social changes as soon as they were in power.[112] That is, *DEV-GENÇ*'s tactic(s) drew on the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party's successful seizure of power in neighboring countries like Iraq. Furthermore, several militant factions of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) actually trained *DEV-GENÇ*'s recruitees in the camps near Syria and Jordan at the beginning of the 1970s, while the Guevarist urban guerillas in Latin America were a prime source of practical underpinnings.[113] Once they were back home, leftist militants took up where they left off professionally.

After the fragmentation and splitting seen on the far-left, Turkey experienced the first serious wave of radical political action between 1971 and 1972. The two non-parliamentary and underground organizations, *Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu* (the "People's Liberation Army of Turkey"), known as *THKO* in the country, and *Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi* (the "People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey"), referred to as *THKP-C* in Turkey, grew out of *DEV-GENÇ*. In addition to armed stand-offs with the security forces, their acts of insurgency included political kidnappings and killings, most notably, of three NATO servicemen, Charles Turner, Gordon Banner, and John Law.[114] The military operations after the coup by memorandum put an end to the armed activities of both groups, but the concomitant death of *THKO* and *THKP-C*'s leaders created *martyrs* and heroes rather than easing the tension in the country. In other words, the first wave at least established a legacy, organizational network, and tradition for the following years to come.

---

[112] Sayari, "Political Violence," 200.
[113] Harris, "The Left," 35.
[114] Sayari, "Political Violence," 202.

As early as 1974, when leftist prisoners came out of jail following an "amnesty bill," the second wave of political extremism hit the country.[115] Several militant organizations ranging from a few descendants of *THKO* and *THKP-C*, such as *Devrimci Sol* ("Revolutionary Left") and *Devimci Yol* ("Revolutionary Path"), and Maoist groups to the followers of Enver Hoxha and pro-Soviet factions appeared. Later, radical youth sparked the flame of insurgency again; ideologically motivated murders increased, innocent bystanders were either killed or seriously injured, and public property was damaged. Soon petty desire for revenge created a foreseeable course of action: "an assassination of a leftist, immediately declared 'martyr' by comrades and given a political funeral, followed by the murder of a right-wing person."[116] While the two hostile camps were blaming each other for the rise of violence, many government employees and prominent public figures, including mayors and politicians, lost their lives. Among the left-wing's targets were army personnel and policemen, especially the ones that radicals held responsible for the death of *martyrs*.

Political polarization had a huge influence not only on students and youngsters but also many others from different socioeconomic and professional backgrounds, and the most ironic of all was the case of those working for state agencies. Even the country's law enforcement service, which is one of the government's key institutions to fight back against revolutionary movements and a major far-left target itself, was under the impact of political division. Judges were giving less heavy sentences to the extremists with whom they had ideological affinity or sympathy than the others from the rival camp.[117] As of 1976, the Turkish police were not quite able to perform the full range of basic duties due to the serious political disagreements among officers. These

[115] Adamson, "Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis," 288.
[116] Sayari, "Political Violence," 204.
[117] Ibid., 205.

disagreements required to establish two police unions, the left-wing *Pol-Der* and the right-wing *Pol-Bir*, both of which had "enormous authority and discipline problems" and served to hinder the police's ability to prevent revolutionaries' attacks and counterattacks.[118] The radical left-wing politics was in consistent clash with the right-wing counterpart in Turkey. The anti-communist and neo-fascist *Ülkücü* ("Idealist Heart") movement, associated closely with *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* ("Nationalist Movement Party," known as *MHP* in Turkey), which was a political party represented in the parliament, expanded its activist cadre throughout the 1970s. This movement's strategies, often overlooked by the state authorities, included fulling the centuries-old sectarian division between *Alevi* Muslims and *Sünni* Muslims in the country. As Murat Belge argues, during the second half of the period between the 1960s and 1980s, the movement was in both "constant armed struggle" and "intense competition" with the Turkish far-left to gain supporters and organizational strength.[119]

Apart from the clandestine groups mentioned above, some leftist guilds and syndicates housed socialists of all varieties in Turkey, and one of the country's most prominent associations was *Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Birliği* ("All Teachers' Alliance and Solidarity Union"), abbreviated as *TÖB-DER* in Turkish. With hundreds of thousands of people, "including the village teachers from the remotest corners of the Turkish republic," *TÖB-DER* coordinated the "militant protests" concerning the "abuses of the rights of the working class."[120] May Day rallies were just one of many occasions where the clashes between the *TÖB-DER* members and the police took place.

---

[118] Ibid., 210.
[119] Murat Belge, "Nationalism, Democracy and the Left in Turkey," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 30, no. 1 (2009): 13.
[120] Harris, "The Left," 36.

Since the far-left activity has been alive in both city centers and *gecekondu*s, the squatter settlements for many low-income families in the country's metropoles, communal radicalism in the shantytowns of the *Alevi* minority was a well-known characteristic of 1970s Turkey.[121] As soon as radical political mobilization shifted from campuses to factories, these shanties—where the majority of industrial workers lived—became a site of struggle. Revolutionary organizations helped the Alevis establish some of those settlements; far-leftist and self-styled *Halk Komiteleri* (the "Committees of the People") took the initiative and designed some communist urbanization plans to allocate the settlers' lands. This collaboration between the Alevi community and the radical left had existed mainly because of the Idealist Heart's increased violence. As Mehmet Ertan claims, the far-left positioned itself as the "protector" and "safeguard" of these slums, and they became the declared "liberated zones" of the nation's leftist movement.[122] While the Alevi settlements were offering hideouts and safe houses, militants were acquiring human resources and support for the future of their groups. Despite the far-left, Turkey witnessed three Alevi massacres in three different cities—Kahramanmaraş, Malatya, and Sivas—in 1978.

Besides the left (and right), Kurdish separatist organizations had been part of the radical political discourse in Turkey since at least the second wave of violent extremism.[123] In the early 1970s, a few ethnic Kurds were the active members of the far-left groups, such as *THKP-C*. Later in the 1970s, Sabri Sayari claims, some radicals of Kurdish origin established organizations with armed wings that "gave more primacy to Kurdish nationalism" and

---

[121] Tolga Özata, "Visibility through Invisibility: Spatialized Political Subjectivities of Alevi Youth," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 62 (2020): 7.
[122] Mehmet Ertan, "The Latent Politicization of Alevism: The Affiliation between Alevis and Leftist Politics (1960–1980)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 55, no. 6 (2019): 939.
[123] There is an extensive literature on the history of Kurdish separatism in Turkey. See, for example, Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "The Kurdish Uprisings in the Middle East: A Survey (1831-1979)," *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations* 1, no. 2 (2020): 43-55.

specifically attacked the security forces in eastern Turkey.[124] Among these ethnic separatist groups was PKK, which is still one of the biggest threats against the unity of Turkey.

What international factors would be effective in the formation of the 1970s extremism? One locally popular argument is that the left-wing radicalism was an outcome of a global plot in which the Soviet Union's foreign policy played a key role. Sayari argues that the "weapon stocks disclosed" in hideouts and "financial support received" by a variety of militant organizations serve to back up these sorts of speculative hypotheses.[125] According to Sayari, "some observers and the army" did put an emphasis on the Soviets' role in the escalation of the far-left radicalism, though the Turkish authorities "failed to provide any strong evidence," demonstrating Moscow's direct involvement.[126] The other explanation, for Sayari, is that the intellectual dissemination of Marxist theories and revolutionary struggle worldwide mobilized a generation of students into taking political action against the forces of oppression. Local opinion leaders who "viewed Turkey's democracy as a sham" offered the glamorous accounts of Asian and Latin American liberation movements.[127] Hence anti-imperialism, the dominant "ideological position" in many underdeveloped countries in the mid-twentieth-century, became a common ground for the Turkish far-left.[128] As Ertan claims, this Third-Worldist stand also urged revolutionaries to rethink Kemalism, the Republic of Turkey's founding ideology that was implemented after the Turkish War of Independence, which is regarded as being the "first anti-imperialist war" of the 20th century.[129]

---

[124] Sayari, "Political Violence," 203.
[125] Ibid., 207.
[126] Ibid., 208.
[127] Ibid., 209.
[128] Ertan, "The Latent Politicization," 936.
[129] Ibid., 937.

A few legal far-left parties, founded after the coup by memorandum, inserted themselves into Turkey's parliamentary politics. Behice Boran, Mehmet Ali Aybar, and Mihri Belli were the prominent leaders of this movement, yet they had ideological differences in terms of, for instance, the means of acquiring power. Aybar's *Sosyalist Devrim Partisi* ("Socialist Revolution Party") and Boran's *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (the "Workers' Party of Turkey") thought that "through constitutional means"—winning the majority of the seats in the parliament—it was possible to rise to power.[130] Thus, those two parties' line of thinking have some "elements of Western parliamentarianism," such as "the multiparty system," and resembled the ideals of the "Eurocommunist parties" in Italy and Spain.[131] Belli's *Türkiye Emekçi Partisi* (the "Labor Party of Turkey") together with Doğu Perinçek's *Türkiye İhtilalçi İşçi Köylü Partisi* (the "Revolutionary Workers-Peasants' Party of Turkey") took the side of non-parliamentary, Third-Worldist means. The "building of socialism in North Korea and Vietnam" was inspiring Belli, whereas Perinçek saw the Chinese interpretation of revolution as a prime example of seizing power.[132] *Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi* (the "Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey") was "the most pro-Soviet one of the Turkish socialists" with the party press publishing the speeches of "the international communist movement's leaders" and the translations of "Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and many other authors."[133] Another recurrent issue was the role of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. On the one hand, some claimed that a bourgeoisie class did not exist in the country. On the other hand, many believed that not only did it exist, but that its "progressive

[130] Igor Lipovsky, "The Legal Socialist Parties of Turkey, 1960–80." *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (1991): 105.
[131] Lipovsky, "The Legal Socialist Parties," 106.
[132] Ertan, "The Latent Politicization of Alevism," 940.
[133] Lipovsky, "The Legal Socialist Parties," 108.

tendencies" had to be used in the struggle.[134] As it was directly related to the selection of allies, this issue was an important one for the Turkish legal far-left.

The ruling governments of mid-century Turkey could not ensure political stability. The two major parties, Turkey's founding and oldest *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (the "Republican People's Party" known as *CHP* in Turkey) and the center-right *Adalet Partisi* (the "Justice Party") referred to as *AP*, exchanged power through the coalition and minority governments during the decade of extremism. While every socialist party was genuinely considering itself as the only true representative of the legal far-left politics and blaming any others for fragmenting the movement, Turkish socialism was failing to transform the parties into massive political organizations. Their members and voters were primarily the "non-working class" and Turkish intelligentsia, and the "splitting of the movement" was encouraging "workers and village people" to vote for *CHP*.[135] With new leader Bülent Ecevit, *CHP* (openly) proclaimed the "center-left course" in order to compete with *AP* in this era of political polarization. Consequently, *CHP* moved leftwards, and its party ideology "approximated the West European social democracy."[136] The party joined the Socialist International even. Thus, almost all the socialist parties regarded *CHP* as being a significant ally in the ongoing competition with the center-right.

In the 1970s, political turmoil was greater than in the late 1960s and witnessed a unique expansion of the far-left. Radicalism was widespread while socioeconomic problems were severe. That is, the "political system proved incapable of coping with the crisis."[137] The army thus intervened in political life for the third time in 1980, which has become known as the 1980

[134] Ibid., 109.
[135] Ibid., 110.
[136] Ibid., 111.
[137] There is an extensive literature on the aftermath of the 1980 Turkish coup d'état. See, for instance, Lorenzo D'Orsi, "Touching History and Making Community. The Memory of the 1980 Turkish Military Coup in the 12 September Museum of Shame." *History and Anthropology* 30, no. 5 (2019): 644-667.

Turkish *coup d'état* on September 12, and declared an immediate state of emergency. As a result, the military banned all the ideological organizations, including political parties, and did not allow any of their activities to continue.

2.1.1 The Green Pine's Two Trends

When the political climate of 1970s Turkey started exhibiting itself in daily life, the Green Pine as the country's commercial, national, and professional film industry was producing films even more than it was in the 1960s, perfecting its business model. According to this model aiming to boost the sheer rate of production, producers created their projects with the advances from the owners of film theatres; these owners from different cities even made decisions on a few key issues, ranging from what genres of films are being produced and who stars in these genre pictures, that shaped the Green Pine's industrial output.[138] Some cost-effective production techniques—including the excessive use of dubbing and limited use of camera angles, movements, and positions—helped this model to achieve its primary aim.[139] The film industry was accordingly experiencing its most productive years; it produced more than 200 pictures per year in the 1970s, reaching its peak with 301 films in 1972.[140] During these years, two cinematic trends—the two opposite poles of the spectrum—coexisted in the film-industrial context of the Green Pine.

One of these trends was known as the movement of Milli Sinema (the "National Cinema"), whose primacy of the Turkish word *milli* ("national") reflected the movement's ideological inclination. Contrary to Halit Refiğ's and Metin Erksan's expression—*ulusal*—used to describe

---

[138] See, for example, Serkan Şavk, "Eski Görüntüler, Yeni Görüngüler: Yeşilçam Filmlerinin Üslup Özellikleri İçin Uzak Okuma Denemesi," *Erciyes İletişim Dergisi* 7, no. 2: 1033-1054.
[139] Şavk, "Eski Görüntüler, Yeni Görüngüler," 1036.
[140] Ibid., 1037.

their political filmmaking, the movement's most prominent figure, Yücel Çakmaklı, preferred *milli*—a locally politicized term referring to Turkey's Ottoman legacy and hence situating the movement in dialogue with the conservative and Islamist politics of the local Turkish context. Çakmaklı's films like *Kızım Ayşe* [*Ayşe, My Daughter*] (1974) had semantic codes, "promoting Islamic identity and religious morals."[141] Some aesthetic strategies—such as the consistent use of Turkish classical music in composite soundtracks—marked his works.[142] But it was Çakmaklı's narrative tactics that displayed his ideological orientation the most. As Gönül Dönmez-Colin argues, emblematic of these tactics were the female protagonists used as a "metaphor" for the "Turkish nation" and "rescued from" some modern and non-Islamic lifestyles—embellished with "alcohol, poker game, and bouffant hairstyles."[143] In the mid-1970s, when the second wave of political radicalism was hitting Turkey, the movement was losing momentum.

