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Security Challenges of States Building Crisis in West Africa since 1955

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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Security Challenges of States Building Crisis in West Africa since 1955

by

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A THESIS

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Abstract

West African states have been struggling to build their nation-states since the independences that started in 1957. The same ills that struck these states since the beginning seem to have stuck with them despite several attempts at healing them. Instead of modern and prosperous states, people are witnessing the chronic weakness of their states. This research seeks to contribute to the understanding of states' weakness in West Africa and to the analysis of possible solutions to address the problem.

The opening chapter sets the stage of the research by introducing the phenomenon of states' weakness in West Africa. The next chapter looks at the literature that deals with states power and weakness. The frames of analysis used to evaluate these states' strength and weaknesses are also introduced in this chapter. These are the critical mass, political skills, economic wealth, military and security assets. These resources offer a view of a state's potential. Chapter three delves on some of the causes of West African states' weakness. These states are weak because of the structures and internal socio-political dynamics within them. Some other causes of their weakness come from the global powers' influences. The last section of the chapter offers an overview of how the Cold War (1945-1989) influenced events in the sub region. The political environment of overlay by global powers shapes considerably the states under study. Security Reform and Governance is posited as the solution to the lack of capacity of West African states. Chapter four of this work delves on this subject. The security sector covers most state's institutions that need to be reformed in West Africa. The closing chapter demonstrates how the Economic Community of West African States is a nascent security community. Its security architecture endorses the Security Sector Governance mechanism and therefore stands a better chance of strengthening member states if provided with the needed resources.

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List of Symbols, Abbreviations and Nomenclature

Symbol	Definition
9/11 or 911	11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States of America
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BCEAO	Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (West African states central bank)
CSSDA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organization
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
MINUSMA	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization du Mali
MoD	Ministry of Defence
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PMC	Private Military Corporation
PSC	Private Security Company
RSCT	Regional Security Community Theory
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSG	Security Sector Governance

SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugee
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
US	United States of America
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAPCCO	West African Police Chiefs Committee
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
ZANU (PF)	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)

Epigraph

A very important aspect of a national liberation struggle is that those who lead the struggle must never confuse what they have in their head with reality. On the contrary, anyone who leads a national liberation struggle must have many things in his head, and more each day (from the starting point of the particular reality of his land, and of the reality of other lands), but he must weigh up and make plans which respect reality and not what he has in his head. This is very important. Failure to respect it has created many difficulties in the peoples' liberation struggle, mainly in Africa.

Amilcar Cabral, *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings*, London: Heinemann, 1980, p.45

Chapter One: THE SETTING OF THE RESEARCH

1.1 Introduction

Africa in general, and West Africa in particular are viewed in international relations through the lenses of the misery, “(...)the triple D : (death, disease, desperation” (Hunter-Gault, 2006) of the peoples and the weakness of their states (Wiarda, 2004, p. 23). The anthropologist Ferguson argues that Africa is often regarded by Westerners in terms of absence. Absence of security, of economic progress, of sanitation, etc (J. Ferguson, 2006; Therkildsen, 2005, p. 35). This work focuses on insecurity as the main cause of the states building crisis that maintains West African states in weakness.

States in the West African sub region are fragile and the current situation indicates that peace and security continue to be challenged (Boniface, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2012d). From East to West, a snapshot of the countries indicates that the sub region continues to deal with instability in their member states with the usual spill over effects into neighbouring countries. Algeria grappled with the spill over effects of the Malian conflicts through the hostage taking at its gas plant in the Sahara desert (A. a. R. G. Nossiter, 2013). From West to East, no single country in the sub region is spared the scourge of insecurity.

In Senegal, the Sopi (change) coalition of centre-right political parties under the leadership of Abdoulaye Wade took power in 2000. The constitution of the time, provided for two presidential terms in office. In 2007, the constitution was amended to allow President Wade to run for a third term. The country experienced socio-political unrest to prevent a third term for the then 85 year old president and because of the Sopi's failure to deliver on its electoral promises of economic improvements (Bingol, 2012; Boone, 1990; Maro, 2011). The basic necessities like water, electricity and transport continue to be in short supply (Lombard, 2003; World Bank, 2008a). Moreover, the Casamance insurgency in the southern part of the country is still going on despite its low-level conflict status as termed by Evans (Martin Evans, 2003). The most recent upheaval in Senegal was resolved thanks to the mediation of the sub regional body ECOWAS

(Economic Community of West African States, 2012) and a successful electoral process that allowed President Maky Sall to replace his mentor Mr. Wade at the helm of the country (Fessy, 2012).

Gambia has a tiny territory that would have been part of Senegal had it not been that it was colonized by a different European power. Britain took control of Gambia after the First Treaty of Versailles in 1783 (Hughes, 2006; Wright, 2010). This former British colony is currently ruled by Yahya Jammeh, leader of the military junta that took control of the state in 1994 (Ceesay, 2006; Sarr, 2007). He is at the same time the Head of State and the Head of the government¹. Despite his initial “democratic” election in 1997, Jammeh continues to rule his country with an iron-fist and this is a major source of insecurity for Gambia (Ceesay, 2006). The cross-border spill over effects from its immediate southern neighbours, Casamance and Guinea-Bissau do also affect the security situation in Gambia (Arieff, 2009). Rebels from either side try to take shelter in Gambia in their run from governmental armies. From their shelters, they also stage attacks against their countries.

In 2009, Guinea-Bissau initiated a period of regime stability with the democratic election of Malam Bacai Sanha to the Presidency of the country. This was preceded by a bloody unrest that resulted in the assassination of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces and of the previous President, Nino Vieira (United Nations, 2010a). Guinea-Bissau has been for a long time on the list failed states controlled by drug traffickers (R. J. Bennett, 2009; B. J. Forrest, 2003). Following his election, President Sanha appointed back to his position a former Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto who was already recognized as a powerful drug lord² (Nossiter, 2010). As a consequence, the European Union and the United States suspended all security cooperation with Guinea-Bissau. This was a very bad signal for a state that badly needs foreign assistance to reform its security apparatus. President Sanha passed away on the 9th of January 2012. As provided for by the Constitution, he was replaced by the president of the National Assembly. The army

¹ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ga.html>

² The fragility of some West African regimes make them so dependent on powerful warlords to the risk of compromising their legitimacy.

did not like the new regime led by the President Raimundo Pereira and his Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. They toppled them in the military coup of 13 April 2012 (Nossiter, 2012a; United Nations, 2012d). This took place just before the second run of elections that favoured Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr.

Cape Verde, the island state of West Africa is situated off the coast of Senegal. The country is in reality an archipelago (Ramalho, 2010). It is made of ten small islands that are difficult to control because of the lack of sufficient resources to do so. It is politically stable but also negatively affected by the drug trade (Unknown, 2008). The United Nations published a report in 2008 that considers drug trafficking to be a security threat in West Africa (United Nations, 2008a). The geographic position of the country makes it a prized stop for marine traffic (Le Bas, 2007). Latin American drug traffickers use the particular geographic configuration and strategic location of Cape Verde as a transit stop for their merchandise being shipped to Europe.

Mali has been enjoying a democratic stability since 1991 following the toppling from power of Moussa Traore by a military junta under the leadership of the Ahmadou Toumani Toure. Toure relinquished power to civilians soon after the military coup. Following two successful terms by Alpha Konare, Toumani Toure was first elected as a civilian president in 2002 (Doumbi-Fakoly, 2010; Unknown, 2010). He was re-elected in 2007 in recognition of the good work he was doing in his country. The political stability of Mali is threatened by poverty and the lack of resources to effectively control the vast territory that shares long borders with Mauritania, Algeria and Niger in the Sahel region (Guterres, 2012). The Tuareg insurgency (Keita, 1998), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other criminal activities are taking place in northern Mali and this is a further source of concerns for Malians and external partners (Rashbaum, 2009; J. Ray, 2009). Just four weeks before the launching of the general elections at which Toure was not running, his government was toppled in a military coup on 22 March 2012 (Nossiter, 2012b). The armed forces expressed disapproval of his handling of the insurgency in the North (International Crisis Group, 2012d). Many northern Tuaregs rebels were for decades incorporated in the late Kaddafi's armed forces. Following his arrest and assassination, the Tuaregs were supplied with considerable ammunition that they brought

home. This allowed them to drive the Malian armed forces out of the northern territory (Jemal and Mohamed Yahya Ould Abdel Wedoud Oumar, 2011). Following the military coup in Bamako, they benefitted from the instability to declare the independence of northern Mali that they call AZAWAD (Yabi, 2012). This unilateral declaration of independence was rejected by the entire international community (United Nations, 2012b). In reality, the north of Mali is run by a cluster of armed groups: the Tuareg separatists of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Islamist fighters of Ansar Dine (Ançar Eddine), the Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This association threw into doubt the credibility of the known rebel group of MNLA is still struggling to get rid of its helpers.

Following the military coup of March 2012 that was strongly condemned by the international community, ECOWAS the regional community intervened to facilitate the return of stability in Mali. Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore was appointed by the regional body to mediate in the Malian conflict. ECOWAS supported Article 36 of the Malian Constitution that states that in case of vacancy of the Head of state, the president of the National Assembly replaces him until the next elections (Gouvernement du Mali, 1991). The Junta attempted to prevent the application of this article of the Constitution because the pro-coup Malians disliked seeing Dioncounda Traore, then President of the National Assembly become Head of State. He was accused of being part of the regime that was toppled in the military coup of March 2012. Following lengthy negotiation between the Junta under Captain Sanogo and ECOWAS, Traore was sworn in on 12 April 2012. The Junta also got the approval of their ally Cheikh Modibo Diarra³ as Prime Minister. Modibo Diarra lost favour with his backers and had to resign his position in December 2012 (Cheney, 2012). On 21 May 2012, the army allowed the pro-coup mob to run into the presidential office and severely beat the Head of state. The following day, Traore flew to France for further medical treatment. He returned to Mali on 27 July 2012 (Diarra, 2012).

Civilians are in charge of the leadership of the country but in reality the military junta still controls the state's apparatus. Traore requested the help of ECOWAS to fight northern rebels and restore the territorial integrity of Mali. The request was conditional on non-deployment of ECOWAS troops in the Capital Bamako but only in the Islamists controlled northern part of the country. The regional body rejected the request because of the condition. Both parties reached an agreement that allowed ECOWAS troops to establish their Headquarters in Bamako to run joint operations in the North (AFP, 2012; Fomba, 2012). This agreement opened a new chapter in the security situation of Mali, ECOWAS and the whole Sahel region (International Crisis Group, 2005; Taje, 2006). After months of hesitation, a military intervention was launched by France to fight Islamist militia that controlled Northern Mali and part of the Sahel. From the onset, the military operation aimed at stopping the rebels advance towards the capital, Bamako (A. Nossiter, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti 2013). The military intervention relied on Article 12 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945). On December 20, 2012, the UN-Security Council voted in favour of this deployment (United Nations, 2012e). Also, it should be noted that Algeria is the military power in the area. For a long time, it provided no sign of support to the military operation on its southern border (International Crisis Group, 2012e). Later on, France obtained the approval to use Algeria's airspace for operations in Mali. It appears that the hostage taking at the In-Amenas gas plant might have drawn Algeria into action (Erlanger, 2013; A. a. R. G. Nossiter, 2013). Mauritania was another Sahel country that had a considerable stake in a military intervention in Mali but that did not formally support it. Democratic president elections have now taken place (BBC, 2013a). New head of state Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was sworn in on 04 September 2013. He seemed to have received support from northern communities but French and UN troops remain on standby to accompany the transition in Mali.

In the Mano river region (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia) the socio-political landscape is characterized by insecurity. After a long waiting period and a bloody popular unrest, Guinea achieved a democratic transition with the election of Alpha Conde on

³ Cheikh Modibo Diarra is the NASA Astrophysicist who returned to the home country of Mali to

December 3rd, 2010. President Conde was a long time political opponent of Ahmed Sekou Toure (R. H. Jackson, 1982, p. 211) and Lansana Conte who both imprisoned him for years (Assanatou Baldé, 2010). This democratic achievement was preceded by violence perpetrated by the military junta that took power following the death of Lansana Conte on 22 December 2008. A military junta under the leadership of Captain Moussa Daddis Camara took power and imposed a harsh dictatorship. On 28 September 2009, one hundred and fifty pro-democracy protestors were gunned down and many women raped in public at the stadium of the capital Conakry (Charbonneau, 2009). Despite its geographical position and vast natural resources, Guinea is still unstable politically like many West African countries (Barry, 2004). Both leaders of the main political parties, the current President Alpha Conde and his main rival Celliou Dalein Diallo are playing the ethno-tribal cards that have not served well any country on the African continent (Alsény, 2010). This is likely to prolong the instability. Presidential elections took place in 2010. Legislatives elections are still pending two years later (International Crisis Group, 2013b; Nossiter, 2012c). International Crisis Group Report indicates that the unresolved electoral standoff is more likely to plunge the country back into armed conflicts. After years and the last weeks of clashes between supporters of the regime and those of the opposition Guineans went to the poll on 28 September 2013 (BBC, 2013c).

Sierra Leone and Liberia are still in a reconstruction period following violent conflicts in the nineties (Arieff, 2009; Farah, 2007). The former Liberian President, Charles Taylor (1997-2003) was tried at The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2000. In May 2012, he was indicted and sentenced to a jail time of 50 years. The Special Court for Sierra Leone established by the International Criminal Court sat in the Netherlands because it was too risky to hold such a high profile trial in the sub-region (Max, 2011). The potential for destabilization was too important mostly for the two countries involved.

During the conflict (1989-2006), Liberians massively took refuge in Cote d'Ivoire to escape the violence. Since 2004, it has been the other way around with Ivoirians fleeing

participate in the political process.

conflicts in their country and seeking refuge in the neighbouring Liberia. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that ninety-thousands Ivoirians (22 March 2011) crossed into Liberia running away from the armed conflicts in their country (International Crisis Group, 2011a). Following the end of the unrest in their country some Ivoirians returned home, but many supporters of the former president Gbagbo remained in the Liberian border areas with Cote d'Ivoire. From there they are launching attacks into Cote d'Ivoire and fleeing back to their shelters in Liberia. In the attacks of June 8th, 2012, three members of ONUCI (United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire) were killed (United Nations, 2012c). Therefore, the success of Liberia post-conflict peace-building consolidation is more likely to depend on the progress in Cote-d'Ivoire ongoing post-conflict settlements (Dobbins, 2008, p. 73). Both Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia are concerned by the spill over effects of the conflicts in either country.

Cote d'Ivoire fell back into civil war following the presidential elections of 28 November 2010. Opposition leader, Alassane Dramane Ouattara won the elections and was recognized by the international community as the legitimate Head of state of Cote d'Ivoire. The incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept his defeat and led the national Constitutional court to proclaim him as the winner of the elections (Nossiter, 2011; United Nations, 2012c). Following many failed attempts by the regional and the continental organizations to mediate the conflicts, the country slipped into civil war again (International Crisis Group, 2011a). Given the political and economic potential of Cote d'Ivoire in the West African sub region, many analysts warned about the risk that the whole sub region could be engulfed by the conflict if nothing was done to resolve it (A. K. Bangura, 2010; Besada, 2009). Louise Arbour, the current President of the International Crisis Group published an Open letter to the West African Heads of states meeting in Abuja (Nigeria) from the 23 to the 24 March 2011 for the annual summit. She exhorted them to take all necessary measures to resolve the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in order to avoid its potential spill over effects (Arbour, 2011). Laurent Gbagbo was arrested on 11 April 2011 with the help of French troops stationed in Cote d'Ivoire. The elected Head of state, Alassane Ouattara is now trying to reconcile Ivoirians. This task is increasingly proving to be very difficult. Besides the attacks of 08 July 2012 from the

West, Cote d'Ivoire was attacked again on 21 September 2012 from the East. Rebels believed to be pro-Gbagbo supporters moved in from Ghana and attacked Ivoirian army and police posts (BBC, 2012a). The Ivoirian government reacted by shutting down its land, air and sea borders with Ghana. The closing of the Noe crossing had enormous consequences for the whole of Guinea Gulf because through there the main highway that links countries of the gulf passes (Kpodo, 2012).

Burkina Faso is a weak state financially dependent on external donors for 31% of its public income. It is considered very corrupt (Delavallade, 2007). The regime stability brought about by the current President Blaise Compaore has allowed Burkina Faso to play a mediating role in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Mali (Fomba, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2007b, 2011a). Compaore is still viewed as the instigator of the assassination in 1987 of the popular leader Thomas Sankara and this allowed him to ascend to power. As a result, he has always firmly clamped down on popular movements contesting his leadership (Salouka, 2011). Burkina Faso has a stable but equally fragile regime in power. Burkinabes will be called to the poll in 2015. According to the Constitution, Compaore can no longer run for another term in office (International Crisis Group, 2013a). He has been evading questions regarding his succession. It is still unclear if he is going to change the Constitution in order to run again or if he is stepping down to allow the transition to a new regime.

Niger like Mali has a vast territory sharing borders with powerful northern neighbours that are Algeria and Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb roams easily in this vast and uncontrolled area shared by Mali, Algeria, Libya and Niger (Jemal and Mohamed Yahya Ould Abdel Wedoud Oumar, 2011). Unlike Mali, Niger is endowed with considerable deposits of uranium that is mined by Areva, the French nuclear company. In September 2010, seven Areva employees were abducted from their residences in northern Niger (Barchfield, 2010). This prompted France, the former colonial power, to send troops in Niger to help in the search for the hostages. Following a transitional period led by the military, Niger successfully and democratically elected its current president, Mahamadou Issoufou and the political opponent conceded to his loss

(Victor Guilbert, 2011). The ruling regime is currently stable and this allowed Niger to actively participate in the international effort to restore security in the neighbouring Mali.

Ghana is currently the most stable state in the sub region, both economically and politically. For the last decade, Ghana has been reforming its institutions and the pay off has begun. It is strongly supported by the high prices of gold, cocoa and now oil (Kodila Tedika, 2011; Neubauer, 2010). Northern territories of Ghana consider that they do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth. This has the potential of destabilization like Nigeria and Mali. In 2011, Ghanaian security forces were deployed in the North to restore order following the clash between two tribal communities (Fox, 2011). The considerable illicit trade in small arms in Ghana is also a source of concerns (Aning, 2004). As they are not controlled they can easily fuel insecurity and state destabilization.

Togo territory is a small strip of land laid between Ghana and Benin, but the country has a complex history. It was colonized by three European powers, Germany, Britain and France (Crowder, 1968). Togo is poor like many other countries in West Africa and has a troubled recent political history. The current President, Faure Gnassingbe took power following the death of his father in 2005. Pressured by the West African community he relinquished power and was democratically elected two months after (Ebeku, 2005). In 2010, he won a second term in office amid accusations of ballot boxes rigging. Like his father, he is strongly backed by the armed forces but the opposition is also too weak to unseat him (Epou, 2011). As a result, Togo is in a state of no open conflict and no political stability.

Benin and Mali are two West African states that benefitted from national conferences organized in the nineties. They aimed at establishing reconciliation with the post-independences political leadership (Ebousi Boulaga, 1993). Benin is a stable country and is considered one of the best students of the World Bank in terms of working on economic reforms (Nougoum, 2011). The flooding of October 2010 did expose the weakness of the current regime to respond to the daily needs of its population (D. Smith, 2010). Corruption is still a major obstacle to economic recovery as resources provided by the international community are being plundered by unscrupulous leaders (Dovenon, 2010). President Thomas Boni Yayi was first elected in 2006. The electoral process that

ended on 13 March 2011 proclaimed him as the winner of the second run. But his opponent, Adrien Houngbédji also proclaimed himself the winner and president of Benin (Victor Guilbert, 2011). That conflict was finally resolved and Houngbedji conceded to the results of the poll.

Nigeria is the powerhouse in the sub region and it has demonstrated that by taking the leadership of the community's peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau in the 1990s (Adebajo, 2002b). Nigeria obtained the leadership of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) as provided for by the Security Council Resolution 2085 (United Nations, 2012e).

Nigeria's influence is challenged domestically by the recurrent insurgencies operations in the Niger Delta (International Crisis Group, 2007c) and unresolved inter-communities tensions in the Northern part of the country (International Crisis Group, 2010, 2012b; McLoughlin, 2013). Boko Haram, the radical Islamic sect that is challenging the Nigerian government is currently the biggest threat to Nigerian security. Its attacks targeting Christians has the potential to destabilize the whole country by pushing it into civil war again (Walker, 2012). President Goodluck Jonathan was sworn to power in May 2010 following the death of President Umar Yar'Adua⁴. He was elected by his ruling party to lead it in the next general elections. Should the coming elections be equally marred by frauds like the previous ones, Nigeria risks slipping into chaos (International Crisis Group, 2011c). Governance remains the main challenge of the Nigerian state (Adejumobi, 2010). This is not unique to Nigeria, but the stakes are high because of the high expectations placed on the Nigerian state by its people, the sub regional and the international community as the whole (Adelugba, 2008). The weakness of Nigeria significantly affects many states around it.

The fifteen countries that currently make the Economic Community of West African states are different but they are facing similar challenges to their peace and security. The lack of viable systems of governance and democratization is the common thread that runs through all these states (C. Ero, 2001). Since 1975 they have embarked

on the process of pooling their resources in order to face together their challenges. Here lies the interest of this research that seeks to examine the prospects and limitations of this community initiative (Collett, 2007; Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2009). ECOWAS has the potential of uplifting the sub region if some challenges are addressed as it will be argued in chapter five.

First of all it will be argued that state building project in West Africa has been in crisis since the time of independences (Meredith, 2005a). States in the sub region have remained weak despite their inception in the international community as sovereign states (R. Jackson, 1990). This situation will be briefly presented in this first chapter and the full study of the causes of West African states' weakness will be done in chapter three.

The evaluation of West African states strength and weakness will be done through the concept of power (Clegg, 2009). To this end, three variables will be retained to expand this concept. The three variables are: political skills, economic capability and military/security. Military and security variables are studied together to better respond to the framework of security sector reform that is holistic in its approach (Chanaa, 2002). It takes into consideration the interaction of all the elements for a desired outcome.

The focus on the security sector stands a better chance of succeeding in addressing the West African states building crisis. It has also been adopted by the Economic Community of West African states security mechanisms (K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009). For the last decade, these states through their common mechanisms have been working to address the insecurity issues in the sub region.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter sets the scene of the research by introducing the phenomenon of states' weakness in West Africa. This undertaking is important because it partly explains why development efforts have not produced the expected results.

Chapter two reviews what the literature says about West African states weakness. In the same section, the literature on the possible solutions to address the problem will be

⁴ Umar Yar'Ardua was a Muslim from northern Nigeria. Goodluck is Christian from the Southeast.

also discussed. Security Sector Reform or Governance being the core of this research, the literature on the topic will be analyzed.

Chapter three looks at the processes involved in the West African states' weakness. All the states in the sub region are weak and some are on the brink failure (D. Carment, 2005; Rotberg, 2003b). Internal and external causes are analyzed to explain this situation. The Cold War has had a significant impact on West African states (Meredith, 1984). These countries became independent after the Second World War while the Cold War between the western and the eastern blocs was taking place. Each of the blocs was striving to expand its respective areas of influence (Dunbabin, 2008). The failure of nation-states building can be attributed to this situation as weak West African states were led to serve the Cold war agenda instead of those of their nascent states (Allison, 1990; Blum, 2004). Most of them were facing internal strife in their early days of independences. The supports received to respond to these conflicts were dependent on the Cold war interests of the global powers.

Chapter four looks at the security sector as the area that requires attention in order to address the problem of West African states. The reform of the security sector is the response to their current lack of capabilities. Security Sector Reform and Governance is concept that was promoted by the development community in order to boost the capacity of weak states (N. Ball, 2000). The concept is new but it holds the promise of addressing the issues at hand. It has been widely adopted by the United Nations and other development agencies. Chapter four will analyze its prospects for ECOWAS.

Chapter five is devoted to the study of the Economic Community of West African States as an evolving Regional Security Community (E. a. M. B. Adler, 1998; B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). It pools resources of the community in order to address the common threats. Most West African states are too poor to respond to their security needs on their own. Since the end of the Cold War, their strategic importance to powerful Western countries has also shifted (Holmes, 1993; Kalinovsky, 2010). Unlike during the Cold war period, these states can no longer count of Western powers to resolve their security issues. The pooling of resources through a regional body offers the best prospect of guaranteeing their security in the current international system.

1.2 Weak West African States

Peace, security and stability in West African states have been the main challenges in the recent past. This situation can be explained in various ways. The absence of democratic values (J. B. Berman, 1998), corrupt leaders (J.-F. Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, 1999), exploitation by colonial powers, capitalist states and organizations (Paul Collier, 2007; Crowder, 1968) are some of these explanations. This study is positing that the root causes are to be found in the West African states' structures and modes of functioning. The same ills that struck African states at their birth seem to have stuck with them despite several attempts at healing them (Herbst, 2000). Many of these states were born weak and have never had a chance "(...) to develop effective political, economic and social institutions"(D. Carment, 2005). Their weakness is a threat to their people, the sub-region and the entire international community.

Definition of a weak state

All West African States are weak and some of them are flirting with failure. None of them is a power in the international system. According to Handel there is a hierarchy of power in the international system. It is made of "super powers, great powers, middle powers, weak states, and mini-states"(Handel, 1990, p. 11). Following this hierarchy, all West African states are classified as weak states as it will be demonstrated in this chapter.

There is a combination of issues that lead to a state's failure and collapse. Wiarda considers this situation to be a "series of vicious circles that are very hard to escape"(Wiarda, 2004, p. 23). The breakdown of the economy creates an insecurity situation. In this atmosphere, each of the communities composing the state will strive to control the scarce resources. The effort to control resources creates civil war. Furthermore, given the instability, national investors take their capitals out of the country. Foreign investors are not likely to come in an instable country (Rothstein, 1987, p. 144). Even aiding states hold up their humanitarian aid for fear that it will be plundered by warring factions and not reach the needy (International Crisis Group, 2008c). As a consequence, the state spirals downward if nothing is done to stop the vicious circle.

West African states ought not to be compared with Western states because as Buzan argues:

(...) they are still in the early stages of the attempt to consolidate themselves as state-nations; domestic violence is endemic in such states. Under these circumstances, violence is as likely to be a sign of the accumulation of central state power as it is to be a symptom of political decay. If these new states follow the consolidation model of the European states, then state-building is likely to generate plenty of violence both internally and externally. Weak states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state. (B. Buzan, 1991, p. 99; Cohen, 1981)

The caution not to compare these states with established democracies does not mean that no study should be undertaken in order to address their weakness in the international system. For lack of locally designed variables, this work has borrowed the internationally designed ones to analyze the mechanisms of the weakness and risk of failure of West African states.

According to researchers at the Harvard University's Failed States Project, West African states are weak because of their persistent insecurity since independence. The state exists to provide political goods to its citizens, the first of which is security.

The state's prime function is to provide that political good of security – to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their dispute with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion. (...) Another key political good enables citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process. This good encompasses the essential freedoms (...)

Other political goods typically supplied by states (although privatized forms are possible) and expected by their citizenries include medical and health care (...); schools and educational instruction (...) roads, railways, harbours, and other physical infrastructures (Rotberg, 2003a, p. 3).

These goods constitute "(...) the criteria according to which modern nation-states may be judged as strong, weak, or failed." (Rotberg, 2003a, p. 4). A strong state performs well in most of these areas. The Project establishes a grid of severity whereby a state can move from weakness to failure and then to collapse. According to these criteria nine out of

fifteen West African states are classified as failed. The remaining six states are all weak (Rotberg, 2003a, pp. 10-19; I. R. Rotberg, 2004, p. 47). These criteria are radical and quite pessimistic. The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace co-author “The Failed States Index” published by *Foreign Policy*. The publication compiles and compares data from 177 countries. According to the 2008 edition, West African states fare in the following way: Ivory Coast, Guinea and Nigeria are considered to be in Critical situation. In Danger, are: Niger, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Burkina Faso. Togo is considered to be on the Borderline. Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Cape Verde, Gambia and Benin are not listed, therefore that leads to the conclusion that they are considered as Stable or Most Stable (Foreign Policy, 2008a, p. 67)⁵. For the 2011 ratings, only 6 out of 15 West African states are considered stable. The remaining 9 are in critical situations. Countries in critical situation remained in that state. Of those in danger, only Burkina Faso managed to move to stability⁶. This stability should also be taken with caution given the current instability in the neighbourhood that send thousands of refugees into Burkina Faso (Yabi, 2012). The control of northern Mali by Tuareg rebels along with various Sahelian Islamist combatants is a serious threat to the whole sub region (Jemal and Mohamed Yahya Ould Abdel Wedoud Oumar, 2011). According to the 2013 rankings, all West African states are under the warning of failure.⁷

A strong state is characterized by firmly established institutions that guarantee all the rules so much so that there is little room left for improvisation. In this context both nationals and non nationals living in the state feel secure.

Where the state is strong, national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference. The idea of the state, its institutions and its territory will all be clearly defined and stable in their own right. Approved mechanisms for adjustment, change and transfer of power will exist, and will

⁵ In 2012-2013 – Mali experienced a military coup following by rebels advance on the capital Bamako. The state averted civil war thanks to the intervention of France and Chad. Following democratic presidential elections in September 2013, Mali is once again on the path to recovery. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings

The stability of Burkina Faso is now threatened by the looming general elections of 2015. According to the Constitution, B. Compaore can no longer run for the office of president.

⁷ <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings>

command sufficient support so that they are not seriously threatened from within the state (B. Buzan, 1991, p. 101).

It follows that a strong state is mostly threatened from without. Its domestic situation being mostly stable, it cares more about external threats in its securitization preparedness. Since the end of the Cold War, the biggest threat to West African states is from within. This sub region has listed the majority of the military coups in Africa since the independence in the sixties. These coups continue to take place to this date, the latest being in Mali in 2012 (Samuel Decalo, 1976; B. Robert Edgerton, 2002; Nossiter, 2012a, 2012b).

A weak state has limited resources in terms of wealth, political skills and military strength. On top of that, it is characterized by “ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent” (Rotberg, 2003a, p. 4; I. R. Rotberg, 2004, p. 4). All the infrastructures in terms of social services and transport appear to be neglected.

In weak states, the ability to provide adequate amounts of other political goods is diminished or is diminishing. Physical infrastructural networks are deteriorated. Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, particularly outside the main cities. GDP per capita and other critical economic indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of venal corruption are embarrassingly high and escalating. (I. R. Rotberg, 2004, p. 4)

West African states under study here all fall in this category. The economic indicators may be improving but these benefits are still to move beyond the macro-economic considerations to improve people’s lives (United Nations, 2011b).

A step down, a failed state, is characterized by overt tension and conflicts. These are taking place not only between communities, but very often government troops are battling one or more warring factions that are contesting its authority. These characteristics are added to those of failure. All economic indicators are down and government authority does not reach beyond the capital city (Rotberg, 2003a, p. 5; I. R. Rotberg, 2004, p. 4).

It is not the absolute intensity of violence that identifies a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence (...), the consuming quality of that violence, which engulfs great swaths of states (...), the fact that much of the violence is directed against existing government or regime, and the inflamed character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify the violence in the minds of the main insurgents.(I. R. Rotberg, 2004, p. 5)

When public authority collapses, social norms disappear as well. Anarchy, security dilemmas and violent predation become the key features of the failed states (Kasfir, 2004, pp. 53-76). Failed states fit in the category of what Buzan calls “Very weak states”.

Very weak states possess neither a widely accepted and coherent idea of the state among their populations, nor a governing power strong enough to impose unity in the absence of political consensus. The fact that they exist as states at all is largely a result of other states recognizing them as such and/or not disputing their existence (...). Because of this, it can be more appropriate to view security in very weak states in terms of the contending groups, organizations and individuals, as the prime objects of security.(B. Buzan, 1991, p. 101)

In the absence of public authority, micro-nations and other organized groups begin the battle to impose their authority and secure their interests (International Crisis Group, 2007c). The Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Sudan fit into this category of failed states. In West Africa, currently Mali and Guinea-Bissau are on the brink of falling in this category as well. In the context of a failed state, warlords and other non-state actors, like religious leaders provide the political goods in the areas under their control or influence (Yabi, 2012). State’s institutions become meaningless if not totally absent to large segments of the population (I. R. Rotberg, 2004, p. 7).

A collapsed state is the “extreme version” of failure. All political goods are obtained through non-state actors since there is no central authority. Very often, citizens cross the borders of their country to get what they no longer find at home, mostly the basic necessities like food, medical care, etc.

A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens) embraced by language or ethnic affinities or borders. (I. R. Rotberg, 2004, pp. 9-10)

The nation-state is considered as failed and collapsed once it can no longer deliver on these criteria. At present no West African state falls under this category. Elsewhere on the African continent, Somalia has for a long time been considered a collapsed state.

Security is the primary political good that a state ought to provide to its population. It makes possible other goods like freedom, education and health care (Cilliers, 2003). Also for post-conflict nation-building projects to be effective, security has to be guaranteed (Petrosky, December 2006). That is why the weakness or failure of a state is primarily measured by its ability to still provide this basic good or not.

This research is focused mainly on the state weakness because it assumes that capable states can look after the needs of their people (Rotberg, 2003a) in terms of security, economic development, health, and so on. The African insecurity issues have brought to light the strength and weakness of the United Nations to bring peace and security to the world. This has been witnessed all across Africa from Sierra Leone to Somalia and down to Mozambique (United Nations, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a; Unknown, 2011). The United Nations' missions are very often too limited in their mandate to be able to answer to the immediate needs of populations affected by conflicts (Beal, 2001; R. C. Thakur, 2006). Given this challenge, regional and sub regional bodies like the ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) in West Africa and SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) in Southern Africa have had to intervene to quell conflicts within their respective sub regions (Agbu, 2006; J. G. M. Cilliers, 1999). They encounter the same challenges and even more given their limited economic and military capabilities.

The participation of African militaries in multinational operations to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts present a range of different problems, of which an important one is finding the necessary funds to finance such involvement(...) As a result of financial constraints, many forces experience logistical and organisational problems. Furthermore, African forces are generally plagued by obsolete military equipment, while training difficulties are also experienced (Neethling, Summer 2003, p. 95).

Since the African continent is too large for the scope of this study, the West African sub region will be the setting of the research. This choice is motivated by the fact that the

Economic Community of West African States is the most advanced of African sub regional communities⁸. It has taken considerable initiative to resolve the problems in member states as will be demonstrated in chapter five of this work. Since most African states are too weak to solve their problems on their own, the pooling of resources that is taking place in West Africa offer the best prospects of success (Ebo, 2007). This work wants to assess how far the West African sub region can be presented as a model to be emulated by the other African sub regional communities.

The West African sub region is made of fifteen countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Three of these countries are landlocked: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Most of these countries are part of the Sahel region where arable land is very limited because of the Sahara desert's advance (Club du Sahel, 2005b)⁹.

The field research for this study was conducted in three out of the fifteen countries. These are Ghana, Liberia and Senegal. This choice was motivated by the fact that Ghana is one of the leading countries of English speaking West Africa. Senegal occupies a similar position among French speaking. Both countries are stable democracies that are playing very important roles not only in the sub region but also in the regional African organization bodies and the international community¹⁰. Given the nature of the study, it was very important to obtain input from a West African country that experienced terrible armed conflicts and that was in the process of recovery with the help of multiple partners. Liberia was the best example of this. The sub regional military wing, the ECOMOG was born out of its intervention in Liberia in 1991(Adebajo, 2002b). The United Nations Mission Liberia (UNMIL) is active in the rebuilding of the country following the war. The United States is involved in the reform of the Liberian security

⁸ see chart 1

⁹ See the map of West Africa

¹⁰ Koffi Annan, a Ghanaian is the former Secretary General of the United Nations. He was the first United Nations envoy to Syria when the conflict erupted in 2012. Abdou Diouf, a Senegalese has been the Secretary General of Francophonie since his democratic defeat in the Senegalese presidential elections in 2000. Jacques Diouf, a Senegalese is currently the Head of the World Food Program.

sector (International Crisis Group, 2009b). All these actions made Liberia one of the best fields of this investigation.

Another reason for this choice of three nations only out of fifteen has to do with security and financial constraints. In the spring of 2007, when the field study took place, it was very difficult to obtain the needed ethic clearance to visit countries where armed conflicts were ongoing. This was a serious impediment to visiting Nigeria, the leading power in the sub region. Because of the same security obstacle the contribution from Liberia was obtained outside the country. Financially, it was impossible to raise sufficient funds to undertake a multiyear and region-wide research at this stage of this work. Finally, it proved not to be necessary to visit all the fifteen West African countries in order to conduct this study. Most of the material collected during the field trips and in the National Archives in London (England) and Aix-en-Provence (France) provided sufficiently for what is requested for this work. From the information collected and the published material it was possible to assess the political, economic and military resources of West African states. The satisfaction with the material collected in this way, does not preclude the fact that ideally it was preferable to visit for an extensive period of time all fifteen countries under study. This would have provided a firsthand knowledge of the similarities and differences in the security challenges. The samples collected serve well the qualitative nature of this study (George, 2004). What matters is the quality and not the number of samples.

The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace do conduct and publish a yearly Index of the world states failure. The survey covers 177 countries which are classified from first to last “(...) in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration”(Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 56). The index uses twelve indicators addressing social, economic, political and military issues. In the 2010 Index, the indicators are called the “12 degrees of failure” : Demographics, Refugees, Illegitimate Governments, Brain drain, Public services, Inequality, Group grievances, Human rights, Economic decline, Security forces, Factionalized elites and

External intervention (Foreign Policy, 2010)¹¹. This wide coverage of the issues adds to the credibility of the analysis and results.

In 2006, of the fifty one countries in the world classified as most vulnerable states, nine are found in West Africa. These are Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger and Guinea Bissau (t. F. f. P. Foreign Policy, May/June 2006). Nine out of sixteen states were weak or failed. The two economic powers in the region, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire were among them. In 2007, nine West African states were still counted among the sixty weakest states out of the 177 states studied. Nigeria had moved from 22nd rank to 17 and Cote d'Ivoire from number 3 to number 6 (Foreign Policy, 2007). The situation in Cote d'Ivoire improved slightly, thanks to the agreement between the President and the opposition (International Crisis Group, 2007a)¹². In 2008, the same nine West African states ranked among the sixty most vulnerable states. Of the two regional powers, Cote d'Ivoire had moved from position 6 to 8, and Nigeria from 17 to 18 (Foreign Policy, 2008b). In 2009, Cote d'Ivoire stood at number 11 and Nigeria moved up to 15. In 2010, Nigeria slipped further up at 14 and Cote d'Ivoire moved down to 12. For a full index of West African states covering the period of 2006-2011, see the chart below.

¹¹ These indicators will be analyzed in chapter 5 of this study that is looking for ways to address these issues in the West African region. Following November 2010 contested elections and civil war, Cote d'Ivoire will move further up in the coming classifications unless the ongoing conflict is resolved.

¹² It has to be noted here that according to this agreement, General elections were supposed to take place in November 2008. They were successfully conducted in 2012. The second round of Presidential elections took place 28 November 2010. The results were contested by Laurent Gbagbo plunging the country in another round of civil war that ended on 11 April 2011 when French troops intervened to take him out of his bunker allowing the incumbent Ouattara to be sworn in as the elected President of Cote d'Ivoire.

1.2.1 West Africa Index 2006-2011¹³

COUNTRY	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Benin	90	104	100	97	93	74
Burkina Faso	30	33	36	35	35	37
Cape Verde	---	66	65	84	88	90
Cote d'Ivoire	3	6	8	11	12	10
Gambia	83	86	83	80	75	70
Ghana	106	125	123	124	122	115
Guinea	11	9	11	9	9	11

¹³ Collected from the Foreign Policy Indexes.
Foreign Policy, "The Failed States Index 2007", *Foreign Policy*(July/August 2007), pp. 54-63
The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2011, Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace,
2011

Since the Spring 2012, the situation in Mali has deteriorated significantly.

COUNTRY	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Guinea-Bissau	46	38	32	27	22	19
Liberia	12	27	34	34	33	26
Mali	81	91	89	83	78	77
Niger	44	32	22	23	19	15
Nigeria	22	17	18	15	14	14
Senegal	99	117	107	102	99	85
Sierra Leone	16	23	31	32	28	30
Togo	38	46	45	50	47	36

Table 1. West African Indexes 2006 - 2011

For 2006, 146 countries were ranked. For a full ranking of countries, the website of the Fund for Peace was consulted. The 2006 figure for Cape Verde was not available on the index¹⁴.

The reading of the above chart for Senegal for example indicates how between 2009 and 2011, the country was sliding towards failure. The attempts by President Wade to either be succeeded by his son or seek re-election for a third term in office destabilized the country. His attempt to change the Constitution seriously threatened the security of this so far stable West African state (Villalón, 2011; Zounmenou, 2011).

For the last five years in a row, the three most important economies in the sub region, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Nigeria have been struggling with weakness. They have always been in the top 20 on the indexes. This situation calls for attention if the West African sub region is to succeed and register an African success story for its member states.

1.2.2 The danger of West African states' weakness

West African societies like many other societies in sub-Saharan Africa are still confronted with the problem of states weakness and failure fifty years after their independences. It has been demonstrated in chapters one and two that the functioning of socio-political structures in Africa in general has not changed much since the independences (Meredith, 2005a).

The current international system rests on states. Therefore the weakness, failure or collapse of some states does threaten the very foundation of the international system itself (I. R. Rotberg, 2004). When one state does not function properly, it becomes a threat to its own people, its neighbours and to the system (D. Carment, John J. Gazo and Stewart Prest, 2007; D. a. R. D. Carment, 2003). Therefore resources are gathered to assist in its

¹⁴http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140

restoration. Since the end of the Cold War, the restoration of the functionality of failed states has increasingly become an urgent policy issue (UN/World Bank, 2007).

(...) state fragility is now an important part of the international policy discourse and is seen by many as one of the greatest challenges facing the development community. The more fragile a country is, the more likely that it will be unable to provide basic necessities to its own people, with negative impacts spilling over the neighboring countries; in the case of extremely weak and failing states, the effects may even be felt at the global level (D. Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, 2010, p. 136).

West African states are mostly weak and some of them risk failing as will be demonstrated in chapter three. Their weakness comes from the fact that they lack sufficient resources in terms of : Critical mass (Population + Territory), Economic Capability, Military Capability, Strategic Purpose and Will to Pursue the National Strategy (Cline, 1975, p. 11).

Job analysis of the insecurity dilemma of Third World countries was developed around three lines of argument that indicate the dangers of state's weakness and failure characteristic of West African states. First, a weak state is unable to respond to the "(...) hobbesian category of social contract between a legitimate state and its people."¹⁵ Next, besides a population, a state is also defined by the borders that situate it geographically among other states. In a situation of weakness, the state is not capable of controlling its borders that in the process become porous. Finally, a weak state is not able to restrain the influence of powerful states. The interests of the foreign powers in its own territory have priority over its own interests (Job, 1992, p. 13). Most West African states are not currently responding to the social contract with their people as they are more focused on regime security (Taje, 2006). States in the sub-region are not sufficiently controlling their territories, that is why conflicts but also organized crime are spreading easily in the area (Agboton-Johnson, 2004; E. K. Aning, 2009). Also, West African resources are

¹⁵ The notion of social contract was developed by Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*. Middlesex: Penguin, 1968; and J.J. Rousseau ; see Rousseau, J.-J. *The political writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau* (C. E. Vaughan, Trans.). New York: B. Franklin, 1971. The social contract theory posits that the people commit themselves to obey the orders of the state that in return will provide them with social goods.

currently benefiting foreign powers than their own populations (Greenhill, 2009; Obi, 2009). Governments are too weak to negotiate favourably their interests. Some of them are just falling in the trap of the shadow economy for their personal benefits (Reno, 2000).

Strengthening the state after failure should not be equated with strengthening the regime in power. This has been the post-colonial experience in many West African states led by military regimes (Samuel Decalo, 1990). Given the unprofessionalism of the military, regimes turned out to be the very threats to their own states' stability (Howe, 2005). The strong state's central authority has been the source of violence and insecurity in many cases and has therefore led to the weakening and even collapse of many states (J.-F. Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, 1999; N'Diaye, 2005). Democratic regimes are the order of the day in most states in the West African sub region. The current Malian experience is an indication that the military's forceful power take over is not yet unlikely (Nossiter, 2012b).

David's study of the causes and cures of internal wars posits that when the central government is too strong compared to the rest of institutions, the power holders are tempted to crush their opponents. The latter tends to overreact for their safety and also with the aim of toppling the "undeserving government". These actions result in clashes between the two factions. (David, 1997, pp. 554-555). According to Tshitereke when the state fails to deliver political goods, it is considered to have broken the social contract linking it to the citizens:

When the social contract between the state and its citizenry fails, war becomes inevitable. The logic is simple: people accept state authority so long as the state equitably delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions, such as employment and income. When this social contract is broken, usually resulting from a myriad of factors such as inefficiency and the legacy of late colonialism, violence and social disorder are the outcomes. (Tshitereke, 2003, p. 84)

It is only through social peace that the state is capable of fulfilling its obligations. When states' institutions are seen as serving an individual or a regime in power they have failed their mission (Valdmanis, 2012). They can only fuel violence sooner or later as has been the case in many West African countries (Herbst, 1990, p. 125ff).

In this sense, a strong state is a functioning one. It encourages predictability in the governance system; creates confidence in its people; lends credibility in the face of other partners; provides security to the people and their goods; displays resolve in the decision-making process and controls resources (Canada, 2007, p. 17; Meierhenrich, 2004). The absence of these characteristics is a strong indication of a weak or failed state.

What Jackson wrote about African states in general, is verified in West Africa:

These states clearly are not “powers”: they lack (not only individually but also in combination) the military means and the supporting scientific, technological, and industrial capacity. Most such states are extremely weak in power-politics terms. They certainly cannot deter the most powerful states, who could intervene in their jurisdictions and the region at large(...)(H. R. Jackson, 1992, pp. 88-89)

This situation of weakness has called for various responses on the part of academics and policy makers. Some academics like J. Herbst and Jackson consider that weak and failed states are artificially maintained by the international system that established them in the first place (H. R. a. C. G. R. Jackson, 1986; R. Jackson, 1990). Herbst posits decertifying these kind of states to allow them to be rebuilt following the model of West European states that were established through wars and various negotiations schemes (Herbst, 2000; Holsti, 1991). The international community acting through the United Nations Security Council does not at ease following this path. This is most likely for fear of the domino effects that can lead to the destabilization of entire regions (Dokken, 2010; Laurie Nathan, 2010).

Given the weakness of these states, West Africa is currently unable to implement successfully the Security Sector Reform and Governance. The regional body, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on the task of supplementing to member states’ weaknesses. Since the 1990s, the ECOWAS has been working at putting in place sub-regional mechanisms to address the insecurity situation that maintains a state of weakness in the member states (Economic Community of West African States, 1999). The community continues to work on these Protocols as it responds to arising challenges

(Economic Community of West African State, 2008). The United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 2000 decided on the goals to be achieved by 2015¹⁶ in uplifting Less Developed Nations. In regards to Africa, the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* states on Article 27:

We will support the consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby bringing Africa into the mainstream of the world economy (United Nations, 2000).

