



IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009

Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, Editors

ISBN 978-1-55238-561-6

THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at ucpress@ucalgary.ca

Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist's copyright.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: This open-access work is published under a Creative Commons licence.

This means that you are free to copy, distribute, display or perform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to its authors and publisher, that you do not use this work for any commercial gain in any form, and that you in no way alter, transform, or build on the work outside of its use in normal academic scholarship without our express permission. If you want to reuse or distribute the work, you must inform its new audience of the licence terms of this work. For more information, see details of the Creative Commons licence at: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>

UNDER THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENCE YOU **MAY**:

- read and store this document free of charge;
- distribute it for personal use free of charge;
- print sections of the work for personal use;
- read or perform parts of the work in a context where no financial transactions take place.

UNDER THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENCE YOU **MAY NOT**:

- gain financially from the work in any way;
- sell the work or seek monies in relation to the distribution of the work;
- use the work in any commercial activity of any kind;
- profit a third party indirectly via use or distribution of the work;
- distribute in or through a commercial body (with the exception of academic usage within educational institutions such as schools and universities);
- reproduce, distribute, or store the cover image outside of its function as a cover of this work;
- alter or build on the work outside of normal academic scholarship.

**"BEHAVING AS ADULTS:"
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NORTH AMERICAN
SECURITY
IN THE 1930S**

Galen Roger Perras

As historians J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer argue elsewhere in this volume, it was abundantly clear by the 1930s that Canada's national interest lay in increasingly closer defence relations with the United States. British political and military weakness, already apparent in the face of growing Japanese militarism and Nazi aggression in Europe, left Canada exposed and isolated on the North American continent with only the United States for company. Then, as it would in 1945 and again today, an uncertain and fearful Washington looked north towards its vulnerable border as a source of danger. While Canada itself was clearly no threat, American policy-makers fretted that its lacklustre defence efforts made it a potential launching pad for an attack on the American homeland. Already, by 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt was anxious to establish some form of bilateral continental security cooperation to address this threat.

This chapter explores the readiness of Canadian diplomats to recognize this changed reality and their capacity to deal with the consequences effectively. For O.D. Skelton, Canada's influential under-secretary of state

for external affairs, continentalist connections with the United States – economic, political, or military – initially seemed to offer Canada an opportunity to extract itself from the dangerous connections to the weakened and bankrupt British Empire that had killed 60,000 Canadians during the First World War. But this continentalist view was slow to triumph. Of course, part of the problem lay south of the border, where many of Roosevelt’s key foreign policy aides, worried about the president’s interest in Canadian security at a time when American opinion was profoundly isolationist, sought to block security cooperation with Canada. This was compounded by more important considerations north of the border. Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King showed little inclination to take a North American road when it came to security. Officers in the department of national defence, too often British by training and outlook, mounted a determined opposition to closer security ties with the United States. More important, Skelton and his diplomats in External Affairs too found reasons, thanks to American clumsiness and the vast continental power disparity, to suspect Washington’s motivations after 1936. As a result, Canadians were slow to acknowledge where their national security interests really lay in the 1930s, delaying genuine continental defence cooperation until German power threatened Britain’s, and Canada’s, very survival in 1940.

Canada had only a sporadic formal defence relationship with the United States before the 1930s. The two countries had cooperated briefly during the final years of the First World War to coordinate military plans and industrial cooperation. The United States and Pacific security loomed large again for Canadians in 1921, when Britain proposed to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance over strong American, and then Canadian, objections. Formal defence relations reverberated too through the halls of Parliament in 1923, when the dynamic prophet of American air power, Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell, unsuccessfully floated the idea of a bilateral aviation alliance.¹ Ottawa’s lack of official interest in building bilateral military connections with Washington was confirmed in 1927. Concerned by the volume of traffic between military authorities in Ottawa and British military attachés in the United States, Canada’s first minister at its new legation in Washington, Vincent Massey, insisted that Canadians “must stand on our own feet” and recommended posting Canadian

military attachés to London and Washington. “Damn nonsense,” sniffed the prime minister, quickly killing Massey’s sensible proposal.²

The absence of Canadian military officers in the Washington legation in the early 1930s meant that the young mission was ill-prepared to anticipate and handle American security concerns in the face of Japan’s growing aggressiveness in the Far East. Certainly, United States Army Air Corps (AAC) plans to conduct operations in western Canada and Alaska caught Canadian officials by surprise in 1934. Keen to restore its tattered prestige, worried about Japan’s ambitions and strength, and recalling Billy Mitchell’s earlier notions for a northern aviation alliance, the Air Corps proposed sending ten bombers to Alaska through Canada. The AAC told the State Department vaguely that the flight would “further” relations with Canada. However, the corps’ secret orders directed the flight to assess “the practicability of dispatching an air force to Alaska” in the event of war with Japan.³

Canada’s chief of the general staff, General A.G.L. McNaughton, was not fooled. Anxious to maintain good relations with Washington – he told Maurice Hankey, secretary of Britain’s powerful Committee on Imperial Defence (CID), in December 1934 that estrangement from the United States only aided Canadians “opposed to cooperation with the Empire in time of war” – McNaughton feared that neither the United States nor Japan would respect Canada’s neutrality in a conflict. Indeed, he thought that the United States might even intervene militarily in British Columbia.⁴ Labeling the Alaskan flight a military reconnaissance likely to induce “similar requests from any other foreign power that could not well be refused,” the general worried that acquiescence would “make it very difficult to maintain our neutrality.”⁵

McNaughton, who was castigated as a “little Canadian” anti-imperialist by some of his officers,⁶ enjoyed the confidence of Conservative prime minister R.B. Bennett. As historian Steve Harris has argued, the general was guided by two overarching objectives: modernizing the army so that it could fight again in Europe alongside British forces if needed; and making the military into the pre-eminent adviser on security matters to the Canadian government. McNaughton’s ambitions put him up against Skelton, whom King described as the “ablest man in the public service.”⁷ Skelton saw himself as a Canadian nationalist and believed that calls for imperial

