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Gender Gaps in Political Participation in a Cross-National Perspective: The Gendered Effects of Political Institutions

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Gender Gaps in Political Participation in a Cross-National Perspective :

The Gendered Effects of Political Institutions

by

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Abstract

Gender differences in political participation have been a persistent phenomenon in multiple countries. On a variety of political activities, women are less likely than men to be involved. Multiple scholarly works have investigated explanations for these persistent gender gaps. Scholars have found that gender differences in political resources and psychological engagement play an important role in understanding participation gaps. Yet, gender differences in political participation have little been investigated in a cross-national perspective. Indeed, there is evidence indicating that gaps are not constant across countries, suggesting that it is possible for country-level factors to contribute to gender differences in political participation in addition to individual-level factors.

This investigation tests for the possibility that political institutions, which vary across countries, contribute to an additional level of explanation for gender differences in political participation. I identify three political institutions that may have a gendered effect: the electoral system, party ideology, and women's representation and gender quotas. Findings demonstrate that all three aspects of political institutions tested in this analysis are associated with varying size of gender gaps in political participation. More specifically, first, it is found that more proportional electoral systems are associated with larger gender differences in political participation. Second, the presence of left ideologies in the party system is not enough to increase women's levels of political participation. It is only when political parties address women's interests in their platforms that gender gaps decrease. Finally, women's representation and gender quotas are found to affect gender gaps, but not always in the expected ways. Results show that both women's representation and gender quotas can influence men's behaviour more so than women's, leading to larger gender gaps in political participation.

It is hypothesized that the gendered effects of political institutions occur since these

institutions have an influence on the types and levels of political resources and orientations toward the political system needed to be involved in politics. Political participation occurs in an environment shaped by political institutions. Since men and women differ in the types and levels of resources and orientations they possess, political institutions will influence differently their participation.

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List of Symbols, Abbreviations and Nomenclature

Symbol	Definition
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
EJPR	European Journal of Political Research
ENPP	Effective Number of Political Parties
GNI	Gross National Income
PR	Proportional representation
U of C	University of Calgary

Chapter 1

Introduction: Explaining Gender Gaps in Political Participation in a Cross-National Perspective

One of the most visible signs of the inequality between men and women in the political world resides in the number of women and men elected as representatives. For most advanced industrial countries, women's presence on the political scene is less than that of men. The number of women leaders of their country, leaders of their political party, members of cabinet, and members of the legislature tend to be lower than the numbers of men. This visible gender inequality tends to overshadow other important gender differences in the political participation of citizens in the eyes of the public and the media. As for their presence in elected office, women tend to be less likely than men to engage in political activities such as electoral campaigns, contacting politicians or participating in organized protest. Despite being less visible to the public, gender differences in political participation among citizens have been the subject of multiple investigations; explanations for these phenomena range from gender differences in the resources needed for political participation (Burns et al., 2001) to the cultural acceptance of gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Yet, there are some gaps in this literature that this research aims to correct.

Political institutions are often ignored as explanations for gender gaps in political participation. Institutions may provide incentives and opportunities that foster engagement and participation or barriers that limit political involvement. Furthermore, it is possible that these incentives and barriers differ for men and women, providing another explanation for gender gaps. This research project answers the question: To what extent do political institutions account for political participation gender gaps in advanced industrialized democracies?

The next sections of this introductory chapter present in more detail the arguments tested

in this investigation. First, a justification for the study of gender gaps in political participation is provided. Second, a review of the literature on theories of political participation and explanations for gender differences illustrates the need for further investigations into the gendered effects of political institutions. Next, I provide a framework for understanding how and why political institutions might provide incentives and barriers to political participation that influence the nature of gender gaps. Finally, an overview of the chapters to follow and the findings is presented.

1.1 Why Political Participation and Gender Gaps?

Political participation is important for the quality of democracy since a healthy democracy requires that citizen inputs are taken into account in the policy-making process (Norris, 2002). The types of political participation as well as the levels of citizen involvement in democracy have been the subject of intense debates among political theorists such as Mill, Schumpeter and Dahl. All agree, however, that some level of citizen involvement in the selection of political representatives is necessary for a healthy and functioning democracy. Furthermore, the legitimacy of a democracy rests on the assumption that all citizens have an equal opportunity for influencing the decision-making process. Therefore, inequalities in political participation raise important questions of the quality and legitimacy of the democratic process. Since political participation serves as a mechanism that links citizen interests and demands to political leaders and governmental policies (Norris, 2002), inequalities in political participation may result in policies and decisions that do not take into account the preferences and interests of all citizens. If some groups, because of their higher levels of political participation, achieve greater influence than others, the quality and legitimacy of democracies is affected negatively.

It has been widely found in the literature on political participation that men are a group that is more likely to engage in political activities than women. As mentioned above,

participatory gender inequalities have a significant impact on the quality of a democracy as they can lead to interests that are neither adequately represented nor properly considered in the formulation of public policies. Even though studies have shown that gender gaps in participation are small, they are nevertheless problematic. Since women constitute roughly half of the population, small gender differences translate into larger differences in the total number of acts performed by citizens (Burns et al., 2001). Since men participate more than women, their interests are more likely to be taken into account in the decision-making process. In other words, small differences can have great consequences.

Additionally, participatory gender inequalities affect women's citizenship rights. Women as citizens in a democracy have the right to realize their democratic potential, meaning that women should have the same opportunities as men to express their ideas, preferences, and interests in the decision-making process and contribute to the democratic process. Factors that prohibit women from participating at similar levels as men prevent them from enjoying their citizenship. A democracy should aim to allow all citizens to benefit from their citizenship rights and realize their potential. Gender gaps in political participation illustrate the existence of barriers that prohibit women from being full citizens.

The investigation of gender gaps in political participation may lead to a better understanding of the conditions required for creating a stronger democracy (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012). Thus far very little empirical work has focused on political institutions as a possible explanation for gender gaps in political participation. The literature on gender gaps in political participation notes that differences between men and women have little changed over time despite changes that ought to have decreased these differences. Political institutions may provide a fruitful avenue of investigation since institutions rarely change over time; they may contribute to the persistance of gender differences despite the increased level of education women have experienced in the last years, a greater commitment to gender equality among advanced industrial democracies, and the increased presence

of women in the labour force, for instance. For this investigation, political institutions are defined as formal organizations such as government structures, legal institutions and political parties, and as informal institutions such as norms and values. An investigation of the role political institutions play in explaining gender gaps in political participation may contribute to an understanding of their persistence as well as help in identifying which institutional arrangements are more conducive to greater political equality and democratic legitimacy.

1.2 Theories of Political Participation

Many theories have been put forward to provide an explanation of why some citizens choose to participate in politics while others do not. These theories encompass both individual- and country-levels of explanation. 'Higher' levels of explanation – or blocs of variables – can influence 'lower' levels of variables and in turn affect political participation. Figure 1 from Norris (2002) illustrates this process. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the general literature on political participation, one that do not necessary focus on explaining gender differences. The next section reviews specific explanations for gender differences found in the literature on political participation. I show that political institutions matter for understanding political participation, but that this type of explanation is lacking from the literature on gender gaps.

The explanation that is the most removed from the individual is the social modernization account which states that "common social trends – such as rising standard of living, the growth of the service sector and expanding educational opportunities – have swept through postindustrial societies contributing to a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies" (Norris, 2002, 19). Levels of socioeconomic development have, in many studies, been linked with political attitudes and political participation (Inglehart, 1997; Almond and Verba, 1963). Countries with higher levels of socioeconomic development tend to have higher levels of literacy, education, leisure time and affluence, a larger professional middle class, and



Source: Norris (2002)

Figure 1: Theories of Political Participation

to have experienced the movement of women from the home into the paid workforce. In turn, these factors have been associated with higher levels of political participation, especially voter turnout. Furthermore, Inglehart (1997) argues that once countries have reached a certain level of economic development, citizens tend to develop political attitudes that move beyond basic material needs. Once citizens no longer have to worry about basic needs such as food or shelter, they shift their political concerns on welfare issues to concerns about more postmodernist issues such as the environment and quality of life. Also, rising education and income levels are associated with an increased desire among citizens to be involved in the policy-making process. Citizens become increasingly involved in politics and demand a greater role in the decision-making process.

The second set of explanations–the structure of the state–for political participation is also considered a country-level explanation. Norris (2002) identifies this level of explanation as the structure of the state explanation, but it can also be referred to as an institutional explanation for political participation since it focuses on political institutions. The structure of the state explanation is useful in understanding differences in political participation across countries with similar levels of socioeconomic development (Norris, 2002). This account consists of different political institutions that vary across countries. Institutions such as the electoral system, the party system, and electoral laws have been shown to influence

political participation, especially voter turnout (Norris, 2002). It has been found that rules such as compulsory voting laws, and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, which produce a more proportional votes-to-seats conversion, lead to higher voter turnout (Blais and Carty, 1990; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Norris, 2004). Furthermore, the party system has been shown to influence other acts of political participation (Whiteley et al., 2010). Party systems consisting of several political parties are associated with higher levels of party membership. According to Whiteley et al. (2010), party membership is higher in these party systems since there are more opportunities and incentives for citizens to get involved. More parties mean that it is easier for citizens to find one that is close to their interests, and political parties may be more likely to recruit members more intensively in the face of increased competition for members due to the presence of more parties. In sum, the structure of the state explanation is important in understanding cross-national differences in political participation.

Individual-level explanations of political participation – resources, mobilizing agencies and engagement – have been called the civic voluntarism model by Verba et al. (1995). In their words, citizens participate in politics because they can, they want to, or because they were asked to. For citizens to be able to participate, they need resources. Verba et al. (1995) identify three main resources: money, time, and civic skills. Money is necessary for political donations, but also for gaining access to other resources. For instance, money can help citizens acquire more free time by making access to child care easier, and since time is required to engage in political activities, more money therefore makes participation easier. Civic skills are "the communication and organizational abilities that allow citizens to use time and money effectively in political life" (Verba et al., 1995, 304). Political participation is easier for citizens who write well, who are comfortable organizing and attending meetings, and who can easily speak in public. Civic skills can be acquired throughout life, but a higher level of education is much more likely to increase the level of civic skills that an individual possesses.

Furthermore, these skills can be obtained through non-political voluntary associations such as religious organizations or unions, and in the workplace. These organizations and sites allow citizens to participate in and organize activities; these organizational and communication skills can later be applied to politics.

Another important explanation for political participation is whether or not citizens are asked to participate. Some occupations and non-political voluntary associations are important for recruiting citizens into political participation (Verba et al., 1995). For instance, churches can encourage their members to vote a certain way or to contact their elected representatives to promote an issue. Also, the workplace can provide opportunities for citizens to discuss politics and meet other citizens that are recruiting participants for political activities. Moreover, non-political voluntary associations can foster political participation by conducting formal and informal discussions on political issues. These organizations may provide cues and information about political issues that in turn may provide incentives for citizens to become involved in politics.

The last component of the civic voluntarism model is political engagement (Verba et al., 1995). Political engagement is defined as the psychological predispositions that citizens have with politics that can spur them on to becoming involved in political activities. Verba et al. (1995) argue that some psychological involvement with politics is necessary for citizens to use their resources for political participation. Without it, citizens could simply use their resources for activities other than political participation. Political engagement can be measured using four distinct concepts: political interest, political efficacy, political information, and partisanship. Political interest is defined as a propensity to follow politics, to care about what happens, and to be concerned about who wins and loses (Verba et al., 1995). It is generally measured using questions that inquire about the level of interest an individual has in national or local politics. Political efficacy can be separated into two different types: internal or external efficacy. Internal efficacy is defined as "an individual's self-perceptions

that they are capable of understanding politics and competent enough to participate in a political act" (Karp and Banducci, 2008a, 318). External efficacy refers to "expressed beliefs about political institutions and the belief that leaders and institutions are responsive to the participation of individuals" (Karp and Banducci, 2008a, 318). Political information is defined as "the range of factual information about politics" held by an individual (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 10). This information can be about current issues, individuals who are active in politics and governments, the constitutional principles underlying the government, or the working of the political system. Finally, according to Verba et al. (1995), the strength of partisanship plays a role in engaging citizens in politics. Partisanship is defined as the affective ties citizens have toward political parties; it is a stable and durable force. It can be measured by questions asking how close an individual is to her or his preferred political party.

1.3 Explanations for Gender Gaps in Political Participation

Gender gaps in political participation have been identified since the 1950s and endure to the present day in multiple countries (Duverger, 1955; Campbell et al., 1960; Anderson, 1975; Welch, 1977; Verba et al., 1978; Marsh and Kaase, 1979; Black and McGlen, 1979; Beckwith, 1986; Rinehart, 1992; Burns et al., 2001; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Gidengil et al., 2004; Armigeon, 2007). In nearly every situation, women have lower levels of political participation than men. Women are less likely to be members of political parties, to volunteer during electoral campaigns, and to contact politicians.

Further discussed in Chapter 2, six indicators of political participation are used in this investigation and not all of these political activities have similar gender gaps. First, in many advanced industrial demoncracies, women and men turn out to vote at similar levels, and in some countries, women are more likely than men to vote (Gidengil et al., 2004; DeVaus and McAllister, 1989; Christy, 1987). Second, studies of advanced industrial democracies show

that men are more likely than women to join political parties, but also are more likely to be active within these parties (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993). Although party membership is not included as an indicator in this study, one indicator is associated with involvement in political parties: whether citizens have shown support for a candidate or a party. For this political activity, the literature on gender gaps in political participation indicates that women should be less likely to engage than men. Third, women in multiple countries are also less likely to engage in political persuasion, that is, they are less likely than men to try to convince others to vote for a candidate or a party (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Inglehart and Norris (2003) show that gender gaps for this political activity tend to be larger than for campaign activity. Four, as demonstrated by Inglehart and Norris (2003), women are less likely than men to engage in protest in postindustrial democracies, but this gender gaps is much smaller than gaps related to invovement in political parties and political persuasion. Five, Inglehart and Norris (2003) indicate that women may be more likely than men to engage in unconventional channels of political participation than in conventional activities since the former activities may reflect women's greater engagement in voluntary associated devoted to caring and helping others. Conventional political activities refer to actions taken within the electoral process, such as voting or volunteering for a political parties (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). On the other hand, unconventional political participation includes activities that are not aimed directly at electing a candidate or a party. Participation in protest or working with others to express views about government actions are examples of such unconventional political activities. The indicator for working with others included in this study may assess gender differences in these unconventional political activities. Results in Inglehart and Norris (2003) reveal that there is no difference between men's and women's likelihood of being involved in unconventional political activities.

The variation in size and direction of gender gaps across political activities may be due to the nature of each action. As Chapter 2 will discuss, each act of political participation

requires a different level of political resources and psychological engagement with politics and each activity allows citizens to express a different political message. More demanding activities tend to be associated with larger gender gaps. As the following paragraphs will demonstrate, gender differences in political participation have different explanations and these explanations are related with gender differences in political resources and political engagement.

It is possible to classify the explanations for gender gaps in political participation following Norris's (2002) model of political activism. First, there is the societal modernization explanation. Inglehart and Norris (2003) have tested this explanation on gender gaps in political participation. They argue that the economic changes associated with postindustrialization – increases in the education level and service sector jobs, for instance – come cultural change. Under conditions of greater physical security, citizens develop different concerns such as giving quality-of-life issues a greater priority, and demanding a greater involvement in the decision-making process. This culture change also affected women's traditional roles as mothers and care-givers. Along with changes in the type of jobs available and in the education level, women entered the labour force in greater numbers. According to Inglehart and Norris (2003), these shifts affected traditional gender roles; women were no longer confined to their traditional roles. This cultural shift and the changes in women's role led to greater support for gender equality among postindustrial countries. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that, in turn, this culture of greater acceptance toward women's rights translate into higher levels of political participation for women. In other words, if the culture is more accepting of women in the labour market and in society, women will also participate more in politics thereby closing the gaps with men.

Among the cultural explanation for gender gaps in political participation, there is the role of religion. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that increased secularization in advanced industrial countries leads to greater support toward gender equality and smaller gender dif-

ferences in political participation. Religious organizations, they argue, may reinforce social norms where women are subordinate to men. The Catholic Church and the evangelical churches in the protestant denomination in Western countries tend to advocate that women focus on their role as mothers and homemakers and leave the public sphere to men's control. The presence of these religious beliefs in countries dominated by religious organizations could lead to a lower commitment toward gender equality and greater gaps in political participation. The process of secularization – the decline in religious beliefs, church attendance, faith in religious authorities, and the increased separation between church and state – observed in advanced industrial countries may lead the population to disagree with the gender roles prescribed by religious organization. Indeed, Inglehart and Norris (2003) find that growing secularization is linked with greater commitment to gender equality among citizens. Therefore, the process of secularization in advanced industrial countries should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation.

Explanations concerning social resources and motivation have also been used to understand gender gaps in political participation. Most of the investigations applying these theories to gaps in political activities focus on single-country analyses. The most commonly cited study is from Burns et al. (2001) which uses the civic voluntarism model to understand gender gaps. They argue that gender gaps stem from two main factors: gender differences in resources and gender differences in psychological engagement. Burns et al. (2001) argue that in addition to gender differences in free time and income, a more important explanation for gender gaps in political participation is found in gender differences in civic skills. Compared to men, women acquire fewer civic skills in their occupations. Women are more likely to be employed part-time meaning that they have fewer opportunities to develop communication and organizational skills. Furthermore, when women work full-time, they are less likely to hold occupations that foster the development of civic skills. Burns et al. (2001) argue that occupations that provide the most civic skills are those that require a higher level of edu-

cation and more on the job training. Occupations that take longer to master are also more likely to provide civic skills. For instance, becoming a lawyer or an architect requires a higher level of education and on the job training than a dishwasher or cashier. Womens occupations are more likely fall into the latter category. According to Statistics Canada (2010), men are more likely than women to hold management positions, to work in the business sector and in engineering. Women are more likely to work in sales, conduct clerical work, or hold a profession that relates to social sciences or health sectors. These differences in occupations result in lower levels of political participation among women, according to Burns et al. (2001).

Burns et al. (2001) argue that the second important explanation for gender gaps in political participation is gender differences in psychological orientations. Women tend to be less interested in politics, and have lower levels of political knowledge and political efficacy (Verba et al., 1997; Deth, 2000; Gidengil et al., 2004). Verba et al. (1997) argue that it is only when gender differences in political engagement are taken into account, along with differences in resources, that gender gaps in political participation can be explained.

Furthermore, gender gaps in political participation can be explained by gender differences in mobilizing agencies. Men's and women's group membership tend to take different forms which influence their levels of political activities in different ways. Mobilizing agencies are important for political participation since citizens can acquire civic skills and join social networks that foster involvement in politics in an environment other than their occupation. Gidengil et al. (2004) find that men and women tend to have a similar associational life; they belong to the same number of associations. Women, however, tend to be more likely to belong to religious organizations, arts and education groups, and groups providing care for the elderly or handicapped; men are more likely to be found in sport clubs, unions and professional groups (Norris and Inglehart, 2006). The organizations women belong to tend to be the ones that provide lower levels of civic skills and fewer opportunities to engage in political activities, which could explain their lower levels of political participation when

compared to men. For instance, women's higher involvement in religious organizations than men could be seen as an advantage for political participation. Indeed, O'Neill (2006) reports that religious women are more likely to be involved in their community. It is men, however, who tend to occupy the leadership positions within religious organizations that provide the most skills and opportunities for political activism (Burns et al., 2001). Verba et al. (1995) also show that unions are more likely than churches to provide civic skills to their members, meaning that despite women's greater involvement in religious organizations than men, they may still be disadvantaged in terms of the accumulation of resources leading to political participation. These differences in group membership contribute to our understanding of gender gaps in political participation.

Additionally, gender differences in political involvement tend to vary across countries and more specifically, across countries that share similar levels of economic development (Verba et al., 1978; Karp and Banducci, 2008b). This may mean that country-level factors are important for understanding gender differences. As explained above, Inglehart and Norris (2003) investigate the relationship between the social modernization explanation and participatory gender gaps. Little attention, however, has been paid to another set of theories that can explain cross-national differences in gender gaps in political activities: political institutions – or the state structure explanation. It is possible that some political institutions may inhibit or facilitate political participation. Moreover, these incentives and barriers may have a gendered effect, leading to cross-national variations in gender gaps in political participation.

One study tries to fill this gap in the literature. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) investigate the gendered effect of electoral institutions on political participation. They argue that "electoral rules that promote political inclusion should have larger effects on women's political engagement and participation as compared to men's, yielding smaller gender gaps under those rules" (6). Since women have long been marginalized from the political sphere,

even after gaining the right to vote and run for office, electoral rules that lead to the inclusion of multiple views and interests in the policy-making process should send a signal to women that they are welcome in the political sphere, leading to higher levels of political participation for them and smaller gender gaps. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) find that the proportionality of the electoral system–the match between the percentage of votes and seats received by a political party–is associated with gender gaps in political participation. When the electoral system translates votes into seats more accurately, that is, when proportionality is high, women and men participate at more similar levels in politics. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) argue that since every vote counts under more proportional electoral systems, political parties have greater incentives to mobilize women as a group to obtain their support. Women may be an 'undertapped market' that political parties are less likely to mobilize unless they have incentives to do so such as when votes are better translated into seats.

This investigation proposes to expand on the work of Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) and investigates the role of political institutions in explaining gender differences in political participation. The following chapters explore the gendered influence of a number of political institutions. The effects of the electoral system as measured by the number of political parties in the legislature, coalition size, the level of disproportionality, and district magnitude are studied on men's and women's likelihood of participating in politics. Additionally, the gendered influence of party ideology, that is, the ideological distance between political parties (or party polarization index), the presence of a left party in government, the number of left parties in the legislature, and whether political parties mention favourably women's interests in their platforms, is assessed on political activities. Finally, a test of the influence of women's representation in the legislature and cabinet as well the history of women's representation on men's and women's levels of political participation is included in this study. Women's representation is included as a gendered effect of political institutions since it is one of

the consequences of the electoral system and it may reflect norms and ideas embedded in political institutions which are part of political institutions as defined in this investigation. The gendered influence of gender quotas, both the legislative and voluntary party type, is also assessed on women's and men's levels of political participation. Additionally, an alternative view of political institutions is tested in this study; political institutions may not just provide incentives to political involvement but also barriers that will influence men and women differently. This alternative view of political institutions may help to explain gender gaps in political participation. This investigation proposes to test the gendered influence of political institutions on a wider range of political activities. It is hypothesized that political institutions do not only affect more conventional acts of political participation, but also unconventional ones.

1.4 Institutional Explanation of Gender Gaps

Political participation is not only the product of individual resources; institutions may help determine the type and number of actions undertaken by citizens. The influence of political institutions on political behaviour has been the object of multiple investigations. For instance, there is a wide literature on the effect of the electoral system on voter turnout (See Norris (2002)). There has been, however, little attention directed to how political institutions may influence groups of citizens differently. This analysis argues that political institutions provide incentives and barriers to political participation that affect men and women differently, leading to variation in gender gaps across countries. This seems plausible in light of the new institutionalism literature and especially the historical institutionalism branch that argues that political institutions can privilege certain groups over others (Immergut, 1998). Institutions can facilitate the organization of certain groups, recognize the legitimacy of particular claims and provide opportunities to certain groups to voice their interests or complaints. Moreover, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010) argue that these

processes can be gendered, meaning that institutions "can carry powerful cognitive cues to men and women alike about women's role in the political arena" (218). Since institutions can privilege certain claims or groups over others, it is possible that political institutions provide different opportunities for men's and women's involvement in politics, explaining gaps.

For this investigation, political institutions can either be formal and informal. According to Peters (2005), "the most important element of an institution is that it is in some way a structural feature of the society and/or polity " (18). In this view, institutions are patterns of interaction occuring in a society that are predictable, which can either be formal such as a legislature or informal such as shared norms and ideas. In other words, for this investigation, political institutions are not only rules, but also the ideas embedded in these rules. For instance, patterns of competition in party systems are included as a political institution. This pattern can be assessed through the number of political parties competing in elections, but also in the ideas and ideologies these political parties defend. Ideas and ideologies are thus considered political institutions since they are predictable patterns that can be observed.

Formal and informal political institutions can also be identified through their stability over time. Formal rules and buildings emcompassing political institutions as well as informal institutions such as party ideology tend to be stable over time. Athough ideas and norms may change more easily over time than formal institutions, they still structure party systems over some period of time. In other words, the stability of political institutions does not mean that they do not change. In addition to providing an observable pattern of interactions and being stable over time, political institutions should influence individual behaviour. Again, it is possible for both formal and informal institutions to influence behaviour. Formal instiutions may provide rules that limit behaviour while informal institutions through ideas can privilege certain form of behaviour over others. The following paragraphs identify how and why we should expected that political insitutions influence differently men's and women's levels of

political participation.

The gendered influence of political institutions may be due to historical traditions in advanced industrial countries where women have been excluded from politics; therefore, political institutions may reflect traditional gender roles and create incentives for participation that vary according to gender. The historical intuitionalism branch argues that institutions tend to be stable over time and, moreover, that institutions are embedded in ideas (Immergut, 1998). Thus, political institutions may help perpetuate traditional gender roles in political participation even though citizens in advanced industrial countries have less traditional views of gender roles (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). In sum, the incentives that political institutions provide for political participation may have been inherited and may persist despite societal changes, leading to the persistance of gender gaps in political engagement and political participation.

This investigation hypothesizes two general effects of political institutions on gender differences in political participation: first, political institutions can provide incentives that facilitate political participation and second, institutions can impose barriers that inhibit political participation. The first general effect of political institutions stipulates that institutions can provide incentives that exert a stronger influence on women than men, leading to smaller gender gaps in political participation. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) argue that these incentives may affect women more positively than men for two reasons: rational and symbolic. The rational explanation notes that it is possible that political institutions provide motivations to some political actors to encourage women's involvement in the political process, thereby reducing gender gaps in political participation. For example, as is discussed in Chapter 4 of this study, the competition among multiple left-wing political parties for winning seats can lead these parties to campaign more actively to obtain the support of groups that are more likely to support them. In the presence of competition on the ideological left, parties will need to attract new voters since they are less likely to

obtain a majority of votes by appealing to the median voter. Since women are more likely to vote for left parties and support left policies, the presence of multiple left parties may lead these parties to increasingly appeal to to women's interests and preferences in the hope of obtaining their vote. This increased attention to women from political parties may lead the former to engage more in politics and lead to smaller gender differences.

The symbolic explanation for these incentives stipulates that institutions can provide a signal and cues to citizens that influence their perception of the democratic process (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012). These signals and cues may inform women that the political system is not only a male activity and may encourage them to take part in political activities, leading to smaller gender differences in political participation. For example, the gendered influence of women's representation on political activities is investigated in Chapter 5. It is argued that the presence of female politicians in the legislature and cabinet may have a symbolic impact on women's political participation that is not reproduced in men's. The presence of women in government may signal that women are capable of taking part in political activities and that the political system is open to their presence; this should encourage more women to become involved in politics, thereby reducing the size of gender gaps in participation.

This investigation tests whether the hypothesized incentives to participation provided by political institutions lead to smaller gender gaps in political activities. The data to be able to test for whether the rational and symbolic reasons are at play are not available. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) surveys used in this analysis do not include questions assessing the motivation of citizens who are involved in political activities. In other words, it is not possible to know whether citizens participate in politics because political parties have contacted them, because they have been asked to by friends or family members, and/or they because they have confidence in the political system. Additionally, identifying a unique source of motivation for citizen behaviour is difficult. It is likely that

both rational and symbolic reasons are involved in explaining the difference in behaviour between men and women. Thus, this study investigates whether the incentives provided by the electoral system, political parties, and women's representation and gender quotas affect differently women's and men's levels of political participation, not whether the rational or symbolic reasons explain these differences.

Additionally, this study tests for possible barriers to political participation that may affect women's and men's political participation differently. Barriers are viewed as hurdles that may make political participation more difficult if citizens do not possess the required predispositions necessary to political participation, namely political resources and orientations toward the political system. Political institutions may act as hurdles that prevent political involvement unless citizens possess the required levels of political resources and/or psychological engagement with politics. These resources and orientations allow citizens to overcome obstacles to political participation such as knowing the rules and political actors involved in the decision-making process. It is argued that the barriers to political participation may be greater for women than men since political institutions may necessitate the types of resources and orientations that are more likely to held by men. For instance, Chapter 4 hypothesizes that the ideological distance between political parties – or party polarization – should be negatively associated with political participation and that this negative relationship should be stronger among women. Since women tend to be more conflict-avoidant than men, the presence of political parties that are ideologically further apart should create a greater barrier to women's political participation. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 elaborate in more detail on how and why components of the electoral system, party system, women's representation, and gender quotas provide incentives and/or barriers to political participation that lead to variation in gender gaps.

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation investigates the role of political institutions in explaining gender differences in political participation. Initial statistical analyses shown in Chapter 3 demonstrate that gender gaps in political activities are not uniform across countries. Gaps vary in size and also across types of political activity. Therefore, it is plausible that country-level factors could provide an additional explanation for gender differences in political participation. To test for this possibility, three different types of institutions are studied. This section offers a brief overview of each institution included in this analysis as well as the methodology used to assess the gendered impact of political institutions on political participation.

Chapter 2 includes information about the methodology used in this investigation. To test the hypotheses concerning the gendered effects of political institutions, data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) are used. This study contains individual-level data as well as country-level information on political institutions that are appropriate for testing the hypotheses outlined herein. Other sources are used to complement the CSES data to assess the influence of political institutions. Information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Quota Project, the Manifesto Project, and the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR) has been added to the CSES dataset. These additional sources provide information on the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet, the presence of gender quotas, political party platforms, and election results. Only advanced industrial democracies are selected to control for the possible influence of the level of democratization and the level of economic development on gender differences in political participation. It is possible that the gendered effects of political insitutions may be different depending on the level of socioeconomic development.

The main dependent variable of this investigation is political participation, which is measured with six distinct indicators. Conventional acts of political participation included in this study are voting, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and political persuasion.

Two other indicators are used to assess the influence of political institutions on gender gaps in more unconventional acts of political participation - protest and working with others. Greater information on how the main independent variables – the electoral system, the party system, women's representation, and gender quotas – are measured can be found in Chapter 2.

Multi-level logistic regressions are used as the primary statistical technique to assess the gendered effects of political institutions on political activities. This statistical technique is designed to address the multi-level nature of the data included in this analysis. It is argued that political participation activities measured at the individual-level are influenced by factors measured at the country-level in addition to individual-level explanations for gender gaps. Because of the presence of factors at two levels of analysis, regular logistic regressions would introduce bias in the results. Since this analysis pooles survey data from multiple countries, it is possible that individuals from the same country are influenced by factors that would not be controlled in non multi-level analysis. The assumption of unbiased errors in standard regression analysis is, thus, violated. This situation results in lower standard errors which increases the probability of concluding there is a relationship between two variables when, in reality, there is none. To correct for this bias, multilevel techniques need to be used.

Chapter 3 discussess the first political institution studied in this investigation which is the electoral system. Two main hypotheses are tested in this chapter. The first one is more in line with the work of Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) and stipulates that gender differences in political participation ought to be smaller in more proportional electoral systems. The second hypothesis states the opposite. Gender differences should be smaller in simpler electoral systems that do not require citizens to possess large amounts of political resources and psychological involvement with politics. Since women are more likely to be in these groups with low levels of resources and engagement, political participation should

be easier for them under simpler electoral systems. Results provide greater support for the second hypothesis. When the electoral system is simpler, especially when the number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude are low, women's levels of political participation in a variety of acts are closer to men's levels. When the electoral system exhibits a greater number of political parties either in the legislature or in government and when it has a large district magnitude, women's levels of political participation are further apart from men's.

Following the hypotheses elaborated in Chapter 3 as well as the results indicating that the number of political parties has an influence on gender differences in political participation, Chapter 4 tests the impact of party ideology on gaps. Ideologies are an important aspect of the party system and as such they are included as a political institution in this investigation. It is hypothesized that party ideology has a different gendered effect on political participation than the number of political parties. Chapter 4 investigates four hypotheses assessing the gendered influence of party ideology. The first hypothesis argues that gender differences ought to be larger when political parties are ideologically further apart, that is, when the index of party polarization is large. An increased ideological polarization may be an indication that conflict among friends and family members may be more frequent. Since women tend to be more likely than men to be socialized into the importance of preserving relationships in the face of conflict, they may be more reticent of participating in politics. Women's levels of political participation, therefore, should be more negatively influenced than men by increased party polarization, leading to greater gender gaps in political participation.

The second and third hypotheses tested involve the positive influence of left-wing political parties on women's levels of political activities. These hypotheses argue that the presence of a left-wing political party in government and/or the presence of multiple left parties in the legislature should lead to greater involvement in politics among women since they tend to be more likely to vote for left parties and support more left-wing policy positions than

men. The final hypothesis stipulates that gender gaps in political participation ought to be smaller when political parties directly address women's concerns in their policy platforms. When political parties are concerned with women's issues and preferences to the point that these are included in their policy platforms, women may be more likely to perceive that the political system welcomes their presence which, in turn, will lead to greater levels of political participation for women and smaller gender gaps. Results provide support for the first and fourth hypotheses. For some acts of political participation, gender gaps are indeed larger when the index of party polarization is high with women being affected more negatively than men by the ideological distance between political parties. As for the fourth hypothesis, findings demonstrate that gender differences in political activities are smaller when the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups is high. In other words, when political parties integrate women's issues and concerns in their platforms, women's levels of participation in politics increase more so than men's.

Chapter 5 tests three hypotheses on the role of women's representation and one hypothesis on the influence of gender quotas on gender gaps in political participation. These hypotheses concerning women's representation stipulate that gender gaps in political participation ought to be smaller when the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, and the number of years since women have gained the right to vote are high. It is argued that the presence of women in the legislature and/or cabinet may send a signal to women that the political system welcomes the presence of women, leading to higher levels of political participation for women and smaller gender gaps. The presence of women in politics at the legislative and executive levels may also lead to increases in the substantive representation of women where governmental policies are more likely to reflect the issues and concerns of women citizens. Again, this increased substantive representation should encourage women's participation and close gaps with men's levels of participation. The third hypothesis argues that a longer history of women's representation should lead to smaller

gender differences in political participation. If there is a longer history of women's representation, women may be more accustomed to seeing women in politics which may provide greater incentives for political participation for them, leading to higher levels of involvement in politics and smaller gender gaps. Findings provide support for this third hypothesis on a variety of political acts. Women are more likely to participate in politics when there is a longer history of women's representation, which in turn, produce smaller gender gaps in political participation. As for the other hypotheses, there is no support for the gendered effects of the presence of women in cabinet on political participation while the effect of the percentage of women in the legislature is limited to one political activity - protest.

The last hypothesis included in Chapter 5 involves the effect of gender quotas on political participation and gender differences. The influence of two types of gender quotas is tested - legislative quotas and voluntary party quotas. Since the adoption of gender quotas has been associated with increases in the proportion of women in the legislature, it is possible that quotas are linked to smaller gender gaps. Furthermore, gender quotas can serve as a signal that the political process is concerned with gender equality and women's issues and preferences. These signals sent to women may lead them to participate at higher levels in politics and reduce the gaps with men's levels. Results in Chapter 5, however, do not confirm this hypothesis concerning the influence of gender quotas on political participation.

1.6 Conclusion

This investigation aims to deepen the study of how political institutions may create incentives and barriers that affect women's and men's levels of political participation differently. Institutions may create a political environment where women's levels of political activities are influenced differently by these incentives than men, leading to smaller gender differences. Political institutions, however, may also inhibit political participation by imposing barriers that create conditions where involvement in politics may be more difficult without the

necessary predispositions. The remainder of this analysis demonstrates that both incentives and barriers influence levels of political participation and that this influence is gendered. The multilevel cross-national statistical analyses presented below show that indeed gender gaps in political participation vary across countries and, more specifically, across political institutions; some political institutions are consistenly associated with smaller gender gaps on multiple political activities while others are linked with larger differences between men and women. In other words, institutions matter for understanding how and why men and women behave differently in the political arena. The most important factor in understanding gender differences in a cross-national perspective seems to be the electoral system. Indeed, PR electoral systems, rather than plurality systems, are associated with larger gender differences for all political activities. Additionally, other findings, but more limited ones, reveal that some institutional arrangements may boost women's levels of participation more so than men, leading to smaller gender gaps. Results show that a longer history of women's representation as well as political parties including favourable mentions toward women in their political platforms are associated with smaller gender gaps for some acts of political participation.

In sum, this research demonstrates that political institutions are an important level of explanation for gender differences in political activities. Additionally, this study provides evidence that the contribution of political institutions to gender gaps needs to be viewed both in terms of incentives and barriers. Some institutional arrangements may stimulate women's involvement in politics and reduce gender differences while others may have the opposite effect.

Chapter 2

Methodology

This chapter provides information on the method and measurements used in the subsequent chapters that assess the gendered effects of political institutions on political participation. This chapter starts with a discussion of the dataset and countries included in the analysis. The chapter also provides a review of all the variables included in the statistical analyses as well as information on the indicators, coding, and sources of the data. Moreover, this methodology section provides the univariate analyses for all the variables in the investigation of the gendered effects of political institutions. Information on the statistical techniques used is also provided below. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion of causality and the problems associated with the relationships between political institutions and gender gaps in political participation.

2.1 Dataset and Case Selection

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is one of the data sources used to conduct this research. The CSES is the product of the collaboration of multiple election study teams from around the world (CSES, June 27, 2007). The CSES contains data on political participation and individual-level factors that are related to political participation such as psychological engagement and political resources. These data were obtained through telephone surveys conducted after a national election in a wide range of countries. Furthermore, the CSES dataset includes a number of country-level variables related to the electoral and party systems.

Data on gender quotas and the number of female representatives were added to the dataset. The Inter-Parliamentary Union provides detailed data on the number and percent-

age of women elected in high and lower chambers of every country included in this study. The Quota Project provides data on which countries use gender quotas and on the type of quotas used: voluntary party quotas or legislative quotas. Additionally, information from the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR), the Manifesto Project, and UN Data is added to the CSES to test and control for the possible gendered influence of political institutions. From the EJPR, information on the electoral results is used to determine the percentage of seats and the percentage of votes each political parties won. Furthermore, the EJPR provides a complete list of all cabinet members with their party affiliation and gender. The Manifesto Project is used to compile the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups political parties include in their platforms. Finally, data on women's labour force participation are obtained from UN Data. Table 2.1 provides a summary of all the variables used in this research as well as their sources.

Module 2 of the CSES conducted between 2001 and 2006 contains a series of questions on different political acts such as contacting politicians, voting, campaign activity, protesting, and working with others; this module is used for this analysis. Module 2 is the only part of the CSES investigation that contains a series of questions measuring cross-national differences in political participation.

Table 2.1: Sources for Indicators

Independent and Dependent Variables		Sources	Years
Concept	Variable		
Political Participation	Contact politicians	CSES	2001-2006
	Protest	CSES	2001-2006
	Vote	CSES	2001-2006
	Work with others to express views	CSES	2001-2006
	Persuade others to vote for a candidate	CSES	2001-2006
	Show support for party of candidate	CSES	2001-2006
Electoral Systems	District magnitude	CSES	2001-2006
	Coalition size	EJPR	2001-2006
	Percentage of seat/vote lower house for each party	EJPR	2001-2006
	Effective number of parties	Gallagher and Mitchell (2008)	2001-2006
Party Ideology	Position of each party on a left/right scale	CSES	2001-2006
	Percentage of favourable mentions	Manifesto Project	2001-2006
Women's Representation	Percentage of women elected	Inter-Parliamentary Union	2001-2006
	Percentage of women in cabinet	EJPR	2001-2006
	Years since women achieved right to vote	Inter-Parliamentary Union	2001-2006
Gender Quotas	Legislative or voluntary party quotas	Quota Project	2001-2006
Controls	Education level	CSES	2001-2006
	Employment status	CSES	2001-2006
	Who is in power makes a difference	CSES	2001-2006
	Political informations item	CSES	2001-2006
	Feel close to one party	CSES	2001-2006
	Degree of closeness to this party	CSES	2001-2006
	Marital Status	CSES	2001-2006
	Age	CSES	2001-2006
	Percentage of women in the workforce	UN Data	2001-2006
	Parliamentary regime	CSES	2001-2006

For this study, only advanced industrial democracies are selected. By focusing on older industrial democracies, the impact of institutions will more likely to be isolated from other explanations that are not tested in this research. For instance, some studies have indicated that the relationships between political institutions and outcomes vary depending on the level of economic development (Matland, 1998). Therefore, the selected countries have a similar level of economic development to control for the impact of this variable. In sum, the selection of cases has been made on two independent variables that will not be considered in this research (King et al., 1994): the level of democratization and the level of economic development. To determine country's level of democratization, the Freedom House index was used. As for the level of economic development, data from the World Bank were used to assess countries' Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. Countries that are classied as free by the Freedom House index and advanced by the World Bank are included in this investigation. The countries in the CSES dataset that meet these criteria are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States[1]. In total, 20 countries are included in this investigation.

Since this research focuses on the gendered effects of political institutions on political participation, it is important to select countries that are similar in ways that ensure that political institutions will have a uniform influence. Previous cross-national investigations on topics related to political behaviour stipulate that institutions such as the electoral system or the party system can work differently for different kinds of countries. Citizens in newer democracies may have a different relationship with their electoral and party systems because electoral rules and political parties do not have a long history. It has been found, for instance, that citizens in new democracies tend to have weaker party identification and have more negative views of political parties in general (Dalton and Anderson, 2011). This difference

[1]Although Denmark is included in the CSES and is a country that meets the criteria for selection, it is not included in the analysis. The survey conducted in Denmark and included in the CSES does not include an important control variable – employment status.

may mean that political institutions will have different gendered effects in countries that are long-established democracies than in those that are new democracies.

Women's representation and gender quotas may also have a different influence on gender differences in political participation in advanced industrial democracies than in new democracies. Matland (1998) finds that the explanations for women's representation are not the same across all types of countries. The electoral system, the percentage of women in the labour force, and the cultural standing of women in societies explain the presence of women in the legislature among advanced industrial countries, but not in developping countries. Again, this situation may mean that women's representation influences citizen behaviour differently across types of countries. In sum, when dealing with political institutions, there is evidence that both the level of socioeconomic development and the level of democratization matter.

2.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables of this investigation are constant in all statistical analyses in the subsequent chapters. Political participation is defined as any "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government actions – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by affecting the selection of people who make those policies" (Verba et al., 1995, 38). It is measured by six questions asking whether respondents have voted in the last election, have contacted a politician in the last five years, have worked with others in the last five years, have persuaded others to vote for a candidate or a party in the last election, have participated in a protest in the last five years, and have showed support for a party or a candidate in the last election. Gender differences in political participation tend to vary according to acts. In some countries, there seems to be no gender difference in voter turnout (Gidengil et al., 2004) and the gender gap is reversed on political consumerism acts where men are less likely than women to perform these activities (Stolle and Micheletti,

2006). Therefore, I decided not to include all political participation questions into a single indicator; six dependent variables are included in the analyses, one for each question about political participation.

Political activities need to be analyzed separately since they require different levels of political resources and predispositions with politics. Verba et al. (1995) distinguish between political acts by the amount of free time, money, and skills necessary to perform them and from the messages they send to elected officials. Additionally, political activities can be classified according to whether they are public or private actions. This distinction between private and public activities as well as differences in terms of levels of political resources and messages sent to politicians may help understand how and why political institutions may influence gender gaps in political participation.

Previous studies have shown that voting is a different activity than other forms of political participation since it requires less time and civil skills to pursue (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995; Whiteley et al., 2010). Elections only occur every few years and do not demand from citizens who turnout to vote a high time commitment. Moreover, voters do not need to possess strong organization skills or be able to speak well in front of a crowd to cast their ballot. In term of the message sent to politicians, engaging in the act of voting does not communicate clearly citizens' opinions and preferences on specific issues. Voting is also considered a private act; vote choice is not publicly displayed and citizens do not have to share their preferences with others.

Participation in protest activities demands a slightly higher time commitment from citizens than voting; protest generally lasts for a few hours. Attending a protest, however, does not require citizens to be well articulated or organized (Verba et al., 1995). While protest may be somewhat more demanding than voting, it is not an act that requires a large amount of skills to perform. What involvement in a protest may necessisate is a greater dissatisfaction with the political system. Protest may be viewed by citizens as an alternative form

of political participation for when they are dissatisfied with politicians and political parties (Whiteley et al., 2010). Participation in protest activities also allows citizens to express a clear position on an issue to politicians. By carrying a sign or singning slogans, citizens can express a preference in way that is not possible through voting. Also, contrary to voting, protest is a public activity. To perform such act, citizens need to publicly express their preferences toward policies and laws and/or dissatisfaction toward the government. By doing so, friends and family members may know a citizen's opinions.

Political persuasion demands from citizens engaged in this activity that they possess communication skills. Individuals need to have a well-formed opinion on politicians or political parties and they also need to express persuasive arguments in favour of these politicians or parties. Therefore, to engage in political persuasion, important communication skills are necessary. Furthermore, political persuasion does not allow citizens to express their opinions and preferences to politicians. This is an act that is aiming at convincing other citizens to support a candidate or a party; the goal is not for citizens to communicate their positions to be taken into account in the decision-making process. Additionally, political persuasion is a public activity. By engaging with others to convince them to support a party or a candidate, citizens reveal their preferences and opinions to their social networks.

Campaign activity, as measured in this investigation, requires citizens to have expressed support for a political party or a candidate. Posting a sign on your front lawn or wearing a button does not require a large amount of free time or civic skills (Verba et al., 1995). Putting a sign can take a few minutes and does not require that citizens be able to organize meetings or speak well in front of a crowd. Moreover, campaign activity, like political persuasion, does not allow citizens to communicate to decision-makers their opinions and preferences about the policy-making process. To be able to perform this act, citizens need a preference toward a political party or a candidate; however, they do not have the possibility of sending political messages to them. Furthermore, campaign activity is a public activity; citizens

need to display publicly which party and/or candidate their support for others to see.

Significant civic skills are required to contact politicians effectively (Verba et al., 1995). This political activity demands that citizens be able to express clearly their opinions and preferences about policy decisions. In other words, individuals need to speak and/or write well for their preferences to be effectively communicated to elected officials. Contacting politicians also requires that citizens have the free time necessary to write a letter or call a politician. Additionally, this act of political participation allows individuals to communicate in greater detail their opinions and preferences to politicians. Citizens, by contacting politicians, can inform the decision-making process on the type of actions and policies they desire from the government. By doing these actions, contacting politicians may be a more private activity. Citizens do not have to communicate their preferences and/or opinions to their friends and family members; they only have to do so to one person, the politician contacted.