In 2007, half way through the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2001), there started appearing some doubts about the success of the project by the 2015 target (United Nations, 2007). Like many other multilateral projects to aid Africa in the last half a century (Calderisi, 2006a), the Millennium Development Goals for West Africa may equally fail in their objectives. The reliance on donors in a context of global economic recession is a big impediment to the success of this project (Moyo, 2009). The priorities of donor countries are on sustaining their staggering economies and not on aid to poor nations.

This thesis posits that the Security Sector Reform or Security Sector Governance stands a better chance of success despite the considerable challenges it faces as well (Bryden Alan, 2008c). Security Sector Reform is a program that seeks to develop a state's capacity that will allow it to function normally by responding to all its needs. The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform defines SSR through its objective:

Security Sector Reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good governance and, in particular, the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law. This relies on the ability of the state to mitigate its people's vulnerabilities through development, and to use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that affect society's well-being (GFN - SSR, 2007).

¹⁶ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

Security is here understood as encompassing all the bodies of the government that need to be reformed and better managed in order to strengthen the state. That is why the concept of Security Sector Governance that is the later development of Security Sector Reform will be the most commonly used in this work. The concept of Security Sector Reform was developed in the eighties in the development circles of the United Kingdom. This was in response to the realization that the development models promoted so far in the Global South were not working (Calderisi, 2006a).

Having realized the failure of the development and security of Third World countries with cooperation that emphasized the military and security forces (OECD, 2004), a paradigm shift was sought. The reform of the state's security institutions appeared as the solution to the problem (N. Ball, 1987, 1988). The United Nations Development Programme having experience running development programs agreed with the United Kingdom project. But it called the attention of the development community to the fact that more than the reform of their institutions, less developed countries also needed a better governance of their states' institutions.

UNDP defines governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Good governance has many attributes. It is participatory, transparent and accountable. It is effective in making the best use of resources and is equitable. And it promotes the rule of law (United Nations, 1997).

Both the concepts of Security Sector Reform and Sector Governance have been used interchangeably, but definitely the emphasis is on the holistic dimension of the latter concept (H. Hänggi, 2003). Governance encompasses all government's institutions.

West African states lack sufficient power resources as indicated throughout this chapter but their problem is mainly related to governance. States' resources are poorly or insufficiently managed and this results in their weakness.

SSR is meant to address a dysfunctional security sector by reducing security deficits (lack of security or even the provision of insecurity) as well as democratic deficits (lack of oversight over the security sector). Although different understandings of SSR can be found among interested stakeholders, a definition has emerged in the last few years which is sufficiently supple to accommodate a range of governance actors as well as a broad spectrum of activities that shape the way in which the security sector is governed. This provides for a holistic approach by integrating partial reforms such as defence and police reform, which had previously been conducted as separate efforts, as well as by linking measures aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness with concerns of democratic governance (Bryden Alan, 2008b, p. 7).

The strength of the Security Sector Reform agenda for West Africa comes mainly from the assumption that peace and security are achieved through governance (Cilliers, 2003). The holistic approach of the program is another one of its strengths that is at the same time its biggest challenge. This will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

1.3 Conclusion

Modern West African states have been weak since their independences. Their weakness in the current international system is expressed in terms of lack sufficient resources to respond to their socio-political, economic and mostly security needs. State weakness is here defined borrowing the categories developed by the Failed States Project at the Carnegie Endowment Fund for International Peace. The studies are based on twelve political, economic, military and social indicators of stability (Foreign Policy, 2007). Most studies of state's capacities do use the same variables in one way or another (Rotberg, 2003b). According to these studies, all West African states are weak and some of them like Guinea Bissau and Mali risk failing. The whole research is built around this understanding of West African states' weakness. The first section is geared towards understanding the phenomenon of these states' weakness through the field study and archives research. The next section is focused on looking for possible ways to resolve the

problem because this weakness is the major source of their insecurity. They are unable to respond to the security needs of the populations and their properties. Very few of these states are able to respond to an external threat because of the weakness of their military and security establishments.

The field study that covered three countries out the fifteen in the sub region provided an invaluable opportunity to verify this hypothesis with West Africans who are also working in various sectors that have to do with states' capacity building. The security concerns in some of the countries and the lack of financial resources did not allow a wide field research in the sub region as was desired. In the end, the information available in the Archives, the published materials and the interviews supplemented this limitation.

The next chapter reviews the literature on West African states' weakness and the attempts that have been made so far to address the problem. Published and non-published materials are important to the analysis here but none provide the complete picture of the situation. That is why a field research was undertaken in order to hear what some people in West Africa think about their states' capabilities in the current international system.

Chapter Two: THE LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

To analyze the West African states building challenges since the 1950s, an extensive body of literature was consulted. The literature covers history, politics, economy, strategic, security and international affairs. The focus has been on works that deal with history, politics strategic, security and international studies as they relate to the building of West African states.

This chapter will first look at the literature related to the major topics that are developed in the thesis. West African states are among the weakest in the current international system (Eggertsson, 1990; Rotberg, 2003b). The causes of this weakness will be analyzed in chapter three. Weakness is here considered in relation to the absence of sufficient power resources. West African states are weak because they are deficient in some key elements that constitute a state's power. These are: the critical mass (land and population), political skills, economic capabilities, military and security potential. The security sector has been identified as encompassing most of states' institutions (Cline, 1994). Therefore, reforming these states and supplying them with the needed resources is the key to building capacity in them (Chanaa, 2002). Given the structural weakness of most of the states in West Africa, the sub regional organization, ECOWAS has stepped up with common initiatives to address the weakness and insecurity of member states (Economic Community of West African States, 2001). The literature on how well this body is responding to the crisis will be reviewed.

The following section will evaluate the ECOWAS literature to raise its strength and weakness. Both printed and archived resources provided a wealth of information on the topic under study. Given the fact that the investigation deals with weak states that are not always the center of attention in international affairs, the literature was insufficient. A visit to the sub region to meet some stakeholders who are also working to address the weakness of their states proved invaluable.

2.2 West African States Weakness

Most West African states that came out of the decolonization movement are considered to be still born states (Dumont, 1969). Just as the independences were generally ill prepared in most cases so were the post independence governance systems (Springhall, 2001). All the activities that were supposed to kick-off the development of local economies were dwarfed and instead the same economy of producing cash crops and raw materials for Western industries continued. Dumont argues that modern African states never materialized and that is the main reason why West African and African states in general have been left off the train to “modernity” or “development” as was expected in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Dumont, 1969).

For many countries in the Global South and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the end of the Cold War in 1989 constitutes another beginning. Great hopes were aroused with the wave of democratization in West Africa (Ebousi Boulaga, 1993). Westad’s work shows how economically, the influence of the current world’s superpower, the United States of America is increasingly overtaken by the emerging powers China, India and Brazil. All these powers are striving to control world’s resources (Westad, 2005). The Gulf of Guinea that runs from West to Central Africa has oil and other strategic minerals that are attracting the world’s appetite for wealth (Okbazghi, 2003). Unless a radical change occurs in West African states’ governance, this opportunity will be lost once again. Resources will enrich other nations while local populations will continue to live in abject misery (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005).

Meredith witnessed the joy of freedom that came with independences and the first challenges to build nations and states (Meredith, 1984). His more recent works on Africa are testimonies of the failure and Afro-pessimism. The latter became very vocal since the end of the Cold War whereby world powers gave up on Africa (Rieff, 1998/1999)¹⁷. This was because in any case most western powers’ interests were no longer at stake. It is

¹⁷ Afro-pessimism is generally used to indicate the general failure of African states. Independences were greeted by great optimism about the future of the continent. But soon it became increasingly obvious that everything was heading in the wrong direction. Instead of the bright future, poverty, diseases, insecurity and states ‘weakness and failure were coined as the general characteristics of African countries.

noted that fifty years after the independences the socio-political and economic situations in many African countries have not changed and even worsened in some cases (Meredith, 2005a, 2005b, 2011). In response to this situation, the African leadership has initiated the New Partnership for African Development, an initiative that is supposed to correct all the mistakes (I. Taylor, 2005). Current events have overtaken the initiative so much so that the attention is once again on conflict resolutions.

In the same line of thinking, it is worth noting the work of Calderisi, a former World Bank official in Africa. He posits that African problems stem from its dictatorial and kleptocratic governments, rampant corruption, poor economic policies and a cultural fatalism. He does recognize the responsibility of western powers and institutions but to a lesser degree. His “Ten ways of changing Africa” evolve around the idea of cutting or limiting foreign aid since it has proved not to be working (Calderisi, 2006b). Calderisi’s work extends the idea of American University’s economist G. Ayittey for whom debt forgiveness amounts to rewarding “past mismanagement and enabling future loan squandering and capital flight” (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005). Economic categories will be referred to in support of the discussions when needed but they will not be analyzed in this thesis. This avoids losing the focus on peace and security challenges.

Early African nationalist leaders were scolded by many authors who consider them to be principally responsible for African states failures. At independence these leaders like Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah were literally worshipped by their people as heroes-gods who freed them from the grip of colonial powers (Southal, 2006). Unfortunately barely a decade following independences, the anger of nationalism in the struggle for independence did not materialize into the strengthening of the nation-states established by the colonial powers (D. J. Francis, 1965-, 2008). The populist ideologies of early leaders did not go beyond mere discourse and transform their societies (P.L.E Idahosa, 2004). They were unable to stand up to the challenges of nation-state building under the pressures of the Cold War political environment that led them to serve the superpowers strategic interests (Gavshon, 1981). As a consequence states have never developed capacities to function normally.

Just as the decolonization process was ill-prepared, so was the dawn of the post-Cold War. Boulaga argued that in the 1990s, African states were not ready to manage the democratization wave that stemmed from the end of the Cold War. Noticing that they could no longer rely on western powers for support, many African leaders had to learn to listen to their people. This was expressed through a wave of democratic elections and various National Conferences. These took place between 1990 and 1995 in West African states of Benin, Niger and Mali. In Central Africa, Gabon, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo are going to carry out the same national reconciliation experiences. These Conferences were mostly chaired by religious figures. Given the leadership crisis, people turned to religious leaders to chair these events of national rebirth. At least some religious groups were regarded as the only trustworthy organizations to lead people to a better future that was supposed to come with independence decades earlier (Eboussi Boulaga, 1993). There seemed to be a vacuum in terms of policies to manage the post Cold War period in Africa (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991). As a consequence, independences were granted or obtained but the newly created states are still struggling to stand up to the challenge of autonomous governance.

Another body of literature that indirectly attempts to answer to the causes of African states weakness is the one on development and underdevelopment. In the 15th century, given their technological progress, Europeans began a search for new markets opportunities elsewhere (Crowder, 1968). That is how they came in touch with the rest of the world's continents. In some of these places, they were going to set up dependent economic organizations designed to supply Europe with cash crops and raw material to develop their industries (Marx, 2001b). This is believed to be the reason why some of the places like Africa remained economically backward compared to Europe and other places where European decided to settle like North America, Australia and New Zealand. These places developed as a result of the settlement.

According to the international political economy theory, West African States weakness is linked to the international system through which powerful states developed at the expense of weaker ones. In his *Capital*, K. Marx shows how capitalism, by appropriating all the means of production, achieves its development by exploiting its

working class made of the proletariat. This idea of exploitation was later developed by Lenin and other Marxist writers like K. Kaustky and Hilferding. K. Marx political ideology is summarized in his *Communist Manifesto*, first published in London in 1848 (Marx, 2001a). The end aim of the communist project is to create a classless society. Some West African States like Ghana, Mali and Guinea adopted this ideology following their independences. This stance prompted a strong reaction from the capitalist bloc as examined in the section on the Cold war (Blum, 2004).

African communitarism (communal modes of production) seemed to have been misinterpreted as a path to Marxism-Leninism and socialism (Thiam, 1965). Since the early 1920s, Scientific Marxism with its direct attacks against what it calls imperialism and its efforts to establish a Communist society (Marx, 2001a) seemed to be a natural ally of early African nationalists. They referred to it in their struggle against colonial powers. The over reliance on former colonial powers for security and economic support doomed the communist project to failure. Both Britain and France, the former West African colonial powers were allied with the Western bloc in the Cold War.

The “Modernization ideology”(Latham, 2000) was developed in the United States as a counterpart to Communism. The American economist W. Rostow wrote *A Non Communist Manifesto*. In this work he posits that in their growth, societies have to move from traditional mode of living to capitalism, production and consumption of goods and services(Rostow, 1971). Researchers increasingly built their work on Rostow and expanded this as an alternative to Communism in the conquest of the Third World countries. American social scientists were called upon by the State department to join this ideological fight by demonstrating how underdeveloped countries can progressively be modernized and be spared from the scourge of Communism. During the Kennedy era much of American foreign policy came to be shaped by this theory. Peace Corps were set up and sent to the four corners of the earth to spread the benefits of civilization (A. J. Amin, 1998; Latham, 2000). The arguments in the third chapter will demonstrate that modernization equally failed to pull West African states out of weakness.

The development of Western countries came from their technological progress.

Underdevelopment is mainly associated with the lack of technology. Therefore the

economy of most underdeveloped countries is limited to the production of raw material for the developed ones (S. Amin, 1998). The Third World countries' category was developed after the Second World War in the wake of the formation of the two power blocs: The Western bloc under NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Eastern one under Warsaw-pact (Agnew, 1998). NATO countries were capitalists and more technologically advanced. They constituted the first world; while Warsaw pact was made of socialist countries that constituted the second world. The rest of the countries were referred to as Third World (Desai, 2002) Therefore, according to the modernization theory, the two superpowers considered that to be developed Third World countries had to ideologically be allied with them. During the Cold War between the two blocs, to expand their respective spheres of influence, they sought to tap into the vast field of underdeveloped countries and attract them into their bloc (Antonio, 2006). This same political and economic environment continues today through the competitions to control energy and strategic minerals resources (Okbazghi, 2003). In this post-Cold War political and economic environment, China is seriously challenging western interests on the African continent (van de Looy, 2006) and elsewhere.

Through modernization theory, Western and Eastern blocs' leading powers appeared to have a "divine" mission to civilize indigenous cultures of the world. From modernization came the concept of development (Binder, 1965). The development doctrine was first promoted by charitable institutions and then by a multitude of governmental and non-governmental organizations (Kabou, 1991). Therefore, modernization theory brought about various development initiatives to lift West Africa out of poverty and states' weakness. But for various reasons, among which are the mismanagement of African leaders and the Cold War political environment calculations, these initiatives failed (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005; Calderisi, 2006a). The result is that all West African states are weak and some are on the brink of failure.

2.2.1 The concept of power

The key question that will be asked is why are West African states so weak? Why have they not been able to become modern states with real power? What does power mean? This section will explore the literature on the key concept of power that runs through this research. West African states are weak and failing because they lack enough of the power resources that constitute and sustain a functioning state.

Definition of power

The concept of power is going to be the framework through which West African states capacity is analyzed. It is the availability of power resources that allows a state to adequately respond to its needs both internally and externally (Knorr, 1983). It will be shown that the states under study are lacking power resources and that is why they are unable to respond to the security challenges they are faced with (International Crisis Group, 2012c).

Power is here understood in its etymological meaning of “to be able”, namely the “capacity to act” as presented by Isaac (Isaac, 2004, pp. 54-55). He provides four typologies to explain the concept of power.

The voluntarist model puts the emphasis on the intentions and strategies of the subjects. While for the hermeneutic model, power comes from the shared meanings in a society. The structuralist posits that the capacity to act is possessed by “social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate”; and the postmodernist model stresses language and symbols as being central to power (Isaac, 2004, pp. 56-63). Each of these models is relevant because it helps understand an aspect of power that is easily overlooked or not stressed enough by other models. The voluntarist and structuralist models have some relevance for this research on West African states building because as it was demonstrated, the actions of particular leaders have played an important role in shaping the future of their states. This is particularly the case of Ghana under Nkrumah and Guinea under Sekou Toure (Southal, 2006). The combination of voluntarist and structuralist models will also show up in the emphasis on structures and resources available or not to these states and the various influences to which they have been and are

still subjected (Allison, 1990). The section on the Cold war will demonstrate how West African states as weak links in the international system were easily overlaid by the superpowers and this has further contributed to their weakness (Hamrell, 1964; J. Peter Schraeder, 1995). Chapter four will put the emphasis on the deficient structures and resources of states under study.

Contributors to *The SAGE handbook of power* offer various developments of the concepts summarized above by Isaac (Clegg, 2009). Prior to World War II, power was essentially viewed as the capacity to wage wars (Cline, 1977; Knorr, 1970). The capacity to wage war is still an important component of the capacity of a state in the current international system, but it is not the only one (Treverton, 2005). The importance of the other elements like land and population sizes and economic potentials is more and more stressed in evaluating states' power (Beuret, 2008; Virmani, 2005). H. Arendt and T. Parsons works are at the forefront of the suspicion of the military might as the sole reference of power given the violence and ravages of the Two World Wars (Arendt, 1970; Parsons, 1978).

Power as domination, which is linked to (the capacity for) violent agency, is the dominant perception of power in everyday speech (...) However, if we look at the academic social science literature, increasingly the conception of power as essentially grounded in coercion represents a minority view. One of the characteristics of the development of the literature over the last thirty years has been a move away from this 'common sense' view to more systemic, less agent specific, perceptions of power that see it as more generally constitutive of reality. Such a move is coupled with a more inclusive perception of the concept, whereby the idea that there is a single thing-in-the-world corresponding to power, as some kind of essence, has fallen out of favour (M. a. S. R. C. Haugaard, 2009, p. 3).

Gohler's contribution posits that the concept of "Power over" which implies a domination relationship have lost favour to "Power to" which stresses the "ability to act autonomously"(Gohler, 2009, pp. 28-29). Arendt was out against "power over" when she wrote that: "Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act

in their name.” She goes on to compare power with strength. While power belongs to a group, strength belongs to an individual (Arendt, 1970, pp. 44-45).

Jenkins argues in the same way by considering power as the ability to act but he adds the dimension of capacity for coercion whereby the power holder can “assist or obstruct” the action of others. “Power in this approach, is understood as ‘efficacy’: the many and varied ways in which humans, whether individually or collectively, attempt to achieve their objectives and to assist or obstruct others in the achievement of theirs.”(Jenkins, 2009, p. 140) . This definition is relevant to this work because since their independences West African states have not only been unable to achieve their objectives, but also the actions of global powers have been somehow an obstruction to their full development (Obasanjo, 1996) as will be argued in the next chapter.

The concept of “Strategic Relational Approach” used by Jessop to study state’s power uses structuralist categories to show how state power depends on the environment in which various power elements are interacting. The context of the exercise of power has been significantly ignored in analyses though its empirical evidences are not less obvious (A. D. Baldwin, 1983). For example, the United States currently has the potential if not the capacity to annihilate or at least considerably cripple the nuclear facilities of North Korea or Iran that are considered to be a threat to the international security as it sees it (International Crisis Group, 2009c). However, it cannot just do it. For North Korea, China’s approval is required (Harden, 2009). As for Iran, the US does not want to appear to the Muslim World as attacking another Muslim country after Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a move would more likely threaten its other vital interests in the Middle East and other Muslim countries.

While there are significant material and discursive lines of demarcation between the state qua institutional ensemble and other institutional orders and/or the life world, the SRA (Strategic- Relational Approach) stresses that its apparatuses and practices are materially interdependent with other institutional orders and social practices. In this sense it is socially embedded (Jessop, 2009, p. 370).

This being true for global powers, it is even more so for weak states like those under study that depend on the international system for their very survival (Herbst, 2000). Also,

these states have demonstrated the desire to pool their limited resources in order to develop the power that they are lacking in the current international system (Adebajo, 2004a). Chapter five will examine how the Economic Community of West African States is managing this pooling of resources.

Following his study of the works of Migdal (Migdal, 1988); Thomas (C. a. P. S. Thomas, 1989) and Buzan (B. Buzan, 1991), Job identified four dimensions of state strength that are also important to this research in assessing power resources of West African states. The four dimensions are: “(...) (1) power potential in terms of the resources that could be extracted and the population that could be mobilized; (2) infrastructural capacity and service delivery; (3) coercive capacity in its military and police forces; and (4) national identity and social cohesion.” (Job, 1992, p. 22). These elements will be analyzed in chapter four of this work.

A number of scholars agree on some power resources that make a state strong, and of which absence is an indication of weakness (R. J. Art, 2004; Berdal, 2010; Berenskoetter, 2007; Cline, 1994). The size, education level and skills of the population count as the main assets. These are followed by the geography that deals with the size, location and natural resources of a country. The political system in place is assessed according to its effectiveness in achieving the goals of the state. The values that a state lives by and that it projects outside its borders are also counted as an asset. The economic wealth is considered not only in terms of natural resources but also in terms of the level and sources of income that the state has. Finally, the military power most obviously portrays the state’s strength. In military might there is the nature, size and composition of armed forces (J. R. Art, 2004). In this research, military force will be associated with the security variable (B. Buzan, 1991) that assesses the capacity of the state to control the means of force, to provide security to its population, to control its borders from internal and external threats.

The concept of power has been a defining feature of social sciences in general as recognized by many authors (Clegg, 2009; Knorr, 1983). The many uses of the term have not taken away its complexity. Every time one still needs to explain the meaning given to the use of the concept of power. In this work, the emphasis is on power as capacity to act

in a particular context. The research is dealing with West African states that are considered weak in the current international system but are of different capacities within their regional community.

Manifestation of power

There are many variables that can be looked at to assess states' capacities. Since it is not the objective of this research to specifically study the power assets of West African states, it is going to focus on three elements that Art considers to be the most fungible. These are: wealth, political skills and military power. A fourth element added to these is the "Critical mass" identified by Cline (Cline, 1977). These three are fungible power assets because they can easily be converted into other resources (J. R. Art, 2004). For example, with wealth, a state can improve the education level of its citizenry. It can also provide for the security services through appropriate training, wages and logistics. Therefore, a state is strong when its wealth, both natural and generated allows it to sustain its policies. Also when its politicians are skilful enough to lead the state through efficient governance (Hyden, 2000). Finally a state is considered strong when its military and security establishments provide for its security both within and outside its borders. Therefore, to narrow down the scope of this analysis, this work will just deal with the three fungible power assets identified by Art as indicated above. These will be translated here into the economy, political skills and military and security forces.

The three variables: political, economic and military/security are the focus of analysis in this work. These three elements are the key points for evaluating West African states' strength or weakness. Economic and political variables are two of the three manifestations of state's strength. Their weakness signals the weakness of the state as identified by Rotberg in his 2003 work. The third one being the number of deaths in combat (Rotberg, 2003b), that will not be analyzed in this research.

Critical Mass

The notion of Critical Mass was studied by Cline in his 1977 study on the measurements of power. It comprises the size of the territory and that of the population (Cline, 1977, p.

33). For the West African states under study in this work, these elements are the most visible signs of their relative power and weakness. Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire are already two powers in the sub region by the sheer size of their lands and populations. Mali and Niger have huge territories but the density of their population is quite low¹⁸.

Political skills

Political skills are among the main assets of a state. They have to do with the capacity to organize people and institutions in order to achieve the goals of the state (J. R. Art, 2004). For that end, a state run by skilful politicians is able to project power all over its territory, to regulate the behaviour of its citizens, to extract and appropriate the resources necessary for its functioning (Migdal, 1988). Once these skills have allowed the state to stabilize the country, it is then possible to project the power outside the borders.

Therefore the question to ask here is: are West African states capable of controlling all of their territories in order to raise the needed resources for their normal functioning? The answer is no. No state in West Africa can pretend to have achieved this level as most of them are currently dealing with internal strife (Adebajo, 2004b; Thelma Ekiyor, 2008; C. e. M. F. Ero, 2002). Some segments of the populations are not prepared to contribute to the running of the states that they consider to have broken the social contract (Uzoigwe, 2011) and therefore do not serve their interests.

The weakness of many West African states can be attributed to the absence or limited number of skilled politicians (N'Diaye, 2005). Internally many states are so unstable that their governments are unable to fully control the political and economic situations. Unable to raise sufficient income from their domestic resources, they turn to the external sources for help (Adebajo, 2010; Besada, 2010). That is what explains the dependency of most West African states on global powers.

According to the realist international relations theorists, a powerful state will seek to secure its interests by projecting power outside (D. S. Krasner, 1995). For them the international system rests on power balance as states seek to maximize their power in

¹⁸ See table in the Appendices

the international arena. This comes from the capacity that the state has to influence the decision making process of other states (H. Morgenthau, 1978). The projection of power still takes place in West Africa because the level of weakness is not even in all states (Agbu, 2006). That is how for example Senegal plays the role of the most powerful nation over Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Nigeria remains the powerful nation in West Africa given the size of its population, economy and military.

Economic wealth

The economic wealth is made of resources that a state has naturally and those that it is able to generate. Poverty is one of the key sources of West African instability (Club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 2005). In many countries of the sub region, the national wealth is not equally divided among all the groups that make the nation. Many rebellions have this inequality as the main motive for their action against central governments (Keita, 1998; Rosenstein, 2005). Many young people are dying at sea in an attempt to reach European shores for a better life (Raizon, 2006). It is somehow this same poverty that is pushing people into the hands of Islamist preachers in their fight against western powers (Taje, 2006).

West Africa has resources that are appealing to external economies (Okbazghi, 2003) just like at the time of the Scramble for Africa (Chamberlain, 2010; Pakenham, 1991). The structural weakness of West African states does not allow them to gain sufficiently from these resources (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005). Crippled by external debts (Guisse, 2004) and other forms of dependency, many of them are led to negotiating their national interests from a position of weakness (Hyden, 2000). Their economic potential does not benefit the population and external partners get the most of it. This economic weakness is seriously hindering the capabilities of states in the sub region (Obi, 2009; Oxfam International, 2002). The states are unable to raise professional armies and police forces simply because they cannot pay for it (Bryden Alan, 2008c; Doumbi-Fakoly, 2010). As a consequence, even the personnel that have been recruited into the armed forces fall prey to corruption from rich criminals (Kirschke, 2008). Guinea-Bissau is

currently the prime example of this criminalization of the armed forces (E. K. Aning, 2009). Similar cases can be found in other states across the sub region.

Military and security

In general African militaries knew sustained growth from the post independence period to the 1990s when they started declining (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985). Herbst attributes this decline to a lack of external military threats (Herbst, 2000). It is equally important to consider in this regard, the rise of democratization and the decrease of military regimes that since the 1990s have been viewed as signs of un-democratization. Every state wants to appear as democratic in order to attract foreign aid and investment (N'Diaye, 2005). Civilian regimes are less prone to favour military investments. Most of the countries in West Africa depend on external aid. Western donors are not keen on financing military expenditures in Africa (N. Ball, 2000). The reduction in security expenditure has led to the reduction in security provision. This void has been filled by private security corporations that provide their services to those who can afford to pay for them (Clapham, 1999; Small, 2006). Small posits that this situation has further weakened West African states as they appeared unable to provide the basic necessity to their population that is security (Small, 2006).

In weak, failing or failed states, the military aims at just securing the strategic environment that allows other means to come into play for a lasting solution to the conflict (R. Smith, 2008). Strengthening the state through the reform of its security apparatuses remains the ultimate goal of states building in West Africa.

Scholars are still trying to agree on the definition of security (Azar, 1988; A. D. Baldwin, 1997; Buss, 2011; Jervis, 1982). The concept is more discussed than defined. Baldwin has pointed out “the neglect of security as a concept” by the academia (A. D. Baldwin, 1997). Buzan suggests that the concept might have been neglected because of its difficulty. Another reason for this neglect comes from the apparent overlap between security and power. The lack of interest by realism critics and the developments in technology have also contributed to this neglect. Other reasons are the policy-driven researches that divert the attention from theoretical endeavours. The fact that the ambiguity of national security

is useful to policy-makers (B. Buzan, 1991) is also used to justify this neglect of the concept. Baldwin contends saying that the security concept is not more difficult than other concepts. The apparent confusion between security and power would lead one to expect researchers to strive for clarification. Also, if realism critics are not interested in the field, Baldwin wonder why security specialists would not be (A. D. Baldwin, 1997). Since scholars and policy-makers do not seem to agree on the definition of security, they will try to characterize it without providing a clear definition. In this work, security will be understood as the absence or mitigation of threats to people, their properties and their states.

2.3 The Security Sector

The origin of the concept of Security Sector can be attributed to the work of Nicole Ball in the 1980s. She raised the issue that the development of poor countries was being affected by excessive military expenditures of states (N. Ball, 1987). She called for the incorporation of the security sector in the larger debate on development in the Global South (N. Ball, 1988). The development community picked on Ball's work to call for the reduction of military expenditure in order to boost development effort in the Global South (Fitz-Gerald, March 2003; Williams, 2005).

Clare Short, then first Minister for International Development in the United Kingdom, was the first to use the concept of "Security Sector Reform" (Short, 1998). This was the official endorsement of Security Sector Reform framework by the United Kingdom. Besides security sector reform, there is also security sector transformation (Cooper, 2002). The concept of security sector governance is used by Ball and Fayemi to emphasize that the governance of the security sector is what is at stake (N. a. K. F. Ball, 2004). Later writings do not consider Security Sector Reform as a reduction of military expenditures. Rather they see the military alongside the economy, administration, justice and so on, as being the institutions to be reformed for strengthening the state (Brzoska, 2003).

The security sector is made of "(...) those organizations within society that are responsible for protecting the state and its citizens, as well as the bodies responsible for

management and oversight of the various security forces”(N. Ball, 2000). Security sector is here understood as comprising much more than the armed and police forces. Ball speaks of the security family:

The members of what might be called ‘the security family’ include: the security forces (armed forces, police, paramilitary and intelligence services); the relevant ministries and offices within the executive branch charged with managing and monitoring the security forces (such as the ministries of defence, finance, internal and foreign affairs, national security councils, and budget and audit offices); informal security forces; the judiciary and correction system; parliamentary oversight committees; private security firms; and civil and political society (N. Ball, 2001, p. 47).

All these institutions have to be brought to function in conjunction for the security of the state, its people and their properties. It is argued here that West African states have not fared well in these sectors and that is the reason why they are weak. The SSR program if followed through offers the best prospect of redressing the weakness of states in the sub region (Bryden Alan, 2008b). The coordination of actions and resources is the key to the success of the reform. This collaboration constitutes a serious challenge to the state being helped and to their helpers (Boanas, 2005). Governmental and Non-Governmental Institutions have sometimes conflicting interests that undermine the efficiency of their actions (N. Ball, 2000; Wulf, 2004). The reform of the security sector is the primary responsibility of a nation-state with the help of bilateral and multilateral agents. External agents find it difficult to cope with the long term commitment that the reform of the security sector requires. There is no “quick-fix solution” as Burian puts it (Burian, 2007). It is difficult to disagree with the principles put forward by the protagonists of Security Sector Reform. The problem arises with the implementation of these principles (Brzoska, 2003). Nathan argues that often the reform of the security sector fails because of the underestimation of its complexity. Furthermore, very often there is the lack of the needed expertise and capacity to conduct the reform. It also happens that institutions to be reformed are themselves resistant to change. Finally, when there is insecurity in the region, states will resist any reform that is likely to tackle its reliance on military force for security (Laurie Nathan, 2004, pp. 2-6). As a consequence, there are many attempts for SSG but limited positive outcomes.

Strengthening the state after failure does not mean strengthening its central authority. This has been the post-colonial experience in many African states. The strong state's central authority has been the source of violence and insecurity in many cases and has therefore led to the weakening and even collapse of many states (David, 1997; Howe, 2005). State's institutions have failed in their mission to provide for state security whenever they are at the service of an individual or a regime in power (Paris, 2009). They can only fuel violence sooner or later as has been the case in many African countries (Ayoob, 1992; Greenhill, 2009). In this sense, a strong state is a functioning one. It encourages predictability in the governance system; creates confidence in its people; lends credibility in the face of other partners; provides security to the people and their goods; displays resolve in the decision-making process and controls resources (Meierhenrich, 2004). In this case all the people inhabiting the nation-state and their goods will be secure.

External partners of West African states like those of other weak states around the world have come to the realization that aiding ungoverned or poorly governed states is a waste of resources (Cawthra, 2003). The United Nations indicated that peace and security in weak and failed states come through the Security Sector Reform (Security Council, 2007). The Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade published a New Road Map for Africa's recovery. It calls for the building of institutions that guarantee the "(...) rule of law, enforceable property rights and contracts, a strong judicial system, sound macroeconomic management and political governance,(...) professional security forces" (Canada Senate, February 2007).

In West Africa, mercenaries, drug and small weapons traffickers and other criminals are thriving on the weak rule of law in many states of the sub region (Farah, 2007; N. a. E. G. B. Florquin, 2004; J. Ray, 2009). Investment opportunities are being lost to other regions because property rights and contracts enforcement are not guaranteed. In many countries of the sub region the justice system is deficient (World Economic Forum, 2009). In a number of states, regimes in power are more concerned about the survival of their governments than the proper political and economic governance of their states (Clapham, 1996; International Crisis Group, 2009a). All these deficiencies contribute significantly to

the weakness of West African states (Jean-François Bayart, 1993; J.-F. Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, 1999). Addressing them is the beginning of the solution to the problems. This is the task that the Security Sector Reform or Governance programs are attempting to achieve.

Critics of Security Sector Reform argue that this project is inspired by “European centre-left” ideology because of its emphasis on recipient poor countries rather than on the interest of the donors (Williams, 2000). Some others posit that by designing the “one size fits all” framework, the SSR as it is currently presented, ignores “the underlying causes of insecurity in developing countries”. In so doing, the concept loses meaning because each country or region has a particular history that led to its weakness and failure (Fayemi, 2001). The SSR project has also been criticised for not fitting in well with the “possibilities for external manipulation of political and social forces” (Luckham, 2003). The Security Sector Reform as formulated does not take into account the required changes in industrialised countries for the projects to succeed. For example, the same country that is sponsoring the reform of the security sector can sometimes be the same one having interest in selling arms to the recipient state. When arms procurement is not on the priority list of the state being assisted, this is more likely to lead to a clash of national interests (Cooper, 2002). Because of its weakness, this state may accept a type of aid that in reality it does not need at that particular time.

The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was established in 2001. It aims among other things at mediating in these sensitive negotiations over national interests. The NEPAD initiative is the African response to the governance issues that has plagued most of the states on the continent (I. Taylor, 2005). In this sense the NEPAD and the SSR projects can work hand in hand to strengthen West African states. The NEPAD has as its key target the improvement of governance in African states (NEPAD, October 2001). For this end, it has established the African Peer Review Mechanism through which states monitor the governance achievements of each other (Cilliers, 2002). This mechanism has begun to produce results for some countries like Ghana that accepted to go through the process (The APRM Monitor, February 2007). The African Peer Review Mechanism taps into the desire for cooperation expressed by

African leaders through the creation of the Organization of African Unity (1963) and many other regional and sub regional organizations. International organizations will be discussed in chapter five. The ECOWAS security mechanism is very much inspired by the NEPAD processes in terms of confidence building between all stakeholders to the securitization (Economic Community of West African State, 2008). These are mostly the civilian and the armed and police forces personnel. African armed and police forces have often been accused of being the principal responsible for the instability (Lyons, 2005). However, as the experiences in Mali, Guinea, Nigeria and Niger demonstrate, the military has allowed peaceful transition to democratic civilian rules. As indicated above, the SSR tackles the whole security family (Williams, 2005). Another flaw in all these West African initiatives is that they depend very much on the United Nations support when the organization is itself in need reform in order to better fulfil its missions (Fréchette, 2012; R. Thakur, 2001). The reform of the United Nations will not be covered in this research as it is not primarily a West African issue.

2.4 Regional Security Community

The thesis will seek to assess how the West African Security Mechanism is doing in terms of turning the sub region into a Regional Security Community. Local ownership of the SSR process is one of the main challenges of the program (Chanaa, 2002). Most of the times, the recipient state is too poor to pay its fair share of the cost of the program. However, it is expected to own it (Bendix, 2008). By expanding the ownership from local government to the sub regional or regional body, there is a chance of overcoming this challenge (Economic Community of West African State, 2008). The sub regional oversight of the security sector is taking place in West Africa and it is the reason behind the relative success of their organization.

The Regional Security Complex Theory was developed at the Copenhagen School of security studies in the wake of the post-Cold war security environment. It emphasizes the territoriality of security whereby not only the state but also its immediate neighbours are concerned by its security (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006).

The move to form regional communities was initiated in Europe following the end of the Second World War in 1945. From then on European governments have been cooperating on political, economic and security matters in order to spare their people “the scourge” of another war. Deutsch considers this to be the beginning of regional communities formation that have been established in other places around the world (Deutsch, 1954). Today, the whole world is divided into regional communities.

In the nineties, Grugel and Hout took interest in the regionalism dynamics that were taking place in the periphery of global powers. Taking benefit from the détente that followed the end of the Cold War, countries on the periphery started forming power blocs that could balance the global powers in the international system (Grugel, 1999). Their efforts are reflected in the international organization studies that look at the world from the perspective of the Global South (Grieco, 1988; H. Milner, 1992; H. V. a. M. Milner, Andrew, 2009).

In security matters, the Copenhagen School has been advocating for the widening of the security definition. Buzan is the flag bearer of this program. Security is much more than the military aspects (B. Buzan, 1991). Fifteen years after *Peoples, States and Fear*, in collaboration with his colleague Weaver, they came up with *Regions and powers* that sum up their earlier works on security. This work is constructed around what they call the “Regional Security Complex Theory”. It is based on the assumption that following the end of the Cold War, the former proxy countries that served the Cold War are no longer in the attention of the superpowers. This leaves room for regional processes to play a more important role in security matters. The second assumption is that threats to security travel faster on shorter distances than on longer ones. This means that neighbouring states are much more likely to suffer from the insecurity in their region than far away states. Therefore, these states are going to find common solutions to mitigate or control these threats out of their own interests. These two assumptions call for the creation of Regional Security Complexes through which states collaborate in security matters (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006).

Regional Security Complex Theory is adopted in this research because it explains how the weak West African states may be able to cope with the changes in the global

security system (Møller, 2005b; R. C. Thakur, 2006). The changes imply among other things that the superpowers are no longer necessarily the guarantors of security in all the states affected by conflicts. The RSC theory's strength for this work lies in its call for the pooling of resources in order to compensate for the weakness (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006).

The work of researchers of the department of African Studies at the US Army War College in Carlisle (PA) is also important to this work. It emphasises the fact that the way ahead in resolving the insecurity in African states passes through the regional communities (Bouchat, 2010; Krakowka, 2009). This work will look at the strength of the RSCT and the obvious challenge of reliance on external donors to fund regional initiatives.

2.5 Evaluation of the literature

The literature consulted is here assessed to weigh its importance relative to the object of this study that centers on the challenges of states building in West Africa since 1955. It has already been mentioned above that the lack of complete answers in the literature on West African states building challenges prompted the field visits. Some people directly affected by West African states' weakness provided valuable insight for the development of this research as indicated in the first chapter.

2.5.1 The Cold war

The Cold War political environment through which these states gained international sovereignty is very important (Agnew, 1998). It allowed their independences but it also became a trap that limited the political choices of newly formed states. They had to ally with the Cold War protagonists: the Western bloc or the Eastern one (Allison, 1990). The West accused the East of spreading Communism through its socialist political orientation that hindered progress. Likewise, the East accused the West of spreading Capitalism that exploits poor countries (Barrass, 2009). The Cold War impact on West African states is one of the causes of West African states weakness. Its importance ought not to be overestimated in the post-Cold period war as some countries have managed to ascertain

their international stature despite the competition of global powers (Black, 2008). This is the case of the emerging states like Brazil, India and South Africa to a certain extent.

2.5.2 After Communism and Capitalism

Most strategies for development implemented in sub-Saharan Africa in the last fifty years have not produced the expected results (Paul. Collier, 2007). Neither Communism nor Capitalism has provided West Africans with what they promised. As a result, fifty years after independences, West African states are still too poor to respond to their security challenges (International Crisis Group, 2012c). This calls for a change of strategy.

Africans have to forego the patronage expectations in their relationship with industrialized countries and understand that international relations are founded on power and interests (E. Berman, 2004; Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991). There is still the old mentality of designing beautiful projects and expecting rich countries around the world to fund them. This is one of the many criticisms levelled against NEPAD (Anyemedu, 2006; I. Taylor, 2005, p. 157). This work will look at how West African states integrate themselves in the anarchical international system (J. E. Keller, 1996) where their security depends on their capacity to defend their interests. The New Partnership for African Development is moving in this direction. It still has to be better explained and adhered to by all states (Owusu, 2003). The NEPAD is part of the “African Renaissance” project coined by the previous South African President, Nelson Mandela (Griggs, 2003). Obasanjo, one of the promoters of NEPAD is credited with the steering of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa in 1989. The work of this group commonly referred to as the Kampala Movement, was looking for a new strategic vision for Africa (Deng, 2002). From this Conference, security has become the centre of attention in African politics.

Generally in Sub-Saharan Africa, the informal sector accounts for the livelihood of more than sixty percent of the population (Ekpo, 2002). So far because of the widespread instability, most states devote a big part of their resources to security. The needed social infrastructures for health and education have been ranked bottom in the order of priorities (Agbango, 1997; Agnekethom, 2008). In many countries these are supplemented for by

religious organizations and other civil society groups like Non-Governmental Organizations (Drew, 2012; Maley, 2003). The central argument of this work is that with peace and security guaranteed people will have freedom of movement. This in turn will allow them to improve their livelihood through farming and other businesses, even without external involvement.

Ayittey's 2005 work, *Africa Unchained* suggests that investment both domestic and foreign is the answer to Africa economic misery. This research posits security before anything else. Without security any investment is doomed to fail as it has been the case so far (World Bank, 2008b). Domestic resources are continually squandered into regime protection because leaders lack vision. Given their doubtful legitimacy, more than required resources are allocated to their self-protection (Tshiyembe, 1990). Uncertain about their future and fearing to live like any ordinary citizen, they steal as much as possible state's properties for their personal and their families' use (Southal, 2006). The security of the regime being promoted instead of the security of the whole state (J. a. P. M. Cilliers, 1999). People are left to fend for themselves.

Given the insecurity, people do not invest because of the uncertain future. In the same way, serious foreign investors are turned off. Only those who do not care about local populations do invest as a way to have greater returns to cover for the risks (Bolton, 2008). The clear illustration of this case is that serious western investors are avoiding unstable African states. China is massively investing in those places (Traub, 2006). Some of these investors are benefitting from the weakness and failure of states (J.-F. Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, 1999). They know how to evade taxes, and operate in complete shadow which they cannot do in stable countries where the return on their investments is much weaker. Chapters four and five will specifically address these issues by explaining how the Security Sector Reform and its application through the ECOWAS mechanism offer the solution to states weakness in the sub region.

2.5.3 From an all African study to a focus on West Africa

Sub-Saharan African states seem to have a lot of things in common given the slavery and colonial experiences. In reality, there are differences from one region to the other and

from one country to the other. As mentioned earlier, the West African region seems to be on a better path toward peace, security and stability than the rest of other sub-Saharan African regions. This aspect is going to be developed in this research by assessing the prospects of success through the Economic Community of West African States.

Meredith's work for example, covers the whole continent (Meredith, 1984, 2005a, 2011). It is interesting and resourceful research, but does not take so much into consideration the local factor in the shaping of events under study. It is undeniable that post-independence African leaders played an important role in modern African states birth and rapid fall towards failure and even collapse (Okafor, 2008; Southal, 2006). Yet it is unfair to attribute all the responsibility to African leaders. The international community in general is still to account for failing Africans as well. From the "false independence" where newly formed states found themselves laden in huge debts (Guisse, 2004), to the support of undemocratic leaders and the failure of many development programs ever since that have only enriched the developers (Bolton, 2008).

Most of the researchers have been studying separately English speaking and French speaking Africa (Meredith, 2011; Samatar, 2002). It is undeniable that different colonial styles gave to these countries different administrative styles after the independences. The West African experience today is showing that the future lies in overcoming this cultural dichotomy (Economic Community of West African States, 2001; Sahel and West Africa Club, 1998). Despite the challenges involved, countries are striving to work together in the Economic Community of West African States (Ezenwe, 1983; Oteng Kufuor, 2006). This study will look at the region as a whole in the search for possible sources of the actual security cooperation. This is what is setting these countries on a better path compared to the rest of sub-Saharan African countries.

2.5.4 Regional Security Community and Global powers

The Regional Security Community offers the best prospects of the success of the reform of the Security Sector in West Africa, but the framework has its limitations as some authors have pointed out. Katzenstein argues that the current wave of regional

communities' formation is just another one of those moments in history when the weakness of global powers has allowed the rising powers and weaker states to come to the fore of international relations attention. That as soon as one or two powers recovers the world swings back to unipolarity or multipolarity power system (Katzenstein, 2005). The author illustrates his argument by citing the current war on terrorism through which the United States is spreading its influence all over the world.

Buzan and Waever do recognize that the Regional Security Community program can fail or be weakened by superpowers' "penetration" or "overlay" (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). Many times in weak states, the regional or sub regional organizations are inspired and funded by a global power (Franke, 2012). It should also be noted that the current superpower, the United States has been so much affected by the economic crisis that the time is on defense spending cuts (Shanker, 2010). Therefore Buzan's main contention holds that in such a context, the superpower is not going to play the role of the global police and attempt to solve all the conflicts around the world. No one can advise West African states to just sit and wait until the next power shows up to overlay them. Out of responsibility and pragmatism, weak states ought to use the current strategic environment to step up and gain ground in the securitization of their region. This is what ECOWAS is striving to achieve.

2.6 Conclusion

The conclusion to this first part and second chapter of the research is a recognition that fifty years after independences, West Africa is still made of weak states and some of them risk failing. There have been many attempts to resolve this problem that have either produced limited results or simply failed. This study is centered on security as the way out of instability in West African states.

Generally speaking the literature on African states portrays them as failed and collapsed as has been the stereotype since the first contacts of the African continent with foreign powers (Davidson, 1992; Hunter-Gault, 2006; Macqueen, 2002). However, in the works of African and particularly West African authors, these states are mostly weak and some of them risk failing (Adebajo, 2004b; K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009). Generalizations

are very common in the literature as if the African continent was just a single country (Meredith, 2005a). It appears that nothing positive is being achieved by these states. That is why some author calls for the decertification of the African states as established by colonial powers in order to allow the building of new modern states that respond to international Westphalia standards (Herbst, 2000; Rotberg, 2002). This quick fix of the problem is the opposite of what West African states are doing to respond to their challenges as it will be argued in this research. They have chosen the long path to peace building (Olawale, 2008) that requires more time and resources, but is more likely to yield the expected results.

This work recognizes the obvious similarities of African states given their common history of overlay by foreign powers through slave trade and colonization. The emphasis is on the literature that expresses the particularity of African states. In this case, the West African sub region is the center of attention. The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was established only in 1975. The political and economic challenges of ECOWAS have been the centre of attention of the research (Edi, 2007b; Oteng Kufuor, 2006). So far, there are few seminal works on the security challenges in the sub regional community (Aboagye, 2005; Adebajo, 2002a, 2004b). The research is ongoing and this thesis is relying mostly on books' chapters, articles and reports (K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009; Ebo, 2004; Sahel and West Africa Club, 1998) to support the arguments. That is why this work is a contribution to this ongoing research on security challenges of West African states.