solidarity “concealed a hard-headed attempt to exploit colonial loyalties for the benefit of Great Britain.”⁸ Convinced that a strong Canadian military meant involvement in more bloody imperial wars, Skelton refused to allow his department to plan jointly with the Department of National Defence and opposed forming a Canadian defence committee that would bring together key departments to ponder security issues. As for relations with the United States, Skelton felt that Canada’s security lay “in her own reasonableness, the decency of her neighbour, and the steady development of friendly intercourse, common standards of conduct, and common points of view.” As an American diplomat observed in 1934, Skelton “has always been a friend of the United States and an advocate of more confident relations with us.”⁹ Skelton doubted that allowing American planes to overfly Canada once would imply a permanent arrangement. He challenged McNaughton’s claim that other countries might seek similar rights, pointing out that Washington “alone possesses territory on this continent between which a route through Canada is a natural one.” Still, as a sop to McNaughton – National Defence had asked Skelton not to mention its concerns about the planned flight path to the Americans – Skelton asked that the Air Corps avoid the commercially promising Mackenzie River Valley. But when puzzled American Legation official Pierre de la Boal said that this policy was “likely to be looked upon in both countries as a measure prompted by military considerations quite unusual in the relationship between Canada and the United States and reminiscent of the inhibitions which exist in other parts of the world,”¹⁰ Skelton told Bennett that “it would be preferable to refuse on the ground that the route is not available rather than bringing in any military defence issues.” McNaughton protested that opening a route for American warplanes in a war with Japan involved broad issues associated with the maintenance of Canadian neutrality. Bennett was unconvinced. Indeed, the prime minister permitted the Air Corps fliers to employ the Mackenzie Valley path.¹¹

Skelton was harder on America, as historian Norman Hillmer observes in his chapter, than his historical reputation suggests. The under-secretary soon regretted his reasonableness when the *Washington Herald* declared that the Air Corps’s flight would test the route’s value in a war with Japan. Skelton feared that relations with Japan would suffer if Canada was seen to help Washington prepare to confront Tokyo in the Pacific and

he insisted that the *Herald's* claim made it impossible to permit further military flights to Alaska. While Skelton declined to obstruct the approved mission, American minister Warren Robbins correctly observed that the disclosure had strengthened the position of the Department of National Defence, which was already inclined "to view our military operations with some suspicion."¹²

The Army Air Corps's flight north in July 1934 drew huge crowds at five Canadian stops from Winnipeg to Whitehorse. The American consul in Edmonton proudly reported that locally based Canadian servicemen expressed pleasure "over what they regard as a symbol of identity between the interests of Canada and the United States in the matter of Alaskan defense." Flight leader Colonel H.H. Arnold, a Mitchell acolyte and the future head of United States air forces in World War II, declared that an Alaskan flyway was feasible.¹³ Yet bilateral security relations languished. Carping to the British War Office that "the gradual establishment of a practice of dispatching aircraft to Alaska over Canadian territory might give rise to a rather awkward situation on some future occasion," McNaughton did more than complain. Wanting options other than cooperation with Washington, the chief of the general staff laid plans for Defence Scheme No. 2, a plan to assert Canada's neutrality forcefully in any military confrontation between Japan and the United States not involving Britain.¹⁴ Some in the Department of External Affairs also now viewed American plans more cynically. After the United States Navy surveyed the Aleutians in 1934 for bases against Japan and then announced large north Pacific naval exercises for 1935, an acerbic Hume Wrong – he had called the United States a "a barbarous country" in 1928 – warned that these plans to militarize the Pacific constituted "a matter of deep interest and concern to Canada."¹⁵

Canadian worries about American plans deepened when the House of Representatives' Committee on Military Affairs examined a proposal for an Army Air Corps base in the Great Lakes region during in-camera hearings in February 1935. Brigadier General C.E. Kilbourne fretted that it "would look as though we contemplated passing away from the century-old principle that our Canadian border needs no defense." But AAC officer Captain H.L. George countered that British warplanes could shuttle via Labrador to bomb American cities. General F.M. Andrews, commander General Headquarters Air Force, doubted that Canada would join an

anti-United States coalition; but if it did, American bombers flying from the new base could strike Toronto and Montreal. Emphasizing the importance of aerial warfare's short operational lines, Lt. Colonel J.D. Reardan stressed that only Canada offered such a threat. If Canada could not stop hostile powers from attacking the United States, Reardan concluded that we "would have to do so."¹⁶ These were not marginalized opinions. The 1933 Drum Board report, a 1934 Baker Board submission, a general headquarters report, and two U.S. Navy documents all had identified potential aerial threats coming from Canada.¹⁷ When the Government Printing Office mistakenly released the testimony in April 1935, the *Washington Post* chastised President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "hypocrisy" for advocating a Good Neighbor policy while his military plotted Canada's doom. In response, the committee's chair, Representative J.J. McSwain, argued that the base was analogous to France's Maginot Line and was designed "not against Belgium, but against what might come over or through Belgium." He added that the limits on Great Lakes warships imposed by the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 did not apply to aircraft and that American fortifications lined the Canadian frontier.¹⁸ An incensed Under Secretary of State William Phillips assured Wrong that such "provocative references to Canada" were uncalled for. Roosevelt, in turn, repudiated the testimony and forced public apologies from McSwain and Secretary of War George Dern.¹⁹

The president's "well merited rebuke" mollified critics, although Canadian and British newspapers were "inclined to treat the matter with a good deal of ridicule at the expense of the Congressional Committee and of our military authorities."²⁰ Initially amused by the public fumbblings in Washington, Skelton told Boal on 2 May that he would not have objected had the project proceeded quietly. On further reflection, however, the Canadian official concluded that Congress had camouflaged the facility's location and purpose by describing it as an intermediate flight station. Skelton, making clear that the revelations could affect Canada's attitude towards a United States–Japan conflict, now believed that the Air Corps had deliberately forced Canada's hand in 1934. To ensure that Air Corps overflights should not become a matter of course, the under-secretary demanded that American planes adopt flight paths that minimized Canadian geographic and political exposure.²¹ Skelton's considered statements contrasted sharply

with McNaughton's views. McNaughton urged Prime Minister Bennett on 5 April to rebuild Canada's military since an American incursion into British Columbia could end Canada's political independence.²² The general argued that the United States "would not hesitate for one moment to occupy our country in order to deny potential bases to their enemy" and insisted that the testimony of the committee of the House of Representatives presaged "an American protectorate over Canada." Largely unmoved by this plea, Bennett offered National Defence a handful of new warplanes.²³

McNaughton's fear was at least partly valid. In 1924 Billy Mitchell had warned that if the United States and Japan clashed, "Canada would either openly side with the United States or run the risk of occupation."²⁴ While he praised Norman Armour, the new United States minister to Canada, as "one of the crack men in the Foreign Service," Wrong ridiculed assertions that Roosevelt's administration did "not in any of its plans or policies envisage the possibility of any change in the friendly relationship between the United States and any foreign country." If so, he asked, why have a military?²⁵ Once hopeful that the president would fix the grievous economic injustices that Canada had suffered at protectionist American hands at the start of the Great Depression, Wrong found it difficult "to find one positive action taken by the Roosevelt Administration which has been beneficial to Canada." He added that "this Administration has proved itself more strongly isolationist than its two predecessors." Roosevelt was "undoubtedly" full of good will towards Canada, but so far it "has been shown in words and not in deeds." Unless something useful happened soon, his Good Neighbor Policy would stand as nothing "more than a slick and hypocritical phase."²⁶