The other of these trends was a cycle of erotic films; some Turkish scholars even referred to the cinematic period between 1974 and 1980 as the "sex period" of the Green Pine.[144] After the rise of television in 1970s Turkey, the Green Pine film was not the "cheapest" entertainment available in the country anymore.[145] While political violence was taking over the streets, the Green Pine was deprived of its "largest" audiences—families and women—who tended to watch series broadcasted by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)—a state channel that held a monopoly over Turkey's airwaves throughout the 1970s.[146] As a result, the Green Pine industry had a financial crisis for a short time, and the industry's solution was to make erotic

---

[141] Gönül Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey: As Images and as Image-makers* (London: Routledge, 2019) 13.
[142] Serkan Yorgancılar, "Sinema ve Kimlik İnşası: Milli Sinema Örneği," *Electronic Turkish Studies* 14, no. 7 (2019): 12, https://doi.org/10.29228/TurkishStudies.39273.
[143] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 14.
[144] Ceyda Kuloğlu, "Women in Turkish Erotic Movies between 1974 and 1979," *Electronic Turkish Studies* 14, no. 5 (2019): 134.
[145] Kuloğlu, "Women in Turkish Erotic Movies," 135.
[146] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 15.

films that were simply impossible for TRT to broadcast (and compete with).[147] Films like *Tornavida Yaşar* ("Yaşar the Screwdriver," 1975), *Ye Beni Mahmut* ("Eat Me, Mahmut," 1975), and *Yırt Kazım* ("Tear Off, Kazım," 1975) typically integrated comedy into their eroticism, featuring some comic stars, such as Ali Poyrazoğlu, Aydemir Akbaş, and Mete İnselel. With these erotic comedies, the Green Pine's largest audience became the men (who were already on the streets outside their homes), and the tradition of women matinées had disappeared. The 1980 Turkish *coup d'état* put an end to this cycle of genre pictures.

2.1.2 Yılmaz Güney's *Hope* of Revolutionary Cinema

The 1970s saw the emergence of Güney as a radical public figure, whose revolutionary cinema was recognized both inside and outside of Turkey. Throughout the 1970s, when his political cinematic production was on the rise, Güney was either in jail or on trial for various charges, all of which were related to his politically active and outspoken persona. Some of Güney's legal battles stemmed from sheltering a couple of young militants and writing a few "communist" short stories.[148] Güney was also in conflict with Turkey's censorship board, and his films—centering on the class struggle—were banned in the country for years.[149] The first of these films—*Hope*—was followed by many others with similar thematic concerns, such as Bilge Olgaç's *Bir Gün Mutlaka* [*Certainly One Day*] (1975), Erdem Kıral's *Kanal* [*The Canal*] (1978) and *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde* [*On the Fertile Lands*] (1979), and Yavuz Özkan's *Maden*

[147] Kuloğlu, "Women in Turkish Erotic Movies," 140.
[148] Muzaffer Koyuncu, "Yılmaz Güney'in Politik Sinemasi ve Duvar Filmi Üzerine Bir Inceleme," *Nişantaşı Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 5, no. 1 (2017): 197.
[149] Koyuncu, "Yılmaz Güney'in Politik Sineması," 204.

[*The Mine*] (1978) and *Demiryol* ("Railway," 1979). *Hope* was (only) secretly shown at the Directors' Fortnight of *Festival de Cannes*, which cost Güney another lawsuit in Turkey.[150]

Hope was a pioneering example of political film outside the cinematic conventions of the Green Pine. Yılmaz Güney's film incorporated documentary aesthetics (and location shooting) into the narrative film—which was, in Celal Hayır and Ayman Köle's words—"unlike anything else made in Turkish cinema before."[151] The film's introductory sequence that contrasts a dying profession—horse-drawn carriages—with its modern capitalist counterpart—taxicabs—best-illustrates this integration. The series of frames edited in documentary style capture the carriages in still shots while the cabs are caught in movement, representing the rise of capitalism in Turkey. In another sequence, where the carriage drivers gather to protest the decline of their profession in the age of capitalist modernization, Güney draws attention to the collective class struggle. Cabbar (played by Güney)—a poor carriage driver whose only horse was run down by an automobile—joins the protestors, with a Turkish flag in his hand. As a Kurdish-Turkish person himself, Güney's persona with the flag foregrounds solidarity and unity in the struggle against capitalism regardless of ethnicity and race. Besides (co-)directing *Hope*, Güney played multiple roles as a lead actor, producer, and a (co-)scenarist, a common characteristic of militant third cinema. The Green Pine's typical audiences, however, did not receive *Hope* well since the "grim realities," portrayed by driver Cabbar, were ironically hitting home, and thus Güney's revolutionary films had to find new audiences, consisting of public intellectuals and young students.[152]

---

[150] Hüseyin Kazan, "Yılmaz Güney'in Üçüncü Sineması." *İletişim Çalışmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2017): 50.
[151] Celal Hayır and Ayman Köle, "Cinematic Search for Identity in the Shade of Turkey's 1960 Coup: The Social Realism Debate and The Hope," *Border Crossing* 7, no. 1 (2017): 163.
[152] Kazan, "Yılmaz Güney's Third Cinema," *İletişim Çalışmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2017): 51.

2.2 Turkish Militant Documentary Praxes

As a direct reflection of the politics of the decade, film radicalism in the 1970s was built on the legacy of *Young Cinema* in Turkey. Among the major tendencies of this radicalism were the amateurist spirit, emphasis on collaboration, and the documentary practices of counter-information inherited from the "international solidarity movements" and the political film collectives of the Global North and the third cinemas of the Global South.[153] The Turkish militant documentary of the 1970s appeared as a cinematic representative of anti-imperialist struggle, collective resistance, and the fight against police brutality in Turkey. A former member of the YFG, Muammer Özer, amateur filmmaker Kaya Tanyeri, and left-wing activist İshak Işıtan, for instance, were part of this tradition of documentary-making. In view of the rich archive of Turkey's oldest professional newspaper, *Cumhuriyet* ("Republic"), this section presents a closer look at their works of (non-professional) counter-information in the 1970s.

Özer's amateur films are perhaps the most internationalist, Third-worldist films in Turkish; these two terms would mean advocating sympathy and solidarity with underdeveloped countries (from an Anti-American perspective) in the context of the 1970s. When Özer was receiving his formal filmmaking education in Finland, he made two 16 mm and black-and-white non-fiction shorts, *Amerikan Tiyatrosu* (1976, "The American Plot") and *Kriz* (1975, "Crisis"), both of which were screened in a local short film festival known as *BÜSK* in İstanbul right after their production.[154] In collaboration with a friend—Mehmet Özgentürk—and his wife Sünnöve Özer, Özer played multiple roles behind the camera as a cinematographer, director, editor, scenarist, and sound designer in making these documentaries.[155] Approaching the Latin American and

[153] Gerhardt and Saljoughi, "Looking Back," 2.
[154] See the relevant entry on the Turkish online database of information related to films and filmmakers, "Muammer Özer," kameraarkasi.org, accessed January 8, 2021, http://www.kameraarkasi.org/yonetmenler/muammerozer.html.
[155] "Muammer Özer."

Southeast Asian contexts from an anti-colonialist perspective, *The American Plot* concerns the US imperialism of the twentieth-century. *Crisis* is similarly about neo-colonialist practices yet puts a special emphasis on the 1973 Oil Crisis and the Middle East. Both works thus align with the liberation struggles of the Global South.

The dominant aesthetic tactic of these militant shorts is to rely heavily on the rhetorical address and voice-over narration. The narrator, Mehmet Özgentürk, verbally presents his arguments and supports them with visual examples. *The American Plot*'s narration focuses on the Philippines, describing the country as a neo-colony of the US, and then draws attention to South America. Rhetorical address (re-)introduces to Turkish audiences the dictatorships "brought about by [the] CIA-assisted coups," such as the one in Paraguay.[156] Özgentürk even refers to the CIA as the "world police" and compares its paramilitary operations to those carried out by the "SS" during World War II. This narration is synchronized mostly with still images, illustrating the narrator's critique, with the camera zooming in and out on them. In line with Özgentürk's critical tone, these images also include caricatures and political prints. *Crisis* contrasts the images of Arab farmers and villages with the shots from cities and modern environments, accompanied by the narrator's voice-over discussing Zionism in mid-century Israel. This contrast implies that oppressed Arabs have become second-class citizens in Israeli-occupied territories. Toward the end, this narration celebrates the success of the Arabian oil embargo of 1973 as a victory over Israeli Zionism. Echoing *DEV-GENÇ* militants in the late 1960s and early 1970s, *Crisis* seems to ally itself with Arab socialism and the PLO's struggle. Özer's films made contributions to critical discourse in Turkey, although they were not the only source of information about liberation struggles in the country.

[156] Gerhadt and Saljoughi, "Looking Back," 8.

The Turkish national audience was, in fact, following the politics of the Global South in the 1970s since Turkish left-wing media outlets, including the newspaper *Republic*, covered major political news stories from the Latin American continent and the Middle East. As early as in 1970, *Republic*—quoting a foreign magazine named *Comunidad*—started reporting some instances of the masses "moving leftwards" and the legacy of Che Guevera in, for instance, Paraguay.[157] These reports were occasionally followed by opinion columns that outline the political atmosphere of the continent like the one written by journalist İlhan Selçuk—the future editor-in-chief of the newspaper—in the same year.[158] In the middle of the 1970s, the headlines referring to the "rising number" of leftists—arrested (and then tortured in jail) by dictatorship authorities—in Uruguay appeared in *Republic*.[159] Of course, due to Turkey's geopolitical location and history, news from the Mid-East, especially from Palestine, were more detailed and frequent. *Republic* published news articles on the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat throughout the early 1970s.[160] In the mid-1970s, the newspaper continued to feature Israel's attacks and the armed resistance and political activities of the PLO, keeping the Turkish audience updated about the Arab-Israeli conflict.[161] *Republic* used a neutral and serious tone in its articles concerning this conflict, but it also reported both national and international efforts that align with the PLO. The newspaper presented the Organization of Islamic Conference's call for solidarity against the

[157] "Latin Amerika'da Halk Sola Kayıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, March 11, 1970, 3.
[158] İlhan Selçuk, "Latin Amerika'dan," *Cumhuriyet*, November 21, 1970.
[159] "Latin Amerika'da İlerici Güçlere Karşı Baskı Uygulaması Artıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1976; Hülya Karadeniz, "Demokrasiye Özlem Duyan Kıta," *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1976.
[160] "Arafat, Pekin'e Gidiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, March 6, 1970; "Gerillalar Kral Hüseyin'i Suçluyor," *Cumhuriyet*, February 11, 1970.
[161] "Lübnan'ın Güneyinde İsraillilerle Filistinliler Arasında Ateş Açıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 22, 1976; İsrail Bombardımanında Ölü Sayısı 111 Kişiyi Buldu, *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1975, 3.

"Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories" and Israel's policy of "Judaization in Jerusalem" together with the "Week of Solidarity with the People of Palestine" in Turkey.[162]

Unlike Özer, Kaya Tanyeri was interested in multiple forms of aesthetic expression, including filmmaking. A pharmacy graduate living and running his drug store in İstanbul, Tanyeri was an art lover.[163] With the encouragement of his friend Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu, a columnist (at *Republic*) and locally famous painter, he started painting non-professionally in the 1960s.[164] Later in the 1980s, Tanyeri had some opportunities to exhibit his paintings, and then he continued to hold many exhibitions throughout the 1990s and 2000s.[165] Tanyeri also practiced amateur moviemaking (and photography) while working professionally as a pharmacist in the 1970s.[166] It is these years when he made a few political shorts. These shorts include *Topumu Ver, Anneciğim* ("Give Me My Ball, Mom"), which is about the daily struggles of child workers in Turkey, and *Kısa Yorgan* ("Short Duvet"), inspired by a news story about a factory worker with dire economic hardships. One of the few documentaries among his works is a militant film: *1 Mayıs 77* (1977, "1 May 77").

Tanyeri's *1 May 77*—a work of collaboration with her daughter Çağlar—documents the International Workers' Day (May 1, 1977), which came to be known as *Kanlı 1 Mayıs* (the "Bloody 1st of May") in Turkey. On this day, several armed attacks by unknown perpetrators against leftist factions and groups at Taksim Square in İstanbul resulted in at least thirty-four

---

[162] "İslam Zirvesi'nde, İsrail'in Kudüs Dahil Arap Topraklarından Çekilmesini Sağlamak İçin Hertürlü Tedbirin Alınması Kararlaştırıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, February 24, 1974; "Filistin Halkıyla Dayanışma Haftasu Bugün Açılacak Sergiyle Başlıyor," *Cumhuriyet*. December 7, 1976.

[163] See the relevant entry on the Turkish Cultural Foundation's database of information related to Turkish artists, "Kaya Tanyeri," turkishculture.org, accessed January 11, 2021, http://www.turkishculture.org/whoiswho/visual-arts/painter/kaya-tanyeri-1814.htm.

[164] "Kaya Tanyeri."

[165] "Tanyeri."

[166] "Tanyeri."

deaths and many more wounded.[167] Tanyeri attended the May Day event, with Çağlar recording audio.[168] He was able to film the masses marching towards Taksim, yet his 8mm camera could not continue to roll during and following the attacks.[169] Tanyeri edited his footage—depicting the early moments of the event—with the photographic images (from some journals and newspapers like *Republic*) that portray chaos and violence at Taksim. He never distributed his film, and it was mostly kept on the shelves of his archive.[170] After many years, Tanyeri's work was screened at *Uluslararası İşçi Filmleri Festivali* (the "International Labor Film Festival") in İstanbul in the early 2000s. *1 May 77* was digitized later, and it is now available on the Sinematek Digital Cinema Library.