The next chapter will analyze the processes of West African states' weakness. This is the reason why this research was undertaken. It aims among other things at identifying these processes and suggest possible responses. Some causes have to do with West African leadership and dysfunctional structures put in place or adopted to govern post independence states. Other causes come from external partners and global powers. Post-colonial leaders failed to deliver on their promises for various reasons, but these do not absolve them from their responsibilities since many of them squandered states' resources. The international community failed to properly accompany the nascent West African

states. Rather, the Cold War superpowers used them to secure their strategic interests and dropped them when they were no longer needed.

The Cold War started with the end of the Second World War in 1945 and ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This period is very important to understanding post-colonial African states in general. The political, economic and security environment it created is still present today in one form or another. There is no longer the East-West powers polarity, but the West against emerging powers like China, India, Brazil and others (Chau, March 2007). The outcome for West African states is more likely to be the same because their modes of functioning have remained the same.

Chapter four will study power resources available to West African states to pull them out of weakness and failure as they move through the 21st century. This will only happen if their Security Sector undergoes the needed reforms. As they gained independences, these states inherited political, administrative, security and other infrastructure resources. Many states did not sufficiently capitalize on these to acquire more, and some just squandered them. Therefore they find themselves lacking resources to respond to the needs of their population.

Security Sector Reform is posited as a solution to states' weakness and failure in West Africa. It is here understood that earlier solutions to African insecurity failed because of their narrow approach to the problem (Bendix, 2008). Security Sector has a wider scope that if properly implemented it is the answer to state's weakness. The challenge remains the long-term commitment that the reform of the security sector in West Africa requires.

Chapter five looks at the Economic Community of West African States as a security mechanism that is to uphold the whole project. Many member states are so limited in terms of territory, demography and economic resources that they cannot succeed on their own in this globalized world. The pooling of resources that the community allows is an opportunity for all. The West African community has been chosen to stage this research because it is the most advanced of African regional communities. It is posited here that West Africa is poised to become a model of how to end poverty and instability on the whole continent (Hugon, 2006). The insecurity is preventing states from raising the needed resources for their development.

Chapter Three:

PROCESSES OF STATES WEAKNESS IN WEST AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

The West African region is composed of states that are weak, some risk failing or are in the process of recovery (Adebajo, 2004b; Ndulo, 2010; J.-P. Pham, 2004). This is not conducive to security. The causes of West African states' weakness must be understood prior to going any further in this analysis.

This chapter will analyze the internal and external causes of West African states weakness. Internally causes can generally be attributed to problems with the political leaderships and the state level decision making processes since the independence. At the same time, there are external factors weakening these states and that are beyond their control (Ayittey, 1992; Dunn, 2001). Former colonial powers and the international system that have been accompanying West African states in their international sovereignty have all failed them as well.

West African states are weak and risk failing because of limited political, economic and security resources (ECOWAS/WAEMU, 2006; Fall, 2007; Oduro, 2003). These causes of state weakness are not limited to West African states. They also apply to most of African states and even to a certain extent to the Global South in general (M. T. J. R. Callaghy, 1993). The general socio-political situation of newly independent West African states can be characterized as a "False start"(Dumont, 1969). They never got an upper hand on building modern states as intended by the independence movement (Clapham, 1996). As a result, the same weakness seems to have lasting effect on them. These deficiencies have to be addressed comprehensively so that people's dream of stability and prosperity can one day become reality and hence true security.

Partial democratization has been identified as one of the problems holding back West African states. Given the positions taken by the AU and the ECOWAS in regards to military regimes, it is expected that in general African states will continue to democratize taking into consideration their particular cultural and historical backgrounds (Harbeson,

2009). For this to happen, national diversity has to be taken into account. In most West African states people show allegiance at the same time to the state and to their traditional or tribal leaders (Vaughan, 2003). A consensus building process, though time and resources consuming must be favoured. It allows all nations that make the nation-state, to take part in the same national ideal (Zartman, 2009). The first efforts towards stability and prosperity will be brought about by building strong middle class between the few elites at the top of the triangle and the wide mass at the base. Only then can many share in the nation's power and wealth (Graham Harrison, 2001, p. 395). Otherwise, elites will influence their bases in their refusal to collaborate with the central government. The lack of political participation by the masses led to the collapse of governments' legitimacy and therefore to weakening the newly formed West African states.

As they became independent, West African states inherited structures and modes of functioning that they have never fully succeeded to put to good use (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005b). Some of these structures are the constitutions tailored to those of the colonizing states. There is also an overreliance on armed forces to maintain law and order at the expense of the development of professional police forces for that purpose (B. Robert Edgerton, 2002). The failure in this area has contributed to the weakness and insecurity in West African states.

The boundaries between states were artificially drawn by colonial powers according to their agendas (Anene, 1970; Brownlie, 1979). This interference in the indigenous nations' building processes have created states in which over a century later, it remains difficult to create a sense of nationhood that is so essential for social peace (Asiwaju, 1985). Some post-independent West African states are faced with insurgencies claiming to resurrect the pre-colonial nation that was unwillingly pooled into the nation-state by colonization (Nyamnjoh, 2006). Nigeria is the prime example in West Africa of this constant effort to maintain together various nations (International Crisis Group, 2006).

Similarly, these post-independent states inherited a triple heritage that is still confusing today. The triple heritage is made of the traditional, the colonial and the Islamic/Christian administrations (A. A. A. Mazrui, 1984). The pre-colonial kingdoms

are still active in some states. In places where they are more powerful like in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso; they literally act like mini states within the modern nation-states (Vaughan, 2003). They own lands, raise taxes, administer justice and social services (Buur, 2007). The second heritage of the state is the modern state system initiated by the colonial administration with all of its structures as it has been adopted in all countries (Crowder, 1968). The third heritage comes from missionary groups. In this case, it is mostly about Islam and Christianity (Bovill, 1933; F. S. W. D. A. R. Miles, 1991). Wherever they established and where the state administration structures were non-existent, they set up their own administration to levy taxes and respond to the needs of local populations mostly for social services (A. A. A. Mazrui, 1984). Therefore, the modern nation-states in West Africa are still struggling to reconcile all these systems of administration. Strengthening states in the sub region will partly depend on the success in this regard.

The weakness of most West African states is characterized among other things by their inability to establish and consolidate the state's administration system all over the territory. As a consequence, their absence favours the parallel administrations run by traditional or religious groups (P. Englebort, 2003). This triple heritage of the state is sometimes confusing to people and as such constitute a further source of instability and weakness of states.

As indicated earlier, since the 1960s, development has been at the centre of the cooperation between West African states and rich western countries. The expected results have never been fully achieved, partially because of the structural deficiency of these states. The foreign aid made available to them has in many cases become a source of their economic weakness because of the burden of external debt. Many times states need aid to service the previous debt. This created a vicious circle that continues to take them down (Paul. Collier, 2007).

The Cold War dynamic between the two superpowers was significantly played out in West African states. These were among the proxies through which the war was fought. As such, they were weakened because they served the Cold War agenda instead of devoting their energies to nation-states' building. Individual or particular group

interests were many times served by this conflict at the expense of the national interests (Allison, 1990). Ghanaian post-independence political turmoil was also the results of the Cold War standoff that pitted Nkrumah against his political opponents (Birmingham, 1998). In Cote d'Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny had a mission of controlling the communist influences in the French speaking West Africa (Obasanjo, 1996). As such the interests of his own country were overlooked.

In the process of the above, West African states lost legitimacy both domestically and internationally. At home, people resented governments that were serving individual interests while neglecting them. The most visible manifestation of this resentment is the military coups that have plagued the sub region (Samuel Decalo, 1990; B. Robert Edgerton, 2002). Insurgencies and criminal activities are the other means through which people have attempted to supplement for what their states are failing to provide them with (Clapham, 1996). In the international system, most of the West African states have for many years been identified as weak or failing and therefore in need of assistance (Foreign Policy, 2011). Therefore, these states are absent where major global decisions are being taken even though these affect them as well.

The following sections of the research will set to analyze each of the issues raised above. Both internal and external causes of West African states' weakness will be examined before looking at possible solutions to the identified issues.

3.2 Endogenous Causes of weakness

The first part of this chapter examines the causes of states' weakness and therefore of the present insecurity in the region. The struggles for independence have produced the countries self-determinations in the international system but failed to bring about the desired coherent nation-states. Soon after independences many countries were faced with insurgencies led by people who considered that they were excluded from post-colonial government processes. In general, these internal divisions were key factors in weakening nascent African states.

3.2.1 The struggle for independences

In the aftermath of the two Great Wars that considerably reduced the capabilities of colonizing powers, decolonization became the order of the day (Brinkley, 1994; Springhall, 2001). African elites in general seized this opportunity to mobilize the discontent with colonization and to call for independences.

This research attempts to look at what went wrong with all the good ideas that were developed at the time of independence. In the clashes of interests, colonizing powers killed or exiled a number of leaders (Adas, 1979), but the voices calling for independences were never completely silenced. Lumumba-Kasongo delved on similar questions in introducing his work:

(...) what went wrong in the African economic planning, policies and politics? Why is it that a politically independent Africa, as a whole, has produced neither its own economic models that may be relevant and appropriate to the African conditions nor reliable political systems in which people's participation is in the center of policy formation and implementation? What did nationalists do to deal with the above questions?(Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991, p. i)

The motives that led colonized Africans to rebel against European colonial powers need to be understood. Three causes are important to this research. First, there is the colonial transformation of African societies. The other cause is the relative deprivation that resulted from land seizure. Finally, forced labour and taxation were also resented by local populations (Adas, 1979, pp. 43-79). The colonial influence was implemented through a form of administration and religion that were all new to Africans. The armed forces and considerable financial capabilities were involved. Therefore, local societies and their structures were destabilized through the transformation that took place. One of the culture shock suffered by many African societies was the weakening of the traditional and tribal leadership. The colonial administration did use some chiefs by turning them into servants of the colony. Those who opposed were jailed, exiled or demoted (Shraeder, 2004, p. 66). The sense of relative deprivation was experienced as people compared their capabilities to that of the colonial forces. This situation became increasingly unbearable when people realized these capabilities were mostly raised from their resources taken through land

seizure, forced labour and taxation as indicated above (Adas, 1979). These three situations became grounds for revolts against the colonial power.

These contentions provided nationalist elites with opportunities for mobilization of the people (A. A. A. M. T. Mazrui, 1984). Unfortunately the aim of chasing colonial masters took precedence over the design of policies meant to manage the post-colonial period (Gifford, 1982). For many reasons, several early leaders were unable to draw worthwhile development policies out of their political platforms (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991). The strong and prosperous states that were supposed to be born out of independence never fully materialized. As a consequence, a number of struggles seem to have failed their true objective, the total independence of their countries (Lofchie, 1994, p. 146).

Many researchers posit that Amilcar Cabral's revolutionary activity had the potential to make a difference in Africa. He is an example of an African early leader who would have possibly succeeded had he not been killed like many other African nationalists (Cabral, 1980; Chilcote, 1991). His work and political activity being extensively studied can still provide an inspiration to African leaders as they strive for the total independence of their respective countries (Cabral, 1980). Cabral took the time to prepare his men and to mobilize populations before launching the armed struggle (Chaliand, 1969, p. 118). One of Cabral's strength was his reliance on the population to achieve his objectives contrary to many leaders who waited on some external patrons to give them power over their people (G. Harrison, 1968-, 2002; Melber, 2002). "Experience proves that when a party is strong, when it receives the support of its own masses, and when it defines its goal as the radical transformation of its own national reality, then it will not go begging for aid." (Chaliand, 1969, p. 104) Unfortunately, this has not been the experience of post independences African states in general (Nyang'oro, 1998). Almost immediately after the enmity of colonial struggles, several early heads of states turned to the same former colonial masters begging for financial and even military support (J. Forrest, 2004). This was needed to quell insurgencies that they were facing just like their predecessors. This recourse to the former political enemy for help can be explained in part by the fact that large number of the early leaders were previously at the service of the colonial administration. Former colonizers also maintained significant

economic and strategic interests in their former colonies as indicated in the discussions on the Cold War (Breslauer, 1991). Chaliand goes on to say that at the most what they achieved was diversification of sources of aid (Chaliand, 1969, p. 109). The accumulated debts are a further cause of West African states weakness.

Referring to Southern African states' experience, Melber indicates how anti-colonial movements were organized on a very authoritarian model. The charismatic leader¹⁹ was the center of power and decisions (Lanciné, 1982). This undemocratic governance system was transferred to newly born states since the same anti-colonial leaders took over from the colonial administration and became the first heads of states. This lack of accountability will prove to be a setback to the establishment of modern democratic states in Africa (Liebenow, 1985, p. 126).

Those in power are at best prepared to be accountable only to themselves as new elite in the making, which cares more about external support and little about a notion of popular democracy (...). There is a lack of critical faculties and extremely limited willingness to accept divergent opinions, particularly if they are expressed publicly. Nonconformist thinking is interpreted as disloyalty, if not equated with treason. But the marginalisation or elimination of dissent limits drastically the new system's capability for reform and innovation (...) In the long term, this means the rulers are themselves undermining their credibility and legitimacy (Melber, 2002, p. 166).

Harrison laments that the idea of struggle has disappeared from African political vernacular following independence. The neo-liberal political philosophy is increasingly dominant since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By struggle he understands "(...) a process, a result of mobilisation provoked by some form of resistance (...), the notion of struggle is based in a sympathy for mass politics rather than elite politics, widening political participation, and the promotion of socio-economic equality."(Graham Harrison, 2001, p. 387). Therefore he suggests bringing back the concept of struggle in African

¹⁹ A charismatic leader is a person who first conceives an idea or a project and who inspires others to join him for its realization. In this paragraph, the charismatic leader is the person who founded the political party and who is governing it in a very autocratic way. For an extensive discussion on charisma, see Weber, M., *On Charisma and institution building*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

politics as a way of curing the current lethargy. This is another outcome of the Cold War and of the Western bloc victory that loathed mass politics.

Focusing on political struggle soon produces a wide gamut of political movements and mobilisations. From the emergence of the first cracks in the post-colonial authoritarian edifice, labour unions, students, civil servants, women's groups, business associations, and less often, peasant groups mobilised to infuse 'transitions' with a particular social content. (Graham Harrison, 2001, p. 395)

This suggestion is to be taken with caution. Most countries are financially very dependent on neo-liberal inspired International Financial Institutions (Moss, 2007, pp. 117-162), which makes it unrealistic to expect much results from that approach. However it is undeniable that besides the neo-liberal dominance, African states need to find ways to mobilize their people. They need this to get their political participation in the governance so that the promised states' building project can begin to materialize. Weak political participation is very detrimental to the security of West African states. When people feel excluded from the political processes in their countries they easily become threats to the regime in power. The recent past in the sub region indicates that threatened regimes promote insecurity in their states for the sake of their survival (Clapham, 1996). This was the case of Cote d'Ivoire with Laurent Gbagbo (International Crisis Group, 2011a).

3.2.2 Insurrectional activities

Revolutionary elites were not the only one who expressed their dissatisfaction with the ruling powers. In many West African countries, the population in general considered themselves excluded from the new governance processes. Therefore, they turned to their local community organizations to fight for self-determination. They wanted to re-create their traditional nations shattered by colonization (J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 309; Njoku, 2002). Following the independence, the strong hand of the colonial power that was "holding" these "nations" together was not there anymore. Each one of them wanted to impose itself over the others as the leader of their common nation created by colonialists

(B. Robert Edgerton, 2002, p. 99ff). They moved to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the colonial administration. The same strategies that were used to oust the colonial powers were soon to be used against each other. There were many insurrection movements which contribute to post-colonial West African states' weakness.

One of the clearest symptoms- and also causes – of state decay in Africa was the growth of armed opposition movements against the state, originating usually in the least accessible areas of the countryside, which came to pose a serious challenge not just to individual states, but to the African international order as a whole. Various described as guerrilla movements, liberation struggles, or indeed as private armies, terrorists or secessionist bandits, these movements may – without overlooking the important differences between them – be examined together under the reasonable neutral term, insurgencies(Clapham, 1996, p. 208)

In general early African regimes were desperate to project their authority over states territories. As such they sometimes resorted to the same methods used by colonial powers to subdue African societies (Meredith, 1984). Very often the new West African regimes were made of elites who were previously living in national capital cities or in metropolitan cities of Europe (Ihonvbere, 2003). As such, they were far removed from the realities of the hinterland in their native countries. They had a difficult task of reaching out to the interior in order to establish their power all over the national territory (Villalon, 2005). They acted like the departing colonial administration by coercing their people to follow them. The exerted brutality and extortion of resources led to the withdrawal from any form of political participation and even to armed resistance (Clapham, 1996, p. 209). Clapham's study distinguishes four forms of insurgencies in Africa. The first one was directed against colonial regimes and led to independence. This first group acted with the blessing of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945) following the Atlantic Charter (Brinkley, 1994). The second form is called 'separatist insurgencies' which were led by those calling for the autonomy of their entities within existing states. This case is illustrated by the Eritrean struggle for independence against Ethiopia (1961-1991). Also more recently there is the case of South Sudan that separated from the Republic of Sudan (1972-2011). This type of insurrection has to labour very hard to get international recognition because international organisation like the OAU has it enshrined in their statutes the protection states' borders inherited from colonization

(OAU, 1964). Clapham calls the third group, 'reform insurgencies' because they called for reform within existing states and did not seek independence. These are the cases of Uganda's National Resistance Movement under Museveni and the Rwandese insurrection led by Kagame. In both cases, insurgents ended up toppling existing governments to seize power. The fourth group is made of those movements without clearly defined aims, where the charisma of the leading warlord is the only reference. Therefore even when they managed to seize power, they were unable to govern (Clapham, 1996, pp. 209-212). In this group are found Charles Taylor in Liberia and Laurent-Desire Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo. West African states ought to address any insurrectional movement either in terms of responding to legitimate requests or subduing them before they become a threat to security. Insurgencies can destabilize not only the host state but also neighbouring states as it was observed in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the nineties (Gompert, 2007).

Whatever its form, the presence of any insurrection in a state is a sign of an unheeded need of a particular group in a population (Allen, 2010). When not addressed in time, this has a potential of destabilizing the state and lead to its weakness and even failure. It should be noted here that the location of the insurgency operational leadership does not make much difference in regard to its capacity to weaken the state. According to Clapham, insurrectional movements may operate from within the country or from outside (Clapham, 1996, pp. 213-214). Elites disagreements do not have to degenerate into armed insurgency against the ruling regime. Higley suggests some of the warning signs of division that any regime should heed to before things get out of hand.

(...) national elite is disunified when its members (1) share few or no understandings about the priorities of political conduct and (2) engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries. The basic situation of persons composing this elite type is one of deep insecurity-the fear, usually rooted in experience, that all is lost if some other person or faction gets the upper hand.(Higley, 1989, p. 19)

This seems to describe much of western Africa. As a consequence, from independence onward, a number of West African states have gone from one military coup to the next. Frequent changes of governments are another indication of an insecure regime. Such a

political climate is not conducive to the implementation of development policies. It also discourages positive foreign investments in the country (Agbango, 1997, pp. 13-49). In many countries an implicit sub-culture of short-term planning develops. Economic development requires a long term planning, but many of these plans remain on paper since governments are unsure about having sufficient time to implement them.

Institutional instability in so many new states, the weakness of political structures and the alienation of large elements of the subject population, have perhaps been most conspicuously displayed in the frequency and ease with which ruling cliques have been overthrown by quite small (and often ill-organized) groups of armed men. The pattern of the coup d'état, once thought of as characteristically Latin American, now appears firmly established in Africa, the Middle East, and in some parts of Asia. This pattern not only of course suggests the near absurdity of a 'democratizing' teleology; it has suggested the need for a whole new analysis of the politics of underdevelopment (D.C. O'Brien, op.cit. 358)

Experiences have demonstrated that it takes very long time for coup d'état regimes to become functional once they seize power (Aboagye, 2005; Adebajo, 2002a). They have first to go through the whole process of domestic and international acceptance. Meanwhile the state's policies remain static until the new government can gain some kind of legitimacy to be able to function. Chabal noted that "Africa is not just a continent of great political instability, it is also a continent where incompetence, greed and the lust for power have unleashed untold violence on ordinary men and women"(P. Chabal, 1996, p. 31). As such, this situation has significant destabilizing effect on West African states and leads to their weakness.

3.2.3 Elites rule

Elites' influence on state's administration is different from one country to another. Higley calls national elites the "(...) persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Burton, 1987; Higley, 1989, p. 18). Macridis refers to them as the "group of people" with power to lead others to follow their orders. In a society, these are not necessarily the politicians. The élite body is also made of "(...) the high clergy, university presidents, the military, managerial groups, labour

union leaders, owners and directors of the media, leaders of mass organizations and , of course, the wealthy”(Macridis, 1991, p. 6). In any society, these are the leaders. Their role becomes more important in societies characterized by weak political participation. This was the case of West African states at the time of independence. The pool of qualified human resources to administer the new states was then limited (Appiah, 2004; Mamdani, 1996). As a consequence, the fate of nascent states was entrusted not necessarily to the people best suited to lead it to a better future, but to those who were available at that time.

At independence, colonial rulers were replaced by Africans elites who were educated in Western schools and some who had worked in the colonial administration. These are the same people who organized the resistance against the colonial powers (P. Peter Ekeh, 1975, pp. 93-94).

By 1932, Presbyterian and Methodist missions had established a number of schools that were famous in the West African region, even as far as Cameroon (Omenka, 2003). These schools were administered by native politicians who were sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Therefore they are going to become the breeding grounds for the first nationalist elites. Omenka indicates that Catholic missions are going to join in and start opening schools at the secondary level but quite late compared to Protestants.

Long before British rule was established in Nigeria, the Protestant missions had begun to prepare their African members for leadership, especially for leadership in the local churches envisages in the country. Realizing the relevance of higher education to nation building, the mission societies sent their African parsons and senior teachers to colleges in England and America, and to Fourah Bay in Sierra Leone, that powerhouse of Protestantism in West Africa(Omenka, 2003, p. 357)

The elites who were thus trained are mostly the same who formed political parties that were supposed to preside over the destiny of their countries. These parties had no vision of the future of the nation-states. All the attention was focused on getting rid of the colonial occupation. The nationalists did not have plans on what to do after colonizers were gone (J. F. Ade Ajayi, 1982, p. 2).

In Africa, the end of the Second World War is a defining moment for the decolonization process. Not only was the postwar international system headed by anti-colonial sentiments as illustrated by the Atlantic Charter (Brinkley, 1994), but also Africans who fought under the metropolitan forces during the War, returned home with the European experience and the desire to free their respective countries from the colonial yoke.

The aftermath of the war brought frustration and restlessness, in Africa as much as in other parts of the world. African elites took the Atlantic Charter to constitute some form of official encouragement to demand political rights, yet faced obstruction. Ex-servicemen returning home with new ideas and skills, wider experiences and high expectations about the future, many believing they had earned the right to demand some share in the government of their countries, found few openings (Meredith, 2005a, p. 9).

Ayittey is very suspicious of the African elites that he considers as having continued the same system of holding populations under control. They misdirected their countries through their administrative ineptitude and neglect of rural areas. For him, here lies the trouble with African states (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005). Not only they were unprepared to lead modern states, but also their lack of vision and unity became a source of instability to nascent states. Elites do not have to agree on everything, but a consensual unity has allowed them elsewhere to produce stable regimes as illustrated by Higley:

A disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of *unstable regimes* that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. A *consensually unified* national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a *stable regime* that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if economic and other facilitative conditions permit. (Higley, 1989, pp. 17-18)²⁰

The lack of a common national vision between elites is responsible for the fact that the first West African regimes were characterized by the killing and imprisoning of political opponents. The killing of elites further created mistrust and insecurity. This was the case in Ghana and Nigeria in the two decades following their independence (Liebenow, 1985;

²⁰ Italics in the original text.

Souare, 2006). The same is seen through the “high incidence of political violence”, the “frequent changes in the makeup of governing coalitions and cabinets” and the “occurrence of coups d’état”(Higley, 1989, p. 20; Sanders, 1981). Very soon leaders were discredited and appeared in conflict with people they claimed to have liberated from colonial oppression. It happened to the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah and later on to Moussa Traore and Matthieu Kerekou.

In the Collected Essays of A. Mazrui it is posited that colonial leaders, alien to local cultures, were better off than the Africans who replaced them. The latter could not claim neutrality in mediating between inter-tribal conflicts. They were labelled as defender of their particular tribal group (Ostergard, 2004, pp. 34-35). Ajayi argues that the first African leaders were ignorant because instead of dealing with the tribal factor, they not only underestimated it but also attempted to annihilate it.

They took for granted the masses' and the traditional elite's willingness to accept their leadership, and underestimated the problems of achieving national cohesion, dismissing the ethnicity that surfaced during the independence movements as ignorant or unpatriotic "tribalism." A radical group at the first All African People's Congress at Accra in December 1958 even pushed through a resolution to abolish those traditional African institutions, such as chieftaincy, that might prove to be incompatible with democracy and modernity (J. F. Ade Ajayi, 1982, p. 2).

It is unfortunate that the first leaders of African independent states misunderstood the tribal factor. In their quest for legitimacy they used the wrong approach. They adopted the same strategies as the colonial powers that previously attempted to silence the local factor in their nation-states' building projects.

(...) the regimes were preoccupied with the nation-state model of development, over which they had in any case been given little choice by the departing metropolitan powers; and obsessed with the problem of 'national integration' and achieving it through the use of state power (...) The hastily carpented institutions of liberal democracy and independence constructions quickly faded and disappeared in the face of growing authoritarianism of both civilian and military regimes.(J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 333; Tshiyembe, Septembre 2000).

As a consequence, their polities treated them likewise by retreating to traditional nations and refusing to collaborate with them (Hale, 2004, p. 461). This lack of popular

participation led to the collapse of the government's legitimacy. Once considered illegitimate by the polity, the state's nation building program becomes impossible to achieve. This is another reason of West African states' weakness.

3.2.4 The shortage of qualified human resources

Post independence West African states were so ill prepared that there were not enough people to administer them. In many countries, missionaries' training institutions were the only place where a significant number of people who knew more than just reading and writing could be found (P. Peter Ekeh, 1975; Omenka, 2003; Ostergard, 2004, p. 204). Graduates from these institutions and a few others who by then had graduated in Western post-secondary schools formed the first elites who took over from departing colonizers.

Liebenow's work indicates how the lack of qualified personnel to run the newly established modern African states bound them to fail from the beginning. The new administrations were not equipped to manage their states. They were unprepared to enter the complex world of international relations where actors have to defend their state's national interests.

The pool of talent available to both run the state and continue the vital role of the political party in galvanizing society with respect to nation-building, economic development, and the other tasks was dangerously thin from the outset. Colonial educational policies had been marked by neglect where they were not characterized by positive hostility to the concept of educating Africans to manage a complex modern society (...). The absence of critical skills in the fields of public administration, medicine, engineering, diplomacy, and the general areas of economics and finance was appalling. Added to this legacy was the lower priority given by African nationalists themselves to economics and other matters during the anti-colonial struggle (...) In any case, African politicians were by force of circumstances unequal bargaining partners during the transitional period relative to the vested European economic actors (Liebenow, 1985, p. 130)

Between the few who formed the top of the triangle and the wide mass of illiterate population at the base, there lacked a middle class which serves to sustain any modern

society in the world. Therefore, the door was open to hegemonic rule. Hameso puts it in the following way:

In communities and economies based predominantly on agriculture, where large sections of populations live in the rural areas, where neither the Western style classes (workers and capitalists) are significant, the ruling elite remains a minority whether it is a military or civilian. The floating elite, which obviously has problems of representation, is damned as parasitic and the 'principal obstacle to qualitative changes in Africa (Bathily, 1994, p. 68; Hameso, 2002, p. 12)

Following independence, most African states elites formed political parties that lacked clear political platforms appealing to their largely illiterate polities (Melber, 2002). Their primary concern was on seizing power from the colonialists. Political, social and economic policies' implementations were written down through constitutions that emulated very much those of colonizing countries. These constitutions were written based on European realities that did not have much in common with African realities at that time (Faure, Mars 1981). Unlike the Africans, colonial metropolitan societies were more educated to be able to participate in political activities of modern states.

3.2.5 Political clientelism and patrimonialism

Political clientelism and patrimonialism are among the problems that have undermined the normal functioning of West African states (Gyimah-Boadi, 2003). Since the colonial period, leaders have used their positions to influence peoples' representatives to serve them and their regimes instead of serving the state (Calderisi, 2006a). This corruption was spread at all levels of the government administration. Following the independence, the new regimes continued the same style whereby people are not appointed to government positions based on their merits but on the potential of returns to the patron. As a consequence, the level of corruption is so high that governments loose legitimacy in the face of their people and external partners (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005). As such, West African states are weak and unable to function normally (Corrigan, 2009; Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2009). This aspect will be further discussed in the next chapter.

According to Dogan, political clientelism, which is the subject matter here, occurs when "The clientelistic relationship is one of personal dependence, unrelated to kinship,

which links two persons who control unequal resources, the patron and the client, for a reciprocal exchange of favours”(Dogan, 1990, p. 75; Medard, 1977, p. 103). This was observed in the interaction between the colonial administration and African traditional leaders. This type of collaboration continued all through the independence of West African states. Clientelism is characterized by “dependence, reciprocity and personalization” (Medard, 1977, p. 103). As such, political clientelism is not the trait of developing countries or younger democracies. It is found in all types of administration in different forms.

Patrimonialism is a situation whereby state’s properties are managed like personal ones (Rosenstein, 2005). The person in authority distributes favours with the state’s resources in total disregard of a sound stewardship.

Patronage politics means that leaders use the institutions of the state, which might include civil service jobs and access to credit, licenses, regulatory decisions, government contracts, and even cash, to keep selected groups satisfied. In return, these groups provide political support to the leaders, blocs of votes, and sometimes recruits for enforcing leaders’ power.(Moss, 2007, pp. 38-39).

The relationship thus established makes patrimonialism similar to clientelism in the political science literature because favours are granted in the expectation of returns (Tshiyembe, 1990, p. 13). While patrimonialism is a top down action on the part of leaders, clientelism is a bottom up action on the part of people seeking the leaders’ favours (Erdmann, 2002). Pitcher argues that most current studies are a departure from Weber (M. Weber, 1964) who considered patrimonialism as a form of exercise of authority like any other without the moral connotation attached to it by current use of the concept (Pitcher, 2009).

It is not the object of this research to intervene in this debate, but to raise the issue of how patrimonial and neo-patrimonial exercises of authority in West African states have led to their weakness (Alemazung, 2011). Nascent nation-states have a much bigger challenge of transparency because of their dependence on external donors.

It happened that even when civil servants were properly trained, they soon became drawn into a patronage system that distorted all decision making mechanisms. The head of state is at the same time the “super minister” that distribute public resources to subservient civil servants (Hyden, 2000). Keefer contends that politicians resort to patronage policies when they lack credibility as to their capacity or willingness to fulfil their electoral promises. This is mostly true of younger democracies where there is not yet an established electoral tradition and political competitors have not yet had the time to establish their reputations (Keefer, 2007, pp. 807-813).

Thus according to many observers, in the colonial period and afterwards, clientelism and patrimonialism were the outcome of the interaction between the colonial powers and the African elites. The colonial power wanted to expand the outreach of their administration over local populations by subjugating the elites. West African tribal elites used the close collaboration with the colonial administration to expand their authority. Having been subdued militarily by the invading power, local elites sought to maximize their gains from this all powerful ally that was seeking their collaboration in order to extend its domination.

The strategic logic of political control in the colonial state rested on a particular application of divide and rule, namely a practice of fragmenting and isolating African political activity within the confines of local administrative sub-divisions and thereby inhibiting the spread of opposition and resistance to a colony-wide bases where it might threaten to overwhelm the limited coercive resources at hand. Each administrative unit ideally contained a single culturally and linguistically homogeneous ‘tribe’ in which people continued to live within the indigenous institutions and were subject to ‘tribal discipline’ through local structures of authority. (J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 315)

Berman explains that this alliance between tribal chiefs and headmen on one side and the colonial power on the other side, took the form of “patron and client”(J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 310) relationship that had unwelcomed consequences for the colonial and post colonial administrations. First, to secure their loyalty, collaborators were supplied with “additional sources of income and patronage” (J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 316). In fact it was their share of the profits that came out of extracted commodities and trade. This situation created the mentality that the state is the distributor of the “benefits of modernity”(J. B.

Berman, 1998, p. 316) and that the patronage relationship was the sure way of accessing these.

Second, the colonial state gained access to “exchange networks of rural society”(J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 317) and became implicated in the lineage and clans’ conflicts. As such, the colonial state became the arbiter and suppressed the grassroots mechanism of conflict resolution by granting support to friendly heads and chiefs. Third, through their pursuit of wealth and abuse of power, headmen became equally subjects to local challenges to the state and of internal class conflicts. Chiefs were alienated from their populations and ethnic divisions were exacerbated as people mainly turned to their inner class identities for protection (J. B. Berman, 1998, pp. 316-317; Mamdani, 1996, p. 26). Thus, the state became far remote from people daily lives and irrelevant. The state is strong in as much as it is able to rally people to participate in its sustenance.

Given the domestic and international economic and political weakness of many governments in West Africa, they rely on external powers for support (Ayittey, 1992). These powers are the former colonizing countries, International Financial Institutions or Multinational Corporations. This dependence maintains the same clientelism and patrimonialism as it will be demonstrated in the second part of this chapter. As a consequence, the political and economic policies are controlled by external donors who do not have to take into consideration the domestic socio-cultural and political situations. This is for example the case with the strong presence of France in the West African economy (Olukoshi, 2001; Yansané, 1976). The local bourgeoisie that elsewhere helps to economically develop the country is here subjected to the will imposed by foreign experts. G. Agbango has pointed out how some leaders develop a self-distrust by neglecting their local experts. “The impact of the failure of African countries to rely on local experts sometimes results in some African delegations going to loan negotiation conferences poorly prepared. In the end, they accept every condition”(Agbango, 1997, p. 5). This is another characteristic of a state weakness because it lacks ownership of knowledge on important issues affecting it.

3.2.6 Decades of military rule

Most of post-independent West African states experienced decades of military rule following their independence. This was partially due to the sustained insecurity situation following the power hand over from the colonial administration to the early leaders.

As they emerged from colonial rule, West Africans were soon faced with the crisis of the power struggle among various micro-nations that constituted their assembled macro-nations (P. S. T. a. M. C. Englebert, 2002). In this situation of chaos it appeared that only military leaders were capable of bringing peaceful cohabitation among their peoples. Since independence, many times military rulers came to power following periods of insecurity and civil strife in their countries (Liebenow, 1985, p. 129). Therefore their presence at the time was welcomed to put an end to insecurity (J.-F. Bayart, 1983, p. 97). Therefore, Africans soldiers have not always been the “bad guys”, as it would appear to some people. Sometimes, they have been agents of change.

Military rule is frowned upon by the West, properly so in Uganda under Amin or the Central African Republic under Bokassa, but one has to be careful not to put all forms of military government in the same box. Soldiers have been agents of change, as in Egypt under Nasser and Sadat. Nigeria would not be one country today without military control and the reforms introduced by General Gowon. The IMF success in Ghana would probably not have come about without Rawlings' imposed discipline. And would Niger have been able to move towards a more liberal regime without the transitional role of Brigadier Ali Saibou, or Benin has achieved its 'civilian coup d'état' without the steady hand of General Soglo? (D. Austin, 1993, p. 213)

In the above cases, military leaders have brought the change that was desired by their people. Armed forces have also been instruments of stabilization in societies that were unsettled by colonial intervention and the uncertainty of the post-colonial period (I. L. Horowitz, 1973, p. 267). This is mostly true in countries where the military had a control over the means of force and a positive collaboration with the civilian power. Unfortunately in many cases, these military leaders clung to power however it was obvious that it was not in the nature of armed forces to govern states (Diop, 1998). The stabilization they brought was short lived because violence became the means to govern and to bring down undesired regimes.

Very often colonialists used force to subdue Africans. This became even more and more needed as indigenous people in the colonies started to resent their presence (Adas, 1979; J. B. Berman, 1998). At independence, colonialists were replaced by Africans who have never experienced another form of rule than the use of force. In the absence of firmly established states, the first African leaders did not have any other reference of leadership than the one used by their predecessors (Liebenow, 1985, p. 135). Modibo Keita in Mali and Ahmed Sekou Toure in Guinea are among the West African leaders who took the leadership of their countries following years of armed struggle for self-determination. With their military background and relying on the credit given to them by their people who acclaimed them as liberators (P. L. E. Idahosa, 2004), most of the early leaders lacked the institutional infrastructure on which to build their nations. The use of force appeared to be the only option to govern and to change governments. As a consequence, soon after independences, many West African countries experienced multiple military coups (Liebenow, 1985, p. 126). “As early as 1968, there were sixty-four attempted coups, twenty-six of them successful, four in Dahomey alone (now known as Benin), and three each in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. From 1963 to 1969, Dahomey had twelve governments and six constitutions.” (B. Robert Edgerton, 2002, p. 141). The post-military coup regimes were more concerned by their survival than by the consolidation of their states. State building times were thus lost in regime protection. Coups d’état were the way elites expressed their dissatisfaction with the ruling powers and replaced them by others.

Since independence, Africa experienced numerous coups d’état as military rulers seize power with declared intent of correcting the past misdeeds. Sooner than later, they curtailed civil liberties or re-wrote constitutions, an action that does not initiate popular reaction because people were not ready to defend what they did not create. As for governments, these constitutions remain on the shelves gathering dust or come to prominence for their violations than for observance. (Hameso, 2002, p. 7)

This militarization of the political process is further fuelled by external powers that exploit the internal rivalries to promote their interests. This situation creates the culture of force as a way of solving conflicts, since military arsenals are easily available (G. Eric Berman, 2003; Taje, 2006). Like in most of the sub-Saharan Africa; Britain and France

have always been present in the West African political landscape. Following the end of the Second World War, they have since been joined by the United States. This presence is explained by the need for humanitarian interventions given the many armed conflicts in the sub-region. But the defence of strategic interests is considered to be main motives (Whiteman, 2004). This aspect will be further discussed in the section on the Cold War.

In today's West Africa the role of militaries in the political processes have been curtailed. Members of the armed forces can still compete for political leadership in their respective countries. However many constitutions do not allow them to run as soldiers. Instead, they state that members of the armed forces have to first renounce their military status and return to civilian life before they can run for political office. This is was the case in Nigeria with Babangida, Sani Abacha and Olusegun Obasanjo; and in Benin with Matthieu Kerekou. Military leaders are sought to bring back order to the country and not necessarily as initiators of democratic processes. Post-independence African militaries were not necessarily professional soldiers_(Samuel Decalo, 1973). They came from political parties opposed to colonial governments that organized armed wings to forcefully achieve their goals.

In both the First and Second Worlds the military served as a professional source of political strength and developmental orientations rather than as a ruling directorate. The same cannot be said for most Third World nations, where, as a matter of fact, the political functions are oftentimes militarized from the outset of independence(I. L. Horowitz, 1973, p. 259)

For Horowitz, to establish political systems, post-independence military regimes needed three things: first, the “control of the instruments of violence”, next, an “ethos of public service and national identity instead of private interest and class identity”, and finally, a “representation as an articulate and expert group” (I. L. Horowitz, 1973, p. 261). The absence of these elements in West Africa led military regimes to fail just like their civilian counterparts. But the failure of military regimes had the dire consequence of multiplying coups and governments reshufflings. These elements were lacking, first because it was not in the interest of the colonial administration to establish professional indigenous armies. Next, like the rest of the post-independence administrations, there was

no preparation to take over the responsibilities of government. The focus of the resistance to colonial power was on ousting it despite the lack of preparation in running established states (Adas, 1979).

This fact has had the effect of maintaining West African states in a constant instability that is not conducive to development because of insecurity (Karbo, 2008). Regimes are more concerned with their survival than the long-term commitment to building their nation-states. The weakness of the state is not so much a concern to such regimes.

It has also been demonstrated that the involvement of the military in political tasks has contributed in weakening the military institution that lost credibility and prestige in the face of the population. Armed forces that were expected to be the instrument of stability (I. L. Horowitz, 1973) were increasingly seen as no better than the corrupt civilian leaders. Top officers become diverted from their primary mission to the more complex one of running a state (Paris, 2009). As a consequence the security of the state was jeopardized. Military leaders enjoyed so much the comfort of prestige and access to property that the political positions provide and became alienated from junior officers and the troops. As politicians, sometimes they had to make decisions that are contrary to the armed forces' interests. Also, this governance by the top officers did not include all segment of societies (Liebenow, 1985, p. 145). Therefore, the field was laid for the next military coup or government overthrow. West African states find themselves with the daunting task of reinforcing not only their governments' institutions but also their armed forces.

3.2.7 The challenges of democratization and nation-state building

Nation-states building in West Africa have been seriously challenged by the unfavourable socio-political and economic environments left by the colonial administration and maintained in the wake of its departure. Democratization has helped the nation-state building processes elsewhere. But in Africa in general, national diversity and unresolved internal conflicts of interests have among other things undermined its success. This section seeks to demonstrate how lack of attention to the diversity of West African nation-states has led to their weakness.

National diversity

West African societies are characterized by a diversity of ethnic and tribal groups that have for centuries lived according to their own traditions without any reference to a supra entity controlling them (F. S. W. D. A. R. Miles, 1991). Colonization is going to impose a dynamic shift by pooling various groups together to form the colonial states that did not necessarily abide by the previous national configuration. This topic will be expanded in the discussion on the artificial borders of colonial states in West Africa (Söderbaum, 2007). Despite their unease with them, people continue to identify with these nation-states crafted by colonial powers. But the sustained sentiment of deprivation experienced by some groups continues to be a source of instability to the West African nation-states as it is observed in Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2008a). Some segments of the state consider that they are not getting their fair share of the national wealth.

Ethnic identifications are the main vehicle of nationalistic sentiments. Etymologically, ethnic comes from the “Greek word *ethnos*, meaning people or nation”(C. F. Andrain, 1983, p. 54). Smith research indicates that all nations derive their origins from ethnic groups accepting to live together under certain rules and regulations (A. D. Smith, 1986). The problem arises when the ethnic identification becomes a hindrance to the participation in the nation-state building as observed in some segments of West African states.

There have been several attempts to grasp and explain this very fluid category of ethnic identification. Berman’s work is interested in the potency of the combination of “interest and affect” that is involved in ethnic or tribal claim (J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 312). This work borrows Hale’s explanation of ethnicity.

(...) “ethnic identity” (or ethnicity) is that set of personal points of reference, thick and thin, that involve what we call “ethnic” distinctions between people. An “ethnic group” is thus a set of people who have common points of reference to these ethnic dimensions of the social world and who perceive that they indeed have these things in common and that these similarities are captured by a label, the ethnic group’s name. By *ethnic*, most follow Weber (1978) in referring mainly to such points of personal references as perceptions of common descent, history, fate, and culture, which usually indicates some mix of language, physical appearance, and the ritual regulation of life, especially religion.(Hale, 2004, p. 473; M. Weber, 1978)

In the contemporary history of African societies, both colonialists and African leaders who took over from them have always regarded traditional nations with suspicion. Colonial rule in many instances diverted traditional authorities by turning leaders into servants of the colonial system (J. B. Berman, 1998). This aspect was discussed above under the clientelism and patrimonialism. This is one of the causes of the violent armed struggles for liberation when people realized what has happened to them (Adas, 1979, pp. 43-79). However, kinship remains the basic identification of people in a society. In a world of constant changes and insecurity, people find security in their local identification among kins. This behaviour is understandable since states that are supposed to protect people are sometimes their main threats and some other times perceived as such. When the state fails, instinctively people turn to their close communities for security and economic opportunities (I. R. Rotberg, 2004).

Economic decline, draconian reforms, the deterioration of already relatively weak states and the delay of distributable resources exacerbate reliance on patron/client relations and intensify the inter-ethnic political conflicts of political tribalism. In circumstances of economic and political instability, where even the wealthy face daily the insecurities and uncertainties of life, kinship and ethnicity, provide networks of mutual support and trust, (...) (J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 336).

In this case, state's weakness and failure contribute to maintain alive the ethnic identification as people seek the security that their state is not able to provide them.

The British indirect rule that aimed at preserving local autonomy ended up locking up people in their local communities. These closed entities did not have much communications with other communities, and this constituted a big challenge when the time came to build nations comprising all the groups together (Ostergard, 2004). The divide and rule strategy that served colonial interests at that time, ended up alienating communities against each other by creating mutual suspicion (J. B. Berman, 1998, p. 315). Within states, there was a competition among the various institutions that claimed to statehood. This could only weaken the internationally legitimate state. Mamdani calls for an incorporation of these traditional institutions instead of trying to suppress them (Mamdani, 1996, p. 25; Tshiyembe, Septembre 2000). But the way of incorporating them

is left up to each state to decide. There is no universal solution applicable to all individual cases.

Ethnic identifications in themselves are not to blame for West African states' weakness. The problem occurs when this category becomes politicized by unscrupulous leaders as it has been the case since colonial times (J. B. Berman, 1998; L. Donald Horowitz, 1981; Scarritt, 2001; Toft, 2003, pp. 9-10). "One of the major causes of instability in Africa is political ethnicity, which, it must be noted, differs from ethno-nationalism or the love for one's ethnic group." (Fawole, 2002; Udogu, 1994, p. 159; 2004, p. 78). Political ethnicity is by its very nature exclusive and as such it is not conducive to the social cohesion that all states require to create nations.

In deeply divided societies, ethnicity- in contrast to other political cleavages, such as those of class or functional interest- appears permanent and all-encompassing, predetermining who will be included and excluded from power and resources. Democratic elections take on the character of a census and produce a zero-sum game: one ethnic group or coalition or party wins by its sheer demographic weight, and others, in losing, see themselves as becoming excluded not only from the government but also from the larger political community.(L. J. Diamond, 1995, p. 42; L. Donald Horowitz, 1990, pp. 115-116)

Tshiyembe contends that it is inappropriate to speak of nation-states in Africa because African states are "multinational"(Tshiyembe, Septembre 2000). In most of them, many nations were pooled together to form the state. Experience has shown that this forceful pooling has not been fully successful. One of the weaknesses of African states today is the lack of cohesion between different groups. Therefore, they fit in the category of plural societies as defined by Lijphart.

Plural society is a society divided by (...) "segmental cleavages." (...) Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature. (...) political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages. The groups of the population bounded by such cleavages will be referred to as the segments of a plural society (Lijphart, 1977, p. 3)²¹.

²¹ Italics in the original text.

The author goes on to borrow Dahl's concept of "polyarchy"(Dahl, 1971) to define democracy in the context of plural societies. Not fully a democracy but an approximation of it. It follows that the "segmental cleavages" in West African states is still a challenge to the democratization process.