Finally, the last act of participation included in this analysis is working with others to express views about government actions. This activity requires that citizens possess significant free time and civic skills. Working with others may involve organizing meetings and speaking to other citizens and politicians to express views and preferences. Furthermore, this act allows citizens to express their preferences toward the prefered government actions. By working with others, individuals may be in a better position to put into effect their policy positions to a particular problem. Working with others to express views about government actions is also a public activity. Working with others implies that a citizen's preferences and opinions are shared with others with the goal of affecting policy making.

These different indicators of political participation are used in this analysis since they require different political resources, they allow citizens to express different types of messages to the decision makers, and they can either be performed privately or publicly. This variety in political activities allows this research to assess the gendered effects of political institutions for acts that are easier for citizens to perform (voting) and for activities that are more

demanding (working with others). In addition to tapping into the different levels of political resources necessary for involvement, these six political activities measure another dimension of political participation, that is, the target of the political actions. Some activities aim at political parties or politicians while others have as a goal to affect other citizens' political preferences. Voting and protest, for instance, have as a consequence to communicate citizen's preferences to politicians. On the other hand, political persuasion and campaign activity are political actions that aim at convincing others to support a particular candidate or political party. Finally, some political actions included in this analysis require that citizens perform publicly actions aimed at expressing their preferences and/or opinion; for instance, protest, political persuasion, campaign activity, and working with others are all public actions. Alternatively, voting and contacting politicians allow citizens to express preferences and opinions, but without communicating them to their social networks.

2.3 Independent Variables

The next three chapters investigate the gendered effects of different types of political institutions on political participation. Chapter 3 hypothesizes that part of cross-national gender differences in political participation can be explained by the electoral system. Four indicators are used to assess the impact of this variable: the level of disproportionality, the effective number of political parties in the legislature, coalition size, and district magnitude. Chapter 4 investigates the role of political parties and their ideologies in understanding gender gaps in political participation. Four indicators are also used to address this question: the index of party polarization, the presence of a left-wing political party in government, the number of left parties with at least one seat in the legislature, and the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups in political party platforms. Finally, Chapter 5 assesses the gendered influence of women's representation and gender quotas on political participation. The percentage of women in the legislature,

the percentage of women in cabinet, the number of years since women won the right to vote are used to assess the gendered effect of women's representation. As for the influence of gender quotas, the presence of legislative or voluntary party quotas is used as the indicator. The next paragraphs will look in greater detail at each indicator used in this investigation to provide information on the sources of each indicator and how they are measured.

First, as an indicator of the number of parties in the legislature, the effective number of political parties (ENPP) is used. That measure is designed to capture the number of meaningful parties in a system (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). The number of parties is weighted by party size, that is the percentage of votes each political party received in the previous election. The data is gathered from Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). Table 2.2 includes the effective number of parties in the legislature for each country in the analysis.

Second, district magnitude is included as an indicator of the electoral system. The CSES contains information on district magnitude for each country[2]. This information can be found in Table 2.2. District magnitude is usually associated with skewness; therefore, its natural log is used in the subsequent statistical analyses. As Table 2.2 shows, most countries in the sample have a district magnitude that is low. The mode of this distribution is one representative per constituency with a mean of 17.07. Two countries in the analysis, however, have a district magnitude that is far above the mean; Israel with a district magnitude of 120 and the Netherlands with a district magnitude of 150. Therefore, the distribution of district magnitude is skewed to the high end of the scale. This is a problem since skewness violates regression assumptions (Lewis-Beck, 1980). The distribution of cases for each variable needs to take the form of a normal distribution. That is, the same number of observations above and below the mean should be observed with 95% of the observations falling within two standard deviations, plus of minus, of the mean. Since this is not the case for district magnitude where most cases are below the mean, statistical analyses may be biased. To

[2]For countries where district magnitude varies across constituencies, the CSES provides the average district magnitude.

remedy this problem, the natural log of the district magnitude is used in the analysis[3].

[3]The natural log is equal to ln(x) where x is the district magnitude in each country.

Table 2.2: Countries and their Institutional Characteristics I

Electoral System	Country	Election Year	Disproportionality	Effective Number of Parties	Coalition Size	District Magnitude	Left Government	Number Left Parties
Plurality/	Australia	2004	8.65	2.44	2	1.00	No	3
Majority Systems	Canada	2004	9.78	3.03	1	1.00	Yes	4
	France	2002	22.99	2.26	2	1.00	No	5
	Great Britain	2005	16.60	2.46	1	1.00	Yes	4
	United States	2004	2.76	2.00	1	1.00	No	1
PR Systems	Belgium	2003	5.14	8.82	4	13.60	Yes	4
	Finland	2003	3.21	4.93	3	13.33	Yes	3
	Iceland	2003	1.86	3.71	2	10.50	No	2
	Ireland	2002	6.48	4.13	2	3.95	No	3
	Israel	2003	2.20	6.17	4	120.00	Yes	3
	Italy	2006	3.39	5.06	6	23.73	Yes	3
	Netherlands	2002	0.88	5.79	3	150.00	No	4
	Norway	2001	3.23	5.35	3	8.26	Yes	4
	Portugal	2002	5.36	3.60	2	10.45	No	5
	Portugal	2005	5.72	3.14	1	10.45	Yes	5
	Spain	2004	5.15	2.53	1	6.73	Yes	3
	Sweden	2002	1.50	4.23	1	10.70	Yes	3
	Switzerland	2003	2.29	5.01	4	7.69	Yes	2
Mixed Systems	Germany	2002	4.24	3.38	2	1.00	Yes	3
	Japan	2004	2.01	2.59	2	1.00	No	3
	New Zealand	2002	2.73	3.76	2	1.00	Yes	4

Source: CSES, Manifest Project, EJPR (various years), Inter-Parliamentary Union, Quota Project

Table 2.3: Countries and their Institutional Characteristics II

Country	Party Polarization	Non-Economic Groups Favourable Mentions	Women in the Legislature	Women in Cabinet	Year Right to Vote	Number Years Right Vote	Gender Quotas
Australia	1.96	4.48	24.7	17.6	1902	102	Yes
Canada	2.06	0.78	21.1	23.1	1917	87	No
France	3.29	-	12.3	23.8	1944	58	Yes
Great Britain	2.37	9.26	19.7	26.1	1918	87	Yes
United States	2.43	1.26	14.9	18.2	1920	84	No
Belgium	-	3.06	35.3	33.3	1919	84	Yes
Finland	2.85	3.56	37.5	50.0	1906	97	No
Iceland	4.08	0	30.2	16.7	1915	88	Yes
Ireland	2.20	3.92	12.7	13.3	1918	84	No
Israel	3.87	-	15.0	13.0	1948	55	Yes
Italy	2.48	0.68	17.3	22.2	1945	61	No
Netherlands	3.64	2.47	34.0	7.1	1919	83	No
Norway	3.75	0.90	35.8	42.1	1913	88	Yes
Portugal (2002)	3.62	1.45	19.1	11.1	1931	71	No
Portugal (2005)	3.44	0.27	19.5	11.8	1931	74	No
Spain	4.33	4.01	36.0	50.0	1931	73	Yes
Sweden	4.07	8.81	45.3	45.4	1919	83	Yes
Switzerland	4.01	2.22	26.5	14.3	1971	32	Yes
Germany	2.70	3.97	32.2	42.8	1918	84	Yes
Japan	3.30	-	7.1	11.1	1945	59	No
New Zealand	3.35	4.32	29.2	30.0	1893	109	No

Source: CSES, Manifest Project, EJPR (various years), Inter-Parliamentary Union, Quota Project

The level of disporportionality is an additional indicator included to test the gendered effects of the electoral system. Gallagher's least squares index of disproportionality, that measures the differences between the percentage of votes that political parties earned and the percentage of seats in the lower or only chamber of the national legislature, is used (Gallagher, 1991; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008)[4]. The least squares index of disproportinality varies between '0' and '100' where '0' represents a perfect concordance between votes and seats and '100' means a complete distortion between votes and seats. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are usually associated with lower levels of disproportionality (Norris, 2004). To obtain the percentages of votes and seats of each political party for each country in the analysis, I rely on various years of the EJPR. The EJPR contains complete election results; on the other hand, the CSES only contains information of votes and seats for up to six political parties. The EJPR data offer a better indication of the level of disproportionality since many countries in the analysis have more than six political parties competing in elections and wining seats in the legislature. Table 2.2 provides the level of disproportionality for each country.

Finally, an indicator measuring the number of political parties in cabinet or the coalition size is included in the analysis of the gendered effects of the electoral system. The coalition size in the government in place prior to the election that was the focus of the CSES survey in each country is used as an indicator. Again, the data provided by the EJPR are used to calculate the coalition size for each country. The EJPR provides a complete list of all members of cabinet in each country as well as their party affiliation. Table 2.2 provides scores on the coalition size for all countries.

The first hypothesis in Chapter 4 investigates the role of party polarization on gender gaps in political participation. Dalton's party polarization index, based on citizen placements of each party on a left-right scale, is employed (Dalton, 2008). Citizens were asked, in the

[4]Gallagher's least squares formula is: $\sqrt{\frac{\frac{(Votes_i - Seats_i)^2}{Votes_i}}{2}}$ where i represents individual parties.

CSES surveys, to place up to six political parties on a 10 point left-right scale. For each party in the system, an average of citizen placements is calculated. An average overall score for the placement of all parties in the system is also calculated. The index of party polarization provide a measure of the standard deviation of the distribution of parties along the left-right scale[5]. To prevent smaller political parties from contributing too much to the index, the measure is weighted by party size, meaning by each party vote share. If all political parties in a party system occupy the same position on the left-right scale, the party polarization index will take the value of '0'. When all parties are split between the two extremes of the left-right scale, the party polarization will be '10'. Table 2.3 contains each country's score on the party polarization index. Belgium is excluded from the analyses in Chapter 4 since the data allowing the calculation of the party polarization are not available in the CSES for this country.

The second indicator of party ideology is whether a political party on the ideological left is part of government. To measure this variable, the CSES contains expert classifications on the left-right scale of political parties in each country in the analysis[6]. Experts scored parties using a scale between '0', for a left-wing party, and '10' for a right-wing political party. Parties scoring between '0' and '5' are coded as left-wing; using the election results provided by the EJPR, a dummy variable is created that identifies left-wing political parties that have formed the government or been part of a coalition government previous to the election contained in the CSES with '1' and zero otherwise. The variable is named 'Left Government'.

The third indicator identifies the presence of multiple left-wing parties in the legislature. A simple additive measure of the number in the system based on the expert ratings of

[5]The formula for calculating party polarization is as follow : $\sqrt{(\text{Party Vote Share}_i) \times (\frac{\text{Party L/R score}_i - \text{Party System Average L/R Score}}{5})^2}$ Where i represents individual parties.

[6]These experts were the team of collaborators responsible for the collection of the public opinion data in each country.

political parties on the left-right scale is created. As for the previous indicator, a party is considered in the ideological left if it receives an expert score between '0' and '5'. Each country's score on the 'Left Government' scale as well as on the number of left-wing parties competing in elections can be found in Table 2.2.

Finally, one additional measure is created to evaluate the impact of political parties that are attentive to women's interests on gender differences in political participation. The Manifesto Project Datatbase tracks political party preferences, through a qualitative analysis of party platforms, over time and in multiple countries. One of the indicators in the Manifesto database calculates the percentage of each party platform that is favourable to, or acknowledges, the need for assistance to women, old people, young people, linguistic groups, or any other special interest groups. The database contains the percentage of favourable mentions for any groups combined for each party in the system that is weighted by the length of each party platform. For each country, I add each political party's score on the favourable mentions variable and then weight by party size, meaning by the share of vote they obtained in the last election. I only use the data provided by the Manifesto Project for the same election year used by the CSES. The score for each country is revealed in Table 2.3.

This measure has the advantage of directly tapping into whether political parties support women in their political platforms. In this sense, it is a better measure than assuming that left-wing political parties, because they are likely to share similar policy preferences with women, will adopt policies favouring them directly. The measure, however, contains some disadvantages that affect the interpretation of the results. First, the measure from the Manifesto Project is not only a measure of whether political parties support women, but is rather an accumulation of favourable mentions towards women and several other non-economic demographic groups. One cannot be certain, therefore, that a higher score on this measure corresponds to greater support for women's issues. Parties could simply be focusing their attention on other groups such as linguistics minorities or senior citizens.

A high score on this measure, however, does signal that although parties may not focus specifically on women, they are nevertheless concerned with disadvantaged social groups. This increased attention to non-economic demographic groups signals to women that their exclusion from the political system is an issue of importance for these political parties, which may positively affect women's participation. Unfortunately, the Manifesto Project does not include information on party platforms for each country in the CSES. Only 17 countries in the CSES are also present in the Manifesto Project. As a result, France, Israel, and Japan are not included in the analysis.

Chapter 5 investigates the gendered effects of women's representation and gender quotas on political participation. To evaluate the influence of the proportion of women elected in the national legislature on gender differences in political participation, the percentage of women elected in the lower or only house of a particular country is employed. The data are provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and added to the CSES dataset. I use the percentage of women members of the legislature in the months previous to the election that is the focus of the survey in this analysis. The percentage of women in cabinet is also used as an indicator of women's representation. The data originate from the EJPR (various years) which contains a complete list of all cabinet members as well as their party affiliation and gender. I then calculate the percentage of women in cabinet for each country. Finally, the third indicator of women's representation is designed to assess the influence of the length of time since women gained access to the political process. To do so, the year women obtained the right to vote for each country in the sample is used. The Inter-Parliamentary Union provides a complete list of when women achieved this milestone in multiple countries[7]. For the statistical analyses, this indicator of women's representation is a simple count of the number of years since they achieved the right to vote. This calculation was performed by substracting the year in which each survey used in the CSES was conducted to the year

[7]Data on the year women obtained the right to run for office can be found online at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm.

women obtained the right to vote in each country. Information for each country's scores on the indicators for women's representation can be found in Table 2.3.

One indicator is used to test for the influence of gender quotas on differences in political participation between men and women. This indicator is a dummy variable measuring whether countries have adopted either legislative quotas or a main political parties has adopted voluntary gender quotas. A country is indicated as having legislative quotas when it has adopted a legislation or amended its constitution to require political parties to include a certain percentage of women among their candidates standing for elections. This information is provided by the Quota Project[8]. Voluntary party quotas exist if one or both of the two main political parties contesting elections has adopted gender quotas. Since the mechanism relating gender quotas to gender differences in political participation relies on the increased proportion of women elected representatives, it is unlikely that voluntary quotas adopted by small political parties will have a strong impact on women's levels of political participation. A shift in the proportion of women members of the legislature will be greater when competitive political parties adopt gender quotas. Since these large parties tend to elect more members, voluntary party gender quotas can lead to large increases in women's representation. Countries where only small political parties have adopted gender quotas and where no legislative quotas have been adopted either are not coded '1' since it is unlikely that these party quotas will be noticed by the population and/or will lead to an increase in the proportion of women in the legislature. To identify the size of a political party, the election results from the EJPR (various years) are used. If the quota project indicates that a party has adopted voluntary gender quotas and finished first or second in the election previous to the conduct of the CSES survey, or when legislative quotas have been adopted, then the country is coded '1'[9]. Information on the coding for the indicator of gender quotas

[8]Information on which countries have adopted legislative or voluntary party gender quotas is available online at http://www.quotaproject.org/en/index.cfm.

[9]Only parties that have voluntary adopted gender quotas by having a formal regulation are considered as political parties with gender quotas. This definition has as a consequence to classify Canada as a country without voluntary party quotas despite the Quota Project classifying the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC),

is showned in Table 2.3.

2.4 Control Variables

To control for the impact of individual-level political resources – time, money, and civic skills – on political participation, measures for the education level and employment status are created[10]. Education level is an indicator of the level of civic skills an individual possesses and a proxy for income levels. The education question in the CSES contains eight possible answers ranging from '1' (no education) to '8' (completed undergraduate degree). The variable is recoded to range from '0' to '1'; the eight categories of education are kept intact in the recoding. Moreover, a dummy variable indicating whether respondents are employed full-time is included. Burns et al. (2001) state that full-time occupations are more likely to provide the civic skills that can be later applied to political participation.

Another important factor in understanding gender differences in political participation is psychological engagement with politics. According to Verba et al. (1995), political engagement can be measured by four concepts: political efficacy, partisanship, political interest, and political knowledge. Given the data found in the CSES, a measure of political efficacy and another for partisanship are included in the statistical analyses. Political efficacy has two components: internal and external efficacy. The CSES data include a measure of external political efficacy[11], which is "expressed beliefs about political institutions and the belief that leaders and institutions are responsive to the participation of individuals" (Karp and Banducci, 2008a, 318). The question asks whether respondents believe that who is in power

a major political party, as having voluntary quotas. The LPC has adopted a recommendation that 25% of their candidates running in elections should be women. This party has not change its internal regulations to include quotas; for this reason Canada is not considered a country with voluntary party quotas.

[10]The CSES contains more questions tapping into political resources such as membership in non-political voluntary associations; however, for many of these questions, data do not exist for several countries. Rather than reduce the number of countries in the analysis, a more limited set of measures for political resources was included in the investigation.

[11]Again, the CSES contains more questions measuring efficacy; however, many countries are missing on these questions and, thus, the additional questions on political efficacy are not used in this analysis.

can make a difference. This question has five possible answers ranging from "it makes a differences who is in power" to "it doesn't make a difference who is in power". This is the closest question to the concept of political efficacy where data from all countries included in this analysis are available. It is not perfectly tapping into the concept of external efficacy as it does not directly connect to the responsiveness of leaders and institutions, but rather to variation by party in power. This variable is recoded to keep the five categories, but to range from '0' (makes no difference) to '1' (makes a difference). As for partisanship, it is defined as the affective ties citizens have toward political parties; it is a relatively stable and durable force. It is measured with two questions: whether respondents feel close to a party and, if yes, how close they feel. Respondents are coded as partisan '1', if they answered yes to the first question and if they indicate that they feel very close to the party (Blais et al., 2002). Respondents who do no feel close to or not very close to a political party are coded '0'.

Finally, control variables are included for marital status and age. Marital status is a dummy variable assessing whether respondents are married or living together as married and age is a continuous variable measuring age at the time of the survey. Since these variables are associated with political participation, including them in the analysis may prevent spurious relationships. For instance, married citizens tend to be more likely to turnout to vote and to be involved in political parties or with others since they are more likely to have deep roots in their community (Blais et al., 2002). For similar reasons, younger individuals are less likely to turnout to vote and/or be involved in political parties and with others since they have not yet created a solid fondation in a community.

Additionally, country-level control variables are needed in the analysis. Since Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that changes in the education level and women's access to the labour force produce a greater commitment in citizens toward gender equality, accounting for variation in these is necessary. To control for this possibility, the percentage of women in the

workforce for each country is included in the statistical analyses[12]. Another country-level control included in the analysis is whether each country has a parliamentary or presidential regime since regime type can affect levels of political participation. Countries with a presidential regime conduct two separate elections, one for president and one for the legislature, which can boost political activity levels (Blais, 2000). Accordingly, a dummy variable is included in the analysis indicating whether each country has a parliamentary or presidential regime. Parliamentary regimes are coded '1' and presidential ones '0'.

2.5 Univariate Analysis

This section provides a review of the univariate analysis of the indicators used in this analysis. It starts first with a overview of the univariate analysis for the dependent variable, then it decribes these statistics for the independent variables, and it finishes with a description of the univariate analysis for the control variables. This description of the univariate analysis helps established that countries and their citizens included in this investigation do vary in their political arrangments. An appropriate test of the gendered effects of political institutions requires that countries exhibit a large range in their scores on the electoral system, party system, women's representation, and gender quotas. Failure to do so, may lead to bias results. Additionally, this investigation is trying to identify specific institutional configurations that result either in smaller or larger gender gaps in political participation. Findings in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, indicate, for instance, what number of political parties or what percentage of women in the legislature is associated with the presence of significant gender differences. Thus, the following univariate analysis should provide the necessary information to assess these findings; the univariate analysis shows how countries and their citizens vary in their political institutions and, eventually, whether many countries are associated with both smaller or larger gender gaps in political participation.

[12]Data for the percentage of women age 15 and plus in the workforce are obtained from the UN Data website at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3a114.

Table 2.4 presents the univariate analysis for each variable included in the subsequent statistical analyses. First, the univariate statistics show that 86.8 per cent of citizens in the pooled sample have voted in the last election. Voter turnout is the most popular act of political participation among citizens included in this investigation. For other political activities, Table 2.4 indicates that 10.7 per cent of individuals has participated in a protest, 23.7 per cent have engaged in political persuasion, 10.5 per cent have taken part in campaign activity, 15.3 per cent have contacted politicians, and 19.5 per cent have been working with others.

Table 2.4: Univariate Analysis

	Mode	Median	Mean	Range	Variance	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Vote	1	-	-	-	-	-	0 (13.16%)	1 (86.84%)
Protest	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (89.83%)	1 (10.67%)
Political Persuasion	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (76.29%)	1 (23.71%)
Campaign Activity	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (89.51%)	1 (10.49%)
Contact Politicians	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (84.67%)	1 (15.33%)
Work with Others	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (80.49%)	1 (19.51%)
Disproportionality	5.70	3.39	4.94	22.12	18.44	4.29	0.88	23
ENPP	3.14	3.76	4.15	6.82	2.68	1.64	2	8.82
Coalition Size	2	2	2.33	5	1.47	1.21	1	6
District Magnitude	1	7.9	17.07	149	1275.07	35.71	1	150
Left Government	1	-	-	-	-	-	0 (41.02%)	1 (58.98%)
Number Left Parties	3	3	3.55	4	0.99	1.00	1	5
Party Polarization	2.20	3.35	3.18	2.3	0.50	0.70	2	4.3
Favourable Mentions	0.27	3.06	3.00	9.3	5.41	2.33	0	9.26
Women Legislature	19.50	26.5	25.59	38.2	99.61	9.98	7.1	45.3
Women Cabinet	11.10	22.2	24.36	42.9	167.45	12.94	7.1	50.0
Year Right Vote	84	84	79.43	77	265.05	16.28	32	109
Gender Quotas	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (54.11%)	1 (45.89%)
Women	1	-	-	-	-	-	0 (48.52%)	1 (51.48%)
Political Efficacy	5	4	3.65	4	1.62	1.27	1	5
Partisanship	0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (88.31%)	1 (11.69%)
Education	5	5	5.22	7	3.03	1.74	1	8
Age	40	46	46.89	84	295.14	17.18	17	101
Married	1	-	-	-	-	-	0 (34.98&)	1 (65.02%)
Women Workforce	54.30	55.70	54.00	32.40	51.00	7.18	38.1	70.5
Parliamentary	1	-	-	-	-	-	0 (44.69%)	1 (55.31%)

Table 2.4 also includes the univariate analysis for the indicators of the electoral system: the level of disproportionality, district magnitude, the effective number of political parties in the legislature, and coalition size. First, the level of disproportionality varies between 0.88 and 23 across countries in the sample. Disproportionality is, on average, 4.94 with a standard deviation of 4.29. The standard deviation provides an indication of how cases are distributed around the mean for each indicator; a large standard deviation indicates that on average, respondents have a score that is far from the average while a small standard deviation shows that respondents have a similar score than the average. The standard deviation calculates the average difference between each value on an indicator and the mean of this indicator. On average, citizens live in a country where the level of disproportionality is 4.29 points away from the mean of 4.94. Second, district magnitude varies between 1 and 150 elected representatives per constituency. The mode for district magnitude is 1, meaning the most frequent district magnitude in the sample is one elected representative per constituency. The average district magnitude is 17.07 representatives per constituency with a standard deviation of 35.71. A 35.71 standard deviation means that, on average, individuals live in a country that have around 35 elected representatives per constituency more or less than the mean of 17 representatives per constituency. Third, the effective number of political parties in the legislature varies between 2 and 8.82 across countries in the sample. On average, countries have 4.15 parties in their legislature with a standard deviation of 1.64. In other words, on average citizens live in a country with a legislature that has around 2 political parties more or less than the overall average of 4.15 parties. Finally, coalition size varies between 1 and 6 political parties. On average, citizens live in countries with 2.33 parties that are part of the government. The mode for coalition size is 2, meaning that the most frequent coalition size in the sample is two political parties. The standard deviation for the mean is 1.21, denoting that on average citizens live in political systems that have about one more or less political party that is part of cabinet than the mean.

For the indicators of party ideology, Table 2.4 shows that the majority of respondents in the sample has a left-wing political party as part of the government; 59 per cent of respondents live under a government with a left party. As for the number of left-wing political parties competing in elections, on average citizens live in countries that have 3.55 parties with a standard deviation of 1.00, meaning that on average countries have about three left political parties competing for elections plus or minus one. The univariate analysis of the party polarization index shows that on average political parties are ideologically apart by 3.18 points on the 10 points left-right ideological scale. On average, countries are 0.70 point away from the mean. Finally, the mean for the percentage of favourable mentions toward non-economic demographic groups is 3.00 with a standard deviation of 2.33, meaning that on average the percentage of favourable mentions is 2.33 points away from the mean.

On average, the percentage of women members of the legislature is 25.59 for citizens in the 20 countries included in the analysis. There are important differences, however, across countries in terms of women's representation. The lowest proportion of women elected representatives is 7.1 per cent while the highest is 45.3 per cent. The standard deviation for the percentage of women in the lower or only house of the national government is 9.68, meaning that on average, respondents live in a country where the percentage of women representatives is higher or lower than the mean by about 10 percentage points.

Moreover, on average, there are 24.36 per cent of women in cabinet. Again, Table 2.4 demonstrates important differences across countries in the proportion of women in cabinet. The percentage of women cabinet members varies between 7.1 per cent and 50 per cent with a standard deviation of 12.94. This standard deviation stipulates that on average respondents live in a country where the percentage of women in cabinet is different from the overall mean by about 13 percentage points. The last indicator of women's representation is the number of years since women gained the right to vote. According to Table 2.4, on average, there have been 79.43 years since women achieved the right to vote in the countries included in

the analysis. Important differences across countries are also observed for this indicator. The New Zealand was the first country that granted women the right to vote which occurred 109 years before the conduct of the survey. On the other hand, women in Switzerland were the last ones to achieve this right - 32 years before the CSES investigation.

For the indicator of gender quotas, Table 2.4 indicates that most respondents live in a country with no legislative or voluntary party quotas. For gender quotas, only 45.89 per cent of the respondents in the analysis live in a country that has adopted legislative and/or voluntary party quotas.

Finally, Table 2.4 reports the univariate analysis for the control variables. In the pooled sample, the overwhelming majority of respondents cannot be classified as partisans. Only 11.7 per cent of respondents conform to the definition of a partisan. As for the indicator for political efficacy, 32.4 per cent of respondents agreed that it made a difference who is in power. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a '1' to '5' scale where '1' meant that 'it makes a difference' and '5' meant that 'it does not make a difference who is in power'. Results show that the average score is 3.65, meaning that most respondents are closer to believing that who is in power does not make a difference than the contrary. The standard deviation is 1.27, meaning that, on average, respondents' levels of political efficacy are about one category away from the mean.

Level of education is measured with one question asking which level of education respondents have completed. Possible answers range from '1' for none to '8' for completed undergraduate degree. On average, respondents have at least completed a secondary degree; the overall average for the education question is 5.22 with a standard deviation of 1.74, meaning that, on average, respondents' answers are close to two categories away from the mean. As for the dummy variable measuring whether respondents are employed full time, the majority of respondents does not have a full time job; 46.5 per cent of respondents in the sample are employed full time. As for age, on average respondents are 46.89 years old with

a standard deviation of 17.18, meaning that, on average, respondents' age is either 17 years older or younger than the mean. Respondents' age in the sample varies from 17 years old to 101 years old. Finally, the majority of respondents is married - 65 per cent of participants are married.

The percentage of women in the workforce varies between 31.8 per cent and 70.5 per cent in the sample with the average being at 54 per cent. The standard deviation for women workforce participation shows that on average countries are 7.18 percentage points away from the mean. As Table 2.4 demonstrates, the majority of countries in the sample has a parliamentary regime; 55.31 per cent of the respondents in the analysis live in a country with a parliamentary system.

2.6 Multi-level Modelling

Multilevel logistic regressions are used to test for the impact of political institutions on gender differences in political participation. Logistic regressions are used since all six dependent variables assessing political participation are dichotomous. Each variable is measured with two categories: '1' (participated) and '0' (did not participate); therefore, ordinary least square regressions are inappropriate since this type of regression assumes that the dependent variable is continuous. Logistic regressions are better fitted to deal with a dichotomous dependent variable.

There are theoretical as well as statistical reasons for using multi-level logistic modelling instead of standard logistic regression (Luke, 2004). Since all the hypotheses tested in this investigation of the gendered impact of political institutions involve the interaction of two levels of analysis, it is imperative that the statistical techniques used match the theoretical framework. The goal of multi-level modeling "is to account for variance in a dependent variable that is measured at the lowest level of analysis by considering information for all levels of analysis" (Steenbergen and Jone, 2002, 219). The hypotheses tested in this research

stipulate that a behaviour measured at the individual-level – political participation – may be influenced by factors at both the individual- and country-levels. Gender gaps in political participation should be affected by differences in political resources and political engagement, which are individual-level factors, and by cross-national differences in electoral systems, party systems, and women's representation, which are country-level factors. Therefore, there are theoretical reasons to use statistical analyses that centre on assessing the impact of factors at all levels of analysis on a dependent variable measured at the individual-level.

Not taking into account the multiple levels of data in the analysis can lead to statistical issues. Individuals from the same country may be influenced by contextual factors that would not be controlled in non multi-level analysis; therefore, the assumption of unbiased errors in standard regression analysis is violated. This situation results in lower standard errors which increase the probability of committing a type I error: rejecting the null hypothesis when it should be accepted. Multi-level modeling corrects for the nonrandom errors resulting from the inclusion of multiple countries in the analysis (Luke, 2004). All multi-level logistic regressions with a random intercept model are conducted with the GLLAMM package in STATA 13[13].

2.7 Testing the Gendered Influence of Political Institutions

To test for the gendered impact of political institutions, the statistical analyses include different interaction terms between gender and indicators of various aspects of political institutions. These interaction terms assess whether men's and women's likelihood of participating in politics is affected differently by these indicators. In other words, interaction terms between gender and political institution indicators assess if and to what extent these political institutions have a greater influence on women's than on men's levels of political partici-

[13]The GLLAMM package allows to apply a sample weight to the multilevel regressions that corrects for unequal sample sizes across countries. The weight variable used in all statistical analyses in this research is provided by the CSES and identified as: b1014_1 Dataset weight: sample.

pation. All hypotheses tested in this research stipulate that political institutions ought to influence women's and men's political activities differently; therefore, the use of interaction terms is needed.

A significant interaction term will indicate that political institutions have a relationship with political participation that is different for women and men. A significant interaction term, however, cannot by itself assess whether political institutions have a statistically significant impact on men's and women's likelihood of engaging in political activities (Brambor et al., 2006). A significant interaction term only means that the difference in the effect that political institutions have on women's and men's probability of participating in a variety of political acts is statistically significant and not that institutions have a significant effect on either men's or women's levels of participation. To determine this, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors are calculated for all the indicators of political institutions[14]. Because of the inclusion of interaction terms between gender and the indicators of political institutions in the multi-level logistic analyses, the logistic coefficient and standard error for each indicator of political institutions indicates whether the relationship between political participation and this indicator is significant, but only for when gender equal zero, that is, for men only. Thus, to determine whether political institutions influence women's likelihood of involvement in political activities, separate logistic coefficients and standard errors need to be calculated. These marginal effects are logistic coefficients and their standard errors provide this additional information. The combination of the interaction terms with the marginal effects will assess whether political institutions have a gendered influence on political participation. To reach a positive conclusion, the interaction term will need to be significant and the indicator of political institutions must also have a significant relationship with political participation for men, women, or both. When both conditions are met, it will be possible to conclude that political institutions influence women's and men's levels of

[14]The lincom post-estimation command in STATA 13 is used to calculate marginal effects and conditional standard errors.

political participation differently, leading to differences in gender gaps.

Additionnally, the marginal effects and conditionals standard errors need to be calculated for the indicators of political institutions that do not result in a significant interaction term with gender. This step is necessary since the orignal results of the multi-level logistic regressions only indicate whether political institutions are a signficant factor associated with political participation for men. Based on this information only, it is not possible to conclude on whether political institutions are significantly related to political activities for all citizens. By calculating the marginal effects and conditional standard errors, the missing information on the significance of the relationships between political institutions and political participation is provided.

It is also possible to calculate the size and significance of gender gaps for each category of the indicators of political institutions. For instance, it is possible to determine the size of the gender gap for the different numbers of political parties in the legislature. This statistical analysis allows us to assess how gender differences in political participation vary across a series of country-level factors. In other words, this statistical analysis will determine under what institutional conditions gender differences in political participation may or may not be significant. Since there exist cross-national differences in gender gaps in political participation, it is plausible that these gender differences vary across political institutions.

The calculation of these gender gaps across political institutions is also called marginal effect of gender and it allows for the identification of those characteristics of the electoral system, party system or women's representation associated with the smallest and insignificant gender gaps in political participation. The marginal effect of gender is illustrated in a series of figures that provide the size of gender differences and the 95 per cent confidence interval for each category of political institutions[15]. The marginal effect of gender or the variation in gender gaps is not provided in the original regression analyses. Post-estimation effects need to be calculated to assess the size and significance of gender gaps across political institutions.

[15] All figures are created by using the instructions and STATA code provided by Brambor et al. (2006).

These post-estimation effects allow to calculate the difference between men's and women's probability of participating in politics for every category of the political institution variables, while all the other factors are kept constant. When the marginal effect of gender, or the gender gap, is positive, it indicates that women are more likely to be involved in political activities than men. On the other hand, when the gender gap is negative, it is men that are more likely to be involved than women. The figures also include the 95 per cent confidence interval; this confidence interval indicates under which institutional arragements are gender gaps in political participation significant at the $p<0.05$ level. To reach this conclusion, both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval need to be above (or below) the zero line (Brambor et al., 2006).

2.8 Assessing Causality

When assessing the gendered effects of political institutions on political participation, a causality problem emerges. It is hypothesized, in this investigation, that political institutions are independent variables that affect the dependent variable of political participation. It is equally plausible, however, that countries where women and men participate in politics in more equal numbers will adopt particular electoral rules, will influence the ideologies present in the party system, or will affect levels of women's representation and the adoption of gender quotas. For instance, a higher level of political participation for women, and smaller gender gaps, may lead to more left-wing political parties competing in elections and being part of government since women tend to be more likely to vote for left parties than men. In other words, it is possible that gender differences in political participation influence the type of political institutions adopted or present rather than the reverse. Doubts about the causal direction of the relationships tested in this research cannot be eliminated entirely, but they can be minimized.

First, the next three chapters identify the specific mechanisms through which political

institutions should affect gender gaps in political participation. For instance, Chapter 5 on women's representation and gender quotas identifies two mechanisms through which the presence of women in the legislature should affect men's and women's levels of political participation differently. The symbolic mechanism stipulates that women in the legislature signal to female citizens that the political sphere is more open and the political process more legitimate, which should in turn spur female citizens' involvement in political activities that were traditionally male dominated. All hypotheses tested in the next chapters rest on mechanisms that logically link political institutions to gender differences in political participation. These mechanisms do not eliminate entirely the possibility of reverse causation; however, they provide a theoretical basis for why and how political institutions should influence gender differences in political participation.

Second, some of the political institutions included in this investigation have been in place long before the political behaviour observed today (Norris, 2004). For instance, in advanced industrial democracies, most components of the electoral system were adopted before women gained the right to vote and run for office. Changes in electoral institutions occur only rarely; therefore, it is more plausible that electoral institutions will influence gender differences in participation than the reverse since these institutions were in place first. Some of the political institutions tested in this analysis, however, tend to be more recent or are more likely to change over time. The ideologies present in the party system, for example, can vary over short periods of time. The party system will experience changes in ideologies as new political parties emerge or old ones modify their ideological orientations to increase their popularity. Furthermore, gender quotas are a more recent phenomenon; countries and political parties have only recently adopted measures to increase the presence of women in the legislature. Therefore, the time argument minimizing the causality problems in this analysis only applies to certain political institutions.

In sum, for some political institutions, the order of causality is reinforced by a long

history of minimal changes while for other political institutions included in this investigation, a reliance on mechanisms is used to minimize causality problems.

Chapter 3

The Electoral System

This chapter has one main goal – to test the extent to which the electoral system can explain cross-national differences in gender gaps in political participation. A review of gender differences in political participation in 20 countries demonstrates that for the six measures of political activities included in this investigation, gender gaps are not uniform across countries. Some countries are consistently associated with greater gaps on a variety of political actions while other countries experience smaller gender differences. This situation indicates the need for a cross-national analysis of gender gaps in political activities as well as the possibility that political institutions, which are not consistent across countries, may provide an additional explanation for gender differences.

This chapter evaluates the effects of the electoral system on gender differences in political participation to assess whether this political institution may contribute to understanding these cross-national differences in gender gaps. To do so, this chapter goes beyond traditional explanations of gender gaps in political activities to gain a better understanding of differences in a cross-national perspective. The electoral system through its rules and consequences can provide barriers and incentives that have a gendered effect on political participation. Two competing hypotheses on the gendered effects of the electoral system are tested. The psychological hypothesis stipulates that gender differences in political participation should be smaller with more proportional electoral institutions. The literature review below hypothesizes that more proportional electoral systems tend to have a greater positive influence of women's levels of psychological involvement in politics which in turn can be applied to political participation. On the other hand, the resource hypothesis specifies that gender gaps ought to be larger when the electoral system is complex since this type of system

requires political resources and levels of orientations toward politics that are more likely to be found in men than women. Results provide greater support for the second hypothesis than the first. Indeed, PR electoral systems are consistently associated with larger gender gaps across mulitiple political activities.

3.1 The Impact of the Electoral System on Gender Differences

Before testing the impact of the electoral system on gender differences in political participation, this section reviews the expectations concerning the electoral system and its influence on political participation and gender differences. Furthermore, I formulate hypotheses and determine which aspects of the electoral system may have a gendered impact on political participation.

3.1.1 The Psychological Hypothesis

Many studies show that the electoral system can influence political participation, and especially voter turnout (Verba et al., 1978; Powell, 1986; Jackman, 1987; Blais and Carty, 1990; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 2002; Norris, 2002, 2004). Some studies argue that the impact of the electoral system on turnout is psychological (Karp and Banducci, 2008a) – that is, the electoral system will first influence levels of political engagement which in turn affects levels of participation. Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems may lead to higher voter turnout when compared to majoritarian or plurality systems, since they reduce the distortion between votes won by a political party and the number of seats obtained in the legislature: that is, the level of disproportionality (Blais and Carty, 1990). In PR electoral systems, seats in the legislature are distributed according to the proportion of votes cast for each party (Norris, 2004). On the other hand, seats in plurality and majoritarian systems are allocate to the candidate with the most votes (pluarlity) or the candidate with over 50 per cent of vote (majoritarian) in territorial single-member

constituencies. Therefore, plurality and majoritarian electoral systems tend to privilege political parties that can earn large vote shares; smaller parties have more difficulty getting candidates elected without a geographical concentration of support. Blais and Carty (1990) state that "as a consequence, voters feel more efficacious or at least less alienated and are thus more inclined to vote" (p. 167) in PR electoral systems. Karp and Banducci (2008a) find that, indeed, citizens in countries with a PR electoral system have higher levels of political efficacy, which in turn leads to higher voter turnout in these countries.

The electoral system does not only have an impact on citizens' levels of political efficacy. Some studies have found that electoral disproportionality and the number of political parties influence levels of political knowledge (Gordon and Segure, 1997; Milner, 1997; Berggren, 2001). Gordon and Segure (1997) argue that PR electoral systems, when compared to plurality/majoritarian systems, are better at lowering the cost of getting politically informed. Huber et al. (2005) also find that the electoral system can influence levels of partisanship. A large number of political parties relieves cross pressures, making it easier for citizens to be partisans. Cross pressures occur when citizens are asked to support different parties by groups to which they belong such as a union and church. If the number of political parties is limited, it may be difficult for citizens to develop a party attachment since their membership in one group encourages partisanship for one party while their membership in another group may encourage partisanship for another party (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). A larger number of political parties may provide citizens with more options that satisfy the multiple exigencies of social groups, thereby relieving cross pressures.

The electoral system has also been shown to influence levels of political engagement differently across groups. Anderson and Guillory (1997) argue that the type of electoral system has an impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy of political minorities who are often supporters of parties that are not in government. Since PR electoral systems produce legislatures that are more reflective of citizens' interests by decreasing the distorsion between

votes won by a political party and the number of seats this party obtained, political minorities are more satisfied with the political process. Using a similar argument, Karp and Banducci (2008a) find that political minorities exhibit higher levels of political efficacy in PR electoral systems than plurality systems. PR electoral systems, by being associated with coalition governments, can include views and interests of the supporters of political parties that did not win the most votes in the decision-making process, which in turn leads to political minorities having higher levels of political efficacy.

Building on this literature, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010, 2012) argue that increased proportionality increases women's levels of political engagement in greater proportions than men's, thereby decreasing gender differences in political engagement. They argue that since women have long been marginalized from the political system after obtaining the right to vote and run for office, electoral systems designed to encompass multiple views and interests in the decision-making process will have a larger positive influence on women's levels of political engagement than men's. Women's involvement in the legislature and political parties remained below those of men's for multiple years after gaining political rights. Given that women share a common social group identity based on their shared history of marginalization (Mansbridge, 1999), women, as a group, will experience larger levels of engagement with politics in more proportional electoral systems. This occurs because more proportional electoral systems send a singal that the political system is open to multiple views and interests by having multiple political parties involved in the decision-making process. Results show that greater proportionality has a larger positive influence on women's levels of political interest, following politics in the news, and political knowledge (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012).

It is hypothesized in this investigation that a similar process to the one described by Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) is at play with political participation. If proportional electoral systems send signals to women that they ought to be engaged in politics, it is possi-

ble that these messages also directly influence levels of political participation. As mentioned previously, an important explanation for gender gaps in political participation is gender differences in political engagement (Burns et al., 2001). Under PR electoral systems, women possess additional psychological predispositions toward politics such as higher levels of political interest or political efficacy that can increase the desire to become involved in politics. Since women under PR electoral systems are more likely to be motivated to participate in politics, then it would be possible to observe smaller gender differences in political activities in PR systems when compared to plurality/majoritarian systems if this increased desire to participate in politics translates into a greater involvement for women. More proportional systems should also influence men's levels of political engagement and political participation; however, this impact should be weaker than the one on women since men are and have been in a position of privilege in the decision-making process. Women because of their traditional disadvantage in politics will have a stronger reaction to the signal sent by PR electoral systems. It is a bit of a conceptual leap to go from the electoral system to participation in political activities; the causal link between the electoral system and gender differences in political participation is indirect and relies on the influence of the electoral system on psychological engagement with politics. Yet, there is evidence that relates all factors together, making it possible that the electoral system is a contributing factor in understanding gender gaps in political participation.

H_1 - The psychological hypothesis: More proportional electoral systems should exhibit smaller gender differences in political participation.

Different rules and consequences of the electoral system can assess the proportionality of systems. The difference between the percentage of votes a political party obtained in an election and the percentage of seats the same party gained is referred to as the level of disproportionality. The presence of numerous political parties in the legislature can also be an indicator of a more proportional electoral system. When multiple parties compete for

seats, more views and interests may be represented in the political process. A large district magnitude is also an indicator of more proportional electoral systems since a large district magnitude allows for the election of multiple candidates from several political parties in each constituency. This situation may lead political parties to nominate candidates that represent different interests and/or voter segments in each constituency in order to increase their chances of taking multiple seats. This greater inclusiveness may send a signal to women that they are welcome in the political process, leading to greater levels of political participation and smaller gender gaps. Finally, coalition size or the number of political parties forming government can be an indicator of the proportionality of electoral systems. A larger coalition size may indicate that multiple views are incorporated in the decision-making process, which again may send a signal to women that their views and interests are welcome in politics, leading to higher levels of political participation and smaller gender gaps.

H_{1A}: A lower level of disproportionality should correspond to smaller gender gaps in political participation.

H_{1B}: A greater number of political parties competing in elections should correspond to smaller gender gaps in political participation.

H_{1C}: A greater district magnitude should correspond to smaller gender differences in political participation.

H_{1D}: A greater coalition size in governments should correspond to smaller gender differences in political participation.

Hypotheses related to the gendered influence of the electoral system are similar to the ones tested by Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012)[1]. This investigation distinguishes itself from theirs by including a larger number of indicators of political participation. This increased number of political acts allows this investigation to assess the gendered influence of the electoral system on more unconventional acts of political participation in addition to the

[1]Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) find that a low level of disproportionality is associated with smaller gender differences for three acts of political participation: political persuasion, campaign activity, and contacting politicians.

more conventional indicators used by Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012). Moreover, the number of countries in this investigation differs from that in their study. This analysis only includes advanced industrial democracies. As explained in Chapter 2, including a larger set of countries runs the risk of misidentifying the gendered effects of the electoral system. Also, this investigation includes a test of the gendered influence of coalition size that is not present in Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012). The coalition size is an important consequence of the electoral system that can have an influence on political behaviour. Finally, this investigation contributes to the literature on gender differences in political participation by assessing another possible influence of the electoral system: the resource hypothesis. The next section elaborates on this additional hypothesis.

3.1.2 The Resource Hypothesis

In addition to a psychological influence, the electoral system may have an impact on political participation through the political resources needed for citizen involvement. This hypothesis is based on Powell's (1986) argument that turnout will be higher under political systems that require fewer political resources to be able to vote. Powell (1986) argues that political institutions – especially voter registration laws – can explain the finding that education and socioeconomic resources are much more important for explaining voter turnout in the United States than in other democracies. American political institutions are such that voters need additional resources to vote to overcome complicated registration laws.

According to Powell (1986), voting, and possibly other acts of political participation, should be easier for citizens with low levels of political resources and engagement when the electoral rules are simpler. Plurality and majoritarian systems are electoral systems that tend to be simpler, often employing single-member districts and including fewer political parties (Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2004), both of which reduce the time, knowledge, and resources required for citizens to be able to participate. Perea (2002) shows that citizens with lower levels of political resources and psychological engagement with politics are affected differently

by the electoral system than citizens with high levels of resources and engagement. For instance, open list proportional electoral systems are associated with higher levels of voter turnout for citizens with significant resources. Citizens with high levels of political resources and political engagement have the necessary capacities to form preferences for individual candidates within the large lists provided by each political party in the election. Since these citizens have formed preferences for individual candidates, this increases their likelihood of voting. On the other hand, citizens with low levels of political resources and engagement may be burdened by the possibility of having to select individual candidates since forming preferences for multiple candidates may require more time and information. Individuals with low levels of resources and engagement may find voting easier when a closed party list is available and which requires a more simple choice between parties.