Tanyeri uses the film form as an analytical tool to point out the *perpetrator* of the Bloody 1st of May. *1 May 77* begins with the documentary footage of Taksim Square on May 1, 1977, displaying a gigantic poster of a worker in chain, and the masses with their red flags around it at the square from which the leftist slogans arise. The hand-held shots of this footage are cross-cut with more fictional ones synchronized with the iconic theme song of the American television series *Mission Impossible* (1966-1973).[171] After the first shot of Taksim, Tanyeri's camera slowly zooms-in to a gray, vast concrete building that almost resembles a military base. Inside, a secret agent informs another named "Jim," alluding to the famous character Jim Phelps (Peter Graves) in *Mission Impossible*, about the Turkish left. The agent stresses the need to "tear down" the leftist movement, and he argues that May Day is "best-suited" to do so. This conversation

[167] Barış Yetkin, *Kırılma Noktası/1 Mayıs 1977 Olayı*, (İstanbul: Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2007), 93.
[168] "1 Mayıs 77 [1 May 77], amateurcinema.org, accessed January 12, 2021, https://amateurcinema.org/index.php/film/1-mays-1977-1-may-1977.
[169] "1 Mayıs 77 [1 May 77]."
[170] "1 Mayıs 77."
[171] TRT was the first channel to broadcast this TV show in 1970s Turkey during the early years of television consumption in the country.

concludes with another reference to the series, specifically to its recurring line: “as always, if any of you are caught or killed, we will deny any responsibilities.” Incorporating the elements of an American spy show into a documentary about a tragic International Workers’ Day holds some political significance. With the US references, Tanyeri’s film suggests that armed attacks by unidentified groups are of foreign origin, and they might have been (secretly) organized by capitalist/imperialist powers. Indeed, the CIA connection of the 1980 Turkish *coup d'état*, followed the Bloody 1st of May, was locally known.[172] Even Çağlar Tanyeri agrees that her father does not relate the tragedy of May 1 to more popular speculations associated with the “splitting of the left” but to some other factors.[173] *1 May 77* presents a new tactic of aesthetic resistance, different from *Young Cinema*’s concept of the simple image; Tanyeri’s subversive strategy thus brings innovation to the aesthetics of resistance by referencing American popular media.

As a film made possible by Çağlar Tanyeri, a young woman in the 1970s, *1 May 77* puts special emphasis on the Turkish far-left’s women activists who were present on the Bloody 1st of May. Çağlar Tanyeri even states that the film was “a result of the dialogue” between her father and *İlerici Kadınlar Derneği* (the “Progressive Women’s Association”), known as *İKD* in Turkey, the largest organization of leftist women in 1970s Turkey.[174] Following an image of the people marching, accompanied by poems and songs that thematize violence on May 1, Tanyeri’s camera shows a group of people wearing the same red bandanas. These women are the ones associated with *İKD*. The close-ups of the women of *İKD* include the shots of some children holding the posters with slogans like “we will establish the future” and “the future is ours.” In

[172] “Yetkin, 1 Mayıs 1977 Olayı, 9.
[173] See Çağlar Tanyeri’s short web article about the Bloody 1st of May, “Çağlar Tanyeri, Kaya Tanyeri’yi ve 1 Mayıs Belgeselini Anlatıyor,” accessed January 13, 2021, http://sinematek.tv/1-mayis-77-1977/.
[174] “Çağlar Tanyeri, Kaya Tanyeri’yi ve 1 Mayıs Belgeselini Anlatıyor.”

synch with these frames is non-diegetic sound, the voice-over commentary of one of the *İKD*'s women. This voice-over is feminist and internationalist in tone, expressing that *İKD* does not "believe that any movements without the voice of women is an important step toward democracy" and that, as part of the "world's working class," the "working class of Turkey" is happy to celebrate the International Workers' Day." The images of the Turkish folkloric dances performed by a few women at Taksim Square occasionally interrupt the shots of *İKD*. Tanyeri's camera also captures the faces of Turkish women celebrities at Taksim on the Bloody 1st of May, such as film actress Semra Özdamar and writer and musician Bilgesu Erensu.

Within at most two days after May 1, 1977, the massacre at Taksim Square was already being referred to as the Bloody 1st of May in Turkish national news media, especially by left-wing newspapers like *Republic*, and was fairly at the center of attention. *Republic* featured, for instance, a public statement about the massacre from the Socialist Revolutionary Party's leader, Mehmet Ali Aybar.[175] Aybar's statement aimed at the CIA, as did Tanyeri's documentary, and even argued that the massacre *could* be the sign of preparations for a violent "military coup" to silence the Turkish left.[176] Another leftist (yet less radical) party *CHP* and its leader Bülent Ecevit's perspective on the Bloody 1st of May were different from Aybar and his party, as *Republic* reported.[177] Ecevit considered the massacre an attempt to discourage people from voting on June 5, the date of national elections in 1977.[178] These views gained popularity; for example, an article published by *Republic* defined the massacre as an effort to "cause panic" at the societal level and intimidate (the left).[179]

---

[175] "Çeşitli Kuruluşlar 1 Mayıs Olaylarını CIA Yönetiminde," *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1977, 9.
[176] "Çeşitli Kuruluşlar," 9.
[177] "Ecevit Antalya'da ve Isparta'da Düzenlenen," *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1977.
[178] "Ecevit."
[179] "Continental Oteli'nin Garajına Bomba Atıldı, 1 Mayıs'tan Beri Süren Yıldırma Kampanyası Orta Dereceli Okulları Hedef Aldı," *Cumhuriyet*, May 6, 1977.

In addition to Muammer Özer and Kaya Tanyeri, İshak Işıtan was another representative of cinematic militancy and collective filmmaking in 1970s Turkey. After his studies at İstanbul University's law school, Işıtan founded a militant film group known as *Halk Sineması Grubu* (the "Cinema of the People Group")—and *Cinéma du peuple* in French—in the late 1970s.[180] Işıtan was also professionally working as an ABC correspondent for the Middle East before the 1980s while being active with his group and making documentary shorts concerning the Turkish radical left.[181] Following the 1980 Turkish *coup d'état*, Işıtan moved to Montréal, Québec, and he continued to work as a professional filmmaker, producing political films in Canada.[182] One of his most recognized feature-length documentaries as a Turkish-Canadian director is *Les Femmes de la Brukman* [*The Women of Brukman*] (2004), presented at many international film festivals, including Sundance. However, *2 Eylül Direnişi* (the "Resistance of September 2," 1977) is the only surviving film made by Işıtan's Cinema of the People group.[183] This work of amateur filmmaking was screened in Lille, France, and awarded at the 8th International Short and Documentary Film Festival in 1978.[184] More recently, the screenings of this film have taken place both in and outside Turkey.[185]

The *Resistance of September 2* documents the collective stand of the people, living in a squatter settlement called *1 Mayıs Mahallesi* (the "1st of May District"), against the police committed to destroying the settlement in İstanbul on September 2, 1977. This resistance was an

---

[180] "Isaac Isitan," Les Productions ISCA, accessed January 17, 2021, http://www.lesproductionsisca.ca/equipe.html
[181] "İshak Işıtan," kameraarkasi.org, accessed January 17, 2021, http://www.kameraarkasi.org/yonetmenler/ishakisitan.html
[182] "İshak Işıtan."
[183] Carole Poliquin, email to Işıtan's spouse Poliquin, February 9, 2020.
[184] "8th International Short and Documentary Film Festival, Lille," fipresci.org, accessed January 17, 2021. https://fipresci.org/festival/8th-international-short-and-documentary-film-festival-lille/
[185] See, for instance, "The Resistance of September 2nd," 5th Which Human Rights? Film Festival, accessed January 17, 2021, http://www.hihff.org/2013/filmler/eng/September2nd.html; "Translations: Independent Documentary Filmmaking in Turkey, L'Alternativa 18é Festival De Cinema Independent De Barcelona, accessed January 17, 2021, https://alternativa.cccb.org/2011/en/_films/fichaSP.php?_film=00018.

example and demonstrated the far-left activity in these settlements in Turkey. A "liberated zone" of the Turkish left, the 1st of May District—named after the International Workers' Day—was (literally) "built" with the communal efforts of its settlers themselves.[186] Because of these communist and socialist tendencies, as Şükrü Aslan argues, the district did not only gain its "political identity" but also attract the attention of government and media circles quickly. Consequently, the local police force with armored vehicles and diggers "*attack*[ed]" this collectivist settlement and demolished its shanties at the cost of six deaths.[187] The district, however, did not fall without a blow, as Işıtan and his group's *Resistance of September 2* conveys.

The *Resistance of September 2*, a black-and-white documentary short, begins with a portrayal of the district, and then it displays the scene of warfare between the people and the police. Işıtan and the group's camera captures the poor conditions of daily life in a settlement that has neither roadways nor water supplies. Their long shots serve to juxtapose the big towers, transmitting electricity to İstanbul's city center, with the small shanties on their heels that must use gas lamps. After these images, establishing the setting, the mobile camera starts chasing the district's people, gathering their committee and helping one another to build their homes.[188] Only the medium-long shots of a local far-left leader, giving a speech at the committee, interrupts this recording of collective effort. The leader notifies his people that the police are approaching. At this committee hearing, all the people of the district—women, men, elders, and children—are present, and their single flag (with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's small portrait) represents their unity against the oppressive state. Soon, the local police arrive at the 1st of May District; following a

---

[186] Şükrü Aslan, "Sıradışı Mahallede Tarih ve Kimlik Sorunsalı," *Kebikeç* 20 (2005): 151.
[187] Aslan, "Sıradışı Mahallede," 153.
[188] The 1st of May District and so its committee were politically "homogenous" when it was established in the 1970s. See Aslan, "Sıradışı Mahallede," 152.

brief warning, they start driving their armored vehicles onto the masses protesting. The people of the district resist this attack with every possible weapon in their power, such as sticks and stones. These sequences of warfare use freeze-frames when one of the protesters resisting the police is wounded. If they are gunned down, then this visual aesthetic includes an additional component, the non-diegetic sound of a locally known far-left slogan: *ölmek var dönmek yok* (translating as "there is no going back even if there is death"). The *Resistance of September 2* concludes with the images of the people of the district, working collectively again to build their shanties after the destruction and the close-up shot of a woman from the district, shouting the slogan.

This collective resistance was on the left-wing national news in Turkey, and newspapers like *Republic* featured articles about the district from September 1977 to the end of the 1970s. On September 6, 1977, the cover page of *Republic*, for instance, included part of a long news article related to a far-leftist student killed during the police attack.[189] *Republic* also published about the organizations that ally with the people of the district, shifting the attention towards poverty in the settlement. The newspaper featured a public statement signed by 37 different organizations; the statement criticizes the fact that the 1st of May District is still deprived of some basic utilities, such as drinking water, and that the government is deaf to this condition of the district.[190] Other news indicated the efforts of the people themselves to improve the quality of daily life in their district. In 1978, for example, *Republic* reported that a "delegation" from the district discussed their issue of mass transportation with the responsible department of local government.[191] The newspaper was even privy to the internal politics of the district. An article

[189] "Ümraniye'deki Gecekondu Yıkımı Sırasında Ölenn Kızılkaa'nın Cenazesi Kaldırıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 6, 1977.
[190] "37 Kuruluş 1 Mayıs Mahallesi Halkının Sorunlarına Çözüm Getirilmemesini Kınadı," Cumhuriyet, May 28, 1978, 4.
[191] "1 Mayıs Mahallesi Halkı İETT'den Otobüs İstedi," *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1978, 5.

published by *Republic* noted that five workers living in the district, who were (presumably) sympathizing with far-right Nationalist Movement Party, known as *MHP* in Turkey, were being executed, yet the mystery surrounding these executions in the district like the identity of executor(s) remained unsolved.[192] In 1979, the front page of the newspaper featured an article concerning an "occupation" of the district in Kadıköy, İstanbul as well. A group of the district's people, who had lost their homes during another police attack, "occupied" an office of *CHP*, saying that "they do not have anywhere else to shelter".[193]

The film radicalism of 1970s Turkey did not necessarily point to an absolute, unified set of aesthetic strategies and narrative tactics that appear and reappear throughout the decade, though it had a tendency toward what contemporary scholars would define as citizen journalism. Similar to the present-day citizen journalists, Turkish political filmmakers like Özer, Tanyeri, and Işıtan (and his Cinema of the People Group) were all "citizens, non-professionals" that involved in "the creation of [counter-]information" in Jessica Roberts's words.[194] Their film praxes included some "regular efforts" to inform others, such as Özer's short documentaries about the politics of the Global South in the 1970s, and also more "spontaneous, one-time acts based on the person's presence at a newsworthy event" like Tanyeri's filming of the Bloody 1st of May.[195] These filmmakers were relying on many low-cost and portable equipment, such as 8- and 16-mm cameras, which served the function of "tools" like "home video camera," and then "smartphones" used by citizen journalists today.[196] That is, the militant documentary of the

[192] "1 Mayıs Olayı Açıklığa Kavuşmadı," *Cumhuriyet*, December 31, 1978. 14.
[193] "1 Mayıs Mahallesi Yakınında Yıkılan Gecekondularda Oturan Bir Grup Kadıköy CHP İlçe Merkezini İşgal Etti," *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1979.
[194] Jessica Roberts, "Citizen Journalism," in *The International Encyclopedia of Media Literacy*, ed. Renee Hobbs, Paul Mihailidis, Gianna Capello, Maria Ranieri, and Benjamin Thevenin (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019), 1.
[195] Roberts, "Citizen Journalism," 2.
[196] Ibid., 3.

1970s anticipated the rise of a more networked and online yet (arguably) less cinematic culture of resistance in the digital age. The resemblance between the two media activisms challenges the "history" and origins of citizen journalism whose, "earliest example" is often cited as "George Holliday's recording of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King in 1991."[197]

On the global map of radical filmmaking in the 1970s, Turkish militant documentary shorts seem closer to the Third World Newsreel (TWN) than any of its other counterparts. Özer's shorts like *The American Plot* reflected the ideology and thematic concerns that the TWN also had, making films that foreground international alliances. It is simply because documentaries made by Özer and the TWN focused on, in Cynthia Young's words, "solidarity along economic rather than gender, ethnic, and racial lines."[198] Stressing exploitation, they saw their works as a means of articulating and solidifying "global analysis."[199] However, Işıtan's collective, the Cinema of the People Group, for instance, concentrated more on a local political struggle. While Özer and the TWN emphasized "structural affinities to national and international events," Işıtan did not put local issues in a context that helps him make connections across the national borders. Despite this difference, Turkish militant documentaries fostered media activism in places where the people's voice needs to be heard.

---

[197] Ibid., 4.
[198] Cynthia Young, "Third World Newsreel: Third Cinema Practice in the United States," in *Global Migration, Social Change, and Cultural Transformation*, ed. Emory Elliott, Jasmine Payne, and Patricia Ploesch. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 84.
[199] Young, "Third World Newsreel," 81.

CHAPTER THREE

1980s (and 1990s) Post-militant Cinema: Bilge Olgaç

To raise awareness of concerning the escalating cases of femicide in twenty-first century Turkey, the artist Vahit Tuna created a guerilla art instillation in 2019. Tuna's installation consisted of roughly 500 pairs of high heels, neatly mounted on the façade of a building in İstanbul's city center. The installation was symbolic of 440 women killed (mostly) by men in 2018 alone.[200] Tragically, during the month before this work was installed, there were an additional 49 cases of femicide.[201] Some of these cases exhibited "torturous death[s]" like Özgecan Arslan's case and included sexual assaults, such as in the case of Şule Çet's murder.[202] This dire situation of accelerated physical violence, portrayed by the contemporary art scene, was conditioned by the specificities of Turkey's present political context.