It is worth noting here that the ethnic issue is not particular to West Africa. Andrain shows that "Since the WWII, the Basques in Spain, the Bretons in France, the Scots and Welsh in Great Britain, the Flemish in Belgium, and the French-speaking citizens of Quebec have sought not only greater resources from the central government but also increased political autonomy, even secession."(C. F. Andrain, 1983, p. 54). But the states have always been able to stand up to them and prevent their destabilizing potential. This has not always been the case of West African states because successive governments tend to overlook or attempt to crush instead of resolving the problem. Senegal for example, is one of the most stable states in the sub region. But it still grapples with the Casamance separatist movement' insurrection (Martin Evans, 2003). Generally speaking, the rebellion is under control, but the instability across the border in Guinea-Bissau has spill-over effects in the southern Senegal. Now and then, there are clashes and casualties on both sides to the conflict. Gambia is more or less part of Senegal. Casamance is situated in the south of Gambia and borders with Guinea-Bissau. This area is populated by people sharing the same cultural background. Casamance rebels can engage the Senegalese army and easily slip into Gambia or Guinea-Bissau to escape the military overwhelming firepower(Handem, 2008; Saine, 2008). Similarly, instability in Guinea-Bissau creates a movement of population, weapons and criminal activity into Senegal and Gambia.

Thus the national diversity in West Africa continues to be a challenge to the states building efforts. For the past fifty-years, there has hardly been any interstate conflict in the sub region. The current insecurity is mostly the result of some ethno-national groups taking up arms against their governments that they consider to be threatening their particular interests.

The illusion of a multi-party democracy

The multiplicity of social segments in West African societies would lead to assume that a multi-party democracy is the answer to the lack of social harmony. People have the opportunity of political participation through one political party or the other. This is just an illusion because the reality is much more complex.

Given the criticism by Western powers and often as a requirement to access foreign aid, African states allowed multi-party electoral processes (Calderisi, 2006b, p. 210). Therefore, they easily limit democracy to the establishment of multipartyism (J. Forrest, 2004). The presence of various political parties competing for power in a state is considered to be a sufficient indication that a given state is democratic (Cowen, 2002; Englund, 2002).

Multi-Parties democracy is a relatively new element of democratic government. By 1850, only the United Kingdom and United States had tried it. Europeans came to Africa while their own countries were still struggling to come to term with ethno-nationalist politics (C. F. Andrain, 1983, p. 54). Like in many other things, Africans have been very swift in emulating the western form of governance (Lindberg, 2006). Many indicators seem to tell that most Africans implemented this system before understanding it properly²².

En effet, la faillite de l'Etat postcolonial traduit une mise en cause du « vouloir vivre ensemble », une crise de sens et de dessein. Il existe un désaccord abyssal entre les nations (ou ethnies) et les citoyens, sur les valeurs fondamentales de la collectivité : définition d'une société de liberté, d'un pouvoir réellement consenti et partagé, d'un droit perçu comme naturel. L'articulation entre Etat et société apparaît conflictuelle depuis que les sociétés plurinationales n'ont survécu à l'anéantissement de leur modèle d'Etat que pour être soumises à une caricature de celui de l'Occident. (Tshiyembe, Septembre 2000)²³

²² As a consequence, they are establishing “illiberal democracies” as Zakaria would call them. The strength of Western democracies like the United States of America comes from their constitutional liberalism. Africans like other new failed democracies confuse democracy with multipartyism. See Zakaria, Fareed. *The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad*, W.W. Norton, New York (2003) .

²³ Own translation.

The first African political parties were just assemblies of like-minded elites who sought to replace European colonialists. Given the oppressive situation in their countries then, the first leaders did not encounter any serious difficulty to mobilize people to their causes. But problems started soon after the leadership power was won (Melber, 2002). The lack of comprehensive political and economic platforms very quickly became an issue to these leaders who were stuck and unable to lead their countries any farther (A. A. A. M. T. Mazrui, 1984, p. 85). Political parties were established but they remained just organizations serving the interests of their founders and their kins. Contrary to Western experience where political parties are formed through democratic processes, African first political parties emerged from non-democratic settings (Melber, 2002). Unfortunately they continued to function undemocratically (Fawole, 2002, p. 299; Salih, 2003, p. 2). Democracy is much more than just holding multiparty elections. Multipartyism can even become an impediment to the development of democracy (Duverger, 1959, pp. 387-388; Lijphart, 1977, p. 402).

The presence of multiple political parties controlled by ethnic affiliations were supposed to be a step towards the creation of coalitions to reduce their numbers (Gyimah-Boadi, 2003). Unfortunately this has not been the case. There continue to be many political parties in many West African states. Some of these parties are substantially identified with an ethnic or tribal group. As a consequence, many West African states continue to hold elections marked by the power struggle between various elites that represent their ethnic or tribal group interests without a substantial national vision. These types of electoral consultations compromise the credibility of the national democratic processes. That is why Joseph posits that:

“Therefore, the failure of the post-colonial State indicates the questioning of the “will to live together”, a crisis of meaning and purpose. There exists an abyssal disagreement between the nations (or ethnic groups) and citizens, on fundamental values of the community: the definition of a society of liberty, of a really agreed upon and shared power, of a right perceived to be natural. The articulation between the State and society appears to be conflicting since

Democracy was not supposed to happen in Africa. It had too little of what seemed necessary for constitutional democratic politics. African countries were too poor, too culturally fragmented, and insufficiently capitalist; they were not fully penetrated by western Christianity and lacked the requisite civic culture. Middle classes were usually weak and more bureaucratic than entrepreneurial, and they were often co-opted into authoritarian political structures.(Joseph, 1999, pp. 237-238)

The elements that allowed democracy to take hold in other nations were lacking in many African countries until the third wave of democratization that started with the end of the Cold War in 1989 (Huntington, 1991).

Therefore, West African states are weak because their independence has never been translated into the creation of modern nations-states. The same armed insurrections against the colonial powers soon turned against the newly established governments in post-colonial states. These revolts were mostly led by elites who did not have elaborate plan for building their nations-states. As a consequence, patrimonialism became a form of government in many West African states as regimes sought primarily to maintain themselves in power. Military coups were therefore used to topple and replace regimes in these states. As regimes established by the militaries were not any better than those they toppled, the sub region went through decades of successive military coups up to the nineties. The end of the Cold War signalled a change in the interests of western powers that sustained a number of regimes in West Africa. Therefore, democracy begun to be recognized as the best form of government as it allows a wide participation of all the segment of the population to the governance of the state. Democracy is still to be firmly established because of the challenge of the multi-ethnic characteristic of West African states.

These internal challenges are not sufficient to explain the weakness of West African states. External factors that led to the weakness and hence to insecurity in the sub region have to be considered as well. States in the West African sub region are also weak for reasons beyond their control. They inherited some situations that continue to affect

multinational societies survived the annihilation of their model of State only to be subjugated to the caricature of the one from the West.”

their development today. The external causes of West African states' weakness are the object of the following part of this chapter.

3.3 Exogenous Causes of West African States Weakness

West African like all African states' weakness and insecurity has also to do with the external interventions on the continent. The disruption brought to West African societies by Arabs and Western slave's trades has considerably affected them to this date. The Scramble for Africa divided the continent among western powers and the independences ushered in still born states that depend on foreign interventions for their sustenance. There are many interpretations of the ways external forces contributed to the weakening of Africa. Some accuse imperialism and its exploitative orientation as the root cause of African problems (Zack-Williams, 2002). Others narrow the problem down to failed capitalist projects (Paul. Collier, 2007). Proponents of this argument contend that imperial powers intended to expand their business by developing the African continent but they failed for various reasons (Phillips, 1989). Others still maintain that Africa has been cheated from the beginning of its dealing with Western powers. Aids and development projects that have been taking place since independences have all played against African interests (Ayittey, 1992; Bolton, 2008). Therefore, West Africa is still poor, its states are weak and mostly unable to respond to the security challenges they are facing.

This section will analyze some of these situations ranging from colonization, the Cold War and the international system that continue to cause weakness in West African states. The scope of this work does not allow a thorough study of all the external causes of state weakness in the sub region. Those selected here are indicative of the whole problem under consideration. A full analysis of all the external causes of West African states' weakness would require going back as far as the 8th century C.E when Arabs moved in from the East and the slave trade that started in the 14th century (Davidson, 1998). That is when the sub region started losing its human and material resources as a

result of foreign interventions. This period will not be covered here. This section will focus on the partition and colonization of West Africa to serve the interests of the colonizing powers. The Cold war between the East and the West that started after WWII will also be considered as a key source of the current weakness of states in West Africa. Drug trade originating from Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations, 2008a) as well as the easy provisions of Small Weapons and Light Ammunitions are also affecting the security of West African states (K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009). But these issues will be referred to the thesis but there will not be a systematic development for the sake of narrowing the scope of the work.

3.3.1 Artificial boundaries between states

One of the causes of Africans' states failure has to do with the artificial boundaries drawn by colonialists in the scramble for foreign territories in exotic lands (Chamberlain, 2010; Crowder, 1968). The main objective was to avoid conflicts between the various European powers that had colonial territories in Africa and not of minding the social cohesion and harmony of African states being carved by the process (Asiwaju, 1985; Brownlie, 1979).

In this research, the border is understood as the identifiable delimitation between two different administrative entities. In pre-colonial Africa, borders were mostly made of physical elements like rivers, mountains, valleys or forests. They were mostly unstable because of wars and alliances that modified them as various tribal groups sought to expand their territory to facilitate access to grazing lands or water sources (Nugent, 1996).

Anene indicates that "Three types of frontier can be identified in Africa during the nineteenth century" (...) First, "the frontier of contact" – living and operating side by side. For example: Yoruba states and Dahomey. (...) Second, "the frontier of separation"- buffer zone over which none had authority. (...) Third, absence of any physical frontier because of the "considerable overlapping of diverse groups" as found in lands of extensive nomadic movements (Masai and Tuareg)"(Anene, 1970, pp. 5-6)

Therefore, prior to colonization, there existed frontiers or boundaries that allowed differentiating different social entities. These are referred to in this work as micro-nations

given their administrative autonomy. The boundaries created by colonial powers divided communities by spreading them over two or more different administrative entities (Asiwaju, 1985, p. 6; Brownlie, 1979). It is recognized that in the process of drawing the frontiers of most African states, it was difficult if not impossible to respect precisely the micro-national boundaries that existed then because of their fluidity.

(...) there is a general recognition of two things: that it would have been hopelessly impossible for colonialism to have followed ethnic boundary lines in carving out states, and that – even had this been possible- the milk has now been spilled and it is impossible to gather it up again. It would mean the total reorganization if not disorganization of Africa. The consequences would be more destructive than constructive. This is why the Organization of African Unity (OAU), at its founding in 1963, accepted state boundaries in Africa as drawn by the colonial powers.(Ostergard, 2004, pp. 34-35)

Colonial powers were rushing for wealth that was their main concern and did care less whether the manpower came from the same kingship or not. Therefore, Africans were bundled together in states that were externally designed and implemented. They were not consulted for this. P. Ekeh, mentions that the governance system established by colonialists in Africa was not necessarily carbon copy of the system in their home countries. It was rather a locally constructed system to answer to their need of colonization. “The parts of the model of the European state imported into Africa were mainly coercive aspects needed in the course of its conquest and colonization. Thus the military, police force, and bureaucracy were prominent”(P. Peter Ekeh, October 1990, p. 683). This has the potential for conflict and lack of cooperation for nation building. Following the independences, indigenous leaders emulated the same iron-fist style of governance and obtained the same results. Some local groups that constitute the nation-states consider the state as a threat and refuse to participate in its running.

However Anene’s work on Nigerian boundaries argues that the concept of “artificial borders” when it relates to Africa, has been unduly blown out of proportions because any boundary, whether physical or cultural is by nature artificial (Anene, 1970, p. 3). In many African societies prior to colonization, inter-tribal boundaries were modelled and remodelled according to circumstances. These could be wars, alliances or simply the settlement of internal divisions in royal families. For example, the Bashi

people in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are spread in four different kingdoms. Usually it is one king per tribal group in most African societies. Anene goes on to say that “It is of course so much easier to condemn the boundaries than to devise a basis for remedying their inadequacies”(Anene, 1970, p. 4) Anene supports the above argument by indicating that diplomats involved in the negotiations did request reports of the explorations and contacts were made with local populations.

Full and reliable data on local conditions were not always available to the boundary negotiators. How they interpreted what they had, and the consequences, are better judged in our own day than in their own. The diplomats in London, Paris and Berlin sought to have before them (a) treaties with native states, (b) the accounts of European travelers, and (c) the personal reports of local European agents or (or colonial parlance) the men on the spot. These sources of information produced their own difficulties (Anene, 1970, p. 14)

The question remains of how the treaties were obtained, and of the kind of information and purpose of recordings made by travelers. The traditional leaders in those days had not received any Western education. This limited their comprehension of legal documents that were presented to them and requiring their signature.

There existed cases where there was a total absence of any kind of demarcation between tribal groups. For example, the border between Cameroun and Nigeria where tribal divisions were considered in order to “ease problems of administration”. The conclusion to Anene’s study contends that Europeans never divided coherent tribal groups in this border area. By the 1970s it was still recognized to host a ‘confusing multitude of tribes’²⁴ according to census reports (Anene, 1970, p. 290). This is also true of many other border areas, but not all because there existed some empires that were politically and economically viable (Ghana, Mali, Kanem-Bornu, Kongo, etc.). This

²⁴ On the 10th October 2002, the International Court of Justice in Hague delivered a judgment in favour of Cameroon on this long disputed issue. The Greentree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula was concluded only on 13 August 2013 as witnessed by the UN-Security Council Statement; see United Nations, *Security Council Press Statement on Bakassi Peninsula Developments*. New York, United Nations, 2013.

viability did not prevent them from being carved out according to wills of colonial powers. Generally speaking people were not consulted in the drawing of borders. Even if they ever were, Africa would today be made of hundreds if not millions of micro-states. Such a multitude of states would have constituted a more complicated issue to the international system as it was taking shape then. Some consider that this would have been a better option since states would have been formed following the European pattern of wars fighting and alliances (Boggs, 1940; Herbst, 2000). But this was not in the interest of Europeans at that time as they primarily sought to secure access to resources of administratively manageable territories (Bouquet, 2003; Brownlie, 1979).

Englebert recognizes the colonial origin of modern African borders. But his study raises the question of whether this has been a liability to African states and can therefore be held responsible for the continent's misfortune and therefore its weakness. (P. S. T. a. M. C. Englebert, 2002, pp. 1093-1094). The study notes that except for a few, most border disputes have been based more on "anecdotes" than on systematic argumentations. Also, those who attribute Africa's ills to the artificial nature of its borders do not take into consideration that there are different levels of "territorial arbitrariness". In some places, the local factor was strictly respected. Further, authors note that since the 1990s, international conflicts in West Africa have been on the decline which would be an indication that the artificiality of boundaries is not an issue (Jean -Francois Bayart, 1996; Herbst, 1997).

In evaluating the low occurrence of border disputes in Africa one has also to take into consideration the political activism of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. These organizations defend borders inherited from colonisation (OAU, 1964) as a way to control potential conflicts on the continent. Most African states are weak, failing or failed, therefore the priorities are on how to manage the state in its actual configuration than on how to acquire new territories. Englebert and alii note that the fear of "a chain reaction" contribute to silence possible border disputes: "(...) there is a consensus that weak African governments are unlikely to challenge each other on irredentist issues for fear of triggering a chain reaction of territorial realignments from which none of them can expect to escape unscathed" (P. S. T. a. M. C. Englebert, 2002, p. 1099; Herbst, 1989; H.

R. a. C. G. R. Jackson, 1982). The states' weakness due to insecurity has shifted the focus of priorities.

When due attention is not given to the study of African borders, academics and politicians tend to misinterpret conflicts between states sharing borders. They jump to the conclusion that they are consequences of the artificiality of the borders that were drawn between them (Brownlie, 1979). An example of such use is the work of Bouquet in his study of the Ivorian crisis (Bouquet, 2003). The Chad – Libya conflict over the Aouzou strip in 1973 (Lanne, 1982) is an indication of how border disputes erupt when natural resources are found in an area that happens to be close to the commonly recognized boundary (P. S. T. a. M. C. Englebert, 2002, p. 1098).

Most of the causes are well known: competition for mineral resources, grazing land or access to water sources; a policy of territorial expansion based upon current power and historical arguments; irredentist policies based upon ethnic affinities; and the use of boundary problems as a pretext or vehicle for forms of pressure designed to further policies having no connection with territorial claims as such. (Brownlie, 1979, p. 14)

Therefore labelling any African conflicts as ethnic detract the attention from the real source of the strife that has to do with the access to resources. An ethnic issue is sometimes considered as having to do essentially with the local populations sharing the same cultural background. Therefore it is considered as not warranting an external intervention until the conflict starts spreading its destabilizing effects to neighbouring states. Today, in West African states experimenting conflicts, many times local factions and even criminal organizations are used as proxies of global forces and multinationals battling for the control of the resources (Peel, 2006; Wong, 2003). This aspect will be further discussed under the Cold War political environment.

It is noted that the explanation of African boundaries as a source of states' weakness and failure is asserted more by non - African scholars than by Africans. The latter consider that the cost of changing current borders far outweighs the benefit. Englebert calls for a consideration of the costs involved in keeping the present borders against the one of redrawing them (P. S. T. a. M. C. Englebert, 2002, p. 1113). On the other hand, Herbst calls for the dismantling of boundaries to allow African states to be re-

established on new grounds of alliances and shared interests as it was the case in Europe (Herbst, 2000). Despite all the suggestions, in the end West Africans will be sole arbitrators of their destiny in regards to borders inherited from colonisation. It is difficult if not impossible to revive the pre-colonial African nations. The proof of that difficulty is illustrated by the fact that despite repeated civil strife after independences, the states involved and their people still hold on to these borders set up by colonizing powers in the scramble for Africa (Pakenham, 1991). Despite the challenges involved, the artificial boundaries created by colonial powers continue to be a liability that needs to be addressed. But for the moment, this is not a priority for West African states.

3.3.2 Triple heritage of the state

Another problem inherited from the influence of colonial powers is the triple heritage of the state. The European presence in Africa was maintained by the colonial administration, traders and Christian missionaries. These encountered the kingdoms or tribal administration. Traders are not considered in this section because they never administered territories contrary to the other agents. The colonial administration was closely linked to the business community to facilitate its operations. Islamic and Christian missionaries followed them but went beyond in the hinterland to spread their message and institutions (Bovill, 1933; Hunwick, 1992). Therefore in the absence of the colonial administration in remote places, they administered territories along local authorities. As a result, many African states developed with three different styles of administration: the traditional, the religious and the colonial (A. A. A. Mazrui, 1984; A. A. A. M. T. Mazrui, 1984). Given the weakness of states, these parallel administrations continue to function. In West Africa, states' institutions are still not yet spread across all territories. In remote areas, some socio-administrative services are provided for by traditional and religious administrations.

All the institutions that came in with the colonisation had their own scramble to establish the administrative system (W. F. S. Miles, 2007). The colonial administration and religious groups each organized the places where they lived and the people they lived with, in their own way. Literally, each colonial post or out-post was a mini-state within

the state. The traditional leadership where it existed did not substantially matter because each foreign power in its own way strived to annihilate it (Sindima, 1994). Foreign religious groups considered anything traditional to be pagan and therefore preached to their folks to alienate them from their cultural institutions. The colonial administration, first sought to replace local leadership by imposing its own system. Given the resistance encountered, it then resorted to corrupt chiefs by turning them into servant of the colony.

One of the most successful ideologies used to explain the necessity of colonial rule was the heavy emphasis placed on what was described as a backward ahistorical past. Africans, according to this view, should be ashamed of their past; the only important thing is in the present. Missionaries openly told Africans that ancestor-worship was bad and they should cut themselves loose from their 'evil' past and embrace the present in the new symbolisms of Christianity and Western culture. Indeed, Africans were virtually told that the colonizers and missionaries came to save them, sometimes in spite of themselves, from their past. (P. Peter Ekeh, 1975, p. 97)

Africans listened to the exhortations but never fully gave up on their cultures and traditions as indicated by the debates still taking place on the role of traditional leadership in modern democracies (Logan, 2009). Traditional authorities are too close to the people to be so easily suppressed. Therefore, West African modern states stemmed from a triple heritage: the colonial, religious (Christianity and Islam) and traditional leadership. As countries emerged from colonial rule, this triple heritage created a confusion that is still unresolved today. By triple heritage, A. Mazrui refers to the “Indigenous rule, Islamic statehood and law, and the European parliamentary and Westphalian state system(...)”(Ostergard, 2004, p. xii). Shamvu’s work delved on the traditional rules, Christian churches and modern states (Shamvu, 2000). African traditional societies unlike modern Europeans do not separate between state and religion. The kingship comprises the three levels of power: administrative, religious and judiciary. During the colonization, Africans were faced with three different authorities. Key events in a person’s life that are birth, marriage and death had to be celebrated separately at the three levels of authority (Shamvu, 2000). This created a confusion with which modern African states are still

challenged as indicated by Shamvu (Shamvu, 1994)²⁵. People have to be registered with and pay their taxes at the same time to the traditional, religious and states' authorities. Today, abiding to religious or traditional institutions' requirements may be left to individual's choice. This was not the case in the colonial and immediate post-colonial times when enforcement measures were called upon. Therefore, fragile societies are further weakened by cultural and administrative systems that were imposed on them by foreign powers.

One of the most complex and intractable problems in our world is the tension that exists between the model of ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous societies that satisfy the ideal of the nation-state and the multiethnic, multilingual societies that face the difficult task of nation building or state building in the absence of the integration and identification we normally associate with the idea of the nation-state. Even in Europe, before the massive and forced transfers (if not destruction) of populations, most states did not satisfy that ideal; outside of Europe, even fewer do. Virtually no African or Asian countries and only a few Latin American countries (in this book, only Chile) seem to satisfy the model. (L. Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, 1995, p. 4)

Like many other unfortunate legacies of colonialism, the institutional confusion created then still contributes to weaken modern states. Political skills as one of the power resources that is needed to strengthen West African states. Bringing all national forces to bear for state building is an indication of skilled politicians.

²⁵ In "La Veste et le Boubou", the interest was on dressing codes in Africa. Choosing to wear a European style jacket or an African boubou on the part of a public figure is not random. When Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir (who was indicted for crimes in Darfour) showed up at the Cairo visit in 2009 wearing a Western jacket instead of the Sudanese traditional garment, medias did pick on it as indicating his willingness to soften his lines and listen to what Westerners have to say. MacFarquhar, N. a. M. S. (2009). "Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order" *New York Times*. This links to the study as an illustration of how Africans are still straddling the two cultures: Western and African.

See also Emmanuel Terray, 'Le Climatiseur et La Veranda' quoted in O'Brien, 'The show of state in a neo-colonial twilight' in Manor, J. *Rethinking Third World politics*. London Longman., pp. 151-152. An indication of the same dialectical mode of functioning in African modern states. "Le Climatiseur" is air-conditioning system in French, and "Veranda" is the covered front yard in tropical Africa, where people seek shelter from the burning sunshine. It is therefore the place where guests are received. Terray sought to show that African states are at the same modern and technocratic, but also patrimonial and clientelistic.

3.3.3 The failure of Foreign Aid

The impact of foreign aid in West Africa is huge topic on its own that is beyond the objectives of this thesis. As part of the analysis of the causes of West African states weakness, a small section of the aid effectiveness will be touched on to illustrate the role of exogenous agents in West Africa.

As they attained their independence, West African states had massive needs in terms of socio-political and economic development (Brautigam, 2009). None of these states had the capabilities to address these issues. Therefore, they appealed for help from bilateral and multilateral sources. Ever since, they have been recipients of foreign aid without ever fully achieving their development as initially intended (Easterly, 2006). This section deals with this failure of the foreign aid to pull West African states out of poverty and insecurity.

It is important to be clear about what is meant by the term foreign aid. Foreign aid comes in three forms as illustrated by Ayittey: "(...) economic development assistance, military aid, and humanitarian relief assistance for humanitarian crisis situations" (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005, p. 157). This work is focused on economic development and military aids that were supposed to kick start African economies and military capabilities.

Given the weakness of states that were born out of the decolonisation process, foreign aids have been at the same time the lifeline that has maintained them alive and a trap that has prevented them from developing. This is because of the dependency and the huge debt they have generated (S. K. B. Asante, 1985, p. 250). After half a century, most African states have economically stagnated if not gone backward compared to where they were at independence (J. F. Ade Ajayi, 1982, p. 7). There is not a quick fix solution to this paradox of foreign aid (Richards, 2006).

Bolton²⁶ and Edwards both worked for many years in the foreign aid business before deciding to step back and reflect on their experiences. Bolton is interesting here because he has the experience of foreign aid both in the fields and at policy levels in offices and diplomacy. He had enough of hearing donor countries telling Africans to

assume their responsibilities for development however they did not have any control on the “rules of the games”.

(...) it's up to African countries to get their show on the road, it's the duty of America, Europe, and other rich regions to ensure there's a road to travel down- because it's they who set the rules both for the aid Africa receives and the system of international trade it must abide by.”(Bolton, 2008, p. 3)

After ten years in the business, Bolton was faced with the choice of either to continue condoning the system's “inefficiency and hypocrisy” or stop to first answer to some questions he was then asking himself (Bolton, 2008, p. 11). He contends that aid agencies and governments are not truthfully accounting to the use of taxpayers' money because their jobs both would be at stake. Aid agencies need to show how effective aid is so that money may continue to flow in. Governments on their part fear the bad press that the revelation of aid poor performance would generate. It is hard to disagree with an insider like Bolton because aid accounting remains very secretive.

Many of our governments in the West, meanwhile, are generally quite pleased to avoid telling the public too much about how their aid is spent. This is partly because aid is a risk-taking business and it's impossible to guarantee all your money will be spent cleanly and perfectly if it's going to have an effect; there's a fear of bad headlines, especially here in America. But it's also because many governments know some of the ways they spend money are highly ineffective and they don't want to draw attention to it.(Bolton, 2008, p. 78)

As a consequence, the system is maintained unchanged just as the recipients' situation is not changing either. Even worse, the recipients' situation is deteriorating. Therefore, foreign aid has failed both donors and recipients.

For the last three decades many analysts have come to the conclusion that foreign aid is not fulfilling its intended objectives (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005; Richards, 2006). But both donors and recipient countries do not seem to learn their lessons. Poor countries continue to beg and money continues to pour in and out to hidden destinations. “What comes in as foreign aid and investment ultimately leaks away. The total foreign aid and investment

²⁶ Giles Bolton (1973) is a British Aid worker and diplomat who have significant experience of

into Africa from all sources amounts to \$18 billion annually. But capital flight out of Africa exceeds \$20 billion annually”(G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005, p. 49). There is a corruption and kickback system that contributes significantly to this amount (R. a. M. T. Austin, 2003, p. 122; Delavallade, 2007).

Ayittey goes on to explain why foreign aid has failed. “Perhaps what contributed most to the failure of Western aid to Africa was a donor culture of doublespeak and inconsistencies in policy actions that achieved a confusing and overlapping array of objectives (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005, p. 157). Cooperation for development was going on at the same time as the support to regimes whose poor management of the funds was proven. It happened also that two or more organizations funded the same project while other equally important projects were left unfunded. The challenge of coordination between various donor agencies will be discussed below.

There is a set of conflicting agendas in regard to foreign aid; as a consequence it has been failing ever since. Ayittey analyzes five of these agendas: aid to support cold war allies, the lack of transparency in the operations, conditionalities whereby donors’ agencies are basically the primary beneficiaries, lack of cautions in funding a number of unsustainable projects and finally, many times donors got duped by “shrewd and corrupt” African leaders (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005, pp. 157-159; Gordon, 1993, pp. 97-98).

Bolton supports the claim that aid money is not producing the expected results because of conditionalities to which recipient countries just sign to get the cash (Bolton, 2008, p. 134; Hyden, 2000, p. 24). It is handed despite the fact that both parties know that these poor partners are unable to fulfill those conditions for various reasons both legitimate and illegitimate. Some of the conditions to which foreign aid is often tied are commercial contracts with donors’ companies and the linking of aid policies to “(...) debt reduction, trade and diplomacy”(Edwards, 1999, p. 130).

The other obstacle to aid efficiency according to Bolton is the challenge of coordination between various aid agencies “A country like Uzima might expect to host representations from UNDP, UNAIDS, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA, FAO, WFP, WHO, UNFPA,

UNIDO, and may be UNESCO, UNECA, UNIFEM, ILO, OHCHR and others (...). Their staff spend almost as much time as those of national aid donors in trying to coordinate.”(Bolton, 2008, p. 129)²⁷

The other barrier to the success of foreign aid is the hypocrisy of liberalization and free market. The International Financial Institutions that are the main proponents of liberal economy overestimate the virtues of markets to create wealth even where the minimal institutional infrastructures are absent.

But it was a mistake to assume that just because the public sector was failing, the market would do better. In fact, as many Africans, including South African finance minister Trevor Manuel, have pointed out, if public institutions in Africa are too shaky and corruption is too great to make state efforts a success, then there is a strong likelihood that the private sector will fail also. The ability to regulate services will be weak, and privatization in particular often leads to more opportunities for graft -through shady sell-offs and deliberate underperformance – than maintaining state ownership. (Bolton, 2008, p. 136)

Edwards attributes this kind of deliberate blindness to the economic policies that were being developed in the United States in the forties (Bernstein, 1983; Edwards, 1999, p. 35). Since the end of WWII, development has occupied a central place in the foreign policy of global powers toward the Third World, but positive results are still very limited compared to resources invested.

Another contradiction raised by critics of foreign aid is the still unfulfilled promises of the 0.7% of the GDP of rich countries to be donated to poor ones to help them out of poverty. Since the eighties when it was first realized that foreign aid was not working, from one meeting to the next, rich countries renew their pledges but to no avail. Bolton laments that:

It’s an extraordinary three and a half decades of unmet promises (with the honourable exceptions of to the regrettably small countries of Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). I’m not aware of any other area of modern political life where democratic Western governments have so consistently lied – both to the poorest countries of the world and their own electorates.(Bolton, 2008, p. 147)

²⁷ Capitals in the original. “Uzima” in Kiswahili (the Central and East African lingua franca) means ‘Life’. The author seems to have adopted this word to avoid naming any particular country.

Based on his experience, Bolton has concluded that aid does not bring development but can create favourable conditions for it. “Aid, no matter how good, can do no more than help create the conditions for development. It can’t deliver it. Only trade – and the economic growth it brings – can do that.” (Bolton, 2008, p. 167). But for Africans in general, even the highly chanted free trade is closed to them because of unfair rules (Oxfam International, 2002).

The importance of the exclusion of agriculture and textiles from significant liberalization cannot be overestimated. When African and other poor countries began to join the GATT negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s, in the aftermath of postcolonial independence, they had to sign up to the rules as already agreed upon in previous rounds. In other words, they would be allowed to sell industrialized products such as cars into rich Western markets – of which, of course, they had none – yet gained only very limited ability to sell agricultural and textile products, which was where they were by far the most competitive. It becomes much easier to understand Africa’s post-independence economic struggles when you consider that newborn countries suffering corruption and instability also found few markets to sell their produce into – a problem that, as we will see, still persists today. (Bolton, 2008, pp. 171-172)

Markets in rich countries are closed to African agricultural products but these countries can pour as much as possible of their subsidized products in African markets. This has led to the weakness of agricultural sector mostly in states that abide to the International Financial Institutions that forbid them to subsidize their farmers. This is an issue over which negotiations have been going on for years. In these rounds of negotiations, West African states are too weak to compete with more powerful states.

Besides the rich countries’ responsibility in African states’ economic weakness and social instability, Bolton does recognize that in Africa, “(...) weak rule of law, corruption, poor infrastructure, and more” are not conducive to trade (Bolton, 2008, p. 174). Moyo and Ayittey’s work support Bolton’s conclusions (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005; Moyo, 2009). These shortcomings were also raised by Edwards in illustrating that Post-War European states had the needed infrastructures to benefit from the Marshall Plan than Africa would (Edwards, 1999, pp. 34-35). Therefore, foreign aid has failed to strengthen West African states, but much could have and can still be achieved where the basics exist. In chapter five, it will be argued that Security Sector Reform tackles the

problems of the absence of the rule of law, corruption, and mismanagement of resources and so on. This aspect is also emphasized by Collier in his conclusion (Paul. Collier, 2007). These are among the obstacles that prevented foreign aid from fully achieving its objectives in West Africa. Therefore, the way foreign aid has been managed so far, instead of strengthening West African states, has maintained them weak and dependent (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005). This thesis argues that aid is still needed, but it has to be invested where it can achieve results. One of these areas is the security sector.

3.3.4 The Debt Burden

The colonial states in West Africa like any other state did contract debts from bilateral and multilateral lenders to carry out their functions (Frankel, 1938). Following their independences West African states were handed the financial burden of the debt contracted on their behalf by departing colonial regimes. This added to the other issues they were already faced with that were weakening them. Debt becomes a burden to a dysfunctional state because it is unable to raise sufficient resources for its normal functioning and to repay it (Ndikumana, 2011). Debt is one of the causes of West African states weakness and failure because the service of this debt alone siphons huge amounts from public revenue. The figures below show the 2008 external debt stocks of West African states and their comparison to the GDP. The figures are drawn from the 2008 World Bank Report and are here presented in one chart (The World Bank, 2009).

COUNTRY	Debt stocks US \$²⁸	% of GDP
Benin	923,785,000	17,8
Burkina Faso	1,689,265,000	19,8
Cape Verde	626,141,000	50,9
Cote d'Ivoire	12,631,820,000	80,2
Gambia	372,966,000	142
Ghana	5,690,002,000	25,1
Guinea	3,174,716,000	102,4
Guinea-Bissau	970,399,000	231,3
Liberia	3,160,827,000	435,5
Mali	2,055,824,000	24,5

²⁸ <http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=Debt>

COUNTRY	Debt stocks	% of GDP
	US	
Niger	987,829,000	22,4
Nigeria	11,599,914,000	5,2
Senegal	2,857,324,000	21,4
Sierra Leone	633,941,000	100,5
Togo	1,638,262,000	81,4

Table 2. West African states foreign debt

Guisse considers the debt passed on to nascent African states following the independences to be a violation of Human Rights. He posits that newly independent States saw themselves imposed an amount of US\$ 59 billion in external public debt at an interest rate unilaterally set at 14 per cent (Guisse, 2004). African states' foreign debt was also studied by Ayittey:

Total African foreign debt rose 24-fold since 1970 to a staggering \$350 billion in 2002, which was equal to its yearly GNP, making the region the most heavily indebted in the world. (Latin America's debt amounted to approximately 60 percent of its GNP.). Currently debt service obligations absorb about 40 percent of export revenue, leaving scant foreign exchange for the importation of capital goods, essential spare parts, and medical supplies. Only about half of the outstanding debts are actually being paid, while on the other half arrears are continually being rescheduled.(G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005, pp. 289-290)

Any economist would support the claim that the risk of non-repayment increases the interest rate on a loan. This is the case of most post-independent West African states. The colonial states could use the backing of metropolitan states as guarantee. This opportunity is generally non-existent to post-independence states.

All states in the world have public debts, but the case of those of the West African sub region is worsened by the absence of an economic infrastructure to sustain a steady repayment mechanism unlike rich countries. For the last decade, debt negotiations have been part of the agenda of various multilateral organizations' meeting. Various formula are considered: debt relief (Reinhalter, 2006), debt cancellation and so on. Most West African states are crippled in one way or another by these external debts. While they are paying high interest rates to service their debts, there is very little left for other vital needs. As a consequence states continue to be poor and insecurity to their people and goods is endemic (Drew, 2012; Ekpo, 2002). A good number of them, like Senegal and Ghana, are benefiting from various initiatives being promoted for debt relief. The DFID report indicates that: "Debt relief has an impact. Ghana, which saved \$60.2 million (£31.1 million) on debt service in 2006, used this to spend more on health, energy, water, and improvements to major highways and rural roads." (DFID, 2009, p. 37). Debt relief decisions are based on how well a particular states is implementing the reforms of its security sector (Daniel Green, 1998). Some economists do not think that a blank unconditional debt relief is the answer to the problem (Calderisi, 2006b; Paul. Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009). This would amount to setting the ground for the same conditions that brought about the crisis.

Underlying the evolving issue of African debt has been the changing political relations between debtors and creditors. African governments tend to believe that, freed from the burden of debt; they would be able to achieve restored economic growth and development. Until recently, creditors in the IFIs believed that debt relief by itself would have limited effect in Africa. Similarly, the IFIs tended to be sceptical about the commitment of many African governments to fundamentally change the policies that created the debt crisis in the first place. (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005, p. 300; Gordon, 1993, p. 92).

Given the absence of the basic sound management structures, a blank debt relief would amount to putting the needed resources in the wrong hands. Conditions have to be

attached to debt relief programs. Three conditions are put forward by Ayittey. First, there must be “full public accounting of external loans”; next, states must repatriate the looted funds kept abroad; debt relief should “be restricted to only the 16 African countries (out of 54) that are democratic: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde Islands, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa and Zambia”(G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005, p. 301). Six out the sixteen indicated countries are in West Africa: Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Had the work been published in 2011, Guinea and Niger would have been listed as well.

These weak states find themselves battling on two fronts. On the domestic front, they have to satisfy the demands of their polities in terms of the mostly needed social services and security. On the international front, they have to negotiate the repayment of their huge foreign debts and to obtain new loans. Most of the times, one of the conditions to obtain new loans is that the money not be used for social services. The way out of this dilemma is very difficult to negotiate. Ruling regimes have to make difficult choices. For example, former president J.Rawlings, ruled Ghana from 1981 to 2001. He is credited of having steered his country towards liberalism that led to the current democratic and economic stability. He achieved this at a price of deep social discontent. When he left power in 2001, his successor John Atta Mills was defeated in the presidential elections by John Kufuor (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). Atta Mills won the 2010 elections with a very thin margin. That is why states need internally generated resources in order to respond to their needs. Dependence on external aid does not always provide the needed solutions to problems.

3.3.5 The collapse of states legitimacy

This section will assess the argument that the weakness of post-independence West African states and mostly their incapacity to respond to the basic needs of their populations has led to the collapse of their legitimacy. Instead of modern and prosperous states, people are helplessly witnessing the progressive weakness and risk of failure of their states as indicated above. Some analysts have shown that socially, economically and

politically, Africans had to start from scratch and were expected to build modern and prosperous democracies (Ayittey, 1992; Hameso, 2002; Meredith, 2005b). People's expectations were too high for their leaders to meet in those circumstances. Very quickly the latter proved their incapacity to lead their people to a better future as promised in the campaigns for self-determination.

The most fundamental aspect of post-independence Africa has been the elusiveness of development, however characterized -Europeanization, Westernization, modernization, progress, or simply development. That is to say, in many ways the quality of life of the average farmer and his family in the village, or worker in the urban areas, has not improved significantly; in some respects, and in some areas, it is even worse than on the eve of independence. In particular, many African countries now find it difficult to provide for their populations sufficient food and energy resources for the basic necessities of life.(J. F. Ade Ajayi, 1982, p. 7)

In general, many Africans are bitterly disappointed with independence and post-independence plans (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991). Ake have pointed out that people are now requesting a second independence, this time from their indigenous leaders. "There is an increased awareness among Africans that the monopoly of power enjoyed by this failed leadership has to be broken in order that power can be transferred to the people who have little to lose and much to gain."(Ake, 1993, p. 240) This awareness is responsible for the social unrests experienced in many West African states. People can no longer put up with any kind of explanation provided to them. Some leaders are still not prepared to account for their governance and risk losing the grip on power. Therefore, the crackdown on demonstrations that take place here and there and this maintains states in instability.

As discussed above, African societies inherited three types of "states": the traditional, the religious and the modern Westphalian state. The three overlap within one geographical space that was artificially created to a certain degree. The "Westphalian" states failed to fulfill its independence promises. Early on people started showing signs of withdrawal of confidence from the modern state and trusted more the traditional and religious leaders for their welfare. In his 1975 article, Ekeh studied what he called the "two public realms". The "primordial public" is shaped by "primordial groupings" and is moral. This level of identification dictates people's behaviour. It corresponds to the

ethnic identification as discussed earlier in this work. The second public is called the “civic public” which is shaped by the colonial administration and it is amoral (P. Peter Ekeh, 1975, p. 92). The failure of the post-colonial administration to deliver on its promises, made it to be considered like its predecessor. The civic public is guided by the jungle law of “eat or be eaten”; it is the realm of what has to be looted by the fastest, strongest and shrewdest of the population. Therefore the post-colonial leaders have the power bestowed on them by departing colonial administration, but they lack the authority to lead their people (P. Peter Ekeh, 1975, p. 93). The author indicates that in this matter, African leaders are just getting on their turn what they served to colonial leaders. In their struggle for independence, they taught people to sabotage colonial administrative institutions. Therefore their people are treating them likewise.

The struggle entailed a necessary but destructive strategy: sabotage of the administrative efforts of the colonizers. A great deal of the anti-colonial activities by the African bourgeoisie consisted of encouragement to their followers to be late to work, to go on strikes for a variety of reasons, etc. The African who evaded his tax was a hero; the African labourer who beat up his white employer was given extensive coverage in newspapers. In general, the African bourgeois class, in and out of politics, encouraged the common man to shirk his duties to the government or else to define them as burdens; in the same breath he was encouraged to demand his rights. Such strategy, one must repeat, was a necessary sabotage against alien personnel whom the African bourgeois class wanted to replace. The irony of it all, however, is that the ordinary African took the principles involved in such activities quite seriously (P. Peter Ekeh, 1975, p. 102).

The lack of collaboration with the colonial administration is being served to the post-colonial governments considered to be equally illegitimate. Being so rebuked by their people, many African leaders turned inward and looked for alternative solutions to ascertain their failing or non-existent legitimacy. Some of the strategies adopted were the patrimonialism, nepotism, centralization of bureaucratic structures and an increasing reliance on foreign patrons (Calderisi, 2006a, p. 58; Murithi, 2005, p. 9). National armed forces became diverted to the service of regimes instead of serving states.

The process of state reorganization during the first years of independence resulted in the creation of neopatrimonial, centralized bureaucratic structures which, while lacking a clear conception of the general interest, worked to promote the concerns of their office-holders and clients. Even though the state was detached from key social groups, it was not necessarily autonomous. Nor was it able to penetrate society and extract sufficient

resources to implement its own policies. The political logic of postcolonial regimes thus tended to accentuate extractive and instrumental norms at the expense of broader developmental concerns. This syndrome had several important consequences. It exposed the political leadership to pressures from powerful patrons, thus limiting its autonomy and contributing to the erosion of the state's organizational capacity. (Chazen, 1993, p. 184)

As a consequence, the rulers were further cut off from their constituencies that they grew up regarding as aliens and enemies. They attempted to control them by using armed forces and corrupting local leaders. Regimes in power shared the country's plunder with them under the patronage that was in place. Still to sustain themselves in an international system that demanded democracy in order to access financial aid, they have to keep a semblance of democracy (D. Austin, 1993; Graham Harrison, 2005).

Some authors attribute the neopatrimonialism that characterizes weak and failed states to weak social bases on which they were built. It is mostly the case with former colonies that received international legitimacy through independences before they even built nation-states (Clapham, 2004; Herbst, 2004). Therefore, according to Clapham and Herbst, it is pointless to speak of the collapse of state authority where it has never existed. A good number of West African states have never resolved the states' legitimacy crisis. As a consequence, they are still unable to rally all the segments of their populations for a common national cause. Therefore, some regimes rely on kins for their survival (Delcroze, 2012). In such situations, states are weak because their authority many times does not extend beyond the capital city.

3.3.6 Cold War political environment

Like the foreign aid, the Cold War was at the same time an opportunity and a source of weakness for African states in general and particularly those in the West Africa sub region. The Cold War did facilitate the speedy decolonization of these states (Springhall, 2001). But also for the newly independent states gaining their sovereignty during the Cold War meant that they were going to spend the following four decades serving the superpowers agenda (Gavshon, 1981). This foreign agenda imposed itself on top of their own nation-states building challenges. The results are that most of the West African states failed in carrying out the two tasks.

The West African region started attracting global powers since the 8th century. Starting with Muslim missionaries the trend continued in the 15th century with European powers (Rodney, 1970). Slave trade and colonisation are going to deprive the sub region of its resources (Crowder, 1978; Diouf, 2003). The Second World War weakened the colonizing powers so much so that decolonisation became an unavoidable option for all (Esedebe, 1994; Springhall, 2001). Following their independence, West Africans were soon drawn into the Cold War between the two superpowers. They soon realized that the war in which they were drawn because of their weakness was not serving their interests. Some of the newly independent states tried to steer clear of the conflict by allying with the nascent Non-Alignment Movement (Strydom, 2007). Ghana and Liberia, the only independent West African states in 1955, were part of the founding members states of the Non-Alignment Movement (O'Sullivan, 2005). The impact of the Cold War was so strong that its end is going to herald a new era for these states. True democratization in most of West Africa started with the end of the Cold War in 1989. Undemocratic leaders who could no longer be protected by superpowers' strategic interests turned to their people for a legitimacy that comes with democratic elections (Lindberg, 2006). This was the case of Mali, Niger, Benin and Togo in the sub region. The end of the Cold War left the United States as the sole superpower. This paved the way for rising powers that to ascertain their influences in the weaker link of the international system that is the Global South and particularly West Africa (Saul, 2007). The sub region is different from what it was fifty years ago. Since the eighties it has been strengthening its integration and cooperation processes. But the weakness of the majority of states is more likely to affect the whole community that risks becoming once again just the battleground of global hegemonic forces.

Coming out of the Second World War, France and Britain were on the side of the victors (Howland, 1995). They were the two main colonizing powers in West Africa. The cultural differences between these two powers led to the division of African states between French and English speaking. In the political realm, this division was translated in the formation of two separate groups of states. The Monrovia group comprising mainly English speaking countries and the Brazzaville group made of mostly French speaking

ones. Within the Monrovia group, there was a power struggle between Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (socialist oriented) and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria (Liberal) (Emerson, 1962; Padelford, 1964, p. 523). Therefore, both independent West African states and the Organization of African Unity that began to take shape after the independences, saw their destiny significantly tied to the Cold war political environment.

The Soviets and Americans were the dominant forces, but still West Africans attempted to advance their own agenda of African unity that has been at the heart of the pan-African movement as a whole. The post-independence Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah attempted to use his appeals to both superpowers to impose a third way that White calls “non-involvement” with either power (United Kingdom, 1961). This is the best illustration of African leaders’ attempts to remain neutral in a conflict that was not theirs.

Rather than non-alignment, Nkrumah opted for a policy of noninvolvement. This strategy enabled him to swing his preference from the West to the East and back without involving Ghana in a Cold War conflict. In this way, he mediated the multiple modernities offered by the two power blocs by aligning and realigning Ghana’s position on numerous occasions, a practice which no doubt confused, if not angered, both the US and the Soviet bloc. He used his ideological leverage to play favorites and secure the substantial amounts of foreign aid needed to implement his development plans. Despite his loose ideology of ‘pan-African socialism’, Nkrumah, along with other CPP leaders, maintained a pro-West bias from the start. With the possibility of both foreign aid and private investment, this friendship was to fund Nkrumah’s extensive dreams of a new Africa. Just as Ghana’s development initiatives were financed by western aid, so were Nkrumah’s numerous international conferences and diplomatic endeavors for African unification(White, 2003, p. 112).