Something quite useful soon followed Wrong's complaint. Triumphant at the polls in October 1935 after five years in opposition, King quickly signed a trade deal with Roosevelt, fulfilling Robbins' claim that the Liberal Party was "a little bit" more inclined "than the other party to play the game with us."²⁷ Skelton told Armour that he sought the creation of a "North American mind" to stop Canada from being further drawn into a "world-wide British economic empire whose interests, as progressively developed from London, might soon diverge seriously from" American needs. Armour was also pleased that King preferred "the American road."²⁸ King, a master of fuzzy statements, hoped that Canada might "link" the

United States and Britain during the London Naval Conference and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. Declaring that "we must stand together on all these questions," King saw the trade deal as the "herald of a better day and a better way" for a troubled world.²⁹ Even Wrong, surprisingly, agreed that Roosevelt was reaching beyond isolationism for a new foreign policy, "the definition of which is of immense importance to Canada as a North American country, as part of the British Commonwealth, and as a member of the League of Nations."³⁰

Indeed, unknown to Canadians, Roosevelt had already begun to think in these broad terms. Increasingly fearful of growing German and Japanese power, he told Secretary of State Sumner Welles as early as 1933 that "we here on this Continent must work out a continental understanding of identification of interests." When Britain pondered naval concessions to Japan in 1934, the president threatened "to approach public sentiment in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in a definite way to make these dominions understand clearly that their future security is linked with us in the United States."³¹ After telling Quebecers in July 1936 that the undefended Canada–United States frontier inspired other nations to live in peace, Roosevelt informed King privately that some American senators favoured military intervention if Japan attacked British Columbia.³² Anxious to flesh out his continental vision, the president backed proposals to build a highway through Canada to Alaska so that American forces could reach the state quickly in a crisis. When a Canadian military report claimed that U.S. Army planning was "based on the general idea of a Far Eastern country making an attack on the United States by way of Canada,"³³ King's previously parsimonious Cabinet speedily approved \$200 million in new military spending with an emphasis on west coast defence. The alternative, King claimed, was relying on Washington's protection and "losing our independence."³⁴

The possibility that a highway to Alaska might have its military uses was not a new subject, but it was a troubling one. In 1931, a joint Canadian–American board, anxious to build a highway to boost economic development, had said it "would have no more military significance than any other road that might extend north beyond the British Columbia boundary." Still, its American members, echoing Mitchell, had agreed it could possess "a very definite value from an aviation standpoint in cases where Canada

and the United States might be allies.”³⁵ Before leaving the Department of National Defence for a post with the National Research Council in 1935, McNaughton cautioned that the road “would confront us with a somewhat delicate situation.” Even if the United States had no desire to use the road militarily, the new chief of the general staff, Major General E.C. Ashton, concluded in “a great international struggle military necessity would tend to overcome political scruples.” Canada would be foolish to create “what would then become a military asset of a very high order if possessed or utilized by our neighbours to the south.”³⁶ Skelton was more judicious. He thought the route a perfectly intelligible aspiration by west coast peoples and argued that unless Canada “incurred a ‘moral’ obligation by allowing the United States to assume the ... cost of building the highway in Canadian territory,” Ashton’s worries should not “be allowed to overcome such a project.” As a result, when American diplomats met with a senior External Affairs official to inquire about the highway in October 1936, Counsellor Loring Christie, though he offered no official support, stated that Canadian military objections to the road merited no consideration.³⁷

Christie’s reluctance to discuss the highway’s security implications reflected his growing concern about the deteriorating global situation and American motives in seeking closer relations with Canada. When King travelled to Washington in March 1937 to encourage a re-elected Roosevelt to confront communism and fascism in an effort to prevent another war, Christie was skeptical.³⁸ Fervently opposed to Canadian participation in international collective security, Christie advised King in 1937 that relying upon America could render Canada an American protectorate.³⁹ Skelton agreed. Canada could not “escape being affected by developments elsewhere,” he admitted. But, he added, Canada was “still the most secure, the least exposed of all countries,” and it did not need American or British aid.⁴⁰ At the White House, Roosevelt told King that an Alaska Highway “would be of a great military advantage, in the event of trouble with Japan.” When King asserted that while some Canadians believed that America’s controversial Monroe Doctrine of 1823 protected them from extra-hemispheric threats, “no self-respecting [Canadian] Government could countenance any such view,” the president replied soothingly that “what we would like would be for Canada to have a few patrol boats on the Pacific Coast, and to see that her coast fortifications around Vancouver were of

a character to be effective there.” As King later told Armour in Ottawa, Roosevelt had discussed Canada’s security in such “a nice way and without in any way suggesting how Canada should handle her own affairs.”⁴¹ But if a pleased King sought in an undefined manner to bridge Anglo-American differences over the response to fascist and communist aggression, Skelton remarked caustically to a visiting American that a bridge was designed “to be walked on.”⁴²

Indeed, the tread of heavy boots resounded following Japan’s attack upon China in July 1937. Neither London nor Washington individually had the political will or military strength to re-establish the shifting balance of power in Asia. British overtures to Washington to mediate the conflict jointly were rejected by Roosevelt, who sought “cooperation on parallel but independent lines.”⁴³ And Roosevelt expected Canada to fall into line. As a result, when Ottawa declined to endorse Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s peace plan, J. Pierrepoint Moffat, assistant under-secretary of state for Western European affairs, had Armour browbeat Skelton to back the initiative.⁴⁴

More important, the crisis strengthened American interest in closer continental security relations, and in early August, the president told Hull that he wanted an Alaska Highway “as soon as possible.” When Hull reported that Canada had shown little inclination to discuss the matter, Armour suggested that a presidential visit to British Columbia would emphasize the “solidarity existing between our own northwest and the stretch of territory separating Alaska from the continental United States.”⁴⁵ Confident that a visit would influence opinion in the right quarters, Armour assured Moffat that Canada’s governor general, Lord Tweedsmuir, felt an Alaska Highway would have enormous strategic importance. Moffat was doubtful, fearful that the Canadians might misinterpret the stopover’s rationale.⁴⁶ Hull overruled his under-secretary and Roosevelt briefly stopped in Victoria on September 30 to give a short public address.⁴⁷