Central to this political context is the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his religious, conservative perspective on women. On several occasions, President Erdoğan has (openly) expressed that he does not believe in gender equality, and his ruling AK Party's national family policies have emphasized marriage as women's social duty.[203] Furthermore, the President is highly critical of birth control and considers women who prefer their careers over motherhood to be "deficient" and "half" human.[204] AK Party's top politicians, such as Bülent Arınç and

---

[200] Cebelihle Bhengu, "Turkish Artist Hangs 440 Pairs of Shoes in Memory of Women Murdered by Their Husbands," *Times Live*, February 21, 2021, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/2019-09-23-turkish-artist-hangs-440-pairs-of-shoes-in-memory-of-women-murdered-by-their-husbands/.

[201] Reuters Staff, "Artist Displays 440 Pairs of High Heels for Women Murdered in Turkey in 2018," *Reuters*, September 24, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-womensrights-shoes-idUSKBN1W923G.

[202] Christine L. Ogan, and Ozen Bas, "Use of Social Media in the Struggle Surrounding Violence against Turkish Women," *International Journal of Communication* 14, no. 8 (2020): 5567.

[203] Ece Algan, "The Politicization of Rape as a Consequence of Western Modernity and Religious Conservatism: Competing Media Narratives on Gender," *International Journal of Communication* 14, no. 8 (2020): 5539.

[204] Ogan, and Bas, "Use of Social Media in the Struggle," 5561.

Mehmet Müezzinoğlu have echoed Erdoğan's perspective; when Arınç was a Deputy Prime Minister, he argued that a woman "should know what is decent... and should preserve her decency."[205] Erdoğan later aimed his criticisms at feminists who organized the 2019 women's march (protesting rape culture) by claiming that they do not know "[how sacred] Islam regards mothers."[206] More recently, Erdoğan has announced Turkey's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, a European accord concerning domestic abuse and beyond, despite the vocal opposition of women's rights protestors.[207] Turkish women, in Esra Özcan's words, "work hard" to resist Erdoğan's gender-political discourse, and yet their fight is becoming more tenuous because of the current "restricted media environment."[208]

Over the past few years, this environment of political oppression has prompted a wide academic response. With scholars' growing interest, special dossiers devoted to the women's struggle in Turkey, such as the *International Journal of Communication* (*IJoC*)'s, were published in late 2020. The *IJoC*'s section aims to recapture both "historical and contemporary" issues concerning Turkish women, examining media praxes that "push back" against the country's "gender conservatism" and the "tide of violence" it facilities.[209] My chapter seizes the recent scholarly momentum by situating an early moment of women's films in dialogue with the broader history of radical political cinema in Turkey, focusing on Bilge Olgaç.

Bilge Olgaç (1940-1994) has a unique figure in the pantheon of cinema in Turkey. Olgaç was one of the first Turkish woman directors, and her career expands over three decades. During the wave of militancy in the 1970s, Olgaç turned to militant cinema, directing films like *Bir Gün*

[205] The translation of Arınç's words is being taken directly from Ogan and Bas's article. Ibid., 5561.
[206] The translation of Erdoğan's words is being taken directly from Ogan and Bas's article. Ibid., 5562.
[207] Esra Yalcınalp, "Turkey Erdogan: Women Rise up over Withdrawal from Istanbul Convention," *BBC News*, March 27, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56516462.
[208] Esra Özcan, "Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Turkey: Struggles over Media Representations and Discourses in the Past and Present," *International Journal of Communication* 14, no: 8 (2020).
[209] Özcan, "Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Turkey," 5456-5458.

Mutlaka [*Certainly One Day*] (1975). After the decline of radicalism in politics and cinema, Olgaç developed a keen interest in women's issues, running concurrently with the feminist movement of the 1980s (and its cinematic equivalent), exhibited in her later works, such as *İpekçe* [*Silky*] (1987). However, Olgaç's post-militant cinema career carried on in the spirit of militant cinema, fusing some energies of cinematic militancy into women's films. Olgaç, thus, presents a fascinating example of how militant cinema came to intersect with feminist culture in Turkey, and, in what follows, I trace the genealogy of this mutation, pointing to its broader resonances for post-militant cinema in the 1980s (and the 1990s).

This chapter takes as its center the genealogical intersection between cinematic militancy and women's films. For Matthew Croombs, the concept of "militant cinema" evokes the traumas of the 1960s (and 1970s), an era of "exhilaration and fatigue" that saw May '68 (and its international reflections) failed.[210] "Militant cinema" represents the "last great moment" of radical political cinema and the concomitant trope of the "melancholy" of the left.[211] Following "the lost battles" of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, cinema "gave up on 'being a medium of communication' in the struggle," and its militancy turned into "embarrassment" by the 1980s.[212] However, the loss of the grand meta-narrative of communism does not point to the natural death of left-wing extremism but more of its fusion, and mutation with identity politics. The decline of militant cinema—built on the macropolitics of anti-capitalism/imperialism—was contemporaneous with the rise of another cinema, founded on micropolitics: women's cinema.[213]

There is a renewed scholarly interest in the historical connection between militant cinema and women's films, as evidenced by a special issue of *Camera Obscura*. This issue revisits the

---

[210] Croombs, *In the Wake of Militant Cinema*, 4.
[211] Ibid., 5.
[212] Ibid., 4.
[213] Ibid, 9-10.

1970s when women's intervention into political filmmaking challenged the macho, macro-aggressive tendencies of cinematic militancy—a worldwide trend in twentieth-century cinema. The issue argues that women from across the world engaged in "film production" and "formed around gender[ed] issues."[214] In France, Carole Roussapoulos was a leading figure, making films about the experiences of sex workers.[215] Women like Roussapoulos also allied with other oppressed identity groups, such as *Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire*—producing early, radical micropolitical films.[216] Canada was another home to the proliferation of women's film, with the women amateur filmmakers working collectively, as discussed in Marusy Bociurkiw's auto-ethnographic research.[217] The media artist Ege Berensel's recent works have shown that the same proliferation in the West occurred in Turkey; militants from *İKD* filmed their march, protesting the state's decision of *İKD*'s closure in the 1970s, with an 8mm camera.[218]

In the local Turkish context, wherein women's cinematic production was flourishing, Bilge Olgaç appeared as a remarkable figure. Arguably the first (professional) woman director engaged in political filmmaking, Olgaç's career and filmography provide a key to illuminating the history of both militant and women's films—especially in terms of their intersection and overlap. This chapter overviews how Olgaç (re-)produced militant cinema in the mid-1970s and then incorporated the socialist issue of class into post-militant women's films in the 1980s (and

[214] The Camera Obscura collective, "Collectivity: Part 1," *Camera Obscura* 31, no. 1 (91) (2016): 1, https://doi.org/10.1215/02705346-3454408.
[215] Stéphanie Jeanjean, "Disobedient Video in France in the 1970s: Video Production by Women's Collectives," *Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context, and Enquiry* 27 (2011): 5.
[216] Ros Murray, "Raised Fists: Politics, Technology, and Embodiment in 1970s French Feminist Video Collectives." *Camera Obscura: Feminism, Culture, and Media Studies* 31, no. 1 (91) (2016): 97.
[217] Marusya Bociurkiw. "Big Affect: The Ephemeral Archive of Second-Wave Feminist Video Collectives in Canada." *Camera Obscura: Feminism, Culture, and Media Studies* 31, no. 3 (93) (2016): 5.
[218] See also chapter two for this women's association known as *İKD* in Turkey; "Women's Films," egeberensel.com, accessed February 22, 2021, https://www.egeberensel.com/index.php/project/womens-films/.

1990s). The chapter ultimately frames Olgaç as a cinematic bridge between macropolitics and micropolitics by historicizing and contextualizing her filmmaking.

3.1 Olgaç's Socialist Years

Although Bilge Olgaç is one of the innovators of women's cinema, she was not a lone figure within Turkish cinema; indeed, a few woman filmmakers came before her, and there were Olgaç's contemporaries. Cahide Sonku, known as the Turkish Greta Garbo (due to her iconic blond hair), is commonly regarded as the earliest woman filmmaker and film star. In the 1930s, Sonku developed her stardom with leading roles, such as the title character of *Aysel* in *Aysel: Bataklı Damın Kızı* (*Aysel: The Girl of Marshy Roof*).[219] In the mid-century, Sonku founded her own production company, Sonku Film, and she produced and co-directed *Vatan and Namık Kemal* (*Homeland and Namık Kemal*). Sonku continued to co-direct later, although Turkish film historiography did not recognize her as a director for a long time, and news media focused on her alcoholism and romantic scandals.[220] In the 1960s, four more women, including Olgaç, started directing—making the number of films by woman 14 in total—which was less than 10 in the 1950s.[221] Among these woman, Olgaç was the only one to continue working after the 1970s.[222] One of Olgaç's contemporaries, Türkan Şoray, was also a star-turned-director—crowned Sultan ("Sultana") by her public—who made three films in the 1970s. These Green Pine melodramas featured Şoray in the leading roles while she—the same as Olgaç—was often not the producer of any of them.[223] Olgaç is still different from Sonku and Şoray, though, because she was neither an

[219] Gönül Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema: Their Presence and Absence as Images and Image-makers," *Third Text* 24, no. 1 (2010): 98.
[220] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema," 99.
[221] Ibid., 98.
[222] Hülya Uğur-Tanrıöver, "Women as Film Directors in Turkish Cinema," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 24, no. 4 (2017): 324.
[223] Uğur-Tanrıöver, "Women as Film Directors," 325.

actor nor benefiting from an already-established acting career as a platform to launch her filmmaking.

Bilge Olgaç was the fourth and most productive Turkish woman filmmaker. According to the film historian Agah Özgüç, Olgaç directed 37 films in total, the largest number generated by woman filmmakers in Turkey; she is the director of 25 out of the 52 feature-length works made by women in Turkey between the 1910s and 1980.[224] Yet this productivity in a career was by no means the result of an affluent background; indeed, Olgaç was the fifth child of a poor, rural family. Financial difficulties forced Olgaç into dropping out of high school and into marrying a man, much older than her, when she was only sixteen years old.[225] Olgaç, then, had to wait for gaining economic independence from her husband to divorce.[226] It was these years that made Olgaç even more conscious of the inequalities between the rich and the poor, and thus the gendered-dynamics of the class struggle.[227] During her teenage years, Olgaç wrote amateur stories, and, by the 1960s, she finally became a screenwriter, then a director.

As one of the very few women working in a profession dominated by men, Bilge Olgaç developed her *survival* tactics as soon as she was part of Turkish cineaste culture. Olgaç frequently and intentionally had short hair, maintained an aggressive attitude, and wore masculine outfits on the set.[228] Su Baloğlu claims that it is Olgaç's "manly" appearance that underlies her impressive productivity as a woman filmmaker.[229] Olgaç also allowed her production crew of men to use foul language and to make sexist jokes during the process of

---

[224] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 127.
[225] Oya Dinçer-Durmuş, "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen: Bilge Olgaç," *Kültür ve Siyasette Feminist Yaklaşımlar* 1, (October 2006): 146.
[226] Mevlüde Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç Sineması" (Master's thesis, Marmara University, 2014), 22.
[227] Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 21.
[228] Ibid., 20.
[229] Su Baloğlu, "Women with a Movie Camera: A Non-fiction Film on Six Female Directors of Turkey" (Master's thesis, Kadir Has University, 2015), 9-10.

shootings, and therefore she came to be known as "*erkek gibi yönetmen*" (the "manlike director") among the crew.[230] This self-aware imitation of macho culture served to let the men "see" Olgaç as one of themselves.[231] Hülya Uğur-Tanrıöver mentions that one of the reasons behind Olgaç's quick adaptation to the "conditions" of filmmaking practice is the fact that she was a divorced, single woman when making her films.

Bilge Olgaç's early films were Green Pine genre pictures, that of the action/adventure genre known as *avantür* in Turkey. Throughout the 1960s, Olgaç mostly made "violent" gangster pictures that Oya Dinçer-Durmuş refers to as "men's films."[232] In this period, for Olgaç, who had not explored the potential of cinema to express her political concerns yet, filmmaking was just an opportunity to gain her economic power, a "source of income."[233] It was also these years that ultimately established a comradery between Olgaç and the filmmaker and actor Yılmaz Güney.

Ugly King, Yılmaz Güney, the legendary representative of militant cinema in Turkey, and Bilge Olgaç had a long history of contact.[234] True to the tradition of cinematic militancy, portrayal of women in Güney's films had always been "problematic," and rumors about "the cruelty" in his private life even got him labeled as a "misogynist."[235] But, ironically, Güney's macho man persona (on the screen) was partially an outcome of his collaboration with Olgaç, as he starred in her first film, *Üçünüzü De Mıhlarım* (*I Can Shoot the Three of You*, 1965). This collaboration produced further films, such as *Kanlı Buğday* [*The Bloody Wheat*], *Krallar Kralı* [*King of the Kings*], and *Tehlikeli Adam* [*The Dangerous Man*] in 1965 alone. One of Güney's lifelong friends, moreover, the actor Tuncel Kurtiz—another politicized figure of Turkish

---

[230] Dinçer-Durmuş, "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen," 147.
[231] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 138.
[232] Dinçer-Durmuş, "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen," 147.
[233] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 127.
[234] See chapter one (and two) for more about Güney.
[235] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema," 94.

cinema—frequently appeared in Olgaç's early films. The alignment between the Kurdish man Güney and the Turkish woman Olgaç, both of whom came from their country's politically oppressed groups, extended beyond the 1960s.