But history witnesses to the fact that Nkrumah’s approach was easily swept aside by the Cold war strategic interests. For this and many other reasons, his regime was crushed through a military coup that removed him from power in 1966. Both Vallin (Vallin, 1966) and Blum agree on the fact that the publication by Nkrumah of his *Neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism* in 1965 was the last drop that sealed his fate in the eyes of Western allies in the Cold war.

The United States wanted him out. Great Britain, the former colonial power in Ghana when it was known as the Gold Coast, wanted him out. France and West Germany wanted him out. Those Ghanaians who carried out the coup suffered from no doubts that a move against Nkrumah would be supported by the Western powers (Blum, 2004, pp. 199-200).

The crushing of Nkrumah and later on that of his friend and protector Sekou Toure did dampen the socialist orientation of some early West African leaders. Schmidt has written about the rise to power in Guinea of Sekou Toure with the help of the French Communist Party. During the 1958 referendum (Archives, 1958), he was the only French West African leader to stand up against De Gaulle regime in France. Given the Cold war context and the upper hand of the Western bloc in West Africa, Sekou Toure was brought down in a military coup orchestrated by France (Muehlenbeck, 2008; E. Schmidt, 2007). Any policy believed to be associated with communism could not be tolerated by the Western bloc through its allies Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal. These Western powers like their counterpart in the Eastern bloc were striving to exert their influence and prestige in the political, economic and military fields (S. N. MacFarlane, 1992, p. 209). Western key powers (USA, Great Britain, and France) made it their mission to fight back the communists. Blum reports in his book, that ever since the United States in particular, has considered anything associated with Communism or Marxism to be the greatest evil to be feared and fought (Blum, 2004). Saull posits that the Cold war started in 1917 with the Russian revolution as from then on, the capitalist and socialist worldviews started battling for the hegemony in the international system (Saull, 2007, p. 25). As colonies, African nations did not exist in the international system of the time. The tide began to turn with the end of the Second War as the calls for independences became stronger supported by the United States and the newly created United Nations (Brinkley, 1994; Hubbard, 2011). The United States as the leading power in the Western bloc changed positions according to its strategic interests. Initially, it supported the Third world decolonisation against its allies, the European colonizing states. Later on, the USA changed completely its foreign policy orientation towards Africa and supported its western allies in their fight against nationalist forces. Thomas indicates that this change took place around 1952 as the Cold War calculations took center stage in US foreign policy. Nationalism was then considered a threat as it was likely to facilitate the spread of Soviet influence on the African continent as a whole (C. M. Thomas, 2008, pp. 49-50). As indicated earlier in this work, the Communist Russia and China were more supportive

of nationalist claims for self-determination. It should be noted that early African leaders turned to Communism not necessarily because they were convinced by the ideology but rather out of tactical calculations. They were desperately looking for support in their struggle against colonial powers. The loss of the United States' help was compensated by turning towards the other superpower in the Cold war. Muehlenbeck reports how when Kennedy came to power in the USA, he took a different approach from the Eisenhower's administration that considered Sekou Toure to be just a communist with whom the US had no business.

Kennedy, however, took another view. During his 1960 presidential campaign he alleged that it was the Republican administration's neglect that had pushed Guinea towards the Soviets. The Democratic candidate criticized Eisenhower for his delay in sending an ambassador to Guinea, pointing out that the Soviet ambassador was in Conakry on Independence Day with offers of trade and aid, while Washington's ambassador did not arrive until eight months later, "and today Guinea has moved toward the communist bloc because of our neglect." (...) (Muehlenbeck, 2008, p. 76)

The personal diplomacy between Toure and Kennedy did bear some positive outcomes for the Cold War in which the US was engaged. The whole initiative was to be crushed by President Kennedy's assassination in 1963.

Some countries in the "Third World" and particularly in West Africa did benefit economically and militarily from this rivalry between the superpowers but on balance, the loss outweighs the gain. This is because the transfers from wealthy nations of the North emphasized the military aspect at the expense of the much needed socio-economic development (McDougall, 2006; McKinlay, 1984; Porter, 1984). Since their independences, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria had developed considerable military power²⁹. Troops from these countries have been outstanding in African peacekeeping missions. However, socially and economically, the level of poverty in these states is simply unacceptable given the importance of the cooperation with Western countries that they have been having since their independences.

²⁹ This is the case of the West African sub region and of the African region in general.

In a nutshell, the effects of Cold War politics on Africa were mixed. In a positive sense, Cold War politics encouraged and assisted the course of political emancipation from what was perceived as Western colonial domination. Cold War rivalry also impelled the superpowers and their allies to provide competitive economic assistance for the newly independent African states in the 1960s and 1970s. In a negative sense, the involvement of the new states in superpower ideological politics aggravated their internal conflicts and encouraged instability. Furthermore, the readiness of the superpowers and their allies to supply arms to Africa encouraged an unnecessary arms build-up and diverted resources meant for development to unproductive and wasteful ends (Obasanjo, 1996, p. 17).

Out of the Cold War agenda, arms were easily supplied to states that were battling insurgencies accused of being communist forces. Since both blocs were involved in the same game, arms build up in proxy states were unnecessarily important (B. Robert Edgerton, 2002). Furthermore, it is sobering to know that the costs of all these weapons were not grants but loans. A huge part of the cumbersome African debts is made of these loans contracted with arms build-up during the Cold War as indicated in the previous section.

3.3.7 West African States weakness in the post-Cold war period

The end of the Cold War in the nineties brought with it the end of a certain type of cooperation with rich nations. The superpowers strategic focus changed and therefore the loss of all the undue benefits to undemocratic regimes in West Africa (Leffler, 2010; Lemke, 2004). These challenges and opportunities are going to be difficult to manage by weak West African states that have never succeeded in obtaining their legitimacy from democratic processes.

The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of the socio-political and economic environment that it has created. West African states are still weak in the international system as it will be analyzed in the next chapter. In the wake of the Soviet Union collapse (Brown, 2007), other powers are emerging. As new global powers ascertain their influence in the international system, weaker states are more likely to serve still as battlegrounds. The rising powers, China and India are increasingly challenging Western interests in the West African sub-region (D. R. Kaplan, 2010). The struggle for positioning between the Western and the rising powers is more likely to push aside the

development needs of populations. Referring to H. Kissinger (Kissinger, 1994, p. 23), Doyle hints at the coming superpowers standoff with the following words:

The former secretary of state foresaw a new order resembling the foreign relations of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. The United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and probably India would in the years ahead engage in competitive relations in which power will balance against power. Kissinger lamented that this was a game the United States, by both its ideological tradition and current expectation, was poorly equipped to play. (Doyle, 1997, p. 16)

Many dividends were expected from the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (Rüland, 2006). One of these dividends according to MacFarlane is an increased role for the United Nations to act effectively in resolving world conflicts given the absence of superpowers interference (S. N. MacFarlane, 1992, p. 210). Twenty-years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall this dividend has not yet materialized (R. C. Thakur, 2006). On the contrary the international system seems to be heading in the opposite direction. The United Nations' role in international peace and security has been dampened by the current counterterrorism war led by the United States and its allies. The distrust of the United Nations processes for security is being expressed in various ways. Regional and sub-regional organizations are increasingly engaging in bilateral cooperation with individual states to obtain what they need. McDougall laments the loss of the end of the Cold War dividends in these words:

The 1990s revealed how difficult it would be to design a global structure of peace that was based on institutions and values shared by all the leading powers and capable of imposition upon the lesser ones. After the collapse of communism, some analysts had talked buoyantly of the triumph of capitalism and human rights, of the "end of history", of a new world order (...) The rosy scenarios gave way to suggestions that the world might soon be rent by a "clash of civilizations" pitting the democracies against militant Islam and an imperial China; by the spread of "chaos" as millions of refugees from the southern half of the world invaded the wealthy land of the north; by ecological and demographic disasters touched off by the spread of industry and disease in the developing world; or by the spread of nuclear and missile technology into the hands of terrorists. (McDougall, 2006)

At the dawn of the 21st century, existing powers seem to be struggling to maintain the equilibrium of the system through the United Security Council. At the same time, emerging powers are questioning the current distribution of power in this system and

requesting its shake up (Cheng, 2009). Developing countries and especially those in West Africa are still largely dependent on the existing system (Paul. Collier, 2003; D. P. Williams, 2008). There are also some prospects for the sub regional community to play a significant role in the peace and security realm as it will be analyzed in chapter five. Writing in 1996, Obasanjo did posit that Africa will have for a long time to come to deal with the consequences of this war that it was imposed.

Although we may talk about the end of the Cold War in the East and the West, for us in Africa the Cold War is not fully over. We are still left holding on to the debris of the war; with little means of support, we have a long, arduous task of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. In addition, we are blamed and condemned for the ills of the war that have become our lot. The conditions in Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, Zaire, and Liberia, to mention a few, are all part of the legacy of the Cold War era, as is the common practice, until recently, of autocratic African leaders being able to rely on the support of external patrons to indefinitely prolong their rule.(Obasanjo, 1996, p. 19)

The structural weaknesses of West African states that were not addressed in the last half century are more likely to lead to its marginalization in the post-Cold war international system (Adebajo, 2004b). The following chapters will argue that West Africa ought to build capacity in order to benefit from its resources. The sub region need not just be a battleground between competing powers in the new scramble (Paul Collier, 2009; Gavshon, 1981).

The two major imperatives for the recent U.S. scramble for Africa concern energy supplies and national security. West Africa has sixty billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Nigeria supplies the United States with ten percent of its oil imports; while Angola provides four percent. Oil experts estimate that the Gulf of Guinea will provide the United States with twenty-five percent of its oil imports by 2015.(Kerr-Ritchie, 2007, p. 209)

The massive foreign investments in the West African resources are boosting the macro-economies in the Sub region. This development is also a major source of insecurity that is keeping states weak and incapable of improving the livelihood of people (Obi, 2009; Omeje, 2006). As global powers compete for the control of the access to the resources, the weak states' institutionalization is fuelling conflicts among national communities.

3.4 Conclusion

Understanding West African states' weakness is the central theme of this research. Prior to analyzing the mechanism of this weakness and to considering possible solutions, it was important to understand the causes of this situation and be able to build on this knowledge.

West African states are weak and failing for reasons that have to do with the structures and modes of functioning of these states. They were “born” weak and they have never had the chance of developing the capacities of modern states in the international system (Turner, 1997). Internal divisions between various segments of their societies accounted for much of their challenges (Noel, 2005). Unscrupulous leaders used these divisions to further divide in order to obtain their submission to their undemocratic regime (W. A. a. C. U. Fawole, 2005). Democratization as a form of government has produced better results in other parts of the world by giving voice to all the groups that form states (Bastian, 2003). This popular participation has produced the social peace that is vital for nation-states' building. In West Africa, the democratization process is so slow that people's frustrations are threatening to halt it altogether (International Crisis Group, 2013b). The undemocratic modes of governance of some states make that regimes are quick to crackdown on demonstrations against them. This further destabilizes these states and alienates the leaders against their people.

Besides their internal issues, West African states were further weakened by the international system in which they were introduced with independences. Prior to colonization, these states had their own tribal administrations (I. D. a. R. Ray, P. S. (Purshottama Sivanarian), 2003). When the European powers took control of their territories, they also introduced the colonial administration and religious organizations. Each of these institutions also administered the territories where they were established since it was believed that there was no administration in those places (T. Chafer, 2004). Therefore they acted like mini-states by levying taxes, enforcing the law and providing for the needs of the populations. Given the weakness of independent states to assume their responsibilities, the triple heritage of the state continued to function side by side if not in conflict at times (A. A. A. Mazrui, 1984). Where states institutions are absent,

these organizations provide for the needs of populations. But also this non-state provision of services creates confusion and further weakens states that are striving to establish their authority all over the territories (Paris, 2009). As a consequence, peace builders turn out to be peace spoilers.

The Cold War between the superpowers contributed to the promotion of West African states independences (Suri, 2006). But also these states spent much of their needed energies serving the Cold War agenda instead of focusing on building their nation-states (E. Schmidt, 2007; Westad, 2005). Because of the focus on global powers' strategic interests, West African states have never fully benefited from the foreign aid that they have been receiving (Obasanjo, 1996). Fifty years after independences, these states are still weak and some of them risk failing at any time. The current weakness of West African states make them soft target in the current global rush for the control of access to natural resources (Bannon, 2003). Unless the states' weakness is resolved, their wealth will benefit more their foreign partners than themselves as it has been the case during the Cold war.

The weakness of West African states is the thread running through all this work. After analyzing the processes of their weakness, the next chapter will set to seek ways of addressing this issue. Weak and failed states are threats to themselves, their surroundings and to the whole international community (R. I. Rotberg, 2004). The conflict spill over effect observed in the West African sub region makes fixing states a priority (D. Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, 2010). This research posits that the security sector reform is the way of comprehensively addressing the weakness of West African states (A. Bryden, 2004). Chapter four analyzes the security sector in the context of West African states. Strengthening the security sector is the solution to building strong states in the sub region by providing the lacking or very limited power resources.

Chapter Four: SECURITY SECTOR AND STATES BUILDING IN WEST AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

West African States are weak for various reasons like poverty, uncontrolled diseases and primarily the rampant insecurity (Bilgin, 2002; Hunter-Gault, 2006). The presence of various armed factions leads to the assumption that stronger armed forces are the solution to the insecurity (Addo, 2005; G. Eric Berman, 2003). This thesis posits the reform of the entire security sector that encompasses all the organs of the state. A normally functioning state is supposed to monopolize the means of force (M. Weber, 1964). Bryden and his colleagues, like many authors consulted, consider that the security family can be grouped into five bodies: the organizations legally mandated to use force; justice and law enforcement organizations; civil management and oversight bodies; non-statutory security organizations and non-statutory civil society bodies (Bryden Alan, 2008b, pp. 7-8). The first three are statutory bodies and these are umbrella organizations for the various state's ministries, departments, agencies and services (N. Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, 2003; Bryden Alan, 2008c). Any help to these countries should be aimed at providing for well trained, paid and equipped forces and personnel in all these sectors.

The armed forces are to provide the strategic security environment that allows other players to operate. Police forces are to protect citizens and their properties. An independent justice system is central not only to the democratization system but also to external partners who need to be sure that their properties are protected through law enforcement mechanisms (Lar, 2009).

On his first visit to Sub-Saharan Africa as newly elected President of the United States of America on July 11, 2009, Mr. Barack Obama made an address to Africa at the Ghanaian Parliament. He raised some issues that are of equal importance to the central topic of this chapter. Speaking of the realization of the Founding Fathers' promises for Africa, he said:

Now, to realize that promise, we must first recognize the fundamental truth that you have given life to in Ghana: Development depends on good governance. (...) That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That's the change that can unlock Africa's potential. And that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans.

Expanding on democratic governance, the President said:

This is about more than just holding elections. It's also about what happens between elections. (...) Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves - - (...) -- if police can be bought off by drug traffickers. (...) No business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 percent off the top -- (...) -- or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. (...) That is not democracy that is tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle an election in there. And now is the time for that style of governance to end. (...)

In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success -- strong parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges -- (...); an independent press; a vibrant private sector; a civil society. (...) Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in people's everyday lives(Obama, 2009).

Extracts of President Obama's address to Africa through the Ghanaian Parliament are reproduced here because they illustrate the object of this chapter. Since their independence, West African states have solicited and received various supports to help them strengthen their governance institutions. All the efforts have so far failed because these states are still weak as indicated in the previous chapters (Brinkerhoff, 2008). The Security Sector Reform program offers the best alternative of uplifting these states as it is essentially about instituting democratic governance (Cilliers, 2003; Zakaria, 1997). All state's institutions have to be under the control of a democratically elected government.

As indicated in chapter three of this research, West African states are lagging behind their promises for various reasons. Some of these stem from their own action or lack thereof, and some other reasons of their weakness come from global powers (A. K. Bangura, 2010; Rotberg, 2002; I. R. Rotberg, 2004). Security Sector Governance mechanisms offer a framework that, if followed through, are more likely to help states resolve governance issues. These are keeping them behind and are the root causes of the current insecurity in the sub region (Y. Bangura, 2002). To analyze these mechanisms in

the region, this chapter sets out first to analyze the origin of the concept of Security Sector Reform and to explain its various components. This work delves into the concept of Security Sector Governance, one of the later offshoots of the security sector reform theorizing.

The argument here is that West African states are weak because they lack sufficient power resources to respond to their needs. The Security Sector Reform and Governance deal with what states need to do to develop the lacking capabilities (D. Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, 2010; Opoku, 2007). The structural weakness of West African states make them less likely succeed at building capacity through the SSG program. This is where the Economic Community of West African States steps in to supplement the weakness of individual member states (Club du Sahel, 2005a). The pooling of resources that the community allows offers a better prospect of the SSG success. This will be demonstrated in chapter five.

4.2 The concept of Security Sector

This first section will explain the concept of Security Sector and its origin. Security is the central theme here. It has been argued in chapter two that insecurity is the main cause of West African states' weakness (Club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 2005).

Addressing this problem requires an understanding of security that goes beyond the mere military and armed forces aspects as was the case during the Cold war (Barrass, 2009; OECD, 2004, p. 1). The whole of government institutions are concerned with the security of the state. That is why any reform or improvement to the state capacity has to address all of them as advocated by the Security Sector Reform and Governance program.

The Security Sector Reform program grew out of the dissatisfaction by Western donors with the poor results of their involvement in favour of poor countries (Chandler, 2010). In addition to this, the end of the Cold War brought about the change in their expectations (N. Ball, 1988). A new way of cooperating with developing countries was being sought.

As for the character of external involvement, this can be understood as deriving from dissatisfaction with the lack of progress of previous development agendas on the part of Western donors, and the changing expectations by which contemporary involvement with security by these donors is characterised. Expectations now include a sustainable peace, conflict prevention and increased regional and international cooperation. The holistic viewing of the security sector that the SSR agenda promises, encompassing as it does both structural and normative elements, is the way to fulfil these expectations, its proponents argue (Chanaa, 2002, p. 8).

The origin of the term “Security Sector” goes back to the work of Nicole Ball in 1988 (N. Ball, 1988). She called for the incorporation of security sector in the larger debate on development in the Global South. She initiated the debate by raising the issue of how high military expenditures were hindering the development process in those countries (N. Ball, 1987). Therefore, it was then suggested that this issue was to be resolved through the incorporation of military expenditures into the development program of the state.

Since many governments spend a not-inconsiderable amount of their available resources in the security sector and the armed forces control or strongly influence the government in many developing countries, it is reasonable to assume that the security sector has affected the efficiency with which resources are employed in many parts of the Third World. (N. Ball, 1988, p. 213).

The development community picked on Ball’s work to call for the reduction of military expenditure in order to boost development effort in the Global South. Williams noted that change in donor countries. They moved from the position where their various defence establishments were controlling the restructuring of the security agenda in recipient countries through vast provision of military equipments to the “zero-sum approach to military expenditure”. His article indicates that both extremes are wrong (Williams, 2005). The wisdom lies in the middle, in balancing the resources allocated to security forces with those allocated to other segments of the security sector.

Clare Short, the first Secretary for International Development in the United Kingdom, was the first to use the concept of “Security Sector Reform” in a Speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 9 March 1999³⁰. This was the official endorsement of the

³⁰ The speech was entitled, ‘Security Sector Reform and the elimination of poverty’

concept by the United Kingdom in its development policy (Brzoska, 2003, p. 3; Hendrickson, 2009, p. 3). From that point, the Department for International Development launched various initiatives to develop and operationalize the SSR concept (United Kingdom, 2000, 2002). An autonomous research center on the subject was established at the King's College London (CSDG – Conflict, Security & Development Group). Also in partnership with the University of Birmingham, the Department runs the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform.

The concept of Security Sector Reform is fairly new in security studies. Its background can equally be attributed to the détente following the end of the Cold War in 1989. World powers' interests shifted from the defence of spheres of influence to the demand of more accountability for resources allocated to other countries (Westad, 2005). It can be said that the 1994 Human Development Report (United Nations, 1994) by bringing to light the concept of human security, was the first translation of the Security Sector Governance trend. The human security concept as developed by the UNDP emphasized the “Notions of democratising societies, good governance with transparency and accountability, peaceful transformation of societies, human security and poverty reduction programmes” (Wulf, 2004, p. 2). In this regard, The Security Sector Reform and Governance is closely related to the Human Security agenda promoted by the UNDP because it calls for the broadening of the understanding of security (A. D. Baldwin, 1997; United Nations, 1997). Security is not only the security of the state but also the one of the people inhabiting it. The Human Security emphasis of the Economic Community of West African States SSR will be explored in the next chapter.

Many other concepts are called upon to designate the same reform and transformation processes that have to take place in the security architecture of weak and fragile states. Besides security sector reform, there is also security sector transformation and security sector governance used by both Ball and Fayemi (N. a. K. F. Ball, 2004). Security sector reform and transformation correspond to the early reactions to the way that military expenditures occupied a big portion of development efforts (Deger, 1987). This topic was developed in the previous chapter that indicated how the Cold war

between the superpowers emphasized military equipment transfers to their proxies in the Third World (McKinlay, 1984; Porter, 1984).

Later writings do not consider Security Sector Reform as a reduction of military expenditures. But rather they see military institutions as being among the bodies to be reformed and transformed for the strengthening of the state (Brzoska, 2003). This is why the United Nations Development Program definition of governance became very relevant to the SSR program (United Nations, 1997). As indicated in the previous chapter, the holistic aspect of the UNDP definition inspired later research on the SSR. Since both reform and governance are required for weak states institutions, both concepts are used depending on the emphasis of a particular author (Opoku, 2007).

SSR involves fundamental issues of governance relating to how countries can strengthen the processes, institutions and instruments that enable them to address the security challenges facing both the state and its citizens (Hendrickson, 2009, p. 5).

This work will give precedence to the concept of Security Sector Governance for its emphasis on Security and Governance (H. a. T. H. W. Hänggi, 2003) that are the key issues in the countries under study. Since their independence, these states have received considerable inputs from donor countries but because of the rampant insecurity and mismanagement of resources they have not developed the expected capacities (Bouchat, 2010). Some of them have considerable numbers of security personnel. Unfortunately, often these are the very threats to both the state and the people due to their lacking professionalism (Howe, 2005, p. 9; Lyons, 2005). Professional security forces are recognised as critical to the defence of states and the protection of populations (N. a. K. F. Ball, 2004). Therefore, the impact of the SSR on military and security forces will be emphasized in the last section of this chapter.

4.2.1 The Security Sector family

The security sector is called a family because it involves most government institutions (Bryden Alan, 2008b). This is the very challenge to the success of the reform because it has to take place in all of them at the same time.

The security sector is made of “(...) those organizations within society that are responsible for protecting the state and its citizens, as well as the bodies responsible for management and oversight of the various security forces” (N. Ball, 2000). In their co-edited handbook Ball and Fayemi study:

Five Major Categories of Actors Influencing Security-Sector Governance:

- **Organisations legally mandated to use force:** armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; intelligence services (including both military and civilian agencies); secret services; coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (national guards, presidential guards, militias, etc.).
- **Judicial and public safety bodies:** judiciary; justice ministries; defence attorneys; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; correctional services; customary and traditional justice systems.
- **Civil management and oversight bodies:** president/prime minister; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and statutory civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- **Non-state security organisations:** liberation armies, guerrilla armies, traditional militias, political party militias, private security companies, civil defence forces, local and international criminal groups.
- **Non-statutory civil society bodies:** professional organizations, including trade unions; research/policy analysis organizations; advocacy organizations; the media; religious organizations; non-governmental organizations; the concerned public. (N. a. K. F. Ball, 2004; United Nations, 2008c, p. 6)³¹

All these institutions have to be brought to function in conjunction for the security of the state, the people inhabiting it and their properties (Kantor, 2011, p. 273). The coordination of actions and resources is the key to the success of the reform (Isima, 2010). During the field research for this work, 76% of participants indicated that the lack of coordination between security institutions is among the obstacles to security sector reform in West Africa. The lack of coordination between organizations to be reformed and between donors constitutes the serious challenge to state being helped and to helpers.

Any coordination model must account for the realities of competency of the donor or stakeholder to effect SSR and also the ability of the donor or stakeholder to carry out a particular SSR activity under its mandate. Analyzing whether there is a ‘fault line’ in the coordination of SSR activities carried out by the organisations is the key question; the

³¹ Bold characters in the original.

differences in mandates and competencies across donors and other stakeholders may preclude full jointery, especially in the more militaristic aspects of SSR. The constituents of the demanded security are a benchmark against which to examine the supply-side rigidities of the selected actors.(Boanas, 2005, p. 2)

Boanas illustrates his argument by mentioning how the World Bank has developed expertise in dealing with less-developed and developing countries. But it cannot act on it because “(...) its risk aversion and mandate limitation means that some of this concentrated donor effect will necessarily be diluted as it has to leave the funding and coordination of the more military parts of SSR to bilateral.”(Boanas, 2005, p. 4). Also the lack of coordination between various agencies involved in SSR leads to the waste of time and money as observed in Guinea-Bissau (Bahnson, 2011, p. 264). The author mentions the conflict between the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention. More than that, within the United Nations system various departments are competing to do the same thing.

In examining UNDP’s role, consideration needs to be given to the wider UN family. At the very least, the UN’ departments for Political Affairs (DPA), Peacekeeping (DPKO), Disarmament Affairs (DDA), Mine Action (MAS), the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) have roles in SSR,(...) however it would be wrong to see the UN system as a contiguous whole (...) and coordination within the UN varies between situations, both specifically within SSR and in general development aid.(Boanas, 2005, p. 7)

This is an indication that there might be interests at stake other than just helping countries in need of assistance. Therefore, recipient countries ought not to solely rely on foreign assistance to resolve their security and development needs. This issue has been extensively analyzed in chapter three in regard to the failure of foreign aid (Calderisi, 2006a). Not only do donor agencies have difficulty coordinating their interventions, but also various intervening agencies are faced with the challenge of coordinating their actions with recipient countries (Jaye, 2010). Governmental and Non-Governmental Institutions sometimes have conflicting interests that undermine the efficiency of their actions (N. Ball, 2000; Jorgel, 2011, p. 251; Wulf, 2004). Analysing donor’s involvement in SSR, Wulf does note a strong interest; unfortunately this is not supported by coherence in their activities:

In recent years, the emphasis among donors has been that sustainable development and peace-building must be based on strengthening governance in the security sector in order to remove the barriers to the state's ability to provide security for its citizens as well as the threats to citizens' security. Compared to the high level of security sector reform needs in many countries, the resources made available are still far from sufficient. However, security sector reform has been accepted as a necessary condition for democratisation and development. (Wulf, 2004, p. 9)

There is no link between discourses and resource allocations. Kaplan indicates how the troubles of West African states have always been on the agendas of G-8 Summits, but pledges to assist are not always followed through (S. Kaplan, 2006). According to Fayemi, the challenges are so dire because of the political nature of security sector reconstruction. Its success depends on the success of negotiation between various stakeholders. But in the end, the long-term interests of the needing state should not be lost sight of, otherwise the whole process is doomed to fail.

The above clearly underscores why security sector reconstruction is a long-term and deeply political issue, not just a technical one and why to be deemed successful, *peacebuilding* must aim to seamlessly merge with *nation-building*. It also brings into clear relief why the reconstruction of the security sector can only work if pursued as part of a more comprehensive restructuring agenda aimed at improving governance and promoting democratisation. Security sector reconstruction in a post-conflict setting is therefore also a discussion about the development of an effective and overarching governance framework. (Fayemi, 2004, p. 7)³²

The reform of the security sector is the primary responsibility of a nation-state with the help of bilateral and multilateral agents. External agents find it difficult to cope with the long term commitment that security sector governance requires. However, as Burian puts it, there is no "quick-fix solution" (Burian, 2007, p. 10; Fayemi, 2004; Jorgel, 2011). The principles put forward by protagonists of the Security Sector Reform and Governance are obviously indications of what is needed to solve the insecurity situation in West Africa. For this to happen state's institutions have to be reformed and better managed (Appiah, 2004). The SSR/SSG suggestions follow a thorough study of the issues to be tackled. The problem arises with the implementation of these principles for various reasons. These are

related to resource availability, but mainly the political will to follow-through with the required action. The lack of political will is one of the main reasons for the failure of various projects in fragile states.

There are several factors that currently limit the capacity of development donors to provide assistance of the type foreseen in the normative literature. One is the limited resources that are available for security sector reform among development donor organisations. A second is that the impetus for reform is often lacking in recipient countries – sometimes a question of capacity for reform, but more often simply a lack of willingness to reform (Brzoska, 2003, p. 37).

In countries affected by conflicts, SSR and the Demobilisation Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants are closely connected (W. A. Knight, 2010). The cessation of armed conflicts allows the initiation of the SSR to prevent the resumption of fighting. From his analysis of the DDR processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Fayemi advocates for the move away from the “shortemism” many times favoured by donors. They do this to avoid the long-term commitment required by the SSR program mostly in states still recovering from armed conflicts.

Thus, there is a need for post-conflict security sector reconstruction to move away from the current donor focus on short-term objectives, based on the interpretation of peace as a mere absence of war, (securing an early end to hostilities, followed by demobilisation) to a recognition of the postconflict rebuilding process in a continuum. This includes the reintegration of ex-combatants, re-professionalisation of the armed forces and policing, and building of institutions of democratic oversight, all necessarily longer-term, more complex and resource-intensive processes. (Fayemi, 2004, p. 10)

It is unrealistic to expect a state that is still in the process of recovering from conflict to be fully functional just after five to ten years of external support. It is also unrealistic to expect an open-ended involvement of external donors. Even charity has an end, more so when it comes to the trade involved in foreign aid where returns on investments are expected sooner than later.

³² Italics in the original

There is an economic case for foreign aid, too, best expressed in the establishment of the World Bank in 1946. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as it was then called, was set up to promote the continued expansion of world trade after World War II. Its purpose was not charity but self-interest (Calderisi, 2006a, p. 156).

West African states weakness cannot be resolved in a short time frame. External donors cannot sustain the long-term commitment required. That is why this whole study is advocating for the strengthening of states' capacities through regional organisations that provide for a pooling of the needed resources (D. J. Francis, 2001, p. 46; S. Kaplan, 2006, p. 82). Chapter five will demonstrate how the Economic Community of West African states has undertaken to do that.

4.2.2 The Complexity and Governance of the security sector

The security sector is very complex, as it is being argued in this chapter. It is vital for weak states' recovery but it is very difficult to implement. Experiences undertaken so far in the West African sub region support this claim (Bahnson, 2011; Ishola, 2007; Jaye, 2010).

The reform of the security sector often fails because of the underestimation of its complexity (Chanaa, 2002). Furthermore, very often there is not the needed expertise and capacity to conduct the reform (Lar, 2009). It happens that institutions to be reformed are themselves resistant to change. This is most often the case when the regime in power and the military interests are connected (Howe, 2005). Finally, given the rampant insecurity in the West African sub region, states will resist any reform that is likely to affect their reliance on military force for security.

The obstacles to security sector reform in emerging democracies are many and varied. They include a lack of vision, expertise and resources; an abiding tendency to view security in an authoritarian, militarist and secretive fashion; resistance to reform from politicians and/or security officers; manipulation by foreign powers and neighbouring states; and the on-going politicisation of the security services. The higher the level of instability and violence in the national or regional arenas, moreover, the less likely it is that reforms with an anti-militarist orientation will be introduced. (Laurie Nathan, 2004, p. 2)

When the armed force is considered as the last resort for a state survival, any action or reform that touches on it will be suspected of attempting to weaken the state. This is mostly the approach in states that are lacking in other capabilities (Cawthra, 2003). The fact that the agenda of the SSG is externally controlled does not help the confidence building in weak states' population (H. a. T. H. W. Hänggi, 2003).

When the reform of the security sector is warranted, often it is because the political and economic situations no longer allow the proper delivery of political goods to the population (Persson, 2011). Furthermore, state's authority might not be present all over the state's territory. Therefore, the most important task in setting the ground for Security Sector Governance is the restoration of legality and bureaucracy. Meierhenrich considers these to be the "two sufficient conditions for state survival *after* state reformation".

The promotion and construction of legality and bureaucracy are the most important tasks in state formation after state failure. Both can "lock in" stakes for those who stand to lose from the reformation of a state. Thus, legality and bureaucracy are two necessary and sufficient conditions of state survival *after* state reformation. If they are usable, newly formed states are likely to serve any of six interrelated functions: (1) encouraging predictability; (2) creating confidence; (3) lending credibility; (4) providing security; (5) displaying resolve; and (6) controlling resources. The functions are cumulative. They can facilitate the gradual construction of trust among adversaries, thus accelerating regime formation and government formation. Legality and bureaucracy are yet again necessary and sufficient to create *usable* states. The formation of usable states is key to the construction and maintenance of social order in changing societies. It is not the end of state formation, but a significant first step. This step involves "institutional" and "societal" formation processes. (Meierhenrich, 2004, pp. 156-157)

Once legality and bureaucracy are firmly established, the remaining state's institutions are more likely to thrive. Through legality, the state regains control of the means of force and is able to curb crime and impunity. This leads to the establishment of a society of law where clear guidelines monitor people's behaviour for the common good (Lyons, 2005, p. 146). Also, the control of force allows the state to project power all over its territory. Through bureaucratic restoration, the state delivers political goods to the entire population (Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 7). The absence of state institutions in some areas of the countries is one of the signs of its weakness.

The reform of the security sector is a program that seeks to establish or restore the capability of states to allow them to respond to the expectations of their populations and

external partners (N. a. K. F. Ball, 2004; Chanaa, 2002). This study posits that the lack of peace and security is the main cause of West African states weakness. Multilateral bodies like the United Nations, are increasingly coming to the conclusion that peace and security in weak and failed states come through the Security Sector Reform (Security Council, 2007). The thesis is adopting this program as the solution to the security problems of the states under study. The next section is going to focus on the shortcomings of the programme that need to be addressed for it to succeed in the ECOWAS.

4.2.3 Critique of the Security Sector Reform and Governance

Security Sector Reform or Governance is recognized to be the program that is most likely to bring lasting peace, security and prosperity to West African states. The program is still in its early stages of experimentation. So far on the African continent, post-conflict South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique can be considered to have succeeded thanks to the implementation of the SSG (Hendricks, 2010). In West Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone are currently going through the program and the prospects are positive despite the challenges involved (International Crisis Group, 2008b; Kantor, 2011; Olawale, 2008). The same cannot be said of the SSG processes initiated in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau that were hampered respectively by the resurgence of conflicts and military coup (Bahnsen, 2011; Dobbins, 2008, p. 73; Nossiter, 2012a).

Security Sector Reform comes from the European and primarily from the British development circles in response to the poor outcomes of development aids given to developing countries (N. Ball, 1987; Chanaa, 2002). It posits that less developed countries are not performing well politically and economically because of deficient governance. Therefore if good governance practices of developed countries are brought to the less developed ones, the latter are going to perform well (N. Ball, 1998; Chandler, 2010, p. 6). This assumption is grounded in liberal institutionalism that asserts that democracy will make the world peaceful because democratic states are not warmongers (Kant, 2006). Chandler considers SSR to be just another term for international state building that Europe has been doing for the last six decades in underdeveloped countries (Chandler, 2010). This work agrees with the aims of the SSR/SSG:

Security Sector Reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good governance and, in particular, the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law. This relies on the ability of the state to mitigate its people's vulnerabilities through development, and to use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that affect society's well-being (GFN - SSR, 2007, p. 4).

Contentions arise from the operationalization of this complex program as it requires enormous resources that are beyond the reach of any individual state in West Africa. Donors do not have the resources or the political will to accompany the SSR/SSG to the end (Bendix, 2008). West African states freshly emerging out of armed conflicts that pitted national communities against one other are expected to recover and perform well within a defined short period of time.

By contrast, if pre-World War II colonialism was unbounded in time and Cold War neocolonialism nearly so, post-Cold War nationbuilding is dominated by the desire for exit strategies and departure deadlines. Governments that engage in this activity genuinely do not want to stay any longer than they have to, and they sometimes leave before they should. Modern nation-building operations may seem interminable, but most have ended in a few years and very few have lasted longer than a decade (Dobbins, 2008, p. 3).

Since states on the receiving end cannot dictate their will on donors, this thesis will call for the support of regional and sub regional mechanisms like ECOWAS. The survival of these regional organisations depends on their ability to resolve conflicts in member states (Agbu, 2006; K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009). As such, the sub regional organization is compelled to use all the needed resources and time to restore stability.

Some other critics posit that by ignoring "the underlying causes of insecurity in developing countries" the concept loses meaning (Fayemi, 2004). The program has also been criticised for not fitting in well with the "possibilities for external manipulation of political and social forces" (Luckham, 2003). Reforms are implemented more often as dictated by donors' requirements than by the needs of recipient countries. Luckham supports his claim with examples of situations where cuts in military spending worsened situations that were already very fragile.

Cuts introduced to resolve fiscal crises and satisfy donors have aggravated the crises of fragile regimes and of their military and security establishments, all the more where military spending has already fallen due to economic decline, resulting in 'demilitarisation by default' (...). In the worst cases, like the Democratic Republic of Congo or Sierra Leone, the authorities simply ceased paying their own armed forces and police, wrecking their discipline and capacity to ensure basic security and public order. Donors and IFIs have now become more sensitive to the dangers of insisting on military cuts in fragile states. Instead they are fostering a new discourse of 'security sector reform' and 'democratic governance of the security sector'(...) (Luckham, 2003, p. 16)³³

Luckham goes on to insist that unless the causes of state's weakness and failure are appropriately tackled, all policy prescriptions are bound to fail even though they might have produced positive results elsewhere (N. Ball, 2004). The signs of state's weakness and failure may be similar but their causes are very particular to each context.

Most discussions of security sector reform so far have focused on the broad goals of reform and on policy prescriptions to make them operational. There has been much less consideration of the political and economic conditions which facilitate reform, the obstacles which confront it, and the conditions which determine when it is sustainable – and when it is not. (...) (Luckham, 2003, p. 17)

SSR guidelines are broad outlines that need to be translated in the local reality of the state where the program is implemented. Jorgel cite the example of Liberia where SSR promoters aimed at teaching skills to demobilized youth. Their choice of skills to teach produced adverse results:

The notion that former rebels would be satisfied with training as carpenters, or trained in soap making can be seen as a funny joke, but it was what was offered to the vast majority of demobilized soldiers (...) If there is something that people in Sub-Saharan Africa is taught to do it is carpentry and other skills such as soap making. What would be needed were skills such as computer literacy, advanced mechanics and advanced management training, and maybe most important basic education (Jorgel, 2011, p. 249).

Former combatants did not show up in the training centres, but went underground where they reorganized their various factions that are a real timed-bomb for Liberia and the whole sub-region (Lyons, 2005, p. 145; Nichols, 2004).

³³³³ IFIs are the International Financial Institutions

Many times, it happens that in the early stages of the Security Sector Reform, security forces responsibilities in states' weakness and failure overly emphasized. When this is the case they are wrongly neglected as indicated above (N. Ball, 1987). Current research is a departure from this initial exclusion of military and security forces by considering them as key stakeholders in the Security Sector Governance. In her later writings, N. Ball changed her mind in this regards.

(...)by contributing to insecurity, instability and various forms of conflict, the security bodies were a major part of the problem confronting developing and transitional countries as the end of the 20th century approached. During the 1990s, it became increasingly evident that the security bodies urgently needed to be made part of the solution. Neither people nor the states they live in are able to achieve democratic consolidation, poverty reduction, or sustainable development without adequate security. It also became increasingly accepted that democratic governance of the security sector is essential to the achievement of appropriate levels and forms of security. (N. Ball, 2004, p. 2)

Therefore, professionalization of security forces rather than their weakening is the key to greater security in weak states that are involved in the process of reforming their security sector (Howe, 2005).

In addition, Security Sector Reform's prescriptions often fail to take into account the required changes in industrialised countries for the projects to succeed. For example, arms export policies have to be transparent to set an example to importing states. The British government has initiated a move in this direction as reported by Cooper.

Many of these initiatives may be undertaken by external actors with a view to influencing the general conditions of the global arms market, or to encourage demilitarisation in post-conflict societies. On the issue of weapons' proliferation, for example, the British government has signed international agreements against the use of bribery to secure contracts, and is committed to not providing export credits for defence sales to a number of low-income developing countries. DFID has also provided political and financial support for regional initiatives to address light-weapons' proliferation, assist in demilitarisation and promote civilian oversight of military budgets.(Cooper, 2002, pp. 17-18)

This is an initiative that needs to be implemented by all arms manufacturers in their dealing with weak and conflicts stricken states.

Furthermore, promoters of SSR compromise the process by wanting to control everything in order to protect the interests of donors and their own managerial credibility (Bahnson, 2011). The fear of resource mismanagement is so great that the local ownership that guarantees the long term success of the project becomes the casualty.

Given the complexities raised by these questions, there is an understandable desire on the part of donors to manage risk – primarily to themselves – and to control the environment within which they are operating. There is a tendency to narrow operational terrain to protect donors’ interests, to portray reform goals as tangible in order to gain donor support, and to make them fail-safe by setting boundaries that can be moved, thus jeopardising the holistic argument upon which the SSR agenda itself is based. (Chanaa, 2002, p. 9)

The very complexity of the SSR program implies the fact that it is taking place in a weak or failed state where institutions have crumbled (Ndulo, 2010). Therefore it is difficult to presume with certainty the end result of the process. It is worth accepting the level of risk involved in trusting local actors though they seem to aim in the opposite direction of the donors (Gberie, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2007a, 2007d). This is not advocating for the absence of control over the resources allocated but rather calling for a partnership (Gbla, 2007). A true partnership provides room to the recipient in the management of the program even though his financial contribution is minimal.

The next section will look at the end results of a successful security sector reform/governance. The core argument is that an SSR fulfills its objectives when it restores the state capacity in terms of political, economic, military and security institutions. These aspects will be discussed in the next section as being the resources that define a functioning state.

4.4 The Outcome of Security Sector Governance

This section will assess how the success of the Security Sector Governance is to be verified. SSR/SSG has succeeded if it restores the power resources referred to above in a recipient country. The SSR aims at building these resources as the foundations for a lasting peace, security and prosperity (N. Ball, 2002). A functioning state is the one that is capable of governing all its population, providing for the material and security needs of

the people and protecting its territory against foreign incursion (D. Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, 2010; Ndulo, 2010). The absence of these capabilities is an indication of state's weakness.

For the analysis, this research considers the four variables referred to above: critical mass, political, economic and military/security. These four variables are used to evaluate a state's strength or weakness. The result of the analysis is that West African states are all weak and some of them like Guinea-Bissau and Mali are on the brink of failure (International Crisis Group, 2012a, 2012f). A successful Security Sector Governance makes the state capable of designing and acting out on its policies.

The contexts within which SSR has been most successful to date tend to be characterised by at least a semblance of state legitimacy. That is, the presence of democratically elected officials who can cooperate, discuss and reach agreement about the direction of reform of their security sectors, not only among themselves, but also regionally and internationally. However, in many reform contexts the question of political legitimacy is still under negotiation. (Chanaa, 2002, p. 34)

According to Chanaa, "The SSR agenda can be divided into four key dimensions: political, institutional, economic and societal." (Chanaa, 2002, p. 28). These can be said to be the four pillars on which the SSR edifice rests. SSR implementation seeks to rebuild the political trust between all stakeholders in a nation (Meierhenrich, 2004, p. 154). State's institutions that crumbled during the conflict have to be restored as visible signs of recovery (Chandler, 2010; Lyons, 2005, p. 95). The economy has to function to be able to provide for the needs (Addison, 2003; Ben-Ari, 2002). Finally, societal harmony resting on the rule of law has to prevail to prevent the return to conflict (N. Ball, 2007; Reno, 2010). The four pillars were analyzed above under the political and economic power resources. To these, this work adds the military and security dimensions of the security sector.

This part of the work will not comment on the Critical mass (land and population size) because it is not yet a priority of governments in West Africa. The main concerns are the political instability, the economic crisis and the insecurity (Adejumobi, 2010; Economic Community of West African State, 2008). This does not preclude the realization that the population size can depend on the political decision of the state's

institutions and leaders (ECOWAS/WAEMU, 2006; Oduro, 2003). This section will rather develop the role of the political, economic and military/security dimensions in strengthening the state and therefore making it stable and secure for its citizens and for the international system at large. A state is functioning when it is able to respond to all these needs.

4.4.1 The Political dimension

It was argued above that political skill is an asset when leaders are capable of designing workable state's strategy and mobilize their population into implementing it. In a state under the rule of law, the mobilization takes place through convincing skills and not coercion (Lyons, 2005, p. 61). A state strategy and a population actively involved in its realization constitute a basic strength that is more likely to lead the nation-state to the achievement of other objectives (Poggi, 1991, 2001). As indicated in chapter three, one of the weaknesses of many Africa states stems from the weak participation of populations in governance institutions. The top-down governance style inherited from colonization continues to be in practice (P. Chabal, 2005; P. a. J.-P. D. Chabal, 1999; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005b, p. 125). Guinea-Conakry had successful presidential elections since 2010. It took three years of frequent clashes and negotiations in order to hold legislative and local elections. These took place on 28 September 2013 (BBC, 2013c). All this time was spent because the regime in power and the opposition were unable to forge any agreement on the electoral process. In one of its Africa Report, the International Crisis Group considered that as the time went on without an elected National Assembly, the risks of renewed violence and instability were high (International Crisis Group, 2013b). This proved to be the case. The same situation is observed in post-conflict states where the interests of the regime in power and those of the armed forces are prevalent over everything else (Lyons, 2005, p. 149). The prevalence of armed forces' interests is currently playing out in the West African states of Guinea-Bissau that is unable to get any stability because of its armed forces (International Crisis Group, 2007b, 2012a). They are opposing any attempt to take the power away from them.

The realization that the socio-political context matters a lot for security in the state was obvious well before the Third Wave of Democratisation in the 1990s (Huntington, 1991) following the end of the Cold War. With the “somehow conclusion” of the conflict, the superpowers loosened their grip on West African states, allowing them to play a greater role in their governance (Joseph, 1999; Obasanjo, 1996). Many states witnessed social unrest as people struggled to be heard through civil society organizations in the new political environment (Ebousi Boulaga, 1993). In the sixties already L. Pye developed similar variables in his study of “Political Culture and Political Development”. He indicated that Political development has several meanings: It can mean “the political and governmental conditions” that allow “higher economic performance. Political development might also have to do with “(...) an increase in administrative performance and a greater capacity for carrying out public policies”. A society can also be said to be developed when in its functioning “(...) achievement considerations replace ascriptive standards, and when functional specificity replaces functional diffuseness in social relations, and when universalistic norms supersede particularistic ones”. A state is said to be developed when both its “government and polity” are capable of handling complex challenges, and therefore are able to perform well in the modern competitive world. Development is also related to national power and is measured according to the ability of the nation-state “(...) to make the most of a society’s inherent resource base”. Finally, development can be equated with “democratic development” characterised “(...) by liberty, popular sovereignty, and free institutions”(Pye, 1965, pp. 11-12). Therefore, the objectives of political development as indicated above are similar to those of SSG. Put together, these various understandings of political development constitute the outcomes of a successful Security Sector Governance that restores states’ institutions and the rule of law (N. Ball, 2008; N. Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, 2003; Chanaa, 2002). The unpredictability of political processes that are still found in many West African states is a serious threat to their security and that of the whole sub region.