The visit, however, did not remove Canadian doubts about closer cooperation with Washington, and when Roosevelt asked for talks on an Alaskan highway in September, Ottawa was unsure how to react. Skelton was inclined to reject the request, pointing out that internal east-west communications ranked first. Christie was more diplomatic. Worried that the White House might resent a rejection and keen to keep the matter on an

“economic plane,” Christie suggested a joint feasibility study. If Washington insisted on paying, Christie cautioned that Canadian military objections “presumably would have to be considered.”⁴⁸

The American president had more than just Canada on his mind. In late July 1937, he had asked British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to come to Washington to discuss broad questions of global stability. Though the dire Asian events “justified our worst fears” and cordial relations with totalitarian states seemed unlikely, Chamberlain declined to meet any time soon.⁴⁹ Thus, in October, Roosevelt declared that “peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort” to quarantine countries seeking to foster international anarchy and instability. In response to critics, who worried that his plan could lead to a war with Japan, the president argued for a general peace treaty, not political and military sanctions⁵⁰ Historian James MacGregor Burns has argued that the speech was a trial balloon to test the public mood; when the mood proved “unheroic,” Roosevelt “pulled in his horns further.”⁵¹ When the League announced a nine-power conference in November to discuss China, the president told Hull, Welles, and his personal representative to the talks, Norman Davis, that if mediation of the Sino-Japanese conflict failed, he would consider further steps. Smarting from Chamberlain’s rejection, he told Davis in October that the United States would not lead against Japan as it could not “afford to be made, in popular opinion at home, a tail to the British kite.”⁵²

Against this uncertain background, Roosevelt saw greater security cooperation with Canada as a step towards meeting American goals in the Pacific. Buoyed by his Victoria trip, which he judged a great success, the president told Armour in September that he wanted coordinated defence plans “for that important section of territory lying between northern Washington [state] and the ‘panhandle’ of Alaska.” Describing British Columbia as defenceless, Roosevelt dismissed Armour’s rejoinder that Canada had begun to revamp its coast defences. Recalling Anglo-American naval cooperation in the North Pacific in 1917–18, he wanted a U.S. Navy officer to broach the subject in Ottawa. Armour suggested instead that King or his minister of national defence, Ian Mackenzie, meet with Roosevelt or Hull. Wisely, Armour consulted the influential under-secretary of state, Welles, who was doubtful. Like his two closest assistants, Moffat and Adolf Berle, Welles practised “Europhobic-Hemispherism” and opposed

speaking to Ottawa lest the United States find itself drawn into Britain's imperial affairs.⁵³

Welles' fears that Roosevelt might be using a Canadian back door to secure an alliance with Britain against Japan seemed justified by events in late 1937. While the nine-power conference failed to resolve the Sino-Japanese conflict, neither the United States nor Britain offended "one another over the crisis: a feat of diplomatic trust, full of hope for future cooperation."⁵⁴ In late November, a hopeful Chamberlain told British Ambassador Robert Lindsay to seek Anglo-American naval conversations and an overwhelming display of naval force in the Pacific. Welles declined to cooperate since the United States would have to provide the naval display.⁵⁵ Davis, an Anglophile who counted many friends among British diplomats, championed the view "that the existence of the British Empire is essential to the national security of the United States and that while we should not follow Great Britain nevertheless we should not allow the Empire to be endangered." This was a view that Moffat ridiculed, and when Davis grouched that Canada wanted to benefit from geography, imperial ties, and its friendship with the United States without assuming any responsibilities, Moffat declared "three cheers for Canada."⁵⁶ Even so, though he opposed Armour's renewed suggestions that King should use a planned vacation in Florida to meet with Roosevelt in December, Welles promised to raise the issue with the president despite his fear that Roosevelt might be seeking a dangerous British alliance through a back door.⁵⁷ While Armour agreed the matter should not be hurried, he told Welles that Canada's Colonel Harry Crerar had met United States Army Chief General Malin Craig in November. Thinking that this chat may have marked the "first move" towards the president's goal of closer defence cooperation with Canada, the American minister in Ottawa sent Welles news clippings about British Columbia's new fortifications. As Canada was finally awakening to the necessity of west coast defences, Armour thought this would be as good a time as any to initiate military conversations.⁵⁸

Japan's shocking sinking of the USS *Panay* on the Yangtze River and its attacks upon British ships in Chinese waters in early December 1937 generated a war scare. Britain, or so American diplomats reported, was anxious for a synchronized Anglo-American response. Berle believed that this request for synchronicity, so reminiscent of British manipulations during the

1915 *Lusitania* crisis, was Davis's doing, while Moffat assailed Britain for "treating us as their seventh dominion." When Lindsay broached the matter in mid-December, Welles preferred concurrent action. But Roosevelt overruled Welles and sent Captain Royal Ingersoll to London for direct naval talks with the Admiralty about possible joint action against Japan.

Meanwhile, on December 20, Welles forwarded Armour's letter of December 17, asking Roosevelt to "let me know what your desires may be." Ever cautious of the anti-British and isolationist lobby, Roosevelt insisted that "nothing ... be put in writing," but he finally invited King to visit Washington in January.⁵⁹ King declined, worried that his presence in the American capital might damage ongoing Anglo-American trade talks. A reluctance to act decisively typified the cautious King; as he told a British diplomat in 1938, "his experience of political life had taught him that any success he had attained had been due far more to avoiding action rather than taking action."⁶⁰ Armour explained Roosevelt's desires personally to King in early January 1938 but failed to change his mind. When the prime minister nervously offered a spring visit to the American capital, Armour countered that Canadian officers could begin security discussions with Craig and Admiral William Leahy immediately and "without any publicity." King agreed that such a discussion might be useful, but tempered his interest by adding that he "was merely thinking out loud."⁶¹

In early January, in what Armour called an extraordinary coincidence, Canadian newspapers discussed British Columbia's coastal defences, Anglo-American staff talks, and a possible Canada–United States west coast security scheme.⁶² Four days later, Skelton told Armour there was "much to be said for getting our defence programme on a realistic North American basis." Still, given his history of suspicion towards military planning, Skelton did not want "such discussions to take place solely between technical defence officials."⁶³ Ashton, who had sent officers to Washington in 1937 to study American military industrial mobilization plans, was cautious. He told his minister, Ian Mackenzie, that he wanted definite assurances that Roosevelt "would safeguard Canada's situation and would not force her into a serious situation." Having complained in 1937 about "the frequent difficulties experienced by this Department in the pursuit of its approved objectives through obstruction or, at least, lack of sympathetic action elsewhere," Ashton condemned the "ultra-isolationist" view

that Canada need not fight at Britain's side, a clear swipe at Skelton and Christie. That policy, Ashton asserted, comprised "an act of secession from the Commonwealth" while a defenceless Canada would obviously concern the United States. Crerar, whom Armour had suspected of starting this process with his November 1937 meeting with General Craig, thought that enhanced security cooperation with the United States would "knock the feet from under" subversive Canadians who opposed joint military initiatives sponsored by Britain.⁶⁴