The electoral system may provide incentives for activities other than electoral participation. Whiteley et al. (2010) argue that the level of disproportionality produced by the electoral system may also impact party membership and activism. Some electoral systems may restrict the variety and effectiveness of political parties, which in turn may reduce incentives for citizens to become involved. For instance, single-member plurality electoral systems, by distorting the relationship between seats and votes, have fewer political parties than PR electoral systems; the difficulties in gathering a plurality of vote in mulitiple electoral districts to have representation in the legislature has as a consequence to limit the number of political parties in plurality electoral systems. PR electoral systems, by increasing the number of political parties, may increase party membership levels by providing greater variation in the types of parties that can be joined. Parties may need to distance themselves from others to attract votes and members, which may result in political parties providing more incentives to members. These increased opportunities and incentives may result in more party members in PR electoral systems when compared to plurality systems. Alternatively, it may be harder for citizens with low levels of political resources to benefit from

these incentives provided by the electoral system. It is possible that they would not have the civic skills or the time necessary to identify which party to support in a more complex party system. Moreover, the reduced number of political parties in plurality systems may stimulate alternative forms of political participation such as participation in a protest or boycotting (Whiteley et al., 2010). Since citizens have fewer party options, they may choose alternative forms of political participation if they feel that none of the political parties represents their views and opinions. Again, this process may influence citizens with low levels of political resources differently. To identify protest as an alternative form of political participation, citizens may need the necessary skills, knowledge and time to investigate groups who organize protest.

H_2 - The resource hypothesis: Plurality and majoritarian electoral systems should exhibit smaller gender gaps in political participation than more proportional systems.

H_{2A}: High levels of disproportionality should correspond to smaller gender gaps in political participation.

H_{2B}: Fewer political parties should correspond to smaller gender gaps in political participation.

H_{2C}: A low district magnitude should correspond to smaller gender differences in political participation.

H_{2D}: A small coalition size should correspond to smaller gender differences in political participation.

In this analysis, the impact of the electoral system on gender differences is tested for multiple political activities. First, campaign activity levels are measured by a question asking whether respondents have shown support for a party or a candidate in the last election. A similar process for party membership may be at play for participation in campaign activity since both acts involve political parties. A larger party system may increase options for campaigning, making it easier to find a political party that represents a citizen's views and

interests. Individuals may need significant amounts of free time and civic skills, however, before deciding for which party to campaign, making it more difficult for citizens with low resources.

Political persuasion is a different type of activity than campaigning or voting; persuasion requires citizens to convince someone to vote for a particular candidate or party. To do so, individuals need a formed preference: they need to know for whom they will vote before being able to convince others to make the same choice. A similar argument, therefore, to the previous ones made for party membership and campaign activity can be made for political persuasion. A larger party system with a greater choice of parties may make it easier for citizens to identify a preferred political party and, in turn, to convince others to support the same party or candidate. Again, convincing others to support a party or a candidate may be harder for citizens with low levels of political resources under a party system with a high number of parties. If this group of citizens does not have the necessary level of civic skills or time to decide who to vote for, it may be difficult for them to engage in political persuasion.

Contacting politicians is an act of political participation that requires civic skills and time. Citizens need to be able to clearly express their opinions and views either in writing or verbally. PR electoral systems are usually associated with a large district magnitude, meaning that citizens have more than one elected representative. Multi-member districts may provide a disincentive for citizens to contact politicians; single-member districts are usually associated with a strong relationship between constituents and representatives (Massicotte, 2005). In multi-member districts, elected representatives are less likely to emphasize constituency work since there is no direct link between voters and one specific representative; the multiple representatives makes it difficult to assign responsibility for problems or issues faced by constituents. Citizens under multi-member districts may not be inclined to contact politicians since there is less of a tradition of elected representatives responding to problems faced by citizens. On the other hand, a large district magnitude means that it is more likely

that citizens will have a representative with whom they identify politically, which may lead to greater tendency to contact politicians. The impact of the electoral system may differ for citizens with low levels of political resources. Citizens with greater resources may easily overcome the barriers provided by the multi-member districts to contact politicians.

Finally, the last indicator of political participation included in this investigation is working with others to express views about government actions. This indicator does not seem to involve political parties and/or politicians; therefore, this act should not be influenced by the electoral system. On the other hand, it is possible that the electoral system has an indirect effect on this activity. If working with others involves contacting politicians or political parties to express opinions on an issue, then the electoral system may impact the likelihood of participation. If citizens have difficulties accessing politicians and/or parties, then it is possible that citizens will not be inclined to work with others knowing that there is little possibility of being successful. Thus, an impact of the electoral system on this form of political participation may be observed if or when there are more political parties and elected representatives. Another possible influence of the electoral system on working with others may be through the motivation to participate in politics. PR electoral systems because they are more likely to foster a culture of direct participation will be associated with a higher level of involvement in this activity. These influences are only indirect and hypothetical at best; it is highly possible that the electoral system has no influence on willingness to work with others.

In this investigation, it is argued that the impact of the electoral system on the resources needed for political participation is gendered. Since women are more likely to hold lower levels of the political resources and political engagement that are necessary for political participation than men (Burns et al., 2001; Gidengil et al., 2004), it may be easier for women to participate in electoral systems that require fewer political resources and lower levels of engagement to participate. All citizens with low levels of resources should be able

to participate at a higher rate when the electoral system is simple; however, since women are more likely to be found in these groups with low levels of political resources than men, the positive influences on political participation should be stronger among them. Plurality electoral systems that are associated with fewer political parties and elected representatives may allow women to compensate for their lower levels of political resources and engagement by having incentives that make participation possible with reduced levels of resources or political engagement. It is hypothesized that since women are more likely than men to possess lower levels of political resources and political engagement, their levels of political participation should increase more so than men when the electoral system provides little barriers to participation. A smaller coalition size may also make it easier for women to identify who is responsible for political decisions since the number of political decision-makers is reduced. Knowing who to blame/reward will make participation easier for women since the levels of political knowledge, time, and skills required to participate in politics are not as high as it could be under a coalition government. Finally, electoral systems that are associated with a small number of political parties, a small district magnitude, and a small coalition size tend to have a high level of disproportionality. Thus, countries with a high level of disproportinality may be associated with small gender differences in political participation.

3.2 Gender Differences in Political Participation Across Countries

Before investigating if and how political institutions influence gender differences in political participation, it is important to determine whether these differences vary across countries. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 report uncontrolled levels of political participation for men and women for six different political activities across 20 countries[2]. Countries with larger gender differences in one act tend to also be associated with larger differences on other types

[2]There are two entries for Portugal since Module 2 of the CSES includes a survey for the 2002 and 2005 election.

of political activity. Furthermore, there is significant variation in the size of gender gaps across countries. Gender differences vary between less than 3 percentage points to over 10 percentage points across political activities and countries.

Next, I review gender differences across countries for each act of political participation. This overview demonstrates that indeed gender gaps are not similar across countries, providing evidence that explanations for gaps may be rooted in political institutions that vary cross-nationally. Moreover, the description of gender gaps across countries and political activities demonstrates that differences are not similar across acts. These observations reinforce the initial decision to investigate political activities separately. In Chapter 2, it was argued that different political actions require different levels of political resources and communicate different messages to political elites. Gender gaps in political activities vary in size by type of activity as demonstrated by the results in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, supporting this argument.

For most political activities, women tend to be less likely than men to participate in politics with the notable exception of voting and, to a lesser extent, protest. For voting, most countries do not have significant differences between men's and women's levels of turnout; there are significant gender differences in only five of 21 cases. For three countries (Belgium, New Zealand, and Switzerland), significant gender gaps are traditional: men are more likely to vote than women. Furthermore, for Belgium and New Zealand, gender differences are similar to the overall average while gender differences are significantly greater in Switzerland (12.0 percentage points). In Australia and Ireland, gender differences are reversed: women are significantly more likely to vote than men.

The measure for participating in protest shows a similar pattern of little difference between women and men. A cross-national analysis of gender differences finds that in only six of 21 cases, there are significant differences between men and women. In each of these six cases, women are less likely to have participated in a protest than men. As in voting, significant gender differences in participating in a protest vary in size. Countries are either

Table 3.1: Gender Differences in Political Participation Across Countries I

	Political Persuasion				Campaign Activity				Vote			
Country	Men	Women	Gap		Men	Women	Gap		Men	Women	Gap	
All	26.7	21.5	5.2	***	11.7	9.5	2.2	***	86.3	85.3	1.0	**
Autralia	33.9	31.0	2.9		17.0	14.8	2.2		97.1	98.8	-1.7	*
Canada	72.3	58.7	13.6	***	39.9	30.2	9.7	***	92.1	89.6	2.5	
France	32.0	26.2	5.8	*	9.8	4.2	5.6	***	78.2	80.4	-2.2	
Great Britain	24.7	12.5	12.2	***	13.8	12.7	1.1		69.3	71.2	-1.9	
USA	46.8	41.6	5.2		28.9	30.9	-2.0		74.6	78.0	-3.4	
Belgium	14.1	10.0	4.1	**	8.7	5.8	2.9	**	95.8	93.4	2.4	*
Finland	12.3	12.9	-0.6		11.7	11.2	0.5		79.1	82.2	-3.1	
Iceland	23.5	20.9	2.6		17.3	15.3	2.0		95.2	96.8	-1.6	
Ireland	15.6	10.8	4.8	***	9.8	6.7	3.1	***	81.4	83.8	-2.4	***
Israel	37.2	27.4	9.8	***	13.2	8.6	4.6	**	88.8	89.6	-0.8	
Italy	12.1	6.2	5.9	***	11.1	5.7	5.4	***	83.3	79.3	4.0	
Netherlands	13.9	10.9	3.0		8.3	5.8	2.5		96.8	96.9	-0.1	
Norway	20.7	14.2	6.5	***	8.1	5.0	3.1	**	82.0	83.5	-1.5	
Portugal 2002	10.2	9.1	1.1		7.1	7.4	-0.3		78.3	74.7	3.6	
Portugal 2005	12.5	8.6	3.9	***					82.8	80.2	2.6	
Spain	9.3	6.3	3.0		6.7	4.7	2.0		88.1	90.3	-2.2	
Sweden	12.5	13.3	-0.8		2.9	3.3	-0.4		88.3	88.5	-0.2	
Switzerland	19.2	11.5	7.7	***	8.6	4.0	4.6	***	74.7	62.7	12.0	***
Germany	33.8	22.1	11.7	***	8.3	4.8	3.5	***	95.3	94.4	0.9	
Japan	13.5	11.0	2.5		4.6	4.1	0.5		81.4	80.5	0.9	
New Zealand	93.2	91.0	2.2		5.8	5.7	0.1		89.1	84.9	4.2	*

Source: CSES.
Note: Cell entries are percentages. Gap is calculated by substracting women's level of participation from men's.
* chi-square significant at the p<0.05 level; ** p<0.01 level; *** p<0.001 level.

Table 3.2: Gender Differences in Political Participation Across Countries II

	Contact Politicians				Protest				Work with Others			
Country	Men	Women	Gap		Men	Women	Gap		Men	Women	Gap	
All	16.9	13.3	3.6	***	11.6	10.2	1.4	***	20.7	17.0	3.7	***
Australia	29.8	28.9	0.9		12.9	14.7	-1.8		21.3	24.0	-2.7	
Canada	38.9	33.9	5.0	*	13.1	15.3	-2.2		36.7	29.8	6.9	**
France	16.9	7.7	9.2	***	28.8	22.0	6.8	*	24.6	15.6	9.0	***
Great Britain	19.7	18.5	1.2		8.0	6.1	1.9		13.7	13.4	0.3	
USA	29.7	27.0	2.7		4.9	6.5	-1.6		33.5	36.1	-2.6	
Belgium	9.8	7.9	1.9		11.5	8.6	2.9	*	18.6	11.5	7.1	***
Finland	17.4	11.8	5.6	**	6.3	5.7	0.6		19.0	17.1	1.9	
Iceland	26.6	16.3	10.3	***	12.0	13.2	-1.2		23.8	20.3	3.5	
Ireland	21.9	21.1	0.8	***	8.2	7.0	1.2	***	19.2	15.9	3.3	***
Israel	12.4	9.3	3.1		16.1	11.2	4.9	*	17.0	11.9	5.1	*
Italy	6.3	2.7	3.6	***	8.9	4.6	4.3	***	5.8	2.4	3.4	**
Netherlands	17.5	10.3	7.2	***	10.4	8.9	1.5		6.4	7.6	-1.2	
Norway	15.5	12.9	2.6		10.4	12.5	-2.1		38.6	33.3	5.3	*
Portugal 2002	7.3	4.9	2.4		6.4	3.4	3.0	*	11.3	7.1	4.2	**
Portugal 2005	7.2	5.1	2.1	*	8.3	6.5	1.8		14.7	10.1	4.6	***
Spain	4.8	3.6	1.2		30.2	25.6	4.6		16.8	12.0	4.8	*
Sweden	13.7	13.3	0.4		9.7	12.1	-2.4		14.5	15.0	-0.5	
Switzerland	15.0	9.7	5.3	**	15.0	14.7	0.3		31.8	18.3	13.5	***
Germany	15.5	9.7	5.8	***	13.5	11.0	2.5		29.3	22.3	7.0	***
Japan	5.9	2.6	3.3	***	1.7	0.9	0.8		4.3	2.9	1.4	
New Zealand	20.8	22.5	-1.7		7.3	8.5	-1.2		17.6	24.3	-6.7	***

Source: CSES.
Cell entries are percentages.
* chi-square significant at the p<0.05 level; ** p<0.01 level; *** p<0.001 level.

similar to the the pooled average, such as a 1.2 percentage points gap in Ireland, or have a gap greater than the average, such as a difference of 6.8 percentage points in France.

For the four remaining measures of political participation, more consistent gender differences and ones more similar to previous findings in the literature can be observed (Burns et al., 2001; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Gidengil et al., 2004; Karp and Banducci, 2008b), with women less likely than men to participate. In other words, for activities such as trying to persuade others to vote for a party or a candidate, being involved in campaign activity, contacting politicians or working with others to express views about government actions, women are less likely than men to participate in politics. Moreover, the size of these gender differences tends to vary across countries. For instance, among countries that have significant gender differences in political persuasion (12 of 21 cases), the size of gender differences is much larger in Canada than in other countries. Indeed, Canada has the largest significant gap (13.6 percentage points) found in any countries across all activities. Other gender differences that are larger can be found in Great Britain (12.2 percentage points), Israel (9.8 percentage points), and Germany (11.7 percentage points). As for voting and protest, significant gender differences vary greatly.

Similar patterns also emerge for gender differences in campaign activity. For ten of 21 cases, there are significant differences in men's and women's levels of campaign activity. Moreover, countries with significant gender differences in campaign activity are mostly the same countries that have significant gaps in political persuasion, meaning that gender differences tend to be consistent across these acts (with the exception of Great Britain and Portugal). For all countries with significant gender differences, men are more likely than women to be involved in campaign activity. Again, the largest gender difference in political participation occurs in Canada (a 9.7 percentage points gap). France (5.7 percentage points), Italy (5.4 percentage points), and Switzerland (4.6 percentage points) are also countries that have large gender differences. In all countries with significant gender differences, most of

the gaps between women and men are similarly sized (around 3 percentage points) with the exception of Canada.

The results for country differences in contacting politicians are also similar to findings for campaign activity and political persuasion. Significant gender differences exist in 12 of 21 cases. In all of these 12 cases, women are less likely than men to contact politicians. Furthermore, as for the other measures of political participation, the size of gender differences varies across countries. For contacting politicians, as for the other acts of participation, Canada has a significant gender difference (5 percentage points), but it is not the largest gap. Iceland and France are the countries with the largest gender differences (10.3 percentage points gap in Iceland and 9.2 percentage points gap in France). Other countries with above average gender differences are the Netherlands (7.2 percentage points), Switzerland (5.3 percentage points) and Germany (5.8 percentage points). The smallest significant gender differences occur in Portugal (2.1 percentage points gap), Ireland (0.8 percentage point) and Japan (3.3 percentage points). Countries such as Great Britain, Israel and the United States do not have significant gender differences. For Great Britain and the United States, there are no significant gender differences in all acts of political participation, with the exception of a significant gender gap in political persuasion in Great Britain.

Finally, the last indicator of political participation is whether respondents have worked with others to express views. In 13 of 21 cases, there are significant gender differences, and in all these cases, with the exception of New Zealand, men are more likely to be involved with others than women. The largest gender differences occur in Switzerland and France (13.5 percentage points gap in Switzerland and a 9.0 percentage points gap in France). Other large differences are found in Canada (6.9 percentage points), Belgium (7.1 percentage points), and Germany (7.0 percentage points). Again, gender differences vary in existence and in size across countries.

In sum, a detailed analysis of gender differences in political participation shows that gaps

vary across countries. Some countries are consistently associated with larger gender differences such as Canada, while for other countries such as Spain and Finland, the existence of gender differences depends on the political act. Additionally, for most significant gender gaps observed, women are less likely than men to engage in political activities. The main difference in terms of gender gaps beside size is between countries where there are no significant gender gaps in political participation and countries where women are less likely than men to be involved in politics. These differences in the existence and the size of gender differences raise the possibility that political institutions such as the electoral system influence differently men's and womens levels of political participation.

The lack of similar patterns in gender differences across countries with the same electoral system does not necessarily mean that this political institution has no impact on gender differences in political participation. It is possible that what influences gender differences across countries are more specific aspects of the electoral system such as the level of disproportionality or district magnitude. In the next sections, tests for the impact of aspects of the electoral system on gender differences in political participation are conducted.

3.3 Individual-Level Variables and Gender Differences in Political Participation

Models including only individual-level political resources and political engagement are not sufficient for explaining gaps in political activities. Model 1 in Table 3.3 to Table 3.10 includes a dummy variable where men are coded '0' and women are '1'; this variable is labelled 'Women'. Each table includes a logistic coefficient for this 'Women' variable that assesses the difference between women's and men's levels of participation in each political activity. The size of this logistic coefficient indicates the difference in logged odds between men's and women's likelihood of involvement in the political act. A positive logistic coefficient indicates that women are more likely than men to be involved in political activities while a negative

coefficient indicates that men are more engaged than women. A test of significance provides information on whether this difference in logged odds can also be found in the population. For this investigation, the $p<0.05$ level – or the 95 per cent confidence level – is used to conclude whether differences between men and women are significant.

Results show that, except for voting, women are significantly less likely than men to be involved in politics after controlling for individual-level determinants. These results for voting are expected since gender differences tend to be small and inconsistent across countries, and much of the literature reveals that there are no significant gender differences in voter turnout (Gidengil et al., 2004).

Moreover, results showing significant gender differences on the five other measures of political participation differ from previous findings in the literature; Burns et al. (2001) and Verba et al. (1997) find that gender differences in political participation tend to disappear once gender differences in resources and political engagement are taken into account. These studies, however, only investigate gender differences in a single country, leaving open the possibility that their explanations have difficulty travelling beyond that country. The results herein tend to be similar to those of Karp and Banducci (2008b) who find that significant gender differences persist when individual-level variables are included as controls in 24 of 35 countries.

3.4 The Gendered Influence of the Electoral System

Before discussing the results concerning the two main hypotheses tested in this chapter, a brief review of the relationships between the control variables and political participation is needed. As Chapter 1 stipulates, there is a wide variety of factors that can influence political participation; these variables have been included in the following statistical analyses to ensure that their impact on political activity is controlled for.

Table 3.3 through Table 3.10 show that for all acts of political participation, the level of

education is significantly and positively associated with a higher likelihood of involvement. The influence of employment status on political activities, on the other hand, depends on the type of political act. There is a significant positive relationship between being employed full-time and turning out to vote, contacting politicians, and working with others. High levels of political efficacy and partisanship are consistently associated with a greater likelihood of involvement in all acts of political participation. Being married is linked with a greater likelihood of turnout and contacting politicians, but has a negative relationship with protest and political persuasion. Older citizens are more likely to turnout, participate in campaign activity and contact politicians than younger citizens while the latter are more likely to engage in protest and political persuasion than the former. Higher levels of women workforce participation are negatively associated with turnout and protest and positively associated with political persuasion, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and working with others. Finally, citizens in parliamentary systems are more likely to protest, engage in political persuasion and contact politicians than citizens in other systems.

In sum, all control variables included in the statistical analyses are associated with political participation in expected ways[3] with the notable exception of the dummy variable assessing whether citizens live in a parliamentary regime. It was expected that higher levels of involvement in political acts should be found in presidential regimes, not parliamentary ones.

The next sections analyze if and how the electoral system relates to gender differences in political participation. To do so, each act of political participation is investigated separately. Interaction terms between each indicator of the electoral system and gender are used to assess whether this political institution has an effect on participation that differs between women and men. Since the level of disproportionality and district magnitude are highly correlated, they cannot be included in the same regression. To remedy this problem, separate statistical

[3]The theoretical expectations about the relationships between the control variables and political activities are found in Chapter 1.

analyses are performed. Models 2 through 5 contain a different interaction term between gender and one indicator of the electoral system, in addition to controls for individual level effects. Multi-level logistic regressions are conducted to test for the various hypotheses elaborated above[4]. Also discussed is whether gender gaps in political participation change in size and significance across electoral systems. Findings consistently reveal that PR electoral systems are associated with the largest gender gaps for multiple political activities.

3.4.1 Voter Turnout

Table 3.3 shows the four different models testing for the psychological and resource hypotheses on gender differences in voter turnout. Model 1 in this table indicates that there are no significant gender differences in voter turnout after individual-level factors have been applied. As Models 2 to 5 show, the inclusion of the indicators of the electoral system and interaction terms can change the significance of the 'Women' logistic coefficient. In Models 3 and 5, gender differences are significant at the $p<0.05$ level with women being more likely than men to turnout. The proper interpretation for the 'Women' logistic coefficent in Model 2 through 5 is the size of gender difference when the indicators of the electoral system are set at zero. Thus, in Model 3, the 'Women' logistice coefficient indicates that when the effective number of parties is equal to zero[5], women are more likely to turnout than men. Similarly, Model 5 shows that when district magnitude is zero, women are significantly more likely to turnout than men. Models 3 and 4 indicate that women and men have the same probability of turning out when the level of disproportionality is equal to zero and when coalition size is zero. Because of the inclusion of the interaction terms between 'Women' and the indicators of the electoral system in the multi-level regression analyses, the logistic coefficient for 'Women' is not the average difference between men and women in their likelihood of turnout (Brambor

[4]Chapter 2 elaborates on the construction of each indicator of the electoral system as well as the statistical technique used.

[5]All indicators of the electoral system have been recoded to range from 0 to 1. Thus, in this situation zero means the minimum value of the effective number of parties.

et al., 2006); it is the gender gap when the interaction term has the value of zero. As the indicators of the electoral system take on different values, it is possible for gender differences to vary in size and become signficance. Subsequent analyses investigate this possibility.

Table 3.3: The Influence of the Electoral System on Voter Turnout

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	0.02		-0.06		0.17	**	0.07		0.10	*
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Education	1.36	***	1.43	***	1.43	***	1.42	***	1.45	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Employed	0.16	***	0.18	***	0.17	***	0.19	***	0.19	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	1.00	***	0.98	***	0.99	***	0.98	***	0.99	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Partisanship	1.06	***	1.08	***	1.07	***	1.07	***	1.10	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Married	0.38	***	0.37	***	0.38	***	0.37	***	0.38	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	2.48	***	2.51	***	2.48	***	2.52	***	2.49	***
	(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
Women Workforce			-0.26	***	-0.09		-0.26	**	-0.94	***
			(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Parliamentary			-0.30	***	0.09	†	-0.30	***	-0.04	
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Disproportionality			-0.83	***	-0.12		-0.64	***		
			(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.08)			
ENPP			0.62	***	1.86	***	0.62	***	1.61	***
			(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.13)		(0.15)	
District Magnitude									-0.06	*
									(0.02)	
Coalition Size			-0.73	*	-0.95	***	-0.62	***	-1.38	***
			(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.14)		(0.11)	
Women X Disproportionality			0.36	**						
			(0.13)							
Women X ENPP					-0.58	***				
					(0.17)					
Women X Coalition							-0.20			
							(0.16)			
Women X District									-0.05	*
									(0.02)	
Constant	-0.87	***	-0.41	***	-1.02	***	-0.48	***	-0.59	***
	(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.09)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.22		0.46		0.25		0.46		0.23	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.03)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	30485		30485		30485		30485		30485	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

Continued on next page

Table 3.3 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Three of four interaction terms assessing the gendered influence of the electoral system in Table 3.3 are significant at the p<0.05 level of significance: the effective number of parties, district magnitude, and level of disproportionality. First, the positive significant interaction for the level of disproportionality by gender means that as disproportionality increases men's likelihood of turning out increasingly lags behind women's. Since plurality electoral systems are generally associated with higher levels of disproportionality, this result does not confirm the psychological hypothesis stipulating that gender differences ought to be smaller under PR electoral system with women's levels of participation being closest to men's. Findings show that women are as likely or more likely to turnout to vote than men when the level of disproportionality is high, that is, in plurality electoral systems. More proportional electoral systems do not send incentives that facilite the participation of women more so than men for the act of voting, as was hypothesized.

Indeed, the findings in Table 3.3 provide some evidence confirming the resource hypothesis (H_{2A}) that gender differences are smaller or reversed when the level of disproportionality is high. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.4 indicate that the level of disproportionality does significantly impact women's and men's likelihood of voting. For both men and women, high levels of disproportionality are significantly associated with lower likelihood of voter turnout. This finding is to be expected since the literature on the topic of the electoral system and voter turnout stipulates that more proportional electoral systems are associated with higher voter turnout. When voters' electoral preferences closely reflect seat shares, citizens are more inclined to vote. Importantly, however, this relationship is gendered. The relationship between the level of disproportionality and turnout is weaker for women than it is for men. As shown in Table 3.4, women's turnout levels do not drop as

quickly as men's with increasing levels of disproportionality, leading to smaller gender gaps and eventually reversed gaps where women are more likely to turnout.

Table 3.4: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of the Electoral System I

	Vote				Protest				Political Persuasion			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Disproportionality	-0.83	***	-0.47	***	1.24	***	1.15	***	-0.22	*	-0.31	***
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
ENPP	1.86	***	1.27	***	-0.16		-0.41	**	-2.11	***	-2.19	***
	(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.12)		(0.13)	
Coalition Size	-0.62	***	-0.82	***	0.34	*	-0.20		0.67	***	0.59	***
	(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.10)		(0.11)	
District Magnitude	-0.06	*	-0.11	***	0.03		-0.03		-0.62	***	-0.60	***
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

To shed further light on how gender gaps in voter turnout are affected by the level of disproportionality, the marginal effect of gender for each level of disproportionality is calculated and plotted (see Figure 3.1). When the level of disproportionality is below 10, gender differences are not significant at the $p<0.05$ level since the confidence interval for the marginal effect of gender includes zero. When the level of disproportionality is greater than 10, gender gaps are positive with women being significantly more likely than men to turnout and get increasingly larger. Among the countries included in this investigation, two have a level of disproportionality that is above 10 (France and Great Britain) and both have a plurality electoral system. These results support the resource hypothesis. It may be easier for women to participate in politics in plurality electoral systems since the vote decision may require fewer political resources. Higher levels of disproportionality are usually associated with fewer political parties running in elections and fewer elected representatives per constituency.

These results for the relationship between the level of disproportionality and voter turnout are one of the rare occasions where a barrier to political participation imposed by a type of electoral system affects men more so than women. As argued before, barriers to political participation require certain political resources and orientations with politics to be able to overcome them. As the level of disproportionality increases, citizens are less motivated to turnout; however, the drop in women's levels of turnout is not as sharp was men's because they possess resources that allow women to turnout despite the barriers imposed by plurality and majoritarian electoral systems. A possible explanation for these results may be found in Harell's (2009) work. Harell (2009) argues that women's social networks are 'richer' than men's in various forms of social capital which allows women to turnout at similar levels as men despite women's lower level of political resources. Thus, women's social networks may allow them to compensate for their lower levels of political resources to overcome the barriers associated with a greater level of disproportionality. Plurality electoral systems

may be associated with positive gender gaps in turnout since they require resources for involvement that are more likely to be held by women than men.

The second significant interaction term in Table 3.3 is between gender and district magnitude. This interaction term is negative, meaning that as district magnitude increases, women's likelihood of turning out to vote lags increasingly further than men's. This result does not confirm the psychological hypothesis (H_{1C}), stipulating that PR electoral systems, which are associated with larger district magnitudes, should be associated with smaller gender gaps in political participation since women's participation should be boosted more so than men's in PR systems. Results are more in line with the resource hypothesis (H_{2C}); women's levels of political participation are closest to men's in plurality electoral systems. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.4 show that for both women and men, district magnitude is negatively and significantly associated with voter turnout; the effect of district magnitude varies, however, for women and men. The negative relationship between district magnitude and voter turnout is stronger for women than for men.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the marginal effect of gender on voter turnout for every level of district magnitude (logged)[6]. This figure indicates that despite district magnitude having a different influence on women's and men's likelihood of turning out to vote, gender gaps for this political activity remain insignificant at every level. In other words, for each possible logged district magnitude, the confidence interval includes zero, meaning that gender differences in voter turnout are not different from zero. Although district magnitude is not associated with cross-national differences in gender gaps in voter turnout, there is a gendered effect of district magnitude on the likelihood of turning out. The gendered effect is on the relationship between district magnitude and voter turnout, not on gender gaps. Although gender gaps are not affected, the different influence that district magnitude has on men's and women's turnout supports the resource hypothesis; PR electoral systems are not linked

[6]District magnitude is logged to correct for the skewness associated with this indicator. See Chapter 2 for more information.

with a larger positive influence on women than men.

This result is the first indicating a pattern in the gendered effects of PR electoral systems. As results below will demonstrate, PR electoral systems tend to put women at a disadvantage when compared to men. Results are consistent for multiple acts of political participation. The findings for the gendered influence of district magnitude show that a large district magnitude, which is a feature of PR systems, is associated with lower turnout for both women and men; however, the effect is stronger for women. When PR electoral systems provide barriers to political participation, these barriers tend to disadvantage the participation of women. On the other hand, as results show below, when PR systems provide incentives to political participation, these incentives have a stronger effect on men than on women. It seems that different types of electoral systems require different types of politial resources and orientations to politics; PR electoral systems are more likely to require resources that are more likely possessed by men than women, leading this type of electoral system to be associated with women's levels of political participation falling being men's.

A possible explanation for this stronger negative influence of district magnitude on women's likelihood of turning out may be that men are in a better position to overcome the barriers provided by PR electoral systems. A larger district magnitude means that citizens have to elect multiple representative which may require that citizens possess more information and interest about politics before turning out to vote. Men are more likely than women to have higher levels of political knowledge and interest; thus, they may be more likely to know and care about the rules surrounding the casting their vote under PR electoral systems. By requiring higher levels of political interest and knowledge, the elements of psychological involvement with politics that are more likely to be held by men, PR electoral systems favour the political participation of men more so than women.

The third significant interaction term in Table 3.3 is between the effective number of political parties (ENPP) and gender. This interaction is negative indicating that as the



Figure 3.1: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Voter Turnout by Level of Disproportionality



Figure 3.2: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Voter Turnout by District Magnitude

number of parties increases, women's likelihood of turning out to vote increasingly lags behing men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.4 show that the ENPP has a significant and positive relationship with the likelihood of turnout for women and men; however, this relationship is stronger for men. As previously stated, the results for the act of voting demonstrate that PR electoral systems, which are more likely to be associated with a high number of parties, tend to put women at a disadvantage when compared to men's levels of political participation.

Since the interaction term between gender and the number of political parties is significant and the ENPP has a significant relationship with turnout for both women and men, it is possible to graph the size and significance of gender differences in voter turnout for every possible ENPP. Figure 3.3 shows the results. Findings in this figure indicate that when the number of political parties is below 3, gender differences are significant with women being more likely to turnout than men. Additionally, as the ENPP increases gender differences decrease until they reverse with men being more likely to turnout than women. Indeed, when the ENPP is superior to five, women's likelihood of voting significantly lags behind men's. These results occur since the ENPP has a stronger positive influence on men's likelihood than on women's, supporting a pattern where the incentives to political participation provided by PR electoral systems tend to favour men's involvement over women's.

As Brambor et al. (2006) suggested, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors are calculated for the all indicators of the electoral system even those that have no significant interaction term with gender for the act of vote turnout. These marginal errors and conditional standard errors allow us to assess whether the indicators of the electoral system have a significant relationship with turnout at the $p<0.05$ level. The initial regression analyses in Table 3.3 only indicate whether the relationship is significant for men. The marginal effects in Table 3.4 reveal that for both women and men, coalition size has a negative and significant relationship with the probability of turning out to vote.

These results, combined with those in Table 3.3, indicate that despite the significant relationship between coalition size and turnout, there is no gendered effect of this indicator. This lack of gendered effect from one indicator of the electoral system may be explained by the political resources and orientations toward the political system possesed by women and men. As explained above women have a social network that differs from men's (Harell, 2009), which may allow them to overcome some barriers imposed by plurality electoral systems such as a high level of disproportionality to participate at similar or greater levels than men. Yet, the number of parties puts women at a disadvantage when compared to men; their level of turnout does not increase at a similare rate as men as the ENPP increases. Women's social networks may not be the required condition to allow them to benefit from the incentives created by coalition size. To be aware of all the implications of electoral rules, different types of political resources may be required; resources and orientations that may be more likely to be held by men such as political knowledge and political interest.

3.4.2 Protest

Table 3.5 presents the findings for the gendered effects of the electoral system on the act of participating in a protest. Model 1 of this table indicates that when individual-level factors are included, there is still a significant difference between men's and women's likelihood of participating in protest. Models 2 through 5 show that gender differences are no longer significant when the indicators of the electoral system are included in the statistical analyses and take on the value of zero. When district magnitude, the level of disproportionality, the number of political parties, and coalition size are set to zero, there are no significant gaps between men's and women's likelihood of participating in protest. Further statistical analyses described below will indicate whether the significance of gender differences in protest changes as the indicators of the electoral system take on values that are not equal to zero.

Two interaction terms assessing whether the electoral system influences men's and women's likelihood of participating in protest differently reach the $p<0.05$ level of significance. The

first significant interaction term is between gender and district magnitude. This term is negative, indicating that as district magnitude increases, women's probability of engaging in protest is increasingly further apart from men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.4 demonstrate that for both women and men, district magnitude is not significantly associated with the probability of engaging in protest. Despite the significant interaction term indicating that the difference between women's and men's relationship between district magnitude and the likelihood of involvement in protest is not equal to zero, it is not possible to conclude that district magnitude is associated with a gendered effect. For the electoral system to have a gendered effect, the indicator needs to be a significant factor in understanding political participation, which is not the case for district magnitude.

Table 3.5: The Influence of the Electoral System on Protest

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.10	**	-0.10	†	-0.04		0.01		-0.01	
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Education	1.67	***	1.67	***	1.67	***	1.65	***	1.71	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Employed	-0.03		-0.05		-0.05		-0.05		-0.09	*
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	0.49	***	0.50	***	0.45	***	0.47	***	0.46	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Partisanship	0.53	***	0.56	***	0.55	***	0.55	***	0.54	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	-0.20	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.18	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	-1.43	***	-1.50	***	-1.48	***	-1.49	***	-1.47	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)	
Women Workforce			-0.05		-0.44	***	0.36	***	-1.07	***
			(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Parliamentary			-0.07		0.19	***	0.10	*	0.26	***
			(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Disproportionality			1.24	***	0.61	***	1.28	***		
			(0.11)		(0.09)		(0.09)			
ENPP			0.09		-0.16		0.05		-0.77	***
			(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.13)		(0.13)	
District Magnitude									0.03	
									(0.02)	
Coalition Size			-0.11		0.07		0.34	*	-0.10	
			(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.14)		(0.13)	
Women X			-0.09							

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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Disproportionality			(0.13)							
Women X ENPP					-0.25					
					(0.16)					
Women X Coalition							-0.53	***		
							(0.15)			
Women X District									-0.07	**
									(0.02)	
Constant	-3.13	***	-3.31	***	-3.04	***	-3.36	***	-2.36	***
	(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.10)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.22		0.26		0.17		0.25		0.21	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	30440		30440		30440		30440		30440	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

The second significant interaction term in Table 3.5 is between gender and coalition size. Again, this interaction is negative, meaning that as coalition size increases, women increasingly lag behind men's probability of engaging in protest. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.4 indicate that coalition size has a significant and positive relationship with men's probability of engaging in protest, while there is no significant relationship between coalition size and protest for women. Again PR electoral systems, that are usually associated with coalition governments, provide incentives to political participation that women and men do not equally take advantage of. Men because of their different levels of political resources and orientations toward the political system are in a better positive to benefit from the incentives available to participate.

Figure 3.4 illustrates how the marginal effect of gender changes as coalition size increases for protest. It is clear that when coalition size is 2.5 or less, gender differences in participating in protest are not significant. When coalition size is above 2.5, however, gender gaps are significant at the p<0.05 level with men being more likely than women to engage in protest. The negative slope of the figure indicates that gender gaps increase as coalition size increases, providing support for the resource hypothesis (H_2); gender gaps are larger under PR electoral

systems which are associated with coalition governments. Seven countries that are part of this study have a coalition size that is larger than two and all these countries have a PR electoral system.

Finally, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors are calculated for the indicators of the electoral system that did not result in a significant interaction term with gender for protest. These results assess whether the level of disproportionality and the number of parties have a significant relationship at the $p<0.05$ level with participation in protest. Results in Table 3.4 indicate that the level of disproportionality has a similar significant and positive effect on women's and men's likelihood of engaging in protest. The level of disproportionality may be associated with greater involvement in protest since this activity may be an alternative to involvement in political parties (Whiteley et al., 2010). When the number of political parties is limited such as in electoral systems with a higher level of disporportionality, citizens may have fewer options to voice their preferences in parties, leading them to look for alternatives.

Despite the significant relationship between the level of disproportionality and involvement in protest, there is no gendered effect; men's and women's involvement in protest is affected equally by the level of disproportionality. A large disproportionality between the votes and seats won by each political party may be more easily observed by citizens since it is reflected in electoral results. Women, even though they have lower levels of engagement with politics and political resources, may be as likely as men to observe the disproportionality of the electoral system, leading to a similar influence of this indicator on protest.

Additionally, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.4 seem to indicate a gendered effect of the number of political parties. Indeed, the ENPP has a significant and negative relationship with the likelihood of involvement in protest for women while having an insignificant relationship for men. Since the interaction between the number of parties and gender is not significant in Table 3.5, it is not possible to conclude that the



Figure 3.3: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Voter Turnout by the Effective Number of Political Parties



Figure 3.4: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Protest by Coalition Size

ENPP has a gendered effect on protest. The difference between women's and men's logistic coefficient in Table 3.4 is large enough to make one coefficient significant at the p<0.05, but not large enough to indicate that the ENPP influences women and men differently.

3.4.3 Political Persuasion

Table 3.6 provides the findings for the four interaction terms testing the gendered effects of the electoral system on political persuasion. Model 1 in this table demonstrates that gender differences are significant at the p<0.05 level when individual-level factors are controlled. Models 2 through 5 indicate that gender differences and their statistical significance are little affected by the inclusion of the indicators of the electoral system and interaction terms; men are still significantly more likely than women to engage in political persuasion when controls for the electoral system are included. As explained above, these significant gender gaps only occur when the indicators of the electoral system equal zero. Yet, this result does not necessary mean that the electoral system does not influence men and women differently; men's and women's likelihood of involvement in political persuasion may be affected differently by the electoral system and gender gaps may change in size and significance as the indicators of the electoral system take on values that are different from zero. The following paragraphs investigate these possibilities.

Table 3.6: The Influence of the Electoral System on Political Persuasion

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.37	***	-0.34	***	-0.34	***	-0.35	***	-0.39	***
	(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Education	0.76	***	0.70	***	0.73	***	0.69	***	0.72	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Employed	-0.06	†	0.01		-0.02		-0.02		-0.01	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Political Efficacy	0.71	***	0.77	***	0.78	***	0.78	***	0.81	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Partisanship	1.15	***	1.12	***	1.17	***	1.12	***	1.14	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Married	-0.08	*	-0.08	*	-0.07	*	-0.08	*	-0.07	*
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	

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Table 3.6 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Age	-0.53	***	-0.49	***	-0.56	***	-0.53	***	-0.54	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Women Workforce			1.67	***	1.10	***	1.46	***	2.12	***
			(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)	
Parliamentary			0.29	***	-0.17	***	0.34	***	0.33	***
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Disproportionality			-0.22	*	2.42	***	0.49	***		
			(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.07)			
ENPP			-1.11	***	-2.11	***	-1.30	***	1.29	***
			(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.12)	
District Magnitude									-0.62	***
									(0.02)	
Coalition Size			0.56	***	1.12	***	0.67	***	2.04	***
			(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.09)	
Women X Disproportionality			-0.09							
			(0.11)							
Women X ENPP					-0.08					
					(0.13)					
Women X Coalition							-0.07			
							(0.12)			
Women X District									0.02	
									(0.02)	
Constant	-1.28	***	-2.37	***	-1.60	***	-1.32	***	-2.68	***
	(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.08)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.63		0.54		0.58		0.47		0.29	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	30759		30759		30759		30759		30759	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.6 indicates that no interaction term assessing whether men's and women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion is affected differently by the electoral system reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance. Marginal effects and conditional standard errors are nonetheless calculated for the four indicators of the electoral system. Results in Table 3.4 show that there is no gendered effect of the level of disproportionality, district magnitude, coalition size, and number of political parties on political participation. All these indicators have a similar influence on men's and women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion. The lack of any gendered effect of the electoral system on political persuasion may indicate that

the indicators do not influence the political resources and orientations toward the political system required to engage in this political activity. Political persuasion is a public activity that requires from citizens that they engage in political discussion with their friends and family members. It is possible that to be involved in this political activity, citizens only need a formed preferences toward a party and/or a candidate, meaning that citizens that possess such preferences will engage in persuasion no matter the type of electoral system.

3.4.4 Campaign Activity

Table 3.7 presents the findings assessing the gendered impact of the electoral system on campaign activity. Model 1 of this table indicates that gender gaps for this political activity are significant at the $p<0.05$ level when only individual-level controls are included. The addition of the controls for the electoral system has no influence on gender gaps and their significance; in Models 2 to 5, gender differences are significant with men being more likely to engage in campaign activity than women. It is still possible that the indicators of the electoral system would influence gender differences in this political activity. The following analyses investigate this possibility.

Table 3.7: The Influence of the Electoral System on Campaign Activity

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.26	***	-0.15	*	-0.16	**	-0.16	**	-0.22	***
	(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Education	0.73	***	0.73	***	0.76	***	0.74	***	0.77	***
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Employed	0.03		0.01		0.01		0.02		0.01	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	0.91	***	0.89	***	0.88	***	0.90	***	0.88	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Partisanship	1.48	***	1.49	***	1.49	***	1.51	***	1.51	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	0.03		0.03		0.04		0.05		0.05	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	0.50	***	0.48	***	0.46	***	0.45	***	0.44	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)	
Women Workforce			1.31	***	0.64	***	1.00	***	0.80	***
			(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	

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Table 3.7 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Parliamentary			-0.37	***	-0.49***		-0.43	***	-0.56	***
			(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Disproportionality			0.89	***	1.81	***	0.84	***		
			(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.11)			
ENPP			0.02		-0.55	***	0.37	**	0.31	†
			(0.14)		(0.16)		(0.14)		(0.16)	
District Magnitude									-0.18	***
									(0.03)	
Coalition Size			-0.91	***	0.42	**	-0.52***		-0.40	**
			(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)	
Women X Disproportionality			-0.15							
			(0.17)							
Women X ENPP					-0.46	**				
					(0.17)					
Women X Coalition							-0.52	**		
							(0.17)			
Women X District									-0.03	
									(0.02)	
Constant	-3.49	***	-4.13	***	-4.02	***	-4.07	***	-3.36	***
	(0.10)		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.11)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.29		0.20		0.26		0.25		0.23	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	29377		29377		29377		29377		29377	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20		20	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Two interaction terms between the indicators of the electoral system and gender are significant at the $p<0.05$ level for campaign activity. First, the term between gender and the effective number of parties in the legislature is significant and negative, meaning that as the number of political parties increases, women increasingly lag behind men's levels of participation. This finding provides support for the resource hypothesis (H_{2B}), stipulating that a smaller number of political parties in the legislature should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation. As Table 3.8 shows, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors demonstrate that a greater number of political parties in the legislature is associated with a lower likelihood of being involved in campaign activity for women and men; however, women's probability of engaging in this activity declines faster

than men's as the number of parties increases. A larger number of political parties may indicate that citizens have more diverse views and opinions, increasing conflict possibilities between friends and family members. Since women are more likely than men to put a greater emphasis in preserving relationships and avoiding conflict, they may be more likely to avoid political participation when there are many political parties in the legislature. Campaign activity involves citizens performing actions that let others know what are their political preferences. These public actions may create conflict when it is more likely that citizens will have preferences that are further apart. This is somewhat contrary to the expectation that a large number of political parties would stimulate citizen involvement by providing more options, making it easier for citizens to find a political party that represents more closely their preferences and interests. It is possible that this incentive for participation is difficult to benefit from since citizens may need to devote more time and energy to researching political parties to determine which one best represents them.

Figure 3.5 illustrates this finding. When the effective number of political parties in the legislature falls below 2, there are no significant gender differences in campaign activity. When the ENPP is 2 or more, women are significantly less likely than men to be involved in this political activity. This figure supports the resource hypothesis (H_2), indicating that gender differences in political participation ought to be smaller under plurality electoral systems – systems that are usually associated with a small number of political parties. Similar to the findings for other political activities, PR electoral systems tend to require resources and orientations that are more likely held by men than women, leading to larger gender gaps in campaign activity.

The second significant interaction term in Table 3.7 is between gender and coalition size. This term is also negative indicating that as coalition size increases, women are increasingly lagging behind men's levels of campaign activity. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors indicate that coalition size has a significant and negative relationship with

campaign activity for both women and men; however, this relationship is stronger for women. These findings for the gendered effect of coalition size conform to the pattern observed for the ENPP and for other acts of political participation. That is, when PR electoral systems provide a barrier to involvement in politics, this barrier has a greater effect on women, confirming the resource hypothesis.