N’Diaye argues that the legacy of French colonial system and its ensuing privileged relations with French speaking African states are negatively influencing the

reform of the security sector in West Africa. This negative influence is seen in the management of the defense and civil military relations. He has come to this conclusion following a comparison with English speaking African countries.

A crucial part of this legacy for understanding the dearth of security reforms mirrors a long-standing Gaullist political tradition: a conception of national defense and security as the reserved domain of the executive, embodied in a strong presidency, as reflected in key French Fifth Republic constitutional provisions. Another consequential French legacy to which many francophone states have also subscribed is the Napoleonic notion of *raison d'état*; that is, the primacy of and deference to the “reason of state,” to be invoked in situations where controversial or morally questionable decisions are made or when critical information is withheld without a need for justification. This particular feature suited well and was eagerly put to use by all of the single party authoritarian regimes that sprung up throughout francophone Africa in the 1960s and held sway until the early 1990s. (N'Diaye, 2009, p. 6)³⁴

As a matter of caution, N'Diaye's remarks should not be generalized. In the West African community, Senegal is an exception in terms of democratic governance of the military and security sector. Since independence Senegal has always been governed by civilian leaders and has never witnessed a single military coup.

Social cohesion that comes from the rule of law to which everybody abides is one of the indicators of a successful SSR/SSG. Undeveloped or deficient political culture is one of the causes of insecurity as people turn to their kins for security (J. B. Berman, 1998) creating a security dilemma because as they seek to protect their own, tribal factions become threats to other social groups (G. E. a. N. F. Berman, 2004; N. a. S. P. Florquin, 2004). Such situations render the state irrelevant, as will be analyzed in this section. Through SSR, skillful leaders will be needed to resolve the security dilemma.

4.4.2 Economic wealth

Economic wealth is one of the fungible power assets. It allows the state to acquire other power resource that it requires (J. R. Art, 2004; Treverton, 2005). Apart from Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea which have some infrastructure to generate wealth out

³⁴ Italics in the original.

their natural resources, the rest of the states in the sub region are still in dire need of economic resources (World Bank, 2009).

Poverty is one of the key sources of West African instability (Club du Sahel, 2005b; ECOWAS/WAEMU, 2006). In many countries, the national wealth is not equally divided among all the groups that make the nation and this becomes a source of conflict (International Crisis Group, 2011b). Already in 1987, as it still is the case today, Rothstein's study indicated that Third World countries are not necessarily poor. Due to the unpredictability of their political systems constituting a threat to regimes in power, they tend to make bad economic decisions to maintain themselves (Rothstein, 1987, p. 140).

The assembled evidence appears to show that there are many Third World security problems; that there is often a complex interaction of internal security threats and external power factors; and that weakness, instability and severe resource constraints tend to focus the attention of elites on questions of regime survival and on the pursuit of short-term relief. In many countries, core values and basic interests are threatened by a range of economic and environmental pressures; it is evident that the relevant concept of national security is far broader than encompassed by the classical concentration on external enemies, defence composition and military expenditures. (M. T. a. J. R. Callaghy, 1993, p. 480)

This can be said of many African states. As regime insecurity grows, state resources are more devoted to rewarding followers and multiplying or reinforcing security forces (Rothstein, 1987, p. 142). This situation is seen in states like the DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Guinea and so on. The mismanagement of state resources was the main motive behind the Security Sector Reform initiative (N. Ball, 1987). In an economic context characterised by poverty and limited resources, after rewarding friends and overspending on regime security, there is not much left for the rest of the population (Hutchful, 2000). As a consequence, conflict and violence follow, prompted by those who feel alienated by the system (International Crisis Group, 2007c). Many rebellions have this inequality as the mobile of their action against the central government. This is the case of the Tuareg insurrection in Northern Mali (International Crisis Group, 2012f; Keita, 1998). Some researchers argue that greed on the part of warlords, rather than socio-economic grievances is the root cause of civil war (P. a. N. S. Collier, 2005). But it remains that despite the type of regime in power, the unequal distribution of the wealth will sooner or

later fuel violence. Rosenstein's work goes on to indicate how sometimes even foreign corporations become complicit in governments' mismanagement of the national wealth.

The problem arises when the relationship between the international corporation and the government exists at the expense of the country's citizens. Local communities endure the brunt of the cost externalities. Oil operations often lead to political and social turmoil and cause irreparable damage to the environment. The local communities suffer these consequences, yet enjoy few of the benefits. Moreover, governments determine the recipients of the community's share of oil revenues decide priorities and allocate resources. Tensions arise if the government rewards some groups, regions, or individuals more than others. (Rosenstein, 2005, p. 12)

Rosenstein illustrates his arguments drawing examples on the Nigerian instability where warlords easily recruit combatants among the victims of inequality in the Niger Delta: "Both Tom and Asari, the two main warlords of the Niger Delta, were able to recruit from a large pool of disgruntled, unemployed youth, many of whom were university graduates and frustrated with their extreme poverty." (Rosenstein, 2005, p. 38) The same situation has been observed in the Northern part of the country where Nigerian security forces are engaging Boko Haram, also known as Nigerian Taliban. Platas observed the confrontation of July 26 - 31, 2009. The conflict started in the Bauchi State, in less than a week it spread to Kano, Yobe and Borno states (Platas, 2009). Observers reported that the movement leader, Mohamed Yusuf who was killed on July 31, 2009 also recruited among young Nigerian university educated who could not find a job (Abubakar, 2009; Nossiter, 2009). The same pattern is observed in all the places across the world where Islamist preachers are easily recruiting young people for the fight against Western forces and their allied local governments that are believed to be the sources of their misfortune. This is the pattern observed from Somalia, where the Al-Shabab (the youth) are seriously challenging the Transitional government (E. a. D. E. S. Schmitt, 2009), to Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Taliban's source of recruitment is well assured (Tavernise, 2009) and to Northern and Western Africa where Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is gaining the momentum (Economist, 2012; E. a. S. M. Schmitt, 2009). The Malian crisis has just obtained much international attention because of the association of Malian Tuareg rebels

with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb that is considered a more serious threat to international security.

In West Africa, the Malian government, with the support of its partners, initiated projects in its Northern communities whose youth are easily recruited by Islamist fighters in the Maghreb region (Fethi, 2009; Keita, 1998). This was obviously not sufficient to quell the conflict. Northern rebels took the opportunity of unrest following a military coup in the capital Bamako on 22 March 2012, to take control of the half north of the country (Yabi, 2012). Besides employment opportunities offered by Islamist fighters, many young West Africans are dying at sea in an attempt to reach European shores for a better life in Europe (Shenker, 2012). Taje asserted that poverty is the source of migrations and conflicts in West Africa.

La dégradation des économies, la faiblesse et l'usure des infrastructures éducatives et sociales, la précarisation des ressources agricoles sont les traits communs des Etats du Sahel, rangés pour la plupart dans la catégorie des Etats les moins avancés (PMA). La paupérisation et le chômage croissant, sources de désespoir, offrent un terreau favorable aux rébellions, aux dissidences et aux extrémismes. (Taje, 2006, p. 71)³⁵

Seventy-six per cent of participants in the field research for this work posit that West African states are weak and failing because of underdevelopment, understood as a lack of resources, structural weakness and dependence on natural resources export. Ninety-five per cent consider that development is the cure to insecurity in the region because it offers people employment as an alternative to war fighting business. Other researchers have come to similar conclusion (Feichtinger, 2007; N. a. E. G. B. Florquin, 2004; United Nations, 2008b). Therefore, a successful SSR/SSG will make West African states capable of generating resources to respond to the economic needs of their populations. War fighting will become less attractive as a means to access the needed resources.

³⁵ Free translation: “The degradation of economies, the weakness and wear of educational and social infrastructures, the neglect of agricultural resources are the common characteristics of Sahel countries, most of which are listed among the Least Developed Countries (LDC). Poverty and increasing unemployment, which are the sources of despair, provide a favorable ground for rebellions, dissidences and extremisms”

4.4.3 Military and security

Military and security capabilities are vital not only for a state's survival but also because they allow other institutions to function by providing security. In the previous section, it was demonstrated that, except for Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Burkina Faso, the West African states are seriously lacking in this regard. It is hoped that through Security Sector Governance this deficiency will begin to be addressed.

In weak, failing and failed states, the military aims mainly at just securing the strategic environment that allows other means to come into play for a lasting solution to the conflict (R. Smith, 2008). Strengthening the state through the reform of its security apparatuses remain the ultimate goal. Military and security forces in West Africa, like in other parts of the African continent, play an "ambiguous" role (Howe, 2005). They are the primary threats to the security of the sub-region, but at the same time they remain the hope for its survival. Well trained, equipped and paid military forces are the solution to the insecurity problems in the sub region (Economic Community of West African States, 2006). When security is provided, populations will be able to become more productive in their daily activities. The primary objective of any external intervention should be the re-establishment of the state in its capacity for sustainable protection of its people and their properties (M. Knight, 2009). The focus is on state's capacity and not on the regime in power. Zisk's study of complex peace operations after the 1990s shows that the help from bilateral and multilateral partners often fails to meet its objectives because of conflicting agendas on their part (Zisk, 2004b). On the one hand, the desire to control the situation on the ground in the recipient country, and on the other hand, the lack of political will to pay the price involved. This is illustrated by the SSR experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adebajo, 2002a; Jaye, 2010).

(...)as time goes on, the lessons of the complex peacekeeping operations of the 1990s remain relevant, despite the American predilection for unilateral action. (...). Tensions will continue between the desire to control political developments on the ground and the lack of political will to do so. There will also be ongoing strains between the

requirements that operations be on the one hand cohesive, and on the other legitimized through multilateralism and local ownership of the peace process. (...) even when liberal democratic states appear to have strong interests in gaining control over foreign societies, they will almost always lack the political will to follow through on their plans with cohesive, well designed operations. Competing political goals get in the way. It has become a truism to make this argument about peacekeeping. UN corridors frequently echo with laments about the absence of political will among member states. (Zisk, 2004a, pp. 146-147)

Strengthening the military and security forces as a solution to West African insecurity is accepted by both SSR recipient states and external partners. SSR/SSG aims at establishing a democratic control of armed and security forces through civil states' authorities (N. Ball, 2008; Born, 2004). But it remains a contentious area of SSR because of the security dilemma involved. Many times the regime in power accepts the professionalization of the military and security forces only if they are able to control them. Otherwise, they would rather have low grade armed and security forces that will easily follow their dictate (Howe, 2005). Because of the deficient democratic culture (Wiarda, 2004), well trained soldiers become a threat to the regime in power as it was recently observed in Mali. The leader of the junta that toppled the government in the military coup of March 2012, Captain Sanogo³⁶, was part of the regional troops that had just been trained by the Americans (Nossiter, 2012b). Armed forces bow easily to the dictate of the regime when its leadership is based on the ethnic affiliation with the regime (A. Fawole, 2005, p. 68).

In many African armies and security forces, informal links and structures of power, based on such factors as ethnic, family and political connections, count for much more than formal hierarchy and lines of command. Hence, a key issue in the outcome of governance is how holders of political power and managers of coercion relate to one another, as well as how they respond to institutional and political challenges from 'strongmen' within constituencies under their formal control (Hutchful, 2000, p. 212).

When regimes in power are unable to control the armed and security forces, they turn to alternative provisions of these services that are increasingly available since the end of the Cold War (Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2000; N'Diaye, 2005). These are the multiple Private

³⁶ As part of the reconciliation with armed forces, the departing administration of Dioncounda Traore promoted Capt. Sanogo to the title of General. New presidential elections were concluded on 04 September 2013 with the victory of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

Military and Security Corporations. Therefore, resources that could have been used to train, equip and pay national armed and security forces are diverted towards the protection of the regime (Lyons, 2005). Financial reports will show that while funds have been invested for the armed and security forces, results in terms of security for populations will still be lacking.

Likewise, Western powers are increasingly relying on Private Military Companies to fight wars on their behalf in places they do not want to go (Dickinson, 2011). Since the Somalia debacle commonly referred to as the “Blackhawk down” (Fishel, 2006), they fear getting entangled in African conflicts. This was the case with Britain in Sierra Leone (International Crisis Group, 2008b) and the United States in Liberia (International Crisis Group, 2009b). In these instances of use of alternative security providers, actions are taken to resolve particular issues at a particular time. It remains that lasting solutions require more commitment of resources than can be provided for by private companies. The increasing reliance on Private Military and Private Security Companies is not without its load of problems for West African states. Musah calls this situation an Africa security dilemma (Gumedze, 2007; Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2000). These forces are needed to provide for the lacking security in weak states, but at the same time they are threats to states’ control over the means of force (Avant, 2005). When a state lacks control over these, it is less likely to be able to provide security for its people and their properties.

PMC and PSC are more and more replacing states in the provision of security goods in many places around the world. It is a serious challenge to state-centered International Relations as we have known it since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) (M. Weber, 1964). It is a departure from the situation whereby the state controls the means of force to the one where these are controlled by multiple organizations as it is happening in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Christensen, 2007; Fayemi, 2004; Livingston, 2011).

It is believed that the mobile behind the April 2012 military coups in Guinea Bissau had to do with the presence of 200 well trained and equipped Angolan military personnel. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr and the interim President Raimundo Pereira, brought in the Angolan Technical and Military Assistance Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG) to assist in the implementation of the SSR/SSG (Bahnson, 2011). The SSR program

involved the reduction of armed forces and this was not accepted by the latter (Rogez, 2012; Vlassenroot, 2008). The International Crisis Group Report also indicated that regional military powers, Senegal and Nigeria were less comfortable with the presence of another military power in their backyard (International Crisis Group, 2012a). Therefore, the Angolans bowed to the pressure and pulled out. The West African Community sent in a contingent to replace them and pursue the same SSR mission (Economic Community of West African State, 2012b).

The Malian and the Bissau Guinean armed forces were both opposed at the beginning to the coming of the regional military contingents in their countries following military coups (BBC, 2012b). They considered them a direct threat to their newly grabbed power. All of the above supports the argument that the presence of multiple military and security forces on a territory is not always a source of increased security provision.

The state exists mostly to provide security to its population (Poggi, 1991). This expectation remains despite the participation of non-governmental organizations in the provision of security. Post-industrial states have reached a stage where they can accommodate some forms of private security services especially in their overseas military operations (Livingston, 2011; P. W. P. W. Singer, 2008)³⁷. None of the West African states have reached this stage of development. Most developing nations-states cannot yet afford this delegation of the use of force. Many of them especially in Africa are still battling or just coming out of conflicts with one or more insurgencies or rebellions (B. Buzan, 1991, p. 99). Therefore relinquishing the control over the means of force is an indication of weakness and inability to provide security.

The perils of states failing in their quintessential security function are starkly highlighted when one looks towards the African continent. Plagued by a host of intra-state instabilities, lawlessness, criminality, civil wars, ethnic clashes, recurrent coups d'état, armed insurgencies, factional fighting, military disloyalty, and ideational conflicts, the African continent exemplifies manifold forms of non-state violence and a clear absence of the state's monopoly over force and all forms of organised violence. (Small, 2006, pp. 12-13)

³⁷ This is currently the case with the United States and its allies in the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In this context, Small ascertains that allowing private sources to exercise authority over the use of force “compromises state power and sovereignty”. Therefore, security becomes like a public good, structurally removed “from the public domain of accountability, legitimacy, and control” (Leander, 2007; Small, 2006, p. 15). Unable to honour its social contract of providing security, the state slips further down into obsolescence and failure (Colletta, 2009, p. 7). Therefore, PMC and PSC should be used with cautious in SSR/SSG programs because they risk further weakening the state instead of strengthening it.

Evaluating the “Progress of Security Sector Reform” in Liberia, the International Crisis Group does not question the U.S and other donor paid PMCs’ contribution in raising the fledgling Liberian army. Rather, it expresses concerns that there will not be the needed funding to allow this action to continue for at least the next decade for it to be fully successful.

Management of the army SSR process has been far from perfect but the efforts of individuals in key coordinating roles and the ability of the U.S. to take on extra responsibilities have in large part kept the program on course. Of greater concern is what will happen when all responsibility is handed over to the Liberian government. The MoD has already displayed weakness in dealing with the expectations of the fledgling army. It needs to take full advantage of the PMCs’ expertise before they leave, strengthen army middle management and in the long term imbue the institution with the doctrines of civilian control and rule of- law. Experience, however, can only come with time. Donors, the U.S. in particular, and regional partners should be far-sighted in guaranteeing financial and military support for at least the next decade, while the army finds its feet. (International Crisis Group, 2009b, p. 15)³⁸

The international cooperation will end, many times sooner than required. The state whether ready or not will have to assume its responsibility of managing the security sector.

While recognizing the need for continuing commitment on the part of the donors, the Report questions the political will of Liberian leaders who do not show significant commitment at owning the process. The success of SSR programs is predicated on local ownership of the process (N. Ball, 1998; Chanaa, 2002; GFN - SSR, 2007; OECD, 2007).

³⁸ MoD stands for Ministry of Defence

Over the course of the cooperation, the local state must develop the necessary capacity to continue with the reforms when the external assistance stops.

With regard to the role of international actors, aside from commitment to support and finance the rebuilding of collapsed states, external donors have a role to play in helping West African states engage in and sustain an SSR agenda. Although local ownership and popular participation are critical to success, it is important to recognise the heavy dependence of most West African states on developed countries, their institutions and their industries. While acknowledging the sensitivity of security issues and the legitimate concerns of essentially weak states, donors must make security a 'public good' in which the provision of efficiency, transparency and accountability are important conditions of their assistance (A. Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and 'Funmi Olonisakin, 2008, p. 336).

The absence of ownership of SSR program is one of the consequences of the reliance on non-state provision of security. States' failure to take into account the short-term commitments of external donors and the use of PMCs in the security sector reform program has the potential to derail the whole process. The SSR has the chance of success if reformed, professionalized, well paid armed and security forces provide stability to the state (Sedra, 2010). This in turn will allow the state to generate the needed resources to continue the SSR/SSG to completion. The process is complete when the state regains the capacity to function normally.

4.2 Conclusion

Security Sector Governance offers the best prospect of solving the problem of insecurity in West Africa. This is possible because it calls for the reform of the many state' institutions that relate to security matters (Chanaa, 2002). The problem lies with the operationalization of this concept in West African settings because the limited local resources prevent the ownership of the SSR/SSG programs (Bryden Alan, 2008c). The reform of the security sector was promoted by the development donors as an answer to underdevelopment. This was thought to be the cause of insecurity in poor and developing countries. Not only does the donors' community seek to control the whole reform process, but also recipient states do not always stand up to the challenge of owning it. As

a result many times, SSR/SSG initiatives fail like other earlier development projects (Paul. Collier, 2007). The program is very challenging for both donors and recipient states, but it remains the only way to go forward. State's weakness and failure is in no party's interest.

The current discourses and actions of West African states and their international partners indicate their conviction and determination to enact Security Sector Reform/Governance as a response to states' weakness (United Nations, 2008b). These states are weak because they lack sufficient political, economic, military and security resources (A. Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and 'Funmi Olonisakin, 2008). To address the issue any action must aim at restoring or creating capabilities in these areas. State' power resources are very important because international partners assisting to end the conflict cannot commit to long term assistance. Also, the recipient state has to take responsibility of its securitization for its own survival (Clapham, 1996). SSR/SSG is considered to have succeeded in a state, when political and economic processes are transparent and predictable. Only then would all social groups participate in the nation-state building (Adebajo, 2004b). Further, SSR/SSG has succeeded when the armed and security forces are accountable to a democratically elected government and parliament and not merely to a regime in power (Howe, 2005). Then and only then, would all state's institutions function normally so as to deter or mitigate sources of insecurity. No single West African state has sufficient resources to achieve the SSR/SSG program on its own might. Also, strategically a unilateral SSR action is likely to fail because of the inevitable spill over effects of conflicts in the sub region (Ebo, 2007). A regional approach to the reform is what ECOWAS is currently pursuing. The experience is ongoing and the current socio-political and economic situations in Liberia and Sierra Leone point in the positive direction.

Taken individually, there are very few West African countries that are able to stand up to the challenges of instability and insecurity on their own. Acting together offers a better chance of success. This is a project that has been ongoing since the sixties as the Organization of African Unity was set up in 1963 (OAU, 1964). Before the eventual unity, a number of cooperation mechanisms are functioning. One of these is the

African regional communities that are supposed to pave the way towards continental unity. The Economic Community of West African States that is at the center of this study is the most advanced on the African continent in terms of responding to the challenges of underdevelopment and insecurity. The next chapter will analyze the security mechanisms of the Economic Community of West African States. The challenges to its success are obvious but the actions being promoted are indications of positive steps. The lacking capacity in individual member states is supplemented by the pooling of resources that the community promotes. The current actions of ECOWAS to respond to instability and insecurity in the sub region are the clear indications of how SSR/SSG program is being implemented.

Chapter Five: ECOWAS AND SECURITY IN THE SUB REGION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes this work on the Security Challenges of the States building crisis in West Africa. Post-colonial nation-states building started on the 6th of March 1957 when Ghana was the first West African state to become independent.

West African states have been weak since their independences. The first chapter introduced the phenomenon of weakness that characterizes West African states up to this date. Chapter two analyzed the literature review on the topic of States building crisis in West Africa since the sixties. The weakness of West African states comes from their own socio-political and economic structures. Deficient structures are still holding them behind other states in the international system. Global powers have also historically played a considerable role in weakening West African states. The processes of the weakness of West African states were analyzed in chapter three. This work posits that insecurity is at the heart of the West African states problems. This is what has hindered all efforts to develop capacities in the sub-region (Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2009; Souare, 2006). Chapter four of this work looked at how the weakness of the security sector portrays the weakness of states in the sub region.

For the last half a century, bilateral and multilateral partners have assisted these states in their development efforts. So far, all these efforts have not produced the desired outcomes. The failure of the development models started being seriously addressed since the end of the Cold war in 1989 (G. B. N. Ayittey, 2005; Calderisi, 2006a). The Security Sector Reform and Governance programs are more and more considered as better solutions to the lack of peace, security and development in weak and fragile states (N. a. K. F. Ball, 2004; A. Schnabel, Vanessa Farr, 2012; Sedra, 2010). These programs have the greatest merit of tackling all the state's institutions under the banner of the security family (Chanaa, 2002). Chapter four extensively discussed this topic.

Taken individually, West African states are too weak to address their challenges alone. Since 1975, when the Economic Community of West African States was established, member states have been working towards more and more pooling of resources. This has allowed them to collectively develop the missing capacity (Adebajo, 2004b; J. E. a. W. S. Okolo, 1990). Insecurity being the main obstacle on their way, chapter five evaluates the prospects and the challenges of ECOWAS' quest to become a Regional Security Community.

The Economic Community of West African states is made of weak states according to international relations standard (D. Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, 2010; Rotberg, 2003b). None of the fifteen states is considered a power in the global system as demonstrated above (D. Carment, 2005; Foreign Policy, 2011; World Bank, 2009). As such they are all on the periphery of the centres where major decisions regarding world's matters are taken (M. R. Singer, 1972). The international system rests on states that have the power capabilities to be able to influence the conduct of world affairs (Handel, 1990). This realization has been obvious for most African states in general since colonisation and decolonisation (Dumont, 1969; El-Ayouty, 1994; Lavelle, 2004; Yifru, 1962). That is why there have always been efforts to pool resources in an attempt to form a counterweight to the global powers influences in the region (Nkrumah, 1963; Padelford, 1964; S. Schmidt, 2010). This process was initiated during the colonisation period, obviously controlled by the metropolitan powers. The different groupings of the nascent African states were designed according to the wishes of the former colonial powers (Emerson, 1962; Kloman, 1962). This control continued unabashed all through the Cold War (1945-1990) (N'Diaye, 2009). Following the end of the Cold war standoff between the two superpowers in 1989, their strategic interests in the Third world changed (Badmus, 2008). This was translated by the end of the military support to rebel movements (Kanet, 2006; Souare, 2006). As a result most countries in the periphery widened their influence through regional and sub regional organizations. This was an attempt to somehow occupy the empty space left by the superpowers whose strategic interests have shifted away from non-strategic states (Kelly, 2007, p. 19). Chapter five first examines how and why this shift occurred. It will then evaluate the

impact for West African states to assume more responsibilities in the securitization of the sub region.

To elaborate on this topic this work starts by looking at how since the end of the Second World War, starting in Europe, governments have been establishing communities. The cooperation on political, economic and security matters aims to spare their people “the scourge” of another war (Haas, 1958). Some of the theories explaining this cooperation will be briefly analyzed to explain that the cooperation taking place in West Africa fits in the general theories of international relations as devised over time (Kofi, 2006; Lavergne, 1997). There exist various international relation theories to explain why states choose to enter into alliances (D. A. D. A. Baldwin, 2008). Two of these will be explored in the first section of this chapter. Since Deutsch’s work on political communities in the fifties (Deutsch, 1954) , the post Cold-war witnessed an increasing interest on the field as indicated by the work of Adler and Barnett (E. a. M. B. Adler, 1998). The Regional Security Complex Theory developed by Buzan and his colleagues at the Copenhagen School of International Relations is the outcome of years of research in security studies (B. Buzan, 1991; B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). The Regional Security Complex Theory is adopted in this research for its consideration of the relationship between weak states and major powers in the international system. Therefore, the theory has the potential of helping weak West African states cope with the change in the global security system. The change implies that the strategic interests of major powers shifted following the end of the Cold War. As a result, states that were previously protected by them now have to look after their own security. This was studied by Hammerstad in his work on Southern African Community (Hammerstad, 2005). Most African regional communities are seeking collective ways of responding to insecurity.

The Post-Cold war disengagement of the global powers was followed by instability in the West African sub-region. This was fuelled by the absence of a global power to guarantee security and the easy access to small arms and light weapons (Ayissi, 2005; Mazrui, 2002). The crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s shook the foundations of the ECOWAS (Adebajo, 2002a). The community that considered itself as solely aiming at political and economic integration had to incorporate

the military and security dimensions in its policies (Carr, 2010). The establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a military and security branch was the response of the community to this new situation. This is going to become a permanent organization one of which the ECOWAS uses to settle conflicts in its member states (Adebajo, 2002b, 2004b).

The application of the Regional Security Complex Theory in the ECOWAS security processes is at the heart of this chapter. Security Sector Reform or Governance programs offer the best hope of building the capacities in weak states. But they are limited in their effectiveness by the lack of the local ownership of the processes as discussed in the previous chapter (Bryden Alan, 2008c). The success of an SSR program requires a long-term commitment that donor countries cannot guarantee. Therefore, countries have to look for alternative sources of support in order to succeed in the securitization of their societies (D. J. Francis, 2006). Given their incapacity, their chances of success are in the pooling of resources that the sub regional mechanisms allow.

5.2 West African institutionalization since independence

Africans and West Africans in particular have taken stock of their weakness in the international system. To address this issue, they have been establishing institutions. These allow them to pool their resource in order to address together their challenges. Institutionalization also allow these states to reduce the transaction costs in the dealing with global powers (Kolodziej, 2005). There are various schools that explain why and how states decide to cooperate. This section will look at some of these IR schools of thought as they relate to ECOWAS institutions.

1. The interstates integration and cooperation in ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States that is analyzed in this chapter is an intergovernmental organization. As such it is grounded in the long tradition of international organizations. To understand its establishment and functioning, it is better to start by looking briefly at the genesis of interstates integration or cooperation. The history

of international organizations is a subject on its own that cannot be covered in this research.

History has records of catalyst leaders that attempted to federate the regions of the world for various reasons. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Simon Bolivar (1783-1830) and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) are among many cases of such leaders. They tried to federate their respective regions through military and ideological coercion. Prompted by the experience of the European Economic Community, studies of regional organizations focus on “(...) *noncoercive* efforts”(Haas, 1970, p. 608)³⁹. States choose freely to enter into a process of cooperation and integration.

Chapter VIII of the United Nations’ Charter provides for “Regional Arrangements”, “(...) provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (Art.52.1)(United Nations, 1945). The theory of regional cooperation or integration was elaborated in Europe after the Second World War. Europeans established institutions to contain “(...) nationalism and promote economies of scale”(Mazzeo, 1984, p. 3). So far, the European integration process that started in 1959 is presented as a model for other regional arrangements (Haas, 1961, p. 366; S. J. Nye, 1965, p. 870). Most scholars of international organizations agree that the work of Karl W. Deutsch is a pioneer in the field (Deutsch, 1954).

In 1965, J. S. Nye did introduce the integration process in intergovernmental relations by distinguishing high and low politics : “‘High’ politics is symbol laden, emotive, and based on attitudes characterized by greater intensity and duration than ‘low’ politics which is consequently more susceptible to the rational calculation of benefits associated with economic problems”(S. J. Nye, 1965, p. 871). This characterization implies economics and politics. Economics is here considered as being a matter of low politics, while politics itself is high. Countries therefore choose to get involved in the process going from low to high politics characterized by a “period of vulnerability” during which anything can happen (S. J. Nye, 1965, p. 872). During this period, actors can change their mind and reverse the process or can go ahead intensifying their loyalties towards

³⁹ Italics in the original.

integration. The European community is still involved in this process towards integration. The economic cooperation is much easier to achieve than is integration that implies surrendering significant aspects of a member state' sovereignty.

The modern international system is characterized by states proclaiming their willingness to cooperate with other states in order to avoid conflicts and wars (Ikenberry, 2006a; R. O. R. O. Keohane, 1989). But at the same time, these states are attempting to exploit others and impose their will on them in order to maximize their interests (Mearsheimer, 1995; H. Morgenthau, 1978). International organizations have to operate amid these paradoxes. L. Bennett has pointed out a number of these contradictions. States do affirm strongly their sovereignty, at the same time they are conscious of living in an increasingly interdependent world. They cooperate easily when their interests converge, and when they diverge, states are likely to be in conflict with one another. Most wars are born out of clashes of interests between the protagonists to the conflict (H. J. H. J. Morgenthau, 1962). Policy-makers behave differently in domestic politics and in international ones, though the same policies are likely to lead the two realms of action. It has also been noted that elements that produce order in national societies do not produce the same result at the international level (Griffiths, 1999, p. 51). Liberals are more sensitive to the spreading of solutions that work at home (Ikenberry, 2006b). They believe that liberal peace can be propagated and bring peace to the whole world. The same goes with national values that are thought to be exportable to other nations.

A state creates a national culture through “education, language, religion and/or ideology, economic ties,(...)”. The international level is so characterized by a diversity of cultures that these elements cannot operate seemingly (A. L. A. L. Bennett, 1995, pp. 4-7). These paradoxes stem from individual minds that form societies. Because of globalisation, the state system is increasingly viewed as a source of insecurity. Therefore regional organisations that are still state-centric are considered more capable of providing the needed security. It has always been assumed that some forms of cooperation at the regional or international level have the potential of bringing with them other benefits among which the most outstanding is security. Deutsche studies since the fifties are the

foundation of the concept that an inter-states community is the most likely to bring peace and stability among states sharing the same values and interests (Deutsch, 1954, 1957). The Rome treaty of 1957 that gave birth to the European Union has always been cited as an outstanding example of the success of this concept. African states saw in it the example to emulate (Haas, 1961; Ukeje, 2005). African regional organisations like similar bodies around the world borrow greatly from the European experience, but the configuration of intergovernmental communities being so established are significantly marked by the colonial and post-colonial experiences states have gone through.

Contemporary regionalism in the developing world is therefore very different from regionalist attempts in the 1950s, when it was overwhelmingly political both in the aspirations and its forms. In contrast to that earlier period, 'new regionalism' is principally a defensive response to the economic marginalization of much of the South in the 1980s, its political reconfiguration during the political and economic turmoil at the end of the Cold War, and a fear of, or reaction to, the trend towards a globalized economy. States are the main actors in new regionalist blocs, sometimes responding to demands generated within society, sometimes in response to external pressures, and sometimes as a result of a particular regionalist vision of relatively autonomous state elites. (Grugel, 1999, p. 4)

Nowadays African regionalism programs have to take stock of the independences that did not bring all the expected results in terms of political development and economic gains. The International Financial Institutions promoted the Structural Adjustment Programs that equally failed the recipient countries. The democratisation processes that were allowed by the end of the Cold War equally failed to bring stability to weak states. Unfortunately, the same old failed cures are still called upon to heal contemporary ills.

5.2.1 The two main schools in African intergovernmental organizations

There are many schools of thought that analyze international organizations: realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc. Realism is the theory of international relations that put emphasis on national interests and security (S. D. Krasner, 1978; H. J. H. J. Morgenthau, 1951). Opposed to realism is liberalism that considers that more than power and interest, international relations are shaped by shared values like democracy (Doyle, 1997; Kant, 2006). Besides these two dominant theories, there are others like constructivism that holds in suspicions the other theories because it considers that all social trends are

constructed to fit a particular agenda (Cox, 2002; Wendt, 1999). Some proponents of constructivism posit that it is a method and not a theory (John Gerard Ruggie, 1998a). This position is justified by the fact that constructivism incorporates elements of the major two theories that are realism and liberalism.

As they obtained the independences, early on African states expressed the desire to federate their nations carved out by European powers (Asiwaju, 1985; Esedebe, 1994). The unification of the continent was seen as a way of not of overcoming the consequences of the artificial boundaries created by foreign powers. It was also considered to be a way of pooling the resources of newly independent states to face together their challenges (Nkrumah, 1963). All the early African leaders agreed on the need to form a single continental body, the Organization of African Unity (Esedebe, 1994). But in practice there were two tendencies that continue to this day (D. J. Francis, 2006). On one hand, the integrationists who advocated for the integration of all states into one supranational state (F. C. Andrain, 1962). On the other hand, the cooperationists who wanted a gradual integration process starting with cooperation in various components of statecraft (McWilliams, 1964). The formation of regional bodies like ECOWAS is part of this gradual process. Therefore, African intergovernmental relations in general are characterized by these two main processes, the cooperation and the integration schools (J. E. Okolo, 1985). All African regional and sub regional organizations follow the same pattern.

The integration school

The concept of integration implies the “(...) unification or putting parts together into a whole”(Ezenwe, 1983, p. 10). For the integration or federalist school, political integration is a prerequisite to economic integration (Martin, 2002, p. 127). Countries have to form a big supra-national body to plan and implement common policies. D. Mazzeo calls this school, the federalist because it relies on elites to fulfill its objectives (Mazzeo, 1984, p. 3).

Early panafricanists, who were socialists by ideology, belong to this school. These are the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah, the Guinean Sekou Toure and the Malian Modibo Keita.

They formed the Casablanca⁴⁰ group alongside King Hassan II of Morocco in 1961. They quickly “(...) assumed that as soon as Africans came to freedom they would sweep aside the arbitrary boundaries imposed by the imperialists that cut across tribes and overrode the dictates of geography and economics”(Emerson, 1962, p. 276). As indicated in chapter three, most African regional and sub regional organizations were established during the Cold War. As such they were subjected to the Cold War strategy of the Western powers that colonized most African states (La Serre, 1990). The Cold War agenda is going to override the one set out by early panafricanists.

The cooperation school

The cooperation or neo-functionalist⁴¹ school favours the gradual or functional approach to regional integration. Ezenwe posits that “Cooperation refers to joint action, by two or more states, in the form of common programs or projects in functionally specific areas (...)”. He goes on to indicate that integration as a final objective is achieved through a gradual dynamic process whereby states progressively remove all obstacles to their integration (Ezenwe, 1983, p. 11). Functionalists give precedence to economics over politics (Mazzeo, 1984, p. 4; S. J. Nye, 1970, p. 796). As it will be demonstrated in the next section, economics are part of low politics. Therefore it is easy for stakeholders to find common grounds. This is not the case with political issues that are part of high politics. For functionalists, countries have to start cooperating in key segments of their socioeconomic apparatuses and gradually move towards integration. Early West African leaders who were more liberal by ideology belong to this school of thought. These are the Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Ivorian Felix Houphouet-Boigny and the Senegalese Leopold Senghor. They united under the Monrovia⁴² Group in the same year 1961

⁴⁰ Casablanca is Morocco’s largest city. The group is named after the city where the meeting took place.

⁴¹ Functionalism is a theory of international relations that posit for cooperation beyond the framework of states. This is based on shared needs and interests and is not concerned by political affiliation. Haas, E. B. *Beyond the nation-state : functionalism and international organization*, Stanford University Press, 1968. Neo-functionalism brought back the territorial dimension of the cooperation.

⁴² Monrovia is the capital of Liberia. The group is also name after the city where the meeting took place.

(Emerson, 1962, pp. 286-288). They seek to preserve the recently acquired states' sovereignty (Martin, 2002, p. 127) by avoiding its surrender to the continental organization. From the very beginning of African integration movement, the absolute states' equality was promoted by the Monrovia group. This group was larger with 21 states⁴³; compared to the Casablanca group that was made of only 4 states (Morocco, Ghana, Guinea and Mali) (Emerson, 1962, p. 279).

The early African leaders who are from the West African sub-region have been chosen to illustrate the influence of the Cold war political environment in African institutional arrangement in general. The left and right political divide of the international system was also present in the nascent West African states (Danchev, 2006). Chapter three analyzed the negative impact of the Cold war on West African states building. This chapter will illustrate how the Economic Community of West African States security mechanisms remain the best option despite the fact that it is overlaid by global powers (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). The emphasis is on institutions building (Moravcsik, 1995) as the framework of the security cooperation.

5.2.1 Three institutionalist theories

Each of the school of thought comprises various trends or approaches to integration and cooperation. J.J. Mearsheimer presents three institutionalist theories that are of interest to this study: liberal institutionalism, collective security and critical theory (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 14). These theories are relevant to this work because it illustrates well the difficulties African intergovernmental organizations are facing given their liberal orientation and their strong dependence on Western powers that are mainly pursuing realist policies (Doyle, 1997; Hounnikpo, 2011). Many organizations have been established over the years and failed because of the failure to grasp the difference between local states and global powers' interests.

⁴³ Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Brazzaville community (Former French African

Liberal institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism avoids security issues to focus on “economic and environmental cooperation”(Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 14). It presumes that increased cooperation is likely to reduce the risk of conflict and war among states (Heper, 1997; Kant, 2006). The emphasis is on low politics that is less prone to conflict as argued by Nye above. Liberal institutionalists will create rules in order to prevent states from engaging in acts of aggression against other states. Proponents of liberal institutionalism posit that through cooperation all the parties are better off than through competition (H. Milner, 1992, p. 468). In games theory, this corresponds to the prisoners’ dilemma whereby cooperation is the only way out. Any attempt to take advantage of the partner will bring down all the parties.

This is particularly true of the West African context. There are very few countries that are able to sustain themselves in the international system (Edi, 2007a). Their demography, economy and military capabilities are very limited. Most of the countries need assistance and since the whole system is interdependent, even stronger countries need weaker ones. The aim of the institution is to show stronger states that their sacrifice is just short-term and is going to bear them higher gains (John Gerard Ruggie, 1982). Liberal institutionalists “(...) argue that institutions can change a state’s calculations about how to maximize gains. Specifically, rules can get states to make the short-term sacrifices needed to resolve the prisoners’ dilemma and thus to realize long-term gains. Institutions, in short, can produce cooperation” (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 18). The strength of institutions comes from the political will and commitment of member states. It will be argued that these have been deficient in the ECOWAS.

Based on J. Grieco’s work, one can raise a flaw in this liberal institutionalist’s assumption about economic cooperation. It focuses on absolute-gain and ignores the relative-gains calculations of state (Grieco, 1988, p. 487). States are equally concerned about how much others are going to gain in the cooperation relative to their own gain.

colonies, except Mali and Guinea.

Another difficulty with liberal institutionalism is its refusal to face security issues where the prospect of cooperation is the most challenged. Security issues are about high politics as indicated above. Calculations are very tight because a slight mistake is likely to lead to devastation as illustrated with the nuclear power balance in the fifties (Kissinger, 1957). But generally, liberal institutionalism can be credited with the empirical evidence of states acceptance of sets of rules, norms, principles and procedures of cooperation. These are the basis international organizations (*R. O. R. O. Keohane, 1941, 1982*)⁴⁴. In 1995, L. Bennett estimated that there existed “(...) 300 public and 5,000 private international organizations”(A. L. A. L. Bennett, 1995, p. 8). Eighty per cent of these organizations were created after the Second World War that ended in 1945. Given their weakness in the international system, Africans have been very active in establishing cooperation institutions. Unfortunately they have not always been able to financially sustain them.

Collective security

Collective security comes out of states commitment to cooperate in this field so as the threat to one of them is considered as a threat to all who therefore intervene to defend the threatened member.

The enthusiasm for collective security after the First World War had some promise of putting an end to the “scourge of war”, but the failure of both the League of Nations and the United Nations to measure up to the task truncated interest in this whole approach (Orakhelashvili, 2011). What might have been a major breakthrough turned out to be what John Herz calls the ‘security dilemma’ that became obvious in the early 1950s (Herz, 1951). “Security dilemma is a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention; to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive, and the measures of others as potentially threatening”.(Herman, 1996, p. 371)

⁴⁴International regimes are synonymous to international organizations.

Since it is impossible to avoid the use of force in the international system, states will seek to protect their nations in a collective security organization. They do so by pooling together their resources in order to protect themselves against aggressors. Therefore states will have to agree to keep the status quo to maintain the cooperation. Any aggressor will be crushed with overwhelming force. Also, “(...) states must trust each other to renounce aggression and to mean that renunciation. They must also be confident that other states will come to their rescue, should they become target of aggression” (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 14)⁴⁵. The League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations (1945) were established in order to eliminate the recourse to war as a way of settling conflicts⁴⁶. To do this they do promote collective security. L. Bennett argues that: “The theory of collective security rests on the assumption that all nations share a primary interest in maintaining peace. For collective security to operate, peace must be viewed as indivisible, and threats to peace anywhere must be treated as the concern of all members of the international system”(A. L. A. L. Bennett, 1995, p. 148). The reality of interstates relations often paints a different picture.

One of the issues with the collective security as defined by the League of Nations’ treaty of 1920 is illustrated by Morgenthau. He argues that indecision on the part of Britain and France in the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936) led to the beginning of the Second World War. The Status quo that followed the Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1919 was beginning to shake. The United States, Germany and Japan did not join the League system of collective security. Germany and Japan were looking for the break-up of the status quo so that they could advance their respective regional claims. France and Britain were left alone with terrible choices to make. They had to choose either to defend their interests at home by protecting the status quo and keeping Russia in control. Or to defend the League

⁴⁵ See also Preseident Denis Sassou N’Guesso (Republic of Congo-Brazzaville) interview with *African Geopolitics* : “L’assistance mutuelle assure est un pilier de l’avenir africain”. He is making a strong case for assurance that mutual assistance will come should a member of collective security be threatened. Realists would answer that this assurance is difficult to provide since states as self-interested actors, their actions would depend on whether their interests are at stake or not.

⁴⁶ The United Nations Charter in its Preamble, speaks of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war”

by helping Ethiopia against Italy that would lead Italy to ally with Germany. They tried to do both and lost both. Italy allied with Germany and the Second World War broke up.

The debacle of collective security, as applied to the Italian aggression against Ethiopia, conveys two important lessons. It shows the contradiction between an ideally perfect scheme of reform and a political reality that lacks all the elements upon which the success of the scheme was predicated. It shows also the fatal weakness of a foreign policy that is incapable of deciding whether to be guided by the national interest, however defined, or by a supranational principle embodying what is considered to be the common good of the community of nations. (H. Morgenthau, 1978, p. 424).

The Italo-Ethiopian conflict had far reaching consequences on the African continent. According to Esedebe it is among the motives that led African states to unite through the continental organization in order to protect themselves against external aggression (Esedebe, 1994, pp. 111-160). The Organization of African Unity that was so established in 1963 is going to be the face of African people's hopes and disappointments. This situation will be further examined in the subsequent sections.

Following the League of Nations (1920-1946), the United Nations (since 1945) has been striving to promote collective security. As he invited for the review of the Security Council, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations' Report was boldly called "Collective Security". In the Post-Cold War period both rich and poor countries are facing the same security threats and challenges. Mr. Koffi Annan invited the world to a more sense of shared responsibility in responding to these (United Nations, 2004). This report was a strong stand against a "(...) two worlds model"(Drew Green, 2001) in international relations. This model was likely to develop following the 9/11 attack in the United States and the military response that followed mostly in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule,

mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us
(United Nations, 2004, p. 10)

Schnabel study of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping shows that the situation has not changed as compared to the Cold War period. His case study covers the United States, Russia and Germany and illustrates that a peacekeeping mission is likely to succeed if global powers' interests are to be promoted through them. Interests can be material in terms of direct access to resources to be gained through a possible intervention. They can also be immaterial and gained through the given country's strategic positioning in the international system (A. Schnabel, 1997). The challenges of security in globalizing world were also studied by Battersby in his 2009 work (Battersby, 2009). Collective security through the United Nations remains an ideal that the international community still finds difficult to implement. Regional and sub-regional communities where conflicts are close to home offer the best prospects of success as it will be illustrated in this chapter.

Critical theory

The critical theory's ambition is to transform completely the international system that has been so heavily guided by realism through a genuine peaceful world. Critical theorists believe that "ideas and discourse" can achieve this by changing the way people look at reality (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 15; John Gerard Ruggie, 1995). Socialist policy makers are more likely to be proponents of the critical theory in international relations. This is illustrated in Noam Chomsky extensive work. (Chomsky, 2003). Despite its limits, institutions creation still holds the best prospects of bringing peace in international relations.

Institutions are born out of ideas. Ideas are here understood as a number of shared set of beliefs, principles patterns and world views that influence the behaviour (J. Knight, 1992). Some theories of international relations suggest that ideas make the world. Jeffrey T. Checkel is one of the authors who have dealt with the role of ideas in influencing state's policy. His case study is the political transition in the former USSR that led to the

end of the Cold war. His research is interesting because he shows how structures and individual agents that he calls “policy entrepreneurs” mediate these ideas’ influence (Checkel, 1997, p. 10). With the détente in superpowers’ rivalry, socialist states mostly those under the umbrella of the former USSR began to turn to the West. They opened to Western socio-economic ideas and saw in them more opportunities for their development. Russian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Gorbachev seized the opportunity to push for the shake off of the former USSR. Eventually the federation collapsed and different countries regained their autonomy.

M. Finnemore is also interested in these individual agents of change that she calls moral entrepreneurs”(Finnemore, 1996, pp. 24-28). Another approach is presented by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane who ask whether ideas have an impact on political outcomes. If the answer is yes, one still has to say under what conditions it happens (J. a. R. O. K. Goldstein, 1993). Contributors to the volume edited by Goldstein do point out to some facts where ideas prompted change. Some of these are: the end of slavery, decolonization, Human rights policies and the Human Security agenda that is gaining ground in international relations.