A few days later, Armour indicated that two Canadian officers would be welcome in Washington to meet their American counterparts. Skelton, having apparently lost the fight (if there had been one) to send External Affairs officials with the military officers, insisted that Canada's legation in Washington must host the talks to ensure no "possibility of the slightest publicity."⁶⁵ There were other last minute complications. Prompted by the anglophile Canadian minister Herbert Marler, Commodore Percy Welles proposed inviting British military attachés in Washington to join the talks between the Canadian and American officers at the legation. Warning that he "could not receive the British Military Attaché," Craig balked and phoned Welles for guidance. Concerned that Canada was trying to bring Britain into the talks, a dangerous complication if the American press got wind of the matter, Welles ruled that only Craig and Leahy, not the Canadians, could provide American defence data to the British.⁶⁶ Lacking knowledge of potential topics, Ashton was authorized "to give and receive information, but to make no commitments." Possessing his own limited instructions, but willing to talk soldier to soldier, Craig discussed west coast defences generally before offering to defend Canada's west coast and asking if British Columbia's airfields could support American bombers. Stunned, Ashton sought to divert Craig by outlining scenarios facing Canada: an Anglo-Japanese war in Asia; British neutrality in an United States-Japan war in the north Pacific; and Canada joining an Anglo-American conflict against Japan. Craig thought only the third option was relevant and dropped his offer to focus on British Columbia airfields and coast defences.⁶⁷ The next day, while Craig feared considerable Japanese air attacks against the west coast, Leahy wished solely to meet Japan's fleet in the central Pacific. The Americans could offer no formal defence commitments, a statement the Canadians did not dispute.⁶⁸

Had the legation discussions progressed, it is doubtful that External Affairs or King would have welcomed even an informal alliance with Washington. In early 1937, after Escott Reid of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs suggested a Canada–United States military alliance, diplomat Hugh Keenleyside accused Reid of excessive rationality. Asserting that governments and peoples could not be expected to be “intelligent enough” to see logically the necessities of their situations, Keenleyside argued that practical politics ruled out any “serious and well-thought-out defensive agreement between Canada and the United States.”⁶⁹ Keenleyside had not misjudged the political situation in Ottawa. Having purchased two destroyers in January 1938 expressly to protect the vulnerable west coast, less than two months later King felt more strongly than ever “how inadequate are Canada’s defence forces, and how necessary it is for us to do something to preserve this country to future generations against nations that place all their reliance upon force.”⁷⁰

But King worried too about nations, including the United States, which seemed to place their reliance upon resisting force. In August 1938, worried by German aggressiveness, Roosevelt sought to send a very public message to Adolf Hitler. Taking advantage of a speech in Canada marking the opening of a bridge linking Ontario with New York State across the St. Lawrence River, the American president admitted that his nation could no longer say that “the eddies of controversy beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm.” He promised dramatically that “the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.”⁷¹ While Roosevelt claimed that what he had said “was so obvious that I cannot understand why some American President did not say it half a century ago” and Canada’s media praised the Monroe Doctrine’s northern extension,⁷² King was concerned. The prime minister judged Roosevelt’s comments most significant, and he said publicly a few days later that his government was “putting our own means of defence in order” to make Canada “as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably expect to make it.” During the Munich Crisis, a shaken King advised his Cabinet that if Britain was “worsted in a world struggle, the only future for Canada would be absorption by the U.S., if we are to be saved from an enemy aggressor.”⁷³

Indeed, until he expressly sought military talks with the United States as France collapsed in June 1940, King showed little enthusiasm for any of Roosevelt's security-related schemes. Present in Washington in late 1938 when Roosevelt suggested producing 50,000 warplanes for the United States and western democracies, King declined to commit his nation to the president's plan to build planes in Canadian-based factories. Similarly, during the long summer of 1939, with war clearly on the horizon, King remained cagey. When Roosevelt mused that the U.S. Navy might need access to Halifax's harbour, the Canadian said that access would depend on unspecified "developments." When a deal was finally struck in late August to allow the American military vessels to use Halifax, King insisted that use must not interfere with Canadian naval activities.⁷⁴ Continental security only reigned once the August 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement created the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. King took the lead, calling in the new American minister to Canada, J. Pierrepoint Moffat, in June 1940, to suggest bilateral military staff talks. The prime minister also used Christie, now Canada's minister in Washington, to inform Roosevelt of his new willingness to do more. Thus, it was unsurprising when Roosevelt asked King in August to meet him in Ogdensburg, New York, to consider "the mutual defence of our coasts on the Atlantic."⁷⁵ King happily signed on when Roosevelt presented him with a short proposal to create a Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) that would formulate continental defence plans for the two governments to consider. According to American Secretary of War Henry Stimson a relieved King signed the pact "almost with tears in his eyes."⁷⁶

Conspicuously absent from the Ogdensburg meeting was Skelton. King, instead, took Moffat with him, a choice King apparently did not see fit to explain or justify even in the privacy of his diary. If Skelton's pride suffered any injury, it did not show. Indeed, he called the PJBD's creation "the best day's work for many a year" and a result of "the inevitable sequence of public policies and personal relationships, based upon the realization of the imperative necessity of close understanding between the English-speaking peoples."⁷⁷ Furthermore, both Skelton and Keenleyside, as early as June 1940, had warned King that if the strategic situation worsened – Skelton especially feared that Japan might enter the war on Germany's side – Canada would have no choice but to seek American military assistance.

According to Keenleyside, the United States might simply demand that Canada accept a bilateral continental defence arrangement.⁷⁸

Theoretical impediments to cooperation ended when the United States entered the Second World War in December 1941. Canada's dual problem then, as Norman Robertson, Keenleyside, and Reid pointed out in 1941–42, was to prevent American domination of the Allied war effort and ensure that Canada's interests were protected. As Reid put it, there was no sense in "being indignant about what the United States was doing" for Canadians "were being treated as children because we have refused to behave as adults" in foreign affairs. Reid wanted to bolster the legation in Washington, have Canadian officials meet senior State Department officials regularly, separate the posts of prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs, and make "the construction of an effective collective system the main goal of our policy."⁷⁹ Reid was right in 1942. However, his judgment of External Affairs' stand on security cooperation with the United States in the 1930s was unnecessarily harsh. The department's hesitations carefully sought to balance its national security interests and its independent scope to manoeuvre while retaining a circumspect view of a powerful United States. Given Roosevelt's sustained interest in closer bilateral ties and the strong opposition of the Department of National Defence to closer ties with the United States, this was not an easy task.