The 1970s—a decade-long era of political polarization and unrest—witnessed a recognition of women's issues. As soon as leftists stressed issues, such as inequality and exploitation, "women's exploitation" and "oppression" increasingly fused into radical political discourse.[236] Eylem Atakav states that since women were present in the leftist movement as ("asexual") comrades, the movement's "intellectual" figures needed to formulate a vague "woman question."[237] Yet this formulation did not recognize women's issues as gendered problems; rather, it explained them in terms of "class structure" and not patriarchy.[238]

In the early 1970s, when left-wing militancy was taking over Turkey, Yılmaz Güney and Bilge Olgaç started making their politically ambitious films, thus becoming two of the cinematic pillars for leftist radicalism. As stated in an interview with Olgaç during the 1970s, she "thought" of cinema as "parallel" with the rising "revolutionary movement" and believed that the goal should be to create the cinema of the working class.[239] Güney's *Hope*—a "turning point" for Turkish cinema—and Olgaç's *Linç* [*Lynching*], both of which are 1970 films, were the first steps of the political cinema that Olgaç once imagined.[240] *Lynching*, a critique of the corruption and oppression in the prisons of Turkey, tells the heroic story of *Arap Kadir* ("Kadir the Arab"), centering on his battle with authority and bribery. It is also the "first" Turkish film without any

---

[236] Eylem Atakav, *Women and Turkish Cinema: Gender Politics, Cultural Identity and Representation*, (London: Routledge, 2014), 25.
[237] Atakav, *Women and Turkish Cinema*, 26.
[238] Ibid., 27.
[239] Dinçer-Durmuş, "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen," 148.
[240] Agah Özgüç, and Giovanni Scognamillo, *A Chorological History of the Turkish Cinema: 1914 – 1988* (İstanbul: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1988), 83.

women in the cast, according to Agah Özgüç and Giovanni Scognamillo.[241] The film competed with *Hope* at the locally significant Adana Film Festival and won Olgaç the "best director" award.[242] In 1974, Olgaç directed *Açlık* ("*Hunger*") in which she took issues like "exploitation," "poverty," and "underdevelopment" as her thematic focus.[243] Starring Türkan Şoray, *Hunger* was a strong "precursor" of Olgaç's films in the 1980s and 1990s.[244] A year after *Hunger*, *Certainly One Day* came out.

Certainly One Day, written by Yılmaz Güney and directed by Bilge Olgaç, was the high expression of the alliance between the two filmmakers. It is a production of Güney Film owned by Güney himself since Olgaç had (almost) never been a producer. Olgaç's film fought a long battle with censorship. Although the film's censored version was ready to exhibit, Güney Film and Olgaç faced hardships in finding any theatres to circulate even this version.[245] But all these challenges were worthy of accepting because *Certainly One Day* would make "Güney's voice" heard, as at the time he was in jail, where he wrote the film's script.[246] For some Turkish scholars, the film was one of the first "realist" films; for others, it was the "first political film" made in Turkey.[247] The fact that there is no real consensus on this issue is probably because of Olgaç's aesthetic tactics that visualized a scenario by Güney.

In *Certainly One Day*, Bilge Olgaç emulates Yılmaz Güney's visual tactics from the earlier days of militant cinema, especially his tactic of embedding documentary realism into a (feature-length) drama. Olgaç's film is essentially the fictional story of an ironworker revolutionary, his militant friends, and their families. Yet even this film's title sequence is a black-and-white

---

[241] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema," 99.
[242] Özgüç, and Scognamillo, *A Chorological History of the Turkish Cinema*, 84.
[243] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema" 99.
[244] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 127.
[245] Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 56.
[246] Ibid., 59.
[247] See Dönmez-Colin (2010) and Dinçer-Durmuş.

montage of documentary footage that displays leftist marches, political funerals, students' protests, and workers' strikes from across twentieth-century Turkey. This use of nonfiction texts creates a recurrent motif in Olgaç's film. Her camera follows the ordinary people on a busy İstanbul street, then focuses on young militants distributing leaflets in the same place. The images of those militants shouting *birlik* ("solidarity"), which is also the name of the leaflets, are juxtaposed with shots of the workers carrying heavy bundles. The stationary camera placed at a high angle above its subjects shoots from afar, thus alluding to the aesthetics of the documentary film. As soon as the police arrives at the street to arrest the militants, the sympathetic people around do not allow any arrests to happen. With this sequence, Olgaç hails the rise of the left and the public support that it gathered in 1970s Turkey.

Olgaç's documentary aesthetics reach the highest point in a sequence halfway through the film. When the ironworker Akif and his militant group are planning their future activities, the camera cuts to a 1975 mass meeting organized by the left-wing Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey, known as *DİSK* in the country. While documentary footage shows images from the meeting, among the workers shouting slogans is *Certainly One Day*'s actual cast—Oktay Sözbir, who played the ironworker, and others. This sequence is perhaps the strongest moment to demonstrate that Olgaç situates her film in conversation with the class struggle of 1970s Turkey.

A certain didacticism, so characteristic of militant cinema in Turkey, is present in Olgaç's film, and it occasionally appears through a *remediation* aesthetic. An instance of the didactic approach is a relatively short sequence in which Akif and other militants try to enhance the revolutionary consciousness of a busload of factory workers. In this sequence, Akif explains Marxist economic concepts, such as *surplus value*, to a young worker. For Gönül Dönmez-Colin,

Olgaç's didacticism "undermined" her "attempted attack on the bourgeoise" in *Certainly One Day*.[248] But it is through this approach that Olgaç harnesses the power of cinema as a mass communication tool, providing partial yet pointed explanations in a country where Marxist-Leninist theories were largely taboo throughout the 1970s. Also, it is this didacticism that helps Olgaç pay tribute to the legacy of amateur militancy in Turkish cinema. In a brief sequence, *Certainly One Day* depicts a group of workers watching one of Muammer Özer's shorts on a projected screen nearby their factory, representing the reception context of the early Turkish militant film, the simple image. The distinct voice-over by Mehmet Özgentürk—Özer's narrator—is present to illuminate the socio-economic conditions of twentieth-century Turkey. *Young Cinema*'s "remediation," in Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin's words, further confirms the genealogical relationship between the Turkish history of militant cinema and Olgaç.[249]

3.2 Olgaç after Feminism

Eylem Atakav describes Ottoman-Turkish culture as a "traditional Islamic culture," which has experienced only "little change" for centuries until the founding of the "self-consciously" Europeanized republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923.[250] Atatürk's republic was, what Atakav calls, a "feminist state," where "women's equality in public space" was a national policy.[251] The new state made new laws, encouraging women not to wear Muslim hijabs, to receive higher education, and to "run for the parliament," an opportunity "introduced well before

[248] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema," 99.
[249] Jay David Bolter, and Richard Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 45.
[250] Atakav, *Women and Turkish Cinema*, 21.
[251] Ibid., 22.

many European countries."[252] But these reforms were the products of one charismatic leader and his vision only. Atatürk's state also created the prototypical "ideal woman"; she was supposed to represent the newly secularized Turkey and was expected to "behave" and "dress" in ways defined as "Western."[253] Accordingly, a sort of republican sisterhood that did not conform to the old Islamic customs was born. Yet, despite these developments, public life was still (largely) the domain of men since Atatürk's project of modernization also "preserved" a *portion* of Muslim-Ottoman culture that served to perceive women as the "symbol of honor" for family.[254] Proclaiming that women had already gained equality, and that there is no social need for their political organizations, *Türk Kadınlar Birliği* (the Turkish Women's Union) was coerced into dissolving in 1935, seen as an "end" of the women's movement—which had a profound impact on Bilge Olgaç and her late films—for at least four decades.[255]

The Turkish feminist movement of the 1980s came to the fore though the specific conditions set by the 1980 Turkish *coup d'état*. The coup worked to urgently and violently "depoliticize" society, which had been radically polarized around the left and the right; the anti-democratic military junta "suspended" the constitution, and martial law took effect.[256] Among the strategies of "systematic" depoliticization were to arrest political party leaders, ban all the "organized political activities," dissolve the parliament, and to execute radical figures.[257] The left had taken a lethal hit by the military junta, though the leftist legacy of the "woman question" from the 1970s survived, evolved, and formed the base of a feminist movement.[258] As the coup destroyed the hegemony of the left and the right in radical political discourse, self-defined

[252] Ibid., 23.
[253] Ibid., 21.
[254] Ibid., 22.
[255] Ibid., 23.
[256] Atakav, *Women and Turkish Cinema*, 36.
[257] Ibid., 26.
[258] Ibid., 25.

feminists took the opportunity to rise on the shoulders of Kemalist reforms and the 1970s.[259] But, dissociated themselves from the left, the feminists of 1980s Turkey were (mostly) liberal individualists.[260] It was mainly because the Western "second wave" feminists were a point of reference and inspiration for these Turkish feminists who were closely following the similarly aligned movements around the world.[261] For the military junta, the feminist movement and woman activists were politically "insignificant" since the coup's primary goal was to "crush" the radical polarization created by the far-left and right-wing militants.[262] Turkish news media even "teased" and "ridiculed" woman activists.[263] Yet the broader area of cultural production was still the primary platform and sphere of influence for the women's movement, which had disseminated ideas through publications like the journal *Feminist* (1987-1990).

Particularly, cinema was influenced by the feminist movement of the 1980s; that is, it had played a role in rejuvenating Turkish cinema after the military coup. Women's films, Esin Paça-Cengiz argues, were one of the major trends in cinema up until the early 1990s.[264] Before the rise of this trend, the coup had forced figures, such as Yılmaz Güney, to live in exile, implying that "the political," perceived as the class struggle of the 1970s, was too "dangerous."[265] While films like Bilge Olgaç's *Certainly One Day* were either strictly censored or largely "destroyed" by the coup, filmmakers living in Turkey, coerced into staying away from "the political," were leaning more towards "the individual."[266] In "parallel" with the feminist movement, thus, an early

[259] Ibid., 27.
[260] Ibid., 33.
[261] Ibid., 28.
[262] Ibid., 27.
[263] Ibid., 33.
[264] Esin Paça-Cengiz, "Cinema Has Split the Girl's Soul into Pieces: Scrutinizing Representations of Women in Films from Turkey," *International Journal of Communication* 14, no. 8 (2020): 5483.
[265] Atakav, *Women and Turkish Cinema*, 48.
[266] Ibid., 49.

moment of women's cinema, a reflection of feminism on the big screen, rose to prominence.[267] The hallmark of women's films in the 1980s was their narrative tactics, pertaining especially to characterization, free of the Green Pine's genre conventions that had objectified women's bodies for men's pleasure.[268] Accordingly, the old, stereotypical representation of women was gradually disappearing. Atıf Yılmaz, Olgaç, and Şerif Gören, Güney's longtime partner in filmmaking, for example, had appeared as the key directors of this period after 1980. Collaborating with the iconic Green Pine stars, such as Müjde Ar and Türkan Şoray, Yılmaz ironically worked to destroy the cliché images of women that he and others once served to create on the screen. According to Paça-Cengiz, although directors like Yılmaz had not (strongly) challenged the Green Pine's visual aesthetic codes, they destroyed its problematic star personas, "ideological operation" of dubbing practices, and its dominant narrative strategies in representing women.[269]

The thematic concern of women's cinema in the 1980s was predominantly women's agency, identity, and the subjectivity. The representative films of this trend concentrated on the search for independence in a patriarchal society, with their "unconventional" woman protagonists.[270] The representation of complex, independent women was new in Turkish cinema.[271] This motif indicated a shift from the "one-dimensional woman" to the "multidimensional" woman, one which embodies both morally "good" and "evil" characteristics within a single narrative.[272] Moreover, this new woman on the screen was "conscious" of her "desires" and "rights," questioning the "family structure" and her place in society.[273] Star personas like the Sultana Türkan Şoray, the "symbol" of men's honor for a long time in the

---

[267] Ibid., 50.
[268] Ibid., 48.
[269] Paça-Cengiz, "Cinema Has Split the Girl's Soul into Pieces," 5485.
[270] Ibid., 5482.
[271] Atakav, *Women and Turkish Cinema*, 49.
[272] Ibid., 52.
[273] Ibid., 50.

Green Pine's melodramas, had appeared "experiencing" their "sexuality" by kissing and "having casual sex" without "losing women's integrity."[274] Some women's films used "fragmented" narratives, extended to the design of their posters.[275]

Just a couple of years before the coup, Bilge Olgaç paused her career. *Certainly One Day* was Olgaç's last film made in the 1970s. It was because Olgaç was "disillusioned" by the erotic film cycle that dominated Turkish cinema during the years of militant extremism.[276] Yet, indeed, Olgaç's temporary retreat was to protest cinema, which would have aligned with the revolutionary class struggle of the proletarian masses, rather than ensuring escapist pleasures embellished with women's objectified bodies. As soon as Olgaç consciously separated herself from the world of cinema in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when feminism was proliferating in Turkey, she started focusing on reading and research, which intellectually prepared her for films to make in the future.[277] It was also around this time that Olgaç's radical ideas and beliefs related to women's issues were developed.[278] Four years after the coup, which had had a deadly impact on Turkish cinema, Olgaç returned to filmmaking, and one of her first works became *Kaşık Düşmanı* (1985). This film's original title translates as the "mouth to feed," a local expression implying that housewives and rural women only consume what men produce, disregarding their daily labor at home and beyond.[279] The film won the top award *Grand Prix* at the Créteil International Women's Film Festival in Paris, France, hailing Olgaç's return and her new films running concurrent with the feminist movement of Turkey.

[274] Ibid., 53.
[275] Paça-Cengiz, "Cinema Has Split the Girl's Soul into Pieces," 5484; see also Paça Cengiz for the subversive dubbing practices of women's films.
[276] Gönül Dönmez-Colin, *Turkish Cinema: Identity, Distance and Belonging* (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), 153.
[277] Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 24 [and 104].
[278] See Kuşaklıoğlu (especially page 105).
[279] Dönmez-Colin, *Turkish Cinema*, 153.

Bilge Olgaç's cinema after the rise of feminism points to the mutation of militant cinema, from its exclusive orientation toward social class, into another cinema that opened its lens toward the questions of gender. Since Olgaç believed that women would "remain sex objects for the rich and the poor" as long as capitalist society exists, she aligned with the "class struggle" and tried to reflect this alignment on her work.[280] But, with *Kaşık Düşmanı*, films—both written and directed by Olgaç—also manifested her growing interest in women's issues, featuring woman protagonists, while the setting of these films was increasingly becoming rural Turkey. Anatolia's small towns and villages had nearly become a recurrent rhetoric element, for Olgaç, as was seen in her films like *Gülüşan* (1985), *Üç Halka 25* (*Three Rings 25*, 1986), *Silky*, and *Gömlek* (*Shirt*, 1990).[281] Mainly, this setting helped Olgaç critique not only the sort of feudalism, specific to Turkey and known as "*ağalık*" that privileged class division in ruling most of the Anatolian countryside for centuries, but also patriarchal customs and rural machismo.[282] These narrative strategies in the cinema of Olgaç represented a moment when the rich tradition of militant filmmaking laid the groundwork for women's films.