Figure 3.5: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Campaign Activity by Number of Political Parties

Table 3.8: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of the Electoral System II

	Campaign Activity				Conctact Politicians				Work with Others			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Disproportionality	0.89	***	0.74	***	0.94	***	1.01	***	0.88	***	0.76	***
	(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
ENPP	-0.55	***	-1.01	***	-0.04		-0.23		0.96	***	0.51	***
	(0.16)		(0.17)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.14)		(0.15)	
Coalition Size	-0.52	***	-1.04	***	-0.83	***	-1.30	***	-0.33	**	-0.92	***
	(0.14)		(0.16)		(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.13)	
District Magnitude	-0.18	***	-0.22	***	-0.29	***	-0.35	***	-0.31	***	-0.37	***
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.6 illustrates gender differences in campaign activity for every coalition size possible. This figure shows that at each coalition size, gender differences are significant with women being less likely than men to engage in campaign activity. The negative slope of Figure 3.6 indicates that as coalition size increases, gender differences also increase with women lagging increasingly behind men's level of participation. Again, results demonstrate that gender gaps are larger in PR electoral system, which are associated with larger coalition governments. Multiple political parties forming a coalition government may increase the demand for political resources and orientations toward the political system that citizen required to be able to participate in politics. Under coalition governments, it may be more difficult for citizens to identify which actor is responsible for each political decision, making it difficult for citizens to form a preference toward political parties without high levels of resources and engagement. Since women are more likely to be found in those groups with low resources and engagement, their political participation is affected more so than men under PR electoral systems.

Table 3.8 also contains the marginal effects and conditional standard errors for the indicators of the electoral system that do not result in a significant interaction term with gender for the act of campaign activity to assess whether the level of disproportionality and district magnitude matter in understanding campaign activity. Results show that both of these indicators of the electoral system have a similar relationship with men's and women's probability of engaging in campaign activity. As the level of disproportionality increases, the probability of engaging in this political activity also increases. As for district magnitude, a large magnitude is associated with a lower probability of participating in campaign activity. Yet, there is no gendered effect of the level of disproportionality and district magnitude on campaign activity. As discussed above, campaign activity does not require high levels of political resources, but requires the display of preferences publicly, which may explain why only the number of political parties in the legislature and coalition size have a gendered effect

on involvement in this activity. It is possible that only a high number of political parties, in the legislature or in government, creates the political environment where a conflict-avoidance tendency and levels of political resources matter for involvement in campaign activity, leading to a gendered effect on participation in campaign activity.

3.4.5 Contacting Politicians

Table 3.9 provides the results for the gendered effects of the electoral system on contacting politicians. Model 1 of this table shows that gender differences are significant with women being less likely to engage in this activity than men when controls for individual-level factors are included. Models 2 through 5 demonstrate that adding controls for the electoral system does not erase these gender differences in contacting politicians. In other words, when the number of political parties, the level of disproportionality, coalition size, and district magnitude equal zero, men are significantly more likely to contact politicians. Yet, the electoral system can still have a gendered effect on this political activity since it may affect women's and men's likelihood of contacting politicians differently which may result in variation in gender gaps.

Table 3.9: The Influence of the Electoral System on Contacting Politicians

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.22	***	-0.23	***	-0.16	**	-0.12	**	-0.14	**
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Education	1.63	***	1.64	***	1.60	***	1.63	***	1.61	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Employed	0.10	**	0.13	***	0.13	***	0.13	***	0.12	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	0.55	***	0.55	***	0.57	***	0.54	***	0.54	***
	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)	
Partisanship	0.89	***	0.90	***	0.85	***	0.90	***	0.88	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	0.23	***	0.24	***	0.24	***	0.25	***	0.23	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	0.95	***	0.96	***	1.01	***	0.96	***	0.96	***
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Women Workforce			1.59	***	1.53	***	1.59	***	1.44	***
			(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	

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Table 3.9 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Parliamentary			0.10	*	0.08		0.10	*	-0.05	
			(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Disproportionality			0.94	***	0.89	***	0.97	***		
			(0.11)		(0.09)		(0.09)			
ENPP			0.61	***	-0.04		0.61	***	0.85	***
			(0.12)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.14)	
District Magnitude									-0.29	***
									(0.02)	
Coalition Size			-1.04	***	-0.63	***	0.83	***	-0.51	***
			(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.12)	
Women X Disproportionality			0.07							
			(0.14)							
Women X ENPP					-0.19					
					(0.15)					
Women X Coalition							-0.47	**		
							(0.16)			
Women X District									-0.06	**
									(0.02)	
Constant	-3.81	***	-4.67	***	-4.60	***	-4.72	***	-3.98	***
	(0.08)		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.10)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.15		0.26		0.33		0.26		0.13	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	30521		30521		30521		30521		30521	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Two of the four interaction terms testing the gendered effect of the electoral system on contacting politicians are significant. First, the interaction between gender and district magnitude is significant at the $p<0.05$ level and negative, meaning that as district magnitude increases, women's likelihood of involvement increasingly lags behind men's. The resource hypothesis (H_{2C}) stipulating that gender differences in political participation should be lower when district magnitude is low is confirmed by these results. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.8 demonstrate that district magnitude has a significant and negative relationship with both women's and men's probability of contacting politicians; however this relationship is stronger for women. As the larger logistic coefficient for women in Table 3.8 indicates, women's likelihood of contacting politicians declines faster than men's as

district magnitude increases. In other words, PR electoral sytems that are associated with larger district magnitudes have a larger negative influence on women's levels of political participation, which is a pattern that is repeated for other political activities.

This negative relationship between district magnitude and contacting politicians could be explained by the possibility that constituency work is more likely to be a priority in plurality electoral systems that tend to be associated with single-member districts (Massicotte, 2005). Under multi-member districts, there is less of a tradition of elected representatives responding directly to concerns expressed by citizens since there is no strong link between one representative and his or her constituents, leading to a lower probability of contacting politicians. Thus, under large district magnitudes, citizens may not consider contacting politicians when faced with problems or to advocate for issues. This process, however, is stronger for women. Indeed, their likelihood of contacting politicians decreases much faster than men as district magnitude increases. Again, the resource hypothesis (H_{2C}) is better at explaining the results. The presence of a barrier to political participation in the form of a large district magnitude may affect women more so than men since they may not have the opportunities to develop the habit of contacting politicians when they are dissatisfied and/or when they want to advocate for an issue. Since women have long been excluded and marginalized from the political system, it may be harder for them to trust politicians to help them with their issues. The presence of multiple elected representatives may only accentuate this tendency by adding a barrier to participation. Figure 3.7 illustrates the significance of the gender coefficient for each possible district magnitude (logged). At every level, Figure 3.7 shows that gender gaps are significant with women lagging behind men's probability of contacting politicians. The negative slope of this relationship indicates that gender gaps increase as the logged district magnitude also increases. Since PR electoral systems are associated with larger district magnitudes, results for contacting politicians indicate that PR systems tend to be associated with larger gender gaps.



Figure 3.6: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Campaign Activity by Coalition Size



Figure 3.7: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Contacting Politicians by District Magnitude

The second significant interaction term in Table 3.9 is between gender and coalition size. Again the interaction term is negative, meaning that as coalition size increases, women lag more and more behind men's probability of contacting politicians. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.8 show that coalition size has a significant and negative relationship with the likelihood of contacting politicians for both men and women. Yet, the larger logistic coefficient for women indicates that the relationship is stronger for women; women's likelihood of contacting politicians declines faster that men's as coalition size increases. The presence of multiple political parties forming government may make the identification of who is responsible for decisions and issues difficult. If citizens wish to contact politicans to complain about a decision or to advocate for an issues, not knowing who is in charge of this issue may make participation in this activity a challenge. Since women have lower levels of political knowledge, they may be less likely to know whether there is a coalition government and who is part of this coalition. Additionally, since women tend to be less interested in politics than men, they may not be as motivated to contact politicians when they have questions and/or issues. Thus, similar to other political activities, contacting politicians under PR systems require political resources and orientations toward politics that are more likely to be found among men than women.

Figure 3.8 graphs the marginal effect of gender for every possible coalition size that is present in the countries included in this analysis. Results show that gender gaps in contacting politicians are significant with women being less likely to be involved than men for every possible coalition size. Moreover, the negative slope of the figure indicates that gender differences in contacting politicians increase as coalition size also increases. A large coalition size is a consequence of a PR electoral system; therefore, Figure 3.8 provides more evidence to support the resource hypothesis (H_2), stipulating that gender gaps should be larger under PR systems.

Marginal effects and conditional standard errors are also calculated for the level of disproportionality and for the number of parties in the legislature in Table 3.8 despite results indicating that they do not have a gendered effect on contacting politicians. Findings show that the level of disproportionality and the number of parties both have a similar relationship with contacting politicians for men and women. The level of disproportionality is significantly and positively related to the probability of contacting politicians and the number of parties does not have a significant relationship at the $p<0.05$ level with this measure of political participation. As explained for campaign activity, the mechanism relating the number of political parties and gender gaps may be a conflict-avoidance tendency. Since contacting politicians is not an action involving communication with other citizens and/or displaying publicly one's preferences, the number of political parties may not be related to increased conflict possibilities if citizens engage in this political activity. This lack of conflict may explain why there is no gendered effect of the number of parties in the legislature on contacting politicians. As for the level of disproportionality, it may have a similar influence on men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians because both women and men are aware of the consequences of the level of disproportionality. The differences in terms of the percentage of votes and seats received by each political party are usually reflected in the electoral results; thus, information of the level of disporportionality may be easy to encounter for women and men, explaining the lack of a gendered effect on contacting politicians.

3.4.6 Working with Others

The last indicator of political participation is working with others to express views about government actions. Model 1 in Table 3.10 shows that gender differences in this political activity are significant with women being less likely than men to be involved after controlling for individual-level factors. Models 2 through 5 include the indicators of the electoral system and interaction terms; results demonstrate that for some models, gender differences in working with others are no longer significant. When the number of political parties and

coalition size equal zero, there are no significant differences between men's and women's likelihood of working with others. Further analyses will investigate whether indicators of the electoral system affect men's and women's differently and produce variation in gender gaps across electoral systems.

Table 3.10: The Influence of the Electoral System on Working with Others

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.19	***	-0.16	***	-0.05		-0.06		-0.09	*
	(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Education	1.17	***	1.20	***	1.23	***	1.20	***	1.20	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.06)	
Employed	0.13	***	0.14	***	0.15	***	0.14	***	0.14	***
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Political Efficacy	0.53	***	0.55	***	0.54	***	0.55	***	0.55	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Partisanship	0.80	***	0.78	***	0.79	***	0.79	***	0.80	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Married	-0.05		-0.06	*	-0.06	†	-0.06	†	-0.05	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Age	-0.02		0.002		0.01		-0.003		-0.04	
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Women Workforce			1.34	***	1.07	***	1.34	***	1.37	***
			(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Parliamentary			-0.34	***	-0.33	***	-0.34	***	-0.25	***
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Disproportionality			0.88	***	0.71	***	0.82	***		
			(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.08)			
ENPP			0.54	***	0.96		0.55	***	1.98	***
			(0.11)		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
District Magnitude									-0.31	***
									(0.02)	
Coalition Size			-0.60	***	-0.49		-0.33	**	-1.12	***
			(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.12)	
Women X Disproportionality			-0.12							
			(0.13)							
Women X ENPP					-0.45	***				
					(0.13)					
Women X Coalition							-0.58	***		
							(0.14)			
Women X District									-0.06	**
									(0.02)	
Constant	-2.77	***	-3.69	***	-3.59	***	-3.74	***	-3.28	***
	(0.07)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.09)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.28		0.15		0.12		0.15		0.16	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	

Continued on next page

Table 3.10 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Level 1 Units	30389	30389	30389	30389	30389
Level 2 Units	21	21	21	21	21

† p <0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Results for the gendered effects of the electoral system, that is the different effects the electoral system can have on women's and men's likelihood of working with others, can be found in Table 3.10. Three interaction terms testing this gendered effect reach the p<0.05 level of significance. First, the interaction between gender and the number of parties in the legislature is significant and negative, meaning that as the number of parties increases, women have increasingly lower levels of participation in this activity than men. Table 3.8 demonstrates that the number of parties in the legislature has a significant positive relationship with the likelihood of working wiht others for both women and men, but this relationship is stronger for men. As the ENPP increases, men's likelihood of working with other increases more so than women's. The link between this political activity and the number of political parties is not as evident as for the previous acts of political participation. It is possible that working with others to express views about government actions is easier when there are multiple parties if expressing these views requires their involvement. When there are multiple parties, citizens may have an easier time finding a political parties that is receptive to their views about government actions. Since women tend to possess lower levels of political knowledge and interest with politics than men, it may be harder for them to work with others when there are more political parties. PR electoral systems are usually associated with a larger number of political parties in the legislature, thus, these findings for working with others conform to a pattern where incentives to participation provided by this type of electoral system on participation affect women more so than men.

Figure 3.9 illustrates the marginal effect of gender across the effective number of political parties in the legislature for working with others. As can be observed, when the number of

political parties is below 2.5, gender differences are not significant. Gender differences are significant when the ENPP exceeds 2.5 with men being more likely to be working with others than women. The negative slope of the figure indicates that as the number of parties increases, gender differences also increase with women lagging increasingly behind men's levels of working with others. These results provide evidence confirming the resource hypothesis (H_2), stipulating that gender differences in political participation should be larger in PR electoral systems. PR electoral systems tend to require that citizens possess particular resources and orientations toward the political system that are more likely to be held by men than women, leading to these larger gender gaps in political participation.

The second significant interaction term in Table 3.10 is between gender and district magnitude. Again, the interaction term is negative, indicating that when district magnitude is higher, women's level of involvement in working with others becomes increasingly different from men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.8 indicate that district magnitude has a negative and significant relationship with working with others for both men and women. As hypothesized above, the electoral system can have an indirect impact on working with others to express views when the access to elected representatives is required. If working with others necessitates access to elected representatives, it may be more difficult to be involved in this activity if these representatives are more difficult to contact. Since success may be unlikely under certain electoral systems, citizens may not work with others. The link between the electoral system and this political activity is indirect at best, but there is a relationship between the two as the significant logistic coefficients show. It is possible that since contacting politicians may be harder under PR electoral systems, a large district magnitude - an attribute of PR electoral systems - may decrease the likelihood of working with others. Moreover, this process is gendered; women's likelihood of participation declines faster than men's as the larger logistic coefficient in Table 3.8 indicates. These results are more in line with the resource hypothesis (H_{2C}); PR electoral systems require



Figure 3.8: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Contacting Politicians by Coalition Size



Figure 3.9: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Working with Others by Number of Political Parties

that citizens possess certain political resources and levels of psychological engagement with politics to engage in political activities that are more likely to be possessed by men than women, such as higher levels of political knowledge and interest with politics.

Figure 3.10 illustrates gender gaps in working with others across district magnitudes. This figure shows that for every logged district magnitude, gender differences are significant with women lagging behind men's likelihood of working with others to express views about government actions. The negative slope of this figure demonstrates that the size of gender gaps increases as district magnitude also increases, providing evidence confirming the resources hypothesis; gender differences in political participation are again larger in PR electoral systems that are associated with a large district magnitude.

The third and last significant interaction term in Table 3.10 is between gender and coalition size. This interaction is also negative, meaning that, as for the previous results, women's levels of working with others are increasingly lower than men's as coalition size increases. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 3.8 demonstrate that coalition size has a negative and significant relationship with working with others for both women and men. The larger logistic coefficient for women indicates that their likelihood of working with others decreases faster than men's as coalition size increases. Again, the gendered effects of the electoral system confirm the resource hypothesis (H_{2D}), indicating that PR electoral systems, with large coalition governments, should be associated with larger gender gaps in political participation. Citizens may be less likely to work with others if coalition size is high since having more political parties in government may mean that citizens will have greater difficulties in identifying which party is responsible for the issues on which they want to express a preference. If working with others to express views about government actions lead citizens to contact and be involved with the government, having multiple parties may provide an additional layer of difficulties. Again, women by being less likely to be knowledgeable and interested about politics, may not be as motivated as men to overcome this barrier, leading

to larger gender gaps in working with others.

This process is gendered; women's involvement in working with others does not increase as coalition size gets larger. Figure 3.11 illustrates the marginal effect of gender for every coalition size. Gender differences in working with others are not significant when coalition size is equal to 1. When coalition size is larger than 1, gender differences are significant with men being more likely than women to participate in this activity. Figure 3.11 provides support for the resource hypothesis, indicating that gender gaps in political participation should be larger under PR electoral systems. Since women possess lower levels of political engagement than men, they may be less likely to recognize that working with others may have important results in term of the adoption of policies favoured by citizens when there is a coalition government. These results conform to a pattern where PR electoral systems provide incentives to political participation that favour the orientations toward the political system held by men over those possessed by women.

Finally, Table 3.8 includes the marginal effects and conditional standard errors for the level of disproportionality, which does not result in a significant interaction term with gender in Table 3.10. Results reveal that there is a similar positive and significant relationship between the level of disproportionality and the likelihood of working with others for both women and men. As explained for the previous measures of political participation, the lack of a gendered effect of the level of disproportionality may be explained by the possibility that men and women are both equally aware of the consequences of the level of disproportionality on the political process. Since a discussion of the electoral results and their consequences is usually easily accessible in the news media, the level of disproportionality affects women's and men's levels of working with others equally.

3.4.7 Control for Political Knowledge

An important control variable and explanation for gender differences in political participation is missing from the results in Table 3.3 to Table 3.10. Political knowledge was originally



Figure 3.10: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Working with Others by District Magnitude



Figure 3.11: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Working with Others by Coalition Size

excluded from the analysis because one country did not include knowledge questions in their survey. Additional statistical analyses are performed to include political knowledge as a control to determine if the previous findings may have been caused by gender differences on this variable. By including political knowledge in the analysis, the number of countries is reduced and the validity of the results may be questioned; any change in the results after the inclusion of political knowledge may not be caused by this action, but by the removal of one country from the analysis. Yet, a separate analysis provides an indication of how political knowledge may affect the results in the previous test of the hypotheses stipulated in this chapter.

Table 3.11: The Influence of the Electoral System on Voter Turnout Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Disproportionality	0.28	†						
	(0.16)							
Women X ENPP			-0.56	*				
			(0.25)					
Women X Coalition					-0.11			
					(0.21)			
Women X District							-0.06	†
							(0.04)	
Constant	-0.60	***	-0.94	***	-0.38	**	-0.69	***
	(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.13)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.65		0.29		0.26		0.43	
Intercept	(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.05)	
Level 1 Units	17376		17376		17376		17376	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, level of disproportionality, number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude but are not shown in the table.

Table 3.11 to Table 3.18 present the findings while controlling for levels of political knowledge. Generally, these results are similar to the original findings in Table 3.3 to Table 3.8. The interaction terms that were originally significant remain so after the introduction of political knowledge with the exception of the interactions between gender and the level of

disproportionality and gender and district magnitude for voter turnout. Furthermore, the signs of the interaction terms are all negative after the addition fo the control, meaning that as for the first test of the hypotheses in this chapter, gender differences in political participation increase as the number of political parties, coalition size or district magnitude increase with women increasingly lagging behind men's levels of political participation. Therefore, the previous results confirming the resources hypothesis appear to not have been caused by gender differences in political knowledge. The electoral system provides incentives and barriers to political participation that require more than a certain level of political knowlege to navigate. A variety of predispositions with politics, ranging from political resources to orientations toward the political system, is necessary to benefit from the incentives and avoid the barriers introduced by the electoral system. Since men and women differ in levels of predispositions they possess, gender differences in political participation are affected by variation in the electoral system's rules and consequences.

Table 3.12: The Influence of the Electoral System on Protest Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Disproportionality	-0.13							
	(0.16)							
Women X ENPP			-0.25					
			(0.22)					
Women X Coalition					-0.70	***		
					(0.20)			
Women X District							-0.09	**
							(0.03)	
Constant	-2.57	***	-2.67	***	-2.95	***	-2.41	***
	(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.13)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.20		0.21		0.31		0.20	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	17252		17252		17252		17252	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, level of disproportionality, number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude but are not shown in the table.

Table 3.13: The Influence of the Electoral System on Political Persuasion Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Disproportionality	0.14							
	(0.14)							
Women X ENPP			-0.33	†				
			(0.18)					
Women X Coalition					-0.09			
					(0.16)			
Women X District							-0.03	
							(0.03)	
Constant	-2.58	***	-3.14	***	-2.15	***	-2.30	***
	(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.12)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.62		0.64		0.47		0.53	
Intercept	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	17408		17408		17408		17408	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, level of disproportionality, number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude but are not shown in the table.

Table 3.14: The Influence of the Electoral System on Campaign Activity Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Disproportionality	-0.07							
	(0.21)							
Women X ENPP			-0.72	**				
			(0.25)					
Women X Coalition					-0.53	*		
					(0.23)			
Women X District							-0.07	*
							(0.03)	
Constant	-4.19	***	-3.87	***	-4.39	***	-3.50	***
	(0.17)		(0.19)		(0.25)		(0.16)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.31		0.23		0.15		0.23	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	16651		16651		16651		16651	
Level 2 Units	19		19		19		19	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, level of disproportionality, number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude but are not shown in the table.

Table 3.15: The Influence of the Electoral System on Contacting Politicians Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Disproportionality	-0.11							
	(0.17)							
Women X ENPP			-0.20					
			(0.21)					
Women X Coalition					-0.51	**		
					(0.20)			
Women X District							-0.05	†
							(0.03)	
Constant	-4.69	***	-4.87	***	-4.87	***	-4.34	***
	(0.16)		(0.17)		(0.16)		(0.14)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.16		0.18		0.22		0.16	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	17313		17313		17313		17313	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, level of disproportionality, number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude but are not shown in the table.

Table 3.16: The Influence of the Electoral System on Working with Others Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Disproportionality	-0.35	*						
	(0.16)							
Women X ENPP			-0.43	*				
			(0.18)					
Women X Coalition					-0.56	***		
					(0.17)			
Women X District							-0.08	**
							(0.03)	
Constant	-4.46	***	-4.16	***	-4.16	***	-3.52	***
	(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.12)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.17		0.22		0.22		0.17	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	17240		17240		17240		17240	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, level of disproportionality, number of political parties, coalition size, and district magnitude but are not shown in the table.

Table 3.17: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of the Electoral System Controlling for Political Knowledge I

	Vote				Protest				Political Persuasion			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Disproportionality	0.17		0.45	**	0.76	***	0.62	***	-0.01		0.12	
	(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
ENPP	0.60	**	0.03		-0.37		-0.62	*	-1.28	***	-1.61	***
	(0.23)		(0.25)		(0.23)		(0.25)		(0.16)		(0.18)	
Coalition Size	-1.19	***	-1.30	***	0.44	*	-0.26		0.16		0.06	
	(0.19)		(0.21)		(0.18)		(0.21)		(0.13)		(0.15)	
District Magnitude	-0.28	***	-0.34	***	-0.03		-0.11	***	-0.68	***	-0.71	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.18: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of the Electoral System Controlling for Political Knowledge II

	Campaign Activitu				Conctact Politicians				Work with Others			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Disproportionality	1.00	***	0.93	***	0.54	***	0.43	**	1.41	***	1.06	***
	(0.15)		(0.18)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.12)		(0.14)	
ENPP	-0.09		-0.81	***	0.57	**	0.36		1.65	***	1.22	***
	(0.25)		(0.29)		(0.20)		(0.22)		(0.17)		(0.19)	
Coalition Size	-0.48	*	-1.01	***	-0.96	***	-1.47	***	-0.47	***	-1.04	***
	(0.24)		(0.27)		(0.16)		(0.19)		(0.14)		(0.17)	
District Magnitude	-0.24	***	-0.3	***	-0.24	***	-0.29	***	-0.39	***	-0.48	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

3.5 Summary of Findings

This section presents a summary of the findings in this chapter. Table 3.19 also indicates which indicators of the electoral system tested in this chapter has a gendered influence on the six political activities included in the analysis.

H_1. The first hypothesis elaborated in this chapter stipulates that more proportional electoral systems should be associated with smaller gender gaps in political participation. More specifically, a low level of disproportionality, a large number of political parties in the legislature, a large district magnitude, and a high coalition size should all be associated with smaller gender differences. Results do not confirm this hypothesis. For none of the six acts of political participation included in this investigation are indicators of proportionality linked with smaller gender gaps.

H_2. The second hypothesis stipulates that gender differences in political participation ought to be smaller in simpler electoral systems a finding confirmed by the results of the statistical analyses. High levels of disproportionality – an indication of simpler electoral rules – are associated with reverse gender gaps in voter turnout. A greater number of political parties in the legislature is related with greater gender differences for the acts of voting, campaign activity, and working with others. A small district magnitude is associated with smaller gender gaps in voter turnout, contacting politicians, and working with others. Most of the larger gaps under high district magnitude are the result of this indicator having a greater negative influence on women's likelihood of engaging in political acts than on men's. Finally, a larger coalition size is related to larger gaps in protest, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and working with others. The coalition size has a greater negative influence on women's levels of political participation than on men's, resulting in larger gender differences.

Table 3.19: Summary of Findings: Electoral System and Gender Gaps in Political Participation

	Voter Turnout	Protest	Political Persuasion	Campaign Activity	Contact Politicians	Work with Others
Level of Disproportionality	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
ENPP	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
District Magnitude	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Coalition Size	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cell entries indicate whether each indicator of the electoral system has a gendered influence on political participation.

3.6 Discussion of the Theoretical Implications of the Findings

The goal of this chapter is to assess the gendered influence of the electoral system on political participation. This study of the electoral system contributes to the literature on gender and political participation by investigating two alternative effects of the electoral system. The first hypothesis stipulates that PR electoral systems should be associated with smaller gender gaps in political participation while the second hypothesizes that it is plurality and majoritarian electoral systems that ought to result in smaller gaps. The main finding of this chapter is to illustrate that more proportional electoral systems can provide barriers to political participation that limit the participation of women more so than men. This gendered effect of the electoral system is confirmed consistently by the results of this investigation. Since women tend to possess different types of political resources and lower levels of the political engagement necessary for political involvement, they may not be able to participate in politics at similar levels as men in PR electoral systems, leading to larger gender differences in political participation. Complex electoral systems tend to systematically put women in a disadvantaged position when compared to men since they tend to favour the predispositions to politics held by men over those possessed by women.

Put differently, plurality and majoritarian electoral systems are associated with smaller or insignificant gender differences in political particiaption for five of six acts of political participation. Since this type of electoral system is associated with simpler electoral rules and a smaller number of political parties and elected representatives, it may allow for more equal political participation between men and women despite women having lower levels of the predispositions necessary to involvement in political activities. The presence of these insignificant and smaller gender gaps in plurality electoral systems is an important finding since statistical analyses conducted in this investigation demonstrate that individual-level factors are not enough to explain the different levels of participation between men and women. The more traditional explanations of gender gaps in political participation need to

be considered alongside the gendered influence of the electoral system to fuller understand gender differences in participation.

Furthermore, findings in this chapter differ from previous studies of the gendered influence of the electoral system. The first hypothesis tested is similar to that in Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer's research (2012) who also hypothesize that more inclusive electoral systems should be associated with smaller gender gaps. These authors find some support for their hypothesis while this investigation does not. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) show that the level of disproportionality has a greater positive influence on women's levels of political participation than on men's which leads to smaller gender gaps under more proportional electoral systems. This result is not replicated in this study; the psychological hypothesis (H_1) is not confirmed for any act of political participation.

A possible explanation for this discrepancy in the results between the two studies testing a similar hypothesis with similar indicators is that the nature of the countries included in the analysis. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) include a larger set of countries in their investigation while this study focuses only on advanced industrial democracies. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible that political institutions have different effects in different types of countries; the electoral system may have a different gendered effect in older rather than newer democracies. Electoral institutions and rules that have been established more recently may not influence political behaviour similarly since not all citizens may have experienced these rules and institutions for an extended period of time. Therefore, by isolating types of countries, it may be possible to obtain a more accurate idea of the gendered effects of the electoral system. The results of this investigation tend to demonstrate that the electoral system can have different effects in advanced industrial democracies than in other systems; findings are dependent on context.

Another contribution to the literature on gender differences in political participation is that this investigation demonstrates the influence of the electoral system on unconventional

acts of political participation. Cross-national studies on the influence of the electoral system on political participation tend to focus on more conventional indicators of political activities such as voting and working in electoral campaigns. This investigation shows that the electoral system does not only have a gendered influence on conventional acts of political participation, but that there is also a gendered impact on unconventional acts of political participation such as protest and working with others. Since women tend not only to have lower levels of political participation, but to favour different acts of political participation from men (Stolle and Micheletti, 2006), it is necessary to include different types of political activities to gauge appropriately the gendered influence of the electoral system. By excluding actions where women may be more likely to engage, studies on the gendered influence of political institutions may ignore different types of gendered influence. Yet, the results of this investigation indicate that the electoral system has a similar gendered effect on conventional and unconventional acts of political participation.

This investigation of the gendered effect of the electoral system also demonstrates that multiple aspects of the electoral system have an influence on political participation that is consistent. This study shows that the number of political parties in the legislature, district magnitude, coalition size, and the level of disproportionality to a lesser extent, all have a gendered effect that leads to larger gender differences in political activities when the electoral system and electoral rules are more complicated to navigate. These results show that all aspects of the electoral system need to be taken into account when assessing its gendered effect. Past studies tend to have ignored the gendered effect of coalition size on political behaviour. One of the important consequences of the electoral system is whether a single political party will be able to form government. The presence of a coalition government tends to have important consequences on the decision-making process which affects political behaviour. Indeed, the results of this investigation demonstrate this; coalition size has a gendered influence on a variety of political acts. Therefore, when investigating the gendered

influence of the electoral system, it is important to include all aspects of the electoral system to fully understand its influence on men's and women's levels of political participation.

Chapter 4

Party Polarization and Party Ideology

This chapter proposes to investigate the influence of party polarization and party ideology on gender gaps in political participation. It is hypothesized that the ideologies defended by the political parties may either provide incentives to political participation that influence men and women differently or act as hurdles that affect gender gaps. Party ideology matters in explaining gender gaps in political participation because it affects the likelihood of conflict in social networks and the mobilization stategies employed by parties, but also because ideologies may provide a signal of inclusion.

The previous chapter confirmed the importance of the number of political parties in the legislature for understanding gender differences in political participation. This factor has a gendered influence on political participation by making it more difficult for women to participate at similar levels as men in different political acts by adding a higher hurdle to political activities. Since the conclusion of the previous chapter was that one of the main component of the electoral system that influences gender differences in political participation is the number of political parties in the legislature, it may be an indication that other aspects of the party system may also have a significant impact on gender gaps. This chapter proposes to investigate party ideology as an explanation for gender differences in political participation. As discussed below, party ideology is a different concept than the number of political parties, one that can have a gendered influence on political participation that is different from the impact of the number of political parties in the legislature. It has been argued that the presence of multiple political parties competing in elections will result in parties adopting different positions and ideologies to attract voters and to distance themselves from the competition which, in turn, can affect political participation, especially voter

turnout (Downs, 1957). The previous chapter tested the gendered influence of the number of political parties; this chapter concentrates on the gendered effect of party ideology.

More specifically, this chapter investigates the gendered influence of the presence of left-wing political parties, and the attention to women's issues paid by political parties on political participation. First, it is expected that party polarization influences men's and women's levels of political participation differently since women and men do not react similarly when confronted with political conflict in their social networks. High party polarization may be an indication that citizens are far apart ideologically which may lead to conflict among friends and family members. Women are more likely to be conflict-avoidant than men (Ulbig and Funk, 1999) which may decrease levels of political participation more so among women than men. Second, women are more likely to vote for left-wing parties than men and they are more likely to hold positions on issues that are similar to left-wing party policies on the welfare state. As a result, left parties may mobilize women's vote to increase their chance of getting elected. Thus, the presence of left parties may affect women's levels of political participation more so than men. Finally, this chapter tests whether political party platforms matter for gender differences in political participation. It is argued that when political parties are more supportive of women's concerns, this signals to women that they are welcome in the political process. In turn, these signals to women may increase their levels of political participation more so than men. Results provide support for the gendered effect of party polarization and political party platforms, but little for the presence of left-wing parties.

4.1 Party Polarization and Political Participation

As mentioned by Dalton (2008) and Dalton and Anderson (2011), many theories concerning the influence of political parties on voter turnout actually insist on the importance of the ideological differences between parties instead of the actual number of political parties in the system. In other words, it is not whether the electoral system contains a large number

of political parties, it is whether political parties adopt similar ideologies. Most famously, Downs (1957) argued that voter turnout should be stimulated when voters can find a political party that is close to their preferences and interests, and one that has a fair chance of getting elected. In more detail, Downs's (1957) argument rests on the assumption that political parties are differentiated enough that voters identify which one is closest to their preferences (Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). If political parties are too similar ideologically, citizens will have difficulty differentiating them and identifying which one is the closest to their interests. If citizens are unable to find a political party that is close to their ideological preferences, they will be less likely to turnout. High turnout is more likely if citizens find an option that is sufficiently close to their ideological preferences which is more likely if political parties are sufficiently differentiated.

As Dalton and Anderson (2011) stipulate, however, a large number of political parties is not a guarantee that parties are ideologically distinct. Having more options does not necessarily mean different alternatives. As Dalton (2008) shows, it is possible for similarly sized party systems to exhibit different ranges in ideologies. For instance, Canada and Spain exibit a similar number of political parties, but Spanish parties are more polarized (Dalton, 2008). Canada's left and right political parties are located much closer to each other on the ideological spectrum. The ideological distance between political parties and the number of political parties are two different concepts that are only weakly correlated with each other (Dalton, 2008; Dalton and Anderson, 2011). It is important, therefore, to measure separately the impact of the number of political parties and of ideological differences across political parties on voter turnout and on other forms of political behaviour (Dalton, 2008).

Many studies have tried to capture the influence of ideological differences across political parties and of the number of political parties on electoral turnout (Kittilson and Anderson, 2011; Brockington, 2009; Aarts and Wessels, 2005; Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). These studies employ different measures to determine the influence of the ideological distance across parties.

In recent years, however, the index of party polarization (Dalton, 2008) has emerged as the dominant measure. Party polarization measures the ideological distance across parties on a left-right scale weighted for party size to prevent smaller parties on the ideological extremes of the spectrum from contributing too much to the measure[1]. Citizen perception of political party placement on the left-right scale is adopted, for as Dalton (2008) argues, although these placements may be incorrect, it is the perception of party ideology that likely influences political behaviour rather than some more objectively determined placement of parties.

Karp and Banducci (2011) investigate how ideological differences across political parties can influence other acts of political participation such as campaign activity and political persuasion. They argue that "many of the causal factors associated with voting turnout may carry over to broader participation in election campaigns" (Karp and Banducci, 2011, 56). For instance, if the ideological distance between parties is limited, citizens may believe that the outcome of the electoral process will be similar no matter which one is elected, leading them to abstain from involvement in campaign activity. Furthermore, if two or more political parties are similar ideologically, citizens with preferences close to these parties will be less likely to turnout since distinguishing across the parties to make a decision is harder. Alternatively, when party polarization is high, citizens may more easily find a political party that is similar to their preferences since it is easier to differentiate parties. According to Downs (1957), when citizens can identify a political parties that is similar to their ideological preferences, they will be more likely to turnout. Moreover, when ideological differences across parties are larger, citizens may feel more attached to their preferred political party (Bowler et al., 1994) and will be more likely to engage in politics to get this party elected (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., 1978). Karp and Banducci (2011) hypothesize that citizens will be more likely to develop a strong attachement toward a political party that caters more specifically to their ideogical preferences than to a catch-all party. In turn, this greater attachment should lead to higher levels of political participation since it is believed that

[1]Chapter 2 contains more information on how the index of party polarization is operationalized.

citizens derive satisfaction from expressing their preferences for a political party. Although Karp and Banducci (2011) find that a high party polarization is associated with stronger preferences toward political parties, a positive relationship between party polarization and participation in campaigns is not found. Indeed, when party polarization is high, citizens are less likely to engage in these activities. Karp and Banducci (2011) state that this finding may stem from conflict-avoidance. Studies reveal that when confronted with political conflict, a common response is to become silent and to withdraw from the political process (Ulbig and Funk, 1999; Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Mutz, 2002). Karp and Banducci (2011) argue that this behaviour is more likely to occur when party polarization is high since citizens are more likely to encounter individuals with political preferences that differ significantly from their own.

Mutz (2002) adds to this explanation with her investigation of the consequence of conflicting views in social networks. She argues that two mechanisms decrease political participation in the face of conflict. First, exposure to contradictory political positions may create uncertainty in citizen opinions that discourages political participation. When citizen networks contain individuals with diverging opinions, citizens may be exposed to political information and arguments that are contradictory, which may make them uncertain about their own political views on issues and candidates. As a result, citizens are less likely to engage in political action.

Second, the need for social accountability will decrease the likelihood of political participation in the face of differing views (Mutz, 2002). Mutz argues that citizens may feel uncomfortable taking sides when their social networks contain individuals who support different positions on issues and candidates. Social accountability requires citizens to cultivate and preserve social relationships, ones that may be threatened by disagreement on political issues. Since there is no way to please members of a social network who hold diverging views, citizens will restrain from involvement in politics to preserve relationships. Mutz

(2002) argues that this desire to protect relationships prevents participation not only for public activities such as political protest, but also for more private ones such as voting or contacting politicians. Since citizens will want to avoid conflict at all costs, they will circumvent situations where they will have to lie about their actions. Briefly, citizens will restrain from more private acts of political participation to ensure that they will not have to lie about their involvement to their family and friends.

Although conflictual situations may lead to lower levels of political participation, there are still individuals who engage in political activities despite potential conflict with their friends and family members. McClurg (2006b) finds that citizens who are in the political majority, whose views are shared by a majority in their neighbourhood, will engage in political participation despite disagreement in their social networks. On the other hand, citizens who are in the political minority of their neighbourhood will be affected negatively by disagreement in their social networks. McClurg (2006b) argues that political minorities are more aware of their status "because the information they receive from the social context is, on balance, contradictory to their political views" (353). Minorities are more likely to fear the consequences of expressing their political views since they can encounter negative feedback for discussing views that are not shared by the majority (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). This situation will lead political minorities to abstain from political participation; political majorities will be less likely to suffer negative consequences from expressing their views making abstention less likely.

Another possible explanation for political participation despite conflicting views and opinions in a social network may be the presence of knowledgeable political discussants (McClurg, 2006a). If citizens have friends and/or family members who possess significant political information that they share with others, these political experts may "provide access to information that helps people recognize and reject dissonant political views, develop confidence in their attitudes, and avoid attitudinal ambivalence, thereby making participation more

likely" (McClurg, 2006a, 737). In other words, the ambivalence that can lead individuals to withdraw from political participation when there is disagreement among friends and family can be overcome by discussions with political experts. These experts may help citizens in identifying their views and opinions, which in turn may lead these citizens to act on these views and be involved in the political process. Similarly, political experts themselves are better able to identify and reject dissonant political views since they possess higher levels of political information, leading to political participation despite the presence of conflict within a social network.

In sum, it is possible that the processes described by Mutz (2002) are exacerbated when there is greater ideological distance across political parties. Since citizens may be more likely to encounter individuals with diverging preferences when parties are further apart and have stronger views and partisanship, the likelihood of conflict is increased because citizens may have fewer views in common. Therefore, party polarization may decrease political participation by exposing citizens to diverse preferences, which in turn lead to ambivalence and a greater desire for social accountability.

4.2 Gender, Party Ideology, and Political Participation

It is hypothesized, in this investigation, that party polarization has a gendered influence on political participation. Since greater ideological distance across political parties may mean greater conflict between individuals, women will be under more pressure than men to preserve harmonious relationships between friends and family members and will avoid political participation to ensure they do not create conflict with individuals who do not possess similar views and preferences. The following paragraphs elaborate on the reasons why it is expected that women's levels of political participation should be affected more negatively than men by the presence of higher party polarization.

As mentioned above, Karp and Banducci (2011) argue that the negative relationship

between party polarization and political participation may exist because citizens tend to withdraw from politics when there is a possibility of conflict. Since high party polarization may lead to greater conflict among members of a social network, citizens will be less likely to participate in politics. This tendency to avoid conflict is not, however, equally distributed among the population; women are more likely than men to be conflict-avoidant (Ulbig and Funk, 1999), which may translate into lower levels of political participation in ideologically polarized party systems than is true for men. As a result, gender differences in political participation will be larger when party polarization is high since women will be more attentive to conflict, which in turn will decrease their political participation at higher rates than men.

Support for women's greater conflict-avoidance may be found in the work of Gilligan (1982). She argues that men and women envisage society differently. When confronted with moral dilemmas concerning abortion, women typically see society as a web of social connections to be preserved while men see it as hierarchy of rights. Men tend to focus on rights and individuals while women tend to focus on responsibilities and relationships when being confronted with moral dilemmas. In other words, preserving relationships in the face of conflict may be more important for women than for men. Gilligan's work, however, has been heavily critized for reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes (Gidengil, 2007). Indeed, it may be possible to conclude from her work that all women and men possess stereotypically feminine and masculin traits which are based on women's traditional roles as mothers and care-givers and men's roles as responsible of the public sphere. These stereotypes can be misleading as not all women and men behave as described by Gilligan (1982); these behaviours should be viewed as tendencies. Although Gilligan's work need to be treated carefully as an explanation as to why women are more likely than men to be conflict-avoidant and put more emphasis in preserving relationships, other studies in various fields of social sciences have identified gender differences that may explain why women's levels of political participation should decrease at a faster rate than men when confronted with conflict in their social

networks. The following paragraphs review these findings.

First, despite men and women having equally-sized social networks (Marsden, 1987; Moore, 1990; Gidengil et al., 2004), women's associational activities tend to limit their exposure to conflict. Women tend to be more likely to belong to religious organizations, art and education groups, and groups providing care for the elderly or handicapped; men are more likely to be found in sport clubs, unions and professional groups (Norris and Inglehart, 2006). The latter groups tend to bring greater exposure to conflict while the former tend to be organizations that are formed around individuals sharing certain preferences and/or beliefs. Organizations favoured by women are more likely to gather like-minded individuals who do not engage in conflict or debates, which mean that women will be less likely to be exposed to conflit.

Second, psychological studies show that women are more likely than men to possess traits that indicate a greater commitment to preserving relationships. For instance, women tend to score higher on agreeableness than men (Eagly and Wood, 1991; Feingold, 1994), meaning that women are more likely to engage in behaviours that can be described as kind, cooperative, and considerate. This personality trait is characterized by an increased desire for social harmony. In other words, women are more likely than men to possess personality traits that make them prioritize relationships over conflict. Moreover, women are more likely than men to refuse to answer political questions and to respond with 'don't know' to survey questions (Atkeson and Rapoport, 2003; Djupe, 2011; Rapoport, 1982, 1985), another indication that women prefer to avoid politics and expressing an opinion which may indicate that women are more likely to believe that doing so will endanger their relationships. Finally, Stoker and Jennings (2005) find that married couples are much more likely to share similar political views; importantly, however, when couples do not initially share similar political views, it is women who tend to adopt the political opinions of their husband. All this evidence suggests that women's conflict-avoidance is greater.

These traits: greater agreeableness, refusal to answer political questions, shifting political views towards one's husband combined with a greater desire to avoid conflict (Ulbig and Funk, 1999) may mean that women will be more likely than men to restrain from political participation as a way of preserving relationships. Since these situations may be more likely when the level of party polarization is high, gender differences in political participation will be larger since women's levels of political activities should be much lower than men's.

H_1 - The party polarization hypothesis: High levels of party polarization should be associated with larger gender gaps in political participation.

A second possibility is that it is not the ideological distance across political parties that matters for explaining gender differences in political participation, but rather the mere presence of left-wing parties in the party system. A common finding in Western states is that women are more likely than men to vote for left-wing political parties (Studlar et al., 1998; Erickson and O'Neill, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Inglehart and Norris (2003), in their wide ranging study, argue that cultural and structural changes in postindustrial societies are responsible for the modern gender gap in voting; before this shift, men were more likely to vote for left-wing political parties than women. They argue that increases in labour force participation and education levels for women have pushed women to the left. Moreover, since women are typically segregated within 'women type' jobs, lower paying employment and the public sector, women may be more likely to vote for political parties that emphasize support for social programs and the presence of a large public sector. This tendency of women being more likely to vote for left-wing political parties may translate into higher political participation levels for women when compared to men when these parties win elections and form government. By seing their options win and having a chance to implement their policy positions, women may feel encourage in taking part in other political activities.

Additionally, women have political views are more in line with the platforms adopted by left-wing political parties (Conover, 1988; Gidengil et al., 2003; Everitt, 1998a; Schlesinger

and Heldman, 2001; O'Neill, 2001; Bedolla et al., 2006). Women are more likely than men to favour the welfare state, to be skeptical of free enterprise and market solutions, and less supportive of harsh punishments for criminals (Gidengil et al., 2003). On the other hand, women tend to have more conservative opinions than men on traditional moral questions with the exception of same-sex marriage. Women tend to express similar levels of anti-immigration sentiment as men. When these opinions are present in the decision-making process, women may feel better represented by political parties and politicians and may be more likely to get involved in political activities. If the political sphere reflects women's interests and preferences, women be more likely to engage by campaigning for these political parties, engaging with others to express views about government actions, contacting politicians, voting, or trying to persuade others to support parties or candidates.

H_2 - The left government hypothesis: Countries with a left-wing political party forming government should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation.

Alternatively, it might be the case that the presence of a single left-wing political party is insufficient to stimulate women into participating more in politics than they might otherwise. As Anderson and Beramendi (2012) argue, when there is competition among left-wing political parties for votes, left-wing parties have a greater incentive to mobilize non-median voters. Low-income voters may be the natural voter for left-wing political parties since they are more likely to benefit from the policies adopted by such parties. When there is only one major left-wing political party, however, this party can focus on pursuing the median voter since it can assume that its natural voters have no legitimate alternative. In the face of competition, the need to mobilize natural non-median voters is increased. This need to mobilize voters in the face of partisan competition may translate into higher participation among the targeted group, an outcome supported by Anderson and Beramendi's (2012) findings.

Extending this argument, a similar effect may be at work on women's levels of political participation. Women might be more willing to become politically engaged when there are

multiple left-wing political parties competing in elections. In the face of competition for their 'natural' voters, parties on the left may have a greater incentive to prime issues to coincide with women's opinions in an effort to win their votes. Alongside this tendency, an increased attention to women's preferences in competitive situations may send a heightened signal to women of their relevance within the political arena, one leading to higher levels of participation. Alternatively, the presence of multiple left-wing parties competing against each other may increase conflictual situations which should result in women's levels of political participation decreasing in greater proportions than men's as the party polarization hypothesis (H_1) stipulates.

H_3 - The left-wing competition hypothesis: Countries with multiple left-wing political parties should be associated with smaller gender gaps in political participation.

It is important, however, to note that the presence of a large number of political parties can have an effect that is contrary to the one explained above. A greater number of political parties may provide voters with too many options, making it difficult for citizens to gather information on each political party and to differentiate between them (Brockington, 2004). Since there are more political parties, citizens may have to spend more time researching each party before being able to identify the one that is the closest to their interests. In this situation, it is possible that many citizens will not possess the time and/or capacity to investigate multiple political parties. The presence of multiple left-wing political parties competing in elections, therfore, may not reduce gender gaps in participation. It may be difficult for women, given their lower levels of political resources and engagement than men, to benefit from the incentives provided by left-wing political parties if the time, skills, and motivation to gather information about these parties are in short supply. In sum, the presence of multiple left-wing political parties competing in elections could lead to either greater or lower levels of political participation for women.