NOTES

- 1 Galen Roger Perras and Katrina E. Kellner, "A perfectly logical and sensible thing: Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance against Japan," *Journal of Military History* 72 (July 2008): 801.
- 2 W.L.M. King Diary, 9 May 1927, W.L.M. King Papers, Library and Archives Canada (LAC); Vincent Massey, *What's Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), 138; John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, vol. 1: *The Early Years, 1909–1946* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 117–18. King's terse rejection of Massey's idea has been described as "unusually vehement"; see C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, vol. 2: *1921–1948: The Mackenzie King Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 226.
- 3 Adjutant General to Chief Air Corps, "Alaskan Flight," 15 May 1934, Records of the Army Air Corps (RAAC), box 706, file 373, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Japan's threat to Alaska is discussed in Galen Roger Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867–1945* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
- 4 "Impressions of Canadian Defence Policy – December 1934 by Sir Maurice Hankey," 1 January 1935, Maurice Hankey Papers, CAB63/8, The National Archives, Kew, England [TNA]. A.G.L. McNaughton to Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, "Sino-Japanese Dispute. Possible Canadian Commitments in Respect to the Maintenance of Neutrality," 24 January 1933, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, vol. 5: *1931–1935*, ed. Alex I. Inglis (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), 343–46.
- 5 Deputy Minister (DND) L.R. LaFleche to Skelton, 9 June 1934, Department of External Affairs Records (DEAR), vol. 1684, file 53-AB, LAC.
- 6 Brigadier J. Sutherland Brown to Colonel W.W. Foster, 31 December 1932, J. Sutherland Brown Papers, Queen's University Archives (QUA).
- 7 Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), chap. 8; W.L.M. King Diary, 7 August 1930, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC.
- 8 H. Blair Neatby, *William Lyon Mackenzie King*, vol. 3, *1932–1939: The Prism of Unity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 134–35.
- 9 Skelton cited in Norman Hillmer, "The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O.D. Skelton," in *Britain and Canada: A Survey of a Changing Relationship*, ed. Peter Lyon (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 76; Pierre de la Boal to John D. Hickerson, 23 June 1934, Department of State Records (hereafter RG 59), Decimal File 1930–39, file 811.2342/460, NARA.
- 10 Skelton to LaFleche, 12 & 13 June 1934, DEAR, vol. 1684, file 53-AB, LAC; Skelton to Warren Robbins, no. 59, 14 June 1934, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-30, file 811.2342/425, NARA; Boal to Robbins, "Projected good will flight from the United States to Alaska," 15 June 1934, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 811.2342/460, NARA.
- 11 Skelton to Bennett, "United States' Request re Flight to Alaska," 15 June 1934; McNaughton to Bennett, 15 June 1934; Bennett to Robbins, 18 June 1934, DEAR, vol. 1684, file 53-AB, LAC.
- 12 "Army to make mass flight from the United States to Alaska," *Washington Herald*, 21 June 1934; Robbins to Hull, "Projected Washington-Alaska Flight," 22 June 1934, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 811.2342/431, NARA.
- 13 Harold M. Collins, "Visit of United States Army Bombing Squadron," 28 July 1934, RG 18, Entry 166, box 705, file 373, NARA; Colonel H.H. Arnold, "Report on

- the Alaskan Flight," October 1934, RG 18, Entry 166, box 705, file 373, NARA.
- 14 McNaughton to General A.A. Montgomery-Massingberd, 31 July 1934, Ian Mackenzie Papers, vol. 30, file X-28, LAC.
 - 15 Wrong quoted in J.L. Granatstein, "Hume Wrong's Road to the Functional Principle," in *Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord*, ed. Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press), 63; Wrong to Bennett, no. 956, 27 September 1934, R.B. Bennett Papers, reel M-1028, vol. 281, file U-110 1934, LAC.
 - 16 Testimony by C.E. Kilbourne, H.L. George, F.M. Andrews, and J.D. Reardan, 11–12 February 1935, *Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 6621 and H.R. 4130, 11–13 February 1935* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1935), 7–8, 16–17, 51–52, 60–61, 72.
 - 17 Drum Board Report, 11 October 1934, War Plans Division Records, Entry 281, RG 165, file WPD888, NARA; WPD, "Suggestions for the Secret Annex" (Baker Board Report), 5 July 1934, Entry 281, RG 165, file 3828, NARA; "Preliminary Report of the Board of Officers on Airdrome Requirements of the GHQ Air Force," 5 November 1934, Entry 281, RG 165, file 3809, NARA; Rear Admiral E.J. King to Clark Howell, 13 December 1934, Ernest J. King Papers, box 5, file Correspondence 1936–38, Library of Congress (LC); Commander H.H. Frost, "Blue Strategy Against a Coalition of Great Powers," May 1932, Strategic Plans Division Records, box 39, File Blue [United States] Strategy, Naval Historical Center (NHC). George to Mitchell, 4 April 1934, Mitchell Papers, box 19, file General Correspondence 1934, LC; George added "IT IS NOT FANTASTICAL OR VISIONARY EITHER" to expect a multinational coalition attack upon America, including attacks from Canadian bases.
 - 18 "Air Bill Provides Secret Base Near Canada to Protect Lakes," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1935; "The Good Neighbor?" *Washington Post*, 2 May 1935; J.J. McSwain to Roosevelt, 1 May 1935, J.J. McSwain Papers, box 11, file correspondence 1935: April 22–Aug., Duke University Archives (DUA).
 - 19 Phillips was "more angry than [Wrong] had ever seen him before"; see Wrong to Bennett, no. 515, 29 April 1935, DEAR, vol. 1746, file 408, LAC; Roosevelt to McSwain, 29 April 1935, McSwain Papers, box 11, file Correspondence 1935: April 22–Aug., DUA; George Dern to Roosevelt, 30 April 1935, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 811.248/80-1/2, NARA.
 - 20 "A Well Merited Rebuke," *New York Herald*, 2 May 1935; Boal to Hull, no. 1241, 2 May 1935, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 811.248/77, NARA; "U.S. Air Base Near Canadian Border is Aim," *Ottawa Morning Journal*, 29 April 1935; "Seizing British Islands," *Manchester Guardian*, 29 April 1935; "U.S. Air Base Plan Near Border," *London Daily Telegraph*, 30 April 1935.
 - 21 Boal to William Phillips, 30 April 1935, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 811.248/80-1/2, NARA; Boal to Hull, no. 1246 plus Enclosure No. 1, 2 May 1935, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 811/248/80, NARA.
 - 22 McNaughton, "The Defence of Canada (A Review of the Present Position)," 5 April 1935, DEAR, vol. 1747, file 469, LAC; McNaughton to Bennett, April 1935, file 014.014, Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence (DHH).
 - 23 McNaughton, "Canada and the United States Security against Air Attack," 29 April 1935, DEAR, vol. 744, file 172, LAC; McNaughton, "The Defence of Canada (A Review of the Present Position)," 28 May 1935, file 74/256, DHH.
 - 24 Mitchell, "Report on Inspection of United States Possessions in the Pacific and Java, Singapore, India, Siam, China, and Japan," 24 October 1924, Mitchell Papers, United States Air Force Archives.
 - 25 Wrong to Skelton, 4 May 1935, DEAR, vol. 1726, file 26-u, LAC; Roosevelt and Wrong cited in Stacey, *Canada and the Age*