The 1987 film *Silky* has a special place in Bilge Olgaç's filmography and in the history of Turkish cinema. The third and last component of Olgaç's "women's trilogy," whose first and second installments are her *Kaşık Düşmanı* and *Gülüşan*, *Silky* is the story of a women sex worker with tuberculosis.[283] According to Russell Campbell—the author of *Marked Women: Prostitutes and Prostitution in the Cinema* (2006)—one of the few book-length projects about cinematic sex workers, the "prostitute [is] written and "directed by men," and it is a "creature of

[280] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema," 99.
[281] Dönmez-Colin, *Turkish Cinema*, 154.
[282] Dinçer-Durmuş, "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen," 151; Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 25.
[283] Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 65.

the male imagination."[284] Yet Olgaç's *Silky*—among her "most accomplished films" for Gönül Dönmez-Colin—is a rare example of Turkish films about sex work, made by a woman.[285] In 1988, a screening program organized by Ontario Film Institute in Ottawa, Canada, included *Silky* for the first-time outside Turkey.[286] More recently, *İstanbul Kültür Sanat Vakfı* (the İstanbul Foundation for Art and Culture) had restored Olgaç's film and then screened it in the 37th İstanbul International Film Festival in 2018.[287]

Silky is primarily about hypocrisy at the core of sex work. As Russell Campbell highlights, the "prostitute" is "created and sustained by patriarchal society" to serve "men's desires": she is "required" to "make her body available to men on demand" and then "condemned for doing so."[288] This hypocrisy fully manifests itself in Bilge Olgaç's film. As soon as a pimp leaves the sex worker Aylin at a remote village in rural Turkey for a couple of weeks, she quickly becomes the center of attention—with her long blond hair and urban, modern look. Yet it is just because Aylin self-consciously does not disclose anything about her profession. The village's people like Aylin so much that they call her *silky*, host and take care of her for free, and build a cottage to shelter Aylin so long as she likes to stay with them. But once these villagers figure out that Aylin is a sex worker in the city, all their benign and positive attitudes disappear. While men with a "fear of contamination" treat Aylin (and her lover from the same village) "like plague victims," a few women give her a hand (only at a distance).[289] Patriarchy, Campbell claims, "compels the prostitute" to "mark herself off" from the "respectable woman," creating a "code of physical

---

[284] Russell Campbell, *Marked Women: Prostitutes and Prostitution in the Cinema* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 5.
[285] Dönmez-Colin, *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey*, 130.
[286] Özgüç, and Scognamillo, *A Chronological History of the Turkish Cinema*, 115.
[287] Kültür Sanat Servisi, "İstanbul Film Festivali 'İpekçe'yi Restore Ediyor," *Milliyet*, February 5, 2018, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbul-film-festivali-ipekce-yi-restore-ediyor-2603835.
[288] Campbell, *Marked Women*, 3.
[289] Ibid., 8.

appearance."[290] Although one of these *codes* had conventionally been "blonde" hair in the Green Pine's genre pictures, Olgaç's film subverts it, as Aylin appears at first with her blond hair as a noblewoman from the city.[291] Yet, indeed, Aylin's hair is a wig—revealed when the villagers learn that she is a sex worker. *Silky*'s exposure of the culture's hypocrisy and its depiction of the villagers' contradictory behaviors problematize the bias and prejudice against sex worker women in Turkish society.

In Bilge Olgaç's *Silky*, melodrama—recalling the old Green Pine films—is the principle mode through which sex work is represented. Russell Campbell states that the melodramatic genre offers two specific "archetypal tales" related to the "fallen woman" and the "white slave."[292] The fallen woman tale is known for its cliché ending in which the "prostitute" is "condemned to a miserable fate"; she "die[s] at the end" and sometimes through "suicide," thus atoning for her "sins."[293] The white slave tale exploits the tragedy of sexual violence victims, typically "imprisoned" in brothels, before being "rescued" by their *true* lovers who are—without exception—men.[294] Both these archetypal tales are partially present in Olgaç's *Silky* because there is an element of coercion involved in Aylin's sex work, conveyed through brief flashback sequences that depict her traumas. Roughly halfway through *Silky*'s third act, Aylin's rescuer Seyit leaves his village and comes to the city's brothel where she works. Yet, in trying to run away with her, he is stabbed to death by a pimp. Aylin, in turn, blows up the brothel even at the cost of her own life. *Silky* concludes with the close-up of an image of a news story published in *Republic*, telling that a sex worker woman exploded her brothel. This image acknowledges the

[290] Ibid., 9.
[291] Paça-Cengiz, "Cinema Has Split the Girl's Soul into Pieces," 5489.
[292] Campbell, *Marked Women*, 10.
[293] Ibid., 11.
[294] Ibid, 16.

source of inspiration for Olgaç's film while framing *Silky* as a dramatic, quasi-social exposé of sex work in Turkey.

At the center of *Silky* lies the urban/rural divide, mounting a critique of social class. The city represents a chaotic, corrupt environment in which the oppression of women is an intimate part of daily life, whereas the village is almost a stand-in for a socialist utopia, beginning with the early sequences of Bilge Olgaç's film. The film's establishing shots depict a self-sufficient rural place where a perfect rhythm and harmony exists between nature and culture, symbolized best by the sky-blue pool nearby an old Turkish coffeehouse ("*kahvehane*") with domestic fowl and children around. This village, surrounded by mesmerizing waterfalls and verdant valleys, is practically a hidden paradise—far away from the mechanic, systematic repression of modern urban life introduced with a giant semi-trailer truck with which Aylin arrives. In the village, collectivism rather than individual action is a conscious and habitual element of everyday life, while there seems to be no rigid hierarchy between villagers based on class. Those villagers do not let Aylin carry her items of baggage by herself, for instance, but they collectively take them out from the truck to help her. The villagers take collective action even when they clean themselves in the river. Yet, perhaps, the most powerful moment of this rural collectivism comes halfway through the film. Once the villagers decide to build one of their local houses for Aylin, they all start constructing it and then furnishing the newly built house hand in hand with each other. Surprised by this monument of collective effort, Aylin says that "I wouldn't even believe if somebody said there are people like you on Earth," further affirming the utopia. Olgaç's utopic socialist depiction of rural Turkey in *Silky* alludes to a criticism of the Turkish left, which largely

failed to receive the full support of various rural communities in the 1970s despite the political potential they would have.[295]

After *Silky*, Bilge Olgaç continued to work as a filmmaker until the last days of her life. The year 1990 was especially productive for Olgaç; she first made *Shirt*, then *Yarın Cumartesi* (*Saturday Tomorrow*). *Shirt* critiques the oppressive feudal rule in rural Turkey much as centuries-old patriarchal customs associated with it, including *başlık parası* ("bride price").[296] Olgaç's *Shirt* also satirizes machismo, as the feudal ruler called "*ağa*," who cannot have a child, starts losing control over the villagers.[297] *Saturday Tomorrow* features Duygu Asena, an iconic figure known well for her feminist writings and activism in Turkey. According to Oya Dinçer-Durmuş, Asena's character—representing a self-taught woman without the need for any husband to support her—embodies the ideals of Olgaç, who firmly believed that women's emancipation is possible through education.[298] For this character, Olgaç particularly uses eye-line matches and static point-of-view (PoV) shots to show men through the self-taught woman's eyes, which empowers her cinematic figure on the screen and destroys the legacy of to-be-looked-at-ness.[299] Olgaç died in a fire incident inside her modest apartment in 1994, when she was preparing for another feature-length film. In honor and memoriam of Olgaç, since the early 2000s, the international women's film festival organized by the Turkish feminist organization Flying Broom has been annually giving the "Bilge Olgaç Merit Award" to "remember" women who made contributions to the cinema.[300]

---

[295] Sabri Sayari's article, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis," has a powerful, instructive footnote about far-left militants' (failed) attempt(s) to gain full support from the rural communities. See Sayari.
[296] Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 69.
[297] Dinçer-Durmuş, "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen," 151.
[298] Ibid., 152.
[299] Kuşaklıoğlu, "Bilge Olgaç," 151.
[300] "Flying Broom International Women's Film Festival," flyingbroom.org, accessed March 25, 2021, https://flyingbroom.org/festival/flying-broom-film-festival/.

Following Bilge Olgaç, women's cinema in Turkey has been growing, gaining prominent international (and concomitant national) exposure. According to Gönül Dönmez-Colin, Turkish cinema has "produced" neither a local Agnes Varda nor its Marguerite Duras yet.[301] Since the 1980s, however, there has been a promising increase in the number of woman directors, as "fourteen women made their first films" in the 1990s.[302] Among these woman filmmakers is Yeşim Ustaoğlu—who has showcased films and won awards at the Sundance Film Festival and high-profile festivals in Berlin, Ghent, Montréal, Oslo, San Sebastián, Tokyo, and Venice—and has become the most internationally recognized one. An architecture major, Ustaoğlu is known for the use of urban landmarks like "skyscrapers" and also "claustrophobic" metropolitan spaces in her cinematography.[303] Ustaoğlu's films and documentaries, especially her early works, such as *Güneşe Yolculuk* [*Journey to the Sun*] (1999), are political—questioning and "challenging" the Turkish national past and identity.[304] With directors like Ustaoğlu, the flame of women's films in Turkey seems to be carried out by the later generation of filmmakers.

The history of radical political cinema displays a particular narrative, intertwined with amateur filmmaking, the professional film industry, and, at some point, women's films in Turkey, but even this broader trajectory is ultimately incomplete and partial. It is especially the case when considering contemporary cinema after the late twentieth-century. Directors, such as Özcan Alper, have found inspiration in local politics, expressing their concerns and what seems problematic to them at the heart of society through cinematic representation. Similar to Yeşim Ustaoğlu, Alper is interested in collectively experienced traumatic events associated with the

---

[301] Dönmez-Colin, "Women in Turkish Cinema," 103.
[302] Ibid., 100.
[303] Ibid., 101.
[304] Ibid., 102.

national past. The following chapter intends to conclude this thesis work and then overviews Alper's example of political cinema from twenty-first century Turkey.

CONCLUSION

Political Cinema Now: Özcan Alper's *Autumn*

This thesis has presented a closer look at militant (and post-militant) cinema in twentieth-century Turkey, bringing a missing chapter into the historiography of cinematic militancy. The thesis engaged radical shorts that orthodox Turkish film historiography largely neglected. In framing these films as the ciné-cultural reflection of the left, I surveyed the amateur political filmmaking scene of the late 1960s and 1970s. The thesis analyzed *Young Cinema*'s practice of the simple image and discussed the later militant documentary praxes. It also overviewed Bilge Olgaç's instance(s) of intersection with militant cinema and her post-militant women's films in the 1980s. Throughout the thesis, Yılmaz Güney has appeared as a radical intertext, alluding to the links between the non-professional filmmaking scene, professional film industry, and beyond.

Like in the twentieth-century, political cinema in twenty-first-century Turkey still resists difficulties, especially economic ones, for production. Filmmakers, such as Özcan Alper, often rely on foreign festival funding and other transnational opportunities, besides the few national funds that may not even always be available for them.[305] The rest of this conclusion offers Alper's example of the political film that had (barely) overcome financial hardships.

The rich heritage of militant cinema that influenced early women's films has also served as a point of reference for the contemporary political film. In 2007, a few young directors founded an independent film group, the latest organized demonstration of professional filmmakers' alliance, Yeni Sinema Hareketi (the New Cinema Movement).[306] Among the objectives of this

---

[305] Aslı Daldal, "1990'ların Yeni Bağımsız Türk Sineması'nda Emekçi Öznenin Kayboluşu: Küreselleşme ve Festivalizm," *Kültür ve İletişim* 24, no. 47 (2021): 181.
[306] Akser, Turkish Independent Cinema, 144.

group was to support first-time directors.[307] The group's "initial mark" became *Sonbahar* [*Autumn*], written and directed by one of the founders of the New Cinema Movement, Özcan Alper, in 2008.[308] *Autumn*, a directorial debut, demonstrated that Alper's aesthetic and thematic tactics recall Turkish militant cinema and, particularly, Yılmaz Güney. Alper and *Autumn*, however, represent an even larger trend today.

The cinema of twenty-first century Turkey has witnessed a renewed interest in political filmmaking. Özge Cengiz recognizes that the cinematic style, most famously associated with Yılmaz Güney, had survived the depoliticization of the 1980s as well as the subsequent 1990s.[309] This style had experienced changes, although its social and political ethos remained the same and influenced some of the later generations of filmmakers. Accordingly, new movements like Özcan Alper's group thematize issues, such as the Cyprus dispute and the plight of ethnic minorities, which were subject to censorship in the past.[310] Encouraged by a general "democratic" atmosphere resulting from Turkey's negotiations of accession to the European Union in the early and mid-2000s, directors like Alper reflected (more freely) on the Turkish national past in their films.[311] According to Esin Paça Cengiz, this "new political cinema" has a "tendency" to revisit the "silenced stories" and "traumatic events" of the past through a critical lens and without "nostalgic" impulses.[312] Alper's *Autumn* is one the "masterpieces" of the new political cinema, taking Hayata Dönüş Operasyonu (Operation Return to Life) as its major theme.[313]

---

[307] Ibid., 145.
[308] Ibid., 146.
[309] Özge Cengiz, "Bahçeden Temizlenen Ayrık Otları: Politik Sinema Bağlamında 'Sonbahar' Filminin Analizi," *Eurasian Journal of Researches in Social and Economics* 5, no. 11 (2018): 109.
[310] Cengiz, "Bahçeden Temizlenen Ayrık Otları," 110.
[311] Ibid., 111.
[312] Esin Paça-Cengiz, "Film as a Tool to Re-write History: New Political Cinema in Turkey" (Master's thesis, Kadir Has University, 2010), 32-4.
[313] Akser, Turkish Independent Cinema, 145.

Operation Return to Life has appeared as among the dramatic incidents of the late history of social life. This armed operation intended to end a hunger strike, collectively organized by jailors at F Tipi Cezaevleri (the F-type Prisons) that hosts particular groups of inmates, such as political prisoners, in 2000.[314] These prisoners had been protesting and resisting the particular conditions of their prisons, specifically the "isolation cells" known as "*hücre sistemi*" since October 20.[315] On December 19, the operation officially began with approximately 10.000 security guards, targeting 20 of the F-type Prisons.[316] The operation ultimately resulted in the death of 30 prisoners, and it injured (at least) 237 inmates.[317] Moreover, the operation aimed to eliminate the hunger strike, indeed, served to increase the total number of inmates in the strike from 259 to 357.[318] Outside the prisons, security forces arrested 2145 activists who protested the operation, searched 18 buildings of different associations, "culture centers," and political parties, and permanently sealed some of these buildings.[319] A few years after the operation, the court decision regarding the first suit for damage acknowledged that the security forces did not follow the principle of proportionality.[320] The F-type Prisons still exist in Turkey, with (relatively) better conditions, and some prisoners and individuals outside jail continue their protest in the form of hunger strikes.