Finally, the previous hypothesis stipulates that when political parties directly address

women's concerns, they should be more likely to participate in politics given a similarity of policy preferences. It is possible, however, that left and right ideologies may not influence women's levels of political activities. What may be more important is political parties directly addressing women's concerns and interests in their policy platforms no matter their position on the left-right scale. Women's interests can be conceived as the expansion of rights, liberties, and opportunities for women (Sapiro, 1981). These interests are distinct from those of men since women occupy a different social position from men. Women have a different shared set of problems that characterizes their distinct interests (Sapiro, 1981). For instance, despite societal change in gender's roles, women still are the primary responsible for chilcare and housework. Women, thus, have a set of interests that is different from those of men[2].

It is hypothesized that women's levels of political participation will be increased relative to men when political parties include women's interests in their platforms. This inclusion of women's interests may send a signal to female citizens that political parties are concerned about their interests and preferences, which in turn, may lead them to increase their participation in political activities. If women know that their interests are taken seriously by political actors, they may be more inclined to get involved in politics. Additionally, the inclusion of favourable mentions toward women in party platforms may indicate that political parties are making an effort to mobilize women's vote. These mobilization strategies by political parties may increase women's levels of political participation more so than men. If parties recruit women to vote for them, women may also feel inclined to participate in electoral campaigns and other activities that are related to supporting political parties, leading them to close the gap with men's levels of political participation.

H_4 - The party platform hypothesis: When political parties directly address women's concerns in their platforms, gender differences in political participation should be smaller.

[2]It is important to note that although women share interests due to their similar social position, among themselves, women are divided by other factors such as, race, class, or age, that result in distinct interests and concerns. Not all women are alike despite their shared set of interests.

4.3 The Gendered Effect of Party Polarization and Party Ideology

Before discussing the results of the tests for the four hypotheses, it is possible to observe in Table 4.1 to Table 4.9 that the control variables are related to political participation in the expected directions[3]. Political efficacy and partisanship are significantly and positively associated with each of the measures of involvement in politics in the study. Level of education is also consistently and positively associated with greater levels of political participation. As for employment status, marital status, and age, their relationship with involvement in politics varies with the potential act. For instance, age is positively associated with the act of turnout while negatively associated with the act of protest. Employment status is significant in understanding voter turnout, working with others, and contacting politicians, but not for protest, political persuasion, and campaign activity. Furthermore, the percentage of women in the workforce is significantly and positively associated with voter turnout, political persuasion, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and working with others. The percentage of women in the workforce also has a significant and negative relationship with the likelihood of engaging in protest. Citizens who live in parliamentary systems are less likely to be involved in protest, campaign activity, and working with others while they are more likely to engage in political persuasion and contacting politicians than those in other political systems. Finally, district magnitude[4] has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of engaging in voter turnout and a significant and negative relationship with involvement in a protest, political persuasion, and working with others.

The next sections elaborate on the results of the gendered influence of party polarization and party ideology on each political activity included in this investigation. The four hypotheses are tested by including an interaction term between gender and each indicator of party ideology. For each hypothesis, one on specific indicator is constructed to assess

[3]Chapter 2 includes information on the data, sources, and statistical techniques employed in the analyses discussed in this section, as well as a discussion of the operationalization of party ideology.

[4]District magnitude in included in this Chapter to control for the influence of the electoral system on political participation.

the gendered impact. Three separate models are presented below for each political activity. Model 1 presents the state of gender differences controlling only for individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the tests for the first three hypotheses while Model 3 tests for the party platform hypothesis (H_4). The party platform hypothesis is tested in a separate model since the number of countries on which information on party platforms is available is limited.

Table 4.1: The Influence of Party Ideology on Voter Turnout

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Woman	0.02		0.18	†	-0.05	
	(0.03)		(0.10)		(0.06)	
Education	1.36	***	1.33	***	1.46	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.10)	
Employed	0.16	***	0.18	***	0.18	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Efficacy	1.00	***	1.00	***	1.02	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Partisanship	1.06	***	1.06	***	1.07	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.09)	
Married	0.38	***	0.36	***	0.36	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	2.48	***	2.50	***	2.47	***
	(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.11)	
Women Workforce			0.21	*	-0.36	**
			(0.10)		(0.11)	
Parliamentary			0.01		0.11	†
			(0.06)		(0.06)	
District Magnitude			0.13	***	0.11	***
			(0.02)		(0.02)	
Party Polarization			-0.52	***	-0.30	**
			(0.11)		(0.09)	
Left Government			-0.17	*	-0.42	***
			(0.07)		(0.05)	
Number Left Parties			0.40	***	0.45	***
			(0.09)		(0.07)	
Favourable Mentions					-0.07	
					(0.10)	
Polarization X Women			-0.17			
			(0.12)			
Left Government X Women			-0.20	**		
			(0.07)			
Number Left X Women			0.11			
			(0.12)			
Favourable X Women					0.24	†
					(0.12)	
Constant	-0.87	***	-0.96	***	-0.63	***

Continued on next page

Table 4.1 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Random Effect			
Standard Deviation Intercept	0.22	0.27	0.31
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Level 1 Units	30485	29133	24642
Level 2 Units	21	20	17

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

4.3.1 Voter Turnout

Table 4.1 provides the results for the tests of the four hypotheses for voting. Model 1 indicates that gender differences in voter turnout are not significant at the p<0.05 level when individual-level factors are included as controls. The logistic coefficient for 'Women' assesses the gender gap for this political activity and demonstrates that at similar levels of political resources and psychological engagement with politics, men and women have similar likelihood of turning out. Models 2 and 3 show the inclusion of controls for party polarization and party ideology do not affect the significance of gender gaps in voter turnout. The logistic coefficient for 'Women' remains not significant at the p<0.05 level. Yet, these results do not indicate that there are no gendered effects of party polarization and party ideology on voter turnout. The logistic coefficients for the variable 'Women' in Models 2 and 3 indicate the size and significance of gender gaps when the indicators of party ideology and party polarization take the value of zero. It is possible that gender differences become larger and significant as the indicators of party polarization and party ideology are at values different from zero. Furthermore, party ideology and party polarization can have a gendered effect on voter turnout by affecting women's and men's likelihood of participation differently. The analysis turns next to investigating these possible gendered effects.

Table 4.2: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of Party Ideology I

	Vote				Protest				Political Persuasion			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Party Polarization	-0.52	***	-0.69	***	1.79	***	1.72	***	-0.80	***	-0.50	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Left Government	-0.17	*	-0.36	***	0.31	***	0.32	***	0.45	***	0.13	**
	(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Number Left Parties	0.40	***	0.50	***	0.80	***	0.44	***	0.75	***	0.80	***
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Favourable Mentions	-0.07		0.16	†	-0.40	***	-0.32	**	-1.50	***	-1.54	***
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.10)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.1 includes the interaction terms testing for the gendered effects of party polarization and party ideology. One of these interaction terms is significant at the $p<0.05$ level. In Model 2, the interaction between whether a left party governs and gender reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance. Its negative sign indicates that when a left-wing political party is in government, women's likelihood of turning oug lags behind men's likelihood. This result does not confirm the left government hypothesis (H_2), stipulating that the presence of a left government should be associated with increased participation among women. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a significant interaction term does not indicate whether the presence of a left-wing political party in government influences voter turnout, only whether the difference between men's and women's relationship between the presence of a left party and turnout is significant. Table 4.2, which contains the marginal effects and conditional standard errors for the left party in government indicator on voting, reveals it has a significant negative relationship with both men's and women's turnout. Again, the results of this table do not confirm the left government hypothesis; women are not more likely to turnout when a left party is part of a coalition government. Indeed, I find the opposite relationship than that hypothesized.

Women's larger logistic coefficient in Table 4.2 for the relationship between left government and voting indicates that this indicator of party ideology decreases women's likelihood of turnout more so than men's. This is contrary to the left government hypothesis; women's turnout is not stimulated by the presence of a left party in government. Traditionally, left-wing political parties aim to mobilized working class electors who are more likely to be men. Women were not the traditional electorate of left-wing parties since they were less likely than men to hold manual-labour jobs. The results in Table 4.2 may reflect this tradition in which left parties are more likely to mobilize and obtain the support of working class men, leading to women's likelihood of turning out decreasing faster than men's when a left party is in government. Indeed, as the findings below will demonstrate, left-wing political parties

may not be mobilizing women or providing a signal that encourages women's participation more so than men's because of their opinions and voting behaviour. As we will see, these findings are consistent across mulitiple political activities.

The previous results reveal that the presence of a left party in government affects men's and women's likelihood of turnout differently. Thus, is is possible that gender gaps in voter turnout vary across countries with and without a party on the left in government. As explained above, the 'Women' logistic coefficient in Model 2 of Table 4.1 indicates whether gender gaps are significant when the indicator of left government takes the value of 'zero'. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors allow us to calculate gender gaps in turnout when the left government indicator takes the value of '1', that is, for citizens living in countries that have a left party in government. When the marginal effect of gender on voter turnout is calculated in Table 4.3, gender differences reach the p<0.10 level of significance in countries with no left party in government. On the other hand, in countries with a left political party in government, gender differences are not significant. These results indicate that although the presence of a left party in government has a different impact on men's and women's likelihood of turning, gender gaps remain insignificant at the p<0.05 level. The gendered effect of a left party in government is not on gender gaps, but on the relationship between the presence of a left party and the likelihood of turning out to vote.

Table 4.3: Marginal Effects of Gender on Political Participation by the Presence of Left Party in Government

	Left Government = 0		Left Government = 1	
	Gender		Gender	
Vote	0.18	†	-0.01	
	(0.10)		(0.11)	
Political Persuasion	-0.35	***	-0.68	***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	
Campaign Activity	-0.07		-0.31	*
	(0.11)		(0.12)	

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors are also calculated for the indicators

of party ideology that do not result in a significant interaction term with gender in Table 4.1. As explained in Chapter 2, the logistic coefficient for each indicator of party polarization and party ideology in Table 4.1 describes the relationship between party ideology and turnout for men only. To obtain information on the relationship between these variables for all citizens, marginal effects and conditional standard errors need to be calculated. As Table 4.2 shows, party polarization has a negative relationship with the likelihood of voting for women and men. In both cases, the index of party polarization reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance, meaning that when the ideological distance between political parties is high, men and women are less likely to turnout. This result somewhat confirms the party polarization hypothesis, stipulating that greater polarization may create more conflict possibilities among citizens which will lead these citizens to withdraw from politics. The party polariation hypothesis, however, also states that this process is gendered, which is not confirmed by the results since the interaction term between gender and party polarization in Table 4.1 is not significant. Furthermore, the number of left-wing political parties has a similar relationship with voter turnout for women and men. The number of left parties has a significant and positive relationship with the probability of turning out; as the number of political parties increases, both men and women are more likely to vote. Again, the number of left parties hypotheis (H_3) is not confirmed. Finally, Table 4.2 indicates that the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and non-economic demographic groups does not have a significant relationship with turnout for both women and men.

In sum, only one indicator of party ideology is associated with a gendered effect on voter turnout – the presence of a left-wing party in government. A possible explanation for why a gendered effect occurs for this indicator and not for the three others may be that voting is about communicating preferences toward which parties and candidates should form government and the left government indicator is the only one assessing how the ideology of a government influences turnout. In other words, an important factor in deciding whether to

turnout is what the government will look like, which may be why men and women will react differently when faced with a left-wing party forming government. This indicator of party ideology may be more likely to influence other factors that differ between women and men – factors that are related to the likelihood of turning out such as left-wing political party traditional mobilization strategies that target the support of working class men. The other indicators of party ideology – party polarization index, the number of left parties, and the percentage of favourable mentions – may not result in a gendered effect on voter turnout since they do not affect differently the relationship between the ideology in government and the likelihood of turning out to vote for women and men.

4.3.2 Protest

The influence of party ideology and party polarization is tested on involvement in protest. Table 4.4 reports results for the interaction terms between party ideology and gender for this political activity. Model 1 in Table 4.4 indicates that gender differences in protest are significant at the $p<0.05$ level when only individual-level factors are included. Models 2 and 3 reveal that once the indicators of party ideology are included, gender differences become insignificant. In other words, when these indicators take the value of zero, there is no difference between men's and women's likelihood of engaging in this political activity. The interaction terms included in Models 2 and 3 indicate whether men's and women's participation in protest is affected differently by party ideology and, in turn, whether it is possible for gender gaps to change in size and significance as the indicators of party ideology take a value other than zero.

Table 4.4 shows that only one interaction term achieves the $p<0.05$ level of significance; the interaction between gender and the number of left political parties is significant and negative. This suggests that as the number of left-wing political parties increases, women increasingly lag behind men's likelihood of participating in protest. This result does not provide evidence confirming H_3 – the left-wing competition hypothesis, which suggested

that women's levels of political participation should be increased more so than men's as the number of left parties also increases.

Table 4.4: The Influence of Party Ideology on Protest

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Woman	-0.10	**	0.14		-0.07	
	(0.04)		(0.14)		(0.07)	
Education	1.67	***	1.69	***	1.85	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.09)	
Employed	-0.03		-0.05		-0.03	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Efficacy	0.49	***	0.47	***	0.50	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Partisanship	0.53	***	0.54	***	0.59	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Married	-0.20	***	-0.19	***	-0.14	**
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Age	-1.43	***	-1.44	***	-1.49	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Women Workforce			-0.93	***	-1.37	***
			(0.09)		(0.10)	
Parliamentary			-0.24	***	0.44	***
			(0.05)		(0.05)	
District Magnitude			-0.19	***	-0.25	***
			(0.01)		(0.02)	
Party Polarization			1.79	***	1.07	***
			(0.10)		(0.09)	
Left Government			0.31	***	0.10	†
			(0.06)		(0.06)	
Number Left Parties			0.80	***	-0.03	
			(0.12)		(0.11)	
Favourable Mentions					-0.40	***
					(0.12)	
Polarization X Women			-0.07			
			(0.12)			
Left Government X Women			0.01			
			(0.08)			
Number Left X Women			-0.36	*		
			(0.16)			
Favourable X Women					0.07	
					(0.16)	
Constant	-3.13	***	-3.63	***	-2.74	***
	(0.09)		(0.15)		(0.14)	
Random Effect						
Standard Deviation Intercept	0.22		0.23		0.17	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	30440		28960		24476	
Level 2 Units	21		20		17	

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Table 4.4 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Marginal effects and conditional standard errors, shown in Table 4.2, are conducted to assess whether the number of left parties does have a significant influence on women's and men's likelihood of participating in protest. The results show that this indicator of party ideology has a significant positive relationship with men's and women's likelihood of engaging in protest; the relationship, however, is weaker for women. In other words, men's probability of participating in protest is affected to a greater degree than women's by the number of left political parties in the system. A possible explanation for this result may be that men are more likely to be dissatisfied with the political system, and thus, more likely to protest, when the number of left parties is high. Women are more likely than men to vote for a left-wing party and are more likely to support the political positions held by these left parties. When there are more left parties in the legislature, men may feel that their preferences and interests are not well represented by the political system, leading them to engage at higher rates in protest. Similar to the findings for voting, women's levels of political participation are not boosted more so than men's by the presence of left-wing parties. Evidence on multiple political activities tend to confirm that left parties may not mobilize women and/or may not act as a signal increasing political participation for them more so than men despite women's political positions and voting behaviour. Although the results do not confirm the hypotheses presented in this chapter, it is possible to conclude that party ideology does matter in explaining gender gaps in political participation but only because of ideology's greater influence on men's behaviour.

Figure 4.1 illustrates how the marginal effect of gender changes with the number of left parties. The figure shows that although the number of left parties has a different influence on men's and women's likelihood of engaging in protest, gender differences in this political

activity are not significant at the $p<0.05$ level across the range for number of parties. Since the 95 per cent confidence interval in Figure 4.1 includes 'zero', men and women have a similar likelihood of engaging in protest. Thus, a varying number of left-wing parties competing in elections is not associated with variation in gender gaps; however, there is a gendered effect of the number of left parties on protest. This gendered effect in not on gender gaps, but on the relationship between protest and the number of left parties.

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors calculated for the other indicators of party ideology are included in Table 4.2. First, the results indicate that the index of party polarization has a significant positive relationship with protest for women and men. This result is contrary to expectations. It was hypothesized that the relationship between party polarization and political participation would be negative due to the effect of conflict-avoidance on political participation. The positive relationship in Table 4.2 between party polarization and protest may be due to the possibility that party polarization increases the likelihood that citizen opinions vary ideologically from those of the political party(ies) in government. This increases the likelihood that citizens are dissatisfied with the political process and government, leading to greater involvement in protest. Second, Table 4.2 shows that the presence of a left-wing political party in government has a significant positive relationship with the likelihood of involvement in protest for women and men. The lack of significant interaction terms for both party polarization and the presence of a left party in government demonstrates that there are no gendered effects of these indicators on protest. Third, results for participating in protest in Model 3 in Table 4.4 do not demonstrate the gendered impact of the percentage of favourable mentions on political participation. The interaction term between gender and the percentage of favourable mentions is not significant and the marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.2 indicate that this indicator has a similar influence on women's and men's likelihood of engaging in protest.

The presence of a left government, the party polarization index, and the percentage of

favourable mentions influence the likelihood of involvement in protest, but not in a gendered manner while there is a gendered effect for the number of left parties. To be able to take advantage of the incentives and/or to overcome the barriers provided by party ideology and party polarization, certain predispositions with politics are necessary such as civic skills or social networks. It is possible that women have other resources that allow them to take advantage of the incentives and to overcome barriers to political participation despite their low levels of political resources and psychological engagement with politics. For instance, women's social networks tend to be richer in terms of informal social capital (Harell, 2009) which may help women overcome the barriers and take advantage of the incentives provided by party ideology. In other words, women are more likely than men to maintain personal relationships with their family members, friends, and neighbours, which provide them with a social network that is conducive to participation in politics. Under certain circumstances, women may participate at similar levels as men since their social networks may be more likely to include people that recruit other political activists. This recruitment process may be less likely to involve men since they put less emphasize than women on maintaining relationships. On the other hand, differences in social networks may not always help women overcome their lower levels of political resources and psychological involvement with politics. The number of left parties is associated with a gendered effect since it may affect some orientations toward the political system that matter for explaining protest, such as dissatisfaction with the political system.

4.3.3 Political Persuasion

The next indicator of political participation is political persuasion. Table 4.5 contains the results of the interaction terms between the indicators of party ideology and gender. Model 1 in Table 4.5 reveals that gender gaps are significant at the $p<0.05$ level of significance and women are less likely than men to engage in political persuasion when individual-level controls are added. The inclusion of the indicator of party ideology and the interaction terms

does not change the size and significance of gender gaps. The logistic coefficient for 'Women' in Models 2 and 3 indicating the state of gender differences in political participation, however, only show whether gender gaps are significant when the indicators of party ideology take the value of zero. In other words, the lack of change in gender gaps between Model 1 and Models 2 and 3 does not indicate that there are no gendered effects of party ideology on political persuasion. It is possible that party ideology influences men's and women's likelihood of engaging in this political activity differently and it is possible for gender gaps in political persuasion to vary in size and significance as the indicators of party ideology take other values than zero. The following paragraphs examine these possible gendered effects.

Table 4.5: The Influence of Party Ideology on Political Persuasion

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Woman	-0.37	***	-0.35	***	-0.36	***
	(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.05)	
Education	0.76	***	0.79	***	0.90	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Employed	-0.06	†	-0.007		-0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Efficacy	0.71	***	0.84	***	0.93	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Partisanship	1.15	***	1.14	***	1.15	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Married	-0.08	*	-0.09	**	-0.07	†
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Age	-0.53	***	-0.49	***	-0.65	***
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
Women Workforce			2.48	***	1.09	***
			(0.09)		(0.10)	
Parliamentary			0.18	***	0.43	***
			(0.04)		(0.04)	
District Magnitude			-0.31	***	-0.63	***
			(0.01)		(0.02)	
Party Polarization			-0.80	***	0.27	**
			(0.08)		(0.09)	
Left Government			0.45	***	0.14	***
			(0.05)		(0.04)	
Number Left Parties			0.75	***	0.76	***
			(0.09)		(0.08)	
Favourable Mentions					-1.50	***
					(0.09)	
Polarization X Women			0.30	**		

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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
			(0.10)			
Left Government X Women			-0.32	***		
			(0.06)			
Number Left X Women			0.05			
			(0.12)			
Favourable Mentions X Women					-0.03	
					(0.12)	
Constant	-1.28	***	-3.17	***	-2.19	***
	(0.07)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Random Effect						
Standard Deviation Intercept	0.63		0.47		0.41	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	30759		29277		24781	
Level 2 Units	21		20		17	

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Two interaction terms are significant: the term between gender and the presence of a left party in government and the interaction between gender and party polarization. The first significant interaction term is between the index of party polarization and gender; this term is significant at the p<0.05 level and positive. Table 4.2 shows the marginal effects and conditional standard errors and indicates that the index of party polarization has a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of political persuasion for women and men. These relationships confirm the hypothesis stating that individuals are less likely to participate in political activities when the ideological distance between political parties is high. The results in Model 2 in Table 4.5 also indicate that this process is gendered since the interaction term between gender and party polarization is significant at the p<0.05 level. The sign of the interaction term, however, is positive, meaning that women's wellingness to persuade others politically changes at a different rate over the index of party polarization than men's. In other words, women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion decreases at a slower rate than men as party polarization increases. Again, this is contrary to the party polarization hypothesis (H_1.). A possible explanation for this result may be found in the distinction between the number of political parties and party polarization. If fewer political parties

are competing against each other in elections and yet are far apart on the ideological scale, citizens may have social networks that are homogenous in terms of political beliefs, making conflict less of a possibility. In this situation, women with their larger number of friends and aquaintances may have more opportunities to engage in political persuasion than men. These differences in social networks may work to the advantage of women by providing them with opportunities to overcome the barriers to participation imposed by party polarization. A large polarization may still be associated with a decrease in political participation levels, not because there are more possibilities for conflict, but because citizens take stronger and more opposed political positions, which makes engaging in political persuasion unlikely to be successful. This negative relationship may be weaker for women since they have larger social networks, providing them with more opportunities to engage in political persuasion.

Since there is a significant interaction coefficient and the marginal effects and conditional standard errors demonstrate that party polarization has a significant impact on political persuasion, the marginal effect of gender is calculated for each level of polarization. Results in Figure 4.2 demonstrate that women are less likely than men to engage in political persuasion when the party polarization index is below 3.5. When party polarization is higher than 3.5, gender differences are insignificant. The positive slope for the relationship indicates that gaps are smaller and become insignificant as the index of polarization rises since women's probability of engaging in this activity does not decrease as fast as men's. Again, findings demonstrate that party ideology matters in explaining gender gaps in political participation; however, ideology does not matter in the expected way. Because of gender differences in political resources, men are the ones who are more negatively affected by party polarization.

The second significant interaction term in Table 4.5 is between gender and the presence of a left party in government. The negative sign of this interaction term indicates that women are less likely than men to engage in political persuasion when a left-wing political party is in government. The left government hypothesis (H_2) is not confirmed by these results. The



Figure 4.1: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Protest by the Number of Left Parties



Figure 4.2: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Political Persuasion by Party Polarization

marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.2 show that there are significant positive relationships between the presence of a left party and the likelihood of engaging in political persuasion for women and men. The logistic coefficient for women, however, is smaller than the one for men, meaning that women's participation is influenced less than men's by the presence of a left party in government. As explained for voter turnout, men may be more likely than women to be mobilized by left parties to vote for them. This increased mobilization of men by left parties may also result in gendered effects for other activities related to voting and electoral campaigns, such as political persuasion. In other words, if men are mobilized to vote for a left party, they also be more likely to try to convince others to vote the same way. Since women do not constitute the traditional electoral basis of left-wing parties, they may not be mobilized to support such parties in the same degree as men, leading to larger gender gaps in political persuasion when a left party is part of the government despite women's being more likely to hold opinions similar to those of left parties. For a third political activity, after turnout and protest, there is evidence that contradicts the hypotheses tested in this chapter; party ideology matters for gender gaps, but it affects men more so than women. It does not appear that left-wing parties mobilize women more or provide a signal of inclusion that increases women's levels of participation more so than men's.

The significance of gender differences in political persuasion is calculated for whether or not a left party is part of the government. As explained above, the 'Women' logistic coefficient in Table 4.5 indicates the size and significance of gender gaps in political persuasion for when there are no left parties forming government (when 'Left Government' = 0). Since the presence of left parties in government influences men and women differently, gender gaps may be a different size when such parties are in government. Results show that gender differences are significant in both cases. Women are significantly less likely than men to engage in political persuasion when there is a left party in government and when this is no

left-wing party in government. Results can be observed in Table 4.3. Gender differences are much larger when there is a left party in government, which are due to women's probability of engaging in political persuasion being lower than men's; therefore, results for political persuasion do not confirm the left government hypothesis (H_2).

Moreover, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors for the other indicators of party ideology indicate a significant relationship between the number of left parties and the likelihood of political persuasion for women and men. For both genders, as the number of left-wing political parties increases, the likelihood of political persuasion also increases. A possible explanation for this result may be related to the overall number of political parties, which is not included as a control variable. If there are more political parties competing in elections there may be more left-wing political parties present in the legislature. If there are more political parties competing, citizens may be more likely to engage in political persuasion since it may be easier to find a political party to support and hence be more partisan (Huber et al., 2005). This greater partisanship may encourage political persuasion to convince others to support one's favoured political party or candidate.

Model 3 in Table 4.5 also shows that there is no gendered influence of the percentage of favourable mentions on men's and women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion. The interaction term between gender and the percentage of favourable mentions of non-economic demographic groups does not reach the $p < 0.05$ level of significance. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.2 indicate that for women and men, the percentage of favourable mentions has a significant and negative relationship with the likelihood of engaging in political persuasion. Men and women are both less likely to be involved in persuading others to support a party or a candidate when political parties address positively the concerns of non-economic demographic groups.

For political persuasion, there is a gendered effect of the presence of a left party in government and party polarization, but there is no gendered influence of the number of

left parties and the percentage of favourable mentions. As discussed for voter turnout, the gendered effect of the presence of a left party in government may be explained by the fact that the traditional electorate of these parties has been working-class men. The same factors linking the presence of a left party and turnout may also exist for political persuasion since both political activities are related to expressing a choice for political parties present in government. Additionally, women possess resources and orientations toward the political system that are not always shared with men such as their social networks that may allow them to overcome their lower levels of political resources in certain circumstances. Since women are more likely to form and maintain multiple personal relationships, they may have more opportunities than men to engage in political persuasion; thus, under certain institutional arrangements, women may be able to overcome their lower levels of political resources and motivation. Social networks may not be sufficient for women to take advantage of the incentives to participation provided by the presence of a left party in government since this indicator of ideology may require other factors to facilitate participation that are not possessed in similar proportions by women and men such, as being mobilized by a left party.

4.3.4 Campaign Activity

Table 4.6 provides the results for the gendered effects of party ideology on campaign activity and includes interaction terms for indicators of party ideology and gender. Model 1 in Table 4.6 demonstrates that gender differences in campaign activity are significant at the $p<0.05$ level when only individual-level factors are included. In this situation, women are significantly less likely than men to engage in this political activity. Model 2 includes three of four indicators of party ideology and reveals that gender differences are not significant once these controls have been applied. These results in Model 2 show that when there is no left party in government, the number of left parties is zero, and the party polarization index is

zero, men's and women's likelihood of participating in campaign activity is similar[5]. On the other hand, Model 3 in Table 4.6 indicates that when the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups is zero, women are significantly less likely than men to engage in this political activity. The following analyses investigate in greater detail the gendered effects of party ideology on the likelihood of engaging in campaign activity and the effects of party ideology on the size and significance of gender gaps as the indicators of party ideology take on values other than zero.

Table 4.6 shows that there is one interaction term testing the gendered effects of party ideology that is significant at the $p<0.05$ level. The interaction term between gender and whether a left-wing political party is part of government is significant and negative. This negative sign means that women are less likely than men to participate in campaign activity when there is a left party in government. This result does not confirm the left government hypothesis (H_2), stipulating that gender differences should be smaller when a left party is part of the government since women's levels of participation should be boosted more so than men's.

Table 4.6: The Influence of Party Ideology on Campaign Activity

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Woman	-0.26	***	-0.07		-0.29	***
	(0.04)		(0.11)		(0.06)	
Education	0.73	***	0.69	***	0.89	***
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
Employed	0.03		0.03		0.07	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Efficacy	0.91	***	0.89	***	0.88	***
	(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Partisanship	1.48	***	1.49	***	1.49	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	0.03		0.03		0.007	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Age	0.50	***	0.50	***	0.70	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Women Workforce			2.13	***	1.80	***

Continued on next page

[5]All indicators of party ideology have been recoded to range from 0 to 1; thus when the indicators equal zero, this value represents the minimum of the indicator.

Table 4.6 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
			(0.11)		(0.13)	
Parliamentary			-0.45	***	-0.26	**
			(0.06)		(0.06)	
District Magnitude			0.01		-0.08	***
			(0.02)		(0.03)	
Party Polarization			0.17	**	0.32	***
			(0.07)		(0.06)	
Left Government			0.17	**	0.32	***
			(0.07)		(0.06)	
Number Left Parties			0.07		0.08	
			(0.12)		(0.11)	
Favourable Mentions					-0.66	***
					(0.13)	
Polarization X Women			-0.09			
			(0.12)			
Left Government X Women			-0.24	**		
			(0.09)			
Number Left X Women			-0.08			
			(0.15)			
Favourable X Women					0.26	†
					(0.16)	
Constant	-3.49	***	-3.84	***	-3.69	***
	(0.10)		(0.14)		(0.15)	
Random Effect						
Standard Deviation Intercept	0.29		0.24		0.20	
	(0.01)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	29377		27895		23400	
Level 2 Units	20		19		16	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

As explained in Chapter 2, the interaction term only indicates whether the difference between the slopes representing the relationship between left government and the probability of participating in campaign activity for women and for men is large enough to be significant. To assess whether the presence of a left party in government is a factor in understanding campaign activity, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors are calculated for women and men. Table 4.7 shows that the presence of a left party has a significant positive relationship with campaign activity for men but not for women. In other words, men are more likely to participate in campaign activity if a left-wing political party is part of government

while women's level of campaign activity remains unaffected by this indicator. Again, these results may reflect left-wing political party traditions in mobilizing working-class men. When a left party is part of the government, it may mean that they engage in larger and/or more successful mobilizing campaigns. Men may be more likely than women to be have been contacted by a left party, leading them to be more likely to engage in campaign activity than women when a left party forms government. These findings are consistent with previous ones indicating that party ideology is a factor in understanding gender gaps in political participation, but that left ideologies are more likely to influence men's behaviour than women's.

The results in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 suggest that there is a gendered effect of the presence of a left party in government on the participation in campaign activity. Again, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors are calculated for the relationship between gender and participation in campaign activity when a left party is in government and when it is not (see Table 4.3). As can be observed, when a left party is not in government, gender differences are insignificant; when a left party is in government, however, gender differences are significant and women are less likely than men to participate in campaign activity. These results reinforce the previous findings of the gendered effects of the presence of a left party in government on political persuasion which also indicate that gender gaps tend to be larger when a left party is in government.

Table 4.7: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of Party Ideology II

	Campaign Activity				Contact Politicians				Work with Others			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Party Polarization	-2.03	***	-2.06	***	-1.22	***	-1.52	***	0.08		-0.12	
	(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Left Government	0.17	**	-0.07		-0.13	*	-0.008		0.40	***	0.31	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Number Left Parties	0.07		-0.01		0.19		0.18		-0.03		-0.13	
	(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Favourable Mentions	-0.66	***	-0.40	**	0.12		0.58	***	-0.12		0.29	***
	(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

As explained in Chapter 2, it is necessary to calculate the marginal effects and conditional standard errors for the indicators of party ideology that do not produce a significant interaction term with gender. Results in Table 4.7 show that the index of party polarization has a significant relationship with campaign activity for both men and women. For all citizens, a high score on the party polarization index is related to a lower likelihood of participating in campaign activity. This result mirrors what Karp and Banducci (2011) find in their study. A high level of party polarization likely translates into greater variation in party identification and opinions, which may increase the possibility of conflict if citizens discuss their political opinions. As a result, to preserve relationships and avoid conflict, men and women will restrain from getting involved in campaigns. The results do not, however, confirm the party polarization hypothesis hypothesis (H_1), indicating a gendered effect of party polarization. Party polarization affects equally men's and women's likelihood of participating in campaign activity.

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.7 also show that the number of left-wing political parties has a similar effect on men's and women's likelihood of engaging in campaign activity. In both cases, the number of left parties reveals no significant relationship with campaign activity. Furthermore, Table 4.7 shows that for both women and men, the number of favourable mentions is negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of participating in campaign activity.

In sum, for campaign activity, only the presence of a left party in government is associated with a gendered effect; the three other indicators of party ideology do not result in a significant interaction term with gender in Table 4.6. The lack of gendered effects for the number of left parties, party polarization, and the percentage of favourable mentions may be explained by the possibility that these indicators of party ideology do not impose barriers and/or incentives to political participation that require citizens to possess a certain level of political knowledge to benefit and/or overcome. Women may possess other predispositions

to politics such as their social networks that allow them to take advantage of the incentives and overcome the barriers provided by the other indicators of party ideology, but these are not enough to increase women's levels of campaign activity to levels similar to men's when a left party is in government.

4.3.5 Contacting Politicians

Table 4.8 includes the tests for the four hypotheses assessing the gendered influence of party ideology on contacting politicians. Model 1 in this table indicates that gender gaps for this political activity are significant at the $p<0.05$ level when individual-level factors are controlled. In Model 1, men are significantly more likely than women to contact politicians. In Model 2, the difference between men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians is insignificant. This result indicates that when party polarization, the presence of a left party in the legislature, and the number of left parties in government take the value of zero, gender gaps are not significant. Model 3 indicates that when the percentage of favourable mentions is zero, women are significantly less likely than men to contact politicians. These results for the logistic coefficient for 'Women' in Table 4.8, do not include all possible gendered effects of party ideology on contacting politicians. The following analyses explore the possible differing effects of party ideology on men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians and how gender gaps may vary as the indicators of party ideology take on different values other than zero.

Table 4.8: The Influence of Party Ideology on Contacting Politicians

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Woman	-0.22	***	-0.15		-0.33	***
	(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.06)	
Education	1.63	***	1.65	***	1.68	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Employed	0.10	**	0.11	**	0.16	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Efficacy	0.55	***	0.54	***	0.60	***
	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)	

Continued on next page

Table 4.8 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Partisanship	0.89	***	0.88	***	0.90	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	0.23	***	0.23	***	0.25	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	0.95	***	1.00	***	1.03	***
	(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
Women Workforce			2.39	***	2.01	***
			(0.13)		(0.18)	
Parliamentary			0.13	*	0.005	
			(0.05)		(0.05)	
District Magnitude			-0.005		-0.003	
			(0.01)		(0.02)	
Party Polarization			-1.22	***	-1.54	***
			(0.10)		(0.11)	
Left Government			-0.13	*	-0.05	
			(0.05)		(0.05)	
Number Left Parties			0.19		-0.08	
			(0.12)		(0.11)	
Favourable Mentions					0.12	
					(0.11)	
Polarization X Women			-0.29	**		
			(0.11)			
Left Government X Women			0.12	†		
			(0.07)			
Number Left X Women			-0.01			
			(0.14)			
Favourable X Women					0.46	***
					(0.12)	
Constant	-3.81	***	-4.37	***	-4.18	***
	(0.08)		(0.13)		(0.16)	
Random Effect						
Standard Deviation Intercept	0.15		0.13		0.07	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	30521		29039		24561	
Level 2 Units	21		20		17	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

In Table 4.8, there are two significant interaction terms testing the gendered influence of party ideology. First, the interaction term between gender and the index of party polarization achieves the $p<0.05$ level of significant and has a negative sign, meaning that as party polarization increases, women's likelihood of contacting politicians is increasingly lower than men's. To be certain that the party polarization index is a factor in understanding the po-

litical activity of contacting politicians for women and men, marginal effects and conditional standard errors are conducted. Results in Table 4.7 reveal that for both women and men, party polarization reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance. For both genders, the logistic coefficients for the index of party polarization are negative, meaning that as the polarization across political parties increases, men and women are less likely to contact politicians. These results confirm the party polarization hypothesis (H_1), which argued that the index of polarization would have a negative relationship with political participation since a high polarization may increase the potential for conflict among citizens, which will lead them to avoid politics. Moreover, the significant interaction term between gender and party polarization means that the difference between men's and women's logistic coefficients for party polarization in Table 4.7 is large enough to be significant. As expected, party polarization has a stronger negative impact on women's likelihood of contacting politicians. Therefore, H_1 is confirmed for contacting politicians. Party ideology matters in understanding gender differences in political participation since ideologies may influence the likelihood of conflict in social networks. Women's greater conflict-avoidance tendencies may result in party polarization decreasing their levels of involvement in politics more so than men.

Figure 4.3 illustrates how the marginal effect of gender changes across levels of party polarization. As it is possible to observe, gender does not have a significant relationship with contacting politicians when the index of party polarization is lower than 2.2. Gender differences are significant when party polarization is above this level of polarization and women are less likely than men to contact politicians. This result confirms the party polarization hypothesis (H_1), indicating that gender gaps will be larger when levels of party polarization are high since women tend to put more emphasis in preserving relationships and avoiding conflict than men. When polarization is low, men and women will behave similarly. Women are more likely than men to value the importance of preserving relationships between friends and family members. Because of this tendency, women are more likely than men to avoid

politics when there is an increased likelihood of conflict. A high party polarization environment may be more conducive to conflict since political positions are further apart from each other and citizens hold their positions more strongly (Bowler et al., 1994; Karp and Banducci, 2011).

The second significant interaction term for contacting politicians in Table 4.8 indicates the presence of a gendered effect of the percentage of favourable mentions toward non-economic demographic groups on political participation. The interaction term between gender and the percentage of favourable mentions is significant and positive, indicating that women's likelihood of contacting politicians is increasingly higher than men's as the percentage of favourable mentions increases. This result confirms the party platform hypothesis (H_4), stipulating that gender differences in political participation should be smaller when political parties address positively women's concerns and interests. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.7 support this result. The marginal effects indicate a positive significant relationship between the percentage of favourable mentions and contacting politicians for women and men; however, the relationship is stronger for women.

Figure 4.4 illustrates how the marginal effect of gender changes with the percentage of favourable mentions. The figure shows that when the percentage of favourable mentions is between 1 and 4.8, men are significantly more likely to participate than women. When the percentage of favourable mentions is greater than 4.8, gender differences do not reach the $p<0.05$ level of significance. This result confirms the party platform hypothesis (H_4), stating that women will be more likely to be involved in politics than men when political parties are concerned with their interests. In other words, women may be more likely to contact politicians to express their opinions and preferences, or to advocate for an issue, when political parties have expressed favourable mentions toward them and other non-economic demographic groups. Since women have long been marginalized in the political system even after gaining the right to vote and run for office, they may be more likely to become involved

in politics when major actors in the political system are stating openly that they are attentive to their concerns and preferences. Political parties expressing favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups may send a signal to women that they are welcome in the political process, leading to higher levels of political participation for them when compared to men.

Findings for contacting politicians indicate that it is possible for party ideology to act as a signal for inclusion boosting women's participation more so than men's; however, simply having similar policy positions between parties and women is not enough. Parties need to directly address positively women's interests and concerns. In other words, the lack of confirmation for the left government hypothesis (H_2) and the number of left parties hypothesis (H_3) may demonstrate that although women are more likely to vote for parties on the left and hold opinions in line with left parties, the presence of these parties is not enough to increase women's participation in politics. Left parties may still be more likely to mobilize and appeal to their traditional male electorate, leaving women feeling excluded from the political process. What matters in term of ideologies present in the party system, then, is whether parties recognize the need for positive measures toward women and other non-economic demographic groups. It is when parties directly mention women's interests that women respond by increasing their levels of participation more so than men. This may occur either because ideologies act as a signal indicating to women that their interests and preferences are representated in the political process and their presence is welcome and/or because the inclusion of favourable mentions in party platforms is an indication that political parties are mobilizing women to get them involved in the political process, leading to smaller gender gaps in political participation.

Marginal effects and conditional standard errors are also calculated for the indicators of party ideology that did not produce significant interaction terms with gender for contacting politicians to provide complete results. Table 4.7 indicates that the presence of a left



Figure 4.3: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Contacting Politicians by Party Polarization



Figure 4.4: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Contacting Politicians by the Percentage of Favourable Mentions

government does not have a significant relationship with contacting politicians for women, but there is a significant relationship at the $p<0.05$ level between the two variables for men. For the latter, the presence of a left party in the government is associated with a lower likelihood of contacting politicians. This result indicates a possible gendered effect of the presence of a left party in government on contacting politicians since this indicator of party ideology influences women's and men's likelihood of participating differently. Yet, the lack of a significant interaction term between 'Left Government' and gender reveals that the difference between men's and women's logistic coefficients in Table 4.7 is not large enough to be significant. In other word, it is not possible to conclude that there is a different relationship between the presence of a left party in government and contacting politicians between men and women. Similarly, the number of left-wing political parties does not have a significant relationship with this political activity for women and men as the marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.7 indicate.

Overall, two indicators of party ideology are associated with a gendered effect on contacting politicians while the two others are not. Contacting politicians is about transmitting preferences directly to elected officials; this activity requires citizens to possess high levels of communication skills to clearly express these preferences. Men are more likely than women to possess high levels of these skills. The presence of political parties favourably addressing women's issues and concerns may allow women to overcome this disadvantage, explaining the gendered effect of the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups. The other gendered effect is from the party polarization index and suggests that women's greater tendency toward conflict-avoidance may explain why their likelihood of contacting politicians declines faster than men's as levels of polarization increases. The two other indicators of party ideology do not have a gendered effect on contacting politicians. A possible explanation for these results may be that the presence of a left party in government and the number of left parties do not influence the

levels of certain individual-level factors necessary for participation such as conflict-avoidance tendencies or communication skills.

4.3.6 Working with Others

The last indicator of political participation is working with others to express views about government actions and results for the gendered effects of party ideology on this activity are found in Table 4.9. Model 1 of Table 4.9 indicates that women are significantly less likely than men to engage with others even after individual-level factors are included as control variables. Model 2 of the same table reveals that the 'Women' logistic coefficient is not significant at the $p<0.05$ level, indicating that when the index of party polarization, the number of left parties, and the presence of a left party in government all take the value of zero, men and women have a similar likelihood of working with others. Model 3 shows that when the percentage of favourable mentions is zero, women are significantly less likely than men to engage in this political activity. These results in Models 2 and 3 indicate that gender differences for working with others may vary across the different indicators of party ideology. The following paragraphs discuss whether political ideology influences differently men's and women's likelihood of working with others and whether gender gaps in this activity vary as the indicators of party ideology take on values other than zero.

Table 4.9 shows that two interaction terms testing the gendered effects of party ideology reach the $p<0.05$ level of significance. First, there is a significant negative interaction term between gender and the index of party polarization. The negative sign means that as the party polarization increases, women increasingly lag behind men's levels of involvement, providing partial confirmation for the party polarization hypothesis (H_1), stipulating that gender differences in political participation should be smaller when the index of polarization is low. H_1, however, is not confirmed by the marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.7. For both men and women, the index of party polarization does not have a significant relationship with the likelihood of working with others. The presence of a

significant relationship between the polarization index and either women's or men's likelihood of participating is necessary to reach a positive conclusion, as explained in Chapter 2.

Table 4.9: The Influence of Party Ideology on Working with Others

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Woman	-0.19	***	0.04		-0.25	***
	(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.05)	
Education	1.17	***	1.12	***	1.28	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Employed	0.13	***	0.13	***	0.17	***
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Efficacy	0.53	***	0.52	***	0.55	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Partisanship	0.80	***	0.76	***	0.79	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Married	-0.05		-0.06	†	-0.03	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Age	-0.02		-0.02		0.03	
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Women Workforce			1.25	***	1.06	***
			(0.09)		(0.10)	
Parliamentary			-0.29	***	0.10	*
			(0.04)		(0.04)	
District Magnitude			-0.21	***	-0.39	***
			(0.01)		(0.02)	
Party Polarization			0.08		0.57	***
			(0.08)		(0.09)	
Left Government			0.40	***	0.29	***
			(0.05)		(0.05)	
Number Left Parties			-0.03		-0.85	***
			(0.09)		(0.08)	
Favourable Mentions					-0.12	
					(0.11)	
Polarization X Women			-0.20	*		
			(0.10)			
Left Government X Women			-0.09			
			(0.07)			
Number Left X Women			-0.10			
			(0.12)			
Favourable Mentions X Women					0.41	***
					(0.12)	
Constant	-2.77	***	-3.06	***	-2.73	***
	(0.07)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Random Effect						
Standard Deviation Intercept	0.28		0.20		0.17	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	30389		28911		24427	
Level 2 Units	21		20		17	

Continued on next page

Table 4.9 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

The second significant interaction term in Table 4.9 is between gender and the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups. This significant and positive interaction term means that as the percentage of favourable mentions increases, women's likelihood of engaging with others increases at a faster rate than men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 4.7 show that there is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of favourable mentions toward non-economic demographic groups and the likelihood of working with others for women but an insignificant relationship for men. These results are similar to the ones for contacting politicians and support the party platform hypothesis (H_4), stipulating that gender gaps in political participation should be smaller when political parties favourably address women's issues in their platforms. It seems that when political parties include favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups in their platforms, it may act as a signal that women's preferences are welcome in the decision-making process and/or that parties are mobilizing women in greater proportions, which leads in turn to increases in women's levels of political participation. These findings provide additional evidence showing that party ideology matters in explaining gender gaps in political participation and that the positions that are important as an explanation are not related to the left-right scale, but to whether political parties view favourably women's interests and concerns.

Figure 4.5 provides an illustration of how the marginal effect of gender changes according to the percentage of favourable mentions. According to Figure 4.5, when the percentage of favourable mentions is below 4, men are significantly more likely than women to engage with others. Additionally, when the number of favourable mentions is greater than 4, there is no significant difference between men's and women's likelihood. These results provide

more evidence confirming the party platform hypothesis (H_4); gender differences reduce and become insignificant as the percentage of favourable mentions increases.

Table 4.7 also shows the marginal effects and conditional standard errors for the other indicators of party ideology and their relationships with working with others for men and women. First, it can be observed that for both women and men, the presence of a left party in government is associated with greater involvement in this political activity. The logistic coefficients are significant at the $p<0.05$ level and positive in both cases. Second, Table 4.7 indicates that for men and women, the number of left-wing parties does not have a significant relationship with the likelihood of involvement with others to express views.