- of Conflict*, vol. 2: 1921–1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 154.
- 26 Wrong, “What has the Good Neighbour Policy Accomplished in the Case of Canada?” 6 July 1935, Hume Wrong Papers, vol. 1, file 2, LAC.
 - 27 Robbins to Roosevelt, 18 December 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President’s Secretary Files (PSF), file Diplomatic Correspondence Canada: 1933–35, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL).
 - 28 Armour to Phillips, 22 October 1935, and Armour memorandum, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, file Diplomatic Correspondence Canada: 1930–35, FDRL.
 - 29 W.L.M. King Diary, 24 and 25 October 1935, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC; King to Roosevelt, 25 November 1935, W.L.M. King Papers, Correspondence, reel C2313, 181549-50 LAC.
 - 30 Wrong to King, no. 1293, 14 December 1935, W.L.M. King Papers, Correspondence, reel C3685, 183253-54, LAC.
 - 31 Sumner Welles memorandum, 14 June 1933, Welles Papers, box 149, file Roosevelt 1934, FDRL; Roosevelt to Norman Davis and Davis to Roosevelt, 9 and 27 November 1934, in Edgar B. Nixon, ed. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, vol. 2: *March 1934–August 1935* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 263, 291.
 - 32 “Address on the Occasion of a Visit to Quebec, by President Roosevelt, July 31, 1936,” W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, reel C4279, C141959-64, LAC.
 - 33 W.L.M. King Diary, 31 July 1936, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC; “Militia and Air Force Confidential Intelligence Summary Volume XIV. Serial No. 3/36,” 30 June 1936, file 112.3M1023 (D23), DHH.
 - 34 W.L.M. King Diary, 5 August 1936, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC.
 - 35 Alaska Road Commission, “The Proposed Pacific Yukon Highway,” 1 April 1931, Herbert Hoover Presidential Papers, box 172, file Highways, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library (HHL).
 - 36 McNaughton to Montgomery-Massingberd, 31 January 1935, Department of National Defence Records (DNDR), reel C4975, file HQS3367, LAC; Canadian General Staff, “USA–Alaska Highway, via British Columbia & Yukon,” 24 August 1935, DEAR, vol. 1739, file 221, pt. 1, LAC; E.C. Ashton to Skelton, 14 September 1935, in *DCER*, vol. 5, 267.
 - 37 Skelton to Ashton, 14 September 1935, in *DCER*, vol. 5, 267; Ely Palmer memorandum, 19 October 1936, Department of State Diplomatic Post Records (hereafter RG 84), Canada, Entry 2195A, file 815.4 Alaska Highway, NARA.
 - 38 W.L.M. King Diary, 24 January 1937, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC.
 - 39 Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, vol. 2, 6–7; J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), 64–73.
 - 40 Loring Christie, “Re: Monroe Doctrine,” 16 February 1937, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, vol. 6: 1936–1939, ed. John H. Munro (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1972), 177; Skelton to King, February 1937, O.D. Skelton Papers, vol. 27, file 9, LAC.
 - 41 W.L.M. King Diary, 5 March 1937, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC; Armour memorandum, 22 March 1937, RG 84, Entry 2195A, file 800, NARA.
 - 42 Skelton cited in Helen Moorhead to Raymond L. Buell, 22 March 1937, Raymond L. Buell Papers, box 10, file Moorhead, Helen Howard, LC.
 - 43 Greg Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East 1933–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 232; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1933–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 147.
 - 44 John D. Meehan, “Steering Clear of Britain: Canada’s Debate over Collective Security in the Far Eastern Crisis of 1937,” *International History Review* 25 (June 2003): 253–81; J. Pierrepont Moffat Diary, 12 August 1937, J. Pierrepont Moffat