Özcan Alper's *Autumn* uses Operation Return to Life and as a backdrop, critiquing the repression of political prisoners in the early 2000s Turkey. Alper's film tells of the last months of a leftist, Yusuf, who has just been released from İstanbul's F-type-inspired prison, where he was

---

[314] Hasan Sezer Fener, "Özcan Alper Sineması ve Toplumsal Hafıza," *The International Journal of Social Science Studies* 69, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 493, http://dx.doi.org/10.9761/JASSS7782.
[315] Paça-Cengiz, "Film as a Tool to Re-write History, 43.
[316] Fener, "Özcan Alper Sineması," 493.
[317] Ibid., 494.
[318] Ibid., 493.
[319] Ibid., 494.
[320] Ibid., 493.

serving a sentence, because of his deteriorating health. The main reason behind Yusuf's worsening health is the condition of his prison and the hunger strike in which he once joined. The film met with the Turkish national audience on the 8th anniversary of the operation. *Autumn* also gained global recognition, receiving awards and award nominations at high-profile, international film festivals in Ghent, Locarno, San Francisco, and Vancouver.

Özcan Alper incorporates the realist aesthetics of the documentary mode into a feature-length fictional drama, recalling Yılmaz Güney's characteristic visual tactic in the 1970s and early 1980s. *Autumn*'s first series of shots come from Operation Return to Life's archival footage that dates back to December 22, 2000, and portray the act of resistance within the F-type Prisons. Alper's film starts with the images of a prison yard behind the white bars outside. Shortly before the armed intervention, a security officer gives an official warning to surrender in a seemingly unemotional tone. The prisoners in the hunger strike respond back to this warning by shouting out slogans that label the state as "fascist." Alper describes the archival footage as an element of distanciation and a "Godardian reflex."[321] *Autumn* exhibits this footage, with an officer's warning that also includes a few words about the value of life, to create a powerful irony years after the operation that intervened many lives.

Later in *Autumn*, the embedded archival footage implies Yusuf's traumas related to Operation Return to Life and his days at the F-type Prison, functioning almost as flashback sequences. In an early moment of the first act, Yusuf receives curious questions and patronizing comments on the prison and his imprisonment when he meets family friends at home.[322] Having faced these exhausting questions, Yusuf gazes into space and recalls the operation, shown in a

[321] Cengiz, "Bahçeden Temizlenen Ayrık Otları," 118.
[322] Yusuf's home is a village in *Doğu Karadeniz Bölgesi* (the "Eastern Black Sea Region"), See, for a discussion of this region in Alper's film, Hüseyin Özden, "Türk Sineması'nda Anlatı Mekanı Olarak Doğu Karadeniz," (Master's thesis, Marmara University, 2019), 68-74.

PoV shot. Özcan Alper, then, cuts to the archival footage. The armed security forces walk into a prison, some of whose cells are on fire. In the second act of Alper's film, Yusuf sees the image of Behiç Ahçı, a lawyer who joined the hunger strike, on the news while watching television. Yusuf's second look at the news report cuts to the footage that portrays political prisoners, making the V sign and resisting the operation. Following this sequence, a sound bridge acts as a transition effect from the archival footage to Yusuf, who slowly hits the wall with his head.

Özcan Alper's mise-en-scène frames Yusuf as a *romantic* leftist who also has been an admirer of Soviet, especially Russian, culture in *Autumn*. There are photographic images of communist figures and militants on the walls of Yusuf's room, and he seems to particularly enjoy watching a film adaptation of *Uncle Vanya* by Anton Chekhov.[323] As soon as Yusuf is aware of a Russian figure-skating couple on TV, he leaves his work aside and starts watching the couple's performance in awe. While Yusuf was checking his family album and photos from his youth, Alper cuts to a video collage pieced together from the archival footage of some leftist student demonstrations from the 1990s. This last instance of the aesthetics of the documentary film, hence, indicates an effect of memory recollection. Eka, Yusuf's love interest, is shocked to hear Yusuf's story of imprisonment, as she asks; "did you really spend the best years of your life in jail in for socialism?"

Eka represents the fall of the socialist block after the Cold War era and some of its impacts on local economies and social life in Turkey. Yusuf frequently visits a city (Artvin) nearby the Turkish-Georgian border, which was part of the larger Turkish-Soviet border before the early 1990s. In this city where there is an entry point, Sarp Sınır Kapısı (the Sarp Border Gate), a couple of women from the USSR's successor republics earn a living. These women are among

[323] Cengiz, "Bahçeden Temizlenen Ayrık Otları," 119.

those who came to Turkey, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to find jobs in a neighbor and neoliberalized country, and Eka is just one of them.[324] Eka, either a Georgian or Russian, was involved in sex work to take care of her child waiting at home. *Autumn*'s more global references and subtexts turn local once Özcan Alper's camera is outside the city, depicting Yusuf's hometown—Çamlıhemşin.

Autumn is spiritually dedicated to the *Hemşin* people and culture. The Hemşins comprise a "small" ethnic minority in Turkey, "unnoticed by the rest of the world."[325] Yusuf and his mother usually speak in the dying Hemşin language with each other. Özcan Alper—who is of Hemşin descent—uses the Çamlıhemşin province (in Rize), home to the ethnic minority, as a setting for the sequences that depict Yusuf's life in his village.[326] Moreover, Alper's film features amateur actors, vaguely recalling tactics that are familiar within the early repertoire of militant cinema, and some of these actors are from the province. The performer that plays the character, Yusuf's mother, for instance, is a local person who can speak in Hemşin. Most of the lines and dialogues of this character are not in Turkish. Alper's emphasis on Hemşin culture empowers *Autumn*'s political meanings in a special way, as the "leftist Hemşin generation," according to Özge Cengiz, had a prominent place in the Turkish left.[327]

Autumn confirms that there exists some degree of relationship, which is loose but aspiring, between the radical cinema of the 1960s and 1970s and the work of directors like Özcan Alper. As Hito Steyerl would agree, the militant cinema of the twentieth-century is an unstable, unstoppable force, striving to fuse with and lead toward films that hold on to a similarly activist

---

[324] Özden, "Türk Sineması'nda Anlatı Mekanı Olarak Doğu Karadeniz," 69.
[325] Akser, Turkish Independent Cinema, 146.
[326] Özden, "Türk Sineması'nda Anlatı Mekanı Olarak Doğu Karadeniz," 70.
[327] Cengiz, "Bahçeden Temizlenen Ayrık Otları," 118.

ethos today.[328] It appears that the contemporary scene of cinematic activism continues to harness the rich history of the political film.

[328] See Hito Steyerl, "In Defense of the Poor Image," *e-flux journal* 10, no. 11 (2009): 7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"1 Mayıs Mahallesi Halkı İETT'den Otobüs İstedi." *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1978.

"1 Mayıs Olayı Açıklığa Kavuşmadı." *Cumhuriyet*, December 31, 1978.

"37 Kuruluş 1 Mayıs Mahallesi Halkının Sorunlarına Çözüm Getirilmemesini Kınadı." *Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 1978.

"1 Mayıs Mahallesi Yakınında Yıkılan Gecekondularda Oturan Bir Grup Kadıköy CHP İlçe Merkezini İşgal Etti" *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1979.

"Arafat, Pekin'e Gidiyor." *Cumhuriyet*, March 6, 1970.

"Continental Oteli'nin Garajına Bomba Atıldı, 1 Mayıs'tan Beri Süren Yıldırma Kampanyası Orta Dereceli Okulları Hedef Aldı." *Cumhuriyet*, May 6, 1977.

"Dziga Vertov ve Belgesel Sinema." *Genç Sinema* 16, (April 1970): 5-6.

"Ecevit Antalya'da ve Isparta'da Düzenlenen." *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1977.

"Filistin Halkıyla Dayanışma Haftasu Bugün Açılacak Sergiyle Başlıyor." *Cumhuriyet*, December 7, 1976.

"Çeşitli Kuruluşlar 1 Mayıs Olaylarını CIA Yönetiminde." *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1977.

"Genç Sinema'dan." *Genç Sinema* 12, (March 1970): 2.

"Genç Sinema'dan." *Genç Sinema* 13, (June 1970): 2-4.

"Genç Sinema'dan." *Genç Sinema* 7, (May 1969): 2.

"Gerillalar Kral Hüseyin'i Suçluyor," *Cumhuriyet*, February 11, 1970.

"İslam Zirvesi'nde İsrail'in Kudüs Dahil Arap Topraklarından Çekilmesini Sağlamak İçin Hertürlü Tedbirin Alınması Kararlaştırldı." *Cumhuriyet*, February 24, 1974.

"İsrail Bombardımanında Ölü Sayısı 111 Kişiyi Buldu." *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1975.

"Latin Amerika'da Halk Sola Kayıyor." *Cumhuriyet*, March 11, 1970.

"Latin Amerika'da İlerici Güçlere Karşı Baskı Uygulaması Artıyor." *Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1976.

"Sinemada Lenin." *Genç Sinema* 13 (June 1970): 8-10.

"Lübnan'ın Güneyinde İsraillilerle Filistinliler Arasında Ateş Açıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 22, 1976.

"Trump Compares Turkey and Kurds Fight to 'Two Kids in a Lot' – Video." *The Guardian*. Accessed December 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2019/oct/18/trump-compares-turkey-and-kurds-fight-to-two-kids-in-a-lot-video.

"Ümraniye'deki Gecekondu Yıkımı Sırasında Ölen Kızılkaya'nın Cenazesi Kaldırıldı." *Cumhuriyet*, September 6, 1977.

Adam, Fiona B. "Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis." *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 2 (2001): 277-303.

Akser, Murat. "Yılmaz Güney's Beautiful Losers: Idiom and Performance in Turkish Political Film." In *Cinema and Politics: Turkish Cinema and the New Europe*, edited by Deniz Bayraktar, Asli Kotaman, and Samav Ugursoy, 142-153. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2009.

Akser, Murat. "Turkish Independent Cinema: Between Bourgeois Auterism and Political Radicalism." In *Independent Filmmaking around the Globe*, edited by Doris Baltuschat and Mary P. Erickson, 131-148. University of Toronto Press, 2015.

Akser, Murat, and Didem Durak-Akser. "Fight for a National Cinema: An Introductory Text and Translation (Halit Refiğ, 1971)." *Film Studies* 16, no. 1 (2017): 56-77.

Atakav, Eylem. *Women and Turkish Cinema: Gender Politics, Cultural Identity and Representation*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Algan, Ece. "The Politicization of Rape as a Consequence of Western Modernity and Religious Conservatism: Competing Media Narratives on Gender." *International Journal of Communication* 14, no. 8 (2020): 5537-5555.

Alper, Emin. "Protest Diffusion and Rising Political Violence in the Turkish'68 Movement: The Arab-Israeli War." In *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*, edited by Chares Demetriou, 255-257. London: Routledge, 2016.

Amateurcinema.org. "Beyoğlu 68." Accessed November 28, 2019. https://www.amateurcinema.org/index.php/film/beyolu-68

Amateurcinema.org. "1 Mayıs 77 [1 May 77]." Accessed January 12, 2021, https://amateurcinema.org/index.php/film/1-mays-1977-1-may-1977.

Armes, Roy. *Third World Film Making and the West*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Aslan, Şükrü. "Sıradışı Mahallede Tarih ve Kimlik Sorunsalı." *Kebikeç* 20 (2005): 149-163.

Ay, Ayşecan, (2019) A Brief History of Turkish Cinémathèque Association, Observatoire de la Turquie Contemporaine Short Paper Series, no: 1, Institut Français de Géopolitique, Paris 8th University, available at: http://observatoireturquie.fr.

Ayça, Engin. "Sinemayı Yeniden İcadetmek," *Genç Sinema* 1, (October 1968): 13-14.

Baloğlu, Su. "Women with a Movie Camera: A Non-fiction Film on Six Female Directors of Turkey." Master's thesis, Kadir Has University, 2015.

Barokas, Yakup. "Basit Sinema." *Genç Sinema* 10, (October 1969): 11-12.

Barokas, Yakup. “Devrimci Açıdan Öz ve Biçim II.” *Genç Sinema* 7, (May 1969): 8-10.

Barokas, Yakup. “Yeni Bir Aşamaya Doğru.” *Genç Sinema* 5, (February 1969): 10-12.

Belge, Murat. “Türkiye’de Sosyalizm Tarihinin Ana Çizgileri.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, edited by Murat Gültekingil, 19-49. Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2008.

Belge, Murat. “Nationalism, Democracy and the Left in Turkey.” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 30, no. 1 (2009): 7-20.

Bergman, İbrahim. “Sanat Olayı ve Halk.” *Genç Sinema* 2, (November 1968): 9-11.

Bhengu, Cebelihle. “Turkish Artist Hangs 440 Pairs of Shoes in Memory of Women Murdered by Their Husbands.” *Times Live*, February 21, 2021, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/2019-09-23-turkish-artist-hangs-440-pairs-of-shoes-in-memory-of-women-murdered-by-their-husbands/.

Bolter, Jay David, and Richard Grusin. *Remediation: Understanding New Media*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.

Bulut, Ergin, and Haluk Mert Bal. “Disrupting the Spectacle: The Case of Capul TV During and After Turkey’s Gezi Uprising.” In *The Spectacle 2.0: Reading Debord in the Context of Digital Capitalism*, edited by Marco Briziarelli and Emiliana Armano, 209-12. London: University of Westminster Press, 2017.

Candan, Can. “Documentary Cinema in Turkey: A Brief Survey of the Past and the Present (2014).” In *The City in Turkish Cinema*, edited by Hakkı Başgüney, and Özge Özdüzen, 113-134. İstanbul: Libra Yayinlari, 2014.

Campbell, Russell. *Marked Women: Prostitutes and Prostitution in the Cinema*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.

Cengiz, Cenk. “Kisa Süreli Bir Sinema Dergisinin Analizi: Genç Sinema, Türkiye, 1968-1971.”

Master's thesis, Sabancı University, 2010.

Cengiz, Özge. "Bahçeden Temizlenen Ayrık Otları: Politik Sinema Bağlamında 'Sonbahar' Filminin Analizi." *Eurasian Journal of Researches in Social and Economics* 5, no. 11 (2018): 108-122.

Coşkun, Esin. *Dünya Sinemasında Akımlar*. Ankara: Phonix Yayinlari, 2017.

Croombs, Matthew. "In the Wake of Militant Cinema: Challenges for Film Studies." *Discourse: Journal for Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture* 41, no. 1 (2020): 68-89.

Croombs, Matthew. "Questions of Militant Cinema: René Vautier and the Anti-colonial Combat Film." Filmed April 2014 at the Institute of African Studies – Carleton University, Ottawa. Video, 1:20:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wavoGS42Nms&t=680s.