These two indicators of political ideology – the presence of a left party in government and the number of left parties – are not associated with a gendered effect on working with others. It was hypothesized in H_2 and H_3 that the presence and competition of left-wing political parties could send a signal to women that their presence in politics is welcome, leading to greater levels of political participation for them. Results for working with others, as well as results for the other political activities, indicate that the left government (H_2) and the left parties competition (H_3) hypotheses are not confirmed. In other words, the lack of a gendered effect for these two indicators of party ideology can be explained by the fact that left-wing political parties may not provide a signal that increases women's levels of political participation more so than men's.

4.3.7 Controls for Political Knowledge

The previous analyses of the gendered effects of party ideology on the different measures of political participation sometimes highlight the importance of political knowledge for understanding how men's and women's likelihood of involvement differs when confronted with varying political ideologies. The level of political knowledge is not included as a control in the previous statistical analyses since the data are not available for some countries. To test for whether political knowledge helps in understanding the gendered effects of party

ideology, a separate analysis is conducted with controls for this individual-level factor. Political knowledge is an important factor that is part of political engagement and one that is strongly correlated with political participation (Verba et al., 1997). Thus, including political knowledge as a control variable allows us to evaluate the relationships between gender, political participation, and party ideology. The statistical analyses, however, include a limited number of countries compared to the previous analyses discussed above. It is important to remember that this smaller number of countries limits the generability of the results. Models 4 and 5 in Table 4.10 to Table 4.15 give an indication of how political knowledge can influence the relationships between party ideology and political participation.

Table 4.10: The Influence of Party Ideology on Voter Turnout Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 4		Model 5
Women X Polarization	-0.13		
	(0.16)		
Women X Left Government	-0.04		
	(0.11)		
Women X Number Left	0.14		
	(0.19)		
Women X Favourable Mentions			0.28
			(0.17)
Constant	-0.93	***	-0.28
	(0.16)		(0.18)
Random Effect			
St. Dev.	0.33		0.45
Intercept	(0.04)		(0.06)
Level 1 Units	16864		14085
Level 2 Units	19		16

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, district magnitude, party polarization, left government, number of left parties, and favourable mentions but are not shown in the table.

Results in Models 5 and 6 in Table 4.10 to Table 4.15 show that once a control for political information is included, most of the interaction terms that were significant in Model 2 in Table 4.1 to Table 4.9 no longer are. For instance, before the controls, in three acts of political participation, the interaction term between the presence of a left-wing political party in government and gender was significant. After controlling for knowledge, two of these

interaction terms no longer are. These results may mean that the larger negative influence of 'Left Government' on women's likelihood of turning out to vote and the lack of a statistical effect on women's likelihood of participating in campaign activity occur because women do not possess the necessary amount of political knowledge to benefit from the incentives provided by the ideologies of political parties and to overcome hurdles to polical participation imposed by the presence of a left party in government. Once a control for knowledge is added to the statistical analyses, there is no difference between men's and women's relationships between the presence of a left party and political participation. As for the gendered influence of party ideology on political persuasion, the addition of politial knowledge as a control variable does not lead to an insignificant result. The relationship between the presence of a left party and the likelihood of involvement in this political activity is different for women and men; women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion does not increase at a lower rate than men's when a left party is part of government. Thus, the presence of a left party requires more than just a high level of political knowledge to take advantage of the incentives to participation the left party in government provides. A possible other factor that may be of importance when engaging in political persuasion is conflict-avoidance. Political persuasion requires that citizens engage with friends and family members to convince them to support a particular candidate and/or party, which in turn, requires that citizens be willing to engage in political discussions that may lead to fights among friends and family members. Women, since they are more likely to be conflict-avoidant than men, may not engage at a rate similar to men in political persuasion.

Similar results also occur for the index of party polarization. After controlling for political knowledge, party polarization is still associated with political participation; however, there are no longer any differences between men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians. The interaction term between party polarization and gender is insignificant for contacting politicians and working with others. The differences in levels of political knowledge between



Figure 4.5: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Working with Others by the Percentage of Favourable Mentions

Table 4.11: The Influence of Party Ideology on Protest Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 4		Model 5	
Women X Polarization	-0.18			
	(0.16)			
Women X Left Government	0.22	†		
	(0.11)			
Women X Number Left	-0.13			
	(0.21)			
Women X Favourable Mentions			0.26	
			(0.19)	
Constant	-3.24	***	-2.36	***
	(0.18)		(0.19)	
Random Effect				
St. Dev.	0.34		0.21	
Intercept	(0.05)		(0.06)	
Level 1 Units	16709		13933	
Level 2 Units	19		16	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for:, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, district magnitude, party polarization, left government, number of left parties, and favourable mentions but are not shown in the table.

men and women explain the different relationships between party polarization and these two political activities. As for the relationship between party polarization and involvement in political persuasion, the inclusion of a control for political knowledge does not eliminate the gendered effect. As Table 4.12 reveals, after controlling for political knowledge, the relationship between women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion and the party polarization index reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance while there is no relationship between the two variables for men. For women, as the index of polarization increases, their likelihood of engaging in political persuasion also increases. A possible explaination for this result may be that the presence of political parties that are further apart ideologically provides women either with a clear political party that they support or one that they oppose, increasing their likelihood of engaging in political persuasion. Women tend to be more likely to support and vote for left-wing political parties than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) and the presence of political parties that are further ideologically apart may make it easier for women to identify a political party to support and, in turn, engage in political persuasion.

Results for Model 5 in Table 4.10 to Table 4.15 are more similar to the original findings after the introduction of political knowledge as a control. It is possible to observe in Model 5 that for two of the indicators of political participation, the interaction term between the percentage of favourable mentions toward non-economic demographic groups and gender is still significant at the $p<0.05$ level. Furthermore, the sign of these interaction terms is still positive, meaning that as the percentage of favourable mentions increases, women's levels of political participation either increase at a faster rate or decrease at a slower rate than men. The presence of a high percentage of favourable mentions seems to be acting as a signal that has as a consequence to affect positively women's likelihood of involvement in contacting politicians and working with others at rates greater than men's. This gendered effect of the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups is not due to a difference between men's and women's levels of political knowledge.

Table 4.12: The Influence of Party Ideology on Political Persuasion Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 4		Model 5	
Women X Polarization	0.32	*		
	(0.14)			
Women X Left Government	-0.26	**		
	(0.09)			
Women X Number Left	0.09			
	(0.16)			
Women X Favourable Mentions			0.18	
			(0.16)	
Constant	-2.73	***	-2.32	***
	(0.14)		(0.16)	
Random Effect				
St. Dev.	0.46		0.34	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	16865		14086	
Level 2 Units	19		16	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, district magnitude, party polarization, left government, number of left parties, and favourable mentions but are not shown in the table.

Table 4.13: The Influence of Party Ideology on Campaign Activity Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 4		Model 5	
Women X Polarization	-0.22			
	(0.18)			
Women X Left Government	0.006			
	(0.12)			
Women X Number Left	-0.38	†		
	(0.22)			
Women X Favourable Mentions			0.63	**
			(0.20)	
Constant	-3.79	***	-3.29	***
	(0.19)		(0.21)	
Random Effect				
St. Dev.	0.27		0.20	
Intercept	(0.03)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	16108		13330	
Level 2 Units	18		15	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, district magnitude, party polarization, left government, number of left parties, and favourable mentions but are not shown in the table.

Table 4.14: The Influence of Party Ideology on Contacting Politicians Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 4		Model 5	
Women X Polarization	-0.10			
	(0.15)			
Women X Left Government	0.13			
	(0.10)			
Women X Number Left	-0.19			
	(0.18)			
Women X Favourable Mentions			0.38	**
			(0.15)	
Constant	-3.95	***	-4.04	***
	(0.17)		(0.25)	
Random Effect				
St. Dev.	0.12		0.05	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	16770		13996	
Level 2 Units	19		16	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, district magnitude, party polarization, left government, number of left parties, and favourable mentions but are not shown in the table.

Table 4.15: The Influence of Party Ideology on Working with Others Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 4		Model 5	
Women X Polarization	-0.23	†		
	(0.14)			
Women X Left Government	0.007			
	(0.09)			
Women X Number Left	-0.30	†		
	(0.16)			
Women X Favourable Mentions			0.37	*
			(0.15)	
Constant	-3.56	***	-2.46	***
	(0.14)		(0.19)	
Random Effect				
St. Dev.	0.26		0.26	
Intercept	(0.03)		(0.05)	
Level 1 Units	16698		13924	
Level 2 Units	19		16	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women, workforce participation, parliamentary system, district magnitude, party polarization, left government, number of left parties, and favourable mentions but are not shown in the table.

Table 4.16: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of Party Ideology Controlling for Knowledge I

	Vote				Protest				Political Persuasion			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Party Polarization	-0.41	**	-0.54	***	1.53	***	1.34	***	-0.02		0.30	*
	(0.15)		(0.16)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Left Government	-0.05		-0.09		0.29	***	0.51	***	1.02	***	0.76	***
	(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Number Left Parties	0.28	*	0.42	***	0.50	***	0.37	*	0.27	*	0.33	**
	(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.16)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Favourable Mentions	-0.30	**	-0.02		-0.74	***	-0.47	***	-1.23	***	-1.04	***
	(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.12)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.17: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of Party Ideology Controlling for Knowledge II

	Campaign Activity				Contact Politicians				Work with Others			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Party Polarization	-1.68	***	-1.91	***	-1.50	***	-1.60	***	0.33	**	0.10	
	(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Left Government	0.15	†	0.16		-0.22	**	-0.09		0.37	***	0.38	***
	(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Number Left Parties	0.86	***	0.48	*	0.08		-0.11		-0.27	*	-0.57	***
	(0.15)		(0.19)		(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.11)		(0.13)	
Favourable Mentions	-1.08	***	-0.44	**	0.08		0.45	***	-0.72	***	-0.35	**
	(0.15)		(0.16)		(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.12)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

4.4 Summary of Findings

This section presents a summary of the findings for the gendered effects of party ideology on political participation and relates these findings to the hypotheses outlined earlier in the chapter. Table 4.18 also provides a summary of the findings.

Table 4.18: Summary of Findings for the Gendered Effect of Party Ideology

	Voter Turnout	Protest	Political Persuasion	Campaign Activity	Contact Politicians	Work with Others
Party Polarization	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Left Government	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Number of Left Parties	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Favourable Mentions	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Cell entries indicate whether each indicator of party ideology has a gendered influence on political participation.

H_1 - The party polarization hypothesis. The first hypothesis elaborated in this chapter stipulates that the index of party polarization should have a negative effect on political participation and that this negative effect should be stronger for women. Results confirm this hypothesis for only one of six acts of political participation. For contacting politicians, women's likelihood declines faster than men's as the index of party polarization increases. A gendered effect of party polarization is also found on political persuasion, but the effect is reversed; men's probability of contacting politicians decreases faster than women's as polarization increases. In sum, there is some evidence to support H_1; but this evidence is limited to one act of political participation.

H_2 - The left government hypothesis. The second hypothesis stipulated that the presence of a left-wing political party in government whould be associated with increases in the likelihood of political participation for women and in greater proportions than for men. Results do not confirm this hypothesis. There is a gendered effect for the presence of a left party on three acts of political participation: voter turnout, political persuasion, and campaign activity. In all three of these cases, women's likelihood either decreases faster than men's or increases more slowly than men's when a left party is in government. For voter turnout and campaign activity, the gendered effect of the presence of a left party is caused by gender differences in levels of political knowledge. Women are less likely than men to be aware of the ideological orientations of the government which explains the impact of the presence of a left party in government for women's likelihood of political participation compared to men's.

H_3 - The left parties competition hypothesis. The third hypothesis tested in this chapter is similar to H_2; it hypothesizes that gender differences ought to be smaller when multiple left-wing political parties compete in elections since the competition among the parties may encourage them to mobilize women's support, which in turn, may lead women to participate at a higher rate in political activities. As for H_2, results do not confirm H_3. There is a

gendered effect of the number of left parties for one activity; however, this effect is contrary to the expectations of H_3. The number of left parties is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of participating in protest for both men and women, but the effect is stronger for men. It seems that women may not benefit from the incentives to political participation provided by the party system at the same rates as men. Again, the gendered effect of the number of left parties may be due to differences in men's and women' levels of political knowledge. Once a control for this factor is included in the analysis, the gendered effect of the number of left parties disappears.

H_4 - The party platform hypothesis. The last hypothesis included in this chapter argued that political parties directly addressing women's issues in their policy platforms should influence positively women's levels of political participation and that this influence should be greater than for men. Results do demonstrate a gendered effect for parties including women's issues in their platforms on two acts of political participation. For these two political activities – contacting politicians and working with others – women's likelihood of participating increases faster than men's when political parties include favourable mentions in their platforms.

4.5 Discussion of the Theoretical Implications of the Findings

This chapter presents the first test, to my knowledge, of the effect of political party ideology on men's and women's levels of political participation. It is hypothesized that party ideology may provide either symbolic or rational incentives that will foster women's levels of political participation more so than men's and/or that party ideology affects the likelihood of conflict in social networks, leading to cross-national differences in gender gaps. The symbolic reason for party ideology having a gendered effect on political participation is that the presence of political parties that address concerns held by women more so than men should have a greater positive influence on women. Additionally, the rational reason stipulates that

under certain circumstances such as a higher level of competition, political parties may more actively encourage women to participate in the political process, reducing and ultimately eliminating gender gaps in political participation. On the other hand, political ideology may act as a hurdle to political participation that affects men and women differently. The party polarization hypothesis (H_1) indicates that the ideological distance across political parties can serve as a barrier to political participation that increases conflict possibilities among citizens, which in turn, leads women to participate less in politics than men since they are more likely to be conflict-avoidant.

Findings provide support for the relevance of party ideology in explaining gender differences in political participation; however, results do not always confirm the hypotheses elaborated in this chapter. There is limited evidence confirming the influence of the index of party polarization on gender differences in political participation. For only one act of political participation, party polarization has a stronger negative influence on women's likelihood of political participation than on men's. Despite this limited support for H_1, this investigation contributes to the literature on political behaviour by demonstrating that party polarization is significantly linked with different acts of political participation and that this relationship is in many situations negative. These findings are contrary to what is traditionally expected in the literature. As discussed above, it has been widely argued that a large ideological difference between political parties should increase voter turnout (Downs, 1957) and other political activities (Karp and Banducci, 2011). For instance, it has been argued that when political parties are ideologically different from one another, it should be easier for citizens to identify the party that is the closest to their interests and preferences. Findings of this investigation demonstrate that this is not the case. For multiple acts of political participation – with the exception of participating in protest – high party polarization is associated with a lower likelihood of involvement in politics. These results are explained by the possibility that greater party polarization presents greater possibilities for conflict. Since there is a tendency

among citizens to avoid political activities when they are faced with differeing views in their social networks (Mutz, 2002), greater party polarization may lead to a decline in political participation levels.

The second and third hypotheses tested in this chapter focus on the gendered effects of the presence of left-wing political parties either in government or in the legislature. These hypotheses are not confirmed by the findings presented in this research. Results show, however, that there are some gendered effects associated with left political parties, only not the effects expected by the left government and party competition hypotheses. When a left-wing political party forms part of a government, men are more likely to engage in campaign activity and political persuasion, but this effect is not found among women. Moreover, a greater number of left-wing parties competing in elections is associated with lower levels of participation in protest for women when compared with men. These results seem to indicate that left-wing political parties do not provide a signal that increases women's levels of political participation more so than men's. A government and/or mulitiple political parties having policy positions similar to women's seem to not perform as a signal to women that their presence in the political process is welcome.

Additionally, findings for the left government and the left parties competition hypotheses may indicate that despite women being more likely than men to vote for left parties and being more likely to have left-wing opinions, political parties may still adopt traditional mobilization strategies that do not focus on obtaining women's support. Left parties may still believe that men are their traditional base of support and thus, they will actively pursue them to obtain their support. This situation may mean that women are still an 'undertapped market' and that despite incentives provided by the party system, left parties still prioritize men as their support base over women. Women's history of exclusion and marginalization from the political system may still have an effect on the mobilization strategies adopted by left-wing political parties. Since women have long been less likely than men to participate

in politics, left political parties may believe that there are no electoral gains to adopting a mobilizing strategy based on a segment of the electorate that has traditionally avoided participation.

This investigation also demonstrates that what positively influences women's levels of political participation and more so than men is not the presence of left-wing political parties, but the positive mention of women's interests and preferences by political parties. When parties include favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups in their platforms, women are more likely to contact politicians and work with others, and this influence is greater than that found among men. This chapter provides evidence that when political parties address women's concerns and issues, women respond by being more involved in some political activites. Political parties can contribute to a political environment that makes women feel welcome in the political process by addressing their concerns as citizens. Moreover, the findings for the party platform hypothesis may indicate that when political parties adopt mobilization strategies aimed at women, the results are an increase in women's participation in politics. The presence of favourable mentions toward women in party platforms may be an indication that parties recognize that women constitute part of their electoral base and thus, need to mobilize them to obtain their support. Parties may do so by including positive mentions toward women's interests and preferences in their platforms. In sum, what matters for women's political participation may not be the similarities in positions between them and political parties, but whether parties identify women as an electorate to mobilize and address their concerns in their policy propositions.

Finally, this chapter provides support for the inclusion of multiple indicators of political participation in investigations of the effects of political institutions. Findings in this chapter, in addition to the results of Chapter 3, demonstrate that political institutions may influence conventional activities such as voting and campaign activity and unconventional acts of political participation such as protest and working with others. Investigations of the gendered

influence of political institutions need to take into account different types of political participation. Institutions – and party ideology – may impact a variety of acts beyond turnout and involvement in electoral campaigns.

Chapter 5

Women's Representation and Gender Quotas

In this chapter, the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on gender differences in political participation is assessed. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the electoral system and the party system help to explain cross-national differences in gender gaps. Important factors associated with the electoral system and the party system that also need to be considered are women's representation and gender quotas. Gender quotas are an electoral rule or a characteristic of individual political parties that offer an explanation for levels of women's representation in the type of electoral system in place. It is possible that cross-national variation in women's representation as well as the presence of gender quotas provide further assistance in explaining varying gender gaps in political participation. This chapter demonstrates that women's representation, but not gender quotas, matters in understanding gender gaps in political participation. Additionally, this influence of women's representation matters for men's as well as women's behaviour.

In the following sections, I review the literature on the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on political participation and from this develop several hypotheses. It is hypothesized that greater representation of women in the legislature and cabinet has a stronger positive influence on women's levels of political participation than men's, leading to smaller gender gaps. Additionally, a hypothesis on the length of time since women were allowed to vote is tested. It is hypothesized that the longer women have experienced women competing in electoral politics, the more they will be involved in political activities, leading to smaller gender differences. I also hypothesize that the presence of legislative and/or voluntary party quotas results in smaller gender differences in political participation as women's levels of political activities should increase relative to men's due to their presence. Results do not,

however, confirm these hypotheses. The presence of women in the legislature and cabinet has a limited effect on gender differences for some acts of political participation and none on others. Moreover, voluntary party quotas and/or legislative quotas only affect gender gaps for one political activity. Finally, the only hypothesis with strong and consistent results relates to the influence of the length of time since women have achieved the right to vote. Results show that women's levels of political participation increase faster than men's in the years since women won the right to vote. In sum, it is argued that women's representation and gender quotas may provide a signal of inclusion in the political process to women, but also a signal of exclusion to men, leading to gender gaps in political participation.

5.1 Women's Representation

Since the late 1990s, a large body of work has tried to gauge the influence of the increased presence of women among elected representatives and candidates on citizen behaviour and especially on women's levels of political engagement and participation. Much of the scholarly investigations of the influence of women's representation in the electoral process focus on the United States and identify two mechanisms through which women's representation influences women's behaviour more so than men's.

The symbolic representation mechanism[1], or role-model effect, stipulates that the presence of female politicians in the electoral process sends cues to women in the electorate that "politics is not just a man's game", i.e. that women are welcome in the political process (Sapiro, 1981; Tolleson-Rinehart, 1992; Karp and Banducci, 2008b). In other words, symbolic representation includes "the attitudinal and behavioural effects that women's presence in positions of political power might confer to women citizens" (Lawless, 2004, 81). Although women have gained the right to vote and run for office, they are still marginalized politically as their lower number of elected representatives indicates. In most countries, the majority of

[1]The concept of symbolic representation originates in the work of Pitkin (1967). She refers to symbolic representation as citizens' feelings of being effectively represented.

candidates and representatives as well as political leaders are male. The dominance of male politicians in the political process may suggest to women that the political system is not fully open to them (Burns et al., 2001), explaining women's lower levels of political participation. The presence of women as candidates and representatives, however, challenges the notion that politics is a male activity (Koch, 1997). When more women run and get elected to office, it may send a signal to female citizens that they can be more involved in politics, increasing their levels of political participation and thereby closing the participation gap. The symbolic effect of women in politics is routinely used as a justification for increasing the number of women as candidates and elected representatives (Lawless, 2004). The effect of women politicians on women's levels of political participation cannot be reproduced in the same way by male politicians regardless of their policy opinions (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005). To increase women's levels of political participation and close gender gaps, the increased presence of women in the electoral process might be needed.

The symbolic effect also stipulates that increasing the percentage of women elected to office or among candidates will increase the political system's legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and especially women (Mansbridge, 1999). By seeing men and women represented more equally in the political process, more women may believe that the political system is fair, open and accessible, which in turn may lead to higher levels of political participation for women when compared to men. Indeed, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) find that an increased representation of women is associated with greater confidence in representative institutions. Norris and Franklin (1997) find that increased women's representation is related to an increased perception of legitimacy for the legislature. In sum, if women recognize that the political system is open to them and thus legitimate, it may translate into higher levels of political activity for women.

The second mechanism addressing the influence of women's representation on gender gaps in political participation is substantive representation (Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007).

Substantive representation is defined as "acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin, 1967, 209). According to Dolan (2006), there is strong evidence that issues and priorities that are important to women receive greater attention in the policy-making process when there are more women serving as representatives (Saint-Germain, 1989; Kathlene, 1995; Swers, 2002; Childs and Whithey, 2004). Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) also find a relationship between women's descriptive representation and government responsiveness to women's policy concerns. When there are more women elected to government, the legislative process will address at greater lengths questions of gender equality and social welfare policies that women favour more than men (Lovenduski and Norris, 2003). Moreover, women candidates are more likely to campaign on issues of interest to women (Dabelko and Herrnson, 1997; Larson, 2001; Herrnson et al., 2003). Scholars have also found that women tend to conduct politics in a different manner than men; one that is more open, collegial, and inclusive (Kathlene, 1995; Rosenthal, 1998). This different way of doing politics may be closer to women's conception of interpersonal relationships and communication styles (see Gilligan (1982)). This shift in the conduct of politics in the presence of women politicians and the addition of the issues these women bring into the political process may change the perception of the electorate – especially among women – about the political process. By seeing that their priorities and values as well as their ideals about how politics and interpersonal relationships should be conducted are present in the political system, women may be more likely to engage in political activities, leading to smaller gender differences in political participation.

Findings of previous studies concerning the impact of women's representation on gender differences in citizen behaviour and attitudes have been mixed. Some scholars have found a greater positive influence of women's representation on women's levels of political engagement, especially political efficacy and interest in politics (Koch, 1997; High-Pippert and Comer, 1998; Atkeson and Rapoport, 2003; Verba et al., 1997; Sapiro and Conover,

1997; Hansen, 1997; Burns et al., 2001; Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007; Reingold and Harrell, 2010) and on political participation (Hansen, 1997; Burns et al., 2001). On the other hand, some researchers have found that women's representation has little effect on gender differences in political participation – especially campaign activity (Lawless, 2004; Dolan, 2006; Karp and Banducci, 2008b; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012). Overall, the literature on women's representation and political behaviour seems to demonstrate that context matters. Women candidates and elected representatives will have an influence of citizen behaviour and attitudes about politics when women's issues are debated during the election campaign (Koch, 1997; Sapiro and Conover, 1997; Hansen, 1997), when women candidates are visible and competitive (Atkeson and Rapoport, 2003) and when a female candidate of the same party as the female citizen is running in an election (Reingold and Harrell, 2010). These findings of the influence of women's representation occur under specific circumstances - that is, when they are cued by electoral campaigns or candidates. When the impact of women's representation is analyzed over a longer period of time, little effect is found on gender gaps in political engagement or political participation (Lawless, 2004; Dolan, 2006).

As mentioned above, most of the research on the influence of women's representation on gender differences in political participation analyzes the United States. The few comparative studies that have been undertaken show that the number of women elected in the legislature is not an important explanation for gender differences in political participation. Karp and Banducci (2008b), in a study including 35 democracies, demonstrate that the presence of women in the legislature is positively associated with greater political engagement for women, but also for men. Their results reveal, however, no corresponding effect for women's representation on political participation. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) also find that women's representation has little influence on gender gaps in political participation. The only positive influence of women's representation that they find is on women's levels of political discussion. As the number of women in the legislature increases, women's political

discussion also increases and at a faster rate than men's. Finally, Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) show that, in 23 European democracies, women are more likely than men to discuss and participate in politics when the number of women in the legislature is high.

In sum, cross-national studies have not consistently found a gendered influence of the percentage of women elected in the legislature on political participation. While Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) and Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) both found an influence of women's representation on gender differences in political discussion, Karp and Banducci (2008b) do not find any gendered influence on political participation. A possible explanation for these varying results may be in the number and type of countries included in the analyses. These comparative studies do not include the same countries in their sample; for instance, Karp and Banducci (2008b) analyze data from 35 democracies around the world while Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007)'s study only includes European democracies. As discussed in Chapter 2, including democracies with varying levels of socioeconomic development runs the risk of misidentifying the gendered effects of political institutions. Women's representation may have a different gendered effect on political participation depending on the level of socioeconomic development. For this reason, this investigation only focuses on democracies sharing a similar level of socioeconomic development. This other test of the effect of the percentage of women in the legislature on gender gaps in political participation will allow us to isolate the gendered effect of women's representation from the influcence of culture and economic development.

Two different measures of women's representation have been employed. Some studies test the impact of women as candidates in elections – successful or not – and others use the number of elected women representatives as an indicator of women's representation. As discussed previously, results show that candidates tend to have a greater impact on citizen behaviour than elected representatives. Much of the literature focusing on the impact of female candidates is limited to the United States, where election campaigns tend to

concentrate on the individuals competing for office (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). In a cross-national setting, the use of women candidates as an indicator of women's representation is inadequate. Some countries included in the sample employed in the current analysis employ multimember districts and party-list voting which leaves the relationship between individual candidates and voters obscured (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). As such, using female candidates as an indicator of women's representation is not an acceptable approach in cross-national research. Some scholars argue that female candidates can act as role models and increase women's attention to political issues by running on issues that are close to women's priorities even if they are not elected in office (Dolan, 2006). In countries with multimember districts, electoral campaigns focus less on individual candidates and their personality and opinions; therefore, woman candidates may not have an impact on gender differences in political participation (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). In electoral systems employing multimember districts and party list voting, it is more plausible that women's representation as measured by the collective body of elected politicians would influence women's levels of political participation. It is only when women politicians are elected into office that women can receive the cues and incentives to participation that these politicians provide.

As a result, the analysis herein uses the collective representation of women as an indicator of women's representation. Collective representation focuses on how well an institution as a whole represents citizens (Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007). Women's representation is not measured as whether each woman in the electorate has an elected representative in their constituency that shares the same gender, but rather as the level of women's representation in each country's legislature. It is expected that countries with a higher percentage of women in the national legislature will be associated with smaller gender gaps in political participation. As mentioned above, two mechanisms can explain this relationship – symbolic and substantive representation. As elected representatives, women can send a signal that female citizens

are welcome in the political process which will increase women's levels of political activities and decrease the size of gender differences. Furthermore, by bringing attention to women's issues in the decision-making process, women politicians create a political environment that provides additional incentives for women to participate in politics, leading to smaller gender gaps.

H_1 - The women in the legislature hypothesis: A higher percentage of women elected representatives should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation.

Another important finding of previous work on the impact of women's representation on gender differences in political participation is on the visibility and competitiveness of women politicians. To be able to positively influence women's levels of political participation, women's representation needs to be visible to the electorate (Atkeson and Rapoport, 2003). If women are not aware that women are present in the political process, it is unlikely that it can have a positive effect on their levels of political participation. Moreover, if women politicians are not successful or competitive in getting elected and performing their tasks, it may send a signal to women that may suppress their levels of political participation (Atkeson and Rapoport, 2003). Unsuccessful women politicians may confirm negative stereotypes about women in politics which in turn will discourage female citizens from participating in politics. In other words, women politicians who have difficulty competing against male politicians in elections may signal to citizens that women do not possess the necessary abilities and qualities to be involved in politics and that women's role in society in more in the private sphere of their home and community and not in politics.

The visibility and competitiveness of women's representation hypothesis has been tested in the United States; the degree of competitiveness of election races in which women are involved is used as the indicator of women's representation. As noted above, it is difficult to use candidates as the indicator for this concept in cross-national analyses. The visibility and competitiveness of races, however, may not be the only way of measuring this aspect of

women's representation. The presence of women in cabinet may also be used as a measure of the visibility and success of women politicians. Cabinet positions tend to be highly visible to the public and highly desired posts. Having a high proportion of women in cabinet may send a signal to women that they are sufficiently competent to undertake important functions in the political process which in turn can lead them to feel confident enough to take part in political activities. Women cabinet members are also in an excellent position to advocate for issues and policies that are important to female citizens. By making these issues more visible at the executive level, women cabinet members may provide incentives for female citizens to engage in politics. In sum, both the symbolic and substantive mechanisms identified above may result from the presence of women in cabinet.

H_2 - The women in cabinet hypothesis: A higher proportion of women in cabinet should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation.

Finally, this study includes an hypothesis testing the influence of the history of women's representation on gender differences in political participation. The literature on cross-national differences in levels of women's representation indicates that the history of women's access to the electoral system matters (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Reynolds, 1999; Tripp and Kang, 2008). The passage of time since women first gained the right to vote and run for office has a positive relationship with the percentage of women getting elected in the national legislature. In other words, the earlier that women achieved the right to vote and run for office, the greater the proportion of women members of the national legislature over time. It is argued that "the more the electorate is accustomed to seeing women compete for political power, the more likely women should be elected" (Tripp and Kang, 2008, 344).

A similar argument can be made for gender differences in political participation. The influence of women's representation on gender gaps may take some time before being observed. Changes in culture and opinions about women's role in politics may require the passage of time. The longer women have to grow accustomed to seeing women run in elec-

toral campaigns, get elected to the legislature, and exerting an influence on the political decision-making process, the more likely they are to believe that the presence of women in the political process is not unusual (Reynolds, 1999). Thus, female citizens, taking cues from a long history of the presence of women, will be more likely to engage in political activities. In sum, the longer that women have had the right to vote, and that they have had role models to look up to, the smaller gender differences in political participation should be.

H_3 - The history of women's representation hypothesis: A longer history of women having the right to vote should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation.

5.2 Gender Quotas

Another avenue for assessing the influence of women's representation on gender differences in political participation is to study the effects of gender quotas. Quotas and women's representation are linked; gender quotas are adopted primarily to increase the percentage of female politicians in legislatures. Moreover, in some debates surrounding the adoption of gender quotas, proponents tend to argue that quotas can also affect citizen behaviour and attitudes (Zetterberg, 2009). Quotas can lead to the political advancement of women in all spheres, beyond their presence in the legislature (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005); they can reshape attitudes and values about women's role in politics (Kittilson, 2005). It is believed that quotas "could help to empower women citizens and break their long-standing subordination in political life" (Zetterberg, 2009, 715). In a fashion similar to the influence of women's representation, gender quotas can send cues to citizens about the appropriate place of both women and men in the political process, thereby influencing levels of political participation.

The literature on the gendered effects of quotas has identified three mechanisms through which quotas can influence gender gaps in political participation. Similar to women's repre-

sentation, the first mechanism is symbolic. Gender quotas may send signals to citizens, and especially female citizens, that the political sphere is open to women's participation and that the political process is fair and legitimate (Krook, 2007). By adopting a law mandating the presence of women on electoral lists, the government stipulates to women citizens that they are not just subjects, but also decision-makers and leaders (Zetterberg, 2009). Furthermore, gender quotas are an example of a gender equality policy; this policy may send a signal to women that the political process prioritizes women's and men's equality. This signal likely makes women feel better represented in the political process and may give them a more positive attitude about politics (Kittilson, 2005), which in turn, may spur their levels of participation. Women's perceptions about their role in politics may also change, leading to greater political involvement on their part and smaller gender gaps. Men's levels of political participation should not be affected by gender quotas – at least not in the same way – since gender quotas directly target women's inclusion in the political process.

The second mechanism links gender quotas to increases in women's representation, which in turn affect gender differences in political participation (Zetterberg, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). The primary goal of gender quotas is to increase the number of women in legislatures. Studies have found that some gender quotas are successful in reaching this goal (Tripp and Kang, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). By achieving their objective, gender quotas lead to increased attention directed to women's policy preferences. As mentioned above, a greater proportion of women legislators is associated with greater consideration in the legislative process to issues and policies that are favoured by women and with improving their evaluations of the political process. Again, this greater substantive representation of women that results from the adoption of gender quotas could provide incentives to women in the electorate to be involved in political activities, leading to smaller gender differences.

The third mechanism through which gender quotas could lead to smaller gender gaps in political participation is through women's mobilization (Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). According

to Schwindt-Bayer (2011), quotas "give political parties a tool to reach out to women in the electorate and garner greater support" (7). In other words, gender quotas give political parties an argument for convincing women to support them. Moreover, gender quotas create an incentive for political parties to target the women's vote. Quotas may make parties realize that women are an "undertapped market" (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012), that is often overlooked. By creating an incentive to convince women to support them, political parties may ask women to get involved in politics. This direct contact by political parties will likely result in women's increased involvement with political parties and in electoral campaigns, thereby reducing gender gaps.

The adoption of gender quotas by a government is also usually associated with vigorious debates among the public and political elites (Schwindt-Bayer, 2011) and with a re-energizing of the women's movement, often a vocal participant in these debates (Krook, 2007). The women's movement may also act in a manner similar to political parties and reach out to women to ask them to get involved in the political process to increase the likelihood of gender quotas being adopted by the government. Again, this mobilization of women by the women's movement may increase their involvement in the political process and decrease gender differences in political participation.

Very few studies have looked to gender quotas as an explanation for gender differences in political participation. Some case-studies have found that gender quotas have positively affected women's political attitudes and activities (Kudva, 2003; Krook, 2006; Zetterberg, 2009). On the other hand, large-N quantitative studies have mostly focused on the impact of legislative quotas on gender differences in Latin America and have not concluded that the presence of quotas reduces gender gaps (Zetterberg, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). Legislative quotas are mandated by the constitution of a country or its legislature and require political parties to establish a target for women (Norris, 2004). Countries with legislative quotas stipulate by law that each political party running in elections should nominate a certain per-

centage of women as candidates. Penalties can be applied if political parties do not respect the quota legislation. Those studies that have evaluated the influence of legislative gender quotas on gender gaps in political participation reveal no impact on gaps in political participation (Zetterberg, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). However, both analyses focused on Latin American countries (Zetterberg, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). On the other hand, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) find, in an analysis including over 30 democracies around the world, that legislative quotas are associated with greater women's involvement and smaller gender differences in political persuasion and campaign activity. These contradictory findings likely are explained by the different countries included in the analyses. Since it does not appear that legislative quotas lead to smaller gender differences in political participation in Latin America, the positive impact of quotas found by Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) may be limited to advanced industrial democracies. Advanced industrial democracies tend to be associated with a greater commitment toward gender equality than other countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). This culture of greater acceptance toward men and women occupying similar roles in society may translate into a greater acceptance of gender quotas as a useful tool to acheive this equality between men and women. In turn, the presence of a gender quota in advanced industrial democracies may result in smaller gender gaps in political participation since the culture is already more accepting of women as elected representatives.

Beside legislative quotas, there exists another type of gender quotas: voluntary party quotas. As its name indicates, voluntary party quotas are not imposed on political parties by the constitution or statutory legislation. Instead, parties choose to voluntary adopt targets for women among their candidates. Political parties may adopt voluntary gender quotas to attract women voters and/or because their ideology advocates for a greater commitment toward gender equality. Since this type of gender quotas is voluntary and not all parties adopt them, voluntary party quotas tend not to be included in analyses on the influence

of gender quotas on differences in political participation between women and men. Not all political parties in a country have to apply quotas to their candidate list, and thus, voluntary party quotas may not have a symbolic, substantive or mobilization effect on women's levels of political participation and gender gaps. Women may not be aware of voluntary party quotas, and voluntary quotas may be less effective in increasing the number of women who get elected and changing the focus of policies in the political process.

There is, however, some evidence that voluntary party quotas are associated with an increase in the proportion of women in the legislature (Caul, 2001; Norris, 2004; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Tripp and Kang (2008) reveal that voluntary party quotas should be more likely to increase women's representation since political parties that adopt them are committed to gender equality. Legislative quotas, since they are imposed on political parties, can be enforced; parties may, however, prefer to pay a fine instead of meeting the required number of women candidates, for instance. These increased number of women elected when major political parties adopt voluntary party quotas can lead, according to the second mechanism identified above, to smaller gender differences in political participation. By increasing the proportion of women members of legislatures, voluntary party quotas may transform the political process in such a way that issues and opinions favoured by women are better addressed in legislatures. This greater substantive representation of women should lead to increasing levels of political participation among them and smaller gender gaps.

H_4 - The gender quotas hypothesis: The adoption of legislative or voluntary party gender quotas should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation.

5.3 The Gendered Effect of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas

Table 5.1 to Table 5.8 present the multi-level logistic regression analyses testing for the four hypotheses elaborated above[2]. Before assessing whether these hypotheses are confirmed by

[2]Chapter 2 contains information on the indicators used to assess the four hypotheses. Results in Table 5.1 to Table 5.8 also include additional control variables that are related to the number of women in the legisla-

the results, a discussion of the control variables is needed. Table 5.1 to Table 5.8 indicate that political efficacy and partisanship are strongly related with all acts of political participation included in this analysis. As the literature predicts, citizens with greater levels of partisanship and political efficacy are more likely to engage in a variety of political acts. Moreover, the level of education is significantly linked with political participation; as education levels increase, the likelihood of involvement in political acts also increases. The relationship between the employment status of respondents and political participation varies by political activity. Being employed full-time is related positively and significantly with voter turnout, contacting politicians, and working with others, but not with the three other acts of political participation. A similar situation also occurs for the control variables of marital status and age. Married citizens are significantly more likely to turnout and contact politicians; however, they are less likely than others to be involved in protest and to attempt political persuasion. As citizens age, they are significantly more likely to vote, participate in campaign activity, and contact politicians; but older citizens are less likely to engage in protest and political persuasion than younger ones.

The country-level control variables also relate to political participation in expected ways. The percentage of women in the workforce is positively associated with involvement in political persuasion, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and working with others; however, it is negatively associated with voter turnout and protest. As expected, parliamentary regimes are significantly associated with lower voter turnout, protest, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and working with others. Furthermore, the logged district magnitude measure has a negative and significant relationship with the likelihood of engaging in protest, political persuasion, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and working with others. Finally, the number of left-wing political parties running in elections has a positive and significant relationship with the probability of engaging in voting, protest, political

ture. The district magnitude control for the finding that proportional electoral systems are associated with a greater number of women elected in legislatures and the number of left-wing political parties is included to control for the tendency of left parties to nominate and elect more women.

persuasion and working with others.

Overall, most of the control variables, both at the individual and country-level, relate to the different acts of political participation in ways anticipated by a review of the literature.

5.3.1 Voter Turnout

After assessing the results in Table 5.1 to Table 5.8 for the control variables, the analysis can now turn to the hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter. Five separate models are conducted; one model for each interaction term between gender and an indicator of women's representation or gender quotas and one model with only individual-level control variables. Five models are analyzed since there is a multicollinearity problem between the percentage of women in the legislature and the percentage of women in cabinet. As the percentage of women in the legislature increases, the percentage of women in cabinet increases strongly. Both indicators, thus, cannot be included in the same multi-level statistical analysis. To solve this problem and ease the interpretation of the result, different models are included in this analysis each containing its own test of the four hypotheses included in this chapter.

Table 5.1: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Voter Turnout

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	0.02		0.09		-0.04		-0.16	†	0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.05)	
Education	1.36	***	1.34	***	1.40	***	1.36	***	1.36	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Employed	0.16	***	0.19	***	0.18	***	0.18	***	0.19	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	1.00	***	0.99	***	0.99	***	0.98	***	1.00	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Partisanship	1.06	***	1.03	***	1.04	***	1.04	***	1.05	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Married	0.38	***	0.37	***	0.39	***	0.38	***	0.38	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	2.48	***	2.50	***	2.50	***	2.50	***	2.50	***
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
Women Workforce			-1.01	***	-1.55	***	-1.17	***	-0.91	***
			(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
Parliamentary			0.17	***	-0.01		-0.07		-0.17	***
			(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	

Continued on next page

Table 5.1 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
District Magnitude			0.25	***	0.31	***	0.15	***	0.14	***
			(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Number Left Parties			0.14	*	-0.13	†	0.30	***	-0.03	
			(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Women Legislature			-0.14				0.07		-0.15	
			(0.13)				(0.11)		(0.13)	
Women Cabinet					-0.26	**				
					(0.10)					
Right Vote			2.19	***	1.90	***	1.76	***	2.19	***
			(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.11)	
Gender Quotas			0.44	***	0.36	***	0.57	***	0.64	***
			(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Women X Legislature			-0.15							
			(0.13)							
Women X Cabinet					0.16					
					(0.11)					
Women X Right Vote							0.34	*		
							(0.14)			
Women X Quotas									0.01	
									(0.07)	
Constant	-0.87	***	-2.22	***	-1.62	***	-1.84	***	-1.85	***
	(0.08)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.11)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.22		0.18		0.24		0.20		0.22	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	30485		30485		30485		30485		30485	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5.1 provides the results for the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on voter turnout. The first line of Models 1 to 5 in Table 5.1 includes the logistic coefficient for 'Women', indicating whether the difference between men's and women's likelihood of turning out is significant at the $p<0.05$ level. As Table 5.1 reveals, in all models, gender differences are not significant; men and women have the same likelihood of voting. Since Models 2 through 5 include an interaction term, the proper interpretation for the 'Women' logistic coefficient is that it indicates the state of gender gaps when the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas are equal to zero. In other words, because of the interaction term between 'Women' and the indicators of women's representation and

gender quotas, the 'Women' coefficient is the significance of gender gaps in voter turnout when the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, the number of years since women won the right to vote, the presence of gender quotas are equal to zero. The analysis of the significance of the interaction terms, described in the paragraphs below, will assess whether the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas influence women's and men's likelihood of turnout differently and lead to variation in the size and significance of gender gaps.

As discussed in Chapter 2, statistically significant interaction terms between each indicator of women's representation, gender quotas and gender identify when a relationship with voter turnout differs between women and men. Table 5.1 reveals that this is only the case for the number of years since women gained the right to vote. It is the only interaction term that is significant at the $p<0.05$ level; moreover, this interaction is positive, meaning that as the number of years since women have gained the right to vote in elections increases, women's probability of turning out to vote increases at a faster rate or decreases at a slower rate than men's. These results confirm the history of women's representation hypothesis; H_3 stipulates that gender gaps in political participation should be smaller when there is a longer history of women having the right to vote. For voting, none of the three remaining hypotheses are confirmed; gender differences in participation are not influenced by gender quotas or the presence of women in the legislature and cabinet.

As explained in Chapter 2, a significant interaction term does not indicate whether the number of years since women achieved the right to vote has a significant influence on women's or men's likelihood of turnout, but rather merely whether it differs by gender (Brambor et al., 2006). To assess whether the number of years is significantly related with turnout, marginal effects and conditional standard errors are calculated. Table 5.2 presents these marginal effects and reveals that the number of years since women gained the right to vote is significantly and positively related to turnout for both men and women, but the

relationship is stronger for women. These results confirm H_3, stipulating that a longer history of women's representation should be associated with greater political involvement for women. This finding conforms to a pattern occuring for mulitiple political activities where women's representation seems to act as a signal of inclusion for women. A longer history of women's representation may signal to women that they are fully accepted as participants in politics, leading them to feel included in the political process, which in turn, increases their levels of political participation.

Table 5.2: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas I

	Vote				Protest				Political Persuasion			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Women Legislature	-0.14		-0.29	*	0.86	***	1.25	***	-0.63	***	-0.43	***
	(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.15)		(0.11)		(0.11)	
Women Cabinet	-0.26	**	-0.10		0.43	***	0.60	***	-0.26	***	-0.25	***
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Right Vote	1.76	***	2.10	***	-0.92	***	-0.57	***	1.40	***	1.52	***
	(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Gender Quotas	0.64	***	0.65	***	0.56	***	0.62	***	-0.28	***	-0.33	***
	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 5.1 illustrates the significance of gender differences for voter turnout. This figure shows that when the number of years since women have gained the right to vote is below 20, gender differences are significant with men being more likely to turnout than women. When the number of years is above 85, gender differences are again significant with women's probability of turnout being higher than men. Figure 5.1 shows that as the number of years increases, gender differences decrease and reverse with women having higher levels of turnout than men as women's representation becomes more firmly embedded in history. This occurs since women's probability increases faster than men's as the number of years increases. These results demonstrate that women's representation, and especially the number of years since women won the right to vote, matters in explaining gender differences in political participation. Additional results for the other political activities included in this analysis as well as those for voting show that it is not so much having women present in cabinet and the legislature that are important for understanding gender gaps, but whether citizens are used to the presence of women in politics. Attitudes toward politics and political behaviour such as involvement in political activities may take years before being affected by the increased presence of women in politics, explaining why time matters more than the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet for explaining gender gaps in political participation.

Even though the interaction terms between the other indicators of women's representation and gender quotas with gender are not significant, marginal effects and conditional standard errors also need to be calculated for the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, and gender quotas (Brambor et al., 2006). Table 5.1 only indicates whether women's representation and gender quotas have a significant relationship with men's likelihood of turnout. To obtain complete results on whether these indicators are related to voting for all citizens, marginal effects and conditional standard errors need to be calculated.

The percentage of women in the legislature and in cabinet may be associated with gendered effects, as Table 5.2 indicates. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors for

the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet in Table 5.2 present some evidence of a gendered effect of these two indicators on voter turnout. The percentage of women in the legislature has a significant and negative relationship with the likelihood of turning out to vote for women and a insignifciant relationshp with turnout for men. Also, the presence of women in cabinet does not have a significant relationship with turnout for women, but has a significant and negative relationship for men. Since the interaction terms between gender and the percentage of women in the legislature and in cabinet in Table 5.1 are not significant, it is not possible to conclude that the presence of women in the legislature and cabinet affects men's and women's turnout differently. The small difference between the logistic coefficients of women and men in Table 5.2 is probably enough to make one relationship significant and the other not, but not enough to conclude that the relationships are different for women and men.