- Papers, vol. 39, Houghton Library, Harvard University [HL].
- 45 Roosevelt to Hull, 4 August 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, box 73, file Hull, Cordell 1933–37, FDRL; Hull to Roosevelt, August 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, box 73, file Hull, Cordell 1933–37, FDRL.
 - 46 Armour to Moffat, 2 September 1937, RG 84, box 35, file 800.1 1937 Chief Executive, NARA; Armour to Moffat, 10 September 1937, Moffat Papers, vol. 12, HL; Moffat to Armour, 14 September 1937, RG 84, box 35, file 800.1 1937 Chief Executive, NARA.
 - 47 Hull to Marvin McIntyre, 13 September 1937, Roosevelt OF, box 36, file OF200-ss Alaska and British Columbia, FDRL; Armour, “Telephone Conversation,” 16 September 1937, RG 84, box 35, file 800.1 1937 Chief Executive, NARA.
 - 48 Armour to Skelton, no. 564, 14 September 1937, DEAR, vol. 1739, file 221, LAC; Skelton to Christie, 16 September 1937, DEAR, vol. 1739, file 221, LAC; Christie memorandum, 12 November 1937, DEAR, vol. 1739, file 221, LAC.
 - 49 Roosevelt to Chamberlain, 28 July 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, file Great Britain 1937–38, FDRL; Chamberlain to Roosevelt, 28 September 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, file Great Britain 1937–38, FDRL.
 - 50 Roosevelt cited in Dallek, *Franklin Roosevelt*, 148; Roosevelt, “Quarantine Address,” 5 October 1937, in *An American Primer*, ed. Daniel J. Boorstin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 847–52; John E. Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1931–1941* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), 63.
 - 51 James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), 318–19.
 - 52 Roosevelt cited in Dallek, *Franklin Roosevelt*, 149–51; Roosevelt, “Notes of Conversation with Norman H. Davis,” 19 October 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, file State Department Norman Davis, FDRL.
 - 53 John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 60.
 - 54 Kennedy, *Anglo-American Relations and the Far East*, 238.
 - 55 Welles memorandum of conversation with Lindsay, 27 November 1937, Welles Papers, box 162, file Great Britain 1936–1937, FDRL.
 - 56 Lawrence Pratt, “The Anglo-American Conversations on the Far East of January 1938,” *International Affairs* 47 (October 1971): 749; J. Pierrepont Moffat Diary, 10 & 13 November 1937, Moffat Papers, vol. 39, HL.
 - 57 Armour’s idea to build upon existing west coast military arrangements came from Robert Hale, a U.S. legation clerk in Ottawa. Robert Hale memorandum, 17 November 1937, Welles Papers, box 161, file Canada, FDRL.
 - 58 Armour to Welles, 10 December 1937, Welles Papers, box 161, file Canada, FDRL; Armour to Welles, 17 December 1937, Welles Papers, box 149, file Roosevelt 1937, FDRL.
 - 59 U.S. Embassy London to Hull, no. 772, 13 December 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, file Great Britain, FDRL; Diary, 30 November 1937, box 210, FDRL; J. Pierrepont Moffat Diary, 13 December 1937, Moffat Papers, vol. 39, HL; Welles memorandum of conversation with Lindsay, 15 December 1937, Welles Papers, box 162, file Great Britain 1936–1937, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, 20 December 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, box 70, file State: 1937, FDRL; Roosevelt to Welles, 22 December 1937, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, box 70, file State: 1937, FDRL; Roosevelt to King, 21 December 1937, King Papers, Correspondence, reel C3729, LAC.
 - 60 King to Roosevelt, 30 December 1937, King Papers, Correspondence, reel C3729, LAC; F.L.C. Floud to Harry Batterbee, 24 May 1938, Dominions Office Records, DO35/586, TNA.

- 61 Armour to Welles, 8 January 1938, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-39, file 842.20/68, NARA.
- 62 Armour to Welles, 6 January 1938, Welles Papers, box 44, file 13, FDRL; "Canadian Defence Weakness 'Menace' to U.S. Security," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 January 1938; "Joint Coastal Defense Plan Envisaged," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 6 January 1938; "Defence Co-operation between Britain, U.S. Suggested in London," *Toronto Daily Star*, 6 January 1938.
- 63 Skelton, "Conversations on West Coast Defence," 10 January 1938, DEAR, vol. 2959, file B-80, LAC.
- 64 Ashton to Mackenzie, "The Defence of Canada: A Survey of Militia Requirements," 10 January 1938, file 114.1 D11, DHH; Ashton to Mackenzie, "Observations on Canada's Defence Policy," 14 October 1937, file 112.3M2009 (D27), DHH; Ashton to Crerar, 29 November 1937, DNDR, vol. 2448, file HQC631-52-1, LAC; Crerar to Col. W.W.T. Torr, 13 January 1938, file 000.8 (D3), DHH.
- 65 Skelton to Herbert Marler, 14 January 1938, DEAR, vol. 2453, file Visits of General Ashton, LAC.
- 66 Percy W. Nelles to MacKenzie, "Conversations held in Washington DC, on the 19th and 20th January 1938," 22 January 1938, W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda & Notes, vol. 157, file F1411, LAC; Royal Air Force Attaché C.G. Pirie, Memorandum, 22 January 1938, Foreign Office Records, FO371/22107, TNA; Gregory Allan Johnson, *North Pacific Triangle? The Impact of the Far East on Canada and Its Relations with the United States and Great Britain, 1937-1948* (PhD diss., York University, 1989), 113-14.
- 67 Ashton to Mackenzie, "Conversations held in Washington DC, on the 19th and 20th January 1938," 22 January 1938, file 112.3M2009 (D22), DHH.
- 68 Nelles to Mackenzie, "Conversations held in Washington DC, on the 19th and 20th January 1938," 22 January 1938, W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda & Notes, vol. 157, file F1411, LAC.
- 69 Hugh L. Keenleyside to Escott Reid, 14 May 1937, Escott Reid Papers, vol. 34, file Keenleyside, Hugh L., LAC.
- 70 W.L.M. King Diary, 11 January 1938, King Papers, LAC; Armour to Hull, no. 1938, "Growing consciousness in Canada for need of defense," 13 January 1938, RG 59, Decimal File 1930-1939, file 842.20/68, NARA; W.L.M. King Diary, 12 March 1938, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC.
- 71 Roosevelt, "Reciprocity in Defense," 18 August 1938, Skelton Papers, vol. 5, file 5-6, LAC.
- 72 Roosevelt to Tweedsmuir, 31 August 1938, John Buchan Papers, box 10, file Correspondence July-August 1938, QUA; "The New 'Roosevelt Doctrine,'" *Montreal Daily Star*, 18 August 1938; "Monroe to Roosevelt," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 20 August 1938.
- 73 W.L.M. King Diary, 18 & 25 August and 27 September 1938, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC.
- 74 Galen Roger Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance: Necessary But Not Necessary Enough* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 51-52.
- 75 *Ibid.*, 72-76; W.L.M. King Diary, 16 August 1940, W.L.M. King Papers, LAC.
- 76 Henry J. Stimson Diary, 17 August 1940, Henry J. Stimson Papers, vol. 30, Yale University Library.
- 77 Skelton to King, 19 August 1940, King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, reel H1516, C220892-94, LAC.
- 78 Skelton to King, no. 274, 1 July 1940, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations: 1939-1941*, part II, vol. 8, ed. David R. Murray (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976), 449-50; Keenleyside to King, "An Outline Synopsis for a Reconsideration of Canadian External Policy with Particular Reference to the United States," 17 June 1940, DEAR, vol. 781, file 394, LAC.

- 79 Escott Reid, "The United States and Canada: Domination, Co-operation, Absorption," 12 January 1942, Escott Reid Papers, vol. 13, file U.S. and Canada, LAC. See also Norman Robertson to King, 22 December 1941, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, vol. 9: 1942-1943, ed. John F. Hilliker (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1980), 1125-31; Hugh Keenleyside, "Recent Trends in United States-Canada Relations," 27 December 1941, DEAR, vol. 5758, file 71(s), LAC.