Daldal, Aslı. "The Concept of 'National Cinema' and the 'New Turkish Cinema'." In *New Cinema, New Media: Reinventing Turkish Cinema*, edited by Murat Akser, and Deniz Bayrakdar, 92-112. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014.

Daldal, Aslı. "1990'ların Yeni Bağımsız Türk Sineması'nda Emekçi Öznenin Kayboluşu: Küreselleşme ve Festivalizm." *Kültür ve İletişim* 24, no. 47 (2021): 159-189.

Dinçer-Durmuş, Oya. "Sinemayı Meslek Edinmiş Bir Kadın Yönetmen: Bilge Olgaç." *Kültür ve Siyasette Feminist Yaklaşımlar* 1, (October 2006): 146-155.

Dönmez-Colin, Gönül. *Women in the Cinemas of Iran and Turkey: As Images and as Image-makers*. London: Routledge, 2019.

Dönmez-Colin, Gönül. "Women in Turkish Cinema: Their Presence and Absence as Images and Image-Makers." *Third Text* 24, no. 1 (2010): 91-105.

Dönmez-Colin, Gönül. *Turkish Cinema: Identity, Distance and Belonging*. London: Reaktion

Books, 2008.

Erdoğan, Nezih. "Powerless Signs: Hybridity and the Logic of Excess of Turkish Trash." In *Mapping the Margins: Identity, Politics, and the Media*, edited by Karen Ross and Deniz Derman, 163-176. Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2003, 163-176.

Erdoğan, Nezih, and Deniz Göktürk. "Turkish Cinema." In *Companion Encyclopedia of Middle Eastern and North African Film*, edited by Oliver Leaman, 533-573. London: Routledge, 2001.

Ertan, Mehmet. "The Latent Politicization of Alevism: The Affiliation between Alevis and Leftist Politics (1960–1980)." *Middle Eastern Studies* 55, no. 6 (2019): 932-944.

Ertuğ, Osman. "Dikkat Sansür Var (!)." *Genç Sinema* 12 (March 1970): 12-13.

Eshun, Kodwo, and Ros Gray. "The Militant Image: A Ciné-Geography: Editors' Introduction." *Third Text* 25, no. 1 (January 2011): 1-12.

Espinosa, Julio García. "For an Imperfect Cinema." In *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, edited by Scott MacKenzie, 220-229. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

Etikan, Hilmi. "Türkiye'de Kısa Filmin Tarihi: 1967-2006," filmed 2016, Istanbul, video, 1:37:23, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zBPQiyzU_M.

Fener, Hasan Sezer. "Özcan Alper Sineması ve Toplumsal Hafıza." *The International Journal of Social Science Studies* 69, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 493, http://dx.doi.org/10.9761/JASSS7782.

Fipresci.org. "8th International Short and Documentary Film Festival, Lille." Accessed January 17, 2021. https://fipresci.org/festival/8th-international-short-and-documentary-film-festival-lille/.

Flyingbroom.org. "Flying Broom International Women's Film Festival." Accessed March 25, 2021, https://flyingbroom.org/festival/flying-broom-film-festival/.

Gerhardt, Christina, and Sara Saljoughi. "Looking Back: Global Cinema and the Legacy of New Waves around 1968." In *1968 and Global Cinema*, edited by Christina Gerhardt and Sara Saljoughi, 1-17. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2018.

Getino, Octavio. "The Cinema as Political Fact." *Third Text* 25, no. 1 (2011): 41-53.

Giles, Dennis, and Haluk Sahin. "Yílmaz Güney Revolutionary Cinema in Turkey." *Jump Cut* 27 (July 1982): 35-37.

Grant, Paul Douglas. *Cinéma Militant: Political Filmmaking and May 1968*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.

Gülendam, Ramazan. "The Development of a Feminist Discourse and Feminist Writing in Turkey: 1970-1990." *Kadın/Woman 2000* 2, no. 1 (2001): 93-117.

Gürata, Ahmet. "Hollywood in Vernacular: Translation and Cross-cultural Reception of American Films in Turkey." In *Going to the movies: Hollywood and the Social Experience of Cinema*, edited by Melvyn Stokes, Robert C. Allen, and Richard Maltby, 334-347. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2007.

Gürcan, Efe Can, and Berk Mete. "The Combined and Uneven Development of Working-class Capacities in Turkey, 1960–2016." *Labor History* 60, no. 3 (2019): 268-286.

Harris, George S. "The Left in Turkey." *Probs. Communism* 29 (1980): 26-41.

Hayır, Celal, and Ayman Köle, "Cinematic Search for Identity in the Shade of Turkey's 1960 Coup: The Social Realism Debate and The Hope." *Border Crossing* 7, no. 1 (2017): 163.

Jappe, Anselm. *Guy Debord*. Oakland: PM Press, 2018.

Kameraarkasi.org. “Muammer Özer.” Accessed January 8, 2021, http://www.kameraarkasi.org/yonetmenler/muammerozer.html.

Kameraarkasi.org. “İshak Işıtan.” Accessed January 17, 2021, http://www.kameraarkasi.org/yonetmenler/ishakisitan.html.

Kaplan, Mert. “Üçüncü Sinemada Devrimci Kimliğin Sunumu: Türk Sinemasından Örnekler.” *Istanbul Journal of Social Sciences* 20 (Spring 2018): 30-53.

Karadeniz, Hülya. “Demokrasiye Özlem Duyan Kıta.” *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1976.

Koyuncu, Muzaffer. “Yılmaz Güney’in Politik Sinemasi ve Duvar Filmi Üzerine Bir İnceleme.” *Nişantaşı Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 5, no. 1 (2017): 196-215.

Kazan, Hüseyin. “Yılmaz Güney’in Üçüncü Sineması.” *İletişim Çalışmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2017): 42-59.

Kuloğlu, Ceyda. “Women in Turkish Erotic Movies between 1974 and 1979.” *Electronic Turkish Studies* 14, no. 5 (2019): 131-151. https://doi.org/10.29228/TurkishStudies.22994.

Kültür Sanat Servisi. “İstanbul Film Festivali ‘İpekçe’yi Restore Ediyor.” *Milliyet*, February 5, 2018, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbul-film-festivali-ipekce-yi-restore-ediyor-2603835.

Kuşaklıoğlu, Mevlüde. “Bilge Olgaç Sineması.” Master’s thesis, Marmara University, 2014.

L’Alternativa 18é Festival de Cinema Independent de Barcelona “Translations: Independent Documentary Filmmaking in Turkey.” Accessed January 17, 2021. https://alternativa.cccb.org/2011/en/_films/fichaSP.php?_film=00018.

Les Productions ISCA. Isaac Isitan. Accessed January 17, 2021. http://www.lesproductionsisca.ca/equipe.html.

Lipovsky, Igor. “The Legal Socialist Parties of Turkey, 1960–80.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 27,

no. 1 (1991): 94-111.

Naficy, Hamid. *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Nugent, Ciara. "Who Is Andrew Brunson, the American Pastor Freed in Turkey?" Accessed December 9, 2019. https://time.com/5351025/andrew-brunson-trump-turkey/.

Ogan, Christine L., and Ozen Bas. "Use of Social Media in the Struggle Surrounding Violence against Turkish Women." *International Journal of Communication* 14, no. 8 (2020): 5556-5574.

Okan, Tuncan. "Neden Yeni Dalga/Kısa Bir Tarihçe ve Sinematek'teki Yeni Dalga Filmleri." *Yeni Sinema* 1, (March 1966): 13-17.

Örsler, M. Mert, and Colleen Kennedy-Karpat. "Cem Yılmaz and Genre Parody in Turkish National Cinema." *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 48, no.1 (2020): 38-48.

Özata, Tolga. "Visibility through Invisibility: Spatialized Political Subjectivities of Alevi Youth." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 62 (2020): 3-25.

Özden, Hüseyin. "Türk Sineması'nda Anlatı Mekanı Olarak Doğu Karadeniz." Master's thesis, Marmara University, 2019.

Özcan, Esra. "Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Turkey: Struggles over Media Representations and Discourses in the Past and Present." *International Journal of Communication* 14, no: 8 (2020): 5455-5462.

Özer, Muammer. "'Kördüğüm' Üzerine." *Genç Sinema* 14 (January 1971): 11.

Özer, Muammer. "Eskişehir'li Genç Sinemacıların Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını." *Genç Sinema* 10, (November 1969): 3-4.

Özgüç, Agah, and Giovanni Scognamillo. *A Chorological History of the Turkish Cinema: 1914 –*

1988. Istanbul: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1988.

Paça-Cengiz, Esin. "Cinema Has Split the Girl's Soul into Pieces: Scrutinizing Representations of Women in Films from Turkey." *International Journal of Communication* 14 (2020): 5482-5498.

Paça-Cengiz, Esin. "Film as a Tool to Re-write History: New Political Cinema in Turkey." Master's thesis, Kadir Has University, 2010.

Petek, Gaye. "Etkin Bir Seyirci Yaratmak." *Genç Sinema* 5 (February 1969): 4-5.

Raw, Laurence. "The Practice of Adaptation in The Turkish Republic: Patriotic Communities." In *Where Is Adaptation?: Mapping Cultures, Texts, and Contexts*, edited by Casie Hermansson, and Janet Zepernick, 197-210. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2018.

Reuters Staff. "Artist Displays 440 Pairs of High Heels for Women Murdered in Turkey in 2018." *Reuters*, September 24, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-womensrights-shoes-idUSKBN1W923G.

Rocha, Glauber, and Joanne Pottlitzer, "Beginning at Zero: Notes on Cinema and Society." *The Drama Review: TDR* 14, no. 2 (Winter 1970): 144-149.

Rocha, Glauber. "The Aesthetics of Hunger" In *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, edited by Scott MacKenzie, 218-220. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

Roberts, Jessica. "Citizen Journalism." In *The International Encyclopedia of Media Literacy*, edited by Renee Hobbs, Paul Mihailidis, Gianna Capello, Maria Ranieri, and Benjamin Thevenin, 1-10. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.

Roth, Mitchel P., and Murat Sever. "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate:

Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, a Case Study." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007): 901-920.

Salazkina, Masha. "Moscow-Rome-Havana: A Film-Theory Road Map." *October* 139 (January 2012): 97-116.

Salazkina, Masha. "Introduction to Juan Piqueras: Amateur Cinema in Nuestro Cinema." *Cinema Journal* 51, no. 4 (Summer 2012): 138-143.

Salazkina, Masha, and Enrique Fibla-Gutierrez. "Introduction: Toward a Global History of Amateur Film Practices and Institutions." *Film History* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2018): I-XIII.

Sayari, Sabri. "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (2010): 198-215.

Selçuk, İlhan. "Latin Amerika'dan." *Cumhuriyet*, November 21, 1970.

Sengul, Ali F. "On the Spatial Ideology of Turkish Cinema (the West as 'Outside')." In *International Westerns: Re-Locating the Frontier*, edited by Cynthia J. Miller, and A. Bowdoin Van Riper, 32-44. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2014.

Sinematek.tv. "Çağlar Tanyeri, Kaya Tanyeri'yi ve 1 Mayıs Belgeselini Anlatıyor." Accessed January 13, 2021. http://sinematek.tv/1-mayis-77-1977/.

Smith, Iain Robert. "'Beam Me up, Ömer': Transnational Media Flow and the Cultural Politics of the Turkish *Star Trek* Remake." *The Velvet Light Trap* 61, no. 1 (2008): 3-13.

Solanas, Fernando, and Octavio Getino. "Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World." In *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology*, edited by Scott MacKenzie, 230-250. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

Soner, Ahmet. "Eski Defterler," *Belgesel Sinema Belgesel Defterleri* 3 (Spring 2003): 73-80.

Soner, Ahmet. "Sansürün Yılan Hikayesi." *Genç Sinema* 6 (March 1969): 11-12.

Stark, Trevor. "'Cinema in the Hands of the People': Chris Marker, the Medvedkin Group, and the Potential of Militant Film," *October* 138 (Winter 2012): 117-150.

Suner, Asuman. "Horror of a Different Kind: Dissonant Voices of the New Turkish Cinema." *Screen* 45, no. 4 (2004): 305-310.

Steyerl, Hito. "In Defense of the Poor Image." *e-flux journal* 10, no. 11 (2009): 1-9.

Şavk, Serkan. "Eski Görüntüler, Yeni Görüngüler: Yeşilçam Filmlerinin Üslup Özellikleri İçin Uzak Okuma Denemesi." *Erciyes İletişim Dergisi* 7, no. 2: 1033-1054.

Tobin, Ben. "ABC News Mistakenly Airs Video from Kentucky Gun Show as Syria Bombing Footage." Accessed December 9, 2019. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/10/15/abc-news-airs-knob-creek-kentucky-gun-range-video-as-syria-bombing/3984400002/.

Turkishculture.org. "Kaya Tanyeri." Accessed January 11, 2021, http://www.turkishculture.org/whoiswho/visual-arts/painter/kaya-tanyeri-1814.htm.

The 5th Which Human Rights? Film Festival. "The Resistance of September 2nd." Accessed January 17, 2021, http://www.hihff.org/2013/filmler/eng/September2nd.html.

Tepperman, Charles. *Amateur Cinema: The Rise of North American Moviemaking, 1923-1960*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

Unhcr.org. "Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey - UNHCR Country." Accessed December 22, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey.

Uğur-Tanrıöver, Hulya. "Women as Film Directors in Turkish Cinema." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 24, no. 4 (2017): 321-335.

Yeşilbursa, Behçet Kemal. "The Kurdish Uprisings in the Middle East: A Survey (1831-1979)." *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations* 1, no. 2 (2020): 43-55.

Yetkin, Barış. *Kırılma Noktası/1 Mayıs 1977 Olayı*. İstanbul: Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2007.

Yıldız, Esra. "Lost Images, Silenced Past." In *The Politics of Culture in Turkey, Greece & Cyprus: Performing the Left since the Sixties*, edited by Leonidas Karakatsanis and Nikolaos Papadogiannis, 142-162. Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis, 2017.

Young, Cynthia. "Third World Newsreel: Third Cinema Practice in the United States." In *Global Migration, Social Change, and Cultural Transformation*, edited by Emory Elliott, Jasmine Payne, and Patricia Ploesch, 77-99. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Yorgancılar, Serkan. "Sinema ve Kimlik İnşası: Milli Sinema Örneği." *Electronic Turkish Studies* 14, no. 7 (2019): 1-13. https://doi.org/10.29228/TurkishStudies.39273.