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.2 also show that there are significant and positive relationships between the presence of gender quotas and turning out to vote for women and men. Whether countries or political parties adopt gender quotas, there is no difference in likelihood of voting for citizens.

In sum, only one indicator of women's representation is associated with a gendered effect on likelihood of turnout and with variation in gender gaps: the number of year since women won the right to vote. This indicator of the history of women's representation may have a gendered influence on turnout since the right for women to vote is directly linked with the rules surrounding elections. The percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet are not rules that are related to who can run for office and vote such as in the case for when women obtained the right to vote. It is possible that gender differences in voting are more likely to be influenced by electoral rules. The absence of a gendered effect of quotas on voter turnout may be an indication that to effectively influence gender gaps, electoral rules need time before affecting men's and women's political behaviour.

5.3.2 Protest

Table 5.3 demonstrates the results for the four hypotheses concerning the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on gender differences in participating in protest. Again, the 'Women' coefficient in Models 2 to 5 indicates the state and significance of gender gaps in protest when each indicator of women's representation and gender quotas equals zero. For Models 2, 3, 4 and 5, gender differences are significant at the $p<0.05$ level with women being less likely to engage in protest than men when the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, the number of year since women won the right to vote, and gender quotas equal zero. The interaction terms, discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, assess whether all indicators of women's representation and gender quotas influence men's and women's likelihood of engaging in protest differently and whether the size and significance of gender gaps vary as these indicators take values greater than zero.

Table 5.3: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Protest Activity

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.10	**	-0.31	***	-0.1	**	-0.31	**	-0.16	*
	(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.10)		(0.07)	
Education	1.67	***	1.67	***	1.67	***	1.71	***	1.71	***
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Employed	-0.03		-0.04		-0.05		-0.06		-0.06	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	0.49	***	0.47	***	0.45	***	0.47	***	0.47	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Partisanship	0.53	***	0.53	***	0.54	***	0.56	***	0.56	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	-0.20	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.18	***	-0.19	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	-1.43	***	-1.47	***	-1.46	***	-1.45	***	-1.45	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)	
Women Workforce			-0.66	***	-0.39	***	-0.60	***	-0.60	***
			(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Parliamentary			-0.20	***	-0.16	***	-0.33	***	-0.33	***
			(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
District Magnitude			-0.08	***	-0.07	***	-0.08	***	-0.08	***
			(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Number Left Parties			0.85	***	0.69	***	0.58	***	0.58	***
			(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Women Legislature			0.86	***			0.91	***	0.91	***

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Table 5.3 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
			(0.15)				(0.12)		(0.12)	
Women Cabinet					0.43	***				
					(0.10)					
Right Vote			-0.73	***	-0.59	***	-0.92	***	-0.75	***
			(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.14)		(0.11)	
Gender Quotas			0.69	***	0.73	***	0.59	***	0.56	***
			(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Women X Legislature			0.39	**						
			(0.15)							
Women X Cabinet					0.17					
					(0.12)					
Women X Right Vote							0.35	*		
							(0.16)			
Women X Quotas									0.06	
									(0.08)	
Constant	-3.13	***	-3.21	***	-3.02	***	-2.94	***	-3.02	***
	(0.09)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.14)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.22		0.16		0.21		0.26		0.26	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	30440		30440		30440		30440		30440	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

As Table 5.3 shows, two of the four interaction terms testing the hypotheses elaborated above are significant. First, there is a significant positive interaction term between the percentage of women in the legislature and gender, meaning that as the percentage of women in the legislature increases, women are increasingly more likely than men to engage in protest. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.2 confirm this finding. For both women and men, the percentage of women in the legislature is significantly and positively related to the probability of engaging in protest; however, women's likelihood increases faster than men's. These results demonstrate that, as the presence of women in legislatures hypothesis (H_1) indicates, gender differences in protest are smaller when the percentage of women in the legislature is higher since the influence of women in the legislature is greater on women's participation than on men's. It is hypothesized that a larger presence of women in the legislature should act as a signal or should increase the substantive representation of

women in the electorate, which in turn, should encourage women in being involved in the political process.

Figure 5.2 graphs gender differences in participating in protest for every level of women's presence in the legislature. This figure shows that when the percentage of women is 29 or below, gender differences are significant with men being more likely than women to engage in protest. Gender differences are not significant when the percentage of female politicians in the legislature is above 29. The results in Figure 5.2 provide support for H_1; gender differences for protest decrease and become insignificant as the percentage of women in the legislature increases.

The second significant interaction term in Table 5.3 is between gender and the number of years since women have obtained the right to vote in elections. As for the previous results for voting, this interaction term is significant and positive, meaning that as the number of years increases, women's likelihood of engaging in protest increases at a faster rate or decreases at a slower rate than men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.2 indicate that the number of years since women gained the right to vote has a significant and negative influence on men's and women's likelihood of participating in protest; however, the relationship is stronger for men. These results do not confirm the history of women's representation hypothesis (H_3) that hypothesized that the number of years since women achieved the right to vote should influence women but not men. The analysis suggests that women's levels of political participation do not benefit from a longer history of the presence of women in electoral politics. Findings show that smaller gender gaps in participating in protest when the number of years is high are due to the stronger negative influence on men's levels of participation in this activity. It is possible that men feel excluded from the political process when there is a longer history of women's representation, leading them to withdraw from political activities. As for the findings for voter turnout, it seems that women's representation may not only act as a signal of inclusion for women, but



Figure 5.1: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Voter Turnout by the Number of Years Since Women Won the Right to Vote



Figure 5.2: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Protest by the Percentage of Women in the Legislature

also as a sign of exclusion for men, leading them to withdraw from politics when there is a longer history of women's representation.

Figure 5.3 illustrates the marginal effect of gender for each year beyond when women gained the right to vote. This figure provides some support for H_3 in that it shows that gender differences decrease and become insignificant as the number of years increases. Gender differences in protest activity are significant with men being more likely to engage in this activity than women when the number of years is below 82. Gender differences are insignificant when the number of years since women have gained the right to vote is above 82.

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors are also calculated for the two indicators of women's representation and gender quotas that do not result in a significant interaction term with gender in Table 5.3. For both men and women, the presence of female politicians in cabinet is associated with a significant and positive likelihood of engaging in this activity. In other words, the percentage of women in cabinet has a similar influence on men and women and does not affect gender gaps in protest; the women in cabinet hypothesis (H_2) is not supported by these results. Additionally, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.2 do not indicate that the presence of legislative gender quotas or voluntary party quotas is associated with a gendered influence. Gender quotas are positively and significantly associated with a greater likelihood of involvement in protest for both men and women.

For the findings on the presence of women in cabinet, the lack of a gendered influence may occur because women cabinet members do not convey a similar signal to women as the percentage of women in the legislature. Citizens, and especially women, may not know the gender composition of cabinet members, which explains the lack of a gendered effect for the percentage of women in cabinet. If women citizens are not aware they are better representated at the executive level, it is unlikely that their levels of political participation

will be increased when more women are in cabinet.

5.3.3 Political Persuasion

Table 5.4 includes the results for the four hypotheses concerning the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on gender gaps in political persuasion. Models 2 to 5 indicate, first, the size and significance of gender differences in this political activity when the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas are zero. The 'Women' logistic coefficients in Models 2 to 5 reveal that gender gaps in political perusasion are significant at the $p<0.05$ level with women being less likely than men to engage when the percentage of women in the legislature (Model 2), the percentage of women in cabinet (Model 3), the number of year since women won the right to vote (Model 4), and the presence of gender quotas (Model 5) equal zero. These findings do not identify whether women's representation and gender quotas have a gendered effect on political participation. Instead, the interaction terms between the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas and gender assess whether these indicators have a different effect on women's and men's likelihood of involvement and whether gender gaps in political persuasion vary as the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas take on values greater than zero. The subsequent discussion investigates these possibilities.

Table 5.4: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Political Persuasion

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.37	***	-0.46	***	-0.36	***	-0.44	***	-0.34	***
	(0.03)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.09)		(0.05)	
Education	0.76	***	0.77	***	0.70	***	0.82	***	0.76	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Employed	0.06	†	-0.03		0.01		-0.03		-0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Political Efficacy	0.71	***	0.81	***	0.80	***	0.79	***	0.79	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Partisanship	1.15	***	1.14	***	1.11	***	1.13	***	1.11	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Married	-0.08	*	-0.09	**	-0.08	*	-0.08	*	-0.08	*
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	

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Table 5.4 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Age	-0.53	***	-0.50	***	-0.51	***	-0.51	***	-0.50	***
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Women Workforce			1.15	***	1.28	***	0.62	***	0.82	***
			(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Parliamentary			0.08	*	0.04		0.18	***	-0.07	†
			(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
District Magnitude			-0.31	***	-0.42	***	-0.43	***	-0.24	***
			(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Number Left Parties			0.73	***	0.68	***	0.82	***	0.63	***
			(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)	
Women Legislature			-0.63	***			-0.25	**	-0.69	***
			(0.11)				(0.09)		(0.09)	
Women Cabinet					-0.26	***				
					(0.08)					
Right Vote			2.02	***	0.91	***	1.40	***	1.82	*
			(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.10)	
Gender Quotas			-0.23	***	-0.24	***	-0.25	***	-0.28	***
			(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Women X Legislature			0.20	†						
			(0.12)							
Women X Cabinet					0.01					
					(0.10)					
Women X Right Vote							0.12			
							(0.14)			
Women X Quotas									-0.04	
									(0.06)	
Constant	-1.28	***	-3.34	***	-2.79	***	-2.87	***	-2.97	***
	(0.07)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.63		0.26		0.33		0.38		0.35	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	30759		30759		30759		30759		30759	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

As Table 5.4 indicates, no interaction term is significant for political persuasion; not one of the four interaction terms assessing the gendered influence of women's representation and gender quotas reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.2 show that the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, and the presence of legislative gender quotas or voluntary party quotas all have a similar effect on men's and women's likelihood of engaging in political

persuasion.

First, the marginal effects for the percentage of women in the legislature has a significant and negative relationship with the probability of political persuasion for men and women. Second, men's and women's likelihood of involvement in political persuasion are similarly influenced by the percentage of women in cabinet. Both logistic coefficients in Table 5.2 for the relationship between the percentage of women in cabinet and the probability of engaging in political persuasion show a significant and negative relationship between the two variables for women and men. Third, the number of years since women won the right to vote has a similar significant and positive relationship with the likelihood of engaging in political persuasion for both women and men. Fourth, Table 5.2 shows that the presence of gender quotas has a similar negative and significant relationship with the probability of engaging in political persuasion for both women and men.

In sum, for political persuasion no indicator of women's representation and gender quotas is associated with a gendered effect. Contrary to voter turnout and protest, the number of years since women gained the right to vote is not associated with varying levels of gender gaps and/or with a different influence on men's and women's likelihood of involvement in political persuasion. Persuasion is a different political activity than voting or protest; political persuasion requires citizens to engage in conversations with family members, friends, and/or colleagues who may not share their views and preferences while voting and protest allow citizens to express a preferences without having to personnally confront others that may disagree with them. Since political persuasion differs from other political activities, other tendencies among men and women may prevent the number of years from having a gendered influence. For instance, women tend to be more likely than men to be conflict-avoidant, meaning they might avoid political activities to prevent creating conflict with friends and family members. Engaging in political persuasion risks greater conflict than other political activites, which in turn, may prevent the signal sent by the number of years since women

won the right to vote from having a gendered effect.

5.3.4 Campaign Activity

Table 5.5 presents the findings on the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on the difference between men's and women's levels of involvement in campaign activity. As for the previous political activities analyzed in this chapter, the first noticeable result in Table 5.5 concerns the 'Women' logistic coefficient. As explained above, this logistic coefficient in Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicates the size and significance of gender differences in campaign activity after controls for individual and country-level factors have been included and for when the women's representation and gender quotas component of the interaction terms takes the value of zero. Results in Table 5.5 reveal that gender gaps are significant at the $p<0.05$ level with women being less likely than men to engage in campaign activity when the percentage of women in the legislature (Model 2), the percentage of women in cabinet (Model 3), the number of years since women gained the right to vote (Model 2), and the presence of gender quotas (Model 5) equal zero. These findings indicate that significant gender gaps are still present; however, they do not reveal whether women's representation and gender quotas influence gender gaps in campaign activity or whether they influence men and women differently. An analysis of the results concerning these interaction terms is necessary to render these conclusions.

Table 5.5: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Campaign Activity

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.26	***	-0.31	***	-0.25	***	-0.73	***	-0.21	***
	(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.14)		(0.06)	
Education	0.73	***	0.67	***	0.70	***	0.72	***	0.70	***
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Employed	0.03		0.03		0.02		0.01		0.03	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	0.91	***	0.86	***	0.88	***	0.90	***	0.88	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Partisanship	1.48	***	1.48	***	1.48	***	1.49	***	1.49	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	

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Table 5.5 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Married	0.03		0.04		0.05		0.05		0.04	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	0.50	***	0.46	***	0.48	***	0.44	***	0.48	***
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)	
Women Workforce			0.97	***	0.80	***	1.06	***	1.32	***
			(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.15)	
Parliamentary			0.11	*	-0.23	***	-0.12	*	-0.002	
			(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.09)	
District Magnitude			-0.02		-0.16	***	-0.11	***	-0.08	*
			(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Number Left Parties			-0.17	*	-0.10		-0.13		-0.10	
			(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Women Legislature			-1.68	***			-0.17		-1.28	***
			(0.16)				(0.14)		(0.24)	
Women Cabinet					-0.83	***				
					(0.10)					
Right Vote			1.29	***	0.84	***	0.54	***	0.99	***
			(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.16)	
Gender Quotas			0.04		-0.06		-0.21	***	-0.18	**
			(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Women X Legislature			0.10							
			(0.17)							
Women X Cabinet					-0.04					
					(0.14)					
Women X Right Office							0.73	***		
							(0.20)			
Women X Quotas									-0.10	
									(0.08)	
Constant	-3.49	***	-3.75	***	-3.63	***	-3.76	***	-3.87	***
	(0.10)		(0.14)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.16)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.29		0.26		0.45		0.31		0.20	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	29377		29377		29377		29377		29377	
Level 2 Units	20		20		20		20		20	

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

One of the interaction terms testing whether the impact of women's representation and gender quotas on campaign activity is significant in Table 5.5. The interaction between gender and the number of years since women gained the right to vote is significant at the p<0.05 level and positive, meaning that as the number of years increases, women's levels of involvement in campaign activity increase at a faster rate than men's. The marginal

effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.6 indicate that the number of years since women achieved the right to vote in elections is positively and significantly associated with the probability of being involved in campaign activity for both women and men; the logistic coefficient is, however, larger for women. Since the difference between men's and women's logistic coefficients for the number of years is large enough to be significant as the interaction term in Table 5.5 indicates, it is possible to conclude that the history of women's representation hypothesis (H_3), stipulating that gender differences in political participation should be smaller when there is a longer history of women's representation, is confirmed by the results in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 for campaign activity. In other words, the number of years since women gained the right to vote has a greater positive influence on women's likelihood of engaging in campaign activity than on men's. It seems that a longer history of women's presence in the political sphere has a positive influence on women's levels of political participation that is not reproduced among men.

These results are counter to the findings for protest where the number of years since women won the right to run for office had a stronger impact on men's likelihood of participation than on women's. This indicator of women's representation may not only act as a signal of exclusion toward men, but also as a sign that women are welcome in the political process, leading to their greater involvement in some political activities. This greater involvement for women may occur for campaign activity and voting, but not protest since the number of years since women gained the right to vote may create a political environment where women are more accustomed to seeing women involved in the political process. This environment may encourage women to also consider running for office themselves. A better avenue for political participation for citizens interested in running for office is involvement in political parties; thus, women will be more likely to engage in this activity when there is a longer history of women's representation.



Figure 5.3: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Protest by the Number of Years Since Women Won the Right to Vote

Table 5.6: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors for Indicators of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas II

	Campaign Activity				Contacting Politicians				Work with Others			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Women Legislature	-1.68	***	-1.58	***	-0.60	***	-0.52	***	0.42	***	0.58	***
	(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Women Cabinet	-0.83	***	-0.87	***	-0.47	***	-0.37	***	0.56	***	0.61	***
	(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Right Vote	0.54	***	1.26	***	1.38	***	1.93	***	-0.43	***	0.45	***
	(0.16)		(0.18)		(0.13)		(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Gender Quotas	-0.18	**	-0.28	***	0.13	*	0.10	†	0.43	***	0.28	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

When the size and significance of the gender coefficient is graphed for every year since women have gained the right to vote in elections (shown in Figure 5.4), gender differences in campaign activity decrease as the number of years increases. Gender gaps are significant with men being more likely to engage in campaign activity when the number of years since women obtained the right to vote is below 95. When the number of year is above 95, gender differences are no longer significant. Overall, findings for this indicator of women's representation indicate a gendered effect that is consistent with the expectations of the history of women's representation hypothesis (H_3).

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors are also calculated for the three other indicators of women's representation and gender quotas. Results are presented in Table 5.6. The percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, and the presence of gender quotas all have a similar influence of men's and women's probability of engaging in campaign activity. In other words, there are no gendered effects of these three indicators of women's representation and gender quotas on campaign activity.

Two indicators of women's representation – the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet – are not associated with a gendered effect. This non-gendered effect tends to be consistent across political activities, with the exception of protest. These findings indicate that for most acts of political participation there is no positive influence of an increased presence of women in the legislature or cabinet on women's likelihood of engaging in politics. What seems to be more important in explaining gender gaps and the different effect of women's representation on men's and women's political participation is the effect of time. The longer that women have experienced the presence of women politicians in the political process, the more their likelihood of involvement in campaign activity increases, and more so than men's. Thus, testing the effect of the presence of women in the legislature and cabinet at one point in time on political participation at the same point in time results in non-gendered effects.

5.3.5 Contacting Politicians

The influence of women's representation and gender quotas on political participation is also tested for contacting politicians. First, Table 5.7 includes the size and significance of gender differences in contacting politicians when the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas are set at zero. The 'Women' logistic coefficients in Models 2 to 5 indicate that gender gaps in contacting politicians are significant at the $p<0.05$ level when the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, the number of years since women won the right to vote, and the presence of gender quotas are zero. Again, these findings do not speak to the presence of a gendered effect of women's representation and gender quotas on contacting politicians. An analysis of the interaction terms between gender and the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas are necessary to render these conclusions.

Table 5.7: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Contacting Politicians

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.22	***	-0.25	***	-0.26	***	-0.58	***	-0.21	***
	(0.03)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.11)		(0.05)	
Education	1.63	***	1.63	***	1.65	***	1.61	***	1.66	***
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Employed	0.10	**	0.12	**	0.11	**	0.12	**	0.10	**
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Political Efficacy	0.55	***	0.53	***	0.54	***	0.53	***	0.55	***
	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)	
Partisanship	0.89	***	0.88	***	0.87	***	0.88	***	0.88	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Married	0.23	***	0.24	***	0.24	***	0.24	***	0.24	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Age	0.95	***	0.97	***	0.99	***	0.96	***	0.98	***
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Women Workforce			1.00	***	0.93	***	0.83	***	1.19	***
			(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)	
Parliamentary			-0.01		0.09	*	0.26	***	-0.31	***
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.0)		(0.0)	
District Magnitude			0.01		-0.26	***	-0.05		-0.31	***
			(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
Number Left Parties			0.08		-0.51	***	-0.56***		0.42	***
			(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.09)	
Women Legislature			-0.60	***			-1.08	***	0.03	

Continued on next page

Table 5.7 – continued from previous page

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
			(0.13)				(0.11)		(0.12)	
Women Cabinet					-0.47	***				
					(0.08)					
Right Vote			1.65	***	1.25	***	1.38	***	1.32	***
			(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.13)		(0.11)	
Gender Quotas			0.07	†	-0.10	**	-0.11	**	0.13	*
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Women X Legislature			0.07							
			(0.14)							
Women X Cabinet					0.10					
					(0.12)					
Women X Right Vote							0.55	***		
							(0.16)			
Women X Quotas									-0.02	
									(0.07)	
Constant	-3.81	***	-5.05	***	-4.02	***	-4.29	***	-4.72	***
	(0.08)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.13)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.15		0.14		0.13		0.12		0.16	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	30521		30521		30521		30521		30521	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Results in Table 5.7 indicate that one of four hypotheses tested in this chapter is confirmed for contacting politicians. Only one interaction terms testing the gendered influence of women's representation and gender quotas reaches the $p<0.05$ level of significance. The interaction between the number of years since women won the right to vote and gender is significant and positive, meaning that as the number of years increases, women's likelihood of contacting politicians increasingly become similar to men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.6 demonstrate that for both women and men the number of years since women acheieved the right to vote is singificantly and positively related with the likelihood of contacting politicians; however, the relationship is stronger for women, confirming the history of women's representation hypothesis. A longer history of the presence of women in the political system may indicate that women are more accustomed

to seeing women in the political process, which in turn may make them feel more welcome in politics.

When the size and significance of the gender coefficient is graphed for every year since women have gained the right to vote in elections (shown in Figure 5.5), gender differences in contacting politicians decrease as the number of years increases until gender gaps are not longer significant at the $p<0.05$ level. Gender gaps are significant with men being more likely to engage in campaign activity when the number of years since women obtained the right to vote is below 97. When the number of year is above 97, gender differences are no longer significant. Overall, findings for this indicator of women's representation indicate a gendered effect that is consistent with the expectations of the history of women's representation hypothesis (H_3).

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.6 also show that the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, and the presence of legislative gender quotas or voluntary party quotas all have a similar effect on men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians. At first sight, it seems that there might be a gendered effect of gender quotas on contacting politicians. Indeed, the presence of gender quotas is associated with a positive and significant relationship with men's likelihood of contacting politicians and an insignificant relationship for women. Since the interaction term between gender and gender quotas is not significant in Table 5.7, it is not possible to conclude that gender quotas have a relationship with this political activity that differs between women and men. The small difference in the logistic coefficients of women and men in Table 5.6 is probably large enough to lead to one significant relationship while the other is not, but is not large enough to indicate a gendered effect.

Women's presence in the legislature and cabinet, and gender quotas do not influence men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians differently, and do not contribute to understanding gender gaps for this activity. Contacting politicians requires that citizens



Figure 5.4: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Campaign Activity by the Number of Years Since Women Won the Right to Vote



Figure 5.5: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Contacting Politicians by the Number of Years Since Women Won the Right to Vote

possess significant civic skills such as good communication abilities to be able to effectively transmit their preferences to politicians. These requirements might limit the incentives to political participation provided by women's representation and gender quotas to men's and women's likelihood of contacting politicians. Even if women, and men, feel more or less inclined to participate when women are better representated in the legislature or cabinet, or when gender quotas have been adopted, gender differences in civic skills may prevent gender gaps from being influenced by women's representation and gender quotas. In other words, women's representation and gender quotas may not provide women with additional resources to overcome their lower levels of political resources.

5.3.6 Working with Others

Results for the final indicator of political participation – working with others to express views about government actions – are found in Table 5.8. Models 2 to 5 include a logistic coefficient for 'Women' that indicates the size and significance of gender differences after the country-level controls and interaction terms have been applied. Findings in Table 5.8 reveal that gender differences in working with others are significant at the $p<0.05$ level with women being less likely than men to engage with others. These findings on the significance of gender gaps, however, only occur when the percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, the number of years since women won the right to vote, the presence of legislative quotas or voluntary party quotas equal to zero. An analysis of the interaction terms and their significance, conducted in the following paragraphs, will allow us to determine whether gender gaps change in size and significance as the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas take on other values than zero, and whether these indicators differently affect men's and women's likelihood of working with others.

Table 5.8: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Working with Others

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**		**Model 5**	
Women	-0.19	***	-0.26	***	-0.20	***	-0.74	***	-0.09	*
	(0.03)		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.09)		(0.05)	
Education	1.17	***	1.16	***	1.19	***	1.15	***	1.17	***
	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.06)	
Employed	0.13	***	0.14	***	0.14	***	0.13	***	0.14	***
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Political Efficacy	0.53	***	0.53	***	0.55	***	0.54	***	0.53	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Partisanship	0.80	***	0.79	***	0.79	***	0.79	***	0.79	***
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Married	-0.05		-0.06	†	-0.05		-0.05		-0.05	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Age	-0.02		-0.02		-0.02		-0.05		-0.02	
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Women Workforce			1.57	***	1.40	***	1.27	***	1.18	***
			(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
Parliamentary			-0.32	***	-0.22	***	-0.24	***	-0.40	***
			(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
District Magnitude			-0.19	***	-0.11	***	-0.19	***	-0.28	***
			(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Number Left Parties			0.52	***	0.22	***	0.29	***	0.22	***
			(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Women Legislature			0.42	***			0.58	***	0.93	***
			(0.11)				(0.10)		(0.10)	
Women Cabinet					0.56	***				
					(0.08)					
Right Vote			-0.05		-0.14		-0.43	***	-0.01	
			(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.09)	
Gender Quotas			0.16	***	0.11	**	0.20	***	0.43	***
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Women X Legislature			0.16							
			(0.12)							
Women X Cabinet					0.05					
					(0.10)					
Women X Right Vote							0.89	***		
							(0.13)			
Women X Quotas									-0.15	*
									(0.06)	
Constant	-2.77	***	-3.36	***	-3.20	***	-2.96	***	-3.22	***
	(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Random Effect										
St. Dev.	0.28		0.20		0.13		0.20		0.26	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Level 1 Units	30389		30389		30389		30389		305389	
Level 2 Units	21		21		21		21		21	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Of the four interaction terms testing the gendered influence of women's representation and gender quotas on working with others, two reach the $p<0.05$ level of significance. First, Table 5.8 contains a significant interaction term between gender and the number of years since women achieved the right to vote. This interaction is also positive, meaning that as the number of years increases, women's likelihood of working with others increases at a faster rate than men's. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.6 demonstrate that women's likelihood of working with other to express views about government actions is higher than men's as the number of years increases because women's representation has a positive influence on women's probability of involvement while it has a negative influence on men's as expected by the history of women's representation hypothesis (H_3).

These results for working with others are similar to those for campaign activity, in that they show that the number of years since women won the right to run for office may act as as a signal that increases women's participation in politics more so than men's. Again, results indicate that a longer habit of women being present in the political process may have a stronger influence on women's levels of political activities than does the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet. The constant presence of women in active politics may do more to develop different political behaviour among women since political participation may be a habit that develops over time. Political participation may not be a sudden decision that is affected only by short term factors such as the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet. If women's representation is a signal that increases women's political participation, it is possible that some time is required for women, and men, to change their habits in the presence of increased participation of women in politics. Additionally, it is possible that the stronger effect of time on gender differences in working with others is related to the substantive representation mechanism requiring significant time to influence women's behaviour. It is likely that substantive representation does not occur instantly the minute

women are elected in the legislature. The decision-making process may be long and the effect of substantive representation may require years before women in the electorate are aware that they are indeed better represented and that policy decisions reflect their preferences and interests. Thus, when there is a longer history of women being present in politics, it may mean that substantive representation had been in effect for longer, which in turn, may lead to women participating at a higher rate than men.

Figure 5.6 illustrates this finding; the figure graphs the size and significance of the gender coefficient for every year since women achieved the right to vote. As the figure shows, when the number of years is below 88, gender differences in working with others are significant with women lagging behind men's probability of involvement. As the number of years increases, however, the gender gap decreases until it is reversed. When the number of years since women gained the right to vote is over 105, women become significantly more likely to work with others than men. This figure provides more evidence confirming the history of women's representation hypothesis (H_3), stipulating that gender differences should be smaller when the number of years since women won the right to vote is high.

Second, the interaction between the presence of gender quotas and gender is significant and negative, meaning that in countries with legislative gender quotas, women increasingly lag behind men's likelihood of working with others to express views about government actions. The marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 5.6 show that gender gaps are larger in countries with gender quotas since these quotas have a greater positive influence on men's likelihood of working with others. This table indicates that for both women and men, the presence of gender quotas has a significant and positive relationship with the probability of participating in this activity. This relationship, however, is stronger for men than women as the larger logistic coefficient indicates. The marginal effect of gender in countries with and without gender quotas in Table 5.9 confirms this finding. In both sets of countries, gender differences are significant with women lagging behind men's levels

working with others; gender gaps, however, are larger in countries with gender quotas. This finding is contrary to the expectations stipulated by the presence of gender quotas hypothesis (H_4), which predicted that gender differences in political participation should be smaller when countries adopt gender quotas.

Table 5.9: Marginal Effects of Gender on Political Participation According to the Presence of Gender Quotas

	Quotas = 0 Gender		Quotas = 1 Gender	
Work with Others	-0.09	*	-0.25	***
	(0.05)		(0.04)	

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

The gendered effect of the presence of gender quotas is stronger for men than women. This finding does not confirm the gender quotas hypothesis stating that gender gaps in political participation should be smaller when countries adopt some form of gender quotas. It is possible that the larger positive influence on men's likelihood of political participation reflects a tradition of men being more present in the political process. In countries where men tend to dominate the political sphere, there may be more pressure to adopt gender quotas to increase women's access to the political process, explaining why the adoption of gender quotas is associated with a stronger positive relationship for men.

The marginal effects and conditional standard errors are also calculated in Table 5.6 for the other indicators of women's representation that do not result in a significant interaction term with gender in Table 5.8. Results indicate that the percentage of women in the legislature and the percentage of women in cabinet all have a similar positive influence on men's and women's involvement in working with others. In other words, there is no gendered effect.

For the indicators of women's representation, only the number of years since women won the right to vote in elections has a gendered effect on working with others. This result for the influence of women's representation is consistent with findings for other political activities where the history of women's representation hypothesis is associated with a gendered effect.

Furthermore, for working with others, the gendered effect results in women being more likely to engage when the number of years is high. This result is similar to the one for campaign activity. Women may be more likely to work with others when there is a longer history of women's representation since this activity may be more women-friendly. As discussed above and in Chapter 4, women are more likely to be socialized in the importance of preserving and cultivating relationships with friends and family members. Working with others sharing similar views may be another way for women to cultivate these relationships and take care of others. A longer history of women's representation may allow women to believe that an appropriate way of cultivating relationships is through political involvement with others, leading to higher levels of participation for women and smaller gender gaps.

5.3.7 Control for Political Knowledge

As in the previous chapters, an additional control variable – political knowledge – is added to the analysis to test for possible spuriousness. The inclusion of this control variable reduces the number of countries in the analysis; therefore, it is always possible that the results may not reflect the inclusion of political knowledge, but rather the removal of Iceland from the sample. Nevertheless, political knowledge is introduced to provide an idea of how this variable might influence the gendered effects of women's representation and quotas on political participation. Results are found in Table 5.10 to Table 5.17.

The first noticeable result is that most of the original findings stand with the inclusion of political knowledge in the statistical analyses. The percentage of women in the legislature is associated with a stronger effect on women's likelihood of engaging in protest than on men's. The number of years since women gained the right to vote maintains a gendered effect on the likelihood of turning out to vote, protest, engaging in campaign activity, contacting politicians and working with others with the introduction of political knowledge as a control. And finally, gender quotas have a gendered influence on working with others. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the gendered influence of women's representation and gender



Figure 5.6: The Marginal Effect of Gender on Working with Others by the Number of Years Since Women Won the Right to Vote

Table 5.10: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Voter Turnout Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Legislature	0.12							
	(0.17)							
Women X Cabinet			0.44	**				
			(0.15)					
Women X Right Vote					0.49	*		
					(0.19)			
Women X Quotas							0.04	
							(0.10)	
Constant	-1.31	***	-1.09	***	-1.25	***	-1.21	***
	(0.17)		(0.16)		(0.17)		(0.16)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.49		0.25		0.21		0.37	
Intercept	(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.05)	
Level 1 Units	17376		17376		17376			
Level 2 Units	20		20		20			

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women workforce participation, parliamentary, district magnitude, number of left parties, percentage of women in the legislature, percentage of women in cabinet, years since women won the right to run for office, legislative quotas, and voluntary party quotas but are not shown in the table.

quotas identified previously is not due by gender differences in levels of political knowledge.

Table 5.11: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Protest Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Legislature	0.54	**						
	(0.18)							
Women X Cabinet			0.31	*				
			(0.15)					
Women X Right Vote					0.41	*		
					(0.20)			
Women X Quotas							0.08	
							(0.10)	
Constant	-2.14	***	-2.96	***	-2.16	***	-2.23	***
	(0.17)		(0.19)		(0.18)		(0.17)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.22		0.18		0.21		0.22	
Intercept	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	17252		17252		17252			
Level 2 Units	20		20		20			

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women workforce participation, parliamentary, district magnitude, number of left parties, percentage of women in the legislature, percentage of women in cabinet, years since women won the right to run for office, legislative quotas, and voluntary party quotas but not shown in the table.

Results in Table 5.10 to Table 5.17 also provide additional support for the presence of women in the legislature hypothesis (H_1) and the presence of women in cabinet hypothesis (H_2) that were not present in the original analyses. Originally, findings did not provide evidence to support H_2 and only identified a gendered effect for the percentage of women in the legislature on protest. The interaction term between gender and the percentage of women in the legislature is significant at the $p<0.05$ level for protest, contacting politicians and working with others. For working with others, findings in Table 5.17 confirm H_1; women's likelihood of engaging with others increases faster than men's as the percentage of female politicians in the legislature increases. For contacting politicians, however, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors show that the percentage of women in the legislature has no significant influence on women's and men's probability of engaging in this activity.

Previously, there was no evidence for a gendered effect for the percentage of women in

Table 5.12: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Political Persuasion Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Legislature	0.07							
	(0.15)							
Women X Cabinet			0.19					
			(0.14)					
Women X Right Vote					0.13			
					(0.18)			
Women X Quotas							-0.07	
							(0.08)	
Constant	-3.37	***	-2.85	***	-3.07 ***	-3.36	***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.14)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.37		0.34		0.43		0.27	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	17408		17408		17408			
Level 2 Units	20		20		20			

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women workforce participation, parliamentary, district magnitude, number of left parties, percentage of women in the legislature, percentage of women in cabinet, years since women won the right to run for office, legislative quotas, and voluntary party quotas but are not shown in the table.

cabinet on various forms of political participation. The inclusion of political knowledge as a control – or the removal of Iceland from the analysis – results in a statistically significant interaction term between gender and the proportion of women in cabinet for voter turnout and protest. For protest, as the presence of women in the cabinet increases, women's and men's likelihood of involvement also increases but with women's increasing at a faster rate than men's. For this political activity, women's logistic coefficient is larger than men's, indicating a gendered effect for the proportion of women in cabinet that confirms the presence of women in cabinet hypothesis (H_2). Results in Table 5.10 to Table 5.17, however, need to be treated carefully. Since the number of countries in the analyses is smaller, it is possible that the gendered effect for the percentage of women in cabinet is due to the sample being less representative of advanced industrial countries.

Table 5.13: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Campaign Activity Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Legislature	0.15							
	(0.21)							
Women X Cabinet			0.28					
			(0.18)					
Women X Right Vote					0.79	***		
					(0.26)			
Women X Quotas							-0.11	
							(0.11)	
Constant	-3.89	***	-3.79	***	-3.72	***	-4.31	***
	(0.21)		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.20)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.24		0.29		0.24		0.28	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	16651		16651		16651			
Level 2 Units	19		19		19			

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women workforce participation, parliamentary, district magnitude, number of left parties, percentage of women in the legislature, percentage of women in cabinet, years since women won the right to run for office, legislative quotas, and voluntary party quotas but are not shown in the table.

Table 5.14: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Contacting Politicians Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Legislature	0.33	*						
	(0.16)							
Women X Cabinet			0.23					
			(0.14)					
Women X Right Vote					0.57	**		
					(0.19)			
Women X Quotas							0.08	
							(0.09)	
Constant	-4.73	***	-4.42	***	-5.03	***	-5.12	***
	(0.18)		(0.17)		(0.18)		(0.19)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.15		0.13		0.28		0.21	
Intercept	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.03)	
Level 1 Units	17313		17313		17313			
Level 2 Units	20		20		20			

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women workforce participation, parliamentary, district magnitude, number of left parties, percentage of women in the legislature, percentage of women in cabinet, years since women won the right to run for office, legislative quotas, and voluntary party quotas but are not shown in the table.

Table 5.15: The Influence of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas on Working with Others Controlling for Political Knowledge

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Women X Legislature	0.33	*						
	(0.15)							
Women X Cabinet			0.22	†				
			(0.13)					
Women X Right Vote					1.05	***		
					(0.17)			
Women X Quotas							-0.16	*
							(0.08)	
Constant	-3.84	***	-3.82	***	-3.59	***	-3.50	***
	(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.17)		(0.19)	
Random Effect								
St. Dev.	0.10		0.14		0.12		0.10	
Intercept	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Level 1 Units	17240		17240		17240			
Level 2 Units	20		20		20			

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$
Controls were included for: women, education, employed, political efficacy, partisanship, political knowledge, marital status, age, women workforce participation, parliamentary, district magnitude, number of left parties, percentage of women in the legislature, percentage of women in cabinet, years since women won the right to run for office, legislative quotas, and voluntary party quotas but are not shown in the table.

Table 5.16: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors Controlling for Political Knowledge I

	Vote				Protest				Political Persuasion			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Women Legislature	-0.16		-0.03		1.36	***	1.90	***	-0.57	***	-0.50	***
	(0.19)		(0.20)		(0.17)		(0.18)		(0.13)		(0.15)	
Women Cabinet	-0.94	***	-0.50	**	0.46	***	0.77	***	-0.49	***	-0.30	*
	(0.15)		(0.16)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.10)		(0.12)	
Right Vote	0.83	***	1.33	***	-1.43	***	-1.01	***	1.16	***	1.29	***
	(0.19)		(0.20)		(0.17)		(0.19)		(0.15)		(0.17)	
Gender Quotas	0.44	***	0.49	***	0.33	***	0.40	***	-0.51	***	-0.58	***
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.06)		(0.07)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5.17: Marginal Effects and Conditional Standard Errors Controlling for Political Knowledge II

	Campaign Activity				Contacting Politicians				Work with Others			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Women Legislature	-0.93	***	-0.78	***	-1.04	***	-0.71	***	0.44	***	0.77	***
	(0.19)		(0.21)		(0.16)		(0.17)		(0.14)		(0.15)	
Women Cabinet	-0.41	*	-0.13		-1.17	***	-0.94	***	0.41	***	0.63	***
	(0.17)		(0.19)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.10)		(0.11)	
Right Vote	0.58	**	1.37	***	1.70	***	2.26	***	-0.17		0.88	***
	(0.21)		(0.26)		(0.16)		(0.19)		(0.14)		(0.17)	
Gender Quotas	-0.21	**	-0.33	***	-0.11		-0.03		0.39	***	0.23	***
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.08)	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

5.4 Summary of Findings

This section provides an overview of the findings from the previous sections and relates the findings to the hypotheses outlined earlier in the chapter. Results are also summarized in Table 5.18.

H_1: The presence of women in the legislature hypothesis. The first hypothesis tested in this chapter stipulates that a high percentage of women in the legislature should be associated with smaller gender differences in political participation since levels of women's political activities should be boosted more so than men's by the presence of women in politics. It was hypothesized that the increased presence of women in the legislature should provide symbolic and substantive representation to women in the electorate, which in turn, would reduce gender gaps in political participation. The results provide limited support for this hypothesis. The percentage of women in the legislature only has a gendered influence on protest. For this activity, results conform to the expectations of H_1. Women's levels of protest are differently influenced than men's by the presence of female politicians. This result, however, is not reproduced for any other acts of political participation. Additional support for this hypothesis is obtained by controlling for the effect of political knowledge. In this situation, it seems that smaller gender gaps in working with others are linked to women's presence in the legislature.

Table 5.18: Summary of Findings for the Gendered Effect of Women's Representation and Gender Quotas

	Voter Turnout	Protest	Political Persuasion	Campaign Activity	Contact Politicians	Work with Others
Women Legislature	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Women Cabinet	No	No	No	No	No	No
Right Vote	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender Quotas	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Cell entries indicate whether each indicator of women's representation and gender quotas has a gendered effect on political participation.

H_2: The presence of women in cabinet hypothesis. This hypothesis underscores the gendered influence of women in political positions of high visibility on gender differences in political participation. It is hypothesized that gender gaps should be smaller when the percentage of women in cabinet is high since highly visible women politicians should influence women's levels of participation more so than men's. This hypothesis stipulates that for the symbolic and substantive representation of women to have an effect on citizen behaviour, women in the electorate need to be aware that they are better represented in the political process. In other words, visibility may act as a link between women's representation and gender gaps in political participation. Results do not confirm this hypothesis. The interaction terms testing the gendered effect of the percentage of women in cabinet are not significant for any act of political participation. It does not seem that the presence of women in cabinet is related to cross-national differences in gender gaps. Once a control for political knowledge is included, however, results change for two political activities. For both voter turnout and protest, the presence of women in cabinet is associated with the greater involvement of women. Women are less likely than men to be knowledgeable about politics; thus, women may be less likely to be informed about the presence women in cabinet, even when this presence is high. If women do not know about the gender composition of cabinet members in their country, it is unlikely that the percentage of women in cabinet will influence differently than men their levels of political participation. Once those gender differences in political knowledge have been taken into acount, the greater effect of the percentage of women in cabinet on women's likelihood voting and protest can be observed.

H_3: The history of women's representation hypothesis. The third hypothesis related to the influence of women's representation on gender gaps in political participation highlights the effect of time. It is hypothesized that the longer women are accustomed to seeing women in the political process, the greater their levels of involvement in politics should be. The longer women are accustomed to seeing women politicians, the more likely they will be to

believe that their place is in the political process, leading to smaller gender gaps in political participation. Results confirm this hypothesis. For five of the six indicators of political participation, the number of years since women achieved the right to vote has an influence on gender gaps. For three political activities, the number of years has a stronger positive influence on women's likelihood of engaging in politics than on men's. In other words, women participate more in politics when there is a longer history of the presence of women in the political sphere. For two other political activities, the number of years has a stronger negative influence on men's likelihood of participation than on women's. Findings for this hypothesis indicate that women's representation may not only act as a signal of inclusion to women, but also as a signal of exclusion to men.

H_4: The gender quotas hypothesis. This hypothesis concerning the gendered influence of gender quotas stipulates that gender differences in political participation should be smaller in countries that have adopted either legislative gender quotas or voluntary party quotas. By increasing the presence of women in the legislature, gender quotas may increased women's symbolic and substantive representation and may send a signal to women in the electorate that they are welcome in the political process, which in turn, results in smaller gender gaps in political participation. This hypothesis is not confirmed by the results. For working with others, gender quotas are associated with greater involvement for women and men, but the effect is stronger for men. Results show that it is men, and not women, whose levels of participation are more strongly affected by the presence of gender quotas.

5.5 Discussion of the Theoretical Implications of the Findings

This chapter assessed the influence of women's representation and gender quotas on gender gaps in political participation. This analysis differs from previous scholarly work on the same topic by testing different hypotheses concerning the presence of women in politics and gender quotas. First, this study moves beyond simply measuring the presence of women in

the political sphere by the percentage of women in the legislature and instead adds indicators for the presence of female politicians in cabinet and the number of years since women gained the right to vote[3]. The results of this analysis mirror those obtained in previous cross-national investigations where the percentage of women in the legislature is concerned. This indicator is not a factor in understanding gender gaps in political participation and is not associated with a different effect on men's and women's likelihood of involvement in political activities with the notable exception of the act of protest. Only for this activity does women's likelihood of involvement increases at a faster rate than men's as the percentage of women in the legislature increases. This finding, although limited, may indicate that the presence of women in the political sphere has a gendered effect on acts of political participation that are already favoured by women such as protest or boycotting (Stolle and Micheletti, 2006). Previous cross-national studies have used more conventional indicators of political participation, including voting and working in electoral campaigns. When women are more inclined to participate in political activities because they are better represented in the legislature, they may choose to be involved in activities that they already feel at ease doing, explaining why the gendered effect of the percentage of women in the legislature may only occur for protest. Studies that use conventional indicators for political participation may not capture the gendered effect of the presence of women in the legislature since they may not include the political activities more likely to be chosen by women to participate in the political process.

As previously mentioned, this analysis adds to the literature on women's representation and political participation by including a hypothesis assessing the influence of the visibility of women politicians. Single-country investigations of women's representation have concluded that citizens have to be in the presence of visible and competitive female politicians for women's representation to influence gender gaps in political participation (Atkeson, 2003).

[3]It is important to note that previous analyses on women's representation do not always focus on the percentage of women in the legislature (see Atkeson (2003)), but all cross-national analyses do (see Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007); Karp and Banducci (2008b); Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012)).

This hypothesis has not been, before this analysis, tested in a cross-national perspective. Results provide mixed evidence on the influence of visibility as measured by the percentage of women in cabinet on gender gaps in political participation. The lack of strong significant results confirming the women in cabinet hypothesis (H_2), stipulating that gender gaps in political participation should be smaller when the presence of women in cabinet is high, may indicate that the visibility of women politicians may only matter in the United States context where electoral races offer greater focus on individual candidates (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). In a cross-national analysis where electoral rules are different across countries, the visibility of women in the political sphere may not influence men's and women's levels of political participation differently. The focus may not be on individual candidates, but on political parties and how, overall, they address women's representation. On the other hand, it is also possible that the indicator of visibility used in this analysis is problematic. The hypothesis suggests that cabinet positions are highly visible and that citizens will notice the presence of women in the executive branch. Maybe this is not the case as not all cabinet positions are equally visible. It is usually the case that some cabinet members are more visible in the press, for instance, because of the importance of their portfolio. Additionally, some women politicians may be more visible than others, no matter their position in the government. For instance, a woman politician may be highly succesful and visible in a country without having a cabinet position, by being in the opposition. Therefore, more investigation is needed on the gendered influence of visible and competitive women politicians on political participation outside of the United States. A larger range of indicators for the visibility of women politicians needs to be tested.

An additional contribution to the literature on women's representation and political participation is provided by including an indicator of time in the analysis. It is hypothesized that the effect of women's representation should be experienced by citizens after a certain period of time. The results in the analysis clearly support this position. The longer women

have achieved the right to vote, the greater is women's probability of engaging in various political acts beyond that of men. Previous studies have not considered that the influence of women's representation in the political sphere may not be felt immediately. This study shows that this may be inappropriate. It may take years of continuous presence of women in the political sphere before attitudes and opinions about women's role in the political arena change, which may explain why previous findings that the percentage of women in the legislature in a certain year has no influence on gender gaps in political participation measured that same year. This time lag in the effect of women's representation may exist because socialization takes time. Women in the legislature and in cabinet may not change instantiously perceptions about men's and women's role in politics. It may be easier to alter perceptions in younger generations who, with time, replace older citizens in the electorate, leading to change in gender gaps in political participation. Additionally, it may also take time for substantive representation, a mechanism of women's representation, to affect women's participation. Policies reflecting women's interests and preferences may require time for implementation; women politicians elected in the legislature may not instantly increase women's substantive representation. But as women's politicians spend more time in the decision-making process, women in the electorate may observe the effect of greater substantive representation, leading to increases in political participation for them. By adding a time component to the analysis, scholars may be better able to assess the influence of women's representation on citizen behaviour.