The study of the Cold War influence on West African states did demonstrate how the two power blocs’ ideology did influence the political environment in the sub region. Critical theory was the underlying orientation of socialist bent political leaders. African institutionalism calls upon various theories both on the left and on the right of the political spectrum. Yeltsin, Gorbachev and Mao Zedong used pragmatism to steer their countries out of the radical Marxism-Leninism by opening the doors to market economy. Similarly, West African policy entrepreneurs seem to be shopping on both sides (Edi, 2007a). In this part of the world the power of ideas is bringing some changes. There are some other theories that explain how ideas are changing the world in the African sub region studied here. These are the rational choice, regimes and cognitive theories as presented in chapter one. In this set of theories that emphasize the power of ideas, the constructivist theory stands out given its use by the proponents of the Regional Security Communities Theories.

The constructivist theory in International Relations was featured after 1989 as scholars began to notice the “analytical and empirical limitations” of neo-utilitarian theories (John Gerard Ruggie, 1998b). “The constructivist project has sought open up the relatively narrow theoretical confines of the field-by pushing them back to problematize the interests and identities of actors; deeper to incorporate the intersubjective bases of social action and social order; and into dimensions of space and time to establish the “duality” of structure, (...) at once constraining social action but also being (re)created and, therefore, potentially transformed by it” (John Gerard Ruggie, 1998a; 1998b, p. 862) Constructivism argues that the reality is socially constructed. The way one thinks about something affects the way he/she acts in the world. Constructivism seeks to foster the contextualization of International Relations theories. It is interested in the role of ideas in helping people shape the world.

J. Samuel Barkin argues that constructivism brings back realism to its classical sense and roots showing that morality and ideas are still relevant to realism (Barkin, 2003). Many constructivist scholars argue that constructivism is a method, not a theory like liberalism or realism. Therefore, it can well be accommodated with these theories. As a result for example, realists are called to seriously consider the social construction of reality. Constructivism has contributed a great deal in bringing back in the notion of social construction giving all its importance to structure, but it has ignored the notion of state-agent and its role in influencing social construction itself (Dessler, 1989). This is an important remark because in the West African sub region, agents are very active in building institutions that promote their cooperation and allow them to overcome their weakness in the international system (Oteng Kufuor, 2006). The weakness of their states is hindering their efforts. For example, institutions building and sustenance require financial commitments to which many agents are failing. This failure is influencing the whole project that is not performing as expected. The section on Regional Security Community Theory will further elaborate on the importance of constructivism in explaining the securitization processes in West Africa.

The next section will introduce will introduce regionalization and regionalism. The two concepts appear similar, but they are as different as are the concepts of integration and cooperation in international organizations.

5.3 Regionalization and Regionalism

Regionalization and regionalism are two concepts that will be examined in this section to explain the cooperation movement taking place in West Africa. Member states are seeking ways of overcoming their overdependence on external powers and want to be able to pool their resources for the development of their nations (J. E. Okolo, 1985). The two concepts appear similar but they differ in their definitions and objectives.

Regionalism experiences in Africa in general

In the Global South, Africa in general is the poorest and the most heterogeneous of all regional organizations.

Of the 54 African countries, 32 have fewer than eight million inhabitants (...) In 1999, Africa accounted for only 1.6 per cent of world exports and imports (compared to 4.6 per cent in 1980) (...) Africa is not only the poorest developing region, the most foreign-trade dependent economy and the most dependent on the markets of the developed countries; it is also the least regionally integrated and the slowest growing in terms of mutual interdependence”(Martin, 2002, pp. 124-125).

A decade later, the macro economic situation has slightly improved, but the benefits are still to reach populations. This critical situation had led African scholars and policy-makers to think that regionalism is the solution. Realizing the failure of most of the strategies adopted after the independences; in the 1980s there was the revival of the regional creed as a cure to African ills. In 1979, the Organization of African Unity Symposium in Monrovia (Liberia) called for the “creation of an African common market based on progressive coordination and integration”(Martin, 2002, p. 125). In 1963, at the founding Summit of the Organization of African Unity, President Senghor had appealed for the creation of an African Common Market as a way of transforming weakness into strength (Padelford, 1964, p. 530). This call was to be ratified through the *Lagos Plan of Action* adopted in 1980, more or less two decades later. In 1985, the 21st OAU Assembly

of Heads of State and Government adopted the *Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990*. The UN General Assembly adopted this Programme in 1986 through the *United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development*. All these initiatives promote regional cooperation and integration as the only way ahead.

In the context of today's globalized economy, no single African country can by itself face the pressure of world economic powers and promote its interests as it wishes to. The only way to achieve this is by pooling resources of countries in a regional or sub regional organization.

The level of all forms of power is generally lower and more diffused in Africa than in other continents. Despite the presence of some potential powers like Nigeria and South Africa, no African country has the actual power to counterbalance extra continental encroachments in Africa or to promote African interests at the global level. It would therefore seem that mainly through collective efforts and common institutions could Africa have a voice in world affairs and transform its rich natural resources into diversified production. (Mazzeo, 1984, p. 225).

Despite past failures and ongoing difficulties, African countries continue to establish regional organizations, both intergovernmental and nongovernmental. Asante argues that the failure or success of African regional organizations is usually measured in West European categories. For Europeans, the integration process aims at increasing efficiency. But in Africa, given the absence of most background conditions, the aim of regionalism is still development.

(...) regional economic integration in developing countries may more properly be called developmental regionalism, or an instrument of collective betterment, because it is designed not only to expand trade but also to encourage new industries, to help diversify national economies, and to increase the region's bargaining power with developing nations. (S. K. B. S. K. B. Asante, 1986, p. 13)

Unlike Western developed nations, Africans are still creating background conditions for development. Therefore, Africans ought to develop their own criteria to evaluate the regional and sub regional organizations' integration or cooperation processes.

5.3.1 The tension between regionalization and regionalism

The establishment of regional interstates cooperation mechanisms can take the form of regionalization or regionalism. Both regionalization and regionalism processes are occurring at the same time in West Africa. It is important to grasp the difference between them in order to avoid any sort of confusion in the ensuing sections.

Regionalization is the informal process undertaken by various actors at establishing regions in order to facilitate their actions as businesses or non-governmental organizations. Regionalism is the formal process of states to establish the regional organization as the framework for their cooperation. The African Union or the ECOWAS stem out of regionalism and not of regionalization. According to Bach, regionalisation “(...) refers to processes that may or may not be related to the emergence of regional institutional structures and patterns of transaction.” While “Regionalism refers specifically to ideas, ideologies, programs, policies, and goals that seek to promote an identified social space as the regional project” (C. D. Bach, 2004, p. 70).

The pooling of regional or sub regional resources in the forms of integration or cooperation can take place in two different ways. It can be informally pushed by the globalisation effects or the regionalizing actions of social and global actors who are pursuing their own interests (Kelly, 2007). For example, the West African states of Cape Verde has a population of 0.5 million, Gambia has 1.8 million, Guinea-Bissau 1.6 million and Liberia 3.6 million. Any organization making business in either of these nations would benefit more through a regional outreach than a concentration in a single state. The United Nations has offices in each of the West African states. In 2010, it established the United Nations Office in West Africa (UNOWA) in order to use the sub regional platform for its actions⁴⁷. In so doing, the organization saves on its operations costs. Grugel and Bach call regionalisation this informal process of sharing resources (C. D. Bach, 2004).

⁴⁷ <http://unowa.unmissions.org/>

The cooperation or integration can also be initiated by states through formal efforts to increase their bargaining power in the international system. Our authors call this process – regionalism.

Regionalization, then, is a *de facto* process, in contrast to regionalism, which is the formal establishment of regions as political units. Regionalization refers to the regional expression of the global processes of economic integration and the changing structures of production and power. The result is to deepen the integration of particular regional economic spaces. But these spaces may well be different from the region-building projects undertaken by states since they are driven by a production rationale. They are not the result of conscious political projects. Nevertheless, regionalization influences, shapes and constrains the regionalist policies that states undertake. (Grugel, 1999, p. 10)

Therefore, regionalization and regionalism are different not only in their definitions, but also in their objectives. Regionalization pursues particular interests, while regionalism pursues the general interest of the state. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media, and transnational civil society as agents of regionalization have a specific role. This is emphasized in the work of Camara referred to above (Camara, 2010). A 2007 Report of the Sahel and West Africa Club looks at the sub-regional integration in terms of its oil output. This illustrates how transnational organizations promote regionalization in order to achieve a particular objective (Sahel and West Africa Club, 2007).

This work deals specifically with regionalism understood as the formal strategic choice of states to form a region in order to maximize their gains in the international system (Grugel, 1999, p. 11). In the chapter on African regionalism, Bach mentions that the process of regionalism has been significantly hindered by the informal regionalization. Given states' weakness, globalising forces and other internal socio-political and economic organizations have taken over the integration/cooperation processes (D. Bach, 1999). Ekiyor illustrates how civil society organizations play an important role in conflict prevention in West Africa (Thelma Ekiyor, 2008). One of the threats to peace and security in the West African sub region comes from the transnational organized crime that is using the regional integration infrastructure for its activities (R. J. Bennett, 2009; United Nations, 2005b, 2008a). Civil society organizations play a

significant role in weak and failed states. This has led some political theorists on the left and the right of the political spectrum to call for the downgrading or suppression of states (Herbst, 2000; Holmén, 2010; Kamat, 2003). The replacement of the state by NGOs or civil society organizations is not recommended. As argued above, they do not primarily seek the interests of the state where they are operating. It is important to raise this issue here because as it will be demonstrated in the following sections, regionalization and regionalism do not always have the same objectives and many times their interests are opposed.

In sub-Saharan Africa, formal regionalism (institutional forms of cooperation or integration) has been increasingly challenged by the development of strong trans-state flows ('informal' or 'network' integration or regionalization) (...). Despite being closely interrelated, the two forms of regionalism appear to be mutually exclusive because of their different impact on state institutions, territorial legitimacy and adjustment capabilities. Formal regionalism postulates the aggregation and fusion into broader units of existing territories or fields of intervention. Network regionalism (regionalization) is a result of the exploitation by dysfunctions and disparities generated by existing boundaries, with debilitating effects on state territorial control. (D. Bach, 1999, p. 152)

States' insistence on territorialisation that clearly defines their national boundaries and separates them from other states is contrary to the regionalization networks' interests. Any territorialisation restrains their capacity to thrive. In chapter one, it was discussed that the inability to adequately defend the Westphalian sovereignty was one of the signs of West African states weakness (D. S. Krasner, 1999). A state affirms this sovereignty by controlling its territorial borders and preventing any external actor from crossing them without their authorization (Teschke, 2002). The states under study hold in high value this right (J. E. a. W. S. Okolo, 1990) and this is not always in the interest of some transnational organizations operating in the sub region (Yates, 2012, 2009). They operate across the existing states' boundaries (Söderbaum, 2007). Some organizations, mostly those pursuing economic gains, do promote states' de-institutionalization and the privatization of their agencies (Besada, 2009). Informal organizations need security in order to expand their activities. But it is not their primary objective to bring security to an area. Where it is lacking, they can rely on private provision of security for themselves and their assets (Foaleng, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). However, securitization is the

primary objective of the state without which it loses legitimacy for its people (I. R. Rotberg, 2004). It was argued in the previous chapter that West African states cannot yet afford to lose control of the provision of security.

5.2.2 Regionalism in the ECOWAS

Regionalism in the ECOWAS started long before its establishment in 1975. Member states have been very active in the whole African regionalism processes. Some initiatives have also been taking place in the sub region like the West African Economic and Monetary Union that gather the French speaking countries of the sub region (Tapsoba, 2009).

The regionalism process on the African continent in general, has been all but a uniform operation. The same drive to associate resources has taken on different shapes and pursued different objectives across time. Scholars in African studies call these different shapes “waves”. They consider that the continent has just entered into its fifth wave of panafricanism.

This current post-Cold War wave of pan-Africanism has been preceded by at least four waves of pan-Africanism since 1880. The first wave was the one against European expansionism between 1880 and 1945; the second was the wave of decolonization between 1945 and 1962; the third wave was the wave of devolution between 1975 and 1989. This fourth wave resulted in the creation of subcontinental bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and sought to promote regional political and economic integration. The current post-Cold War wave of pan-Africanism is the wave of the African Renaissance,(...) (Landsberg, 2004, p. 119)

The fifth wave strives to be a departure from the enduring integration debate of African unity. It pinpoints those ills that are holding back the continent’s socio-political and economic development compared to other regions of the world. The ills are among other things the deficient democratisation processes, lack of accountability, transparency and democratic governance.(Landsberg, 2004, p. 117) This departure was symbolically materialized by the putting to rest of the Organization of African Unity and the creation of the African Union to replace it since 1991. Also new institutions have been established

to promote the new vision. Among these are the Conference on Security, Stability Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Attempts at promoting the CSSDCA, the AU, and NEPAD in West Africa will have to take into account the commonalities and complementarities between each of these governing components, as well as the specificities of West Africa's security architecture. Compared to other subregional and regional organizations, ECOWAS appears to have articulated the most advanced security architecture in Africa (...) Nevertheless, the same questions about strategic synergies, complementarities, and niches between different elements of this architecture apply in West Africa as elsewhere, especially in terms of how the CSSDCA, the AU, and NEPAD will relate to each other and to existing subregional mechanisms and initiatives."(Landsberg, 2004, p. 136).

The new institutions are not immune to the deficiencies that plagued earlier one. As indicated above, NEPAD itself is heavily foreign aid dependant (Anyemedu, 2006). Despite the challenges involved, West African countries are striving to work together in the Economic Community of West African States (Ezenwe, 1983).

The idea to create the ECOWAS came from the *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*. In the mid 1960s, it projected the division of Africa into regions for the sake of economic development. At the Monrovia meeting of April 1968, heads of state established the West African Regional Grouping. Only nine of the fourteen countries attended the meeting and signed the protocol (Sohn, 1971, p. 987)⁴⁸. The scheduled signing of the Common Market treaty in 1969 in Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) never took place. All other initiatives entered a standstill until April 1972, when General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and President Eyadema of Togo, decided to resuscitate the West African Grouping. The bilateral initiative continued to gain other members until May 28, 1975 in Lagos. On that day, the fifteen ECOWAS member-states signed the treaty establishing the ECOWAS. ECOWAS member states were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde became the 16th member in 1978. Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS in December 2000.

⁴⁸ Absent were Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Togo and Niger.

The ECOWAS is made of WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union)⁴⁹ plus Anglophone and Lusophone countries of West Africa. It is the first attempt to transcend traditional linguistic barriers between Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone. With this widening of the early Francophone circle, the leadership passes from Cote d'Ivoire to Nigeria. The community adopted the WAEMU achievements in tariffs policies, but furthermore launched huge communication and infrastructure projects to link the whole region. The WAEMU continues to function within the ECOWAS. The institutions of this organization, the BCEAO (Banque centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) and BOAD (Banque Ouest-africaine de Developpement) are still very active. This fact constitutes an institutional overlapping that is seriously hindering the ECOWAS. These institutions allow France to keep control of the region's economy. The WAEMU currency, Franc CFA, is convertible to the Euro that replaced the French Franc in France (N'Diaye, 2009).

WAEMU deserves special attention for two reasons: it illustrates the advantages and constraints of a monetary zone (the franc zone) anchored on a convertible external currency (formerly the French Franc, now the Euro); and it provides some ideas as to the impact of the arrangements on the process of economic integration among the participating countries (Martin, 2002, p. 137).

It is hoped that as West African states evolve towards integration, WAEMU institutions will merge into ECOWAS. Like other African organizations ECOWAS has its other challenges. They are related to the harmonization of domestic taxation and the implementation of the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. ECOWAS does benefit from the strong political will of Francophone leaders gathered through WAEMU. The complementarity of elite values is the strength to the West African community. This facilitates the work of experts and policy choices. This was demonstrated in the Togolese crisis (2005) and in Niger (2010). The community leaders

⁴⁹ WAEMU made of the French speaking West African countries. The sub region is made of 8 French speaking, 5 English speaking and 2 Portuguese speaking countries. This majority provide a significant weight to French speaking countries. Added to that is the fact that Portuguese speaking countries tend to ally with the French speaking. The general weakness of this bloc lies in its general lack of resources compared to the other bloc that comprises Nigeria.

expressed their disapproval of power gained through military coup as has been the case in the past (Bienen, 1985; Samuel Decalo, 1973)⁵⁰.

The Liberian crisis of 1990 prompted the community to develop a military wing under the leadership of Nigeria, the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG). Besides Liberia, ECOMOG has been very active in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire. The security aspect came as an accident to ECOWAS because its original treaty did not provide for cooperation on defence. The words of President Senghor, the first president of Senegal (1960-1980) in support for the defence pact as reported by Okolo, have proven to be true: "(...) there is no development without security"(J. E. Okolo, 1985, p. 146). ECOMOG has become a key institution of the community.

The potential of regionalism in the post-Cold War period

West African regionalism in the post-Cold War has managed to set aside the old debate on the timing of integration. This achievement has helped to focus on economic and security issues as the main impediments to the regional development.

ECOWAS can count on the integrative potential of WAEMU. The former French colonies in the region have a history of integrative initiatives. They have a common language, a common currency and have established institutions to promote their objectives (Grimm, 1999). Given the long delivery of ECOWAS, the community had time to deal with various issues that held members back. The treaty establishing the community was innovative in its time because it was a response to the various aspirations of member-states. While many have criticized ECOWAS' institutions building, J. E. Okolo considers these to be its strength toward the integration given their relative freedom from national institutions (J. E. Okolo, 1985, p. 136ss).

⁵⁰ "Good and bad neighbours : West African leaders speak up for democracy; southern African leaders stay mute" , *The Economist*; 2/26/2005, Vol. 374 Issue 8415, p14, 2/3p, 1c. Also recently in Niger where President Mamadou Tandja wanting to stay in power changed the constitution of his country so as to be able to run for election beyond the two terms provided for by the constitution. The ECOWAS did apply pressure on him by excluding Niger from the processes and refusing to recognize the President's reelection. The pressure politically weakened

Infrastructures development has been as well one of the key achievements of the sub regional cooperation. In the coming few years, the whole community will be linked through paved roads. The interconnection of the electric grid is well advanced despite the setbacks. Improved telecommunications systems in the region have as well help to boost their economies. The current cooperation initiatives are well ahead compared to other regions on the African continent (Karipko, 2007).

The obstacles to the success of the new regionalism

The ECOWAS project is very active and very promising, but it cannot yet pretend to be on an irreversible path to success. The main problem is the existence within the same community of two overlapping strong organizations: WAEMU and ECOWAS. The first, under French influence wants to keep its autonomy while the latter under Nigerian influence strive to supersede all other regional organizations.

Also, resources are not evenly distributed in West Africa. Some landlocked countries like Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali are heavily dependent on the community infrastructures. In calculating their gains from the integration, they tend to favour their links to France that seems to provide more returns (Martin, 2002, p. 171; Mazzeo, 1984, p. 230). There is very little “horizontal interaction among ECOWAS member-states and a comparatively high vertical relationship between them and the industrialized countries, primarily the former colonial powers, and then Japan and the United States”(J. E. Okolo, 1985, p. 124) This external dependence is one of the things African regional organizations want to avoid by promoting greater cooperation among countries and the regional integration (Meyns, 1995, p. 49; Tévoédjrè, 1965, p. 19).

ECOWAS is also characterized by a diversity of currencies that are inconvertible. This complicates internal trade by delaying payments. Resources being unevenly

him so much so that it was easy to bring down his government through a military coup led by Maj

distributed, so are costs and gains from regional integration. Rich countries feel that they are paying more and not getting enough in return, proportionate to their contribution. Less Developed Countries feel that they are getting less compared to the time they were running their own domestic market through tariff barriers (Mytelka, 1973).

One of the difficulties of most intergovernmental organizations is the sacrifice of national sovereignty to supranational powers (Keohane O. , 2001; Oye, 1986). The situation is critical in Africa where most countries acquired their sovereignty from colonial powers only recently. They have not yet build solid national identities and fulfill the promises of independences (J. F. Ade Ajayi, 1982; Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991). Trade liberalization required by cooperation is incompatible with strong nationalism. Adherence to ECOWAS was retarded by diverging national interests. Senegal was interested in an institution to manage conflicts in the sub region. Ghana and Nigeria were looking for an institution “to drive better bargains with multinationals and other extra regional actors”. Nigeria in particular was after an extension of its influence in the sub region (J. E. Okolo, 1985, p. 135). In 2002, Martin noted that the ECOWAS has been faster in building institutions than in fostering positive integration. “While institution-building has proceeded apace, no significant progress has yet been made towards positive integration in ECOWAS” (Martin, 2002, p. 141). This remark has to be nuanced because a lot more has been achieved in this sub region in this regard. For example, the ECOWAS passport that has been implemented since 2005 allows individuals to freely circulate in the sub region. They have special booths in sub regional airports’ arrivals areas that allow a speedy processing compared to non-ECOWAS nationals.

5.3.2 Regional Security Complex Theory at the heart of ECOWAS

institutionalization

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) was developed by the Copenhagen school of security studies to designate regional states’ cooperation in security affairs (B.

Buzan, 2000; B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). It stems from the fact that states confronted to similar challenges and mostly when they happen to be in the same geographic location, tend to pool their resources to address the challenges together (Kelly, 2007). Following Deutsch studies of the North Atlantic political community in the 1950s (Deutsch, 1957), researches have extended the notion of political community to the security realm. States in the same regional organization trust that they will peacefully settle their conflicts should they arise. They also hold that they would defend one another when their security is threatened. This type of cooperation between states sharing common “identities, values and meanings” create a security community (E. a. M. B. Adler, 1998; E. a. M. N. B. Adler, 1996). Chapter eight of the United Nations Charter provides for regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security (United Nations, 1985; D. P. Williams, 2008, p. 312). This provision is based on the understanding that states sharing the same “identities, values and meanings” (E. a. M. B. Adler, 1998, p. 31), have greater stakes in a conflict arising in their midst. As such, they are the first respondents in addressing it.

The work of the Copenhagen school of security studies pushed further the notion of security community initiated by Adler, Barnett and others (E. a. M. B. Adler, 1998; Bellamy, 2004). The Regional Security Complex Theory argues that despite the undeniable strong influence of world powers over weaker states, the security realm has a local level that cannot be overlooked.

The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes. (...) Security complexes may well be extensively penetrated by the global powers, but their regional dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree of autonomy from the patterns set by the global powers. To paint a proper portrait of global security, one need to understand both of these levels independently, as well as the interaction between them. (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 4)

The international security is usually shaped by the interests of the major powers that have the capacity to control it (Katzenstein, 2005). Weaker states in the international system depend on them in one way or another for their security and other aspects of their functioning.

The Regional Security Complex Theory borrows from materialism⁵¹ by using neorealist categories of “territoriality and distribution of power” (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 4). It equally borrows on constructivism⁵² by emphasizing the securitization/de-securitization processes that take place between actors. Like constructivism, the RSCT acknowledges that there is multiplicity of factors that may influence a security situation besides the influence of world powers. Buzan and Waever argue that there are

(...) three theoretical perspectives in the post-Cold War security order”: the neorealist perspective that is state-centric and emphasize power polarity. The globalist one is rooted in globalisation understanding. Finally, the regionalist perspective posits that the regional level is “(...) the locus of conflict and cooperation” between states (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, pp. 6-10) .

The authors prefer the regionalist approach that according to them explains better the contemporary security environment in which regional organizations are increasingly playing a significant role (Calleya, 2000; Katzenstein, 2005). Their regionalist theory is developed around two assumptions. The first one argues that “the decline of superpower rivalry reduces the penetrative quality” of their interests in other countries. The second indicates that great powers still have the military capability to intervene in weaker states. The only obstacle to this intervention comes from their domestic politics that are more and more opposed to military commitments where the states do not have strategic interests. Humanitarian calamities are no longer sufficient to warrant their military interventions. The authors argue that this change of focus leave more room for local actors to solve their own problems as they cannot rely on external powers to do it for them (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, pp. 10-11). As indicated above, the end of the Cold war in the 1990s coincided with the eruption of conflicts in three West African states (Adebajo, 2002a). The crisis threatened to engulf the whole sub-region. The regional

⁵¹ Materialism is a philosophical doctrine that posits that everything can be explained through the matter. The matter is the basic source of knowledge. Armstrong, D. M. D. M., *A materialist theory of the mind* London; New York, Routledge, 1993.

⁵² Constructivism argues that nothing is predetermined in international relations. Even the national interests that are at the core of realism, are constructed according to the circumstances of the time and place. Wendt, A., *Social theory of international politics* Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

body was compelled to respond to the crisis(Olonisakin, 2000). Given the instability in the sub region, security cooperation in ECOWAS has become its most visible manifestation.

The two assumptions raised above summarize the main object of this chapter. Global powers interests have shifted with the end of the Cold War. They still have the capability to intervene globally when their interest are at state. West African states should not wait for global powers to solve their security like other needs. The assistance offered to ECOMOG and the conflict stricken West African states (Economic Community of West African State, 2005; Olonisakin, 2008) is far below the massive support given to the Cold war allies to crush their enemies. Stopping the spread and even better crushing communism or capitalism was a serious business for the Cold War superpowers. Significant resources were committed to that cause (Blum, 2004; Kanet, 2006). In the post-Cold war period, the level of involvement of global powers in weaker states has changed (De Waal, 1996, p. 7; J. Peter Schraeder, 1996) as indicated in chapter three of this work. The world military and economic powers are not going to invest their resources where they do not have strategic interests_(T. a. G. C. Chafer, 2011). The focus on national interests is illustrated by the way the European Union scrambled to intervene in Guinea-Bissau. This is a tiny West African nation without significant economic potential. But following the failure of its state, it was becoming a safe haven for drug dealers and other criminal activities destined to Europe (Gibert, 2009). Also, France launched the Operation Serval in Mali in January 2013 for which it received a wide support of the international community for the same type of reasons (Gowan, 2013; A. Nossiter, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti 2013). Jihadi-Islamists with their anti-Western rhetorics are considered a great threat to international security. Denying them safe haven from where to launch terrorist activities is becoming a priority of the international community. These self-interested and narrowly oriented types of interventions are set to be the trend on the part of world powers (Leriche, 2003). Therefore, for effective solutions to their security and development needs, weak states have to rely more on their own or their regional organizations (A. Goldstein, 2002; Tavares, 2004). This is what the ECOWAS has set to do.

Up to the 1990s, the West African sub regional community was mostly an economic development arrangement (Ukeje, 2005). The Liberian, Guinean and Sierra Leonean conflicts are going to change that fact and bring the community to rethink its mission (Adebajo, 2002a). As a result, peace and security needs became part of the ECOWAS mandate following the 1993 review (Oteng Kufuor, 2006). The community realized that without peace and security all development initiatives are bound to fail (Addo, 2005; Ukeje, 2005). The regionalization movement that began in 1975 aimed at regional integration and economic development cooperation opened up to cooperation in security matters. Most countries in the sub region share a similar colonial past. Because of that they were affected in the same way by the change in the security environment brought by the end of the Cold War (Rüland, 2006). The post-Cold war period witnessed the reduction in the interventions of great powers in security affairs in West Africa. This situation allowed the regional body to play a greater role in this areas (Adebajo, 2004b). Williams speaks of “African solutions to African problems”(D. J. Francis, 2001, p. 46; D. P. Williams, 2008, p. 310) to indicate that global powers are no longer willing to spend their resources to resolve African conflicts. The majority of current conflicts are taking place in weak states that are not necessarily the centre of attention of world powers.

(...) these pressing problems and challenges provide the opportunity for continental and regional co-operative security and solidarity to collectively respond to both the military and non-military sources of threats to peace, security and development. A helpful approach is to depart from the usual pigeon-hole and simplistic interpretations of conflict in Africa (D. J. Francis, 2006, p. 90).

Therefore, the conflicts prone states stand a better chance of surviving by getting together to find solutions to their problems. They are doing this through regional and sub regional security initiatives that Buzan and Waever call “regional security complexes”.

/These authors posit that the simple juxtaposition of states does not necessarily lead them to form a Regional Security Complex. This arrangement allows a pooling of resources to promote common security needs. Buzan and Waever lay down two situations that hinder the formation of a RSC. The first obstacle is the “overlay”, that is when a region is very much penetrated and controlled by a powerful member or a superpower. The regional

cooperation is therefore hindered by the controlling power that prohibits any parallel security arrangements (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 56). This was the case mostly during the colonial and the Cold War periods. The US and France competition in Francophone Africa is one evidence of this as indicated in chapter three (J. Peter Schraeder, 2000). Besides the US, France had also to deal with the rising power of Nigeria in the sub region (Olusanya, 1986). The second obstacle to the formation of a RSC is the presence of “unstructured” states in the region. These are states that are too weak to project any influence; or states that are isolated geographically. Most Island nations as well as African states fit well into this category.

(...) There is also the possibility that the regional level fails to function because the local actors do not generate their own patterns of security interdependence. RSC presuppases that the units concerned are normal members of an international system: ‘normal’ in the sense that they possess autonomy to make their own policy and the power capabilities to engage the other units in the system. There are two general sets of conditions in which RSCs do not, or cannot, form: *overlay* and *unstructured*. (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, pp. 61-62)

The states under study are all overlaid and “unstructured”, therefore unsuitable to form an efficient RSC (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 232). Experience has demonstrated that this situation does not prevent them from pursuing a process of integration that enhances at the same time their security cooperation (Camara, 2010). Realizing this twist to the theory, Buzan calls West Africa a “proto RSC”:

If we stay within the interstate frame, there are a number of nodes where the first outlines of pre-or proto-RSCs can be traced on the basis of local patterns of interaction (...). Up until the 1990s, only Southern Africa looked like a fully developed RSC. West Africa is best defined as a proto-RSC (i.e., clearly formed, but with rather weak security interdependence) (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 233).

The weakness of the West African security regime is further illustrated by the fact that “(...) Substate rather than interstate security issues dominate the agenda (...)” (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 241). West African states are not threatened by border or economic disputes, but rather by crime, civil wars, the prevalence of unprofessional military and

security forces (Howe, 2005). The threats to security are more from within than from without.

Francis referred to West Africa as an “emerging security community” because of the absence of essential variables, namely: “(...) liberal politics and economics. Furthermore, the sub-region lacks the normative and structural or institutional values that may sustain a security community” (D. J. Francis, 2001, p. 56). He goes on to indicate that this weakness is not an obstacle to the formation of a RSC in West Africa. He noted that Acharya identified the same trends in Southeast Asia where security communities are being formed without strong liberal values and institutional capacities (Acharya, 1998; D. J. Francis, 2001, p. 57).

The Economic Community of West African States is an intergovernmental organization that is globally recognized as the engine of development, peace and security in the sub region. The following section will look at how it can benefit from the RSCT in its mission of combating security threats by restoring states’ capacities.

5.3.3 The Prospects of the Regional Security Complex in West Africa

The RSCT provides an understanding of the West African sub regional security mechanism in response to the post-Cold War security environment (Badmus, 2008). The main advantage of the regionalist approach to security is the differentiation of levels of analysis that it allows. The approach permits the distinction between the global, the inter-regional and the regional levels and in so doing, provides due attention to each one of them in the ways it influences the security dynamic.

Acknowledging the regional level as an independent, and frequently powerful, factor in the security equation is essential to both sound theory and sensible policy (...). In RSCT, regions are not given by geography or culture or patterns of current events, or the whims of analysts, or local discourses about regionalism. RSCs are socially constructed by their members, whether consciously or (more often) unconsciously by the ways in which their processes of (de) securitisation interlock with each other. They can therefore be changed by changes in those processes, though the scope for change may well be conditioned by the relative depth or shallowness of the way in which the social structure of security is internalised by the actors involved. (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 481)

Besides the United Nations and the African regional security processes, the West African community has been able to devise its own processes in response to the local challenges (Iheduru, 2003). The 1975 treaty had to be revised to include cooperation in security matters (Economic Community of West African State, 1993). In the same move, protocols were devised to address conflicts in the community (Economic Community of West African States, 1999, 2001). Recognising the importance and the threat of armed forces and security services, the ECOWAS went as far as establishing a Code of conduct for them (Economic Community of West African States, 2006). These sub regional mechanisms have been adopted by the global and the regional bodies through the various supports provided (United Nations, 2005a, 2008a).

The RSCT has the merits of emphasizing that despite the overwhelming influence of global powers, the regional level is not just an “(...) arbitrary and purely analytical” category but a real level of securitization/de-securitization (Kelly, 2007, p. 198). The theory also delves on the broad understanding of security as more than just its military aspect. Security involves also the “(...) political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions” (Walt, 1991; P. Williams, 2008, p. 4). It will be argued in this chapter that ECOWAS is pursuing a holistic approach to security that encompasses both the state and human security.

Also, in RSCT, regional security complexes are constructed by the actors involved either from “bottom-up”, when member states initiate the creation of the structure or from “up to bottom” when it is imposed by the dominating power (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, pp. 481-482). The setting up of a RSC is a response to perceived security needs common to a particular region or sub region. Therefore, whether the response is promoted by concerned states or by global powers does not make a big difference because in both cases, West Africans for example still depend on external support for their actions.

Whatever progress has so far been achieved by ECOWAS and UEMOA remains largely externally driven due to the predominant role ascribed to external donors and foreign agencies of restraints in the field of development cooperation and integration. Current attempts to establish an effective state and a citizen-friendly Pax West Africana point to the urgent need for the empowerment of domestic agencies of restraint (C. D. Bach, 2004, p. 85).

Therefore, the RSCT has the merit of accommodating all the levels of interventions in weak states. The global powers can intervene when they wish to. Whether they do act or do not, local actors have to respond because they are directly affected by the insecurity. In the current international relations system, the prospects are bright for regional security communities to play a role in the stabilization of weak and troubled states (Adebajo, 2004b). The momentum observed with the ECOWAS security mechanisms can be explained by this new security environment that provides more room for regional security arrangements (United Nations, 1985). Global powers intending to play a role in the sub region are calling for the cooperation of the sub regional organization. This is for example the case with the OECD (Club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 2005). Also, the United Nations authorized the use of force to oust Jihadi-Islamist fighters from Northern Mali based on the understanding that the mission is to be regionally-led (BBC, 2012c; United Nations, 2012e). The African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) is to be the backbone of the intervention. By February 2013, the only non-ECOWAS African troops on the ground in Mali are Chadians (BBC, 2013b). The 2000 strong Chadian contingent well trained for the difficult terrain of desert operations is an invaluable contribution to the mission.

5.3.4 The West African challenges to the Regional Security Complex Theory

The RSCT is very interesting but it is not easy to implement, especially in weak security community like the one of West Africa. The dynamics of International Relations continue to function at whatever level states are cooperating (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 52). This is the same with the regionalist approach. The willingness to cooperate does not preclude the defence of the national interest as realists would argue (Miskel, 2002). There is no enforcement mechanism that guarantees that all states will play by the rules (Sterling-Folker, 2002). As such, the potential for clashes remain as each member tries to make sure he is not being cheated or other states are not gaining more from their cooperation (Jervis, 1978; M. Taylor, 1987). The RSCT is not blind to the power dynamics that exist

in an interstate cooperation system as indicated by the four variables identified as making the “essential structure of an RSC”:

(...) boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours; anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units; polarity, which covers the distribution of power among units; and social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 53)⁵³.

This is the strength of the theory that comes from its accommodation of various trends in International Relations. Both the realist categories of power play between states and the critical theories categories of construction of cooperation institutions are recognised by the theory.

Another challenge to the application of an RSCT comes from the presence of “buffer” and “insulator” states in all regions. “A buffer is internal to an RSC, where it keeps powers of the region apart. An insulator is located in the zone of indifference between RSCs, helping to keep separate from each other two or more sets of regional security dynamics.”(B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 483)

In the West African sub region, Senegal can be considered a buffer state between Nigeria (on the English speaking side) and Cote d’Ivoire (on the French speaking side). Turkey, Afghanistan and Sahel states in Africa are considered as insulator states in their respective regions. Within ECOWAS, Ghana is an insulator between the powerful Nigeria and WAEMU states. Despite the language barriers (English and French), Ghana has traditionally maintained good relationships with French speaking countries of the sub region (Edi, 2007a). Ghana is currently playing an important role in the political reconciliation process taking place in the neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire (Kpodo, 2012). Without these buffer and insulator states, conflicts can easily spread and engulf entire regions.

Other critics of regionalism in general consider RSC movement to be just a brief dysfunction of the global system that passes away and the world re-settles into power

⁵³ The variables are numerically identified in the original

polarity (unipolar or bipolar) (Katzenstein, 2005). They contend that the first wave of regionalism took place between 1960 and 1970 following the United States' hurdles in Vietnam and the Bretton Woods crisis of 1973. By the 1980, the global system began to move back into the superpowers' control. Likewise, the end of the Cold War in 1991 opened another window of opportunity for regionalism. This window seems to be closing following the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 and the responses that followed. Through the responses to 9/11 attacks, the US is once again asserting its power globally (Kelly, 2007, p. 198).

As the discussion above suggests, new regionalism faces an uphill battle. Centripetal forces in the world—unipolarity and globalization—and systemic prejudices in theory challenge post-Cold War regionalism. If the new regionalism buckles under this weight, regional analysis in general will appear as an occasional fad. Just as the old regionalism collapsed before resurgent systemic bipolarity and failed Third Worldism, so the new regionalism could collapse before hegemony and globalization. The coming decade will be crucial to this IR subliterature. If regions in the world do not establish dynamics that are meaningfully independent from imposing global/systemic forces, the new regionalism will subside (Kelly, 2007, p. 199).

It is difficult to deny the fact that the United States will continue to be a superpower in the foreseeable future given its unsurpassed political, economic and military potential. But also given its financial difficulties and the presence of the rising powers, it is not obvious that the US will continue to impose itself like before as the sole superpower (Gvosdev, 2010; S. Weber, 2007). Its reluctance to intervene in Mali that opened the door for France action is another illustration (A. Nossiter, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti 2013). But still the US played a key role that eased France intervention by obtaining the approval of the fly zone over Algeria (Soares, 2012) and by contributing to the airlift capability.

Africans and particularly West African have somehow taken stock of past failures. More and more leaders are prepared to use the global powers' overlay⁵⁴ to

⁵⁴ “When the interests of external great powers transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local dynamics of security interdependence virtually cease to operate. It usually results in the long-term stationing of great power armed forces in the region, and in the alignment of the local states according to the patterns of great power rivalry” in Buzan, B. a. O. W. (Ed.), *Regions and powers : the structure of international security*, 2006, p. 490

promote their national interests. This is mostly true of states that have developed one or the other form of power resources.

Overlay is not a one-way process, as clients can blackmail, flip-flop, hedge, or otherwise strategically manipulate patrons. African and Arab countries in the Cold War routinely jostled and toyed with supposedly dominant patrons. Kim Il Sung manoeuvred China and the Soviet Union into competitive support for his expansionism. For decades, Israel has successfully prevented its reduction to a simple client of the United States through unilateral actions like settlement expansion or the 2006 Lebanon campaign. Systemic theories that see a simplistic one-way transmission of preferences from great powers to the rest miss the gamesmanship, squirming, and other autonomy-generating techniques small states deploy. Regions already have more autonomy than we think. (Kelly, 2007, p. 201)

A global power can overlay a regional community by controlling all its security mechanisms. But also skilled politicians can use this powerful presence to achieve what they would otherwise not achieve without this “umbrella”. During the Cold war, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal enjoyed greater prestige among their pairs in the West African sub region because their potential allowed them to become the preferred allies of France and Britain in the sub region (Westad, 2005, p. 77). Through these allies Britain, France and the US had a secured foothold in the area.

Also, following the many criticisms of imperialism and colonialism, it is increasingly appearing unacceptable for great powers to overlay other states even though they have the capability to do so. For example, the United States spent so much diplomatic energy and other resources to sell the war on terrorism to as many countries around the world as possible (Department of Homeland Security, 2006; A. B. Jackson, 2009). It can use its might to coerce weaker states into following its policy orientation, but preference is given to diplomacy that is ethically more acceptable (J. S. Nye, 2004). Another example is that after failed attempts to establish the headquarters of the United States Africa Command in a country of its choice on the African continent, the Command is currently based in Stuttgart in Germany (Buss, 2011; McFate, 2008). This is an indication that in the current international system, military power alone is not sufficient for a state to achieve its aims.

Beside the international community’s challenge to great powers overlay, the latter are equally finding it difficult to sell prolonged military ventures abroad to tax payers at home (J. P. Pham, 2011). For example, leaders of some NATO members who were

involved in Afghanistan faced tough challenges at home during the elections. This was mostly the case of European countries (Traynor, 2010). Other democracies are more likely to face the same situation.

In light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that West African states cannot expect prompt actions from global powers to respond to their security challenges. Self-help appears to be in order before seeking external help. Given the weakness of most states in the sub region, the pooling of resources through the regionalism or the RSC is the solution despite its limitations.

5.4 ECOMOG and the genesis of a Regional Security Complex in West Africa

Taken individually most West African States do not have the resources to achieve their security policies as indicated in chapter four. Also, they are unable to play a role that is expected of sovereign states in the current international system (R. Jackson, 1990). The Economic Community of West African States is promoting the pooling of resources that offers the better prospects of pulling these countries out of their current situation of weakness (D. J. Francis, 2001, 2006). Various initiatives have been undertaken to address this issue.

Since the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the nineties (Addo, 2005), the ECOWAS has been strengthening its security architecture. The sub regional community is an example of the emphasis on military and security infrastructures as a means to bring other goods to the sub region (Adebajo, 2002b). As indicated above, the international security context that encourages regional conflicts resolution has been supportive of this process (Møller, 2005a). An ECOWAS security mechanism is the emphasis of this chapter.

5.4.1 ECOWAS as a Regional Security Community

From the discussion on regionalism, it can indeed be argued that the ECOWAS is an emerging Regional Security Community (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006; D. J. Francis, 2001).

The Regional Security Complex Theory studied above is verified by the fact that these states are in the same geographic location. They more or less have a common history, similar capabilities, except Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. Most of West African states also face the same challenges. The Cold War political environment that somehow protected them from the days of their independences in the sixties can no longer be counted on as the sole guarantor of their security (E. J. E. J. Keller, 1996; S. N. MacFarlane, 1992; S. N. a. T. G. W. MacFarlane, 1992). Given their general weakness, West African states have chosen to put together their resources for a common action against insecurity. Musah's definition of a regional security illustrates this setting of a security mechanism in the sub region.

(...), "regional security" describes the common political, economic, and security arrangements that a contiguous transnational space of sovereign states with a degree of "pooled" sovereignty based on shared fears and expectations, may implement to promote mutual assistance and ensure the collective well-being of its population, institutions, and values, and their protection from perceived threats. (Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2009, p. 1)

The shift from a pure economic cooperation as willed by the ECOWAS founders in 1975 to the security cooperation prompted by the Liberian crisis has been significant for the region. ECOWAS has become at the same time an economic and a security community (Ebo, 2004). Taking into account the realist fact that international relations are defined by interests to be defended (H. J. H. J. Morgenthau, 1951) and not by charity, West African states stand to gain in defending their interests rather than expecting handouts from rich and powerful nations. The end of the Cold War resulted in the reluctance of global powers to intervene in resolving conflicts in countries where they have no strategic interests (C. Ero, 2001, p. 3)⁵⁵. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity was revisited to encourage regional security pools (Møller, 2005a). Since the 1990s, the ECOWAS has been steadily putting together the structure of the regional security pool.

⁵⁵ Ero is here referring to the failed intervention in Somalia in 1992 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994

Security is closely linked to economic development and governance. A Report sponsored by the U.S. Army War College and published in The Letort Papers series insists that poor governance and political instability are the key factors of states' failure in Africa (Bouchat, 2010)⁵⁶. In 1999, the ECOWAS revisited the Cairo Declaration of 29 June 1993. The declaration called for the establishment of a *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa* (OAU, 1993). ECOWAS realized it by setting up a sub regional body called: *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security*. The Protocol does mention the heads of states concern that: "(...) the proliferation of conflicts which constitute a threat to the peace and security in the African continent, and undermine our efforts to improve the living standards of our peoples" (Bouchat, 2010, p. 87; Economic Community of West African States, 1999). All the states in the sub-region are threatened by conflicts though at varying degrees because some of them are managing to control the threats.

Banditry and challenges to state authority in large swathes of territory within ECOWAS are notable, especially in the Niger Delta, northern Niger, and Casamance in Senegal. Disputes over land, water, and chieftaincy have claimed hundreds of lives in low-intensity conflicts in northern Ghana, Mali, and western Côte d'Ivoire, among others. The conflicts have created major human and regional security threats through spillover effects and the export of bad practices that have blighted the region's development perspectives (Bouchat, 2010, p. 5).

The ECOWAS community mechanisms for peace and security are not magic tools to bring about the stabilization of the sub region. The lack of enforcement mechanisms is a serious impediment as it often happens with intergovernmental organizations (K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009). Out of respect for the sovereignty of individual member states, the community does not intervene soon enough to avert the suffering of concerned

⁵⁶ The 2010 Kingston Conference on International Security was entitled: Security and Governance: Foundations for International Stability. The conference took place in Kingston from June 21-23, 2010. Policymaking think-tanks and practitioners in International security and stability operations were the speakers at this conference. The discussions were an indication that the military and policy makers are more than before convinced that without security and stability there cannot be any socio-economic development in failing and failed states.

populations. This has just happened in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. The military juntas that forcefully deposed democratically elected governments are the ones that negotiated ECOWAS interventions in their respective countries (Economic Community of West African State, 2012a). Bouchat does note the example of Nigeria and Gambia where the states' instabilities did not prevent their leaders from assuming regional responsibilities (Bouchat, 2010, p. 9).

Despite its shortcomings, ECOWAS peace and security initiatives are opening the way for the stabilization of the whole African continent (Dempsey, 2009, p. 387). That is why the sub regional community, besides its strategic importance, has become the focal point for the EU and the US security capacities building in Africa (Bouchat, 2010, p. 14).

Since the end of the Cold War the two military powers in West Africa are France and Nigeria. France is a military power in the sub region because of its grip on West African French speaking countries (Medhora, 1992). The end of the Cold War has been characterized by the gradual pull out of French military presence through the closure of some of its bases on the continent. But its economic presence and military cooperation are still to be reckoned with⁵⁷. France military bases in Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Ndjamea (Chad), Libreville (Gabon) and Djibouti provide the capacity to intervene anywhere on the African continent. For the Operation Serval in Mali (2013), French fighter jets were flying from their base in Ndjamea.

The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s took place at the time that global powers were re-assessing their strategic interests (Oberdorfer, 1998; Okbazghi, 2002). This situation provided Nigeria with an opportunity to ascertain its influence in the sub region. This hegemonic influence has been the main critique of ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau (Adebajo, 2002a, p. 140). Adebajo's work on ECOMOG operations in the 1990s indicates how the sub region has taken stock of the weaknesses of the interventions. Lessons have been drawn in order to build a security

⁵⁷ At the French National on 14 July 2010, armed forces from 13 African countries and 12 heads of states took part in the military parade in Paris to mark the 50th anniversary of African independences. All the African participants are from former French colonies in Africa.

mechanism that is to be emulated by other African sub regions and even the continental organization.