Findings for the history of women's representation hypothesis also indicate that the number of years since women won the right to vote does not only affect women's participation, but also men's. For two political activities, the number of years has a stronger negative influence on men's involvement than on women's. Thus, we can conclude that in addition to leading to increases in women's symbolic and substantive representation, the history of women's representation may also act a signal of exclusion to men. As discussed above, it is

possible that a longer presence of women in the political process indicates to men that they no longer dominate the decision-making process. This loss of privilege may be experienced by men as an exclusion from the political process, leading to larger drops in involvement for some political activities. At the same time, women's greater substantive representation, when there is a longer history of women's representation, may make men feel like their interests and preferences are not properly represented in the decision-making process. In sum, findings for the history of women's representation hypothesis demonstrate that it is possible for women's symbolic and substantive representation to be experienced negatively by men, leading to a decline in their political participation.

This study also contributes to the literature on gender quotas and political participation by testing the influence of two types of quotas on gender gaps. Previous analyses focus exclusively on legislative quotas to the neglect of voluntary party quotas. As for the preceding investigations, results demonstrate some gendered influence of gender quotas on political participation. The effect of quotas, however, is stronger for men than women, contrary to expectations. This result is the opposite to what Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2012) found, which was that gender quotas have a stronger positive influence of women's levels of political participation. These contradictory results suggest that gender quotas' influence on citizen behaviour is not uniform across countries. Since this study focuses on advanced industrial countries only and previous research has failed to identify an effect of legislative gender quotas on gender differences in political participation in Latin American countries (Zetterberg, 2009), the combination of results suggests that political institutions have effects on citizens' political participation that vary with the level of socioeconomic development. Further investigations need to take into account how gender quotas, and women's representation, interact with other country-level factors such as these to influence gender differences in political participation.

Moreover, the mechanisms identifying how gender quotas should affect gender differ-

ences in political participation focus exclusively on women. The symbolic, substantive, and women's mobilization mechanisms all insist that gender quotas should have a stronger positive effect on women's levels of political participation than on men's. Results of this analysis indicate that this may be an inappropriate assumption; findings show that gender quotas tend to have a stronger influence on men's likelihood of participating in politics than women's. Greater attention needs to be directed to how gender quotas and representation influence men's behaviour in addition to women's. Men's more negative opinions toward gender quotas (Lovenduski, 2005) might spur their involvement in the political process to a greater extent than women. As for women's representation, it is possible that gender quotas provide a signal of exclusion to men. When countries adopt gender quotas, men may feel like their position in the decision-making process is threatened by the increased attention toward women's interests and preferences, resulting in a change in their patterns of political involvement.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: Gender Gaps and Political Institutions

Gender differences in political participation have been a persistent phenomenon for many years and in many countries; they also have been the subject of numerous investigations. The proportion of women involved in electoral campaigns, political discussion, contacting politicians, participating in protest, and working with others to express views about government actions tends to be lower than men, leading to inequalities in the political process. Yet, as this research has demonstrated, some countries do better than others. This investigation adds to the growing body of work on gender gaps by moving beyond an analysis based on individual-level explanations to demonstrate that political institutions are a factor that needs to be considered. Some countries may be associated with smaller gender differences in involvement in political activities since their institutional arrangements provide incentives and/or barriers to political participation that lead to a similar involvement of women and men. Simple electoral systems as well as signals of inclusion transmitted by political parties and women's representation have been found to reduce and even eliminate gender gaps in political participation. On the other hand, this study identifies those aspects of political institutions that may contribute to larger gender gaps. For instance, PR electoral systems are associated with larger gender gaps. In sum, understanding gender differences in a cross-national perspective necessitates a focus on political institutions. Political institutions affect thes type and levels of political resources and orientations toward the political system required for political participation; since these resources and orientations vary between women and men, gender gaps in political participation are affected by political institutions.

This conclusion will first start by summarizing the main findings of this investigation and then their theoretical relevance. Avenues for further investigations will also be considered.

6.1 What Was Found

This section provides a summary of the findings of the previous three chapters. Results are organized by political participation activity. Table 6.1 provides a summary table of these findings.

6.1.1 Voter Turnout

Political institutions provide barriers and incentives to voter turnout that affect women and men differently. In more detail, the level of disproportionality is associated with gender differences in voter turnout. Findings in Chapter 3 show that when the level of disproportionality is low, the difference between men's and women's likelihood of turning out is insignificant and when the disproportionality is high, it is women who are significantly more likely to turnout to vote than men. These larger gaps are due to the level of disproportionality's larger negative influence on men's likelihood of involvement than on women's. Moreover, district magnitude, another indicator used to assess the gendered effects of the electoral system, has a different effect on men's and women's probability of turning out to vote. Women's likelihood of turning decreases faster than men's with increases in district magnitude. Additionally, when the effective number of political parties is high, gender differences in turnout are also high with men being significantly more likely to turnout than women. As explained in Chapter 3, women's greater likelihood of turnout in plurality and majoritarian electoral systems (systems usually associated with a high level of disproportionality, low number of parties, and small district magnitude) may be due to their social networks allowing them to overcome the negative incentives to voting provided by a high level of disproportionality. This advantage women have in their social networks may not be enough for them to benefit from the incentives to turnout provided by a larger ENPP. Other factors may be required such as a high level of political interest to be aware that these incentives exist. Since men are more likely to be interested in politics, they may participate more so than women when

PR electoral systems provide incentives, leading to larger gender differences.

As for the findings concerning the gendered influence of political party ideology on voter turnout, results again reveal that political institutions provide barriers that limit women's involvement more strongly than men's. There is a greater negative relationship between the presence of a left party in government and the likelihood of turning out to vote for women than men. This presence of a left party, however, has no effect on gender gaps in turnout. It is possible for the presence of a party on the left of the ideological spectrum in government to affect differently women and men and at the same time to find that there is an insignificant gap between women's and men's likelihood of turning out to vote. This different effect, although it exists, is not enough to affect gender gaps. As explained in Chapter 4, left-wing political parties may not act as a signal of inclusion as it was expected maybe because their mobilization strategy focuses on left parties traditional electorate, that is, middle class men. It is not enough that the government reflects the more left-wing policy opinions of women to increase women's levels of political participation. Findings for voter turnout and other political activities show that the direct mention of women's interests in party platforms send a signal of inclusion to women and/or demonstrate that party are mobilizing women voters, which in turn lead to greater involvement in politics for women.

A longer history of women's representation seems to provide incentives for participation that affect women's turnout more so than men's, resulting in smaller gender gaps. A more detailed analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates indeed that this result is the product of the history of women's representation having a greater positive influence on women's levels of participation. A longer history of women's representation may send a signal or a cue to women that increases their levels of political activities. A longer history of women's inclusion in the political process may make women feel included as they no longer have a marginal position in the political process, leading them to participate at a greater rate in political activities.

6.1.2 Political Persuasion

Political institutions also provide barriers and incentives for engaging in political persuasion that influence gender gaps. Chapter 3, however, on the gendered effects of the electoral system demonstrates that none of the indicator of the electoral system is associated with a gendered effect on political persuasion. In other words, men's and women's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion is influenced similarly by the electoral system.

Results in Chapter 4 on the gendered effect of party ideology provide unexpected findings. The index of party polarization appears to create a barrier to political participation; this barrier, however, affects men rather than women. Indeed, men's probability of engaging in political persuasion declines faster than women's as the level of polarization increases. This results in gender gaps in political persuasion being smaller when the index of party polarization is high. It was hypothesized that a larger polarization among political parties would be synonymous with conflit, which in turn, should affect women's participation more negatively than men's. It is possible that differences in the social networks of women and men explain this result. Women have a larger number of friends and aquaintances than men. Additionally, women are more likely than men to cultive these relationships between friends and family members. These gender differences may provide women with more opportunities to engage in political discussion than men. When confronted with increased conflict in high party polarization environment, men's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion may decrease faster than women's since their social networks containt less opportunities for political discussion. Women's likelihood will also decrease when confronted with greater conflict but this decline will be less prononced than the one for men since they have more opportunities than them to engage in discussions with friends and family members. Again, political institutions influence the resources required to engage in political activities, which in turn influence gender gaps. For political persuasion, political institutions influence how necessary social networks are for political participation.

Other significant results in Chapter 4 show that there is a stronger positive relationship between the presence of a left party in government and the likelihood of engaging in political persuasion for men than women. Gender differences are larger when a left party is part of the government with women lagging behind men's likelihood of engaging in political persuasion. As explained above, left-wing political parties traditionally have working-class men as their electoral base. Because of this tradition, men may be more likely than women to be mobilized by left parties to vote for them, but also to volunteer in electoral campaigns, which may include engaging in political persuasion during those campaigns. Since women may be less likely to be mobilized by left parties, their likelihood of engaging in political persuasion will increase less so than men when a left party is part of the government. Party ideology may reflect the mobilization strategies employed by political parties which are gendered. Being asked to take part in political activities is an important explanation for why citizens will engage in politics. When parties do not mobilize men and women equally, it can result in larger gender differences in multiple political activities, not only for voting.

Finally, findings show that there are no gendered effects of women's representation and gender quotas on engaging in political persuasion. The percentage of women in the legislature, the percentage of women in cabinet, the number of years since women won the right to vote, the presence of legislative or voluntary party quotas all have the same influence on women's and men's involvement in this political activity. It is possible that the indicators of women's representation and gender quotas do not affect the requirements needed in terms of political resources and orientations toward the political system to engage in political persuasion, leading to the absence of gendered effects.

6.1.3 Campaign Activity

Findings for the act of campaign activity conform to a pattern where political institutions provide barriers and incentives to involvement in politics that affect men and women differently. Results in Chapter 3 show that the effective number of political parties in the system

and the coalition size both constitute a barrier to political activities that influences women more so than men. Women's likelihood of involvement in campaign activity declines faster than men's as the number of parties increases and as coalition size increases, resulting in larger gender gaps in campaign activity in PR electoral systems. These findings provide additional support for the supposition that the consequences and rules of the electoral system can inhibit political participation differently depending on the citizens' gender. Additionally, results again conform to a pattern where PR electoral systems are associated with larger gender gaps. A larger number of political parties and a large coalition size, which are more likely to be found in PR systems, may indicate that citizens have more diverse views and opinions, increasing conflict possibilities between friends and family members. Since women are more likely than men to put emphasis in preserving relationships, they may be more likely to avoid political participation to prevent conflit when there is a high number of political parties in the legislature and in government. In sum, PR electoral systems tend to require, for political participation, political resources and orientations toward the political system that are more likely to be possessed by men, leading to larger gender gaps.

Chapter 4 also presents findings that demonstrate the gendered effects of political party ideology. The presence of a left-wing political party in government is associated with greater involvement in campaign activity for men while this variable has no influence on women's levels of involvement. Additionally, gender differences in campaign activity are larger when a left party is in government since men's likelihood of involvement in this activity is boosted more so than women. Similar to political persuasion, the presence of a left party in government seems to provide incentives that stimulate involvement in campaign activity and that men are more likely to be the beneficiary than women. Again, these results may reflect left-wing political party traditions of mobilizing working-class men to vote for them. When a left party is part of the government, it may mean that they engaged in a larger and/or more successful mobilizing campaign. Men may be more likely than women to be contacted by a

left party, leading them to be more likely to engage in campaign activity than women when a left party forms government. Having a political party in government that shares women's policy positions on the left-right scale is not sufficient to increase their levels of political participation. If women perceive the presence of a left party in government as a signal of inclusion, it may not be sufficient to change their behaviour if the mobilization strategies used by these political parties exclude women.

Finally, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the presence of incentives provided by political institutions leads to smaller gender gaps in campaign activity. A longer history of women's access to the political system is associated with smaller gender differences in campaign activity. These smaller gaps are the product of the number of years since women gained the right to vote having a greater positive influence on women's likelihood of engaging in this political activity than on men's. Again, findings provide support for political institutions influencing men's and women's levels of political participation differently. It is possible that a longer history of women's representation means that women are more likely to be accustomed in seeing women involved in the political process, which in turn, may lead them to participate at greater levels in political activities, reducing differences between men and women.

6.1.4 Contacting Politicians

Findings in Chapter 3 demonstrate that district magnitude and coalition size constitute both a barrier to contacting politicians that inhibits the involvement of women more so than men. Gender gaps for this activity of political participation are larger when district magnitude is high and when coalition size is large with women increasingly lagging behind men's probability of involvement. The negative relationship between district magnitude and contacting politicians may be due to the lack of a constituency work tradition in multi-member districts (Massicotte, 2005). Women may be at a greater disadvantage than men in multi-member districts since traditionally they have been excluded and marginalized from

the political process. Because of this exclusion, women may be less likely than men to possess the habit of contacting politicians when they are dissatisfied with the political process and/or when they want to advocate for an issue. The addition of a barrier to contacting politicians, such as district magnitude, may increase women's disadvantage, leading to larger gender differences. Again, we can observe evidence indicating that PR electoral systems, which have larger district magnitudes, are associated with greater gender gaps in participation than plurality systems. The type of electoral system has an influence of the political resources and orientations toward the political system required for political participation. Since women and men differ in the types and levels of resources and orientations they possess, the electoral system has an effect on gender differences in political participation.

Furthermore, Chapter 4 provides evidence that the party system and party ideology can impose barriers and incentives to contacting politicians that affect men and women differently. Findings show that gender differences for this political activity are indeed larger when the index of party polarization is high, with women lagging behind men's likelihood of involvement. As argued in Chapter 4, women tend to be more likely to be conflict-avoidant which affects negatively their levels of political participation and more so than men's. A greater ideological distance among political parties may require certain predispositions with politics, such as a greater tolerance toward political conflict in one's social network, for citizens to have a high probability of contacting politicians. Gender differences in these predispositions with politics, therefore, will lead to variation in gender gaps in contacting politicians dependent on the ideological polarization in the party system. These findings demonstrate that it is not only the electoral system that influences the orientations toward the political system required for political participation. Party ideology influences whether citizens need to possess a high tolerance toward conflict to engage in political activities, leading to gender differences.

In addition to the evidence supporting the role of political institutions as barriers to po-

litical participation, Chapter 4 demonstrates that political parties can also provide incentives that encourage women's involvement in politics. When political parties include favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups in their policy platforms, gender differences in contacting politicians are smaller and even reverse with women being more likely than men to be involved in this act of political participation. Favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographics groups included in party platforms may be an indication that parties and politicians are mobilizing women, which in turn, may lead women to be more involved in the political process. Citizens, men and women alike, tend to be more likely to participate in politics when they are asked (Verba et al., 1995). Thus, if parties make an effort to mobilize women, the consequence may be that women will participate at higher levels and close the gap with men.

Finally, Chapter 5 on the gendered effects of women's representation and gender quotas on political participation provides evidence that gender gaps in contacting politicians are influenced by the history of women's representation. As for turnout and campaign activity, the number of years since women won the right to vote has a stronger positive influence on women's likelihood of participating than on men's, leading to smaller gender gaps in contacting politicians. Again, there seems to be evidence supporting the assumption that the impact of women's representation may take some time before influencing positively women's behaviour and decreasing gender gaps in political participation.

6.1.5 Protest

Findings for the more unconventional political activities tend to be ones that demonstrate the greatest evidence for the influence of political institutions on gender differences in political activities. Unconventional activites do not involve elections or political parties like conventional political activities. For protest, Chapter 3 provides additional evidence that the electoral system through its effect on coalition size provides incentives to political activities that affect men more so than women. Gender differences in protest participation tend to

be larger when the number of political parties forming the government is high. Women's probability of engaging in protest does not increase as fast as men's as coalition size increases.

The number of left-wing political parties in the legislature has a different influence on men's and women's involvement in protest as demonstrated in Chapter 4. The number of parties has a positive influence on men's likelihood of participating in a protest that is not reproduced to the same degree among women. In other words, men's likelihood of involvement increases at a faster rate than women as the number of left parties increases. Since men are less likely than women to vote for left-wing political parties and support left parties' policy preferences, they may be more dissatisfied with the political process when mulitiple left parties are present in the legislature, leading to a greater increses in their likelihood of protest. This may occur despite left-wing political parties mobilization strategies aimed at men since political parties may operate on their traditional habit about what is the electorate and what has worked in the past. Left parties may still be more likely to mobilize men while the latter is more likely to vote for right-wing parties.

Findings in Chapter 5 also demonstrate that political institutions can provide incentives to political participation that affect men and women differently. First, this chapter shows that as the percentage of women in the legislature increases, gender differences in participating in protest decrease until they become insignificant. These smaller and insignificant gender gaps are the result of the presence of female politicians in the legislature having a greater positive influence on women's likelihood of engaging in protest when compared to men's. It seems that the percentage of women creates incentives to political participation that women are better able to take advantage of. Since there is a tradition of men dominating the political process, the increased presence of women in the legislature may only influence women's likelihood of involvement in protest. The increased women's representation may not alter men's motivation to participate in political activities and their feelings toward the political system since they may still believe that the political system is reponsive to their

interests as it always was. On the other hand, because there is less of a tradition in women being represented in the political process, an increase in women's representation may be linked with women's likelihood of participating in politics. This increased representation of women may change their views about the political system and they may be more willing to participate in politics.

Second, results in Chapter 5 demonstrate that women's representation may not just supply incentives to political participation, it may also serve as a barrier that tends to affect men's involvement in protest more so than women's. Findings in this chapter indicate that gender gaps are smaller and insignificant when there is a longer history of women's representation. These smaller gaps, however, are created by the history of women's representation having a greater negative influence on men's likelihood of participation than on women's. A longer history of the presence of women in the political system may send a signal to men that dampens their levels of political participation. A longer presence of women in the political process may make men feel like the decision-making process does not include their interests and preferences, leading men to participate at lower levels than women. In sum, women's representation and gender quotas affect both women and men; political institutions that may send a signal of inclusion for women may also have the opposite influence on men.

6.1.6 Working with Others

Similar to the results obtained for the act of protest, multiple aspects of political institutions have a gendered effect on working with others to express views about government actions. First, it was found that the electoral system, through the number of political parties in the legislature, creates incentives to political activities that influence men more so than women. Gender gaps in working with others increase as the number of parties increases with women lagging increasingly behind men's likelihood of engaging. Second, similar results occur for district magnitude; gender differences are larger when district magnitude is high. Women's probability of engaging with others to express views declines faster than men's as district

magnitude increases, leading to these larger gaps. Third, the electoral system has a gendered effect on this political activity through coalition size. Gender gaps increase as coalition size increases, but these larger gaps are the result of coalition size having a greater negative influence on women's likelihood than on men's. Overall, results in Chapter 3 show that PR electoral systems are associated with larger gender differences in political participation. Plurality and majoritarian electoral systems may decrease gender gaps in working with others by having simpler rules and limited number of political actors involved in the political process. Easier electoral systems may remove some of the obstacles that prevent women from participating at the same rate as men in political activities. Since women have long been excluded and marginalized from the political process, a simpler electoral system may allow them to overcome this disadvantage by removing barriers to political participation such as a high number of political parties and elected representatives.

A similar pattern of political institutions providing incentives and barriers to political participation that are gendered also appears in Chapter 4. Findings show that gender differences decrease and then become insignificant as the percentage of favourable mentions toward women and other non-economic demographic groups increases in party platforms. In other words, women are more likely to be involved with others to express views than men when political parties include favourable mentions toward the former in their platforms. The grounds for these smaller gaps are rooted in women's behaviour; as the percentage increases, women's likelihood of being involved with others increases faster than men's. As explained above, it is possible that the presence of favourable mentions toward women is an indication that political parties are more likely to mobilize women for their support and/or that favourable mentions act as a signal of inclusion for women, which in turn, may lead them to have higher levels of political participation.

Chapter 5 presents the findings concerning the gendered influence of women's representation and gender quotas on working with others. The first significant result indicates that

gender gaps in this political activity decrease and even reverse to have women being more likely than men to be involved with others as the number of years since women achieved the right to vote increases. As expected, it seems that a longer history of women's representation provides incentives to women's participation that are not replicated among men. A longer history of women's representation may mean that there is a longer tradition of women being present and visible as politicians, leading to higher involvement in politics from women in the electorate. Women may be more likely to believe that they have a role to play in politics when they are accustomed in seeing women do so in the political arena, leading to smaller and reverse gender differences.

Second, the presence of gender gender quotas also provides incentives that increase involvement with others; however, contrary to the findings for the number of years since women gained the right to vote, these incentives affect men's likelihood of involvement more so than women's. The presence of these incentives results in gender gaps in this involvement being larger in countries that adopt gender quotas. As explained above, the stronger positive relationship between gender quotas and political participation for men may be a reflection of gender quotas being more likely to be adopted in countries where men dominate the political process. In such countries, gender quotas may be viewed as a solution to increase the presence of women.

6.1.7 Conclusion

Three main points can be drawn from the review of the main findings of this dissertation described above. First, for a variety of political activities, proportional electoral systems tend to be consistently associated with larger gender gaps while plurality systems are associated either with smaller gaps, insignficant gaps or reversed gender differences. Plurality electoral systems require political resources and specific orientations toward politics to participate in politics that are as likely to be held by women and men. On the other hand, PR systems likely require resources and orientations that are more likely to be found among men than

women. Second, party positions on the left-right scale and their support for women's issues and interests influence gender gaps. Party positions may influence the likelihood of conflict among social networks, they may impact party mobilization strategies, and they may signal women that they are welcome in the political system, influencing gender gaps in political participation. For some political activities, women's greater conflict-avoidance tendency will decrease their levels of involvement more so than men. Additionally, the presence of parties sharing women's policy opinions is not enough to increase women's participation and decrease gender gaps. Political parties need to directly and positively address women's interests and preferences for women's behaviour to be affected more so than men's, leading to smaller gender gaps. Third, women's representation affects women's symbolic and substantive representation, which in turn, lead to smaller gender gaps in political participation. Results demonstrate that the influence of time is stronger on gender gaps than the effects of the percentage of women in the legislature and cabinet. A longer history of women's representation will increase women's participation more so than men's, resulting in smaller gender gaps for some political activities. But findings also show that women's representation and gender quotas may act as a signal of exclusion toward men, leading to a greater influence on men's behaviour than women's. These results demonstrate that it is important to also consider the influence of political institutions on men when investigating cross-national differences in gender gaps in political participation.

Table 6.1 reveals that the political institution that matters the most in explaining gender differences in political participation is the electoral system. This table indicates that the mulitiple indicators used to assess the gendered influence of the electoral system all are associated with a gendered effect for at least one political activity. Additionally, the number of political parties in the legislature, district magnitude, and coalition size are linked with gender differences for multiple activities. On the one hand, the electoral system influences the size and significant of gender differences for five of six political activities and on the

other hand, the electoral system has a different relationship with political participation for women and men. Mulitiple indicators of the electoral system are associated with a different influence on women's and men's participation in politics for a variety of political activities, which is not reproduced for the other political institutions included in this investigation.

Table 6.1: Summary of Findings for the Gendered Effect of Political Institutions on Political Participation

	Voter Turnout	Protest	Political Persuasion	Campaign Activity	Contact Politicians	Work with Others
Level of Disproportionality	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
ENPP	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
District Magnitude	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Coalition Size	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Polarization	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Left Government	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Number of Left Parties	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Favourable Mentions	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Women Legislature	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Women Cabinet	No	No	No	No	No	No
Right Vote	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender Quotas	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Cell entries indicate whether each indicator of political institutions has a gendered influence on the given political activity.

Party ideology, women's representation, and gender quotas are also associated with various gendered effects on political activities, but these influences tend to be limited for some actions and/or some indicators. The presence of a left party in government has a gendered effect on three political activities while the other indicators of political ideology are associated with a different influence on men's and women's likelihood of participating in politics for two or a single activity. As for the indicators of women's representation, the number of years since women won the right to vote is linked with a gendered effect for five political activities, the percentage of women in the legislature has a gendered effect for only one activity, and the percentage of women in cabinet has no influence. Finally, gender quotas have a gendered effect on political participation, but this influence occurs for only one political activity.

It is possible that the electoral system is the political institution associated with the most gendered effects since the majority of the indicators of political participation used in this study is associated with elections and political parties. The electoral system has a direct impact on the number of political parties competing in elections and the number of representatives elected. Thus, it is likely that political activities that are associated with parties and elected representatives are more likely to be affected by the electoral system. Additionally, men's and women's participation is more likely to be affected differently by the electoral system than other political institutions because it may has an influence on the resources and orientations with politics that differ the most between men and women. For instance, women are more likely than men to be conflict-avoidant. The electoral system may have a more direct influence of conflict through the number of political parties competing in elections than other political institutions, leading to a larger gendered effect since women are more likely than men to withdraw from politics when conflict is present.

6.2 Theoretical Implications

The conclusion now turns to a discussion of the contributions these findings have for research on political participation and gender gaps. First, the findings demonstrate that political institutions influence participation in a variety of activities beyond simple turnout. A large body of work has investigated how the electoral system and the party system can influence voter turnout; scholarly research on how political institutions affect other acts of political participation are more rare. The analysis herein demonstrates that political institutions are related with higher or lower levels of political participation, depending on the type of activity in question and the political institution. While the number of parties may create a barrier to involvement in some political activities, for others it may create an incentive. Understanding the limits and incentives to political participation provided by political institutions is crucial since the involvement of citizens in the decision-making process is an important part of a healthy democracy. By demonstrating that political institutions matter in explaining political participation, this research illustrates how some institutions can foster a more legitimate democracy through higher levels of political participation while others may limit citizen involvement in the decision-making process.

Second, another important contribution of this research is that it shows that political institutions do not simply influence acts of political participation that are closely related to elections and political parties such as voter turnout and campaign activity. Political institutions also matter in understanding citizen involvement in unconventional political activities such as protest and working with others. Protest may be viewed as an alternative to more conventional political participation that citizens will use when they are dissastisfied with the political system. Political institutions may influence satisfaction with the decision-making process by influencing the translation of citizen preferences into policies. The inclusion of multiple views and interests in coalition governments, for instance, may mean that a larger number of citizens will view their preferences represented in the decision-making process,

making them better satisfied with the democratic process and decreasing participation in protest.

At first, it may seem that working with others to express views about government actions does not necessitate the presence of politicians or political parties; citizens likely decide to take part in this political activity not withstanding the influence of political institutions as tested in this investigation. It is possible to be involved with others without knowing about the electoral system, party system, political parties, and/or politicians. Working with others requires that citizens organize themselves, and not with political actors, to express their views. Findings demonstrate, however, that working with others, as with more conventional political activities, is affected by multiple political institutions. Moreover, it seems that involvement with others is not viewed by citizens as an alternative to more conventional acts of political participation as is the case for protest. For instance, higher levels of disproportionality and a larger coalition size are positively associated with conventional political activities and with involvement with others to express views. In other words, the incentives and barriers to political participation provided by political institutions affect both conventional and unconventional acts of political participation. Institutional factors that make citizens participate in campaign activity or contacting politicians can also lead to greater involvement with others. This may be the case since working with others is a way for them to communicate their preferences and opinions to politicians, like voting and contacting elected representatives. These conventional and unconventional political activities are similarly influenced by political institutions since they have similar goals, that are, allowing citizens to send their views to decision-makers.

Third, this present investigation demonstrates that the influence of political institutions on a variety of political activities is gendered. Men and women do not react in the same ways when confronted with institutional factors. It has been traditionally found that men's and women's levels of involvement in political activities differ and that gender gaps vary according

to the type of activity. The findings of this investigation add that the size and significance of gender differences in political participation are influenced by institutional arrangements. In other words, political institutions contribute to the understanding of gender gaps alongside individual-level explanations such as gender differences in political resources and political engagement.

Moreover, the gendered influence on political participation is not uniform across political activities. Some institutional arrangements are associated with smaller gaps for one act while having no influence for others. Additionally, this gendered effect of political institutions affects all types of political activities - conventional and unconventional. Gender gaps in unconventional acts of political participation tend to be more influenced by political arrangements than conventional acts such as voter turnout and political persuasion. Gender differences in protest and working with others are linked with the electoral system, party ideology, women's representation, and gender quotas. On the other hand, actions such as voter turnout and campaign activity are affected by fewer political institutions including the party system and women's representation. A possible explanation for this variation in the gendered effects of political institutions may be that protest and working with others demand different types of political resources and orientations toward politics. These activities may require that citizens possess higher levels political resources such as organization skills or public speaking. By demanding more of citizens, barriers and incentives provided by political institutions have more opportunities to affect political participation levels and gender differences. For example, as explained in Chapter 3, women's social networks may allow them to overcome barriers imposed by the electoral system to turnout to vote to a greater extent than men's; however, since unconventional political activities require greater levels of skills, motivation, and/or specific orientations toward the political system, women's social networks may not be sufficient to allow them in participating at similar or greater levels as men. Instead of only requiring a specific type of social networks, unconventional activities

may require a social network, a large motivation, free time, and a large levels of civic skills, increasing possibilities for political institutions to limit and increase political participation.

On the other hand, instead of classifying political activities according to whether they are conventional or unconventional, acts can be qualified as private or public. By analyzing the results of the gendered effects of political institutions for private and public activities, it is possible to conclude that political institutions have a similar effect on both types of actions. For most indicators of political institutions used in this investigation, findings show that their gendered effects occur for both private and public activities and the effects are in the same direction. For instance, for both private and public activities, the number of years since women have gained the right to vote has a stronger positive for women's likelihood of involvement than for men's. This might be a surprising findings since political institutions structure the public sphere which may indicate that they will have a stronger effect on public activities. On the other hand, as discussed above, political institutions may influence other factors necessary for political participation, in private and public activities, such as political resources and orientations toward the political system. Both public and private political activities require some form of resources and orientation to become involved. If political institutions affect the requirements for participation, they may also influence equally private and public activities. For instance, both contacting politicians and working with others require larger amount of civic skills and high levels of political knowledge and interest for citizens to be actively involved. Certain political arragements may provide incentives to participation that increase levels of political interest and knowledge, which in turn may lead to higher levels of involvement in both contacting politicians and working with others. This similarity between the two types of acts in the resources and orientations required may be more important in explaining the gendered effects of political institutions than whether the actions involved expressing publicly a preference.

As discussed in the introduction, small gender gaps have great consequences. Findings

of this investigation demonstrate that gender gaps vary cross-nationally and that political institutions are one explanation for these variations; gender gaps, however, despite being significant, remain small. The differences in men's and women's behaviour under different institutional arrangements are not substantively large. With that being said, since women represent around 50 per cent of the population in advanced industrial democracies, small gender differences translate into larger gaps in the total number of actions performed by women and men. For instance, if women had more similar levels of political participation to men when the number of political parties in the legislature is low, this would translate into more political signs being posted, or greater political discussion. This increased presence of women in the political process under certain institutional arrangements may lead to their interests and preferences being better represented in the decision-making process which ultimately benefits the quality and legitimacy of the democratic process.

Fourth, this research demonstrates that the incentives and barriers provided by the electoral system and the party system seem to consistently put women at a disadvantage over men. For activities where there is a gendered effect and political institutions have a positive influence on participation, men's probability of involvement increases faster than women's. For example, there is a stronger positive relationship between the presence of a left party in government and the likelihood of political persuasion and campaign activity for men than women. On the other hand, when political institutions are associated with lower levels of political participation, they affect women more so than men. For instance, the number of political parties in the legislature is associated with a stronger negative relationship to the likelihood of engaging in campaign activity for women than men. This situation occurs for most of the gendered effects of the indicators of the electoral system and party ideology. The electoral system and party system rarely change over time and may create a persistent environment where they favour men's orientations toward the political systems over those of women's, leading to consistent gender differences in political participation. PR electoral sys-

tems tend to be one of those environments that consistently puts women at a disadvantage by affecting the requirements for political participation.

Fifth, this investigation provides evidence that the conventional wisdom about the benefit of gender quotas may be wrong. Debates surrounding the adoption of gender quotas in scholarly work, and among citizens and politicians tend to emphasize the benefit to citizens, and especially women, that gender quotas can offer. It is argued that, in addition to increasing the presence of women in the legislature, gender quotas may change women's orientations toward the political system to make them feel more welcome in politics, which in turn, should increase their level of political engagement and political participation. Findings herein, however, demonstrate that gender quotas affect men's probability of involvement in politics more so than women's. These results occur for only one of six political activities included in this analysis. Although, women's levels of participation are positively influenced by gender quotas for working with others, this positive effect is stronger for men, leading to larger gender gaps. A possible explanation for this situation may be found in men's opinions and preferences. For instance, men tend to be more likely than women to oppose the adoption of gender quotas (Lovenduski, 2005; Meier, 2008), which may lead the former to develop greater feelings of dissatisfaction toward the political process when countries adopt these quotas, resulting in greater involvement in political activities when compared to women.

Furthermore, similar findings to the ones described above for gender quotas occur for the number of years since women gained the right to vote. A longer history of women's representation in the political sphere should make women feel more welcome in the decision-making process. Again, results indicate that the opposite also occurs. Men's probability of involvement in political activities declines faster than women's with the number of years since women achieved the right to vote. As for gender quotas, this indicator may activate orientations toward the political systems that are more likely to the held by men than women.

Men may experience a feeling of exclusion when the political system is more open to the presence of women, leading them to withdraw or change their political participation.

Six, despite the majority of findings demonstrating that political institutions may put women at a disadvantage compared to men, this investigation also shows that on specific occasions, political institutions offer incentives that affect positively women's probability of engaging in political participation and more so than men's. These results, however, are limited to certain political activities. More specifically, women are more likely to contact politicians when political parties include favourable mentions toward them and other non-economic demographic groups, they are more likely to engage in protest when the percentage of women in the legislature is high, and a longer history of women's representation in politics is associated with greater involvement in voting, campaign activity and contacting politicians. Since different activities require different types of political resources and orientations toward the political system for participation and because men and women differ in these resources and orientations, it may be difficult for women to benefit from the incentives provided by political institutions. As discussed previously, political institutions may carry cues and signals to political participation that represent ideas and norms about gender roles that are no longer fully supported in advanced industrial democracies; for instance, findings seem to demonstrate that despite women being more likely than men to vote for left parties, these parties may still be more likely to mobilize men to obtain their support. Therefore, only on limited occasions could women benefit more than men from the incentives provided by political institutions. Yet, these situations do occur and findings in this investigation offer potential avenues for determining which political arrangements may foster women's involvement in political participation by making the political system more welcoming and open to their presence.

6.3 Moving Forward

This investigation has focused on how political institutions can create barriers to political participation that affect women and men differently and how they can offer incentives that boost women's levels of participation more so than men's. Yet, findings, as discussed above, demonstrate that sometimes political institutions may have a greater effect on men and one that is contrary to theoretical expectations. For instance, gender quotas tend to have a larger positive influence on men's likelihood of involvement in working with others than on women's. This unexpected result illustrates a factor that is missing from this investigation: a theoretical focus on men. Mechanisms linking political institutions to gender differences in political activities as elaborated upon in this investigation focus on how women's behaviour is affected differently by institutional arrangements, remaining silent on how political institutions may provide incentives and barriers to participation that differently affect men. Future investigations on the relationships between political institutions and political participation need to devote greater attention to how these institutions influence men as well as women.

A possible avenue to explain men's behaviour as revealed by the findings of this study may be the backlash hypothesis and dissatisfaction with the political system. It has been argued that some men in advanced industrial democracies feel rejected by political actors when the political system is perceived to be too open to women's presence. Some men may believe that the increased presence of women in the political system and the greater attention toward women's interests and preferences have been possible at the expense of men's position in society. This loss of status may lead some men to support positions and political parties aimed at reverting back to the status quo. This backlash toward the increased presence and attention to women may explain why some incentives provided by political institutions such as gender quotas, that ought to have a greater impact on women, have instead a larger influence on men. In other words, in the face of signals provided by political institutions that encourage the presence of women, some men may retreat from particular acts of political

participation to engage in other activities to express this dissatisfaction.

Another potential avenue for further investigation may be how political institutions affect resources and orientations toward the political system, which in turn, may influence gender differences in political behaviour. This study only hypothesizes on how political institutions may favour some of these predispositions over others such as political resources, political engagement or conflict-avoidance. It is possible that other factors may be involved. For instance, women tend to be more likely than men to have a high sense of duty which may explain why they are more likely to turn out to vote. This greater sense of duty may explain why women's likelihood of turnout does not decline as fast as men's when the level of disproportionality is high. Women's greater sense of duty may allow them to overcome the barriers to turnout, and possibly to other political activities, provided by the electoral system. Political institutions may affect when and how this sense of duty varies between women and men and when it matters for explaining gender gaps.

This investigation is a large-N comparative analysis and as such it suffers from some of the limitations associated with this type of research. The goal of this study, however, is to identify trends in how political institutions affect gender gaps in political participation in advanced industrial democracies. As such, a large cross-national analysis is the most appropriate method. Case-study analyses and/or the comparisons of two or three countries, however, could complement the findings of this investigation. An in-depth focus on a limited number of countries could provide greater detail about the political messages and actions performed by parties, politicians, and the history of women's representation. Findings of this investigation demonstrate, for instance, that the messages included in political party platforms have a relationship with men's and women's involvement in political activities. Further research could investigate what type of policy or language adopted by political parties leads to differences in men's and women's levels of political participation. It is unclear whether simply mentioning the need to address women's and other non-economic

demographic groups concerns is enough to lead to variation in gender differences in political activities or whether a commitment from political parties to a specific issue or policy is needed to affect gender gaps. By focusing on a limited number of countries, investigations could delve in greater detail in political party platforms and their strategies to contact men and women to obtain their support and involve them in the political process.

Although this investigation has highlighted the importance of time and the history of women's representation on gender gaps in political participation, it does not provide a longitudinal analysis. Due to limits of time and space, and the lack of longitudinal comparative data, this study could not explore questions of change in gender gaps over time. Following the arguments tested in this investigation, it is logical to hypothesize that changes in political institutions should affect gender differences in political participation. As discussed in Chapter 2, analyses performed herein have to be treated carefully since there is a causality problem. It remains unclear whether it is the adoption of gender quotas that leads to larger gender gaps, or whether it is countries where the gap between men's and women's participation is the largest that adopt policies aiming at reducing this inequality, for instance. Longitudinal studies could help assess the direction causality between political institutions and gender differences in political participation. By comparing data on men's and women's levels of political participation before and after changes in political institutions, longitudinal analyses could reinforce this investigation's findings on the influence of political arrangements on gender gaps in political activities.

This investigation concentrates on how political institutions may be associated with cross-national variation in gender differences in political participation. In addition to demonstrating that this is the case, findings from this study reveal that political arrangements are an important factor for understanding overall levels of political activity. By focusing on explaining variations in gender gaps by looking to political institutions, this investigation may not have fully provided a rationale for why and how political institutions matter for involvement

in political activities. For instance, findings demonstrate that gender quotas and the percentage of women in cabinet are significantly related to political participation even if there are no gendered effects. A limit of this research is that it does not provide a theoretical explanation for these results. Quotas are associated with a decrease in involvement in conventional acts of political participation while they are linked with an increased participation in unconventional acts. A possible explanation for these findings maybe that the adoption of gender quotas by political parties or the legislature reflects a general dissatisfaction of citizens toward politics. In countries where quotas have been adopted, citizens may no longer participate in politics through political parties, but are involved in unconventional acts. To reverse this trend, parties may adopt reforms such as gender quotas to improve their image and stimulate involvement in their ranks. In sum, greater attention needs to be devoted to understanding the relationships between political institutions and involvement in political activities.

Another limit of this investigation is that its findings can only be generalized to advanced industrial democracies. For theoretical reasons, other democracies were excluded from the analysis; it was argued that the relationships between political institutions and gender differences in political participation may vary according to the level of socio-economic development. Findings of this investigation indicate that this may be appropriate. For instance, the results show that gender quotas are related with gender gaps for some acts of political participation while previous investigations have found that this is not the case in Latin American countries (see Zetterberg (2009)). Further research into the topic of political institutions and political participation may focus on how the gendered effects of institutions vary in different types of democracies. The effects of the electoral system and the party system on gender gaps in political activities may differ in newer democracies since these countries have had a shorter history with their political institutions.

6.4 Conclusion

This investigation has demonstrated that political institutions add to the understanding of gender differences in political participation. Political arrangements provide limits and incentives to political activities that influence men's and women's behaviour differently. Moreover, institutions can also provide an environment that favours citizens who possess certain political resources and/or orientations toward the political systems. Since men and women differ in these resources and orientations, political institutions have gendered effects. In sum, this investigation was able to identify which political arrangements are more conducive to the equal participation of women and men in the political process.

As previously discussed, the equal participation of women and men in the decision-making process is part of a healthy and legitimate democracy. Political institutions that allow all citizens to have an equal voice should be stronger and should lead to a greater satisfaction with the political process. A better understanding into how political arrangements can contribute to allowing some groups of citizens to participate more than others could inform future debates on the necessity of political change. Multiple democracies have faced dissatisfaction from their citizens related to how the political process may be inadequate. Questions of electoral reform and the role of political parties are the subject of much debate in multiple societies around the world, for instance. Understanding how the electoral system and party system influence the equal participation of all citizens may cast a light into how proposed changes may influence men's and women's levels of political participation, leading to the adoption of political arrangements that favour the inclusion of all citizens equally in the political process.

Appendix A

First Appendix: Variable Description from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

Micro-Level Data

D1. Age of respondent (in years).

D2. Gender of respondent.

1. Male

2. Female

7. Refused

9. Missing

D3. Education of the respondent.

01. None

02. Incomplete primary

03. Primary completed

04. Incomplete secondary

05. Secondary completed

06. Post-secondary trade/vocational school

07. University undergraduate degree incomplete

08. University undergratuate degree complete

97. Refused

98. Don't know

99. Missing

D4. Respondent's marital status

1. Married or living together as married
2. Widowed
3. Divorced or separated (married but separated/not living with legal spouse)
4. Single, never married
7. Refused
8. Don't know
9. Missing

D10. Current employment status of respondent.

01. Employed – full-time (32+ hours weekly)
02. Employed – part-time (15-32 hours weekly)
03. Employed – less than 15 hours
04. Helping family member
05. Unemployed
06. Student, in school, in vocational training
07. Retired
08. Housewife, home duties
09. Permanently disabled
10. Other, not in labor force
97. Refused
98. Don't know
99. Missing

Q1. Here is a list of things some people do during elections. Which if any did you do during the most recent election?

Q1a. Talked to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular party or candidate

1. Yes
2. No
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q1b. Showed your support for a particular party or candidate by, for example, attending a meeting, putting up a poster, or in some other way?

1. Yes
2. No
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q3. Whether or not respondent cast a ballot (regardless of whether the ballot was valid)

1. Cast a ballot
2. Did not cast a ballot
3. Inconsistent response: respondent reported not casting a ballot but reported a vote choice
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q9. Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card (where ONE means that it

makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?

1. It makes a difference who is in power
2.
3.
4.
5. It doesn't make a difference who is in power
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q18b. Which party do you feel closest to?

Q18e. Do you feel very close to this party/party bloc, somewhat close, or not very close?

1. Very close
2. Somewhat close
3. Not very close
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q21. Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views about something the government should or should not be doing?

Q21a. Contacted a politician or government official either in person, or in writing, or some other way?

1. Yes
2. No
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q21b. Taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?

1. Yes
2. No
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q21c. Worked together with people who shared the same concern?

1. Yes
2. No
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Q25-Q27. Political information items.

1. Correct
2. Incorrect
7. Refused
8. Dont' know
9. Missing

Appendix B

Second Appendix: Survey Information

This appendix contains information for each of the surveys included in the analysis.

Australia

Election date: October 9, 2004

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Self-administered (mail-back; self-completed supplement)

Length of survey time: October 12, 2004 to January 21, 2005

N = 1769

Belgium

Election date: May 18, 2003

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: December 16, 2003 to April 20, 2004

N = 2225

Canada

Election date: June 28, 2004

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Combination of telephone and self-administered

Length of survey time: July 5, 2004 to September 18, 2004

N = 1674

Finland

Election date: March 16, 2003

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: March 17, 2003 to April 30, 2003

N = 1196

France

Election date: April 21, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election

Mode of interview: Telephone

Length of survey time: May 23, 2003 to May 24, 2003

N = 1000

Germany

Election date: September 22, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Telephone

Length of survey time: October 31, 2002 to November 13, 2002

N = 2000

Great Britain

Election date: May 5, 2005

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Combination of face-to-face and self-administered

Length of survey time: June 19, 2005 to November 24, 2005

N = 860

Iceland

Election date: May 10, 2003

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Telephone

Length of survey time: May 15, 2003 to June 18, 2003

N = 1446

Ireland

Election date: May 17, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Combination of face-to-face and self-administered

Length of survey time: May 22, 2002 to October 10, 2002

N = 2367

Israel

Election date: January 28, 2003

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Telephone

Length of survey time: February 2, 2003 to February 7, 2003

N = 1212

Italy

Election date: April 10, 2006

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: May 10, 2006 to May 16, 2006

N = 1439

Japan

Election date: July 11, 2004

Timing of study relative to election: Pre-election and post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: July 15, 2004 to July 26, 2004

N = 1977

The Netherlands

Election date: May 15, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Pre-election and post-election study

Mode of interview: Combination of face-to-face and self-administered

Length of survey time: May 16, 2002 to June 24, 2002

N = 1574

New Zealand

Election date: July 27, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Self-administered (mail-back; self-completed supplement)

Length of survey time: N/A

N = 1741

Norway

Election date: September 10, 2001

Timing of study relative to election: Pre-election and post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: September 11, 2001 to January 31, 2002

N = 2052

Portugal

Election date: March 17, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: March 23, 2002 to April 8, 2002

N = 1303

Portugal

Election date: February 20, 2005

Timinig of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: March 5, 2005 to May 8, 2005

N = 2801

Spain

Election date: March 14, 2004

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: March 15, 2004 to March 23, 2004

N = 1212

Sweden

Election date: September 15, 2002

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: September 17, 2002 to November 26, 2002

N = 1060

Switzerland

Election date: October 19, 2003

Timing of study relative to election: Post-election study

Mode of interview: Combination of telephone and self-administered

Length of survey time: October 20, 2003 to November 2, 2003

N = 1418

United States

Election date: November 2, 2004

Timing of study relative to election: Pre-election and post-election study

Mode of interview: Face-to-face

Length of survey time: November 4, 2004 to December 16, 2004

N = 1066

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