There are five major flaws of the three ECOMOG interventions that are particularly relevant to the establishment of a security mechanism. First, ECOMOG peacekeepers were deployed to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau before detailed logistical and financial arrangements were made (...). Second, the ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone were dominated by Nigeria, resulting in a lack of subregional unity and depriving the force of important legitimacy in fulfilling its tasks. Third, the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau was deployed without Nigeria, denying the peacekeepers the logistical and financial muscle of the subregion's dominant force. Fourth, the ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were under the operational control of ECOMOG commanders in the field, rather than the ECOWAS secretariat (...). Finally, the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau, under a Togolese commander, reported directly to Togolese leader Gnassingbe Eyadema the ECOWAS chairman (Adebajo, 2002a, p. 147).

Given its experiences since the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, the sub regional community can rightly be called a regional security organization. By the year 2002, there had been conflicts resolutions and managements in four different member states: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire. Furthermore, the community has taken time to evaluate the operations and learn from its mistakes.

The sub-region's structural weakness remains, but equally obvious are the efforts in order to quell the limitations through the use of available opportunities. The regional body has even devised a creative mechanism to overcome the financial hurdles (Oteng Kufuor, 2006, p. 52) that cripple most international organizations and particularly those of the Global South.

Chronic underfunding has been the bane of the African Union and the regional economic communities as they strive to meet the challenges of human and regional security. Often, member states are either reluctant or unable to make their financial contributions. ECOWAS has by and large succeeded in overcoming this handicap by devising the innovative system of community levy, whereby 0.5 percent of taxes levied by member states on all imports entering the Community is automatically credited to the institution. The levy generates almost 80 percent of ECOWAS's annual operational budget, with external funding making up the rest.(Bouchat, 2010, p. 17)

In his 2004 article, Berman questioned whether African regional organizations will be able to reach their goals of peace and security despite the massive inputs from donor countries (E. Berman, 2004, pp. 27-28). This doubt stemmed from the structural

weakness that many times sucks in the resources provided for meagre results. Financially, under the *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework*, troops contributing countries have to be able to provide for all the needs of their troops for the first three months of an operation. After that, the community takes over the funding and logistics and reimburses states for the costs incurred (Economic Community of West African State, 2008). Out of realism, countries are often reluctant to contribute to operations because they doubt that the regional body will be able to refund them (E. Berman, 2004, p. 32). This reluctance has just played out again for the mission in Mali (Raghavan, 2013). For a long time, French and Malian armies bore the brunt of the fight to push back northern rebels.

By their very nature, external interventions are meant to be limited in time and in their objectives and means (B. N. G. Ayittey, 2005). Therefore, the only sustainable means of solving security issues in weak and fragile states is through regional and sub regional organizations (D. J. Francis, 2006). Because of the geographic proximity or other shared interests, their member states are very much affected by neighbours' misfortunes (Jörgel, 2007). States are bound to get involved in one way or another to find solutions to the problems because the "fire next door" will not spare them.

Though these civil wars are domestic in nature, they often have regional and international dimension and ramifications. The most serious threat to peace and security in West Africa is the 'contagion effect' of civil wars. These domestic conflicts are perceived as the 'fire next door', a bush fire that does not respect national boundaries because its consequences are felt far beyond the state's borders. These brutal intra-state conflicts have led to state collapse and their contagion effects threaten national and regional security of the sub-region mainly due to the influx of refugees and the proliferation of small arms (D. J. Francis, 2001, p. 39).

In the last five years, Burkina Faso has been experiencing the "fire next door" situation. First, there was an influx of Ivoirians and Guineans refugees. Currently, the country is hosting Malians fleeing the conflict in their home country. Understandably, President Blaise Compaore is the mediator in a number of conflicts in the sub region (International Crisis Group, 2013a).

The regional mechanism where it exists remains the best way to a win-win solution for both foreign powers and recipient countries. Global powers find in it an opportunity to

exit what appears to be unsolvable conflicts (Grey, 2010). States being assisted are able to contain the threats to their security. As indicated in chapter four, coordinating various agendas remains a challenge. Bouchat does recognize that despite the clash of interests among donor countries, both donors and recipients stand to gain from a coordination of actions.

When done together with regional organizations, like ECOWAS rather than individual countries, coordinated donor efforts simplify the process for Africans, who share more responsibility, too. This leverages the ability of African states to sustain success and may also reduce instability recidivism, since any problems that do arise are African problems to solve through a regional organization instead of becoming international problems that may be ignored or that may serve as excuses for foreign intervention (...). Coordinating efforts between international participants can ensure that limited development funds go farther in support of African security and stability operations (Bouchat, 2010, p. 124).

The success of ECOMOG forces during the operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the nineties is a proof that Africans are capable of solving their problems. They just still need help with what they lack in terms of logistical capabilities (J. G. M. Cilliers, 1999; Dempsey, 2009). The end results of these operations are evaluated differently depending on whether one sees a “glass half full or half empty of water”. Most accounts of the operations agree that West African forces did bravely bear the brunt of the war and brought about the cessation of fighting (Adebajo, 2002b). This credit is equally shared by those who fought with their boots on the ground and those who supported the operations.

The U.S.-led support effort in West Africa in the early nineties provided “cradle to grave” logistics and administrative support to ECOMOG forces in Liberia and subsequently in Sierra Leone. This support structure enabled combat forces from ECOWAS member states to deploy to and conduct sustained combat operations in the most remote areas of Liberia and Sierra Leone. When provided with robust multifunctional logistics support, reliable communications networks, and responsive tactical mobility (both wheeled vehicles and rotary wing aviation), ECOMOG combat elements proved highly effective on the ground in Liberia from 1996 until the ECOMOG withdrawal in 1999 (...) (Dempsey, 2009, p. 396).

ECOMOG is supported by the P3⁵⁸ (Britain, France and the United States) for the professionalization of its personnel through various capacity building programs (E. Berman, 2004; C. Ero, 2001, p. 18). All these P3 countries have their own agenda in West Africa. France is more interested in supporting its allies, the French speaking countries. Britain was interested in Sierra Leone and the US in Liberia (Whiteman, 2004). Coordination of actions remains a pious wish that is hardly heeded by them since it is not necessarily in their national interests to do so (Jendayi, 1997; Miskel, 2002). Not everybody agree with the way military cooperation with these Western powers is conducted. The cooperation entails classroom instructions, field operations and the provision of equipment. The contention is that sometimes highly lethal equipments are provided to troops that are not yet professionally fit to handle and maintain them (G. Eric Berman, 2003). Also, the armed and security forces are sometimes the very sources of insecurity in some states because it happens that they are organized along ethnic and tribal lines (Howe, 2005; Paris, 2009). Training such forces without addressing the root causes of insecurity ends up aggravating it (Young, 2002).

The sub regional hegemon (M. Haugaard, 2006), Nigeria used to be the most vocal in criticizing the ACRI⁵⁹ (Africa Crisis Response Initiative) program as being “divisive” and aiming at weakening “African security initiatives”. Another critique indicated that the program provides training but no logistics because it is underfunded (C. Ero, 2001, p. 20). It can be argued that the regional hegemon saw in the ACRI program a threat to its prestige as a result of the provision of military capability to other states. Under the second presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo⁶⁰, Nigeria did soften its position. It welcomed the United States military cooperation as it saw in it an opportunity to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of its armed forces and therefore its regional position of leadership (Whiteman, 2004, p. 375). In the end, whether one agrees or disagrees with

⁵⁸ P3 means partnership of three

⁵⁹ US support program to African states

⁶⁰ Gen. Obasanjo was himself a military ruler of his country between 1976 -1973. Following the democratization, he resigned from the armed forces to run for election at the helm of his country. Having won the elections, he ruled Nigeria from 1999 - 2007. He is going to become one of the spearheads of *The Conference on Security, Stability Development and Co-operation in Africa* (CSSDCA).

military cooperation with global powers, the truth remains that ECOWAS needs external supports in order to address its economic and security needs.

Regional conflict management becomes meaningless when one takes into consideration the “(...) partisanship, local rivalries, and lack of resources”(S. N. T. G. W. MacFarlane, 1992, p. 11). These more often hinder the efficiency of regional and sub regional organizations. One of the case studies used by MacFarlane to illustrate his analysis is the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1990-1992. (S. N. T. G. W. MacFarlane, 1992, p. 19). He explains how the mission never achieved its full results because of internal division within the organization. Nigeria used its economic and military might to spearhead the operation. Some members of the community, mainly from French speaking countries led by Cote d’Ivoire with the backing of France (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006, p. 250) continued to support the rebel Charles Taylor. They did it for fear of Nigerian hegemony in the region should the operation fully succeed. “In other words, divergent interests in the context of an uneven distribution of power have impeded the capacity of this regional organization to resolve this specific conflict” (S. N. T. G. W. MacFarlane, 1992, p. 20). This is one of the pitfalls of ECOMOG intervention in Liberia that does not hinder the overall success of the mission. It ended up being a learning experience that emboldened ECOWAS to continue reinforcing ECOMOG to respond to regional threats to peace and security.

Nigeria is the powerhouse of the ECOWAS sub region for its economic and military capabilities. But politically, the hegemon is weak because of its unresolved communities dissensions (International Crisis Group, 2006, 2012b; McLoughlin, 2013). Its democratisation process is very shaky (International Crisis Group, 2007e); therefore it is very difficult for Nigeria to fully assume the position of powerhouse.

This shortcoming does not affect the general recognition that the ECOWAS is far ahead in terms of devising ways of responding to threats in the sub region. This has repeatedly been demonstrated by the experience and current responses. The African Union Peace and Security Council plans to establish the African Standby Force (Solomon, 2004; St-Pierre, 2006). It is most likely going to rely on the ECOMOG that has the experience of relative success in regional conflict managements. ECOMOG has already its own Stand

by force of 3,000 troops that can be deployed in less than three months according to the books.

5.4.2 Capacity building through the Security Sector Reform/Governance program

The security Sector Reform /Governance programs have started to be implemented in some West African states. So far these are the best means for security and capacity building in the sub region. The holistic approach that SSG advocates has the advantage of tackling various states' institutions at the same time instead of the only armed and police forces (Chanaa, 2002).

In West Africa like on the rest of the continent, many times security forces are part of the causes of insecurity (Howe, 2005). Therefore, the professionalization of these forces requires among other things the civilian oversight of the process (Rothchild, 2008; Williams, 2005). As indicated in chapter four, traditionally civilians have been kept aloof of security matters. To change this unfortunate tradition there has to be a progressive involvement of civilians in security matters, be they members of parliaments, academics or civil society activists (N. Ball, Tsjearad Bouta and Luc van de Goor, 2003). "An underlying argument is that only a fundamental shift in the way security is conceived and the pursuit of a governance agenda that puts citizens at the centre of security planning and provision can mould these states into stable and secure environments where development can thrive"(Bryden Alan, 2008b, p. 4).

The ECOWAS has chosen to embark on the Security Sector Reform program as a region (Ebo, 2007) by devising a number of Mechanisms and Processes for member states (Economic Community of West African State, 2008; Economic Community of West African States, 1999). SSR program is long lasting and requires considerable resources that are beyond the reach of most individual West African states. The sub regional body being appointed as the bargaining representative for all, they stand a better chance of success. The community has the mandate of raising the needed resources on the international stage through bilateral and multilateral partners.

West Africa provides a challenging laboratory for security sector governance concerns. Indeed, the development of the SSR agenda among Western security and development actors was encouraged by a sense of weariness at the channelling of financial aid into a seemingly bottomless African pit with no obvious impact on underlying chronic insecurity. Sierra Leone became the most prominent ‘guinea pig’ in a UK-driven effort to transform the country’s entire security apparatus. Ghana and Nigeria were recipients of assistance from the United Kingdom and the latter from the United States through several schemes which were intended more as support for re-professionalisation of the military establishment. Liberia’s SSR process is now largely US-driven, with private security firms – first DynCorp (from 2004 to 2007) and PAE (from 2007), overseeing the rebuilding of Liberia’s armed forces and the United Nations assisting with the training of a new police force. On a smaller scale, Guinea has also been a beneficiary of US assistance for the re-professionalisation of its armed forces. (Bryden Alan, 2008b, p. 12)

Bryden does allude to the challenges still impeding the implementation of SSR in West Africa. The first of these is the absence of “local ownership” of the process. Foreign donors, mostly from Anglo-Saxon countries still conceive and implement the SSR in West Africa. In 2007, the United Kingdom did order a report on how donor countries can promote the local ownership of SSR programs.

In practice, however, the principle is often very difficult to apply, it is frequently breached by donor governments and it has not been translated into a set of donor strategies and methods of working in the field. As currently conceived, local ownership is more of a rhetorical device than a guide to donor officials engaged in SSR.(...) (Laurie Nathan, 2007, p. 5)

All the stakeholders are aware of the problem but the solution seems to still be out of reach for various reasons. On one hand, recipient states emerging out of destabilizing conflicts are too weak to assume their fair share of the cost of the program(Zartman, 1997). On the other hand, donor states would find it hard to sell to their polity (taxpayers) a costly and all charitable SSR project.

5.4.3 Security as more than police and military forces

ECOMOG has been established as the armed wing of ECOWAS mechanism for conflicts management and resolution. It should also be borne in mind that one of the biggest challenges to West Africa peace and security comes from criminal activities of various sorts (Hills, 2009). Drugs, human and small arms and light weapons trafficking, money laundering, etc are all creating insecurity in the sub region (United Nations, 2005b,

2008a). These activities thrive on the weakness of states. Their financial capability allows them to corrupt the state apparatuses to make sure they are freely exercising their illicit trade. Guinea-Bissau is the prime example of a West African state where criminal organizations somehow control the state (K. D. A. S. B. Aning, 2009; R. J. Bennett, 2009). Against such threats, police forces are best suited to respond (C. a. J. O. I. Ferguson, 2004). There exists a regional police organization – WAPCCO (West African Police Chiefs Committee). It is also integrated into ECOWAS and benefits from the support provided by Interpol (Addo, 2005). Unfortunately it suffers from similar deficiencies like other organizations in the sub region, namely the lack of sufficient funding (Hills, 2008a). Military forces are favoured by international cooperation because they can readily respond to foreign powers security agendas than can police forces (C. Ero, 2001, p. 4). Police forces are more domestic societies oriented and this makes them less appealing when it comes to funding.

There are many reasons for WAPCCO's ineffectiveness. From Interpol's perspective the subregion's policing problems demand a coherent regional response: cross-border trade is unregulated, institutional capacity is low, corruption is endemic, the Bight of Benin is a major hub for transnational drugs trafficking, and Guinea Bissau is Africa's first narco state.(...) Yet there is little evidence of coherent strategies for cooperation between the subregion's police, and Nigeria cannot play a coordinating role comparable to that of South Africa. Its police are notoriously corrupt, and it has less influence outside its borders than France in Benin or the United States in Liberia. Even Ghana, with its good bilateral relations with its neighbours (...), offers little in terms of regional leadership. (Hills, 2008b, p. 108)

Local ownership of securitization processes is still very weak but it remains the sustainable solution to insecurity in weak states. For it to succeed, the focus has to be on police forces and encourage states to invest accordingly in reinforcing their capacities.

There is the danger of foreign control of West African armed forces through military cooperation. The local capacity is still deficient and the challenges are enormous. At the moment the answer lies in this cooperation with capable states (G. Eric Berman, 2003). The onus is on leaders to diversify their sources of cooperation. Western powers have traditionally been the supporters of West African states. For the last decade, China has been gaining ground, particularly in logistical support (Beuret, 2008; Carmody,

2011). It remains that from the receiving end, a state cannot dictate its will on the donor. Therefore, full control of the securitization comes only from the development of local capacity to fund it.

Furthermore, it has been noted that cooperation with individual members of the Security Council is preferred to the cooperation with the United Nations. The organization depends on these same powers for its resources. The current difficulties of the United Nations operations on the African continent, like in the Democratic Republic of Congo support this claim (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005a). But the proven experience of the United Nations in peace building remains an aspect that makes it an unavoidable partner in the stabilization of troubled states (C. Ero, 2001, p. 21; United Nations, 2008b). This realization led to the creation of the United Nations Office for West Africa. The office has its headquarters in Dakar (Senegal) and aims at coordinating the efforts by the two organizations: United Nations and ECOWAS. The office did order the 2007 Report on the security situation in the sub region (Boniface, 2007). There is an increasing collaboration between the ECOWAS and the United Nations through this office. This is the case with the ongoing United Nations Missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire (United Nations, 2005a). The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) is to follow the same pattern for it to achieve the objectives desired by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (United Nations, 2012a). According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), the authority of AFISMA was to be transferred to MINUSMA (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization du Mali. The transfer of power to this "Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali" took place on the 01 July 2013 (United Nations, 2013). The Resolution calls for the holistic approach to security in Mali that goes beyond the crushing of Islamist armed factions.

The proceedings of the 2001 Abuja conference end with practical suggestions for ECOWAS mechanism to succeed in its objectives of peace and security in the sub region. One of these suggestions is the integration of civil society organisations in the search for security.

A number of critical interventions, which focused on operational factors, seem necessary to consolidate the efforts made by ECOWAS in the area of sub-regional peace and

security. These relate to: streamlining ECOWAS activities, addressing its resource, logistics and operational problems, and developing strategies for closer collaboration between ECOWAS and civil society actors in West Africa.(C. Ero, 2001, p. 26)

Civil society organisations could be a big help in promoting ECOWAS missions to the grassroots in member states. Furthermore, their support is an indicator of the democratic oversight of military interventions.

So far, the processes of cooperation and integration in West Africa has been led and supported by foreign donors. Bach considers this to be a failure of regionalism because the local ownership of the mechanism is still lacking (C. D. Bach, 2004, p. 85). This claim is verified by the way the U.S. war on terrorism is the key driver of all its cooperation with West African states (Whiteman, 2004, p. 376) as it is the case with many other states around the world. This is understandable, but on the other hand participating states are building their military capacity through this cooperation with the USA (J. P. Pham, 2011). Civil society involvement in these processes could help redress this situation by widening the circle of participants. When more than the armed forces and the governments are involved, states get a greater return in terms of security and governance (Rashid, 2004, pp. 385-386). For this end, Rashid goes as far as calling for the establishment of a security sector that encompasses those forces often labelled as “negative forces”. These are opposed to the central government; therefore they offer an alternative approach for the resolution of a problem.

(...) West Africa’s security sector challenges also need to be conceptualized more broadly. This debate needs to move beyond the narrow confines of the military and policy to include government-supported militias such as the civil defense forces in Sierra Leone, and irregular community defense forces like the Bakassi Boys and the Oodua People’s Congress in Nigeria. These groups participate in activities that directly or indirectly impinge on law and order and public safety. (Rashid, 2004, p. 387)

Many times these non-state forces are formed as a result of unheeded grievances against the state. When some social groups in the nation-state consider that their interests are not protected by the regime in power, they express their dissatisfaction in various ways (Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 328; Ebo, 2004, p. 6). One of these ways is the armed struggle to force state officials to heed to their pleas (G. E. a. N. F. Berman, 2004; Best, 2004;

Martin Evans, 2002). Elsenhans considers that no sustainable nation-building can take place while some segments of the society are excluded from the process. (Elsenhans, 1991, p. 68). This is a serious challenge to West African states SSG. Many times the excluded non-state armed groups have backers within the government circles given their ethnic, tribal or regional configurations (J. B. Berman, 1998). The human security component of SSR/SSG would seek to address this situation.

5.4.4 The human security component of the West African SSG program

Mindful of the broad understanding of the Security Sector, the ECOWAS has come up with The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) that was adopted in January 2008. The main objective of the Framework is to promote the human security in the sub region (Bryden Alan, 2008b). Article 5 of the Framework states:

To this end, the purpose of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) is to serve as a reference for the ECOWAS system and Member States in their efforts to strengthen human security in the region. Achieving this objective requires effective and durable cooperative interventions to prevent violent conflicts within and between States, and to support peace-building in post-conflict environments (Economic Community of West African State, 2008).

It has been argued throughout this chapter that it is unrealistic to expect “durable cooperative interventions” from foreign powers in order to achieve the human security agenda. The sustainability that the human security component requires is to be achieved by concerned states themselves.

Achieving the human security agenda in the West African SSR program is going to require considerable leadership. There is a need to balance this agenda with the strategic interests of donors who so far are the backbone of SSR in the sub region (Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 337; Ebo, 2004, p. 20). This is where the ECOWAS should step in to find ways of reducing the dependency on external donors for sustainable SSR program in member states. Ebo does recognise that: “(...) the concept of human security, while very appealing at a conceptual and rhetorical level, confronts real difficulties at the level of operationalisation and implementation”(Ebo, 2004, p. 5). The concept is all encompassing in nature and therefore it is difficult to operationalise. The challenge is

considerable for countries that lack own capabilities and therefore relies on external assistance (Uche, 2006). A further challenge to the implementation is the presence multiple security actors who have different agendas. Some of these favour the Westphalia state system that characterizes the sub regional organization. This is the case mostly of the United Nations organizations that deal with internationally recognised states. Some other actors are regionalizing forces that consider the state system to be a threat to their expanding objectives as argued above. This would be the case of armed groups, civil society and criminal networks that are all active in the sub region.

Apart from ECOWAS and its member-states, other security actors that are active in West Africa include the United Nations, intergovernmental donor organizations such as the OECD, EU, international NGOs, foreign private security companies, national and regional civil society networks, national and sub-regional and global criminal networks, non-state armed groups (mercenaries, militants), national and regional civil society organizations and networks. All these actors have an impact on the push-and-pull of security governance in West Africa. Therefore, even though an organization composed of states, a common ECOWAS SSR agenda and concept must be cognizant of, and be responsive to the respective roles of, and challenges posed by this array of security actors. (Ebo, 2007, p. 5)

The human security/peace building orientation in SSR would require that all these forces be brought to collaborate for the securitization of the sub-region. Once again a regional approach is better than leaving individual states to try and tackle these challenges on their own. Ebo supports a common ECOWAS SSR Agenda because it “(...) would contribute to addressing issues of donor coherence and coordination. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a common SSR concept would foster a common vision of security sector governance among ECOWAS states and provide the conceptual clarity (...)”(Ebo, 2007, p. 8) . The pooling of resources that a sub regional approach to SSR allows provides the needed capabilities to realize the human security agenda within the SSR because local actors are able to control the process.

This research recognizes that the human security remains the ultimate objective of any securitization efforts in Africa in general. It also posits that human security is very difficult to achieve in the short-term period that external cooperation is available. Only capable states are going to fully provide for the human security of their people (Jones,

2009). That is why in the immediate post-conflict period, the emphasis of stabilization efforts should be on strengthening states (Paris, 2004). They have to be capable of controlling and mitigating conflicts in their midst (Meierhenrich, 2004; Rotberg, 2003b). By the time donors' financial involvement comes to end, there has to be a minimal state confidence. Then governments and the population in general will be able to step in to continue with the securitization process. One of Ebo's recommendations is for the sub regional community SSR to focus on confidence building measures. The ECOWAS Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services advocates for such measures.

In view of the highly political nature of SSR, ECOWAS should focus initially on seeking broad agreement on Confidence Building Measures, such as a Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services. The ramification effect from such uncontroversial intervention would create the necessary space and mutuality of interests and confidence necessary for the more thorny aspects of regional security cooperation.”(Ebo, 2007, p. 23)

The difficulties of member states in ratifying such mechanisms are an indication that it is difficult to agree on a common human security oriented SSR agenda (Frerks, 2007). For this to happen there has to be basic confidence among stakeholders. Aiming for human security from the onset of the cooperation with external donors would be to condemn the whole process to failure. Human security agenda is a daunting task that requires long-term commitments that external partners would not necessarily be prepared to commit too (Dobbins, 2008). The major issue here is mostly financial (N. Ball, 2001). The economic prospects in West African sub region are bright as indicated in chapter four. But states are still very weak to be counted on for funding regional projects in the near future. Based on the case of West Africa which is the most advanced sub regional organization on the continent, Uche is quite pessimistic on the capacity of Africans to finance their development:

Member countries have, for instance, perpetually lagged behind in contributing their share of the capital for the organization. There is also a lack of political will on the part of member states to adhere to the rules and regulations of such institutions. It is therefore over-optimistic to expect synergy to arise out of a relationship among poorly managed countries.”(Uche, 2006, p. 236).

Five years after Uche's work, Bouchat indicated that this concern of financial capability has started to be addressed by ECOWAS as indicated above (Bouchat, 2010). Still, without significant local funding it is unrealistic to expect a local ownership of the securitization processes. While waiting for this capability to materialize, in the meantime it is wise to work with what can realistically be obtained from the external partners.

5.4.6 The challenges of West African Security Sector Governance program

The West African Security Sector Reform program is well designed through various mechanisms, but its implementation remains a challenge. The sub regional organization has its security agenda that sometimes clashes with the one of foreign backers. Besides the reform of the armed and security forces, the West African states are aiming for human security that is more holistic and requires considerable resources and time. Foreign donors on their part are looking at stopping conflicts, initiate the rebuilding of the state capacity and head home (Dobbins, 2008).

Bryden illustrates this challenge of conflicting agendas by stressing the negative impact of the fact that a Private Military Company was given the charge of reforming the Liberian Armed Forces. The lack of transparency involved in such a process results in the creation armed forces that consider that they do not have to account to anybody else but their military leadership (Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 329). Another consequence of outsourcing the reform of security forces is the rejection by the recipient societies. They consider the reformed security personnel to be at the service of the foreign powers that trained and equipped them. As such locals do not trust these forces for their security (Ebo, 2007, pp. 10-11). Meharg's Report on Security Sector Reform devotes a whole chapter on Non-Security Actors in the Liberia SSR program. When not involved in the SSR process they can also significantly act as "spoilers" of the whole process (Meharg, 2010, pp. 47-72). This can happen for example when PMC or PSC look more at financial opportunities that come from the easy access to natural resources of a weak state (Foaleng, 2007).

Also, the ECOWAS is made of countries that inherited different administration styles from the colonizing powers (Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 326). SSR agenda was easily adopted by English speaking countries than the French speaking ones. Security forces in Anglophone West African states have long been introduced to the concept of civil-military relations. This was not the case in Francophone countries that started to learn it following the democratization waves of the end of the Cold War (Mulikita, 2003; N'Diaye, 2009). Civilian involvement being at the heart of the SSR, it will still take time before all member states can speak the same language in these matters.

There is as yet no systematic and in-depth analysis of the current state of security governance across countries in the West African sub-region. Better understanding of national contexts can therefore only enhance understanding of how to deliver more meaningful support in states that are amenable to reform. At the very least, deeper knowledge of national contexts will allow for better testing and refinement of the SSR concept and afford greater understanding of sub regional challenges. (Bryden Alan, 2008b, p. 19)

So far, the SSR/SSG is steady in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The program was interrupted in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau by the resurgence of conflicts. Cote d'Ivoire is once again on the path of stabilization following the sworn in of President Ouattara in April 2011.

In his 2004 work on SSR in West Africa, Ebo did mention the issue of 'Political expediency versus practical imperatives' in the allocation of resources. (Bryden Alan, 2008b, pp. 19-20; Ebo, 2004, pp. 12-14). The need to accommodate the different political sensitiveness in the community takes precedence over the real requirements for the success of a given operation. For example when a French speaking country is affected by the conflict, the management of the situation has to be preferably under the leadership of another French speaking country. The military capability in the sub region lies mostly with the Anglophone Nigeria and Ghana. The slow pace of ECOWAS involvement in Mali conflict in 2013 is an illustration of this difficulty. Chad (BBC, 2013b), a non ECOWAS state was first on the scene along French troops.

A further challenge to the success of SSG in West Africa comes from the counterterrorism operations going on in the Sahel region. Many states are still in the

process of nation-state building and others are faced with insurgencies and criminality. Western donors have their own agendas in the region that is tied to counterterrorism and the fight against illegal immigration (Adjaye, 2011; OECD, 2008; Jemal and Mohamed Yahya Ould Abdel Wedoud Oumar, 2011). West African states have stakes in these foreign agendas but they are not necessarily their priority. Given their dependence for funding, they are more likely to end up juggling with the two programs. The more able states like Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria do benefit from the cooperation. Weaker member states, like Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Cape Verde risk giving up on the domestic plans when they have one.

The War on Terror and 'homeland' security, the growing strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea to American interests, and Euro-Atlantic immigration politics are some of the major strategic external factors that cast a defining shadow over the direction and viability of a home-grown SSR concept and agenda (Ebo, 2007, p. 21).

SSR processes are still recent in the sub region, but the program as a response to state's weakness is bound to continue. The Western powers that has traditionally assisted African states affected by conflicts are either going to put an end to their cooperation or drastically condition their it to the achievement of their national interests (Dobbins, 2008; Hounnikpo, 2011). This reorientation of the focus may not necessarily be in harmony with recipient states' national interests. Also there are increasingly vocal civil society organizations (Thelma Ekiyor, 2008) and opposition political parties in many countries. These will continue to keep governments in check despite the repressions that take place at times. That is why Bryden posits that:

It is therefore fundamentally important that due attention be paid not just to enhancing the operational effectiveness of security providers but to national capacity to manage reform processes within a framework of democratic control and oversight. Only through a mutually reinforcing emphasis on effectiveness, sound management and democratic governance can sustainable progress be achieved in reforming the security sector, its management and oversight. Moving beyond state-centric approaches to emphasise the human security of individuals and communities is the only way to forge a covenant between government, security providers and citizens based on trust and respect for the rule of law.(Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 330).

The uniformed members of the armed forces have traditionally been considered as the sources of insecurity in many West African states (Ebo, 2007, p. 17; Howe, 2005). However, a successful SSR depends on mutual collaboration between uniformed and non-uniformed civil servants. To improve on this, the ECOWAS has developed the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (Economic Community of West African States, 2001) and a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in West Africa⁶¹ that seeks to infuse “(...) democratic values (...) in the behaviour of security actors”(Bryden Alan, 2008a, p. 335). The Code for armed and security forces was adopted by Chiefs of Defence Staff gathered in the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission on 30-31 October 2006. Article 2 of the Draft code stipulates the Civilian supremacy in the management of armed and security forces:

The Armed Forces and Security Services shall be at the disposal of the constitutionally established political authority and are subordinated to the constitutionally democratically elected authorities. Political authorities and groups shall refrain from undue interference or to extend partisan politics to the operations of the Armed Forces and Security Services. Personnel of the Armed Forces and Security Services shall observe strict neutrality in partisan political matters (...) (Economic Community of West African States, 2006)

The Code still has to be ratified by all member states. As indicated above, the diverging administrative and military styles may play a role in delaying or hindering such a process (N'Diaye, 2009). It is a very important confidence building tool for the collaboration between civilians and armed forces in the sub region. Since the independences, both armed forces and civilian leaders have used each other for political gains (Howe, 2005). Sub regional frameworks that define their respective roles for better governance of states are very important.

5.5 Conclusion

⁶¹ This is a regionalization of the Proposed *Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa*. See Adedeji Ebo, (2005). *Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

The Economic Community of West African States was established in 1975 to promote the economic cooperation between member states. It is part of the continental states' integration or cooperation project. The post-Cold War security environment and conflicts in the sub region in the 1990s brought in the security component of the cooperation (Ukeje, 2005). Therefore, ECOWAS is indeed an “emerging” Regional Security Complex (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). The community has experienced atrocities and instabilities that affected the whole region (Adebajo, 2002a). It did come up with locally designed solutions to deal with the problem. Following the operations, it has taken time to reflect on them and draw the needed lessons. Having learned from this experience, the ECOWAS has designed various mechanisms that guide its operations and allow evaluating their effectiveness (Adebajo, 2004a; Ukeje, 2005).

The ECOWAS Regional Security Complex is still foreign dependent and this prevents it from controlling the securitization agenda (Uche, 2006). However, despite the lack of capability, the community has made significant progress that draw the praise of bilateral and multilateral supporters. They trust the regional security mechanisms and provide it with the needed aid (Bouchat, 2010). The cooperation is slowly building the capacity of the region to deal with its own conflicts (G. Eric Berman, 2002). It is expected that with time, the regional community will acquire the needed maturity and capability to reduce the dependency and be able to successfully bargain for its interests. Meanwhile, the ECOWAS security architecture is recognized as a model for other African sub regional communities to emulate (Bouchat, 2010). Even the continental security mechanism is learning from ECOWAS by calling on its resources to develop its own program.

Challenges are still considerable. The economic and other strategic resources in the West African region are still being developed and this has the potential of altering the ongoing capacity building process. The future may likely be decided by the way the existing and the rising powers will decide on how to access the resources (Carmody,

2011; Obi, 2009). What is certain is that the community has grown sufficiently to allow it to play a role in the design of its future.

Chapter Six: CONCLUSION

Most of the modern West African states were born with deficiencies that have to be addressed comprehensively so that people's dreams of stability and prosperity can one day become reality.

As they became independent, West African states inherited structures and modes of functioning that they have never fully succeeded to put to good use and this has led to their weakness and insecurity. The boundaries between states were artificially drawn by colonial powers according to their agendas (Asiwaju, 1985). This interference in the indigenous nation building processes has proven to be detrimental to their development. It has created states in which over a century after, it still is difficult to create a sense of nationhood that is so essential for the needed social peace (Aboagye, 2005). Some post-independent West African states are faced with insurgencies claiming to resurrect the pre-colonial nations that were forcefully pooled to create states by colonization. Similarly, these post-independent states inherited a triple heritage that is still somehow confusing today (A. A. A. Mazrui, 1984). The weakness of most West African states is characterized among other things by their inability to spread the state administration system all over the territory. As a consequence, their absence do favour parallel administrations run by traditional or religious groups (I. D. a. R. Ray, P. S. (Purshottama Sivanarian), 2003). As states gain some strength, they sometimes find themselves dealing with these parallel powers that are not always prepared to give up their acquired prerogatives. This triple heritage of the state is sometimes confusing to people and as such constitute a further source of instability in West African states.

Politically, democratization is recognized as the best form of governance that will allow these states a national cohesion that they all need. The democratization so much desired by all has to be recognized as a process and not a cure to be administered to obtain quick results. The main lesson to be learned from failed democratization processes is that African states in general will continue to be democratized taking into consideration their particular cultural and historical backgrounds (Harbeson, 2009). For that to happen, the national diversity has to be taken as an ally and not an enemy. A consensus building process, though time and resources consuming has to be favoured so that all nations that

make the nation-state, feeling considered, can come to share the same national ideal (Zartman, 2009). The first efforts towards stability and prosperity will be brought about by building strong middle class between the few elites at the top of the triangle and the wide mass at the base. Only then can many people share in the nation's power and wealth (Graham Harrison, 2001, p. 395). Otherwise, elites are going to influence their bases in their refusal to collaborate with the central government. The lack of political participation by the masses will lead to the collapse of governments' legitimacy and therefore to the weakening the West African states.

As indicated earlier, since the 1960s, development has been at the centre of the cooperation between West African states and the mostly rich Western countries. The expected results have never been fully achieved because of the structural deficiency of these states (Bolton, 2008). The foreign aid made available to them has in many cases become a source of their economic weakness because of the burden of external debt. Many times states need aid to service the previous debt (Ndikumana, 2011). This created a vicious circle that continues to take them down.

The Cold War dynamic between the two superpowers was significantly played out in West African states that were among the proxies through which the war was fought. This weakened them because they served more the Cold War agenda instead of devoting their energies to nation-states building. Individual or particular group interests were many times served by this conflict at the expense of the national interests (D. J. Francis, 2006).

In the process of all the above, West African states lost legitimacy both domestically and internationally. At home, people resented governments that were serving individual's interests and neglected them. The most visible manifestation of this is the military coups that have plagued the sub region (Souare, 2006). Insurgencies and criminal activities are the other means through which people attempt to supplement for what their states are failing to provide them with (Clapham, 1996). In the international system, most of the West African states have for many years been identified as weak and therefore in need of assistance. As such, these states are absent where major global decisions are being taken even though these affect them as well.

The Economic Community of West African States can indeed be called a Regional Security Complex (B. a. O. W. Buzan, 2006). The community has experienced atrocities and instabilities that affected the whole region. It did come up with locally designed solutions to deal with the problems. Following the operations, it has taken time to reflect on them and draw the needed lessons. Having learned from this experience, ECOWAS has designed various mechanisms that guide its operations and allow evaluating their effectiveness (Adebajo, 2004b). The ECOWAS Regional Security Complex is still foreign dependent and this prevents it from controlling the securitization agenda (Chanaa, 2002). However, despite the lack of capability, the community has made significant progress that draw the praise of bilateral and multilateral supporters who trust the regional security mechanisms and provide it with the needed resources (Bouchat, 2010). The cooperation is slowly building the capacity of the region to deal with its own conflicts. It is expected that with time, the regional community will acquire the needed maturity and capability to reduce the dependency and be able to successfully bargain for its interests. Meanwhile, the ECOWAS security architecture is recognized as a model for other African sub regional communities to emulate. Even the continental security mechanism is learning from ECOWAS by calling on its resources to develop its own program.

The strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea provide economic opportunities but also security challenges. The sub region is endowed with natural resources and its geographic location makes it a strategic region. It is close to the Western powers of Europe and America. Global powers have always sought to control this region. Similarly, terrorists and criminal organizations do also seek to benefit from the weakness of West African states to set up the bases for their activities.

This geographical space covers West African States from Cape Verde to the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). The emphasis of this work is on those countries having access to the gulf and that are members of the Economic Community of West African States. If foreign countries and corporations have interests in the region, states should receive equal if not more return from the trade (Abdel-Fatau Musah, 2009, p. 2). It is unrealistic to solely rely

on rich countries for responses to domestic peace and security issues. Out of humanitarian solidarity alone, countries are more likely to assist only too little and as late as possible. But once their interests are at stake, assistance or intervention will be readily available (Okbazghi, 2003). Therefore, traditionally receiver countries ought to seek ways of reducing the dependency dynamic and be able to bargain for their national interests as well.

West Africa is fast becoming a major oil reservoir, and for the past several years it has been the most active oil exploration region in the world. (...) More than 100 billion barrels of oil are thought to exist in the region, along with trillions of cubic feet of natural gas. The safety of this resource—an increasing part of U.S. supplies—is critical, but supporting West African Hydrocarbon development also helps achieve U.S. policy as it relates to the geographic consolidation of U.S. oil sourcing, balancing the power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and permitting flexibility in U.S. Middle Eastern diplomacy(...). The United States imports 15 percent of its oil from West Africa, a figure expected to rise to 25 percent within the next decade. (M. A. Smith, 2004, p. 309)

The potential is significant but so far states in the sub region are not getting their fair share of these resources. Given the geographic position of the sub region, close to Europe and the Americas by sea and air, West Africa has always attracted foreign powers in many ways (J. F. Ade Ajayi, 1985; Crowder, 1968). It was among other things mostly affected by slave trade to the Americas. The Guinea gulf position in the Atlantic Ocean is important to the security of the United States that will hardly allow it to fall in unfriendly hands. (M. A. Smith, 2004, p. 312). “The terrorist attacks on the United States of America in 2001 and the counterterrorism war that has been waged ever since have shed this new light on the strategic importance of the Guinea Gulf in both economic and security terms”. (J. P. Pham, 2007; M. A. Smith, 2004, p. 308)

The regional community is the most advanced on the African continent. For the last decade Western powers have been seeking ways of increasing African capabilities for peacekeeping. This would allow them to pull out of African conflicts. For that purpose West Africa has received overlapping investments in peacekeeping training (G. Eric Berman, 2003). This overlapping is due to diverging national interests. Smith illustration of the motives behind U.S. action in regard to Nigeria’s instability indicates well the unrealistic clash of motives.

Nigeria, the source of nearly 10 percent of U.S. oil, has suffered frequent interruptions in oil production. These disturbances are increasingly due to militant groups' urging the government to manage the oil sector more equitably. The concerns of the militant groups should be heeded, but the groups' ability to hold the country's oil industry hostage should be curtailed. U.S. forces in the region, acting as a guarantor of security, may help reduce such interruptions while pushing the Nigerian government, and other newer oil states, towards needed reforms (M. A. Smith, 2004, p. 310).

It remains to be seen how the US and other Western democracies are going to pursue both objectives of access to resources and of governments' reforms in West Africa. They are competing against the rising China for which access to resources is the only objective (Garrett, 2004). For China conditioning the cooperation to democratization is an unacceptable interference in internal affairs of the state. This has been the main contention in the cooperation between a good numbers of developing states and International Financial Institutions. Some leaders are cashing on this competition between global powers in their bargaining (Beuret, 2008; Carmody, 2011). As a result, China has become the most important commercial partner of African states. ECOWAS is increasingly strengthening its institutions so that member states may benefit from their resources. Insecurity remains the main hindrance to the economic development of the community.

African and particularly West African states have demonstrated their eagerness to cooperate in regional organizations through regionalism. Since the end of the Cold War, cooperation in security matters has become the priority given the instability that prevents the normal functioning of states. The challenges are considerable. The economic and other strategic resources in the West African region are still being developed and this has the potential of altering the ongoing capacity building process. The future may likely be decided by the way the existing and the rising powers will decide on how to access the resources. What is certain is that the community has grown sufficiently to allow it to play a role in the design of its future.

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Appendices

Invitation to participate in the study

The following text is an indication of the content to communicate to individuals when inviting them to participate in the study. Contacts will be made either verbally through personal contact or by telephone. If need be, this text may be sent by fax or e-mail to those who request it.

My name is Jean-Pierre Mulago Shamvu, a PhD candidate at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies of the University of Calgary. My research interest is on States' Building Crisis in West-Africa since 1955. I would like to look at some patterns that explain why West African States are weak and what can be done to stop or reverse this situation. For this end, I am meeting academics, politicians, traditional and religious leaders to discuss the causes of weakness and the capabilities that they see in various states.

I would appreciate if you could provide some of your time to be interviewed on this topic. If so, please e-mail or phone me at...

Sample questionnaire

These questions will be provided to the interviewee at least 24 hours prior to the interview to allow them to prepare. They seek to get their opinion on these issues.

- 1) According to Failed States Index (Foreign Policy) and the “Country Indicators for Foreign Policy” (NPSIA), most West African States are classified as weak and some are failed. Do you agree with this classification? If yes, why is it so fifty years after independences? If not, why?
- 2) Insecurity is still present in many West African States. In some areas people are not free to go about their daily work like farming or trade. What can be done to fix this situation?
- 3) Fixing the States in West Africa passes through the reform of the Security Sector (Armed Forces, Police, Administration, Justice System, etc.) What are the obstacles to this reform?
- 4) The Human Development Index that compounds the GDP per capita, literacy rate and life expectancy is very low in West African States. What are the prospects of improving on this in the near future?
- 5) The New Partnership for African Development has suggested some bold initiatives to take Africa out of poverty and dependence. Why are some West African States reluctant to ratify the initiative like the Peer Review Mechanism?

Echantillon de questionnaire

Ces questions seront remises à la personne participante au moins 24 heures avant la rencontre pour lui permettre de se préparer. Elles visent à obtenir son opinion sur ces problématiques.

1. Selon le Failed States Index (Foreign Policy) et le “Country Indicators for Foreign Policy” (NPSIA), la plupart des pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest sont classifiés comme faibles et certains risquent la faillite. Etes-vous d’accord avec cette classification ? Si, oui, pourquoi est-ce le cas cinquante ans après les indépendances ? Si non, pourquoi êtes-vous en désaccord ?
2. L’insécurité est encore présente dans plusieurs pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Dans certaines régions les gens ne sont pas libres de vaquer à leurs activités quotidiennes comme l’agriculture et le commerce. Qu’est-ce qui peut être fait pour corriger cette situation ?
3. La consolidation des Etats en Afrique de l’Ouest passe par la Reforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (Les Forces Armées, la Police, l’Administration, le Système judiciaire, etc.). Quels sont es obstacles a cette reforme ?
4. L’Indice de Développement Humain qui rassemble le Produit Intérieur Brut per capita, le taux d’alphabétisation et l’espérance de vie et très bas dans les Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Quelles sont les perspectives pour améliorer cette situation dans un proche avenir ?
5. Le Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l’Afrique (NEPAD) a suggéré des initiatives courageuses pour sortir l’Afrique de la pauvreté et de la dépendance. Pourquoi certains Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest sont-ils réticents pour ratifier l’initiative comme le Mécanisme de Révision par les Pairs ?

WEST AFRICA



Figure 1. Map of West Africa⁶²

⁶² <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/westafrika.pdf>

Major African Regional Organizations in chronological order⁶³

Organization	Founding date	Member states	Aims
Entente Council	May 1959	[5] Benin, Burkina, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo	Economic and Technical cooperation
UAM- Union Africaine et Malgache	December 1960	[12] Afrique Occidentale Française + Afrique Equatoriale Française + Madagascar	Cooperation
CPCM – Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee	October 1964	[4] Algeria Libya, Morocco Tunisia	Common market
UDEAC- Union Douanière & Economique De l'Afrique centrale	December 1964	[6] Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon	Common market
OCAM- Organisation commune africaine et Mauricienne	February 1965	[9] Bénin, Burkina, CAR, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo	Economic and Technical cooperation

⁶³ G. Martin, 2002: p.129, Table 3-1. The order has been changed in favor of a chronological one and a presentation in a chart. The UAM that was not in the original table has been added.

Organization	Founding date	Member states	Aims
EAC-East African Community	December 1967	[3] Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	Common market
CEAO- Communauté Economique De l'Afrique de l'Ouest	April 1973	[7] Benin, Burkina, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal	Common market
MRU- Mano River Union	October 1973	[3] Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone	Customs union
ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States	May 1975	[16] Benin, Burkina, Cote D'Ivoire, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Togo	Common market And Economic Community
CEPGL- Communauté Economique des Pays Des Grands Lacs	September 1976	[3] Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire (DRC)	Common market
SADCC- Southern African Development Coordination Conference	April 1980	[9] Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Project oriented Economic cooperation

Organization	Founding date	Member states	Aims
PTA-Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa	December 1981	[16] Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Common market And Economic Community
Senegambia Confederation	December 1981	[2] Senegal, Gambia	Political union
ECCAS- Economic Community of Central African States	October 1983	[10] Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equat. Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire (DRC)	Common market
UAM- Union of the Arab Maghreb	February 1989	[5] Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia	Economic, social and cultural

Figure 2. African regional organizations

COUNTRY	Land:	Population:	Population:2
	(thousands of square km)	1960-1980	2005-2008
		(millions)	(millions)
Benin	113	3.4	9.3
Burkina Faso	274	5.6	15.2
Cape Verde	0.433		0.5
Cote d'Ivoire	322	8.2	19.6
Gambia	11	0.6	1.8
Ghana	239	11.3	23.9
Guinea	246	5.3	9.7
Guinea-Bissau	36	0.8	1.6
Liberia	111	1.8	3.6
Mali	1,240	6.8	12.7
Niger	1,267	5.2	13.7
Nigeria	924	82.6	151.5
Senegal	197	5.5	12.7
Sierra Leone	72	3.4	5.7
Togo	57	2.4	6.4

6.1 Table of Land and population of West African states 1960-2008